PERCEPTIONS OF ANIMAL MINDS
by
Lauren N. Maurer
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of
The Charles E. Schmidt College of Science in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
Florida Atlantic University
Boca Raton, Florida
December 2010
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my thesis committee, Dr. David Bjorklund, Dr. Robin
Vallacher, and Dr. Todd Shackelford, for all of their help with this undertaking. I would particularly like to thank Dr. Bjorklund for his unshakeable calm and his well-developed sense of humor, both of which I have appreciated immensely.
I would also like to thank my fellow lab members, particularly Alyssa Raymond and Jason Grotuss, for lending their ears and their ideas as this study progressed, particularly in moments of difficulty.
I would like to thank my DIS student, Amber Jackson, for her enthusiastic help with data collection, literature searches, and data entry.
Of course I also would like to thank my family, whose support for me has been unlimited, no matter where the road has led.
And finally, I would like to thank Noel Trew, whose limitless support and abiding faith—and technological savvy—have made everything infinitely easier. A sorrow shared is halved, and a joy shared is doubled. Thank you, everyone, for helping me
“Keep calm and carry on.” Now, it's on to the next great adventure—Allons-y!
iii ABSTRACT
Author: Lauren Maurer
Title: Perceptions of Animal Minds
Institution: Florida Atlantic University
Thesis Advisor: Dr. David F. Bjorklund
Degree: Master of Arts
Year: 2010
Previous research into people’s perceptions of animals suggests that people view animals most favorably when they perceive them as being mentally like humans. This thesis examined whether animals perceived as threatening are still seen to be mentally similar to humans, but more likely to experience mental states associated with anger and aggression. Using three separate measures of people’s perceptions of animals, including one designed for this study, it was found that participants did indeed view the mental lives of animals differently when those animals were perceived to be threatening.
Examination of the effect of the animal chosen showed that some animals are inherently seen as more threatening and less-human like. The implications of these findings for animal conservation efforts, reduction of human-animal conflict, and anthropomorphism in the study of animal cognition were discussed.
iv DEDICATION
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents, Richard and Dawn Maurer.
Their endless support and encouragement have helped me throughout my academic career, and they continue to be a source of strength and inspiration for me. Everything I have accomplished is a credit to their love and faith, and for all the opportunities I have ahead of me I am gratefully indebted to them. Thank you for everything. PERCEPTIONS OF ANIMAL MINDS
List of Tables ...... ix
Introduction ...... 1
What Are Animals to Us? ...... 9
When Animals Become More than Human ...... 12
The Present Study ...... 14
Method ...... 17
Participants ...... 17
Materials ...... 17
Procedure ...... 20
Results ...... 21
Animal Attitude Scale ...... 21
Animal Rating Scale ...... 21
Animal Rating Scale 1: Important to Humans ...... 22
Animal Rating Scale 2: Smart ...... 22
Animal Rating Scale 3: Lovable ...... 23
Animal Rating Scale 4: Safe ...... 24
Animal Rating Scale 5: Important to Environment ...... 24
Perceptions of Mental States ...... 25
vi Factor analysis ...... 25
Complex Self-Aware ...... 26
Simple Positive ...... 27
Aggressive ...... 29
Participant Background and Attitudes toward Animals ...... 30
Gender ...... 30
Dog ...... 30
Reptile ...... 31
Job ...... 31
Believe in Evolution ...... 31
Religion ...... 31
Services ...... 32
Discussion ...... 33
Animal Rating Scale ...... 32
Perceptions of Mental States ...... 34
Participant Background and Attitudes toward Animals ...... 37
The Other Uncanny Valley ...... 39
The Human Animal ...... 43
Moving Forward ...... 45
Appendices ...... 55
Appendix A ...... 55
Appendix B ...... 58
vii Appendix C ...... 59
Appendix D ...... 62
References ...... 65
viii LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Animal Pictures and Control Readings ...... 47
Table 2 Non-Threatening and Threatening Reading Paragraphs ...... 48
Table 3 Important to Humans ...... 49
Table 4 Smart ...... 49
Table 5 Lovable ...... 49
Table 6 Safe ...... 50
Table 7 Important to Environment ...... 50
Table 8 Factor Analysis and Complexity ...... 51
Table 9 Complex Self-Aware Mental States ...... 52
Table 10 Simple Positive Mental States ...... 52
Table 11 Aggressive Mental States ...... 53
Table 12 Religion and Animal Attitude Scale Score ...... 53
Table 13 Perceptions of Mental States by Condition and Attitude ...... 54
ix INTRODUCTION
Humans’ relationships with animals are as varied as our relationships with each other. The beginning of animal domestication was one of the turning points of modern human culture: For many thousands of years, we have raised and bred animals for food, for labor, and—perhaps most incredibly—for companionship. Human-animal relationships are seldom simple, nor are they universal. It is not intuitively obvious, for example, why in our culture dogs are “man’s best friend,” while pigs are future BLTs.
Both are quadrupedal land mammals, of similar intelligence and size (at least, some of the time). But large differences exist between cultures in how these two animals are perceived. Some people raise pigs not for food but as pets, while in some religious traditions they are considered ritually unclean and therefore may not be eaten; and similarly, while dogs enjoy the status of a fortunate favorite in our society—the “family dog” being practically an icon of American life—they are raised for food in many cultures, and in others they are utter pariahs, chased away whenever they come near people.
And, while many of us no longer have to worry about it, throughout our history as a species we have often been threatened by animals. Even today, although we have in many ways “tamed” the wild, animals can still pose a very serious threat to us, as much as any other force of nature. So, when that proverbial tide is turned, and Man and Beast
1 come into conflict—and the Beast wins—what does that mean for us? How do we perceive it, how do we explain it, how do we make sense of it? And how do we respond?
Debate as to the “nature” of animal beings and the question of our relationship to them—their rights, our obligations—is perhaps very old. In the story of the creation of the Earth in the first chapter of the Bible, it reads,
Then God said, “Let us make man in our image, in our likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air, over the livestock, over all the earth, and over all the creatures that move along the ground.” So God created man in his own image... God blessed them and said to them, “Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground” (Gen. 1:26-28, New International Version).
This story is taken as literal truth by a sizable portion of the Western world, particularly in America; and, even for those for whom it is not taken as literal truth, this story nonetheless plays a foundational role in the formation of a worldview. The belief that we humans have the right to do with animals as we see fit is referred to as
Dominionism (from the King James translation of these same Biblical verses), and is one of the predominant attitudes toward animals that has been identified in research in this area (e.g., DeLeeuw, Galen, Aebersold, & Stanton, 2007; Kellert, 1991). The
Dominionistic attitude toward animals is obviously related—but not limited—to the
Judeo-Christian worldview, so we can say that religious belief sometimes plays a role in how people relate and respond to animals. But what other factors determine what we see when we look at animals, and how we feel about them?
2 While the issue of animal rights has been an on-and-off topic of importance in the
Western world for a very long time, having been tied to (among other things) both the abolition and women’s rights movements, it’s probably safe to say that our modern animal rights movement began during the increased environmental awareness in the U.S. that led to the passing of the Endangered Species Preservation Act in 1966 and then the founding of Earth Day in 1970 (Bruskotter, Schmidt, & Teel, 2007; Jamison & Lunch,
1992). Since then, it has become important to researchers and conservationists to understand the variety of attitudes people have toward animals and the underlying causes of those attitudes.
Kellert (e.g., 1991) suggests that there are six predominant attitudes people have toward animals, of which he labels three negative and three positive. In the negative, he identifies Dominionistic, Utilitarian, and Negativistic attitudes; in the positive, he lists
Ecologistic, Moralistic, and Naturalistic. The Dominionistic attitude, mentioned earlier, is focused on dominance, mastery, and control over animals and nature. The Utilitarian attitude, which is related, manifests as a focus on the utilization and subordination of animals for the benefit of humans. The Negativistic attitude is marked by fear, dislike, or indifference toward animals. The Ecologistic attitude is centered on the ecological value of animals and on their relationship with the rest of their environment. The Moralistic attitude is marked by opposition to causing harm or suffering to animals, and the
Naturalistic attitude is expressed through interest in direct experience (particularly recreational) with animals, the environment, and “the outdoors.”
3 Of these, the Dominionistic attitude has perhaps garnered the most attention in research, particularly in the U.S., where this worldview is found in a large portion of the population. Dominionistic (and, to some extent, Utilitarian) views of animals are associated with conservative religious beliefs, church attendance, and religious fundamentalism (e.g., Biblical literalism)—all of which, in turn, correlate negatively with attitudes toward animals, interest in conservation, and empathy for animals (DeLeeuw et al., 2007).
Many factors have been examined in relation to people’s attitudes toward animals.
Some of the most commonly found to influence attitudes toward animals include gender, having pets, age, income, education level, marital status, having children in the home, religious and/or ethical ideology, and cultural background (for a review, see Signal &
Taylor, 2006).
Of these, gender is by far the strongest factor. In numerous studies, women have been found to have more favorable attitudes toward animals, higher empathy for animals, and greater disapproval of using animals in research (e.g., Daly & Morton, 2008;
DeLeeuw et al., 2007; Driscoll, 1995; Herzog, Betchart, & Pittman, 1991; Herzog &
Mathews, 1997; Taylor & Signal, 2005).
After gender effects are accounted for, however, the next most significant correlate of attitudes toward animals is empathizing with and identifying with animals.
How we feel about animals is strongly connected to how we relate to them, whether we see ourselves in them—whether we perceive them as being “like us.” Nagel’s question of
“What is it like to be bat?” aside, people want to know what’s going on inside the minds
4 of animals, and what we believe about animal minds weighs heavily on how we believe animals should be treated. Daly and Morton (2008) examined various measures of empathy and found that, in general, empathy scores were higher in people who indicated that they had seen the inhumane killing of an animal at some point in their lives, indicating perhaps those with higher empathy are more likely to be distressed by (and thus disapprove of) the killing of animals. Similarly, when Herzog and Mathews (1997) examined the relationship between various personality traits and attitudes toward animals, they found little reliable correlation, except on the factors labeled “sensitivity” and “imaginativeness”—factors that seem to be associated with empathy.
But back to the issue brought up earlier: Why in our culture are dogs friends, but pigs food? Perceptions of animals’ similarity to humans are linked to people’s judgments regarding whether animals can experience pain (Plous, 1993); and similarly, perceptions of animals’ similarity to humans correlate positively with favorable attitudes toward animals—with some animals (e.g., dolphins) even being rated more favorably than humans (Driscoll, 1995). In fact, in one study, participants judged a dog and a ten-year old boy not to be qualitatively different in their cognitive and affective experiences
(Rasmussen & Rajecki, 1995). In another study, it was found that perceived similarity to humans predicted participants’ empathy for abused animals and the desire to see human animal-abusers punished (Allen, Hunstone, Waerstad, Foy, Hobbins, Wikner, & Wirrel,
2002).
