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Home , Ben Kiernan, Cambodia, Cambodian genocide, Cambodia (1953–1970), Vietnam

the walrus 2006

History Bombs Over New information reveals that Cambodia was bombed far more heavily during the War than previously believed — and that the bombing began not under , but under Lyndon Johnson story by Taylor Owen and mapping by Taylor Owen US Air Force bombers like this B-52, shown releasing its payload over Vietnam, helped make Cambodia one of the most heavily bombed countries in history — perhaps the most heavily bombed.

In the fall of 2000, twenty-five years after the end of the war in Indochina, more ordnance on Cambodia than was previously believed: 2,756,941 Bill Clinton became the first US president since Richard Nixon to visit tons’ worth, dropped in 230,516 sorties on 113,716 sites. Just over 10 per- Vietnam. While media coverage of the trip was dominated by talk of cent of this bombing was indiscriminate, with 3,580 of the sites listed as some two thousand US soldiers still classified as missing in action, a having “unknown” targets and another 8,238 sites having no target listed small act of great historical importance went almost unnoticed. As a - at all. The database also shows that the bombing began four years earlier manitarian gesture, Clinton released extensive Air Force data on all Amer- than is widely believed — not under Nixon, but under Lyndon Johnson. ican bombings of Indochina between 1964 and 1975. Recorded using a The impact of this bombing, the subject of much debate for the past groundbreaking ibm-designed system, the database provided extensive three decades, is now clearer than ever. Civilian casualties in Cambo- information on sorties conducted over Vietnam, , and Cambodia. dia drove an enraged populace into the arms of an that Clinton’s gift was intended to assist in the search for unexploded ord- had enjoyed relatively little support until the bombing began, setting nance left behind during the carpet bombing of the region. Littering the in motion the expansion of the deeper into Cambodia, a countryside, often submerged under farmland, this ordnance remains coup d’état in 1970, the rapid rise of the Rouge, and ultimately a significant humanitarian concern. It has maimed and killed farmers, the Cambodian . and rendered valuable land all but unusable. Development and demin- The data demonstrates that the way a country chooses to exit a conflict ing organizations have put the Air Force data to good use over the past can have disastrous consequences. It therefore speaks to contempor­ six years, but have done so without noting its full implications, which ary warfare as well, including US operations in . Despite many dif- turn out to be staggering. ferences, a critical similarity links the war in Iraq with the Cambodian The still-incomplete database (it has several “dark” periods) reveals that conflict: an increasing reliance on air power to battle a heterogeneous, from October 4, 1965, to 15, 1973, the dropped far volatile insurgency. see story on page 66.

62 photograph by us air force/getty images 63 the walrus Bombs Over Cambodia

laos

cambodia

Phnom Penh

vietnam

Sites bombed by the us air force in cambodia, 1965–1973

< 113,716 sites < 230,516 sorties < 2,756,941 tons of ordnance

64 65 the walrus Bombs Over Cambodia 20,000 To put 2,756,941 tons into perspective, the Allies dropped just over 2 million tons of bombs during — tons of ordnance all of War II. Cambodia may be the most heavily bombed country in history.The 16,000 dark perios

