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Index

31 December Women’s Movement (Ghana), Ahidjo, Ahmadou, 258–9 300 Akayev, Askar, 55 Abdullah, Badawi, 327–8 Akufo-Addo, Nana, 305 ABIM (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement), Albania, 4, 78, 282, 124, 329, 346, 350 319, 323 civil society in, 119; competitive Abkhazia, 221, 222 authoritarianism in, 12, 21, 22, 82, 87, 119, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy 121–24, 341, 342, 369, 370; elections, civil Act (Zimbabwe), 243 liberties and playing field in, 13, 90, 121–4; Action Front for Renewal and Development EU role in, 122–4; leverage in, 119, 122–4, (Benin), 295 373; linkage in, 46, 91, 119–24, 375; active leverage, 91 opposition in, 121–2, 349; organizational acquis communautaire, 88 power in, 29, 30, 31, 57, 59, 73, 77, 98, ADEMA (Alliance for Democracy in Mali), 120–1, 128–9, 357, 379–80;UN 297–8, 307 peacekeeping force in, 122; U.S. role in, Adil (Movement for Social Justice, Malaysia), 123 325 Albright, Madeleine, 168 ADP (Agrarian of Moldova), Aleman,´ Arnoldo, 144 230–1 Alia, Ramiz, 121 Afghanistan, 46, 109 Aliyev, Heydar, 34 AFORD (Alliance for Democracy, Malawi), Alliance for Democracy (Malawi). See AFORD 284, 285 Alliance for Democracy in Mali. See ADEMA Africa, 4, 35, 236, 239, 252, 255, 259, 266, 274, Alternative Front (Malaysia). See BA 282, 283, 292, 293, 297, 305–6 Americas, the, 3, 4, 40, 309 civil society in, 25, 46, 236; democracy lack of countervailing power in, 41–2; promotion/conditionality in, 40, 236; economy in, 67, 236; leverage in, 53, economy in, 60, 77, 177; leverage in, 237; 130–79, 219, 352; linkage in, 23, 25, 36, 44, linkage in, 23, 25, 45, 237; opposition in, 50, 53, 70, 85–6, 130–79, 181, 185, 221, 25, 30, 31, 236, 260; organizational power 352; OAS role in, 18 across, 36, 55, 74, 80, 236–7. See also Americas Watch, 156 countries by name Amoussou, Bruno, 295 Afro-Shirazi Party (Zanzibar), 252 Andrianarivo, Tantely, 281 Agrarian Democratic Party of Moldova. See Angola, 32, 46, 109 ADP ANM (Armenian National Movement), 208–11 Aguayo, Sergio, 151 antigos combatentes, 248, 354 Aguilar Zinser, Adolfo, 151 Anwar, Ibrahim, 9, 12, 55, 324–28

493

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494 Index

APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), name; stable authoritarianism; unstable 325 authoritarianism Aquino, Benigno, 60 authoritarian stability. See stable AREMA (Vanguard of the Malagasy authoritarianism Revolution, Madagascar), 277–81 Azarov, Mykola, 216 Argentina, 14, 15, 17, 35, 69 Azerbaijan Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, 29, 55, 59, 170–7, term limits in, 80; dynastic succession in, 29; 354 as fully authoritarian regime, 34;and armed forces. See security forces Russian pressure, 185;andstate Armenia, 4, 42, 185 discretionary control of economy, 343;war attack of parliament in, 210, 211;Central with Armenia, 55, 186, 207, 208, 358 Election Committee in, 210; competitive authoritarianism in, 20, 21, 22, 82, 89, BA (Alternative Front, Malaysia), 326, 327 183–6, 209–13, 233–4, 341, 369, 370; Baker, Bruce, 80 discretionary state economic power in, Balaguer, Joaquin, 33, 82, 132–7, 169, 352 210; elections, civil liberties and playing Banda, Hastings, 11, 29, 268, 282–5, 291, 355 field in, 13, 28, 207–13, 342; leverage in, Banda, Rupiah, 291 185, 207–8, 210, 212, 221, 373; linkage in, Bangladesh, 32, 170 45, 48, 214, 207–8, 221, 352, 375; Barisan Nasional (Malaysia). See BN Nagorno–Karabakh conflict in, 208–9;role Basescu,˘ Traian, 103 of nationalism/past violent conflict in, BDP (Botswana Democratic Party), 238, 255–8 208–9; opposition in, 70, 184, 210, 212–13, Belarus, 4, 78, 183, 346, 348 216, 348, 349, 356; organizational power civil society in, 31, 205; competitive in, 25, 29, 55, 57, 60, 61, 68, 69, 73, 77, 90, authoritarianism in, 12, 14, 20, 21, 22, 82, 186, 207–13, 233, 345, 349, 350, 356, 358, 89, 183–6, 203–7, 233–4, 341, 342, 369, 379–80; U.S. role in, 207–8, 210, 212 370; constitution in, 79, 80, 183, 204; Armenian National Movement. See ANM Constitutional Court in, 12, 79, 204–5; Armenian Revolutionary Party. See Dashniaks constitutional referendum in, 204; Army. See security forces constitutional reform in, 80; discretionary ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian state economic power in, 201, 202–3, 206; Nations), 318, 334, 335 Election Commission in, 204; elections, Asia, 3, 4, 35, 36, 40, 317, 318, 321, 322 civil liberties and playing field in, 9, 10, 12, civil society in, 25; countervailing power in, 13, 58, 202–7;EUrolein,201, 205; 131; leverage in, 181, 309; linkage in, 181, opposition in, 70, 204–6, 348, 349; 309; opposition in, 25; organizational legislature in, 80, 204; leverage in, 24, 186, power across, 181 217, 201–7, 220, 352, 373; linkage in, 46, Asian Financial Crisis (1997), 324 50, 51, 201, 206, 375; organizational power Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. See in, 59, 186, 66, 67, 68, 73, 77, 83, 90, 201, APEC 343, 349, 350, 357, 379–80; Russia, as Association of Southeast Asian Nations. See black knight in, 41, 185–6, 201, 214, 232; ASEAN U.S. role in, 205–6 ATT. See Toure,´ Amadou Toumani Bellin, Eva, 57 Atta Mills, John, 305 Benin, 4, 17, 24, 33, 78, 329 Austria, 93, 374 civil society in, 291; competitive authoritarian backsliding, 91, 299 authoritarianism in, 21, 22, 293–7, 305–8, authoritarianism 340, 341, 369, 370; Constitutional Court competitive vs. noncompetitive, 6–7, 13, in, 293–6, 359; constitutional reform in, 33–4; constitutions and, 80; institutional 293; discretionary state economic power design and, 78, 80; party strength and, in, 295; elections, civil liberties and playing 67–8; post-Cold War international field in, 293–7; Electoral Commission in, environment and, 18–19, 24, 27, 42, 54, 69, 294, 296, 303; legislature in, 294; leverage 91; and transitions from, 25, 54, 69; types in, 24, 181, 276, 292, 340, 373; linkage in, of, 15–16, 26–7; security apparatuses and, 30, 52, 276, 292, 340, 375; National 57; state strength and, 57, 67–8. See also Conference in, 291; opposition in, 69, competitive authoritarianism; countries by 293–6, 348, 349, 357; organizational

