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Seminar: Die Philosophie Von David Lewis Prof. Dr. André Fuhrmann Instítut für Philosophie Goethe‐Universität Frankfurt Winter 2016‐17 Seminar: Die Philosophie von David Lewis Dieser Reader enthält: Mad pain and Martian pain (1980) Reduction of mind (1994) Elusive knowledge (1996) Naming the colours (1997) Mill and Milquetoast (1989) The punishment that leaves something to chance (1989) Dispositional theories of value (1998) Are we free to break the laws? (1981) (with Stephanie Lewis) Holes (1970) (with Stephanie Lewis) Casati and Varzi on holes (1996) Many, but almost one (1993) Der Reader ist nur für den Seminargebrauch bestimmt. 16 Mad Pain and Martian Pain David Lewis I is possible, but my opinion that this is a possible case seems pretty firm. If I want a There might be a strange man who credible theory of mind, I need a theory sometimes feels pain, just as we do, but that does not deny the possibility of mad whose pain differs greatly from ours in its pain. I needn't mind conceding that per­ causes and effects. Our pain is typically haps the madman is not in pain in quite caused by cuts, burns, pressure, and the the same sense that the rest of us are, but like; his is caused by moderate exercise on there had better be some straightforward an empty stomach. Our pain is generally sense in which he and we are both in pain. distracting; his turns his mind to mathe­ Also, there might be a Martian who matics, facilitating concentration on that sometimes feels pain, just as we do, but but distracting him from anything else. whose pain differs greatly from ours in its Intense pain has no tendency whatever to physical realization. His hydraulic mind cause him to groan or writhe, but does contains nothing like our neurons. Rather, cause him to cross his legs and snap his there are varying amounts of fluid in fingers. He is not in the least motivated to many inflatable cavities, and the inflation prevent pain or to get rid of it. In short, he of any one of these cavities opens some feels pain but his pain does not at all oc­ valves and closes others. His mental cupy the typical causal role of pain. He plumbing pervades most of his body-in would doubtless seem to us to be some fact, all but the heat exchanger inside his sort of madman, and that is what I shall head. When you pinch his skin you cause call him, though of course the sort of no firing of C-fibers-he has none-but madness I have imagined may bear little rather, you cause the inflation of man; resemblance to the real thing. smallish cavities in his feet. ·when these I said there might be such a madman. cavities are inflated, he is in pain. And the I don't know how to prove that something effects of his pain are fitting: his thought and activity are disrupted, he groans and writhes, he is strongly motivated to stop This paper was presented at a conference on you from pinching him and to see to it min�-body identity held at Rice University in that you never do again. In short, he feels Apn1 1978. I am grateful to many friends, and espeCially_ to Patricia Kitcher, for valuable discus­ pain but lacks the bodily states that either sions of the topic. are pain or else accompany it in us. 16. Mad Pain and Martian Pain 217 There might be such a Martian; this right physical state, the Martian because opinion too seems pretty firm. A credible he is in a state rightly situated in the causal theory of mind had better not deny the network. possibility of Martian pain. I needn't mind Certainly we can cook up a mixed conceding that perhaps the Martian is not theory. Here's an easy recipe: First, find a in pain in quite the same sense that we theory to take care of the common man Earthlings are, but there had better be and the madman, disregarding the Mar­ some straightforward sense in which he tian-presumably an identity theory. Sec­ and we are both in pain. ond, find a theory to take care of the com­ mon man and the Martian, disregarding II the madman-presumably . some sort of A credible theory of mind needs to behaviorism or functionalism. Then dis­ make a place both for mad pain and for join the two: say that to be in pain is to be Martian pain. Prima facie, it seems hard in pain either according to the first theory for a materialist theory to pass this two­ or according to the second. Alternatively, fold test. As philosophers, we would like claim ambiguity: say that to be in pain in to characterize pain a priori. (We might one sense is to be in pain according to the settle for less, but let's start by asking for first theory, to be in pain in another sense all we want.) As materialists, we want to is to be in pain according to the second characterize pain as a physical phenom­ theory. enon. We can speak of the place of pain in This strategy seems desperate. One the causal network from stimuli to inner wonders why we should have a disjunc­ states to behavior. And we can speak of tive or ambiguous concept of pain, if the physical processes that go on when common men who suffer pain are always there is pain and that take their place in in pain according to both disjuncts or that causal network. We seem to have no both disambiguations. It detracts from other resources but these. But the lesson the credibility of a theory that it posits a of mad pain is that pain is associated only useless complexity in our concept of pain contingently with its causal role, while the -useless in application to the common lesson of Martian pain is that pain is con­ man, at least, and therefore useless almost nected only contingently with its physical always. realization. How can we characterize pain I don't object to the strategy of claim­ a priori in terms of causal role and physi­ ing ambiguity. As you'll see, I shall defend cal realization, and yet respect both kinds a version of it. But it's not plausible to of contingency? cook up an ambiguity ad hoc to account A simple identity theory straightfor­ for the compossibility of mad pain and wardly solves the problem of mad pain. It Martian pain. It would be better to find � goes just as straightforwardly wrong widespread sort of ambiguity, a sort we about Martian pain. A simple behavior­ would believe in no matter what we ism or functionalism goes the other way: thought about pain, and show that it will right about the Martian, wrong about the solve our problem. That is my plan. madman. The theories that fail our two­ Ill fold test so decisively are altogether too simple. (Perhaps they are too simple ever A dozen years or so ago, D. M. Arm­ to have had adherents.) It seems that a strong and I (independently) proposed a theory that can pass our test will have to materialist theory of mind that joins be a mixed theory. It will have to be able claims of type-type psychophysical iden­ to tell us that the madman and the Mar­ tity with a behaviorist or functionalist tian are both in pain, but for different rea­ way of characterizing mental states such sons: the madman because he is in the as pain.' I believe our theory passes the 218 David Lewis twofold test. Positing no ambiguity with­ have lost" (true) versus "It might have out independent reason, it provides natu­ been that the winner lost" (false). No ral senses in which both madman and wording is entirely unambiguous, but ] Martian are in pain. It wriggles through trust my meaning is clear. between Scylla and Charybdis.. ln short, the concept of pain as Arm­ Our view is that the concept of pain, strong and I understand it is a nonrigid or indeed of any other experience or men­ concept. Likewise the word "pain" is a tal state, is the concept of a state that oc­ nonrigid designator. It is a contingent mat­ cupies a certain causal role, a state with ter what state the concept and the word certain typical causes and effects. It is the apply to. It depends on what causes what. concept of a state apt for being qmsed by The same goes for the rest of our concepts certain stimuli and apt for causing certain and ordinary names of mental states. behavior. Or, better, of a state apt for Some need hear no more. The notion being caused in certain ways by stimuli that mental concepts and names are non­ plus other mental states and apt for com­ rigid, wherefore what is pain might not bining with certain other mental states to have been, seems to them just self-evident­ jointly cause certain behavior. It is the ly false.' I cannot tell why they think so. concept of a member of a system of states Bracketing my own theoretical commit­ that together more or less realize the pat­ ments, I think I would have no opinion tern of causal generalizations set forth in one way or the other. It's not that I don't commonsense psychology. (That system care about shaping theory to respect naive may be characterized as a whole and its opinion as well as can be, but in this case I members characterized afterward by ref­ have no naive opinion to respect.
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