he US bombing of Cambodia re- they would keep enemy forces at bay revealed by the database, the number 12,000 Tmains a divisive and iconic topic. It long enough to allow the United States of casualties is surely higher. was a mobilizing issue for the antiwar to withdraw from Vietnam. Former US The Cambodian bombing campaign 8,000 movement and is still cited regularly General Theodore Mataxis depicted had two unintended side effects that as an example of American war crimes. the move as “a holding action . . . . The ultimately combined to produce the Writers such as Noam Chomsky, Chris- troika’s going down the road and the very domino effect that the Vietnam 4,000 topher Hitchens, and William Shaw- wolves are closing in, and so you throw War was supposed to prevent. First, no cross emerged as influential political them something off and let them chew the bombing forced the Vietnam- data 0 voices after condemning the bombing it.” The result was that Cambodians ese Communists deeper and deep- and the foreign policy it symbolized. essentially became cannon fodder to er into Cambodia, bringing them into jan-70 apr-70 jul-70 oct-70 jan-71 apr-71 jul-71 oct-71 jan-72 apr-72 jul-72 oct-72 jan-73 apr-73 jul-73 In the years since the Vietnam War, protect American lives. greater contact with in- total us ordnance dropped on cambodia, jan. 1, 197o–aug. 15, 1973 something of a consensus has emerged The last phase of the bombing, from surgents. Second, the bombs drove or- The Air Force database reveals that beginning on 1, 1970, bombing escalated from less than one ton on the extent of US involvement in February to , was designed dinary Cambodians into the arms of per day to hundreds and sometimes tens of thousands of tons per day. Cambodia. The details are controversial, to stop the Khmer Rouge’s advance on the Khmer Rouge, a group that seemed but the narrative begins on , the Cambodian capital, . initially to have slim prospects of revo- We heard a terrifying noise which shook the demanded more bombing, deeper in- “The problem is, Mr. President, the Air 1969, when the United States launched The United States, fearing that the first lutionary success. himself de- ground; it was as if the earth trembled, to the country: “They have got to go in Force is designed to fight an air battle the Menu campaign. The joint US– Asian domino was about to scribed the Khmer Rouge during that up and opened beneath our feet. Enormous there and I mean really go in . . . I want against the . They are not ground offensive fol- fall, began a massive escalation of the explosions lit up the sky like huge bolts everything that can fly to go in there designed for this war . . . in fact, they are lowed. For the next three years, the air war — an unprecedented B-52 bom- of lightning; it was the American B-52s. and crack the hell out of them. There not designed for any war we are likely United States continued with air strikes bardment that focused on the heavily — Cambodian bombing survivor is no limitation on mileage and there is to have to fight.” under Nixon’s orders, hitting deep in- populated around Phnom Penh no limitation on budget. Is that clear? ” Five minutes after his conversation side Cambodia’s borders, first to but left few regions of the country un- n December 9, 1970, US Presi­ Kissinger knew that this order ig- with Nixon ended, Kissinger called out the vc/nva and later to protect the touched. The extent of this bombard- dent Richard Nixon telephoned nored Nixon’s promise to Congress General Alexander Haig to relay the regime from growing num- ment has only now come to light. his national-security adviser, that US planes would remain with- new orders from the president: “He bers of Cambodian Communist forces. The data released by Clinton shows OHenry Kissinger, to discuss the ongoing in thirty kilometres of the Vietnam- wants a massive bombing campaign Congress cut funding for the war and the total payload dropped during these bombing of Cambodia. This sideshow ese border, his own assurances to the in Cambodia. He doesn’t want to hear imposed an end to the bombing on Aug­ years to be nearly five times greater to the war in Vietnam, begun in 1965 public that bombing would not take anything. It’s an order, it’s to be done. ust 15, 1973, amid calls for Nixon’s im- than the generally accepted figure. To under the Johnson administration, place within a kilometre of any , Anything that flies, on anything that peachment for his deceit in escalating put the revised total of 2,756,941 tons had already seen 475,515 tons of ord- and military assessments stating that moves. You got that? ” The response the campaign. into perspective, the Allies dropped just nance dropped on Cambodia, which air strikes were like poking a beehive from Haig, barely audible on tape, Thanks to the database, we now over 2 million tons of bombs during all had been a neutral kingdom until with a stick. He responded hesitantly: sounds like laughter. know that the US bombardment start- of World War II, including the bombs nine months before the phone call, ed three-and-a-half years earlier, in that struck Hiroshima and Nagasaki: when pro-US General Lon Nol seized 1965, under the Johnson administration. 15,000 and 20,000 tons, respectively. The of Chantrea in southern Cambodia power. The first intense series of bomb- What happened in 1969 was not the Cambodia may well be the most heav- was destroyed by 2,245 tons of US ordnance. ings, the Menu campaign on targets start of bombings in Cambodia but the ily bombed country in history. Stated one survivor: “The people were in Cambodia’s border areas — labelled escalation into carpet bombing. From angry with the US, and that is why so many of them joined the Khmer Communists.” Breakfast, , Supper, Dinner, Des- 1965 to 1968, 2,565 sorties took place single B-52d “Big Belly” payload sert, and Snack by American command- over Cambodia, with 214 tons of bombs A consists of up to 108 225-kilogram ers — had concluded in May, shortly dropped. These early strikes were likely or 42 340-kilogram bombs, which are period as “fewer than five thousand after the coup. tactical, designed to support the nearly dropped on a target area of approxi­ poorly armed guerrillas . . . scattered Nixon was facing growing con- two thousand secret ground incursions mately 500 by 1,500 metres. In many across the Cambodian landscape, un- gressional opposition to his Indochi- conducted by the cia and US Special cases, Cambodian were hit certain about their strategy, tactics, loyal­ na policy. A joint US–South Vietnam Forces during that period. B-52s — long- with dozens of payloads over the ty, and leaders.” ground invasion of Cambodia in May range bombers capable of carrying course of several . The result was Years after the war ended, and June of 1970 had failed to root out very heavy loads — were not deployed, near-total destruction. One US official Bruce Palling asked Chhit Do, a former Vietnamese Communists, and Nixon whether out of concern for Cambodian stated at the time, “We had been told, Khmer Rouge officer, if his forces had now wanted to covertly escalate the air lives or the country’s neutrality, or be- as had everybody . . . that those carpet- used the bombing as anti-American attacks, which were aimed at destroy- Air operations were subject to rules of engagement that prohibited the use of B-52s cause carpet bombing was believed to bombing attacks by B-52s were totally propaganda. Chhit replied: ing the mobile headquarters of the Viet against targets closer than one kilometre to friendly forces, villages, hamlets, , monuments, be of limited strategic value. devastating, that nothing could sur- , , or holy places. — , ending the vietnam war Cong and the North Vietnamese Army Nixon decided on a different course, vive.” Previously, it was estimated that Every time after there had been bomb- (vc/nva) in the Cambodian jungle. Hundreds of examples of villages being bombed can be extrapolated from the database, counter- and beginning in 1969 the Air Force de- between 50,000 and 150,000 Cambodian ing, they would take the people to see the ing Kissinger’s claim. The “after” map shows the destruction of villages in Kandal , southwest After telling Kissinger that the US Air of Phnom Penh, by 6,418 tons of ordnance dropped between Nov. 7, 1972, and Aug. 14, 1973. Black ployed B-52s over Cambodia. The new civilians were killed by the bombing. craters, to see how big and deep the cra- Force was being unimaginative, Nixon dots represent huts, dots are bombing points, and red circles are areas carpet bombed by B-52s. rationale for the bombings was that Given the fivefold increase in tonnage ters were, to see how the earth had been