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Index 495

power in, 60–69, 71, 73, 83, 181, 237, 250, 258; organizational power in, 30, 237, 238, 263, 267, 276, 291–7, 340, 349, 379–80 254–8, 266, 379–80 Benin Resistance. See RB Botswana Congress Party, 257–8 Berezovsky, Boris, 198 Botswana Democratic Party. See BDP Berisha, Sali, 82, 121–23 Botswana National Front. See BNF Berlin Wall, fall of, 17, 237 Brazil, 15, 21, 33, 35, 131 Bersih (Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections, Brigadistas, 139 Malaysia), 327 Britain. See United Kingdom Biya, Paul, 258–64, 307 British Know-How Fund, 92 black knight brown areas, 59, 222, 297 definition/measurement of, 41, 372; Albania Brownlee, Jason, 26, 61 and, 119; Belarus and, 186, 201, 206, 232, Bulgaria, 17, 32, 33, 34, 47, 100, 124, 233, 342, 343; Benin and, 276, 292; Bolivia 201 and, 178–9;Botswanaand,255; Cameroon Bulldozer Revolution, 30 and, 237, 258, 262, 305, 308; China as, 41, Bunce, Valerie, 54 309, 373; Ecuador and, 178–9;Franceas, bureaucratic authoritarianism, 7, 15. 41, 258, 262, 263, 292, 305, 373; Gabon See also full authoritarianism and, 237, 258, 263, 305, 308; Ghana and, Burjanadze, Nino, 224–6 300; Georgia and, 185, 221; Japan as, 309, Burjanadze-Democrats (Georgia), 225 373; Kenya and, 265, 266, 273, 307; Burkina Faso, 33, 80, 343 Macedonia and, 124; Madagascar and, 276, Burma, 73, 206, 352, 353 277; Malawi and, 276, 282; Mali and, 276, Burnham, Forbes, 80, 147–8 297; Moldova and, 185; Nicaragua and, Bush administration (1989–1992), 154 178–9; and, 162; Russia as, 41, 185, Bush administration (2001–2008), 176 214, 221, 232, 233, 342, 343, 373; Senegal Bush, George H. W., 100, 143, 154, 163 and, 265, 276, 307; Slovakia and, 91; South Bush, George W., 199, 226, 228 Africa as potential, 238, 243; Tanzania and, 251; Ukraine and, 214; Venezuela as CAFTA (Central American Free Trade potential, 131, 179;Zambiaand,276, 288, Agreement), 137, 144 289; Zimbabwe and, 238, 243 Calderon,´ Felipe, 151, 160 Blanco, Salvador Jorge, 135 Cambodia, 3, 4, 17, 78, 248, 346 BN (Barisan Nasional, Malaysia), 11, 320–4, civil society in, 31, 328; competitive 326–8 authoritarianism in, 12, 14, 20, 21, 22, 28, BNF (Botswana National Front), 257–8 33, 76, 82, 309, 328–37, 337–8, 341, 369, Bogdanov, Andrei, 200 370; constitution in, 79; elections, civil Boix, Carles, 75 liberties and playing field in, 8, 9, 11, 13, Bolanos,˜ Enrique, 144, 352 28, 58, 330–7; Electoral Commission in, Bolivia, 178–9 335; legislature in, 333, 335; leverage in, Bolona,˜ Carlos, 164 50, 249, 352, 329, 373; linkage in, 44, 48, Bongo, Ali-Ben 265 50, 86, 329, 344, 375; opposition in, 69, 70, Bongo, Omar, 263–5, 359 328, 332–7, 348, 349, 357; organizational Boni, Yayi, 33, 292, 296, 340 power in, 25, 31, 57, 62, 328–37, 343–4, boomerang effect, 18, 44, 51, 143, 352. 358, 379–80;UNrolein,330–3, 334, 335; See also double boomerang effect and Vietnam in, 329, 331 Bosch, Juan, 135 Cambodian People’s Party. See CPP Bosnia, 104–6, 107, 108–9, 113, 116, 124, Cameroon, 4, 80 366 civil society in, 263; competitive Bosnia-Herzegovina, 32 authoritarianism in, 21, 22, 259–63, 305–8, Botswana, 4, 78, 246, 346 341, 369, 370; Constitutional Council in, competitive authoritarianism in, 20, 21, 22, 262; constitutional reform in, 80; 33, 254–8, 305–8, 341, 369, 370; discretionary state economic power in, discretionary state economic power in, 259; elections, civil liberties and playing 255–6; elections, civil liberties and playing field in, 9, 13, 30, 258–63; ethno-regional field in, 8, 35, 255–8; leverage in, 255, 373; cleavage in, 260–3; France as black knight linkage in, 255, 375; opposition in, 256, in, 41, 258, 260–2; leverage in, 24, 258–9,

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496 Index

Cameroon (cont.) Chen, Li-an, 316 261, 373; linkage in, 45, 258, 375; Ch’en, Lu-an, 311 opposition in, 259–62, 264, 273, 348, 349; Chen, Shui-bian, 317–18 organizational power in, 30, 31, 237, Chernomyrdin, Victor, 194–5 258–63, 265, 266, 269, 296, 303, 349, 350, Chesoni, Zacchaeus, 268 379–80; U.S. role in, 261 Chiang, Ching-kuo, 309, 314 Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement. See Chiang, Kai-shek, 313 CPDM Chihana, Chakufwa, 284 Cameroon People’s Union. See UPC Chile, 21 Canada, 150, 214 Chiluba, Frederick, 29, 82, 288–91, 359 Cannibal Army, 176 Chilumpha, Cassim, 287 capital mobility, 76 Chimeres` , 28, 174, 176 Cardenas,´ Cuauhtemoc,´ 153–4, 158 China, 120, 138, 150, 198, 333, 334 Cardoso, Carlos, 251 as black knight, 41, 309, 373; as closed Carey, Henry, 172 regime, 7; and global balance of power, Caribbean, 34, 86, 130, 133, 145, 146, 172, 177 363; and limits on external pressure in, 19, Caribbean Basin, 44, 46 41; linkage and leverage, 352, 361;and Caribbean Basin Initiative, 133 non-Western linkage, 50;and Caribbean Community, 149 organizational power, 57, 354, 361, 362, Carpizo, Jorge, 156, 158 363; and rapprochement with West, 313; Carter, Jimmy, 141, 143–4, 148 and Taiwan, 310, 311, 313, 314, 316, 318 Carter Center, 144, 148–9, 168 Chinese Communist Party, 61, 313, 362 Castaneda,˜ Jorge, 151 Chissano, Joaquim, 249–51 Castro, Fidel, 130, 134, 362 Christian Council of Churches in Madagascar, Castro, Raul, 362 278 Catholic Church, 114, 283, 141 Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar. See CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Tanzania), 63, FJKM 64, 247, 252–4, 266 CIO (Central Intelligence Organization, CDN (Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator), Zimbabwe), 239 140 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), CDR (Democratic Convention, Romania), 101, 89, 185, 214 102 Cisse,´ Soumaıla,¨ 298–9 Ceaus¸escu, Nicolae, 98–101, 252 Citizen Coalition for Constitutional Change Central African Republic, 4 (Kenya), 269 Central America, 34, 130, 137, 139, 152 Citizen’s Union of Georgia. See CUG Central American Free Trade Agreement. See Civic Alliance (Mexico), 151, 158, 159 CAFTA civic movements. See civil society Central Asia, 236 civil liberties, 6, 8–9, 13–15, 19, 21, 33, 42–3, Central Election Committee (Armenia), 210 51, 366–7. See also legal repression; Central Elections Board (Dominican Republic). countries by name See JCE civil society Central Intelligence Organization, Zimbabwe. and Communist regimes, 69, 87; co-optation See CIO of, 28, 54, 64; diffusion of, 18;and CEP (Provisional Electoral Council, Haiti), discretionary economic power of the state, 174–5 67; and economy, 31, 67; and linkage, 44, Chad, 80 50; strength of, 19, 24, 69; transnational Chakuamba, Gwanda, 285 dimension of, 25, 44, 53, 70; weakness of, Chama Cha Mapinduzi. See CCM 56, 69, 85. See also countries by name Chamorro, Joaquin, 60 Civil Society Development Foundation, 96 Chamorro, Violeta, 52, 138, 142–4 Clauthier, Manuel, 151 Change 90 (Peru), 163 Clinton, Bill, 109, 169 Chanturia, Giorgi, 222 Clinton administration, 46, 136, 154, 174, Chavez, Hugo, 12, 82, 170, 178 195 Chavunduka, Mark, 243 closed regime, 7, 13, 15, 17, 56, 73, 360. See also Chechnya, 46, 190, 194, 196, 366 full authoritarianism

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Index 497

CNN effect, 44 regime subtype, 13–16; indicators of, coalitional strategy, and opposition parties, 365–8; informal institution in, 27–8; 30–1 leverage in, 38–43, 50–4; lifespan of, 21; coercion linkage in, 38–40, 43–54;vs. high intensity, 57–8, 60; and incumbents, noncompetitive/full authoritarianism, 6–7, 69–70; informal mechanisms of, 27–8;low 12–13, 365; organizational power in, intensity, 58–9, 67. See also countries by 54–68; opposition strength under, 68–70; name; security forces; state coercive party behavior in, 29–32, 63–4; regime capacity trajectories in, 20–7, 37–8;riseof,16–20; coercive apparatus. See security forces; state stability of, 57–61; succession in, 28–9; coercive capacity uneven playing fields in, 9–13. See also cohesion. See elite cohesion; party strength; countries by name state coercive capacity conditionality Cold War era, 3, 17, 20, 34, 351, 361, 363, 364 and linkage/leverage, 24–5; and electoralism, Colina Group, 165 42–3; multilateral, 17–18, 39; spatial effects Collier, David, 13–14 of, 40. See also countries by name; See also Collins, Rudy, 148 democratizing pressure; European Union Colombia, 15, 32 Congo, 32, 46, 241 color revolutions, 54, 184, 348. See also Congo-Brazzaville, 4, 32 countries by name Congressional Black Caucus, 46, 136, 174 Colosio, Luis Donaldo, 158 Congressional Hispanic Caucus, 136 Colton, Timothy, 78 Constantinescu, Emil, 52, 102, 103 Committee of National Salvation (Ukraine), Constitution, 63, 80 219 in Belarus, 79, 80, 183, 204; in Cambodia, 79; Committees for the Defense of the Revolution in Croatia, 79; in Gabon, 264; in Ghana, (Benin), 292 301–3; in Haiti, 79; in Kazakhstan, 80;in Committees for the Defense of the Revolution Kenya, 269; in Madagascar, 79; in Malawi, (Ghana), 300 285; in Malaysia, 79; in Mexico, 79;in Committee on Security in Ukraine. See SBU Mozambique, 248; in Nicaragua, 144, 145; Committee for State Security (Soviet Union). in Peru, 79, 80–1, 163–4; in Romania, 79; See KGB in Russia, 79, 80, 183;inTurkmenistan, communism, collapse of, 87–8, 100. See also 80; in Uzbekistan, 80 Soviet Union, collapse of Constitutional Council (Cameroon), 261–2 Communist Party of Cuba, 363 Constitutional Court 63, 359 Communist Party of Moldova. See PCRM in Belarus, 12, 79, 204–5; in Benin, 293–7, Communist Party of the Russian Federation. 359; in Cameroon, 261–2; in Croatia, 117; See KPRF in Kenya, 269; in Madagascar, 279; in Mali, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 36, 184, 298; in Moldova, 359;inPeru,20, 80, 187, 188, 190, 204, 214 166–7; in Russia, 192; in Slovakia, 93;in Commonwealth of Independent States. See CIS Ukraine, 218. See also countries by name communication ties constitutional design and EU leverage, 129; and geographic as competing theory of regime outcomes, 27; proximity, 104; and linkage measurement, and Eastern European democratization, 374–5; in Belarus, 201; in Cambodia, 329; 129; as endogenous to regime outcomes, in Georgia, 221; in Moldova, 228;in 80; and former Soviet Union, 81, 183, 233; Taiwan, 311; and U.S.–Mexican ties, 151. and formal institutions, 358; and regime See also Internet; linkage outcomes, 78, 346, 351, 357. See also Community Development Agency (Malaysia), institutional design 322 Constitutional (Nicaragua). See competitive authoritarianism PLC civil liberties in, 8–9; contestation/ constitutional oligarchy, 14. See also hybrid uncertainty in, 12–13; definition of, 3, regime 5–16; vs. democracy, 7, 12–13, 37, 365–8; constitutional reform, 80 distinctive logic of, 17–20; diverging paths in Belarus, 80; in Benin, 293; in Croatia, 81; of, 5, 23–4; elections in, 7–8; as hybrid in Gabon, 263; in Ghana, 301–2;in

