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Should Lawyers Obey the Law?
Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 1996 Should Lawyers Obey the Law? William H. Simon Columbia Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons Recommended Citation William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217 (1996). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/880 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SHOULD LAWYERS OBEY THE LAW? WmLiAM H. SIMON" At the same time that it denies authority to nonlegal norms, the dominant view of legal ethics (the "Dominant View") insists on deference to legal ones. "Zealous advocacy" stops at the "bounds of the law."' By and large, critics of the Dominant View have not chal- lenged this categorical duty of obedience to law. They typically want to add further public-regarding duties,' but they are as insistent on this one as the Dominant View. Now the idea that lawyers should obey the law seems so obvi- ous that it is rarely examined within the profession. In fact, however, once you start to think about it, the argument for a categorical duty of legal obedience encounters difficulties, and these difficulties have revealing implications for legal ethics generally. The basic difficulty is that the plausibility of a duty of obedi- ence to law depends on how we define law. -
Publicaonp ' ;INSTITUTION Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C
4 4 DOCOMENTAESOME. ED 210 372 UD 021 863 TITLE Th4 54ual4Rights Amendment: Guaranteeing Equa°1 Rights for Wompn Under t 'he Constitution. ClearigTjhouse PublicaonP ' ;INSTITUTION Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C.. *- PUB DATE Jun 81 NOTE 32p.; Not available in papei copy due tc reproduction ,quality of original document. EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS- . DESCRIPTORS , *Civil Rights Legislation: *Constitutional_ Law; Equal Educatioh; Equal Opportunities (Jobs); *Equal Protection: Federal State Relationship; Females; *Laws; *Sex fairness IDENTIFIERS *Equal Rights Amendment ,ABSTRACT This repOrt examines the effects that the ratification of thy Equal Rights Amendment will have on laws concerning women. Tfie amendment's impacts on divorced, married, and emtioTed women, on women in the military and in school, and on women 'dependent on pensions, insurance, and social securiy/ete all analyzed. A discussion of the 'Constitutional rhmificaticns of the Amerdment on the Stakes and"courts is also included. (APM) 1 .4 I. a *******i*****i****************************************************** .4 * Reproductions supplied by EDRS are they best that can be made "lc * . from'the original decument. e * 6 1 *******************************************f**************************0 7, 4 k The Equal .Rights Amendment: r4 r/ .G usranteeirig Equal Rights for yVonlyen Uncle! The Constitution LLI United States, Commission on Civil Rights Clearinghouse Puttation 68 June 1981 A X I ti "" p 4 O U.S DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER IERICI /Thisdocument has been reproduced as received from the person or orgerozahon ongtnahng a Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quaint Points of Anew or opinions stated as this docu 'bent do not r.tec4tsarity represent official NIE position or policy For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 1.7.8, Oovemm °Mee, Washington, D.C. -
CVE and Constitutionality in the Twin Cities: How Countering Violent Extremism Threatens the Equal Protection Rights of American Muslims in Minneapolis-St
American University Law Review Volume 69 Issue 6 Article 6 2020 CVE and Constitutionality in the Twin Cities: How Countering Violent Extremism Threatens the Equal Protection Rights of American Muslims in Minneapolis-St. Paul Sarah Chaney Reichenbach American University Washington College of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Society Commons, President/Executive Department Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons Recommended Citation Reichenbach, Sarah Chaney (2020) "CVE and Constitutionality in the Twin Cities: How Countering Violent Extremism Threatens the Equal Protection Rights of American Muslims in Minneapolis-St. Paul," American University Law Review: Vol. 69 : Iss. 6 , Article 6. Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol69/iss6/6 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CVE and Constitutionality in the Twin Cities: How Countering Violent Extremism Threatens the Equal Protection Rights of American Muslims in Minneapolis-St. Paul Abstract In 2011, President Barack Obama announced a national strategy for countering violent extremism (CVE) to attempt to prevent the “radicalization” of potential violent extremists. The Obama Administration intended the strategy to employ a community-based approach, bringing together the government, law enforcement, and local communities for CVE efforts. -
Experts Weigh in on Designating the Muslim Brotherhood As a Foreign Terrorist Organization