66 67 the walrus october 2006 motives that lead locals to help do not fit into strategic rationales. Those whose power studies at the Royal Air Force’s advanced staff college, told Hersh, lives have been ruined don’t care about geopolitics; they tend to blame the attackers. “Don’t believe that air power is a - tion to the problems inside Iraq at all. gouged out and scorched . . . . The ordin­ as a primary strategic concern. In Vietnam, this meant building up the Replacing boots on the ground with air ary people sometimes literally shit in The Nixon administration kept the ground-fighting capability of South power didn’t work in Vietnam, did it? ” their pants when the big bombs and shells air war secret for so long that debate Vietnamese forces while American It’s true that air strikes are generally came. Their minds just froze up and they over its impact came far too late. It units slowly disengaged. In Cambo- more accurate now than they were dur- would wander around mute for three or wasn’t until 1973 that Congress, an- dia, Washington gave military to ing the war in Indochina, so in theory, four days. Terrified and half crazy, the gered by the destruction the campaign prop up Lon Nol’s regime from 1970 to at least, unidentified targets should people were ready to believe what they had caused and the systematic decep- 1975 while the US Air Force conducted be hit less frequently and civilian cas­ were told. It was because of their dissatis- tion that had masked it, legislated a its massive aerial bombardment. ualties should be lower. Nonetheless, faction with the bombing that they kept halt to the bombing of Cambodia. By US policy in Iraq may yet under- civilian deaths have been the norm on co-operating with the Khmer Rouge, then, the damage was already done. go a similar shift. re- during the Iraq and cam- joining up with the Khmer Rouge, send- Having grown to more than two hun- ported in the New Yorker in December paigns, as they were during the bomb- ing their children off to go with them . . . . dred thousand troops and militia for­ 2005 that a key element of any draw- ing of by Israeli forces over the Sometimes the bombs fell and hit little ces by 1973, the Khmer Rouge captured down of American troops will be their summer. As in Cambodia, insurgencies children, and their fathers would be all Phnom Penh two years later. They went replacement with air power. “We just are the likely beneficiaries. To cite one for the Khmer Rouge. on to subject Cambodia to a Maoist want to change the mix of the forces example, on January 13 of this year an agrarian revolution and a genocide in doing the fighting — Iraqi infantry with aerial strike by a US Predator drone on The Nixon administration knew that which 1.7 million people perished. American support and greater use of a village in a border area of the Khmer Rouge was winning over air power,” said Patrick Clawson, the killed eighteen civilians, including five peasants. The cia’s Directorate of Oper­ he relied on the no- deputy director of the Washington In- women and five children. The deaths ations, after investigations south of Ttion that the United States could stitute for Policy. undermined the positive sentiments Phnom Penh, reported in May 1973 supply an allied regime with the re- Critics argue that a shift to air pow- created by the billions of in that the Communists were “using sources needed to withstand internal er will cause even greater numbers of aid that had flowed into that part of damage caused by B-52 strikes as the or external challenges while the US civilian casualties, which in turn will Pakistan after the massive main theme of their propaganda.” But withdrew its ground troops or, in some benefit the insurgency in Iraq. Andrew months earlier. The question remains: this does not seem to have registered cases, simply remained at arm’s length. Brookes, the former director of air- is bombing worth the strategic risk? If the Cambodian experience teach- es us anything, it is that miscalculation of the consequences of civilian casual- ties stems partly from a failure to un- derstand how insurgencies thrive. The motives that lead locals to help such movements don’t fit into strategic ra- tionales like the ones set forth by Kis­ singer and Nixon. Those whose lives have been ruined don’t care about the geopolitics behind bomb attacks; they tend to blame the attackers. The failure of the American campaign in Cambo- dia lay not only in the civilian death toll during the unprecedented bomb- ing, but also in its aftermath, when the Khmer Rouge regime rose up from the bomb craters, with tragic results. The dynamics in Iraq could be similar.n

Taylor Owen is a doctoral candidate and Trudeau Scholar at the of Oxford. In 2004, he was a visiting fellow in the Yale Program.

Ben Kiernan is a professor of history at and the author of How Pol Pot Came to Power and The Pol Pot Regime.

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