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498 Index

constitutional reform (cont.) 117–18, 356; organizational power in, 85, Guyana, 80; in Kenya, 270, 272;in 114–18, 347, 379–80; U.S. role in, 116 Madagascar, 79, 278; in Malaysia, 79;in Croatian Catholic Church, 114 Moldova, 359; in Romania, 80; in Russia, Croatian Democratic Union. See HDZ 79;inPeru,20, 80, 164; in Slovakia, 93;in Croatian Party of Rights. See HSP Taiwan, 313, 316; in Zambia, 289, 290;in Cruz, Arturo, 138 Zimbabwe, 80 Cuba, 7, 131, 139, 146, 206, 353, 360–3 Constitutional Review Commission (Kenya), Cuban Revolution, 362 269 CUG (Citizen’s Union of Georgia), 221, 223–5 Constitutional Tribunal of Peru, 20, 80, 166–7 Czechoslovakia, 92–3 Contras, 140–1 Czech Republic, 81, 92, 94 Copenhagen criteria, 88, 94 Cornea, Doina, 101 Dahl, Robert, 5–6 Corona, Norma, 156 Dahomey. See Benin Correa, Rafael, 178 Dansokho, Amath, 276 Costa Rica, 138, 142, 172 DAP (Democratic Action Party, Malaysia), 322, Cote d’Ivoire, 34 325–8 Council of Europe, 89, 94, 98, 100, 112, 116, Dashniaks (Armenia), 208–11, 212 185, 206 Dayton Accords, 91, 105, 109, 116 counter-hegemon. See black knight Debswana mining company, ties to BDP, Country of Law (Armenia), 212 255 coups (civilian/military), 32, 42, 47, 131, 226 defection, of elites. See elite defection absence in Kenya, 266; absence in Malaysia, defective democracy, 15. See hybrid regime 320; absence in Mexico, 152; absence in Defenders of the Land (Armenia). See Zimbabwe, 255; in Benin, 292;in Yerkrapah Cambodia, 334;inGhana,300;in de la Madrid, Miguel, 151 Guatemala, 51; in Haiti, 173, 176;in Demirchian, Karen, 211 Honduras, 131, 173; in Mali, 297–8;in Demirchian, Stepan, 211 Peru, 48, 81, 130, 162–4, 165, 166 democracy coup attempts vs. competitive authoritarianism, 7, 12–13, as indicator of weak state cohesion, 377;in 37; definition of, 3, 5–6, 368; civil liberties Cameroon, 259; in Georgia, 222;in in, 6, 42; hybrid regimes and, 15; playing Ghana, 300; in Mali, 297; in Soviet Union, field and, 6; promotion of, 19, 42–3; 188, 222; in Venezuela, 131; in Zambia, scoring of, 368; and state strength, 56–7; 288, 289 types of, 13–15 CPDM (Cameroon People’s Democratic Democratic Action Party (Malaysia). See DAP Movement), 259–63 democratic conditionality. See conditionality; CPP (Cambodian People’s Party), 328–36, 337, democratizing pressure 344, 358 Democratic Convention (Romania). See CDR CRN (National Reconciliation Committee, Democratic Opposition of Serbia. See DOS Madagascar), 280–1 Democratic Party (Kenya), 268 Croatia, 4, 78 Democratic Party (Serbia), 111–13 competitive authoritarianism in, 12, 21, 22, Democratic Party of Albania. See PD 82, 87, 113, 128–9, 341, 369; constitution Democratic Party of Albanians. See DPA in, 79; Constitutional Court in, 117; Democratic Party of Serbia. See DSS discretionary state economic power in, Democratic Progressive Party (Malawi). See 115; elections, civil liberties and playing DPP field in, 9, 114–18; electoral authorities in, Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan). See 115, 359; and ethnic civil war, 85, 91, 105, DPP 106, 107, 113, 114–16;EUrolein,48, 49, Democratic Russia, 187, 191 116–18; legislature in, 81, 115, 117; Democratic Union (Slovakia), 95 leverage in, 114–16, 373; linkage in, 47, 49, Democratic Union for Integration 51, 85, 114–18, 132, 228, 375; nationalism (Macedonia). See DUI as ideology in, 61, 114–15, 118;NATO Democratization, 3–4, 21–2, 26–7, 37–8, 75, role in, 117–18; opposition in, 81, 115, 85–91, 386. See also countries by name

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Index 499

democratizing pressure double boomerang effect, 51–2 external/Western, and linkage, 23, 25, 43–5, DPA (Democratic Party of Albanians), 50–3, 85, 339, 351, 361; and leverage, 128 24–5, 40–3, 50–3, 71; and post-Cold War DPP (Democratic Progressive Party, Malawi), international environment, 19; variation 287 across cases in, 40, 181; in Africa, 236–7;in DPP (Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan), Americas, 131, 177; in Belarus, 186;in 313, 315–17 Benin, 276; in Cambodia, 337; in Croatia, Draskoviˇ c,´ Vuk, 106, 111 114, 115, 118; in former Soviet Union, Druc, Mircea, 230 184–5; in Georgia, 221; in Ghana, 300;in DSS (Democratic Party of Serbia), 112 Kenya, 265; in Madagascar, 276;in DUI (Democratic Union for Integration, Malawi, 276; in Mali, 276; in Mexico, 149; Macedonia), 128 in Peru, 162; in Romania, 98; in Russia, Duma. See Russia, legislature in 187, 193;inSenegal,265;inSerbia,105;in Duvalier, Jean-Claude, 172–3 Taiwan, 310; in Tanzania, 254; in Zambia, Dyachenko, Tatyana, 195 276; in Zimbabwe, 240. See also European Dzurinda, Mikula´s,ˇ 52, 97 Union; OAS; OSCE; countries by name demonstration effects, 24, 38, 44. See also linkage East Asia, 44, 49, 313. Department of North American Affairs (created See alsocountries by name by KMT), 310 Easter, Gerald, 183 Dhlakama, Afonso, 249–51 Eastern Europe, 81 Diacov, Dumutri, 231 lack of countervailing power in, 17, 41–2, Diamond, Larry, 15, 360 309; diffusion effects across, 40, 54; diasporas economy in, 17;EUrolein,18, 42, 50, Armenian, 207; and Haiti, 171, 174; 88–91, 129, 214; leverage in, 50, 53, 87–91, Croatian, 114, 115; and linkage, 43, 45–6; 130, 214, 219, 360; linkage in, 23, 25, 36, and Taiwanese, 311, 312; Ukrainian, 214 44–6, 53, 70, 85–91, 130, 184–5, 207, 214, diffusion effects 221, 352, 353; opposition in, 69, 220; and existing scholarship, 24, 38, 44; organizational power in, 9, 67, 130; compared to linkage, 45; and multiparty transnational advocacy networks in, 40; elections, 19; and opposition strategies, 54, uneven playing field across, 9–10; U.S. role 183; and geospatial dependence, 40;and in, 50. See also countries by name Western democratic models, 17 EC. See European Community Din− di ¯ c,´ Zoran, 30, 111–13 economic control discretionary state, 70, 343; Diouf, Abdou, 274–5 indicators of, 378; and state/party strength, discretionary economic power. See economic 66–7. See also individual countries control economic crisis. See economic performance Dominican Republic, 4, 78, 172 economic inequality. See income inequality Central Elections Board (JCE) in, 135–6; economic linkage. See linkage civil society in, 132, 135; competitive economic conditionality. See conditionality authoritarianism in, 17, 20, 21, 22, 33, 34, economic development, as alternative 82, 132–7, 177–8, 341, 369; elections, civil explanation for regime outcomes, 24, 74–5, liberties and playing field in, 8, 132–7; 345–6 leverage in, 42, 50, 131, 132–7, 149, 162, economic performance, as alternative 373; linkage in, 47, 50, 51, 52, 85, 131, explanation for regime outcomes, 77–8, 132–7, 161, 170, 352, 375; OAS role in, 346–7 131, 136–7; opposition in, 132, 135–6, 348, Ecuador, 178–9 349; organizational power in, 30, 134–7, Egypt, 7, 8, 16, 34, 41, 343, 350, 361 347, 349, 350, 352, 359, 379–80; U.S. role elections, 3, 5–6, 7–8, 12–13, 19, 42–3, in, 133–7 366 Dominican Liberation Party. See PLD as alternative explanation for Dominican Revolutionary Party. See PRD democratization, 22;stolen,42, 45, 132, Dominique, Jean, 175 136, 218, 250, 272–3, 306–7, 345, 349–50. DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia), See also countries by name 111–12 election-monitoring, 39, 48, 304