Experts Weigh In on Designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization February 2017 “I think it would be an incredibly stupid thing to do, the top reason being that it’s not a terrorist group.” Daniel Benjamin, former Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. State Department (Politico) “If credible evidence of terrorist activity is not forthcoming, it would quite simply be illegal for the United States to designate the Brotherhood on purely ideological grounds. To be sure, the Egyptian Brotherhood pursues an illiberal agenda in a democratic framework, but that is not a lawless act. Criminalizing the group for a set of ideas, by contrast, would be a lawless act.” William McCants, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy and Director, Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World and Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies (Brookings Institution) “What you have is a disparate network of groups that may or may not meet criteria […] It’s trying to hit a grand slam and it’s probably going to lead to a strikeout.” Jonathan Schanzer, former Treasury Department analyst; Vice President for Research, Foundation for Defense of Democracies (Politico) There is no “evidence that senior Muslim Brotherhood leaders have ordered or condoned [recent violent acts], or that the Brotherhood has carried out any of the major terrorist attacks that have wracked [Egypt].” Designating the Brotherhood as an FTO would, in effect, “[force] its leaders in that direction [of terror] because all other political and legal avenues will be closed to them.” Michele Dunne, Senior Associate and Director of Middle East Program and Nathan Brown, Nonresident Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “A U.S. -
The Duty of the Government to Make the Law Known
Fordham Law Review Volume 51 Issue 2 Article 2 1982 The Duty of the Government to Make the Law Known Joseph E. Murphy Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Joseph E. Murphy, The Duty of the Government to Make the Law Known, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 255 (1982). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol51/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE THE LAW KNOWN JOSEPH E. MURPHY* INTRODUCTION N a democracy it is accepted that the public should have full access to the lawmaking process.' It generally has gone unnoticed, how- ever, that governmental bodies, which may now be required to re- main open to the public for their deliberations, may nevertheless adopt laws and regulations with little or no publicity being given to those enactments. 2 Under an ancient Anglo-American common-law doctrine, a law may take effect from the moment it is signed, or an administrative rule may penalize conduct immediately after it is voted on, with no obligation on the lawmakers to publicize or promulgate their enactments.2 If a citizen acts in unavoidable ignorance of such afoul of the new law, his igno- an unpublicized enactment and runs 4 rance may offer him no legal defense. -
International Refugee Assistance Project ("IRAP") V. Trump
Appeal: 17-1351 Doc: 196-1 Filed: 04/19/2017 Pg: 1 of 30 No. 17-1351 IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT ________________________ INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2, Plaintiffs – Appellees, v. DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the U.S.; DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; JOHN F. KELLY, in his official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; REX W. TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants – Appellants. ________________________ On Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (8:17-cv-00361-TDC) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES BY AMICI CURIAE THE AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE TO DENY THE APPELLANTS MOTION TO STAY PENDING EXPEDITED TRIAL AND IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE OF THE DECISION BY THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND YOLANDA C. RONDON , ESQ. STAFF ATTORNEY AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE 1705 DeSales Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: (202) 244-2990 Facsimile: (202) 333-6470 Email: [email protected] April 19, 2017 Counsel of Record for Amici Curiae Appeal: 17-1351 Doc: 196-1 Filed: 04/19/2017 Pg: 2 of 30 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT The Amicus does not have a parent corporation. -
Exploring Alternative Approaches to Hate Crimes