Interestingly, Driscoll (1995) found that animals routinely “used” by humans, particularly for food, clustered separately from other animals in people’s perceptions, and
5 were rated fairly low on several factors, including intelligence and lovability. But it’s not clear what the causal relationship is here: Do we use animals for food that we don’t perceive as being “like us,” or is it a psychological distancing mechanism that we don’t perceive animals as being similar to us after we’ve re-labeled them as food?
This point brings us to the discussion of why this topic should matter to psychologists. That biologists, environmentalists, animal rights activists, and PETA (who are in a category all their own) should care about how people perceive animals is obvious; but why should psychologists care? The differences and similarities between humans and animals are important to comparative psychologists, it’s true; and animal models of pathology are important in many areas of research, including psychology (I’ll return to this particular point in the Discussion). As previously mentioned, Driscoll
(1995) found that traditional “food animals” are perceived less favorably than comparable animals not used by people in the same way. Relatedly, in Daly and
Morton’s (2008) study of empathy in people who reported having seen an animal killed inhumanely, those people who reported seeing the inhumane killing of an animal more than once (compared to those who reported this event happening only once in their lives) showed higher scores on Perspective Taking (PT), but lower scores on Personal Distress
(PD). Daly and Morton suggest that this is evidence that these participants have maintained the cognitive components of empathy, but their empathy has decreased in its affective components—as a coping mechanism, perhaps.
The perception that people who are willing to hurt and abuse animals likely will eventually “graduate” to doing the same to humans has become commonplace. But as for
6 the rest of us, what do our (in)sensitivity to animal suffering and our level of fellow- feeling for non-humans say about us psychologically?
Taylor and Signal (2005) point out that attitudes toward animals correlate with empathy not just for animals but in general. That is, people who empathize with animals have greater empathy overall. And they suggest that, as such, studying people’s empathy for animals may help researchers to understand a vast variety of psychological pathologies that are marked by empathic difficulties with other people—and may even lead to novel treatments (Taylor & Signal, 2005).
Continuing from this (and this point also will be explored more fully in the
Discussion), the observation that studying how we relate to animals can help us understand how we relate to our fellow humans has implications that are deeply important to social psychology. Indeed, how we humanize animals and how we dehumanize people are two sides of a single phenomenon, and understanding both of these can add greatly to the study of peace and conflict in human society.
So, we’ve already seen that people tend to judge “food animals” less favorably; what else determines how we judge individual species? Kellert identifies four main variables affecting people’s attitudes toward particular animals (Kellert, 1996, cited in
Kellert, Black, Rush, & Bath, 1996):
1) People have certain basic values underlying their attitudes toward animals and nature
in general, which influence their attitudes toward individual species.
7 2) The individual species’ physical and behavioral characteristics influence people’s
attitudes (these include both the fundamental characteristics of the species in question
and how these are viewed in light of a person’s society/culture).
3) Knowledge about and understanding of a species both affect people’s attitudes.
4) Past and present experiences, interactions, and associations with the species in
question affect people’s perceptions and attitudes.
The first point, about people’s values, relates to the six core attitudes discussed earlier. The second, the characteristics of the animal, gets at the question of “are they like us?” Next time you get a chance, take a quick poll of your friends to see how often people’s favorite animals are non-mammals for a simple example of this. Animals with unsavory eating habits suffer under a similar bias—as do foreigners, for that matter. One of the most common accusations leveled at indigenous cultures by European settlers was that they were cannibals—but then, some native South American cultures were terrified of the Europeans in part because of suspicions that they were cannibals (Jahoda, 1999, p.
109).
Related to the third point is familiarity: It’s not what you know about an animal, so much as what you think you know. The current research was largely inspired by a conversation at a zoo with a visitor who was insistent that wolves are bloodthirsty, sadistic creatures that will kill an entire herd of livestock for the sheer fun of it, animals that have been known to snatch unwary hikers—particularly children—from woodland paths on a regular basis. When told that deer kill more people each year than wolves
8 have in the entirety of recorded history in North America, the visitor’s response to the author’s obvious naïveté vacillated between indignation and pity.
Educating the public about animals and the roles they play in their ecosystems is hugely important to conservation efforts, and how animals are portrayed in the media also is a major determining factor in people’s attitudes. In tracing attitudes toward wolves over time, Bruskotter et al. (2007) found that media portrayal of wolves had a huge impact on how the public felt about wolf conservation efforts. Interestingly, wolf conservation sometimes lost public favor not because the public had anything against wolves, per se—just against specific government policies regarding the conservation effort. But even that association effect bled over into people’s attitudes toward wolves.
Both the third and fourth points (about knowledge and experience, respectively) are strongly related, although their effects on people’s attitudes toward animals are not always easy to predict. In one study of people’s attitudes toward large carnivore species in Norway, people with higher levels of education expressed less fear of large predators, and people who lived in areas where these animals were present expressed less fear of them than did people who lived where these animals were absent (Røskaft, Bjerke,
Kaltenborn, Linnel, & Andersen, 2003). On the other hand, Karlsson and Sjöström
(2007) found that favorable attitudes toward wolves correlated positively with distance from the nearest wolf territory.
What Are Animals to Us?
Let us now take these ideas a little further. A major component of how people feel about animals comes from making comparisons—to other animals, and to humans.
9 The most basic comparison, and one which we probably make all the time, is this: How do I compare this animal (or person, for that matter) to myself? Perhaps when the participants in Rasmussen and Rajecki’s (1995) study compared dogs and boys, they found both more like each other than like themselves. So, they rated dogs as being boy- like—or boys as being dog-like, depending on your point of view.
When Allen et al. (2002) looked at people’s desires to see animal-abusers punished, they found participants’ desire for punishment correlated with how strongly they perceived the abused animal as being like themselves. Perhaps a comparison is being made, and participants are asking themselves, “Who is more like me, the abused animal or the human abuser?” And the answer, at least some of the time, seems to be the former. When conflicts arise over how animals should be treated—say, between wildlife conservationists and cattle farmers—each of the two parties mutually scratch their collective heads and wonder how the other party could be so inhuman: The conservationists wonder how a person with any human feeling at all can get in a helicopter and shoot wolves with a high-powered assault rifle, while at the same time the ranchers bemoan how any intelligent human being can allow a mangy animal to ruin a man’s livelihood.
Kaltenborn, Bjerke, and Strumse (1998) queried sheep farmers, wildlife managers, and research biologists on their attitudes toward large carnivores. And while they found differences between these three groups, there were many similarities. All three expressed largely positive attitudes regarding conservation (although the farmers were more likely to express attitudes of human exceptionalism). The real difference
10 between these three groups was only in regards to large predators, which the farmers justifiably perceived as threats to their lives and livelihoods. And it’s not that the farmers are lacking in empathy for animals. In fact, the more a sheep farmer indicates empathy with and emotional attachment to his sheep, the stronger his negative attitudes toward predators are (Bjerke & Kaltenborn, 1999). And, just as the farmers might be accused of not “understanding” animals, they can probably fairly accuse the conservationists of the same thing—or, at least, not understanding those animals in the context of farmers’ livelihoods. In asking farmers and non-farmers for their recommendations in dealing with problem wildlife (that is, wildlife that typically damage crops or kill livestock), non- farmers strongly preferred non-lethal methods, whereas farmers preferred “whichever method works best” (McIvor & Conover, 1994). These attitudes can sometimes impair farmers’ judgment: When livestock are threatened by diseases carried by wild hoofstock
(e.g., deer), wolves and other predators become an important mechanism of controlling the spread of disease. Yet, even when farmers are educated on this, they still express concern about having these predators anywhere near their lands, and would prefer they were gone (Stronen, Brook, Paquet, & Mclachlan, 2007).
While this might seem extreme, consider the lot of subsistence farmers in other cultures. In Nepal, for example, the average farming family loses less than one animal to snow leopard depredation each year—but the loss of even one animal amounts to nearly a quarter of the typical individual’s annual income. Given those circumstances, it is perhaps understandable that most Nepali farmers have strongly negative attitudes toward snow leopards, indicating complete extermination as the only viable solution to the
11 problem (Oli, Taylor, & Rogers, 1994). So, while it might be tempting to say that those who don’t express enthusiastic support for predator conservation efforts are in some way empathically defective, the truth is more complicated. How we perceive animals depends largely on context: Thus, ranchers and conservationists might seem to be talking about the same animal, but in terms of their respective relationships with that animal, they’re really not.
When Animals Become More than Human
Whether for reasons of religion-based Dominionism or some other variety of human exceptionalism, we in the West tend to think of ourselves as somehow removed from the “web of life”—particularly the food chain. That an animal would so upset the perceived cosmic order as to kill (and, even worse, eat) a human produces a level of cognitive dissonance that for us normally comes only from Hollywood. Wilbert (2006) gives an excellent example of this: In Australia, dingoes attacked a mother and her nine- year old son, ending in the child’s death. This completely changed public opinion toward dingoes: They were suddenly seen as villainous, vengeful creatures, sneaking into human territory with ill intent. They were chased away or shot “in a bid to return the population to their ‘natural’ hierarchical and solitary behavior and ‘proper’ spaces from which they had strayed. Boundaries had to be policed, reasserted, cleansed of the ‘criminal’ behavior of these animals, and in this furor animals were anthropomorphized, attributed with humanlike aberrant qualities” (p.38). In our own culture, we have tales of the Big Bad
Wolf (in whom, apparently, the visitor at the zoo strongly believed). Some African cultures believe that we reincarnate, and that while most people are born as other humans,
12 great leaders and other people of power may sometimes be reborn as lions. They believe that, in these cases, these powerful spirits may strike out vengefully against anyone who acts against the spirits’ interests. Given this belief, it is not hard to imagine how the locals might have arrived at a supernatural explanation when the infamous lions of Tsavo began attacking and killing the workers who were laboring to build a railway across the land (Patterson, 2004).
Indeed, in places where being killed by an animal constitutes a very real and omnipresent danger, these man-eaters are sometimes incorporated into the local mythologies—often as monsters of some variety, forces of evil to be overcome; but sometimes as instruments of divine justice (the man-eating tigers of the Sundarbans being a good example of the latter)—perhaps because of the culture’s need to explain how the perceived natural order could be so violated. Likewise, animals that spread disease—or that are believed to do so—tend to be ill-favored in stories (rats and toads are good examples of these).
Some species that don’t necessarily pose a threat to human life but to our livelihoods come to be villainized as well, though not quite to the “big bad wolf” extent:
The fox is renowned as a cunning and generally untrustworthy trickster (and even shapeshifter) in many cultures, and some people may be familiar with a rhyme about counting crows (or magpies, depending on your side of the Atlantic) that begins, “One for sorrow, two for joy...”