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500 Index

electoral authoritarianism, 16. See also former Soviet states, 185; in Georgia, 221, authoritarianism 228; in Guyana, 149; in Macedonia, 126–7; electoral commission, 63, 359 in Malawi, 286; in Nicaragua, 145;in in Armenia, 210; in Belarus, 204; in Benin, Romania, 49, 91, 98, 100–3; in Russia, 196; 294, 296, 303; in Cambodia, 335;in in Serbia, 49, 108, 111–113; in Slovakia, Dominican Republic, 135–6; in Gabon, 48–9, 91–2, 94–7; in Ukraine, 214, 218, 79–80; in Ghana, 302–3; in Guyana, 148–9; 219. See also countries by name in Haiti, 174–5; in Kenya, 272, 273;in European Union of Christian Democrats, 92 Madagascar, 279; in Malawi, 80, 284, 285, even playing field. See playing field 286, 287, 303; in Malaysia, 322; in Mexico, exclusive republic. See constitutional oligarchy 157–61; in Mozambique, 250;inPeru, executive succession. See succession 164–5, 166–7, 168, 169; in Zimbabwe, 250. exile communities. See diasporas See also countries by name; organizations external assistance. See democratizing pressure by name external vulnerability. See leverage electoral democracy, 15. See also hybrid regime EZLN (Zapatista National Liberation Army), electoralism, 19, 42–3 156 electoral revolution, 54, 205 elite cohesion, 26, 67, 170, 345, 353–4, 358, Fairbanks, Charles, 226 362 FAPSI (Federal Agency for Government elite defection, 26, 47, 60, 61–2, 65, 67, 68, 69, Communications and Information, Russia), 70, 77, 339, 345, 354–5. See also countries 188 by name Fatherland (Ukraine), 31, 216–17 El Salvador, 15, 32, 34 Fatherland-All Russia. See OVR Enlarged Presidential Majority (Senegal), 275 Federal Agency for Government EPP (European People’s Party), 118 Communications and Information EPS (Sandinista Popular Army, Nicaragua), (Russia). See FAPSI 139 Federal Border Service (Russia), 188 Estonia, 14, 17, 81 Federal Counter-Intelligence Service (Russia). Esquipulas II peace process, 141 See FSK Ethiopia, 33, 46, 109, 343 Federal Electoral Institute (Mexico). See IFE ethnic civil war, 87, 91 Federal Electoral Tribunal (Mexico), 157 ethnic cleavage/ties, as source of elite cohesion Federal Protective Service (Russia), 188 26, 60, 65 Federal Security Service (Russia). See FSB ethnic identity, and state cohesion 26, 60 Federation Council. See Russia, legislature in EU. See European Union Fernandez,´ Diego, 158 Europe, 92, 105, 113, 114, 116, 119, 120, 188, Fernandez,´ Leonel, 52, 137 208, 229, 236, 318 fiscal health, and state cohesion, 60 integration with, 47, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 102, Fish, Steven, 78, 81 118, 318, 353; linkage with, 89, 118, 352; FJKM (Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar), proximity to, 85–6, 109. See also European 280 Union FL (Lavalas Family), 173 Europe Agreement, 88–9, 92 flying brigades, 63 European Community, 47, 88, 108 For A New Georgia!, 224–5 European Democratic Union, 92 FORD (Forum for the Restoration of European Institute for the Media, 185 Democracy, Kenya), 267–8 , 88, 94, 123 FORD-Asili (Forum for the Restoration of European People’s Party. See EPP Democracy, Kenya), 268 European Union, 40, 90 FORD-Kenya (Forum for the Restoration of and accession, 50, 90, 92, 101, 102;and Democracy), 268 conditionality, 18, 36, 39, 40, 42, 85, 90; Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia). See SVR and enlargement, 49, 83, 88–91, 353;and formal institutions, 27, 78–81, 297, 358–60 leverage, 41–2, 50, 89–91; and linkage, 23, former Soviet Union, 19, 87, 129, 177, 181 43–4, 46, 50, 89–91; in Albania, 122–4;in countervailing power in, 131;economic Belarus, 210, 205; in Croatia, 48, 49, factors in, 17, 60; linkage in, 23, 25, 44, 46, 116–18; in Eastern Europe, 88–91, 129;in 82; opposition in, 31, 69; organizational

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Index 501

power in, 36, 55, 57, 74, 129; post-Cold 263–5, 266, 269, 296, 303, 347, 349, 350, War regimes in, 3, 4, 16, 35, 56, 82, 379–80 183–235, 360; and spatial dependence of Gabonese Democratic Party. See PDG diffusion effects, 40, 44. See also countries Gachechiladze, Levan, 227 by name Gaidar, Yegor, 192, 194 Formosa Club in America, 311 Gambia, 20, 32 Formosan Association for Political Affairs, Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 82, 220–3, 228, 311 355 Formosan Christians for Self-Determination, Garrison Command (Taiwan), 312 311 Gazprom, 197–8 Forum for the Restoration of Democracy GDF (Guyana Defense Forces), 146, 147 (Kenya). See FORD Geddes, Barbara, 26, 61, 62 Fourth Wave regime transitions, 20, 37–8, 83 General Directorate of State Security Fox, Vicente, 151, 160 (Nicaragua), 139 France, 280, 311, 374 Georgia, 4, 42, 185 as black knight, 41, 258, 261, 262–3, 264, civil society in, 225, 228; competitive 265, 305, 307, 333, 336, 373; and political authoritarianism in, 21, 22, 33, 82, 89, 183, conditionality in Africa, 236; post-Cold 213, 220, 222–8, 369, 370; elections, civil War shift in foreign policy, 17–18, 236; liberties and playing field in, 223–8;EU and post-colonial ties to Africa, 258, 273, role in, 221, 228; leverage in, 181, 185–6, 292, 297 221, 226, 233, 340, 373; linkage in, 24, 51, Freedom House, 14–15, 35, 89, 232, 255, 291 52, 221, 375; opposition in, 183–6, 205, Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of 222–6, 228, 233–4, 348, 349, 355; Mozambique), 26, 246–51 organizational power in, 25, 30, 55, 57, 59, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique. See 60, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 73, 77, 83, 181, 186, Frelimo 200, 213, 220–8, 340, 345, 349, 350, 354, Fru Ndi, John, 260–2 357, 379–80; Ossetia and Abkhazia, FSB (Russian Federal Security Service), 188 conflict in, 221–2; Rose Revolution in, 54, FSK (Russian Federal Counter-Intelligence 212, 225–6; U.S. role in, 226, 228 Service), 188 Georgievski, Ljubco,ˇ 127 FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front), Germany, 34, 93, 107, 138, 150, 311, 374 26, 82, 134, 137–45, 344, 345, 352 Ghana, 4, 24, 78, 340 FSN (National Salvation Front, Romania), 80, civil society in, 301, 304; competitive 98–99, 100, 101 authoritarianism in, 14, 21, 22, 261, 301–5, Fujimori, Alberto, 9, 11, 12, 14, 20, 29, 48, 63, 305–8, 341, 343, 369; constitution in, 64, 80, 81, 161–70, 177, 358 301–303; constitutional reform in, 80, Fujimorismo, 166 301–2; discretionary state economic power full authoritarianism, 6–8, 13–14, 19, 33, 365, in, 302, 304; elections, civil liberties and 369. See also authoritarianism playing field in, 10, 30, 301–5; Electoral FUNCINPEC (National United Front for an Commission in, 302–3;HumanRights Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Commission in, 302; leverage in, 343, 300, Cooperative Cambodia), 31, 331–6 373; linkage in, 299, 300, 305, 343, 375; Media Commission in, 302; opposition in, Gabon, 4 69, 299, 301, 304, 351, 356, 357; civil society in, 31; competitive organizational power in, 30, 237, 299–305, authoritarianism in, 21, 22, 258, 263, 343, 356, 357, 379–80; Supreme Court in, 305–6, 308, 341, 369, 370; constitution in, 302–3 264; constitutional reform in, 80, 263; Githongo, John, 272 discretionary state economic power in, Glasnost Defense Fund, 199 263–5; elections, civil liberties and playing Gligorov, Kiro, 125–6 field in, 13, 263–5; Electoral Commission Gongadze, Georgii, 217 in, 79–80; France as black knight in, 41, Good, Kenneth, 256 263, 264; leverage in, 24, 263, 373; linkage Gorbachev, Mikhail, 19, 80, 188, 190 in, 45, 375; opposition in, 70, 263–5, 273, Gore, Al, 217, 325 348, 349; organizational power in, 67, 237, Grachev, Pavel, 193