Exploring Alternative Approaches to Hate Crimes A collaborative report by: StanfordLawSchool Law and Policy Lab BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE IINYU ILAW June 2021 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This publication is a joint report of the Stanford Law School Policy Lab on Assessing Alternative Responses to Hate Crimes and the Brennan Center for Justice. The report was co-written by the following Stanford Law students under the supervision of Stanford Law Professor Shirin Sinnar and Brennan Center Fellow Michael German: Tyler Bishop ’20 Arielle Andrews ’21 Sam Becker ’22 Lauren Martin ’21 Benjy Mercer-Golden ’21 Mariel Pérez-Santiago ’20 Tiarra Rogers ’22 Kai Wiggins ’23 We would like to acknowledge the following individuals and organizations for their support and assistance on this project: Shirin Bakhshay Jeannine Bell Jami Butler Angela Chan Beth Colgan Proteus Fund Luciana Herman Stanford Center for Comparative Studies in Race and Ethnicity Stanford Clayman Institute for Gender Research Stanford Law School Dean’s Office Becky Monroe Eun Sze Participants in the “Empowering Communities in the Face of Hate Crimes” Convening at Stanford Law School (March 6, 2020) (see Appendix) Exploring Alternative Approaches to Hate Crimes | June 2021 ABOUT THE STANFORD LAW SCHOOL POLICY LAB Engagement in public policy is a core mission of teaching and research at Stanford Law School. The Law and Policy Lab (The Policy Lab) offers students an immersive experience in finding solutions to some of the world’s most pressing issues. Directed by former SLS Dean Paul Brest, the Policy Lab reflects the school’s belief that systematic examination of societal problems, informed by rigorous data analysis, can generate solutions to society’s most challenging public problems. -
Brief for Petitioners
NO. 19-968 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States CHIKE UZUEGBUNAM AND JOSEPH BRADFORD, Petitioners, v. STANLEY C. PRECZEWSKI, JANN L. JOSEPH, LOIS C. RICHARDSON, JIM B. FATZINGER, TOMAS JIMINEZ, AILEEN C. DOWELL, GENE RUFFIN, CATHERINE JANNICK DOWNEY, TERRANCE SCHNEIDER, COREY HUGHES, REBECCA A. LAWLER, AND SHENNA PERRY, Respondents. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS DAVID A. CORTMAN KRISTEN K. WAGGONER TRAVIS C. BARHAM Counsel of Record JEREMIAH J. GALUS JOHN J. BURSCH KATHERINE L. ANDERSON TYSON C. LANGHOFER ALLIANCE DEFENDING ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM FREEDOM 1000 Hurricane Shoals Rd. 440 First Street, N.W. N.E., Suite D-1100 Suite 600 Lawrenceville, GA 30043 Washington, D.C. 20001 (770) 339–0774 (202) 393-8690 [email protected] Counsel for Petitioners i QUESTION PRESENTED Whether a government’s post-filing change of an unconstitutional policy moots nominal-damages claims that vindicate the government’s past, com- pleted violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional right. ii PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING & CORPORATE DISCLOSURE Petitioners are Chike Uzuegbunam* and Joseph Bradford. Both were students at Georgia Gwinnett College when this case began. Both are individual persons. Respondents are Stanley C. Preczewski, Lois C. Richardson, Jim B. Fatzinger, Tomas Jiminez, Aileen C. Dowell, Gene Ruffin, Catherine Jannick Downey, Terrance Schneider, Corey Hughes, Rebecca A. Lawler, and Shenna Perry. All are or were officials at Georgia Gwinnett College involved in enforcing the challenged policies, and Chike and Joseph sued them in their official and individual capacities. During this lawsuit, Respondent Preczewski left the employ of Georgia Gwinnett College, and Respondent Jann L. -
Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment
RESPONDING TO THE TIME-BASED FAILURES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW THROUGH A CRIMINAL SUNSET AMENDMENT Richard E. Myers II* Abstract: The libertarian genius of the drafters of the U.S. Constitution recognized that liberty is defended best when it is difficult to pass a law. They therefore split power vertically and horizontally—between the states and the federal government, and among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches—and barred some laws from being passed at all. The obstructive mechanisms intended to defend liberty, however, also stymie attempts to restore liberty. This Article proposes a constitutional amend- ment that would redress that oversight by creating a twenty-five-year limit on the effect of all criminal legislation. It would force regular legislative oversight of the criminal codes. It would redistribute power among the branches by reducing the courts’ incentives to create new conceptions of substantive due process to redress perceived process failures. And it would reset the checks and balances for each generation in favor of liberty. This Article is intended to provoke a renewed discussion of the issues of gen- erational entrenchment, overcriminalization, and the structural bases that result in what Professor William Stuntz has called “the pathological politics of the criminal law.” * Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. J.D., 1998, University of North Carolina School of Law; M.A. History, 1994, University of North Caro- lina at Wilmington; B.A., 1989, University of North Carolina at Wilmington. I would like to thank Christopher Slobogin, Ronald Wright, Robert Mosteller, Paul Robinson, all of my colleagues at the University of North Carolina, and the participants of the following work- shops: Jurisgenesis at Washington University in St. -
Undead Laws: the Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in Non-Criminal Litigation
