A Contemporary Approach to Epictetus and Stoicism
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doi: https://doi.org/10.15359/siwo.12-1.6 Recibido: 10 de marzo de 2019 Aprobado: 29 de abril de 2019 [p. 133 – p. 149] THE PHENOMENAL-INTENTIONAL NATURE OF HAPPINESS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH TO EPICTETUS AND STOICISM Allan Arturo González Estrada Escuela de Filosofía, Universidad Nacional Resumen Este presente artículo ofrece una comparación entre las ideas filosóficas del estoicis- mo y las ideas contemporáneas en filosofía de la mente, para entender la naturaleza de la intencionalidad y experiencia como un elemento fundamental en una teoría de la “felicidad”. De esta manera se evalúan aspectos relacionados con una teoría fisicalista a partir de una idea basada en una visión de la intencionalidad-fenomé- nica, esto es, la idea que la intencionalidad depende de las características fenomé- nicas, de esta forma, un análisis de la psicología popular y actitudes proposicionales como una base contemporánea para reinterpretar la metafísica y epistemología es- toica, en particular desde las ideas expuestas por Epicteto, es posible. Se concluye que esta interpretación puede aportar una base más sólida que la propuesta en las teorías representacionales como las defendidas por Michael Tye para entender la naturaleza de la representación y el cambio en la narrativa interna que sugiere el estoicismo como vía a la felicidad. Palabras clave: felicidad, intencionalidad, carácter fenoménico de la experiencia, estoicismo, Epicteto. Abstract The present paper offers a contrast between the philosophical ideas of Stoicism and contemporary ideas in philosophy of the mind, to understand the nature of intentionality and phenomenal experience as a fundamental element in a theory of "happiness". The metaphysical foundation that I fallow is based on a physi- calist approach in non-reductive terms, from a perspective derived from a phe- nomenal-intentionality program, that is, the idea that intentionality depends on its phenomenal characteristics, in this way, an analysis of popular psychology and propositional attitudes as a contemporary basis for reinterpreting metaphysics and stoic epistemology in particular from the ideas exposed by Epictetus is possible. It is concluded that an interpretation more in line with the phenomenal char- acteristics of intentionality can provide a solid base to understand the nature of Volumen 12, Número 1, 2019 133 The Phenomenal-Intentional Nature of Happiness: A Contemporary Approach to Epictetus and Stoicism Allan Arturo González Estrada representation and the change in the narrative suggested by Epictetus rather than the representational theories such as those advocated by Michael Tye as the path to understand happiness. Keywords: Happiness, Intentionality, Phenomenal Character of Experience, Sto- icism, Epictetus. Introduction defended. Incidentally, we should be clear on the fact that if we must dive It is said that happiness is neither deep into a theory of happiness, we a warm puppy nor a warm gun, and must first establish its origin. That is, yet, there is an attempt to put our defining a starting point, developing hopes in pursuing happiness in exter- the required discussion, and offering a nal factors such as objects, persons, or plausible conclusion. things. The conception of happiness is very elusive. This is evident consider- The position that I will explore ing that through history, philosophers lies on the fact that, if happiness is no had suggested different standpoints the exclusive result of nurturing the on the meaning of happiness. I want character by our owns means (À la Ar- however to propose a view in which istotle)2, then, it must be considered happiness is understood as a mental state with phenomenological and in- 2 For instance, Plato argues in the Republic that tentional properties realized by the living in justice may result in happiness. Plato states that, “We have proved that justice in it- relevant brain states. The idea I con- self is the best thing for the soul itself” (Plato tend could be sympathetic with the 10.612b). Justice in the platonic point of view views held by the stoics, specifically is to live in harmony, and this harmony rooted in a mathematical idea is quite restrictive, this 1 Epictetus . On this account, I pretend is, if you leave your natural place, there is no to compare the stoic viewpoint on the harmony, thus not justice. Another philosopher mind, the idea of the representation, who explored the idea of happiness is Aristotle, who claims that eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία) is to and the phenomenal properties, with live according to virtue. Hence, by mean of this the way they can be understood in the “human flourishing” (Rasmussen 1-2) via the ex- ercise of habits, and then virtues, the life must actual framework of the philosophy lead us to focus on the contemplation of philo- of mind. Thereby, I will suggest that sophical truths According to Aristotle, we must the thesis of understanding