In some cases, even relatively benign species have the misfortune of being maligned by myth and superstition. The aye-aye, an unfortunately grotesque-looking
13 primate native to Madagascar, is endangered in large part because it is believed to be a harbinger of death, and is therefore generally killed on sight. Perhaps in the absence of germ theory and the need for a culprit to blame when people fell ill, people chose the aye- aye, which happens to look the part, to be the scapegoat (a word that represents yet another case of animals taking blame which, unfortunately, is too much of a theological digression to pursue here). Thus, while perceiving animals as like humans correlates with favorable attitudes towards them, in cases where animals become threatening to our lives and livelihood, in a sense we see animals as more—and less—than human: These threatening creatures reach mythological levels of power, like the werewolf or dragon, and they exhibit a human-like capacity for intelligence and cruelty, but are rarely (if ever) credited with any of the “human” goodness of compassion or mercy.
The Present Study
The goal of this study was to examine how people’s perceptions of animals, particularly the mental lives of animals, are affected by information suggesting that an animal is threatening, and the extent to which participants’ initial attitudes toward animals influence their susceptibility to this effect. As a baseline measure, participants were given the Animal Attitude Scale (Herzog, Betchart, & Pittman, 1991), which examines attitudes toward animals on a number of factors, including hunting animals, eating them for food, keeping them in zoos, and using them for research.
Participants were then presented with one of three animals: A saltwater crocodile, a Bengal tiger, or a chimpanzee. They saw a picture of the animal and were asked to rate on a Likert scale how familiar with the animal they were. They then read a short Reading
14 Sample about the animal which, depending on participants’ experimental condition
(control vs. non-threatening vs. threatening), contained wholly neutral information about the animal, contained an additional paragraph about the animal and humans coexisting peacefully, or contained an additional paragraph about the animal and humans coming into conflict, with humans being hurt or killed as a result.
Next, participants were asked to rate the animal about which they’d just read on the five-point Animal Rating Scale, based on Driscoll’s (1995) similar work. Then, they were given the 24-point Perceptions of Animal Minds questionnaire, original to this study. This questionnaire consists of a list of mental states, and participants were asked to rate on a series of Likert scales how likely it was that the animal about which they’d just read was capable of experiencing each of those mental states.
Finally, in the Participant Background and Attitudes Toward Animals questionnaire, participants were asked 21 questions detailing aspects of their background, such as age, sex, pet ownership history, and religiosity. All measures used in this questionnaire have been found previously to correlate with people’s attitudes toward animals.
It was difficult to decide which three species to use for the Animal component of the study. The three were chosen because they are all fairly familiar, although none are found naturally in North America, and they are all large animals. The animals needed to be representative of somewhat different clades, with some clearly more similar to humans than others. It was decided by the researchers that a non-human primate (chimpanzee), a
15 non-primate mammal (tiger), and a reptile (crocodile) would offer a decent, although limited, sample from the spectrum of animal life.
For the effect of Condition, it was predicted that those participants who were presented with any animal in the threat condition would rate the animal less favorably on the Animal Rating Scale, and on the Perceptions of Mental States questionnaire they would indicate “angry-type” mental states as more likely, and “happy-type” mental states as less likely. It was predicted that the reverse would hold true for the non-threat condition: That is, participants in this condition would rate their animal favorably on the
Animal Rating Scale, and would indicate “happy-type” mental states as more likely and
“angry-type” mental states as less likely on the Perceptions of Mental States questionnaire.
For the effect of Animal, it was predicted that the chimpanzee, as the most human-like of the three animals, would be rated more favorably than the others, regardless of experimental condition, while the crocodile, as the least human-like, would be perceived less favorably.
It was predicted that those who scored highly on the Animal Attitude Scale, indicating favorable perceptions of animals, would be less susceptible to the “threat bias” predicted in the threat condition.
16 METHOD
Participants
Participants were 260 undergraduate psychology students from Florida Atlantic
University, recruited via posted sign-up sheets at the Boca Raton campus, in accordance with the requirements of the university’s IRB. Participants received research credit, required for the psychology class in which they were enrolled, but otherwise were not compensated for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of nine test conditions in the study.
Materials
The survey consisted of a collection of three questionnaires that examined people’s perceptions of animals, a reading sample about one of three animals, and an additional questionnaire used to gather personal information.
The first questionnaire was the Animal Attitudes Scale (AAS), developed by
Herzog et al. (1991). This scale is a well-established measure used to gauge people’s attitudes toward animals in varying contexts, including hunting, food production, and scientific research (! = .90). For the purposes of the current study, the AAS functioned as a baseline measure of participants’ general attitudes toward animals.
The following are two examples if questions from the AAS. The entire questionnaire is presented in Appendix A.
17 18 AAS Sample Questions:
Much of the scientific research done with animals is unnecessary and cruel.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
I think it is perfectly acceptable for cattle and hogs to be raised for human consumption.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
The Reading Samples were nine short narratives written for this study. At the top of the page with the reading, participants were asked to look at the picture of the animal and rate on a six-point Likert scale how familiar they were with the animal in question.
Each of the readings was a factual, “encyclopedic-style” article about one of three species
—the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), the tiger (Panthera tigris), or the saltwater crocodile
(Crocodylus porosus). Each reading contained general, neutral information about the animal, including topics such as habitat, diet, and reproduction. These readings can be found in Table 1.
For each animal, participants read one of three types of descriptions: Control,
Threatening, or Non-Threatening. The Control version of each reading contained only this neutral information. In the other two conditions, the readings included an additional short paragraph briefly describing the animal in question’s relationship with humans. In the Non-Threat condition, participants read about the animal co-existing in relative peace with humans, with little conflict between the two species, while in the Threat condition, participants read about humans and this animal coming into direct conflict, with the result
19 of humans being injured or killed. These additional “threat” and non-threat” paragraphs for each animal are presented in Table 2.
The second questionnaire was the Animal Rating Scale (ARS). This scale was adapted from a measure used by Driscoll (1995), and asked participants to rate the animal about which they had just read on a five-point scale on each of five factors indicating their positive/negative perceptions of this animal: Important to Humans, Safe, Smart,
Lovable, and Important to Environment (The ARS is presented in Appendix B). The third measure was the Perceptions of Mental States questionnaire (PMS). This measure, designed specifically for this study, had participants examine 24 mental states of varying complexity, positive/negative affect, and threatening/non-threatening elements; they were then asked to rate on a five-point scale the likelihood that the animal from the reading sample is capable of experiencing each of these mental states. This list was created with a mixture of positive and negative mental states, with the negative divided into threatening and non-threatening states. The list of mental states was randomized to determine the order in which they would be presented in the study. The PMS questionnaire is presented in Appendix C.
The final portion of the survey was the Participant Background and Attitudes toward Animals questionnaire (PB). These questions dealt with items that in previous research had been shown to correlate with scores on Herzog’s AAS, including gender, pet ownership, and beliefs and attitudes regarding evolutionary theory. This portion of the questionnaire was last in the survey so as to avoid any possible cuing effects for
20 participants that might have altered how they answered the other portions of the survey
(The PB questionnaire is presented in Appendix D).
Procedure
Participants were given the survey in paper format, administered in a single sitting. While they were informed of the general purpose of the study at the time they signed their consent forms, they were not made aware of the experimental hypothesis until after they had completed the survey and were given their debriefing, so as to avoid possibly biasing the results.
All elements of the questionnaire were given at the same time. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three animals (crocodile, tiger, chimpanzee) and within each of these one of three experimental conditions (control, non-threat, threat).
Participants began with the AAS as a baseline measure. After completing this measure, they read the Reading Sample (each participant only saw the reading sample appropriate to that individual’s assigned Animal and Condition). They then answered the
ARS and the PMS questionnaires, and finally the PB questionnaire. When they completed the survey and turned it in, they were debriefed.
21 RESULTS
Animal Attitude Scale
Scores on the Animal Attitude Scale were used as a baseline measure of participants’ overall attitudes toward animals. The Scale has a range of 20-100, with higher scores indicating more positive attitudes toward animals. Participants had an average score of 57.32 (SD = 10.21), with a range of 34 to 89. Statistical analysis showed that there was no correlation between Animal Attitude Scale scores and either assigned Animal or Condition; therefore there was no significant inadvertent difference in baseline attitudes between the experimental groups. Because gender effects are known to be significant in attitudes toward animals, the effect of gender was examined in preliminary analyses, but, because it rarely produced significant effects, is not reported unless it yielded significant effects.
Animal Rating Scale
For the Animal Rating Scale that was given to participants after the reading samples, analyses were performed to determine the effects of 1) assigned Animal and 2) assigned Condition on how they rated the animal on a set of five parameters. Note that all of these parameters were reverse scored on a scale of 1 to 5—that is, a score of 1 indicates the most favorable rating, whereas a score of 5 indicates the least favorable. To control for the effect of familiarity on participants’ perceptions of their assigned animal,
22 participants were asked prior to the reading sample to indicate how familiar they were with the animal on a scale from 1 to 6, with 1 indicating “Very familiar” and 6 “Not familiar at all.” These scores were used as a covariate in subsequent analyses.
The Animal Rating Scale scores were analyzed using a 3 (Animal: crocodile vs. tiger vs. chimpanzee) x 3 (Condition: control vs. non-threat vs. threat) between-subjects
ANOVA, using Familiarity as a covariate, for each of the five Animal Rating Scale questions. Post-hoc analyses used Tukey’s test, p < .05, unless otherwise specified.
Animal Rating Scale 1: Important to Humans
For participants’ mean scores on the Animal Rating Scale measure Important to
Humans organized by Animal and Condition, see Table 3.
The Animal x Condition analysis produced a significant main effect of Animal, F
(2, 247) = 30.30, p < .001, partial !2 = .20. Neither the main effect of Condition, F(2,
247) < 1, nor the Animal x Condition interaction, F(4, 247) < 1, was significant. Post- hoc analyses of the significant main effect of Animal showed that participants rated the chimpanzee (M = 2.23) as significantly more important to humans than the tiger (M =
2.91), and the tiger as significantly more important than the crocodile (M = 3.33).
The effect of the covariate Familiarity was also significant, F(1, 247) = 16.86, p
< .001, partial !2 = .06, with participants indicating greater familiarity with the animals rating animals as more important to humans.
Animal Rating Scale 2: Smart
For participants’ mean scores on the Animal Rating Scale measure Smart organized by Animal and Condition, see Table 4.
