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Behind the Scenes of the ROC Diplomatic Alternative Service Program

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Behind the Scenes of the ROC Diplomatic Alternative Service Program ICDF PROFILE Behind the Scenes of the ROC Diplomatic Alternative Service Program An interview with Director Huang Nan-huei of the ROC Department of Economic and Trade Affairs, and Section Chief Chang Fu-heng of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs he ROC Diplomatic Alternative Service program, Alternative Service program. They have succeeded Twhich allows young male Taiwanese conscripts admirably, with President Chen Shui-bian saying the to serve in ROC overseas technical and medical program “opens a window to broader participation in missions in lieu of military service in Taiwan, is a international cooperation” in an address at the ICDF milestone in ROC diplomatic and social history. IC&D headquarters in October. The following interview with has presented the background and development of this Huang and Chang clarifies their thoughts and planning program in previous issues, and in this issue bids a as they shaped the Diplomatic Alternative Service hearty farewell to the first 37 recruits in the program, program. who departed for formal diplomatic service in 21 nations allied with the ROC in November. IC&D: What problems did you initially encounter Throughout the life of the Diplomatic Alternative in creating the Diplomatic Alternative Service? Service program—from President Chen Shui-bian’s proposal of the plan in August 2000, to the passage of Section Chief Chang: When we began signing up the Diplomatic Alternative Service Bill on October 23, potential recruits, the trickle of applications worried us, 2000, to the training and ultimate departure of the and we were concerned that the Diplomatic Alternative recruits in 2001—two men have led development: Service would end up a stillborn idea. Conscripts in Director Huang Nan-huei of the ROC Department of this program would have to face extreme difficulties Economic and Trade Affairs, and Section Chief Chang and cope with challenging environments while stationed Fu-heng of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). overseas. They would have to leave their friends and In a case with no precedents to guide them, but families far behind, and live among people with different which involved major national policy issues and the cultures and languages. This possibility of hardship and country’s future direction, Director Huang and Section homesickness reduced interest in applying for the Chief Chang had to bear substantial pressure and face program. Most of the people who were interested at thorny problems during the creation of the Diplomatic that time were young exchange students who were 4 International Cooperation & Development Director Huang Nan-huei, ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Katharine Chang and ICDF acting Secretary General Yang Tzu-pao, surrounded by the Diplomatic Alternative Service recruits. living overseas who had reached the age of eligibility service to understand what life was really like for the for military service. We received relatively few inquiries members of technical missions. After working hard to from young men in Taiwan. Looking at the small number create this awareness, we got a response that of applicants, we were preparing for the worst. surpassed our expectations. A total of 211 persons Furthermore, we were worried about how many signed up! Because of this enthusiasm, we wanted to applicants would meet the necessary qualifications for make sure we didn’t pass up any highly-qualified overseas service. Faced with this dilemma, appropriate individuals. So we got in touch with the Ministry of the publicity became essential. We arranged for discussions Interior and had the original 35-place roster for the at six Taiwanese universities, using ICDF materials to program increased to 40 places. Our success at explain technical mission work and living environments. recruiting gave us a tremendous psychological boost, We also created a short publicity video that was and it showed us that the Diplomatic Alternative Service broadcast by four Taiwanese TV stations. program had received a high degree of support and approval from the country’s citizens. It also showed Director Huang: When we were doing these publicity that citizens were very concerned about diplomatic activities, we were careful to let people know that the issues and were strongly interested in participating in work was hard and the living conditions primitive. We diplomatic work. wanted all citizens and young men eligible for military International Cooperation & Development 5 IC&D: Did the skill levels of the potential recruits interested in international cooperation work through the meet your expectations? Diplomatic Alternative Service, and if they find that diplomatic work is exciting, we would encourage them Director Huang: Many of the 211 recruits who to join technical missions or take part in other diplomatic signed up for alternative service possessed at least an activities. We planned from the start that the M.S. degree, and when the recruits’ representatives Diplomatic Alternative Service would achieve the goal spoke at the end of their training, they talked about of training for technical missions and Taiwan’s their aspirations and gratitude in Chinese, English, and diplomatic services. French. Unquestionably they were highly qualified, and this left a deep impression upon everyone. Section Chief Chang: While taking a national employment test or finding a job with the ICDF should IC&D: Were you concerned for the safety of the be a fair, competitive process, the recruits’ hard work recruits in the overseas environments? during their alternative service will enable them to build their capacities and develop their talents. Regardless Director Huang: I happened to be attending the of whether they take a technical mission or medical WTO meeting in Qatar when the recruits were mission test, a consular personnel test, or a Taiwanese dispatched in November. I was very far from Taiwan, government test for personnel stationed overseas, their but I couldn’t stop thinking about the recruits who were experience will enable them to surpass many about to leave their country, and I couldn’t resist calling competitors without real-world working experience. back to make sure that they would be met at the airports when they arrived at their destinations. There IC&D: What were the ICDF’s roles in the creation had just been an air crash at New York, and I was of the Diplomatic Alternative Service? tremendously concerned for the safety of the recruits. My colleagues also made many phone calls and Director Huang: MOFA and ICDF cooperated well requested the in-country technical missions to meet the during the planning stage, and they’ve demonstrated arriving recruits at the airport. Fortunately, none of them good teamwork throughout the implementation process. had any problems. At both MOFA and the ICDF, we They have always listened to each other’s views, and take care of the recruits, and we are as concerned for the ICDF has immediately notified MOFA of any them as their parents are. IC&D: What will the Diplomatic Alternative Service program offer recruits after they have completed their service? Director Huang: The baptism of overseas service will give the recruits an international outlook and much practical experience. They are certain to have acquired plentiful new abilities and know-how by the time they return to Taiwan. They will be well equipped to use their language skills, international outlook, and practical Section Chief Chang Fu-heng meets Diplomatic talents in the workplace. Further, if they become Alternative Service recruits. 6 International Cooperation & Development difficulties encountered during implementation. MOFA hopes that after some more time has gone by, our embassies will be able to provide the names of outstanding recruits, and will be able to suggest where improvements may be needed. The ICDF doesn’t want to wait until problems occur before solving them. It would rather come up with possible solutions before problems happen, and I think this is a very desirable approach. Since the ICDF has already conducted overseas volunteer group training, dispatch and management, it has accumulated extensive experience. While the Director Huang Nan-huei ICDF once outsourced the selection and training of volunteers, it now performs this work itself. It is The Diplomatic Alternative Service will be recruiting gradually honing its professional training capability, and again in May of 2002. Personnel from the MOFA this is a very pleasing trend. In the future, MOFA will Research and Planning Board, Department of request the ICDF to continue handling relevant matters, Personnel, the ICDF, and the Ministry of the Interior and the ICDF will have developed professional Department of Conscription will hold meetings to discuss expertise in the training of both volunteers and problems that need attention, how we should prepare alternative service recruits. for the second stage, and whether the methods we are using now need improvement. IC&D: Director Huang, you will be assigned a new During this first stage, the views of some of our overseas post in the near future. How are plans embassies and technical missions have occasionally proceeding for the transition, and the next phase been at odds. Some want more people sent, while others of the Diplomatic Alternative Service program? feel this would increase their burden. But after talking to them and working things out, they all acknowledge Director Huang: Foreign Minister Tien Hung-mao that the recruits have been of assistance to them, and places great importance on continuity. Someone has they all can accept the situation. already been found to replace me, and I will be sure to The most important thing to remember is that the tell him my ideas and views. We have established a second stage will be easier. While sending the recruits system, drafted appropriate criteria, and established to join technical missions is proving quite difficult, it will several important principles. Completing our work get easier as it goes.
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