Battle at Marathon Year: September of 490 BC ​

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Battle at Marathon Year: September of 490 BC ​ Battle at Marathon Year: September of 490 BC ​ Location: Marathon, Greece ​ The Persians navy sailed down the coast of Greece and landed at the bay of Marathon, about 40 miles north of Athens. It was fought between the citizens of Athens, aided by Plataea, and a Persian force commanded by Datis and Artaphernes. The battle was the culmination of the first attempt by Persia, under King Darius 1, to subjugate Greece. Reason for Conflict: ● The Persian Empire was expanding vastly throughout the Mediterranean under the reign of King Darius the Great ● Persian Empire experienced many revolts from the people under the Persian control ● Ionia, one of the rebelling regions was originally settled by the Greeks ● When the Ionians revolted against the Persian Empire, the Greek City­State Athens offered their help to the rebels ● Battle could’ve been avoided as Great Persian Army > Small Ionia city rebels ● King Darius and the Persian Generals invaded mainland Greece with rage in vengeance to the intervention of the Athens to Ionia People(Key figures): The Persians(king Darius the great) ​ Datis and Artaphernes( the commander of the Persian force) ​ ​ Miltiades: Greek general who really wanted other generals to agree with him and defend Greece against the Persians. He ordered his soldiers to form a long line facing the Persians and charge at them. The middle of the line weakened and Persians broke through, but the Greeks trapped them. Callimachus: Senior commander in the Greek military who aided Miltiades in his victory. Outcome: The marathon war between Persians and the Greeks, the Greeks took the victory ​ giving them the belief that they had the ability to defend themselves and that actually kept the Persians away for ten years. Battle Plan: The Persian plan was twofold: They knew that if the Athenian army was ​ defeated outside of Athens, the city’s civilian inhabitants would have no choice but to submit. The Athenian army led by General Miltiades moved to block the Persians' advance and trapped them on the plains around the bay. While the army kept the Persians at a stand­still, Miltiades sent runners to Sparta and Plataea to ask for aid Battle Plan Map Interesting fact :For the first 5 days, the Greek and the Persian armies faced each other ​ without making any move. This was good for Athens because every passing day brought Spartan arrival closer. ​ King Darius I of Persia swore to take revenge on those two Greek cities and even commissioned one of his servants to remind him thrice every day before dinner about the pending revenge. The Greeks were outnumbered by the Persians by at least 2:1. Miltiades was aware of this and ordered the Greek troops to form a ‘double envelopment’ or ‘pincer’ formation. B) Answer: How did warfare contribute to the expansion/consolidation of the Persian Empire ​ and/or its decline? What is the significance of this battle? The Battle at Marathon was an imperative asset to bringing momentum to the Greek army. The verdict of the battle itself was in no manner a victory for the Persians. The geographical setting declared that the Greeks had bested their foes on Persian land ­ this indicates the very first time the Persians were defeated on their own land. The victory over the Persian’s imposed the Greeks with greater faith in their armies and tactical prowess. Consequently, the outcome threw the Persians in a primitive state of decline. The Battle at Marathon signifies great importance, because it was essentially the first war that broke out between the Greek­states and the Persian Empire on a large spectrum. Modern day site in which the Battle at Marathon took place .
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