Undead Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in Non-Criminal Litigation Hillary Greenet Long after criminal laws have lost their vigor in the context for which they were drafted, they may rise again elsewhere. The American legal system has yet to develop a coherent policy delineating when or if historically unenforced penal statutes can be invoked in non-penal contexts. This issue is particularly evident in cases where the relevant laws are caught between shifting moral sentiments. Fornication, for example, remains illegal in many states,' but it is rarely prosecuted. Should one of the participants in this "criminal" act contract a sexually transmitted disease and sue her partner in tort, however, these disused statutes may be invoked under the "clean hands" doctrine to bar recovery.2 There is a growing body of ill-considered, contradictory case law regarding the legitimacy of such non-criminal invocation of profoundly disused criminal laws. The lack of a coherent approach to secondary applications of disused laws warrants fundamental consideration of the issue rather than the piecemeal attention it has received. Academics have grappled extensively with issues stemming from the renewed enforcement of disused criminal laws,3 which I shall call primary applications. At the same time, however, commentators have virtually ignored a potentially larger issue: the permissibility of what I shall call the secondary application4 of these laws in civil, family, and other non- t B.A. (1990), J.D. (1997), Yale University. Special thanks to Professor Steven Duke, Thomas Easton, Robert Gulack, Brian C. Kalt, and Ryan Wesley Bounds for valuable comments and encouragement. -
Race, Indigeneity, Settler Colonialism, and the Making of South Asian Diasporas in Canada N
“WE’LL SAIL LIKE COLUMBUS”: RACE, INDIGENEITY, SETTLER COLONIALISM, AND THE MAKING OF SOUTH ASIAN DIASPORAS IN CANADA NISHANT UPADHYAY A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT YORK UNIVERSITY TORONTO, ONTARIO JUNE, 2016 © NISHANT UPADHYAY, 2016 Abstract This dissertation is an interrogation of colonial and racial formations in the making of white settler states. Through an intersectional and transnational exploration of proximities between South Asians and Indigenous peoples in Canada, the dissertation unravels South Asian complicities in ongoing processes of colonization of Indigenous peoples and lands. Theorizing “pernicious continuities”—overlapping experiences of racism and colonialism between Indigenous peoples and South Asians—the dissertation studies complexities, complicities, and incommensurabilities in the making of racialized diasporas. However, it argues that varying loci of power and privilege render these complicities ambiguous, entwined, and invisible. Deploying traces as a methodological tool to study settler colonial processes, the dissertation explores the intersections of colonialism, white supremacy, capitalism, and heteropatriarchy. Further, while anti-Native racism has its own genealogies in settler societies, these grammars of anti-Native racism function in relation to processes of casteism, anti-Black racism, Islamophobia, and border making in the making of “model” South Asian diasporas. The dissertation draws from varying theoretical frameworks and research in Vancouver, British Columbia and Fort McMurray, Alberta. It looks at three sites of resource extraction— logging and canneries in British Columbia in the 1970s-90s and tar sands in Alberta presently— as spaces of simultaneous dispossession of Indigenous peoples and racialized, gendered, and casted labour formations. -
Should Lawyers Obey the Law?
William & Mary Law Review Volume 38 (1996-1997) Issue 1 W.M. Keck Foundation Forum on the Article 12 Teaching of Legal Ethics October 1996 Should Lawyers Obey the Law? William H. Simon Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons Repository Citation William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 217 (1996), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/12 Copyright c 1996 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr SHOULD LAWYERS OBEY THE LAW? WmLiAM H. SIMON" At the same time that it denies authority to nonlegal norms, the dominant view of legal ethics (the "Dominant View") insists on deference to legal ones. "Zealous advocacy" stops at the "bounds of the law."' By and large, critics of the Dominant View have not chal- lenged this categorical duty of obedience to law. They typically want to add further public-regarding duties,' but they are as insistent on this one as the Dominant View. Now the idea that lawyers should obey the law seems so obvi- ous that it is rarely examined within the profession. In fact, however, once you start to think about it, the argument for a categorical duty of legal obedience encounters difficulties, and these difficulties have revealing implications for legal ethics generally. The basic difficulty is that the plausibility of a duty of obedi- ence to law depends on how we define law.