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Navy Columbia-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress Updated September 14, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R41129 Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program Summary The Navy’s Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program is a program to design and build a class of 12 new SSBNs to replace the Navy’s current force of 14 aging Ohio-class SSBNs. Since 2013, the Navy has consistently identified the Columbia-class program as the Navy’s top priority program. The Navy procured the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021 and wants to procure the second boat in the class in FY2024. The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests $3,003.0 (i.e., $3.0 billion) in procurement funding for the first Columbia-class boat and $1,644.0 million (i.e., about $1.6 billion) in advance procurement (AP) funding for the second boat, for a combined FY2022 procurement and AP funding request of $4,647.0 million (i.e., about $4.6 billion). The Navy’s FY2022 budget submission estimates the procurement cost of the first Columbia- class boat at $15,030.5 million (i.e., about $15.0 billion) in then-year dollars, including $6,557.6 million (i.e., about $6.60 billion) in costs for plans, meaning (essentially) the detail design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the Columbia class. (It is a long-standing Navy budgetary practice to incorporate the DD/NRE costs for a new class of ship into the total procurement cost of the first ship in the class.) Excluding costs for plans, the estimated hands-on construction cost of the first ship is $8,473.0 million (i.e., about $8.5 billion). -
United States Navy and World War I: 1914–1922
Cover: During World War I, convoys carried almost two million men to Europe. In this 1920 oil painting “A Fast Convoy” by Burnell Poole, the destroyer USS Allen (DD-66) is shown escorting USS Leviathan (SP-1326). Throughout the course of the war, Leviathan transported more than 98,000 troops. Naval History and Heritage Command 1 United States Navy and World War I: 1914–1922 Frank A. Blazich Jr., PhD Naval History and Heritage Command Introduction This document is intended to provide readers with a chronological progression of the activities of the United States Navy and its involvement with World War I as an outside observer, active participant, and victor engaged in the war’s lingering effects in the postwar period. The document is not a comprehensive timeline of every action, policy decision, or ship movement. What is provided is a glimpse into how the 20th century’s first global conflict influenced the Navy and its evolution throughout the conflict and the immediate aftermath. The source base is predominately composed of the published records of the Navy and the primary materials gathered under the supervision of Captain Dudley Knox in the Historical Section in the Office of Naval Records and Library. A thorough chronology remains to be written on the Navy’s actions in regard to World War I. The nationality of all vessels, unless otherwise listed, is the United States. All errors and omissions are solely those of the author. Table of Contents 1914..................................................................................................................................................1 -
Dredging and Disposal Plan
DREDGING AND DISPOSAL PLAN PORT OF OLYMPIA MARINE BERTHS 2 & 3 INTERIM ACTION DREDGING Contract No.: 2008-0011 Project No. MT0601 Submitted To: Port of Olympia Attn: Rick Anderson 915 Washington Street NE Olympia, WA TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 Dredging ..................................................................................................................... 1 Trans-loading ............................................................................................................. 1 Material Barge ............................................................................................................ 2 Dredge Bucket ............................................................................................................ 3 Dredge Sediment Disposal ........................................................................................ 3 Working Hours .......................................................................................................... 3 Position & Progress Surveys .................................................................................... 3 Dredge Navigation ...................................................................................................... 4 Survey Boat ................................................................................................................ 4 Water Quality BMP’s ................................................................................................ -
Alternative Naval Force Structure
Alternative Naval Force Structure A compendium by CIMSEC Articles By Steve Wills · Javier Gonzalez · Tom Meyer · Bob Hein · Eric Beaty Chuck Hill · Jan Musil · Wayne P. Hughes Jr. Edited By Dmitry Filipoff · David Van Dyk · John Stryker 1 Contents Preface ................................................................................................................................ 3 The Perils of Alternative Force Structure ................................................... 4 By Steve Wills UnmannedCentric Force Structure ............................................................... 8 By Javier Gonzalez Proposing A Modern High Speed Transport – The Long Range Patrol Vessel ................................................................................................... 11 By Tom Meyer No Time To Spare: Drawing on History to Inspire Capability Innovation in Today’s Navy ................................................................................. 15 By Bob Hein Enhancing Existing Force Structure by Optimizing Maritime Service Specialization .............................................................................................. 18 By Eric Beaty Augment Naval Force Structure By Upgunning The Coast Guard .......................................................................................................... 21 By Chuck Hill A Fleet Plan for 2045: The Navy the U.S. Ought to be Building ..... 25 By Jan Musil Closing Remarks on Changing Naval Force Structure ....................... 31 By Wayne P. Hughes Jr. CIMSEC 22 www.cimsec.org -
Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress
Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress (name redacted) Specialist in Naval Affairs December 13, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov RS22478 Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress Summary Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy’s ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. On July 13, 2012, the Navy submitted to Congress a 73-page report on the Navy’s policies and practices for naming ships. For ship types now being procured for the Navy, or recently procured for the Navy, naming rules can be summarized as follows: The first Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SBNX) has been named Columbia in honor of the District of Columbia, but the Navy has not stated what the naming rule for these ships will be. Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. Aircraft carriers are generally named for past U.S. Presidents. Of the past 14, 10 were named for past U.S. Presidents, and 2 for Members of Congress. Destroyers are being named for deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy. -
The Voyager Dutch Barge
THE VOYAGER DUTCH BARGE SPECIFICATION Derby Office Mercia Marina, Findern Lane, Willington, Derbyshire DE65 6DW Tel: 01283 707357 Fax: 01283 707364 Hanbury Office Hanbury Wharf, Hanbury Road, Droitwich, Worcester WR9 7DU Tel: 01905 794445 Fax: 01905 776750 web www.newandusedboat.co.uk www.aqualinemarine.co.uk May 2014 Dutch Barge specification - Page 2 DESIGN Using the latest AutoCAD and 3D rendering technology, fully supported with theoretical stability calculations, Aqualine has taken the hull design of the traditional Dutch Barge and brought it in to the modern age. The end result is a boat that is has poise, proportion and purpose. Sweeping body lines of the hull wrap around the boat in an almost fortress-like manner. The superstructure has shape and interest - this is anything but a monolithic block. Upon this, elegantly perched, is the wheelhouse which puts you in a commanding position with panoramic vision for pleasurable cruising and ease of handling. This is a boat that looks and feels good on water. Inside, this meticulous eye for design continues with a determined and considered interior design approach throughout the boat. Style, symmetry and substance mean that life aboard isn’t in any way compromised. The Voyager, is nothing short of than a luxurious floating suite of rooms. Category As a category C craft you can cruise with confidence, safe in the knowledge that the Voyager has been designed and built for conditions up to, and including, wind force 6 and wave heights up to, and including, 2 metres (based on mean average wave heights). Lengths and Beam Standard lengths are 55, 60 and 65ft with a 12ft 4’ beam, with other lengths available upon request. -
Submarines in the United States Navy - Wikipedia Page 1 of 13
Submarines in the United States Navy - Wikipedia Page 1 of 13 Submarines in the United States Navy There are three major types of submarines in the United States Navy: ballistic missile submarines, attack submarines, and cruise missile submarines. All submarines in the U.S. Navy are nuclear-powered. Ballistic subs have a single strategic mission of carrying nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Attack submarines have several tactical missions, including sinking ships and subs, launching cruise missiles, and gathering intelligence. The submarine has a long history in the United States, beginning with the Turtle, the world's first submersible with a documented record of use in combat.[1] Contents Early History (1775–1914) World War I and the inter-war years (1914–1941) World War II (1941–1945) Offensive against Japanese merchant shipping and Japanese war ships Lifeguard League Cold War (1945–1991) Towards the "Nuclear Navy" Strategic deterrence Post–Cold War (1991–present) Composition of the current force Fast attack submarines Ballistic and guided missile submarines Personnel Training Pressure training Escape training Traditions Insignia Submarines Insignia Other insignia Unofficial insignia Submarine verse of the Navy Hymn See also External links References https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarines_in_the_United_States_Navy 3/24/2018 Submarines in the United States Navy - Wikipedia Page 2 of 13 Early History (1775–1914) There were various submersible projects in the 1800s. Alligator was a US Navy submarine that was never commissioned. She was being towed to South Carolina to be used in taking Charleston, but she was lost due to bad weather 2 April 1863 off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. -
NCITEC National Center for Intermodal Transportation for Economic Competitiveness
National Center for Intermodal Transportation for Economic Competitiveness Final Report 525 The Impact of Modifying the Jones Act on US Coastal Shipping by Asaf Ashar James R. Amdal UNO Department of Planning and Urban Studies NCITEC National Center for Intermodal Transportation for Economic Competitiveness Supported by: 4101 Gourrier Avenue | Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 | (225) 767-9131 | www.ltrc.lsu.edu TECHNICAL REPORT STANDARD PAGE 1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. FHWA/LA.525 4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date The Impact of Modifying the Jones Act on US Coastal June 2014 Shipping 6. Performing Organization Code 7. Author(s) 8. Performing Organization Report No. Asaf Ashar, Professor Research, UNOTI LTRC Project Number: 13-8SS James R. Amdal, Sr. Research Associate, UNOTI State Project Number: 30000766 9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10. Work Unit No. University of New Orleans Department of Planning and Urban Studies 11. Contract or Grant No. 368 Milneburg Hall, 2000 Lakeshore Dr. New Orleans, LA 70148 12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 13. Type of Report and Period Covered Louisiana Department of Transportation and Final Report Development July 2012 – December 2013 P.O. Box 94245 Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9245 14. Sponsoring Agency Code 15. Supplementary Notes Conducted in Cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA), Federal Highway Administration 16. Abstract The study assesses exempt coastal shipping defined as exempted from the US-built stipulation of the Jones Act, operating with functional crews and exempted from Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT). The study focuses on two research questions: (a) the impact of the US-built exemption on the cost of coastal shipping; and (b) the competitiveness of exempt services. -