23 The Animal x Condition analysis produced a significant main effect of Animal, F
(2, 247) = 12.30, p < .001, partial !2 = .09. Neither the main effect of Condition, F(2,
247) = 1.53, nor the Animal x Condition interaction F(4, 247) < 1, was significant. Post- hoc analyses of the significant main effect of Animal showed that participants rated both the chimpanzee (M = 1.85) and the tiger (M = 1.80) as significantly smarter than the crocodile (M = 2.52).
The effect of the covariate Familiarity was also significant, ,F(1, 247) = 7.92, p = .
005, partial !2 = .03, with participants indicating greater familiarity rating animals as more intelligent.
Animal Rating Scale 3: Lovable
For participants’ mean scores on the Animal Rating Scale measure Lovable organized by Animal and Condition, see Table 5.
The Animal x Condition analysis produced significant main effects of both
Animal, F(2, 247) = 77.50, p < .001, partial !2 = .39, and Condition, F(2, 247) = 3.03, p
= .05, partial !2 = .02. The Animal x Condition interaction was not significant, F(4, 247)
< 1. Post-hoc analyses of the significant main effect of Animal showed that participants rated the chimpanzee (M = 2.18) as significantly more lovable than the tiger (M = 2.78), and the tiger as significantly more lovable than the crocodile (M = 4. 07). Post-hoc analyses of the significant main effect of Condition revealed that participants in the non- threat condition (M = 2.80) rated their animals as more lovable than did those in the threat condition (M = 3.28). No other interactions were significant.
The effect of the covariate Familiarity was not significant, F(1, 247) < 1.
24 Animal Rating Scale 4: Safe
For participants’ mean scores on the Animal Rating Scale measure Safe organized by Animal and Condition, see Table 6.
The Animal x Condition analysis produced significant main effects of both
Animal, F(2, 247) = 32.01, p < .001, partial !2 = .21, and Condition, F(2, 247) = 15.93, p
< .001, partial !2 = .11. The Animal x Condition interaction was not significant, F(4,
247) =1.06. Post-hoc analyses of the significant main effect of Animal showed that participants rated the chimpanzee (M = 3.57) as significantly safer than the tiger (M =
3.71), and the tiger as significantly safer than the crocodile (M = 4.10). Post-hoc analyses of the significant main effect of Condition revealed that participants in the non-threat condition (M = 3.13) rated their animals as safer than did those in the control condition
(M = 3.64), and participants in the control condition rater their animals as safer than did those in the threat condition (M = 3.97).
The effect of the covariate Familiarity, F(1, 247) = 1.34, was not significant.
Animal Rating Scale 5: Important to Environment
For participants’ mean scores on the Animal Rating Scale measure Important to
Environment organized by Animal and Condition, see Table 7.
The Animal x Condition analysis produced no significant main effect of either
Animal, F(2, 247) = 1.90, or Condition, F(2, 247) < 1, nor was the Animal x Condition interaction significant, F(4, 247) < 1. The covariate Familiarity produced a significant effect, F(1, 247) = 7.39, p < .005, partial !2 = .03, with participants indicating greater familiarity with the animals rating animals as more important to the environment.
25 A preliminary analysis did produce a significant interaction effect of Animal x
Gender, F(2, 238) = 4.43, p < .05, partial !2 = .04. Bonferroni t-tests found no significant differences between individual means across the Animal and Gender categories; in general, however, male participants rated the crocodile (M = 2.05) as more important to the environment than the tiger (M = 2.12) and the tiger more important than the chimpanzee (M = 2.27), whereas female participants ranked the chimpanzee (M = 1.79) most important, followed by the tiger (M = 2.27) and crocodile (M = 2.36).
Perceptions of Mental States
After completing the Animal Rating Scale, participants were asked to rate the likelihood that their assigned animal was capable of experiencing each of 24 mental states in the Perceptions of Mental States questionnaire. These were reverse scored, with a score of 1 indicating the participant felt it was “very likely” that the animal could experience the mental state in question, and 5 indicating it was “very unlikely.”
Factor analysis
A factor analysis was performed on the 24 mental states from the Perceptions of
Mental States questionnaire, producing three components with eigenvalues greater than
1.5. Individual mental states were considered to load significantly for a component if their loading strength was " 0.5. For a list of these three components of the factor analysis, and the loading strengths of their respective constituent mental states, see Table
8. The first component, called Complex Self-Aware, consisted of the nine mental states guilt, grief, sadism, resentment, compassion, shame, sadness, embarrassment, and sympathy. The second component, called Simple Positive, consisted of the three mental
26 states pleasure, happiness, and joy. The third component, called Aggressive, consisted of the four mental states vengefulness, spite, jealousy, and hatred. The averages of participants’ ratings of the mental states in each of the three components from the factor analysis were used as their Component scores (e.g., the average of the scores for pleasure, happiness, and joy became the Component score for the Simple Positive component).
Participants’ scores on the Animal Attitude Scale were sorted into high and low categories, with scores from 20 to 60 coded as low, and scores from 61 to 100 coded as high (This variable is referred to as “Attitude”). The three Components of the factor analysis were then analyzed using a 3 (Animal) x 3 (Condition) x 2 (Attitude: high vs. low) between-subjects ANOVA, separately for each component. Post-hoc analyses used
Tukey’s test, p < .05, unless otherwise specified.
Complex Self-Aware
For participants’ mean scores on the Complex Self-Aware mental states organized by Animal, Condition, and Attitude, see Table 9.
The Animal x Condition x Attitude analysis produced significant main effects of
Animal, F(2, 240) = 47.00, p <.001, partial !2 = .28, and Condition, F(2, 240) = 3.86, p
< .05, partial !2 = .03. The main effect of Attitude was not significant, F(1, 240) < 1, nor were the interaction effects of Animal x Condition, F(4, 240) < 1, Animal x Attitude, F(2,
240) = 2.24, Condition x Attitude, F(2, 240) = 1.56, or Animal x Condition x Attitude, F
(4, 240) = 1.87.
Post-hoc analyses of the significant main effect of Animal showed that participants rated the chimpanzee (M = 2.35) as significantly more likely to experience
27 the Complex Self-Aware mental states than the tiger (M = 2.96), and the tiger as significantly more likely to experience these mental states than the crocodile (M = 3.53); post-hoc analyses of the significant main effect of Condition revealed that participants in the non-threat condition (M = 2.75) rated their animals as more likely to experience these mental states than did those in the control condition (M = 3.02) and in the threat condition
(M = 3.05), with the latter two conditions not differing from one another.
A preliminary analysis produced a significant main effect of Gender, F(1, 224) =
5.45, p < .05, partial !2 = .02, with female participants rating animals as more likely to experience the Complex Self-Aware mental states (M = 2.80) than did male participants
(M = 3.15).
Simple Positive
For participants’ mean scores on the Simple Positive mental states organized by
Animal, Condition, and Attitude, see Table 10.
The Animal x Condition x Attitude analysis produced a significant main effect of
Animal, F(2, 240) = 49.98, p < .001, partial !2 = .29, and a nearly significant main effect of Attitude, F(1, 240) = 3.79, p # .05, partial !2 = .02, as well as significant interaction effects of Condition x Attitude, F(2, 240) =4.49, p < .05, and Animal x Condition x
Attitude, F(4, 240) = 6.70, p < .001. The main effect of Condition, F(2, 240) = 1.58, was not significant, nor were the interaction effects of Animal x Condition, F(4, 240) = 1.63, and Animal x Attitude, F(2, 240) < 1. Post-hoc analyses of the significant main effect of
Animal showed that participants rated the chimpanzee (M = 1.62) as significantly more likely to experience the Simple Positive mental states than the tiger (M = 2.03), and the
28 tiger as significantly more likely to experience these mental states than the crocodile (M =
2.79).
Bonferroni t-tests of the Condition x Attitude interaction effect revealed that, among participants with high Animal Attitude Scale scores, animals in the non-threat condition were rated as being significantly more likely to experience the Simple Positive mental states (M = 1.72) than were those in the threat condition (M = 2.33), t = 3.81, p < .
001. In the non-threat condition, participants with high Animal Attitude Scale scores rated animals as significantly more likely to experience Simple Positive mental states (M
= 1.72) than did those with low Animal Attitude Scale scores (M = 2.26), t = 3.38, p < .
001. As a general trend, participants with high Animal Attitude Scale scores rated animals in the threat condition as the least likely to experience these mental states, whereas those with low Animal Attitude Scale scores rated these animals as the most likely (M = 2.07).
T-tests of the Animal x Condition x Attitude interaction effect revealed that participants with high Animal Attitude Scale scores in the control and non-threat conditions rated the crocodile as significantly more likely to experience Simple Positive mental states (M = 2.19 and 2.22, respectively) than did those with low Animal Attitude
Scale scores (M = 3.25 and 3.13, respectively), ts > 3.20, p < .005, while in the threat condition participants with high Animal Attitude Scale scores rated the crocodile as significantly less likely to experience these mental states (M = 3.57) than did those with low Animal Attitude Scale scores (M = 2.48), t = 3.84, p < .001.
29 Aggressive
For participants’ mean scores on the Aggressive mental states organized by
Animal, Condition, and Attitude, see Table 11.
The Animal x Condition x Attitude analysis produced a significant main effect of
Animal, F(241, 2) = 3.08, p < .001, partial !2 = .03, and a significant Condition x
Attitude interaction effect, F(2, 241) = 3.48, p < .05, partial !2 = .03. Neither the main effects of Condition, F(2, 241) < 1, Attitude, F(1, 241) < 1, nor the interaction effects of
Animal x Condition, F(4, 241) < 1, Animal x Attitude, F(2, 241) = 1.21, and Animal x
Condition x Attitude, F(4, 241) = 1.56, were significant.
Post-hoc analyses of the significant main effect of Animal revealed no significant differences; using the LSD test, however—a less conservative test than Tukey’s test— showed that participants rated the chimpanzee (M = 2.44) as significantly more likely to experience the mental states than the crocodile (M = 2.74). Participants also rated the tiger (M = 2.49) as more likely to experience these mental states than the crocodile, but this difference was not significant.
Bonferroni t-tests of the significant interaction effect of Condition x Attitude revealed that, in the threat condition, participants with low Animal Attitude Scale scores rated animals as significantly more likely to experience Aggressive mental states (M =
2.32) than did those with high Animal Attitude Scale scores (M = 2.89), t = 2.89, p < .
005. As a general trend, participants with low Animal Attitude Scale scores rated animals in the threat condition as most likely to experience these mental states, whereas
30 participants with high Animal Attitude Scale scores rated these animals as the least likely to experience these mental states.
