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bruegelpolicybrief ISSUE 2012/02 SEPTEMBER 2012 FISCAL RULES: TIMING IS EVERYTHING by Benedicta Marzinotto THE ISSUE The strengthening of the European Union’s fiscal rules with the Research Fellow at Bruegel approval of the so-called ‘six-pack’, and the parallel worsening of economic [email protected] and André Sapir conditions in Europe, re-opened the debate about the relationship between Senior Fellow at Bruegel fiscal discipline and growth. Influential voices have argued against the EU’s [email protected] perceived obsession with fiscal discipline, which risks being self-defeating in bad times. However, EU fiscal rules are not as rigid as commonly thought, but represent a sophisticated system of surveillance and ex-post control that provides sufficient room for manoeuvre under exceptional circumstances. POLICY CHALLENGE The EU fiscal framework has come under attack more because of the timing of the application of the new rules than for substantive reasons. The frame- work entered into force when most euro-area countries were under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Linked to this is the fact that the six-pack sug- gests that the new surveillance procedure enters into force after EU coun- tries have corrected nominal fiscal deficits. We argue that: a) fiscal surveillance should be prioritised over enforcement of sanctions for exces- sive deficits; b) it is inconsistent to allow for exceptional circumstances, while not recognising up-front the role of surveillance; c) there is scope to decide that slow growth at member state level and EU levels acts as a con- straint on fiscal consolidation: it should be done ex ante in a way that allows governments to use the Commission’s forecasts in their Stability Pro- grammes, and must be decided by the Commission and not by the Council. Time inconsistency in the application of the new SGP rules 2012 → 2013 → 2014 onwards Potential sanctions under Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, All countries Preventive Arm Germany, Luxembourg Potential sanctions under Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Austria, France, Greece, Ireland, All countries Corrective Arm Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Slovenia, Spain Spain Source: Bruegel. FISCAL RULES: TIMING IS EVERYTHING THE TIGHTENING OF EUROPEAN ity, and are a useful contribution to laid down in the six-pack, the set of 02 UNION FISCAL RULES through the the functioning of European mone- six regulations that entered into Fiscal Compact, which was signed tary union. It would be a shame if force on 13 December 2011, and in March 2012, and through the so- the credibility of the rules were to which form the backbone of the called six-pack regulations that be undermined because of the Fiscal Compact. Both the six-pack brief entered into force in December timing of their introduction. and the Fiscal Compact aim to 2011, comes at a time of strengthen fiscal surveillance and worsening economic conditions in Policymakers need to take this improve enforcement by granting Europe. This unfortunate timing into account. In the current the European Commission powers policy has re-opened the debate about economic situation – with slow to impose sanctions on countries the relationship between fiscal growth and high unemployment in that have failed to make sufficient discipline and growth, and has many euro-area countries – it is progress towards more sustain- provoked a wave of criticism from important that the room for able (structural) fiscal positions governments and academics manoeuvre provided by the and/or to correct excessive bruegel about the EU’s perceived Treaties and the new six-pa ck is deficits. The six-pack introduces obsession with fiscal discipline, fully exploited, possibly with some rules both in the preventive and and the potential in bad times for minor corrections to the process. the corrective arms of the Stability this to be self-defeating1. For the first test of the new rules to and Growth Pact (SGP). be negotiated successfully, timing It is certainly the case that the is everything. On 23 November 2011, the Com- new, tougher rules on excessive mission made two additional regu- deficits have been introduced at a For a smoother transition from the latory proposals, known as the time of exceptional circum- old to the new regime, we suggest two-pack, which introduce stances, which will severely test a simple rule that will allow a enhanced monitoring of euro-area the new system. When the new 'smart' application of the six-pack countries that risk non-compli- rules entered into force, 14 of the provisions without undermining ance with the deficit criterion, and 17 euro-area countries (ie all them. We start in the next section more clearly-defined surveillance except Estonia, Finland and Lux- by outlining the main features of and monitoring of countries receiv- embourg) were under the Exces- the new fiscal framework. In the ing financial