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502 Index

Greater Romania Party. See PRM Honduras, 32, 131, 138, 142, 172, Greece, 88, 120, 122, 124, 374 179 Greene, Kenneth, 160 Hong, Victor Wing, 281 Grinev, Vladimir, 215 Houngbedji,´ Adrien, 295–6 Gruevski, Nikola, 127 House of Israel, 147 Guatemala, 14, 32, 42, 51 Howard, Marc, 54 Gubbay, Anthony, 243 Hoxha, Enver, 119–21 Guebuza, Armando, 251 Hoyte, Desmond, 148–9 Gusinsky, Vladimir, 191, 194, 198 HSP (Croatian Party of Rights), 118 Guyana, 4, 17, 33, 78, 172, 178 Humala, Ollanta, 170 competitive authoritarianism in, 12, 17, 21, human rights violations. See civil liberties 22, 76, 145–9, 177–8, 341, 369; Hungary, 17, 81, 94, 68 constitutional reform in, 80; elections, civil Hun Sen, 31, 82, 330, 332–3, 335–6, 358 liberties and playing field in, 10, 28; Huntington, Samuel, 56 Electoral Commission in, 148–9; ethnic hybrid regimes, 4, 26–7, 85 divisions within, 85, 145–7, 149;EUrole and democratization, 3–4; and institutional in, 149; leverage in, 104, 131–2, 145–9, design, 78; and party behavior, 29–32;as 162, 373; linkage in, 23, 85, 104, 131–2, subtype of democracy/authoritarianism, 145–9, 170, 375; OAS role in, 131, 149; 14–16; trajectories of, 4, 13–16. See also opposition in, 147–9; organizational power competitive authoritarianism in, 31, 60, 62, 65, 66, 85, 146–9, 347, 348, HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia), 354, 379–80; U.S. role in, 145–9 91–7 Guyana Defense Forces. See GDF ideology Haiti, 4, 17, 130, 178, 308 as source of elite cohesion, 65, 361; as source civil society in, 174; competitive of party cohesion, 65, 378; as source of authoritarianism in, 14, 21, 22, 76, 177–8, state cohesion, 61, 377. See also countries 341, 370; constitution in, 79; elections, civil by name liberties and playing field in, 28, 30, 172–7; IFE (Federal Electoral Institute, Mexico), leverage in, 42, 132, 171, 176, 373; linkage 157–61 in, 44, 46, 85, 132, 161, 170–4, 375; OAS illiberal democracy, 15. See also hybrid regime role in, 131, 175–6; opposition in, 69, 174, I Love Madagascar, 279 175, 349; organizational power in, 29, 30, IMF (International Monetary Fund) 55, 57, 59, 60, 61, 68, 73, 77, 170, 172–7, and Belarus, 207; and Cambodia, 334;and 347, 350, 354, 357, 379–80;Provisional Cameroon, 260; and domestic technocrats, Electoral Council (CEP) in, 174–5;UN 47; and Haiti, 176; and Malaysia, 324, 325, role in, 177; U.S. role in, 39, 171–7 326;andPeru,163; and Russia, 195;and Haitian National Police. See HNP Serbia, 107; and Zambia, 289, 290 Hale, Henry, 67 immigration. See migration Hanchar, Victor, 204–5 income inequality, as alternative explanation for hard-door transitions. See transitions, hard-door regime outcomes, 75–7 HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), 49, 81–2, incumbent capacity, 54–6, 65. See also 113–18 organizational power hegemonic regime, 7, 29, 360. See also full incumbent weakness, and regime transition, authoritarianism 69–70 Helms, Jesse, 167 Independent Democratic Serbian Party, 118 Helsinki Agreement, 89, 119 India, 15, 321 Herbst, Jeffrey, 55 informal institutions, 27–8, 45, 174, 193, 217 Heritage Foundation Index of Economic information linkage. See communication ties, Freedom, 76 linkage High Court of Malawi, 285, 286 INGOs (international nongovernmental High State Authority. See Madagascar, organizations), 18, 45–8, 72. See also legislature in countries by name HNP (Haitian National Police), 173 institutional design, as alternative explanation Holmes, Stephen, 56 for regime outcomes, 78–81, 83, 183

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Index 503

Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico). See Ka, Djibo, 275 PRI Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party, 329 institutions. See informal institutions; formal KANU (Kenya African National Union), 31, institutions 62, 64, 70, 263, 265–71, 273, 275, 276, 307, Inter-American Human Rights Court, 167 348, 355 intergovernmental linkage. See linkage Karabakh Committee, 208 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Kasparov, Garry, 200 Organization. See VMRO-DPMNE Kasyanov, Mikhail, 199, 200 Internal Security Act (Malaysia). See ISA Kaunda, Kenneth, 82, 268, 288–90 International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Kazakhstan, 4, 7, 15, 16, 33, 34, 80, 343, 361 90, 108, 116 Kebich, Viacheslau, 82, 201, 202, 203, 233, international factors. See democratizing 342 pressure, linkage Keıta,¨ Ibrahim Boubacar, 298–9 International Monetary Fund. See IMF Kenya, 4, 42 international nongovernmental organizations. civil society in, 266, 267, 269; competitive See INGOs authoritarianism in, 3, 12, 20, 21, 22, 34, international organizations. See IOs 261, 265–73, 305–8, 370; constitutional international pressure. See democratizing reform in, 80, 270, 272; Constitutional pressure Review Commission in, 269; elections, Internet civil liberties and playing field in, 13, 20, and Africa, 237; and linkage, 38, 44, 374–5; 28, 29, 30, 266–73; Electoral Commission, and Malaysia, 319, 328; and Taiwan, 311; 272, 273; leverage in, 42, 228, 265, 266, and transnational civil society, 18;and 269, 273, 373; linkage in, 51, 266, 375; Zapatistas in Mexico, 156 opposition in, 70, 266–73, 348, 349, 355; Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (Kenya). See organizational power in, 25, 26, 31, 57, 62, IPPG 64, 65, 66, 70, 237, 246, 251, 263, 265–73, IOs (international organizations), 18, 39, 47, 276, 303, 345, 349, 350, 353, 354, 379–80; 185, 342, 353. See also countries by name, U.S. role in, 267 organizations by name Kenya African National Union. See KANU Ioseliani, Jaba, 222–3 Kenya Human Rights Commission, 269 IPPG (Inter-Party Parliamentary Group, Kenyatta, Jomo, 266–7, 270 Kenya), 269 Kenyatta, Uhuru, 270–1 Iran, 14, 32, 206, 353 Kepala 10 (Malaysia), 320 ISA (Internal Securities Act, Malaysia), 321, Ker´ ekou,´ Mathieu, 82, 291–3, 295–6 325 KGB (Committee for State Security) Islamic community, 50 and Armenia, 208; and Belarus, 202, 203;and Islamic Party of Malaysia. See PAS Moldova, 229; and Russia, 188, 190;and Italy, 46, 119, 120, 122, 374 Ukraine, 214–15 Ivanov, Gjorge, 128 Khama, Ian, 258 Ivcher, Baruch, 164, 167 Khama, Seretse, 255–6 Khasbulatov, Ruslan, 191–3 Jagan, Cheddi, 149 Khmer National Party (Cambodia). See KNP Japan, 138, 150, 169, 311, 318, 321, 362 Khmer Rouge, 329–31 as black knight, 41, 373, 309, 326, 333, 334, Khodorkovsky, Mikhail, 9, 194, 198–9 335, 373 Kibaki, Mwai, 268–73, 355 Jarquın,´ Agustın,´ 144 Kikwete, Jakaya, 254 JCE (Central Elections Board, Dominican Kim, Il Sung, 362 Republic), 135–6 Kitovani, Tengiz, 222–3 Jiu Valley, 100 Kivuitu, Samuel, 273 Joint Inter-Parliamentary Committee, 94 KMT (Kuomintang), 11, 49, 62, 82, 309–18, Jordan, 29, 32 337, 338 judiciary. See supreme courts; constitutional KNP (Khmer National Party, Cambodia), 333 courts; countries by name Kocharian, Robert, 207–8, 210–13 Justice and Truth Alliance (Romania), Kohl, Helmut, 193 103 Koma, Kenneth, 257–8