today’s dedicate ourselves to practice virtue. By this mean, we shape our character to the main goal complex metaphysics of the mind, of human life which is this human flourishing. and a theory of happiness whose roots However, I may not totally agree with the Ar- istotelian viewpoint. The critique that Gregory are founded in the stoicism can be Trianosky made about Aristotle may have some sense in the view that I explore: 1 Epictetus (AD 55-135, Nicopolis), was a Greek ...although one’s attitudes, emotions, reac- philosopher associated with the early Stoicism. tive capacities, and skills are or can to some 134 Volumen 12, Número 1, 2019 The Phenomenal-Intentional Nature of Happiness: A Contemporary Approach to Allan Arturo González Estrada Epictetus and Stoicism the external factors that may appear in may attempt to provide a modern per- our lives, and the way they affect us. spective on how our minds are the ac- Thus, as Trianosky asserts, it is not the tual main highways to happiness. exercise of the agent on its own; in- stead, what it may be important is, as Epictetus, stoicism and the early David Lewis observes, the history and philosophy of mind the evidence of the agent (Lewis, Rad- ical Interpretation 337). It can be conceived at the light of the modern philosophy of mind, that In order to have a history of evi- the ancient Greeks (and Romans) did dence and cognition, we must require not have a solid theory of the inten- a brain to store all the elements that tionality5, or a complex metaphysical configure our history and our character3 his existence goes according to wish and (our memories, hopes, beliefs, fears and will. Hence this depends upon the agree- so on) On this account, I will discuss ment of nature with his entire purpose the idea that happiness has its founda- [which includes happiness], likewise to the essential determination basis of his will tion in the phenomenal and intention- (Kant 161) al nature of the mind4. This proposal However, this definition of happiness is entan- gled with the moral system that he develops. In other words, it can be suggested that Kant holds extent be developed by will, no effort of will, the idea that happiness is what makes a balance however sustained, is sufficient for their de- with morality of rational beings. Thus, as Kant velopment. Character is the product not only suggested “[happiness] amounts to the highest of voluntary action but also of the activity of good of a world into which… we must definitely temperament, along with upbringing, child- transfer ourselves” (Kant180). I may agree with hood experiences, social environment, peer Kant in some sense, as he emphasizes that happi- expectations, and pure happenstance. And ness must be grounded in a more moral concep- not only temperament but all of these things tion, and this moral conception must be rooted are not themselves the product of some exer- in the reason. Thus, happiness must be part of cise of agency, whether voluntary or non-vol- our mental faculties, rather to considered happi- untary. Hence, no Aristotelian account of ness as a result of external objects alone. responsibility for character can succeed(104). 5 Intentionality in the “modern” conception can Moreover, Aristotle suggests that some exter- be traced back to Franz Brentano (1874), so in- nal goods are required in addition to virtue for tentionality will be defined in this line, that is happiness, but my view is that this idea could be to say, a representation or aboutness. Nowadays, highly problematic. How an external object can we understand representation under a theory of give us a sense of security? intentionality, introduced in contemporary phi- 3 According to Kant “Virtue is the strength of a losophy by Franz Brentano, who claims that: human being’s maxims in fulfilling his duty.” Every mental phenomenon is character- (Kant167). This idea of virtue will be explored ized by what the Scholastics of the Middle in concordance with the position I defend. Ages called the intentional (or mental) in- 4 Even Kant, who’s ethical system does not rely existence of an object, and what we might upon a definition of happiness, he explored the call, though not wholly unambiguously, ref- topic, according to Kant: erence to a content, direction toward an ob- Happiness is the state of a rational being ject (which is not to be understood here as in the world, to whom everything in all of meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Volumen 12, Número 1, 2019 135 The Phenomenal-Intentional Nature of Happiness: A Contemporary Approach to Epictetus and Stoicism Allan Arturo González Estrada and epistemological theory on the understood from the perspective of the mind as we currently have. Instead, modern philosophical concepts. As the Stoics conceived different ideas to suggested by Rubarth, from the Stoics explain representation. Nonetheless, and the theory of representation, it can it is important to emphasize the fact be conceived a theory of phenomenal that the views that they had, can be experience (Rubarth, para.