assistance. sive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and third section, we discuss the size were committed to bringing their of the required correction, the rele- The preventive arm deficits to below 3 percent of GDP vance of arguments about its by 2012 (Belgium and Cyprus) or potentially self-defeating nature, The preventive arm of the SGP 2013 (12 others)2. Yet EDP coun- and the notion of ‘exceptional cir- invites member states to achieve a tries face low or even negative cumstances’. We conclude in the balanced budget in the medium growth prospects especially for final section with suggestions to term. The ‘balanced budget’ provi- 2012, as acknowledged by the ameliorate the risks that might sion has been there since the very 1. See, for example, the Commission3. Thus, they could arise because of the timing of the first version of the Stability Pact, Vox Debate 'Has face sanctions for excessive first application of the rules. but deviations have never been austerity gone too far?', deficits, whether in 2013 or a year sanctioned. Under the six-pack available at http://www.voxeu.org/d later as recently decided for Spain, THE NEW RULES EXPLAINED provisions, they will be. ebates/has-austerity- even before the EU is able to use gone-too-far. its new surveillance tools to moni- The Fiscal Compact (a part of the The structural balance 2. Exceptions are made tor structural fiscal positions. Treaty on Stability, Coordination for countries under programme (ie Greece, and Governance – TSCG) will be an The preventive arm of the SGP is Ireland and Portugal), But the debate about timing important addition to the EU's fis- concerned with surveillance and whose commitments should not be allowed to detract cal architecture. It will enter into early detection and correction of are defined in their respective adjustment from a measured analysis of the force when at least 12 euro-area unbalanced fiscal positions. As programmes. new framework. In fact, the EU fis- countries have ratified it, which deficit levels may be affected by 3. European cal rules are well designed, offer could happen in early 2013. In the unfavourable growth conditions, Commission (2012b). an often-underestimated flexibil- meantime the EU fiscal rules are rather than signalling discre- FISCAL RULES: TIMING IS EVERYTHING tionary measures that are exces- respect to the 3 percent target. other countries after they have sively expansionary, the fiscal Table 1 sets out the MTOs and corrected their excessive deficits 03 aggregate that is used for the sur- sanctions contained in the SGP and formally exited the EDP. This veillance exercise is the so-called and six-pack7. implies that, for most countries, medium-term budgetary objective the new regime and the ensuing (MTO), which is a country’s cycli- Deviations from MTOs are allowed. sanctions on medium-term com- brief cally adjusted (or structural) budg- They are accepted if a country has mitments will be enforced from etary position net of one-off and implemented structural reforms 2014, by which time it will pre- temporary measures. This aggre- (eg pension reform) that may be sumably be strengthened by the gate is typically assessed over the costly in the short-term but con- Fiscal Compact (Table 2 on the policy medium-term (ie about three tribute to debt sustainability. Devi- next page). years, the typical time horizon of ations are also allowed if they Stability and Convergence Pro- result from “an unusual event out- Box 1 describes the main features grammes)4. The reference value for side the control of the Member of the TSCG Treaty, of which the Fis- bruegel the MTO is a structural balance but, State concerned... or in case of cal Compact is a part, and the in reality, each country has the severe economic downturn for the extent to which it adds to the six- freedom to pick its own MTO follow- euro area or the Union as a pack rules. The Fiscal Compact ing a commonly agreed measure- whole”8. This is a further novelty recognises the importance of the ment methodology, provided the from the six-pack, namely the structural balance, above and target does not exceed a deficit of appreciation of aggregate circum- beyond deficit levels. However, the 4. Stability and Conver- 1 percent of GDP5. stances, on top of country-specific commitment of the contracting gence Programmes are medium-term fiscal exceptional circumstances. The parties to include a debt brake rule plans which euro-area MTOs have always been central to provision addresses the problem either in their constitutions or via a countries and countries that are preparing for the exercise of fiscal surveillance of possible negative growth spirals similarly binding regulation, risks accession respectively under the SGP. The original text of when all countries reduce public making the system more rigid at need to submit to the 1997 already called on EU consumption in bad aggregate home than what it really is at EU EU in the Spring every year in the framework 9 countries to adhere to “the conditions .