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504 Index

Konare,´ Alpha Oumar, 298 inter-regional variation in, 360–4;low Kosovo, 46, 109–10, 122, 124, 366 leverage, 24, 38, 71–2; limits on Kostikov, Viacheslav, 187 effectiveness of, 42–3; measurement of, Kostunica,ˇ Vojislav, 31, 110, 111–13 372–3; variation with linkage, 50–4. See also Kova´c,ˇ Michal, 93, 95 countries by name KPRF (Communist Party of the Russian Levitsky, Steven, 13–14 Federation), 194, 196, 198 Lexa, Ivan, 93 Kravchuk, Leonid, 64, 68, 83, 214–16, 233, Li, Yuan-Zu, 311 340 Liberal Democratic Party (Kenya). See LDP Kuchma, Leonid, 9, 11, 29, 31, 193, 214–19, , 92, 94, 95 220, 233, 340 Liberation Front of Mozambique. See Frelimo Kufuor, John, 304–3 Liberia, 17, 32 Kung Fu self-defense societies (Madagascar), Lien, Chan, 311, 317 277 Lilic,´ Zoran, 108, 110 Kuntz, Philipp, 349 Lin, Yang-kang, 316 Kuomintang (Taiwan). See KMT Lindberg, Staffan, 22 Kuwait, 32, 41 linkage, 44, 83 Kyrgyzstan, 32, 54, 55, 205, 245, 343 and civil society, 44; cluster effects of, 50; definition of, 23, 25, 43–52; Lahiniriko, Jean, 281 democratization and, 45–54; and diasporas, Lancaster House Agreement (1979), 240 45–6; and diffusion, 44–5; and domestic Laos, 361 preferences, 47–8; high linkage, 5, 23, 38, Latin America, 35, 40, 162 48, 51–2, 70–1, 85–6, 181; inter-regional external assistance in, 236; linkage, 86, 130–1; variation across, 36, 85–6, 360–4;low post-Cold War international environment linkage, 5, 23, 38, 51–2, 71, 85–6, 181; in, 24, 152; transnational advocacy measurement of, 374–5; mediation of networks in, 40; uneven playing field in, 9. economic growth, 77–8; non-Western See also countries by name linkage, 50; variation with leverage, 50–4. Latvia, 14, 15, 17, 81 See also countries by name Lavalas Family (Haiti). See FL Linz, Juan, 15, 78 Lavalas movement, 173–5, 177 Lithuania, 17, 81, 192 Lavalas Political Organization (Haiti). Liu, Henry, 314 See OPL Look East Policy (Malaysia), 318 Law and (Maintenance) Act, Zimbabwe, Lucinschi, Petru, 228, 230–1 240, 243 Lukashenka, Alyaksandr, 12, 79, 80, 82, 97, 183, Lazarenko, Pavlo, 9 186, 201–7, 233, 342, 343 LDP (Liberal Democratic Party, Kenya), 270, Luzhkov, Iurii, 195 272 Lytvyn, Volodymyr, 219 leadership, role of, 81–3 League of Communists of Macedonia, 125 Ma, Ying-jeou, 311 League of Communists of Serbia, 62, 105–6 Macedonia, 4, 33 Lebanon, 32 competitive authoritarianism in, 21, 22, 87, Lee, Teng-hui, 309, 311, 314 125, 128–9, 341, 370; elections, civil legal repression, 9, 28. See also countries by liberties and playing field in, 125–8; ethnic name conflict in, 85, 125, 126–7;EUrolein, legislature, 20, 30, 56, 63–5, 78, 80 126–7; leverage in, 124–7, 373; linkage in, and control of governing party, 63–4. See also 23, 47, 91, 124–7, 375;NATOrolein, countries by name 126–7; organizational power in, 59, 125, Leninism, 17, 69, 87, 277, 292, 312, 313, 347, 379–80;UNrolein,125–6 361 Machel, Samora, 248 Let’s Go Neighbor (Peru), 163 Madagascar, 4, 17 level electoral field. See playing field civil society in, 278; competitive leverage, 41, 42 authoritarianism in, 14, 20, 21, 22, 278–82, black knights and, 41–2; definition of, 24–5, 305–8, 341, 370; constitution in, 79; 40–3; high leverage, 24, 38, 71–2, 85–6; Constitutional Court in, 279;

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Index 505

constitutional reform in, 80, 278, 279; Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement.See elections, civil liberties and playing field in, ABIM 13, 278–82; legislature in, 63; leverage in, Malewezi, Justin, 286 181, 276, 277, 340, 373; linkage in, 51, 276, Mali, 4, 78 277, 352, 375; National Election competitive authoritarianism in, 21, 22, Commission, 279; opposition in, 69, 277, 297–9, 305–8, 340, 341, 370; 278–82, 348, 349, 355, 358; organizational Constitutional Court in, 298; elections, power in, 29, 30, 57, 60, 68, 69, 77, 181, civil liberties and playing field in, 30; 237, 250, 267, 276–82, 340, 345, 347, 349, linkage in, 52, 276, 297, 340, 375; leverage 350, 354, 357, 379–80 in, 24, 276, 297–8, 340, 373; opposition in, Magaloni, Beatriz, 26, 61, 160 297–8, 355; organizational power in, 65, Mahathir, Mohammad, 9, 12, 79, 314, 322–8, 66, 71, 237, 267, 276, 297–9, 340, 379–80 337, 345 managed democracy, 15. See also hybrid regime Makhumula, James, 286 managed pluralism, 15. See also hybrid regime Makoni, Simba, 62, 245, 246, 345 Mann, Michael, 58 Malashenko, Igor, 194 Manukian, Vazgen, 209–10 Malawi, 4, 329 Manus, Leon, 175 civil society in, 31, 283; competitive Marxism 147, 292, 293 authoritarianism in, 12, 14, 21, 22, 35, 82, Masire, Quett, 256, 258 282–7, 305–8, 341, 370; constitution in, mass protest 285; constitutional reform in, 80; and authoritarian instability, 348–9;and discretionary state economic power in, democratization, 69; and economic crisis, 285; elections, civil liberties and playing 77; and opposition, 25, 30, 32, 54;and field in, 9, 11, 13, 28, 29, 30, 282–7; organizational power, 55–8, 69–70, 77, Electoral Commission in, 80, 284, 285, 308, 345, 348–9, 354–5, 358; and stolen 286, 287, 303;EUrolein,286; High Court elections, 349; in Africa, 236, 258;in in, 285, 286; leverage in, 42, 50, 228, 276, Armenia, 55, 184, 208, 209–10, 211, 212, 282, 283, 287, 373; linkage in, 24, 50, 51, 213; in Belarus, 205; in Benin, 293;in 276, 282, 352, 375; opposition in, 70, Cambodia, 335; in Cameroon, 260, 307;in 283–7, 355, 358; organizational power in, China, 362; in Croatia, 115;inthe 26, 29, 60, 68, 69, 70, 73, 77, 237, 250, 251, Dominican Republic, 135; in the former 267, 276, 282–7, 347, 353, 354, 379–80; Soviet Union, 184, 233; in Gabon, 263, U.S. role in, 286 264; in Georgia, 222, 225, 227; in Guyana, Malawi Congress Party. See MCP 148; in Haiti, 175–6; in Kenya, 267, 269, Malawi Young Pioneers. See MYP 273; in Madagascar, 276–8, 280, 281–2, Malay Royal Regiment, 320 345; in Malawi, 283; in Malaysia, 323, Malaysia, 3, 4, 78, 346 324–5, 327; in Mali, 297; in Mexico, 153, civil society in, 323; competitive 157; in Moldova, 184; in Peru, 168;in authoritarianism in, 3, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, Senegal, 274; in Serbia, 107, 108, 111;in 33, 76, 309, 320–8, 337–8, 341, 370, 371; Taiwan, 314, 316; in Tanzania, 253–4;in constitution in, 79; discretionary state Ukraine, 216, 217, 218–219; in Zambia, economic power, 321–2; elections, civil 288, 291; in Zimbabwe, 241, 242, 245 liberties and playing field in, 9, 10, 11, 12, Matiba, Kenneth, 267–8 28, 58, 321–8; Electoral Commission in, Matos Berrido, Leonardo, 136 322; ethnic cleavages in, 319–20, 322, 354; Mazoka, Anderson, 291 leverage in, 318, 326, 328, 373; linkage in, Mba Abessole, Paul, 264–5 44, 48, 50, 318–19, 326, 328, 344, 375;and MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association), 320 Muslim world, 319; opposition in, 314, MCP (Malawi Congress Party), 282, 283, 318, 322–8, 348, 349, 351, 356; 284–5, 287 organizational power in, 23, 31, 55, 59, 60, MDC (Movement for Democratic Change, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 70, 73, 83, 319–28, 348, Zimbabwe), 241–7 350, 356, 379–80; Supreme Court in, 322, Meciar,ˇ Vladimır,´ 33, 46, 49, 82, 90–7, 129, 323; U.S. role in, 324–7 351, 352 Malaysian Chinese Association. See MCA medium-n analysis, 34–5 Malaysian Indian Congress. See MIC Medvedchuk, Viktor, 216