Participant Background and Attitudes toward Animals
The final portion of the survey consisted of a series of questions regarding participants’ personal backgrounds. Preliminary analysis showed that participants’ age was strongly skewed and had little variability, so this was not included in any further analysis. Similarly, within the variable Religion, the categories Hindu and Unitarian
Universalist were collapsed into the category “Other.” The remaining 20 variables from the Participant Background questionnaire were run individually in either t-tests or One-
Way ANOVAs (depending on the number of values for each variable), with total score on the Animal Attitude Scale as the dependent variable. For brevity, only significant effects are reported.
Gender
A t-test on the variable Gender was significant, t = 6.59, p < .001, with women (M
= 60.43) scoring higher on the Animal Attitude Scale than men (M = 52.51).
Dog
A t-test on the variable Dog (whether participants owned or had owned a dog) was significant, t = 2.29, p < .05, with participants who had owned a pet dog (M = 58.08) having significantly higher scores on the Animal Attitude Scale than those who had not
(M = 54.61).
31 Reptile
A t-test on the variable Reptile (whether participants owned or had owned a pet reptile that was not a snake) was significant, t = 2.23, p < .05, with participants who had owned a pet reptile (M = 59.82) having significantly higher scores on the Animal Attitude
Scale than those who had not (M = 56.54).
Job
A t-test on the variable Job (whether participants had ever had a job that involved working with animals) was significant, t = 3.27, p = .001, with participants who had worked with animals (M = 63.30) having significantly higher scores on the Animal
Attitude Scale than those who had not (M = 56.63).
Believe in Evolution
A One-Way ANOVA of the variable Believe in Evolution (the extent to which participants indicated belief in evolution: definitely yes, more yes than no, more no than yes, definitely no) produced a marginally significant effect, F(3, 258) = 2.59, p # .05, with participants who indicated Definitely Yes (M = 59.57) having the highest scores on the Animal Attitude Scale, and those indicating Definitely No (M = 53.96) having the lowest.
Religion
For a table of mean scores on the Animal Attitude Scale by religion, see Table 12.
A One-Way ANOVA of the variable Religion (participants’ religious affiliation) produced a significant effect, F(7, 254) = 3.23, p < .005. Post-hoc analyses using
Tukey’s test showed that Atheist/Agnostic participants (M = 62.68) had significantly
32 higher scores on the Animal Attitude Scale than Protestant participants (M = 51.21; these were the highest and lowest scores, respectively). Participants categorized as Other (M =
62.32) also scored significantly higher than Protestant participants. No other contrasts were significant.
Services
A One-Way ANOVA of the variable Services (how often participants attended religious services and/or engaged in religious activities: more than once a week, once a week, less than once a week) produced a significant effect, F(2, 255) = 4.07, p < .05.
Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s test showed that participants who attended services less than once a week (M = 58.28) had significantly higher scores on the Animal Attitude
Scale than did participants who attended services once a week (M = 53.68) or more than once a week (M = 55.00), with the latter two groups not differing from each other.
33 DISCUSSION
Animal Rating Scale
It was predicted that responses to the five questions from the Animal Rating Scale would be influenced by participants’ Animal (crocodile vs. tiger vs. chimpanzee) and
Condition (control vs. non-threat vs. threat), with participants responding most favorably to the chimpanzee and to the non-threat condition, and least favorably to the crocodile and the threat condition. For four of the five measures, participants were influenced by their assigned animal in a way consistent with the hypothesis, with participants rating the chimpanzee as the most Important to Humans, Smart, Lovable, and Safe. On the last measure, Important to Environment, this trend was maintained in female participants, but the trend reversed for male participants, who rated the crocodile the most important to the environment, and the chimpanzee the least. It would be interesting if, like Driscoll
(1995), participants were asked to also rate humans on these measures. It’s possible that these participants deemed chimpanzees, liked humans, to be largely “above the fray” environmentally; alternatively, men may have a bias toward large carnivores (tigers and crocodiles) that women do not share.
Participants’ assigned Condition only affected their ratings on the measures
Lovable and Safe, with animals in the non-threat condition rated the most favorably on these measures, and those in the threat condition the least favorably. That this effect
34 occurred for the measure Safe should not be surprising: It merely confirms that the
“threat” messages in the readings succeeded in suggesting to participants that these animals could harm people. But the response on the measure Lovable is far more interesting, as it seems to support the previous research examining the importance of empathy. A dangerous creature is difficult to love.
Interestingly, the covariate Familiarity, which correlated positively with favorable attitudes on the measures Important to Humans, Smart, and Important to the Environment was not significant for Lovable or Safe. This suggests that while Important to Humans,
Smart, Important to the Environment might involve an intellectual judgment on the part of the participants, Lovable and Safe seem to get at a wholly affect-based response—that is, previous knowledge about animals (real or perceived, or lack thereof) apparently had no bearing on participants’ judgments on these two measures.
Perceptions of Mental States
Of the 24 mental states used in the Perceptions of Mental States questionnaire, 12 factored significantly into three components (Self-Aware, Simple Positive, Aggressive).
For the effect of Animal, it was predicted that chimpanzee would be rated the most likely to possess any of these mental states; and for the effect of Condition, it was predicted that participants in the Threat condition would rate “angry-type” (or, as they sorted out,
Aggressive) mental states as more likely to occur than would those in the other conditions, while for the other mental states the reverse would be true.
For the first component, the Self-Aware mental states (guilt, grief, sadism, resentment, compassion, shame, sadness, embarrassment, sympathy), there were
35 significant differences between all three animals, with the chimpanzee rated the most likely to experience these mental states and the crocodile rated the least likely.
Participants’ Condition also influenced responses, with those in the non-threat condition rating animals significantly more likely to experience these mental states than in both the control and threat conditions. While there are some negative, somewhat threatening mental states included in this component (i.e., sadism, resentment), on the whole these nine states are all fairly social, higher-order mental states arguably requiring self- awareness. It is therefore likely that participants in the non-threat condition saw their assigned animals as more human than did those in the other conditions.
For the second component, Simple Positive mental states (pleasure, happiness, joy), there was again the expected effect of Animal. Examination of the Condition x
Attitude effect showed that, among participants who had scored highly on the Animal
Attitude Scale, the effect of Condition behaved as predicted, with animals in the non- threat condition being perceived as more likely to experience these mental states than in the threat condition. But among participants with low scores on the Animal Attitude
Scale, this trend was reversed, and animals in the threat condition were perceived as most likely to experience these mental states. Regardless of how they scored on the Animal
Attitude Scale, participants in the threat condition still rated the Simple Positive mental states as fairly likely to occur; so it is possible the effect of the threat condition was not as strong for these mental states. Examining the Animal x Condition x Attitude interaction effect, we see that participants responded uniquely to the crocodile: While in the non- threat and control conditions participants with high scores on the Animal Attitude Scale
36 rated the crocodile more likely to experience these mental states than did those with low scores, in the threat condition this was reversed, and participants with low Attitude scores rated the crocodile more likely to experience these mental states than did those with high scores. It is not clear what could cause this response.
For the third component, Aggressive mental states (vengefulness, spite, jealousy, hatred), the effect of Animal was not as strong as in the previous two: The chimpanzee was still rated as the most likely to experience these mental states, but the difference between animals was notably smaller—suggesting participants viewed the ability to experience these Aggressive mental states as plausible for all animals. Examining the
Condition x Attitude interaction effect, we see that in the threat condition participants with low scores on the Animal Attitude Scale rated animals as more likely to experience these mental states than did those with high scores. Furthermore, among those with high scores on the Animal Attitude Scale, animals in the threat condition were rated the least likely to experience these mental states. This supports the prediction that those with less favorable baseline attitudes toward animals would be more susceptible to “threat bias,” perceiving dangerous animals as mentally and emotionally aggressive. The second result, though, is somewhat less straightforward: Why would participants with favorable attitudes toward animals rate the threatening ones as the least likely to experience mental aggression? Perhaps it’s a function of the perceived locus of control. As Wilbert (2006) points out, while many people perceive dangerous animals as villainous, scheming creatures, for some the perception is quite different. Instead, they perceive the dangerous animal, on the whole, as not being responsible for its actions. The threatening animal is
37 merely a dangerous force of nature, not unlike a tornado or a flood, and human error is thus the cause of any conflict between humans and the animal in question. The animal is merely obeying its instincts, doing what is in its “nature,” and people should know better than to get in the way.
Participant Background and Attitudes toward Animals
Finally, in examining the data from the Participant Background questionnaire, we found several interesting effects. The gender effect was not surprising, as this is fairly ubiquitous in the literature. It was somewhat surprising that pet ownership, in general, had no effect. It was interesting to note, however, that ownership of specific pets did have an effect. Pet dogs, as mentioned earlier, are practically a standard in American culture. Indeed, nearly 80% of participants indicated that they owned or had owned a pet dog. The causal relationship here could go either way: People with less positive attitudes toward animals might be disinclined to have a dog in the home; alternatively, having a dog in the home might facilitate the development of positive attitudes toward animals.
Ownership of a pet reptile also correlated with positive attitudes toward animals.
Fewer than 25% of respondents indicating having had a non-snake pet reptile. It seems likely that those with favorable opinions of animals might be more inclined to keep an unusual pet than would the average person, although, once again, the causal relationship might very well run the opposite direction—that is, exposure to atypical pets might facilitate positive attitudes toward animals.
Similarly, having had a job working with animals predicted favorable attitudes, though whether this is because working with animals causes people to view them
38 favorably or because people with positive attitudes toward animals would be more inclined to work with them is difficult to determine. It’s important to note, though, that it was not immediately apparent that this correlation would appear—working in a slaughterhouse, after all, would qualify as a job “working with animals,” but we might not expect slaughterhouse workers to have strongly favorable attitudes toward animals.
Indeed, one would expect that people working with animals in a way that requires them to harm or even kill animals on a regular basis might develop less favorable attitudes toward animals—or, as Driscoll found (1995), they might develop unfavorable attitudes only toward the specific animal with which they worked. Of course, because no attempt was made to differentiate between kinds of jobs working with animals in the analysis, this specific issue was not examined.
Belief in evolution has been shown previously to correlate with positive attitudes toward animals, so it was not surprising to find this effect. In examining the effect of religious affiliation, it is interesting to note that all groups of Christian respondents had
Animal Attitude Scale scores that fell below the overall average (M = 57.32; although it was unexpected that the small number of Buddhist respondents also fell below this average). It is possible that this is the result of Dominionistic attitudes toward animals, as mentioned earlier; but because varieties of attitudes toward animals were not explicitly examined in this study, this cannot be determined for certain. Interestingly, the frequency with which participants engaged in religious activity only mattered inasmuch as those who did so precisely once a week (that is, the regular church/synagogue/temple attendees) had less favorable attitudes toward animals than either those who went less
39 often (including those who never did so) or those who engaged in religious activity more than once a week; both of these latter two groups had similarly high scores on the Animal
Attitude Scale. Because participants were not asked to be specific about the nature of their religious activities, we can only speculate on the nature of this third group; but it likely includes those who attend religious services frequently or are involved in religion- based social groups, people who engage in frequent prayer and/or meditation, or those who regularly read scriptures. With religiosity generally being associated with less favorable attitudes toward animals, it is unclear what it is about the religiously active participants that makes their attitudes toward animals more positive than those who simply engage in religious activity weekly.