World War I Context Follow up in 1915, Europe Was Embroiled in U.S
1915: World War I Context Follow Up In 1915, Europe was embroiled in U.S. newspapers aroused outrage war, but U.S. public sentiment op- against Germany for ruthlessly kill- posed involvement. President ing defenceless Americans. The U.S. Woodrow Wilson said they would was being drawn into the war. In “remain neutral in fact as well as in June 1916, Congress increased the name.”23 size of the army. In September, Con- gress allocated $7 billion for national Pretext Incident defense, “the largest sum appropri- On May 7, 1915, a German subma- ated to that time.”30 rine (U-boat) sank the Lusitania, a In January 1917, the British British passenger ship killing 1,198, said they had intercepted a German including 128 Americans.24 message to Mexico seeking an alli- The public was not told that ance with Germany and offering to passengers were, in effect, a ‘human help Mexico recover land ceded to shield’ protecting six million rounds the U.S. On April 2, Wilson told of U.S. ammunition bound for Brit- Congress: “The world must be safe ain.25 To Germany, the ship was a for democracy.” Four days later the threat. To Britain, it was bait for lur- U.S. declared war on Germany.31 ing an attack. Why? A week before the attack, Real Reasons British Admiralty leader, Winston The maneuvre which brings Influential British military, political Churchill wrote to the Board of an ally into the field is as and business interests wanted U.S. Trade’s president saying it is “most serviceable as that which help in their war with Germany. -
Arbon, Anthony Lyle PRG 1190/11 Special List ______
___________________________________________________________________ Arbon, Anthony Lyle PRG 1190/11 Special List ___________________________________________________________________ Outsize illustrations of ships 750 illustrations from published sources. These illustrations are not duplicated in the Arbon-Le Maiste collection. Sources include newspaper cuttings and centre-spreads from periodicals, brochures, calendar pages, posters, sketches, plans, prints, and other reproductions of artworks. Most are in colour. Please note the estimated date ranges relate to the ships illustrated, not year of publication. See Series 11/14 for Combined select index to Series 11 arranged alphabetically by ships name. REQUESTING ITEMS: Please provide both ships name and full location details. Unnumbered illustrations are filed in alphabetical order under the name of the first ship mentioned in the caption. ___________________________________________________________________ 1. Illustrations of sailing ships. c1780-. 230 illustrations. Arranged alphabetically by name of ship. 2. Illustrations mainly of ocean going motor powered ships. Excludes navy vessels (see Series 3,4 & 5) c1852- 150 illustrations. Merchant shipping, including steamships, passenger liners, cargo vessels, tankers, container ships etc. Includes a few river steamers and paddleboats. Arranged alphabetically by name of ship. 3. Illustrations of Australian warships. c1928- 21 illustrations Arranged alphabetically by name of ship. 4. Australian general naval illustrations, including warship badges, -
English Comes from the French: Guerre De Course
The Maritime Transport War - Emphasizing a strategy to interrupt the enemy sea lines of communication1 (SLOCs) - ARAKAWA Kenichi Preface Why did the Imperial Japanese Navy not aggressively develop a strategy to interrupt the enemy sea line of communication (SLOC) during the Second World War? Japan’s SLOC connecting her southern and Asian continental fronts to the mainland were destroyed mainly by the U.S. submarine warfare. Consequently, Japanese forces suffered from shortages of provisions as well as natural resources necessary for her military power. Furthermore, neither weapons nor provisions could be delivered to the fronts due to the U.S. operations to disrupt the Japanese SLOCs between the battlegrounds and the Japanese home island. Thus soldiers on the front were threatened with starvation even before the battle. In contrast, the U.S. and British military forces supported long logistical supply lines to their Asian and Pacific battlegrounds. However, there are no records indicating that the Imperial Japanese Navy attempted to interrupt these vital sea lines. Surely Japanese officers were aware of the German use of submarines in World WarⅠ. Why did the Imperial Japanese Navy not adopt a guerre de course strategy, that is a strategy targeting the enemy merchant marine and logistical lines? The most comprehensive explanation indicates that the Imperial Japanese Navy had no doctrine providing for this kind of warfare. The core of its naval strategy was the doctrine of “decisive battles at any cost.” Under the Japanese naval doctrine submarines were meant to contribute to fleet engagements not to have an independent combat role or to target anything but the enemy fleet. -
Naval Postgraduate School Thesis
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS A STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION OF THE FRENCH MISTRAL AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS by Patrick Thomas Baker June 2011 Thesis Advisor: Mikhail Tsypkin Second Reader: Douglas Porch Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2011 Master‘s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS A Study of the Russian Acquisition of the French Mistral Amphibious Assault Warships 6. AUTHOR(S) Patrick Thomas Baker 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S.