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506 Index

Medvedev, Dmitri, 199–200 230–2; electoral authorities in, 232; Meidani, Rexhep, 122 leverage in, 181, 185–6, 228, 233, 373; Mejıa,´ Hipolito,´ 137 linkage in, 51, 228, 375; organizational Mesic,´ Stjepan, 117 power in, 83, 181, 186, 228–32, 347, 357, Mexico, 3, 4, 78, 178, 305 379–80; opposition in, 230–1, 355; civil society in, 151, 155, 159; competitive Transnistria conflict in, 229 authoritarianism in, 3, 14, 16, 21, 22, Moldovan Popular Front, 229–30 149–61, 177–8, 341, 370; constitution in, Monarchy, 6, 7. See also full authoritarianism 79; discretionary state economic power in, Mondlane, Eduardo, 248 153–4; elections, civil liberties and playing Mongolia, 34, 81 field in, 8, 10, 11, 28, 35, 82, 149, 153–61; Montesinos, Vladimiro 161–4, 167, 169 electoral reform in, 157; Federal Electoral Morales, Evo, 178, 179 Institute (IFE), 157–61; Federal Electoral Morocco, 32 Tribunal, 157; ideology/past violent Moroz, Oleksandr, 31, 217 conflict, role in, 152–3; leverage in, 53, 83, Most Favored Nation trade status. See MFN 131, 132, 149–50, 310, 373; linkage in, 45, Mount Kenya Mafia, 272 47, 53, 71, 73, 78, 83, 85, 130, 132, 149–61, Mourides, 274 162, 310, 344, 353, 375; OAS role in, 131; Moustarchidine movement (Senegal), 275 opposition in, 69, 153, 159–60, 316, 318, Movement for Democratic Change 349, 351, 356, 357; organizational power (Zimbabwe). See MDC in, 56, 62, 165, 85, 130, 152–61, 299, 303, Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous 304, 328, 343, 350, 356, 357, 379–80; Moldova. See PMDP Supreme Court in, 79; U.S. role in, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. See 149–51, 154–9; Zapatista uprising in, HZDS 156–7, 158 Movement for Freedom and Justice (Ghana), Mexico City, 1968 repression in, 57 301 MFN (Most Favored Nation), 101, 314 Movement for Multiparty Democracy MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress), 320 (Zambia). See MMD Middle East, the, 19, 35, 40, 57, 319, 360, 361 Movement for Social Justice (Malaysia). See Adil migration Mozambique, 4, 17, 42 to West, from former Soviet Union, 185;to civil war in, 247–9; competitive West, from Eastern Europe, 185;toWest, authoritarianism in, 14, 21, 22, 76, 246–51, from the Americas, 185 305–8, 341, 344, 370, 371; constitution in, military. See security forces 248; elections, civil liberties and playing military conflict. See war field in, 13, 246, 249–51; ideology/past military coup. See coup violent conflict, role in, 201, 238, 248, 250, military rule, 3, 14, 15, 21, 32 252, 255, 288, 354; leverage in, 42, 246, Miloseviˇ c,´ Slobodan, 10, 29, 31, 48, 62, 82, 90, 248–9, 254, 373; linkage in, 86, 246, 344, 104–113, 129, 242, 244, 351 375; National Elections Commission in, Milutinovic,´ Milan, 109 250; opposition in, 249–51; organizational Ministry of Security, Russia, 188 power in, 26, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, Mkapa, Benjamin William, 253–4 74, 237, 247–51, 273, 347, 348, 379–80; Mkhedrioni, 222 Technical Secretariat for Election MMD (Movement for Multiparty Democracy, Administration in, 250;UNrolein,247, Zambia), 288–91 249 modernization. See economic development Mozambican National Resistance. See Renamo Mogae, Festus, 255, 258 Mpinganjira, Brown, 286 Moi, Daniel arap, 31, 266–72, 273, 307 Mrema, Augustine, 62, 253, 254 Moisiu, Alfred, 123 Msosa, Anastazia, 80, 284, 285 Moldova, 4, 185 Mugabe, Robert, 20, 77, 82, 238, 241–6 competitive authoritarianism in, 21, 22, multilateral conditionality. See conditionality 183–6, 213, 228–32, 233–4, 341, 370, 371; multilateral organizations, 45, 51, 70. See also Constitutional Court in, 359; organizations by name constitutional reform in, 359; elections, Muluzi, Bakili, 9, 11, 29, 80, 82, 284–7, 359 civil liberties and playing field in, 90, Muslim Brotherhood, 34

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Index 507

Musyoka, Kalonzo, 270–1 National Front for Change and Democracy Mutharika, Bingu wa, 9, 286–7 (Haiti), 173 Muzorewa, Abel, 241 National Front for the Defense of the Mwanawasa, Levy, 290–1 Revolution (Madagascar), 278 Mwinyi, Ali Hassan, 252, 254 nationalism, and state cohesion, 61 MYP (Malawi Young Pioneers), 282, 284 National Justice Party (Malaysia), 326–7 National Movement (Georgia), 225–6, 227 NAC (National Affairs Conference, Taiwan), National Observatory of Elections (Cameroon), 315 262 NAFTA (North American Free Trade National Operations Council (Malaysia), 320 Agreement), 150, 154–7, 159, 353 National Opposition Union (Nicaragua). See Nagorno-Karabakh, 208–10, 345 UNO Najib, Razak, 328 National Reconciliation Committee Namibia, 34, 80 (Madagascar). See CRN Nano, Fatos, 29, 121–2 National Salvation Front (Romania). See FSN NARC ( Rainbow Coalition, National Security Act (Botswana), 256 Kenya), 270–2, 348 National Security Bureau (Taiwan), 312 Nastase,˘ Adrian, 103 National Union for Democracy and Progress National Accord (Mexico), 159–60 (Cameroon). See UNDP National Action Party (Mexico). See PAN National United Front (Cambodia). See NUF National Affairs Conference (Taiwan).See National United Front for an Independent, NAC Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (Kenya). Cambodia. See FUNCINPEC See NARC NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), National Assembly of Benin. See Benin, 46, 89. See also countries by name legislature in NCA (National Constitutional Assembly, National Assembly of Cambodia. See Zimbabwe), 241–2, 245 Cambodia, legislature in NCEC (National Convention Executive National Assembly of the Republic of China. Council, Kenya), 269 See Taiwan, legislature in Ncube, Pius, 245 National Conference NDA (National Democratic Alliance, Malawi), in Benin, 293; in Cameroon, 260; in Gabon, 286 263 NDC (National Democratic Congress, Ghana), National Constitutional Assembly (Zimbabwe). 300, 302–5 See NCA NDI (National Democratic Institute), 117, 136 National Convention Executive Council NDP (National Development Party, Kenya), (Kenya). See NCEC 31, 270 National Council of Businessmen (Dominican NED (National Endowment for Democracy), Republic), 137 142, 151 National Democratic Alliance (Malawi). See NEP (New Economic Policy, Malaysia), 321 NDA Nepal, 14, 32 National Democratic Congress (Ghana). See New Economic Policy (Malaysia). See NEP NDC new information technologies, 18, 25. See also National Democratic Institute. See NDI Internet National Democratic Union (Armenia), 210 New Majority (Peru), 64, 163 National Development Party (Kenya). See NDP New Party (Taiwan), 316 National Dialogue (Nicaragua), 141–2 New Patriotic Party (Ghana). See NPP National Election Commission (Madagascar), New Rights Party (Georgia), 224–5 279–80 NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), 39, National Elections Board (Peru), 164–5, 166–7, 40, 44–5, 52, 56, 73 168, 169 in Belarus, 205; in Benin, 295; in Cambodia, National Elections Commission (Mozambique), 329; in Croatia, 117; in Eastern Europe, 250 88–90; and EU, 353; in former Soviet National Endowment for Democracy.See Union, 185; in Ghana, 304; in Haiti, 174; NED in Kenya, 269; in Malaysia, 323;in

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508 Index

NGOs (cont.) O’Donnell, Guillermo, 56, 81 Mexico,151, 155, 159;inPeru,342;in Ohrid Framework Agreement, 126 Romania, 102; in Russia, 199; in Serbia, oil, 41, 66, 178–9, 361, 187, 190, 197–8, 201, 109, 112; in Zimbabwe, 238, 240. See also 219, 258, 263–5, 297, 361, 372–3 civil society Okruashvili, Irakli, 227 Niasse, Moustapha, 275 Onn, Jafar Datuk, 320 Nicaragua, 4, 17, 78, 172, 329, 356 Ooi, Su-Mei, 312 civil society in, 139, 141; competitive Open Society Foundation, 92, 96 authoritarianism in, 12, 14, 21, 22, 76, Open Terms Bill (Malawi), 286 177–9, 248, 341, 370, 371; constitution in, Operation Bwezani (Malawi), 282 144, 145; discretionary state economic Operation Ghost Town (Cameroon), 260 power in, 140; elections, civil liberties and Operation Lallang (Malaysia), 319, 323 playing field in, 28, 31, 58, 137–45;EU Operation Murambatsvina (Zimbabwe), 245 role in, 145; ideology/past violent conflict, Operation Where Did You Put Your Vote? role in, 139–40, 201, 354; leverage in, 42, (Zimbabwe), 246 83, 104, 131–2, 137–8, 141, 149, 162, 373; OPL (Lavalas Political Organization, Haiti), linkage in, 49, 51, 52, 73, 83, 104, 131–2, 173 137–45, 148, 170, 179, 326, 344, 352, 354, opposition 375; OAS role in, 131, 141; opposition in, party strategy, 30–2; strength of, 68–70 138, 140–1; organizational power in, 26, Orange Democratic Movement (Kenya). See 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 74, 77, 85, ODM 138–40, 345, 346, 347, 351, 379–80; Orange Revolution, 31, 70, 185, 217–19, Supreme Court in, 144–5;UNrolein,141; 348 U.S. role in, 138–45 organizational power, 72, 41, 73–4, 77 Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator. See CDN and authoritarianism, 54–61, 68, 181; Niger, 32, 171, 80 definition of, 23; and incumbents, 25, Nigeria, 3, 4, 16, 32 54–68, 70–4, 83; measurement of, 73, Nikolic,´ Tomislav, 113 376–80; and regime outcomes, 72;vs. Nkruhamism, 301 Western leverage, 41. See also countries by noncompetitive authoritarianism. See full name authoritarianism. Organization for Security and Cooperation in nongovernmental organizations. See NGOs Europe. See OSCE non-Western linkage. See linkage, non-Western Organization of American States. See OAS North Africa, 360, 361 Organization of the Islamic Conference, 319 North America, 114, 138, 150, 172 organized labor, 25, 54, 135 North American Free Trade Agreement. See Ortega, Daniel, 142–5, 178, 351 NAFTA Ortega, Humberto, 139 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See OSCE (Organization for Security and NATO Cooperation in Europe) North Korea, 29, 73, 206, 239, 361, 362, 363 and Albania, 122, 123; and Armenia, 185;and NPP (New Patriotic Party, Ghana), 301–2, Azerbaijan, 185; and Belarus, 205;and 304–5, 343 Croatia, 116; and Eastern Europe, 89;and NUF (National United Front, Cambodia), 333 former Soviet Union, 185; and Georgia, Nyerere, Julius, 16, 238, 252 226, 227; and Macedonia, 125;and Moldova, 185; and Russia, 185; and Serbia, OAS (Organization of American States), 18 112; and Slovakia, 94; and Ukraine, 220 in Dominican Republic, 131, 136–7;in Ossetia, 221, 222 Guyana, 131, 149; in Haiti, 131, 175–6;in Ostankino television station, 192 Mexico, 131; in Nicaragua, 131, 141;in Our Home is Russia, 187, 194 Peru, 131, 163–5, 168–9 Our Ukraine bloc, 217–18 Odhiambo-Mbai, Crispin, 272 OVR (Fatherland-All Russia), 195–7 Odinga, Oginga, 267–8 Odinga, Raila, 31, 70, 270–3 Pact for Democracy (Dominican Republic), ODM (Orange Democratic Movement, 136–7 Kenya), 272–3 Pakatan Rakyat (Malaysia), 328