The Other Uncanny Valley
How people perceive animals is of course important to those interested in ecology and conservation, but its importance extends throughout much of science. One needn’t look far to see that debates over the use of animals in research, for example, continue to rage as fiercely as ever; and related discussions are ongoing as to the rights of animals— particularly the rights of our closest living relatives, the chimpanzee and bonobo, as well as the other great apes.
Animals play a central role in scientific research. We study animals not only to try to understand them, but also to understand ourselves. Much of the research into both healthy development and pathology utilizes animal models. But this poses a philosophical dilemma: For animals to be useful models of human wellness and disease,
40 they must be sufficiently like us; but if they are too like us, we may no longer feel justified in conducting our research on them.
Perhaps it is for this reason that a number of states in the U.S.A. have made it illegal to produce chimaeras—hybrid creatures possessing the DNA of multiple species
—with any human genetic material. Even among people who do not have religiously- based Dominionistic attitudes toward animals, there is nonetheless a predominant view of human exceptionalism: Humans are, in some way, qualitatively different from other animals. Even as we accept the fact of evolution by natural selection, and even as we are aware that all known life is built from the same fundamental building blocks, there is nonetheless the perception that there is a distinct boundary drawn through the continuum of lifeforms, with humans on one side of it, and non-humans on the other.
To be sure, there are perfectly sound evolutionary reasons to perceive ourselves as separate from other species. It’s not a difficult thought-experiment to see how disastrous it would have been for our ancestors not to think of the animals they encountered as being different from them: At best, they’d be hungry; at worst, they’d be eaten. But today, the boundary between human and animal is perhaps being defended too rigorously.
Consider Panksepp’s “laughing” rats: Panksepp and colleagues discovered a 50- kHz vocalization in rats that was seen during play behavior, tickling (that is, the experimenters tickling the rats, which was used as a reward), and, to a lesser extent, sex; and it was found that deafening decreased play behavior in rats, possibly because this vocalization played an important communicative function (Panksepp & Burgdorf, 2003).
Panksepp and Burgdorf suggest that, at the very least, this “chirp” could be viewed as a
41 measure of positive social affect, laying out a 12-point argument for this view. Naturally, this was met with some criticism. They write: "Of course, it was hard to publish this kind of work, and it was ironic that the publication of our initial manuscript was impeded by prominent emotion researchers, some of whom take pains to deny that we can ever know whether animals have any emotional feelings" (Panksepp & Burgdorf, 2003, p.
535). Their critics are right, of course: We can never know whether animals experience emotions similar to our own. And, indeed, Lloyd Morgan’s Canon, which provides the philosophical foundation for the study of animal behavior and cognition, posits that we should not ascribe to a behavior a complex underlying cognitive faculty when a simpler one could explain the behavior—a wise note of caution, to be sure, and useful in avoiding embarrassments of the Clever Hans variety. But Morgan himself didn’t intend for his statement to be used to justify the wholesale denial of the mental lives of animals
(Bekoff, 2000), and his Canon can be taken to extremes.
In response to Panksepp and colleagues, Blumberg and Sokoloff examined what has commonly been referred to as a “distress call” in rats, and they posit that this call is actually an incidental vocalization produced by the abdominal compression reaction
(ACR)—a maneuver by rats that increases venous return of blood to the heart (Blumberg
& Sokoloff, 2001). That is, they suggest the sound is non-functional, merely the byproduct of a bodily function, like the sound of a cough or a sneeze; in situations thought to be stress-inducing, the rats just happen to produce a sound.
Of course, this is entirely possible, and, as Wynne mentions, in science the simplest explanation is always preferable, and positing cognitive processes for which
42 there is no need can be problematic: “In the long run it is far better to be safe, secure and plodding but confident that the knowledge we have amassed so far is reliable” (Wynne,
2001, p. 12). But, at the same time, there is a reasonable limit to the usefulness of such thinking. As Panksepp and Burgdorf point out, “the assumption that…animals are unfeeling behavioral zombies seems evolutionarily improbable, especially if many human affects emerge from subcortical circuits we share homogeneously with other animals" (2003, 536). Of course, it is possible that non-human animals have no emotional lives—just as it is possible that no other humans have consciousness but you.
But there comes a point when such arguments are more for the likes of Nagel and Searle.
After all, we cannot know with certainty about the mental lives of any but ourselves; and yet, most people don’t seriously question whether other humans are normally conscious.
Given that we know other humans to be more or less neurologically like ourselves, and that believing them to have mental lives similar to our own informs our ability to understand and predict their behavior, it seems the more parsimonious explanation is that humans, in fact, all share a similar kind of conscious experience. That, or there are some deeply convincing zombies out there.
So, does believing animals have emotional lives of some kind add to our ability to understand their behavior? We’d better hope so, since preliminary research on anti- depressants often uses animal models—including methods that take advantage of those
“distress calls” mentioned earlier (cf. Panksepp, 2003). Anthropomorphism in its extremes of course should be avoided in the absence of strong evidence to justify it; but on the other hand, given the homologies between human and animal (particularly
43 mammalian) neurological systems, researchers should not hobble themselves excessively by claiming that we cannot possibly know about the mental lives of animals—as
Panksepp puts it, “wrapping themselves perpetually in the cloak of agnosticism" (2003, p.
378).
Anthropomorphism and zoomorphism both are, in moderation, not only useful but perhaps necessary for understanding animals and humans alike. People observing an animal’s behavior often agree on what affective experience they perceive the animal to be having. This alone is not proof of the mental lives of animals, of course, but coupled with the fact that working from the assumption that these perceptions are correct adds to researchers’ ability to predict animals’ behavior suggests that we should not be overzealous in our efforts to refute animal emotions (Bekoff, 2000). That animals are
“like” us is not a subject up for debate. The foundational assumptions of the life sciences require us to accept that all life exists on a continuum. The question is the extent to which the differences between species are differences of degree, rather than kind. If a reptile consistently chooses warmth over cold, and shows physiological signs
(neurological and hormonal) of what in humans would be distress when taken away from warmth (Bekoff, 2000), what is the more parsimonious explanation—that reptiles experience something homologous to pleasure and displeasure, or that they just “happen” to show all the behavioral and physiological signs that they do?
The Human Animal
We perceive animals as like us, but not too like us. This situation should be familiar to any student of social psychology. Animals represent the ultimate out-group—
44 after all, they could not be any more unlike us and still be considered beings at all. It is perhaps for this reason that colonizing forces often found it convenient to compare indigenous cultures to animals. Native cultures were often decried as bestial, to the extreme of mythical tales of “dog-men” being commonplace throughout history, their gustatory and sexual habits were described as animalistic, their languages dismissed as mere noises lacking in “human” feeling, and there was considerable debate as to whether these indigenous peoples were truly human at all, and therefore possessing souls (Jahoda,
1999; White, 1991). This argument, of course, enabled colonizers to use native peoples in whatever way they saw fit—they weren’t “really” human, after all. In 1893, along with their usual fare, Barnum & Bailey’s Circus displayed 70 “non-Westerners” for the amusement of visitors, (Jahoda, 1999, p. 213); and in the Victorian era, scientific theories involving migrations of people of African descent to the British Isles and co-mingling with the Irish were used to explain the latter’s inherent “differences” from the English
(Jahoda, 1999, p. 227). In the beginning of the 20th century, books were still being published that reported that Chinese, Indian, and African peoples possessed “grasping feet,” which they used to weave, row boats, and grasp branches while climbing trees
(Jahoda, 1999, p.83). If, as Allport suggests, we cannot perceive our in-group except in opposition to an out-group (Allport, 1954, cited in Brewer, 1999), then perhaps we need there to be monsters lurking in the shadows, marginalized groups—human, animal, or somewhere between the two—that play the role of the generic “other,” living on the boundaries of the space we have claimed for ourselves, existing outside the edges of the world that is tamed, civilized, human (White, 1991).
45 Moving Forward
There is no one ready solution to problems of human-animal conflict. In Bhutan, researchers found the creation of a new wildlife preserve greatly increased instances of animals damaging farmers’ crops (Wang, Curtis, & Lassoie, 2006). Considering fitness threats that a group perceives (consciously or unconsciously) as being surmountable by strengthening in-group ties tends to aggravate intergroup bias (Navarrete, Kurzban,
Fessler, & Kirkpatrick, 2004), it seems in this case choosing to protect the local wildlife only furthered locals’ perceptions that they were in an “us-versus-them” conflict, escalating an already serious problem. Researchers working to reduce human-animal conflict must find a middle road to take. An excellent example of this is the case of Jim
Corbett. Corbett, whose tales of adventure in India were once widely acclaimed both there and in the West, was best-known as a hunter of “man-eaters”—traveling throughout
India at the request of locals to hunt tigers and leopards who had taken to killing people.
Corbett was adamant that these animals turned to killing humans only when circumstances prevented them from hunting their preferred prey—citing examples such as illness or injury, or when human encroachment had made their prey too scarce.
Although he was in many ways the “great white hunter” archetype, Corbett was also an adamant supporter of tiger conservation, and stressed that conflict with the big cats was largely avoidable (Corbett, 1946). Today, there is a tiger preserve in India that bears his name, as does the Indochinese tiger, Panthera tigris corbetti.
In-group favoritism doesn’t necessitate hatred for the out-group (Brewer, 1999); thus, the goal of those seeking to reduce human-animal conflict should be to work toward
46 a solution such that people come first, while reducing the perceived threat of the animals with which they have come into conflict. Just as solutions to problems of human-animal conflict likely cannot be solved by siding exclusively with one side or the other, so too will cooperation be required between the two sides of the debate over ascribing human mental states to animals, if the research concerning animals’ cognitive and behavioral faculties is to continue to progress. Ideally, the two sides should engage in dialogue, analyzing each other’s experimental results from both perspectives, and both must share the burden of proof equally (Bekoff, 2000). Darwin’s evolutionary theory suggests a continuum of cognitive development throughout the animal kingdom. In the past, researchers such as Skinner and Harlow, it could be argued, took this to emphasize the ways in which we are not unlike animals; today, the opposite is taking place, and researchers like Bekoff and de Waal are emphasizing the ways in which animals are not unlike us (Melson, 2002). Panksepp’s “laughing” rats are no small matter. If an animal model of joy can be found and studied, this may very well lead to major advancements in the understanding of human psychology and may inform more effective treatments for psychological disorders, such as depression (Panksepp, 2000). Additionally, a model of animal happiness could further inform the effort to find solutions to human-animal conflict. It’s hard to imagine a more effective way to convince people that an animal isn’t all that dangerous than to show them he’s ticklish.
