India's Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean – Securing the Waves? David Scott a a Brunel University , Uxbridge , UK Published Online: 07 Feb 2013
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
This article was downloaded by: [Rollins College] On: 07 August 2014, At: 18:47 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Strategic Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20 India's Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean – Securing the Waves? David Scott a a Brunel University , Uxbridge , UK Published online: 07 Feb 2013. To cite this article: David Scott (2013) India's Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean – Securing the Waves?, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36:4, 484-511, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2012.728134 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.728134 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub- licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions Downloaded by [Rollins College] at 18:47 07 August 2014 The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2013 Vol. 36, No. 4, 484–511, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.728134 India’s Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean – Securing the Waves? DAVID SCOTT Brunel University, Uxbridge, UK ABSTRACT India has increasingly high aspirations in the Indian Ocean, as enunciated by politicians, naval figures and the wider elite. These aspirations, its strategic discourse, are of pre-eminence and leadership. India’s maritime strategy for such a self-confessed diplomatic, constabulary and benign role is primarily naval-focused; a sixfold strategy of increasing its naval spending, strengthening its infrastructure, increasing its naval capabilities, active maritime diplomacy, exercising in the Indian Ocean and keeping open the choke points. Through such strategy, and soft balancing with the United States, India hopes to secure its own position against a perceived growing Chinese challenge in the Indian Ocean. KEY WORDS: India, Indian Ocean, Navy, Seapower, Strategy Strategy . is an overall plan to move from the present situation to a desired goal . The Maritime Strategy of a country can be defined as the overall approach of a nation to the oceans around it . to maximise national gains . Being a nation with vital maritime interests, India’s Maritime Strategy defines the country’s role in its maritime area of interest . for a strategy, the start point Downloaded by [Rollins College] at 18:47 07 August 2014 is invariably a threat, whether real or perceived. India’s Maritime Military Strategy, 2007 The Indian Ocean as India’s ocean? A play on words but one that is the heart of this article in terms of considering India’s aspirations and its strategies to meet any such Indian Ocean aspirations. The argument of this article is twofold and, despite caveats, simple. First, it argues that the Indian Navy has clear-enough aspirations for the Indian Ocean which are being supported by the government. Second, it argues that various successful strategies designed to further these aspirations mean that India is gaining a sought-after position of some eminence in the Indian Ocean. Consequently, the structure of the article is similarly © 2013 Taylor & Francis India’s Strategy for the Indian Ocean 485 twofold. First, it sets out to pinpoint what India’s aspirations actually are; through closely following, contextualising and evaluating the strategic discourse circulating in India with regard to the Indian Ocean. Second, it pinpoints and assesses India’s strategy for realising such aspirations in the Indian Ocean; including examining whether India is effectively matching political and strategic goals with maritime resources in the form of acquisition and deployment of appropriate assets (ships and naval aircraft) and creation of infrastructure, as well as considering India’s interactions in the Indian Ocean with local and extra-regional powers. India’s Aspirations One general characteristic, and potential shortcoming for India, is that at the national level it does not have any relevant government White Paper, nor any official national security document, nor combined services doctrine that set forth aspirations, objectives and grand strategic direction. Hence Pant’s position that ‘the Indian navy’s attempt to come up with its own strategy and doctrine, though welcome in many respects, has little meaning in the absence of a national security strategy from the Indian government’.1 Indeed, there is a wider debate over whether India has a sense of Grand Strategy at all. This was something broached in 1992 by George Tanham, who argued that India’s history and cultural traits had generated a ‘lacunae in strategy and planning’.2 However, since 1992 there have been authoritative Navy statements on its naval strategy, intermittent government announcements, subordinate service-level deliberations, and ongoing wider commentary in think tanks like the National Maritime Foundation. There may indeed not be a National Security Strategy, the National Security Council set up in 1998 remains notional rather than substantive, and integration between the military services remains extremely limited. Nevertheless, this article argues that there is Downloaded by [Rollins College] at 18:47 07 August 2014 a significant meaningful degree of lower Service-level naval strategy for the Indian Ocean backed up by the government, in which a degree of consensus is noticeable over India’s aspirations in the Indian Ocean, even though questions remain over the effectiveness and impact of the strategy to realise such aspirations. 1Harsh Pant, ‘India in the Indian Ocean: Growing Mismatch between Ambitions and Capabilities’, Pacific Affairs 82/2 (Summer 2009), 279. Also Arun Prakash, ‘Strategic Policy-making and the Indian System’, Maritime Studies 5/2 (Winter 2010), 22–31. Also Iskander Rehman, ‘India’s Aspirational Naval Doctrine’, in Harsh Pant (ed.), The Rise of the Indian Navy (Farnham: Ashgate 2012). 2George Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought (Washington DC: RAND 1992), 50. 486 David Scott Indian expectations are underpinned by geopolitical considerations in which one recurring contextual feature in Indian discourse among naval and government figures is to stress the territorial advantages enjoyed by India in the Indian Ocean Region. As the former Chief of Naval Staff (2004–06) and subsequent Chairman of the National Maritime Foundation (2008–12) Arun Prakash put it, India has the opportunity and challenge ‘to leverage her geographical advantage’ through appropriate strategies.3 These geopolitical advantages for India are partly of length of coastline; 7,516.6 km, made up of the mainland (5,422.6 km), the 27 Lakshadweep Islands (132 km), and the 572 Andaman and Nicobar islands (1,962 km). They are partly of location; India being situated in the middle of the northern Indian Ocean, looking both westwards across the Arabian Sea and eastwards across the Bay of Bengal. They are partly of extension, with a long Indian peninsula jutting over 2,000 km further southwards into the Indian Ocean reaches. Government Discourse India officially recognises what it now calls the ‘strategic imperatives’ of India’s international relations; or the ‘marine imperatives of India foreign policy’.4 In the past decade, successive Prime Ministers across the political divide have pushed for an increased focus on the Indian Ocean, somewhat neglected under Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. In such a vein, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee told the 2003 Combined Services Conference that ‘our security environment ranges from the Persian Gulf to Straits of Malacca across the Indian Ocean . Our strategic thinking has also to extend to these horizons.5 In front of that same audience, the new Congress Party Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reiterated a similar message the following year; that ‘our strategic footprint covers . to the far reaches of the Indian Ocean. Awareness Downloaded by [Rollins College] at 18:47 07 August 2014 3Arun Prakash, ‘The Rationale and Implications of India’s Growing Maritime Power’, in Michael Kugelman (ed.), India’s Contemporary Security Challenges (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 2011), 80. 4Shiv Shankar Menon (Foreign Secretary), ‘Maritime Imperatives of Indian Foreign Policy’, Maritime Affairs 5/2 (Winter 2009), 15; Pranab Mukherjee (Minister for External Affairs),