47 TABLES Table 1: Animal Pictures and Control Readings
Saltwater, or estuarine, crocodiles are native to Southeast Asia and Northern Australia. They can be found both in Chimpanzees are native to Central Africa. freshwater and brackish (somewhat salty) They are found predominantly in dense water, and they have even been known to Tigers are native to South and East Asia. rainforests, but they live in a wide variety swim out to sea. They can be found in habitats ranging from of habitats, and are even occasionally found Saltwater crocodiles sometimes will swamps and jungles to the tundra. They on the savannah. They live in complex congregate together to bask on the shore or are solitary animals, each establishing and social groups called “fission-fusion to hunt, but they are highly territorial, and defending its own territory, although same- societies,” in which the group frequently fight to establish dominance between rivals sex siblings occasionally will share a splits into several subgroups, each of which and to defend territory, food, and mates. territory. travels separately from the others. They are carnivores, eating aquatic animals Tigers are carnivores. They generally hunt Chimpanzees are omnivores, with a very such as fish and frogs, and larger land large animals, such as deer and elk, relying diverse diet. They often eat plants, but they animals that come close to the water. They on stealth more than strength or speed. will also use sticks to “fish” for termites, are considered ambush predators, normally After approximately a 90-day gestation and will sometimes hunt in groups for lying in wait for prey near the water’s edge, period, a female tiger will give birth to a monkeys and other smaller primates. rather than actively pursuing them. litter of usually two to four cubs. Initially, Gestation in chimpanzees lasts an average After mating, a female moves upstream she hides them in a den, and moves them to of 230 days, after which the mother into freshwater and digs a nest high on the new hiding places regularly, but once they typically gives birth to a single young, shoreline. She lays and buries around are older she allows them to come with her, although twins can occur. The mother 40-60 eggs in the nest, and guards it and so they learn to hunt. Tiger cubs live carries the young against her belly for three closely. After about 100 days, the eggs with their mother for 2-2.5 years, and then to six months, after which the young hatch; the hatchlings make a distinctive set out to claim territories of their own. typically rides on the mother’s back, sound that calls the mother to the nest, and They reach maturity at three to five years of generally until weaning, at around 3.5-4.5 she carries them in her mouth to the water. age, with females maturing on average one years. After, the young still stay close to Young crocodiles in an area congregate year sooner than males. the mother up to puberty, at around seven together, watched over by their mothers, There are six subspecies of tiger, all of years. Female chimpanzees reach sexual until they about 8 months of age. Female which are listed as endangered or critically maturity at about 10-13 years of age, and saltwater crocodiles reach maturity at endangered. While tigers are related to males at 12-15. around 10-12 years, while males mature at lions, jaguars, and leopards (all members of There are at least three subspecies of around 16 years. the genus Panthera), these are distinctly chimpanzee, all of which are endangered. The saltwater crocodile is the largest of the different species. While chimpanzees are related to bonobos, twelve species in the genus Crocodylus. gorillas, and humans (all members of the While crocodiles are related to alligators, family Hominidae), these are distinctly caimans, and gharials (all members of the different species. order Crocodilia), they are distinctly different species.
48 Table 2: Non-Threatening and Threatening Reading Paragraphs Crocodile Tiger Chimpanzee
Chimpanzees share some of Tigers share some of their their habitat with people, but Saltwater crocodiles share some habitat with people, but conflicts conflicts rarely occur. They are of their habitat with people, but rarely occur. As fairly elusive largely found in forest habitats conflicts rarely occur. These animals, tigers are more likely to where they don’t often come animals strongly prefer to hunt hide from humans, rather than into contact with humans. from the water, so a little approach them. In India, Chimpanzees are intelligent caution and alertness on the part conservationists have been animals, capable of learning of the public is enough to avoid working for decades to establish complex behaviors, and have, in coming into conflict with and maintain sanctuaries that some cases, been crocodiles. In Australia, enable the tiger population to “enculturated”—that is, they Non-Threatening saltwater crocodiles are a recover from hunting and habitat have been raised among, and common sight in the Northern loss while helping local people socialized by, humans. In this waterways, but locals don’t better use natural resources to form of captivity in particular, normally have any problems. If maintain their traditional chimpanzees and humans a saltwater crocodile settles in lifestyle while coexisting usually avoid any conflict. The peacefully with the tigers. Many researchers who spend time with an area that is heavily populated, local wildlife authorities of the wildlife refuges where chimpanzees, both in the wild generally are able to capture and tigers are found have villages on and in captivity, have gained relocate the crocodile without their borders, but with proper invaluable insights into a broad incident. care and education the local range of research topics in people and their tiger neighbors psychology, biology, coexist peacefully. anthropology, and other sciences.
Tigers share some of their Chimpanzees share some of habitat with people, and their habitat with people, and Saltwater crocodiles share some conflicts sometimes occur. They conflicts sometimes occur. For of their habitat with people, and are extremely adept at stalking their size, they are incredibly conflicts sometimes occur. through vegetation without strong, and are extremely Crocodiles are extremely well- being detected, and often will aggressive toward perceived adapted to hunting from the attack their prey from behind. threats or competition. In parts water, and can strike at close In the Sundarbans, a large of Uganda, chimpanzees have range faster than most prey can mangrove swamp on the border been known to attack and react. In Australia, it is usually of India and Bangladesh, many sometimes kill children, tourists who are attacked by locals make a living either by possibly mistaking them for Threatening saltwater crocodiles, but even fishing on the rivers or by monkeys, a favorite prey. In locals sometimes are caught off- collecting wood or honey in the captivity, chimpanzees guard. When saltwater jungle, and tigers have taken to sometimes develop aberrant crocodiles move into waterways hunting people in the forests as behaviors, and even an in areas heavily populated with they would any other prey, apparently docile animal that people, the risk of conflict is sometimes even pulling has been around humans for even higher; and, in these fishermen from their boats. In years may suddenly turn and situations, it becomes more addition, there are numerous violently attack humans—even common for children to be cases of tigers kept in zoos or by people the chimpanzee has victims of crocodile attacks. private owners attacking and known for years. sometimes killing their owners or other bystanders.
49 Table 3: Important to Humans control non-threat threat Total
crocodile 3.20 3.32 3.48 3.33
tiger 2.97 2.93 2.79 2.91
chimpanzee 2.23 2.10 2.37 2.23
Total 2.80 2.74 2.90 2.81
Mean ratings of the Animal Rating Scale measure Important to Humans; reverse scored (1 = Important to humans, 5 = Not important to humans)
Table 4: Smart control non-threat threat Total
crocodile 2.17 2.88 2.59 2.52
tiger 1.81 1.90 1.67 1.80
chimpanzee 1.87 1.81 1.89 1.85
Total 1.95 2.15 2.07 2.05
Mean ratings of the Animal Rating Scale measure Smart; reverse scored (1 = Smart, 5 = Not smart).
Table 5: Lovable control non-threat threat Total
crocodile 3.97 3.96 4.28 4.07
tiger 2.84 2.67 2.83 2.78
chimpanzee 2.00 2.00 2.59 2.18
Total 2.93 2.80 3.28 3.00
Mean ratings of the Animal Rating Scale measure Lovable; reverse scored (1 = Lovable, 5 = Unlovable) 50 Table 6: Safe control non-threat threat Total
crocodile 4.30 3.64 4.28 4.10
tiger 3.81 3.27 4.12 3.71
chimpanzee 2.80 2.58 3.52 3.57
Total 3.64 3.13 3.97 3.57
Mean ratings of the Animal Rating Scale measure Safe; reverse scored (1 = Safe, 5 = Dangerous)
Table 7: Important to Environment control non-threat threat Total
crocodile 2.07 2.44 2.21 2.23
tiger 2.13 2.20 2.23 2.21
chimpanzee 2.20 1.87 1.78 1.95
Total 2.13 2.15 2.10 2.13
Mean ratings of the Animal Rating Scale measure Important to environment; reverse scored (1 = Important to environment, 5 = Not important to environment)
51 Table 8: Factor Analysis and Complexity Mental state Load guilt 0.747 grief 0.585 sadism 0.647 resentment 0.518 Complex Self-Aware compassion 0.546 shame 0.743 sadness 0.564 embarrassment 0.766 sympathy 0.719 pleasure 0.758 Simple Positive happiness 0.816 joy 0.737 vengefulness 0.814 spite 0.820 Aggressive jealousy 0.536 hatred 0.622
Factor analysis of the Perceptions of Mental States data revealed that 12 of the 24 mental states factored into three main components. These mental states are listed with their loading strength in their respective components.
52 Table 9: Complex Self-Aware Mental States Animal Attitude control non-threat threat Total
low 3.94 3.51 3.50 crocodile 3.53 high 3.15 3.06 3.90
low 3.04 2.86 3.14 tiger 2.96 high 3.08 2.73 2.83
low 2.43 2.18 2.27 chimpanzee 2.35 high 2.54 2.25 2.68
Total 3.02 2.75 3.05 2.94
Participants’ mean ratings of the likelihood that animals experience the Complex Self- Aware mental states; reverse scored (1 = Very likely, 5 = Very unlikely)
Table 10: Simple Positive Mental States Animal Attitude control non-threat threat Total
low 3.25 3.13 2.48 crocodile 2.79 high 2.19 2.22 3.57
low 2.14 2.27 1.94 tiger 2.03 high 2.38 1.69 1.71
low 1.80 1.45 1.72 chimpanzee 1.62 high 1.71 1.43 1.52
Total 2.24 2.02 2.16 2.14
Participants’ mean ratings of the likelihood that animals experience the Simple Positive mental states; reverse scored (1 = Very likely, 5 = Very unlikely)
53 Table 11: Aggressive Mental States Animal Attitude control non-threat threat Total
low 3.06 2.69 2.33 crocodile 2.74 high 2.56 2.56 3.53
low 2.51 2.72 2.47 tiger 2.49 high 2.22 2.42 2.44
low 2.34 2.60 2.18 chimpanzee 2.44 high 2.63 2.54 2.58
Total 2.55 2.59 2.51 2.55
Participants’ mean ratings of the likelihood that animals experience the Aggressive mental states; reverse scored (1 = Very likely, 5 = Very unlikely)
Table 12: Religion and Animal Attitude Scale Score Religion AAS score n
Protestant 51.21 24
Buddhist 53.60 5
Catholic 56.66 91
Other Christian 56.69 71
Jewish 60.11 19
Muslim 60.80 5
Other 62.32 22
Atheist/Agnostic 62.68 18
Participants’ scores on the Animal Attitude Scale as a function of religious affiliation, and number of participants indicating each religion.
54 Table 13: Perceptions of Mental States by Condition and Attitude Complex Self- Simple Condition Attitude Aggressive Aware Positive
low 3.04 2.30 2.59 control high 2.96 2.11 2.48
low 2.84 2.26 2.67 non-threat high 2.63 1.72 2.49
low 2.99 2.07 2.32 threat high 3.18 2.33 2.89
Participants’ ratings of the likelihood that animals can experience the mental states from the three components of the Perceptions of Mental States questionnaire, organized by Condition and Attitude; reverse scored (1 = Very likely, 5 = very unlikely)
55 APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Animal Attitude Scale (AAS)
Animal Attitude Scale
Please read each of the following statements, and then circle the word or phrase indicating how strongly you agree or disagree with each.
It is morally wrong to hunt wild animals for sport.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
I do not think that there is anything wrong with using animals in medical research.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
There should be extremely stiff penalties including jail sentences for people who participate in cock-fighting.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
Wild animals, such as mink and raccoons, should not be trapped and their skins made into fur coats.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
There is nothing morally wrong with hunting wild animals for food.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
56 I think people who object to raising animals for meat are too sentimental.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
Much of the scientific research done with animals is unnecessary and cruel.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
I think it is perfectly acceptable for cattle and hogs to be raised for human consumption.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
Basically, humans have the right to use animals as we see fit.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
The slaughter of whales and dolphins should be stopped immediately even if it means some people will be put out of work.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
I sometimes get upset when I see wild animals in cages at zoos.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
In general, I think that human economic gain is more important than setting aside more land for wildlife.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
Too much fuss is made over the welfare of animals these days when there are many human problems that need to be solved.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
57 Breeding animals for their skins is a legitimate use of animals.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
Some aspects of biology can only be learned through dissecting preserved animals such as cats.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
Continued research with animals will be necessary if we are ever to conquer diseases such as cancer, heart disease, and AIDS.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
It is unethical to breed purebred dogs for pets when millions of dogs are killed in animal shelters each year.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
The production of inexpensive meat, eggs, and dairy products justifies maintaining animals under crowded conditions.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
The use of animals such as rabbits for testing the safety of cosmetics and household products is unnecessary and should be stopped.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
The use of animals in rodeos and circuses is cruel.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
58 APPENDIX B: Animal Rating Scale (ARS)
Animal Rating Scale
Please consider the animal you just read about, and circle the number indicating how you would rate this animal on each of these scales.
Important to humans Not important to humans
1 2 3 4 5
Smart Not Smart
1 2 3 4 5
Lovable Unlovable
1 2 3 4 5
Safe Dangerous
1 2 3 4 5
Important to environment Not important to environment
1 2 3 4 5
59 APPENDIX C: Perceptions of Mental States
Perceptions of Mental States
Please consider the animal you just read about, and circle the word or phrase indicating how likely you think it is that this animal can experience the following mental states.
Pleasure
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Happiness
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Guilt
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Love
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Grief
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Sadism
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Anger
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
60 Resentment
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Compassion
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Vengefulness
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Spite
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Jealousy
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Shame
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Joy
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Pain
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
61 Sadness
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Embarrassment
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Surprise
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Frustration
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Sympathy
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Fear
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Protectiveness
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Hatred
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
62 Loneliness
Very likely Somewhat likely Not sure Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
63 APPENDIX D: Participant Background and Attitudes toward Animals
Personal Information
Finally, we would like to take a moment to get a little information about you.
What is your age?
______
What is your gender?
Male Female
Do you have any children, or any siblings currently under 18 years of age?
Yes No
Do you own any pets, or have you in the past?
Yes No
If yes, please indicate all pets you have or have had in the past:
[ ] Dog [ ] Cat [ ] Fish [ ] Bird [ ] Horse [ ] Snake [ ] Other reptile [ ] Other (please specify): ______
Do you have, or have you had in the past, a job in which you regularly worked with animals?
Yes No
64 If yes, please indicate this occupation:
______
At any point, has your parent(s)/guardian(s) had an occupation working with animals?
Yes No Not sure
If yes, please indicate in what occupation(s).
______
Were you born in the U.S.A.?
Yes No
Have you lived in any country besides the U.S.A.?
Yes No
If yes, please indicate for how long:
Less than one year One to five years Five years or more
How familiar would you say you are with the theory of evolution?
Very familiar Somewhat familiar Not very familiar Not sure
Would you say that you believe in evolution?
Definitely yes More yes than no More no than yes Definitely no
65 How would you describe your religious affiliation?
[ ] Protestant Christian [ ] Catholic [ ] Other Christian [ ] Jewish [ ] Muslim [ ] Hindu [ ] Buddhist [ ] Unitarian Universalist [ ] Atheist or Agnostic [ ] Other
How often do you attend religious services and/or engage in religious activities?
Less than once a week Once a week More than once a week
66 REFERENCES
Allen, M.W., Hunstone, M., Waerstad, J., Foy, E., Hobbins, T., Wikner, B., & Wirrel, J. (2002). Human-to-animal similarity and participant mood influence punishment recommendations for animal abusers. Society & Animals, 10, 267-284.
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Bekoff, M. (2000). Animal emotions: Exploring passionate natures. BioScience, 50, 861-870.
Bjerke & Kaltenborn (1999). The relationship of ecocentric and anthropocentric motives to attitudes toward large carnivores. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 19, 415-421.
Blumberg, M. S., & Sokoloff, G. (2001). Do infant rats cry? Psychological Review, 108, 83–95.
Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love or outgroup hate? Journal of Social Issues, 55, 429-444.
Bruskotter, J. T., Schmidt, R. H., & Teel, T. L. (2007). Are attitudes toward wolves changing? A case study in Utah. Biological Conservation, 139, 211-218.
Corbett, J. (1946). Man-eaters of Kumaon. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Daly, B., & Morton, L. L. (2008). Empathic correlates of witnessing the inhumane killing of an animal: An investigation of single and multiple exposures. Society and Animals, 16, 243-255.
DeLeeuw, J. L., Galen, L. W., Aebersold, C., & Stanton, V. (2007). Support for animal rights as a function of belief in evolution, religious fundamentalism, and religious denomination. Society and Animals, 15, 353-363.
Driscoll, J. W. (1995). Attitudes toward animals: species ratings. Society and Animals, 3, 139-150.
67 Herzog, H. A., Jr., Betchart, N. S., & Pittman, R. (1991). Sex role identity and attitudes toward animals. Anthrozoos, 4, 184-192.
Herzog, H. A., Mathews, S. (1997). Personality and attitudes toward the treatment of animals. Society and Animals, 5, 169-175.
Jahoda, G. (1999). Images of savages: Ancient roots of modern prejudice in Western culture. New York, NY: Routledge.
Jamison, W. V., & Lunch, W. M. (1992). Rights of animals, perceptions of science, and political activism: Profile of American animal rights activists. Science, Technology, and Human Values, 17, 438-458.
Kaltenborn, B. P., Bjerke, T., & Strumse, E. (1998). Diverging attitudes towards predators: Do environmental beliefs play a part? Human Ecology Review, 5, 1-9.
Karlsson, J., & Sjöström, M. (2007). Human attitudes toward wolves, a matter of distance. Biological Conservation, 137, 610-616.
Kellert, S. R. (1991). Public views of wolf restoration in Michigan. Transactions of the North American Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference, 56, 152-161.
Kellert, S. R. (1996). The value of life: Biological diversity and human society. Washington, DC: Island Press/Shearwater Books.
Kellert, S. R., Black, M., Rush, C. R., & Bath, A. J. (1996). Human culture and large carnivore conservation in North America. Conservation Biology, 10, 977-990.
McIvor, D. E., & Conover, M. R. (1994). Perceptions of farmers and non-farmers toward management of problem wildlife. Wildlife Society Bulletin, 22, 21-219.
Melson, G. F. (2002). Psychology and the study of human-animal relationships. Society and Animals, 10, 347-352.
Navarrete, C. D., Kurzban, R., Fessler, D. M. T., & Kirkpatrick, L. A. (2004). Anxiety and intergroup bias: Terror management or coalitional psychology? Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 7, 370-397.
Oli, M. K., Taylor, I.R., Rogers, M.E. (1994). Snow leopard Panthera uncia predation of livestock: An assessment of local perceptions in the Annapurna Conservation Area, Nepal. Biological Conservation, 68, 63-68.
68 Panksepp, J. (2000). The riddle of laughter: Neural and psychoevolutionary underpinnings of joy. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9, 183-186.
Panksepp, J. (2003). Can anthropomorphic analyses of separation cries in other animals inform us about the emotional nature of social loss in humans? Comment on Blumberg and Sokoloff (2001). Psychological Review, 110, 376-388.
Panksepp, J., & Burgdorf, J. (2003). "Laughing" rats and the evolutionary antecedents of human joy? Physiology and Behavior, 79, 533-547.
Patterson, B. D. (2004). The lions of Tsavo: Exploring the legacy of Africa’s notorious man-eaters. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Plous, S. (1993). Psychological mechanisms in the human use of animals. Journal of Social Issues, 49, 11-52.
Rasmussen, L., & Rajecki, D. W. (1995). Differences and similarities in humans' perceptions of the thinking and feeling of a dog and a boy. Society & Animals, 3, 117-137.
Røskaft, E., Bjerke, T., Kaltenborn, B., Linnell, J. D. C., & Andersen, R. (2003). Patterns of self-reported fear towards large carnivores among the Norwegian public. Evolution and Human Behavior, 24, 184-198.
Signal, T. D., & Taylor, N. (2006). Attitudes to animals: Demographics within a community sample. Society and Animals, 14, 147-157.
Stronen, A. V., Brook, R. K., Paquet, P. C., & Mclachlan, S. (2007). Farmer attitudes toward wolves: Implications for the role of predators managing disease. Biological Conservation, 135, 1-10.
Taylor, N., & Signal, T. D. (2005). Empathy and attitudes to animals. Anthrozoos, 18, 18-27.
Wang, S. W., Curtis, P. D., & Lassoie, J. P. (2006). Farmer perceptions of crop damage by wildlife in Jigme Singye Wangchuck National park, Bhutan. Wildlife Society Bulletin, 34, 359-365.
White, D. G. (1991). Myths of the dog-man. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
69 Wilbert, C. (2006). What is doing the killing? Animal attacks, man-eaters, and shifting boundaries and flows of human-animal relations. In The Animal Studies Group (Eds.), Killing animals (pp. 30-49). Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Wynne (2001). Animal cognition: The mental lives of animals. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
70