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Index 509

Pakistan, 14, 32, 41 state coercive capacity, 67–8. See also by PAN (National Action Party, Mexico), 151, country name; party name 153–4, 157–60 party substitutes, 67–8 Panama, 39 party weakness, and elite conflict, 68 Paniagua, Valentin, 169 PAS (Islamic Party of Malaysia), 319, 322, 323, Panic,´ Milan, 108 325–8 Paraguay, 42 Patarkatsishvili, Badri, 227 paramilitary organizations, 58–9, 108, 125 Patiashvili, Jumber, 223–4 in Armenia, 202, 208–9, 210; in Cambodia, patronage 332; in Georgia, 222; in Ghana, 302;in and economic performance, 72, 77;as Haiti, 172; in Kenya, 268; in Malawi, 282; informal institution, 28;andparty in Malaysia, 319;inSerbia,105;in cohesion, 26, 61, 65, 77, 345, 347, 353–4; Zimbabwe, 239, 243, 244 opposition access to, 31; and uneven parchment rules, 79, 359 playing field, 6. See also proxy ownership Paris Accord (1991), 331 patronage-based machine, 72, 305, 306 parliament. See legislature in Benin, 294; in Botswana, 255, 257, 258;in parliamentary regime, 78, 81, 320, 346 Cambodia, 330; in Cameroon, 259;inthe partial democracies, 4. See also hybrid regime Dominican Republic, 134; in Gabon, 263; parties in Georgia, 221; in Kenya, 266–7;in behavior under competitive authoritarianism, Madagascar, 277; in Malawi, 285–6;in 29–32, 56; and elite conflict, 61–2;as Malaysia, 320; in Russia, 189, 200–201;in facilitating legislative control, 63–4; Senegal, 273–6, 307; in Taiwan, 313;in international party networks, 48;and Zambia, 288, 289–1, 307 legislative weakness, 68; and management patronage-based regime. See patronage-based of intra-elite conflict, 62; and succession, machine 64. See also by party name; See also party PCRM (Communist Party of Moldova), 230–2, strength 358 partly free regime, 14–15. See also Freedom PD (Democratic Party of Albania), 120–23 House PDG (Gabonese Democratic Party), 263–5 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 89, PDS (Senegalese Democratic Party), 31, 275–6 185 PDSR (Party of Democratic Socialists, Partnership for Peace, in Croatia, 118 Romania), 99, 103 party of barons. See party of notables Pena˜ Gomez,´ Jose´ Francisco, 136–7 Party of Civic Understanding (Slovakia). See Peng, Ming-min, 317 SOP People’s Justice Party (Malaysia), 326, 328 Party of Democratic Socialists (Romania). See People’s National Congress (Guyana). See PNC PDSR People’s Party of Armenia, 211 Party of National Unity (Kenya). See PNU People’s Party of the Revolution (Benin). See party of notables PRPB in Benin, 293–5; in Botswana, 255; in Kenya, Perez´ de Cuellar,´ Javier, 162, 166 70, 267, 270–1, 272; in Madagascar, 277;in Perisiˇ c,´ Momcilo,ˇ 110 Malawi, 285; in Mali, 298; in Senegal, Peron,´ Juan, 17 274–5 Persian Gulf War, 264 Party of Regions (Ukraine), 216 Peru, 4, 42, 78, 178 Party of Russian Unity and Concord. See PRES civil society in, 161–2, 165; competitive Party of the Democratic Left (Slovakia), 96 authoritarianism in, 3, 14, 20, 21, 22, 161, Party of the Democratic Revolution (Mexico). 163–70, 177–8, 341, 370; constitution in, See PRD 79, 80–1, 163–4; constitutional reform in, party organization, and competitive 80, 164; Constitutional Tribunal in, 20, 80, authoritarianism, 61–6 166–7; discretionary state economic power party strength in, 165; elections, civil liberties and playing and authoritarian stability/instability, 23, 25, field in, 9–12, 28, 29, 30, 58, 162–70; 55, 61–6, 71–2, 339, 345; party cohesion, legislature in, 81, 163, 166, 169; leverage 65, 353–4; party scope, 64; measurement in, 132, 161–3, 167–69, 373; linkage in, 44, of, 65–6, 73, 377–8; and patronage, 65;and 48, 51, 52, 85, 132, 161–2, 170, 342, 375;

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510 Index

Peru (cont.) 179, 358; and shifts in Western foreign National Elections Board in, 164–5, 166–7, policy, 17–18, 236 168, 169; OAS in, 131, 163–5, 168–9; post-totalitarianism, 15. See also opposition in, 161–2, 168, 348, 349; authoritarianism organizational power in, 29, 63, 64, 66, 67, PPP (Progressive People’s Party, Guyana), 68, 161–70, 342, 379–80; Shining Path 145–7, 149 insurgency in, 162, 163, 165–6; Supreme PRD (Dominican Revolutionary Party), 134–7 Court in, 164; U.S. role in, 161–3, 165, PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution, 167, 169 Mexico), 153, 154, 157, 159 Peru 2000, 163, 168, 169 PRES (Party of Russian Unity and Concord), Peruvian National Intelligence Service. See SIN 187, 193–4 PHARE program, 89, 116, 292, 126 Presidential Bloc (Mali), 299 Philippines, 15, 33, 60, 69 presidentialism, 78, 80, 81, 130, 177, 183, 203, Pinchuk, Viktor, 216 233, 346, 350, 360, 368 playing field presidential succession. See succession access to media and, 10–11; biased referees presidential term limits. See term limits and, 12; and definition of democracy, 6; Preval,´ Rene,´ 170, 174–5, 177 level, 6–7, 19, 21, 32, 42, 43, 48–9; uneven, Primakov, Evgenii, 195–6 9–12; 33; scoring of, 368. See also countries Printing Presses and Publications Act by name (Malaysia), 321 PLC (Constitutional Liberal Party, Nicaragua), PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), 10, 11, 144 14, 49, 62, 63, 79, 82, 132, 134, 149–61, PLD (Dominican Liberation Party), 135, 178, 303, 343, 344–5 137 Private Voluntary Organizations Act Plyushch, Ivan, 215 (Zimbabwe), 240 PMDP (Movement for a Democratic and PRM (Greater Romania Party), 103 Prosperous Moldova), 231 Prodi, Romano, 97 PNC (People’s National Congress, Guyana), Progressive People’s Party (Guyana). 145–9 See PPP PNDC (Provisional National Defense Council, Provisional National Defense Council (Ghana). Ghana), 301 See PNDC PNU (Party of National Unity, Kenya), 272 Provisional Electoral Council (Haiti). See CEP Pognon, Elizabeth, 295 proxy ownership 6, 11, 28, 106. See also Poland, 17, 56, 69, 81, 94 patronage police. See security forces; organization by name PRPB (People’s Party of the Revolution, political conditionality. See conditionality Benin), 292–3 political parties. See parties PRSC (Social Christian Reformist Party, Politkovskaia, Anna, 199 Dominican Republic), 134–5 Polity IV, 35 PS ( of Albania), 120–23 Popescu-Tariceanu,˘ Calin,˘ 103 PS (Socialist Party of Senegal), 265, 274–6 PORA! Youth movement, 220 PSD (Social Democratic Party, Romania), 99 Poroshenko, Petro, 217, 219 Public Order and Security Act (Zimbabwe), 243 Portugal, 88, 374 Pustovoitenko, Valerii, 217 post-Cold War era, 3–5, 7, 17, 18, 26, 78, 60, Putin, Vladimir, 6, 9, 14, 36, 57, 68, 82, 186, 131 189–90, 196–201, 233, 344, 349, 358, 359 and black knights, 41–2; and competitive authoritarianism, 13–14, 17, 27–32, 37–8, quasi-democracy, 15. See also hybrid regime 57, 74, 183–6, 339, 360–4;and international dimension of Racan,ˇ Ivica, 117 democratization, 38, 40, 236;and Radio Free Europe, 100 international environment, 27, 76, 193, Rainsy, Sam, 333, 336–7 344; and leverage, 42–3, 50; and linkage, Rajaonarivelo, Pierrot, 281 43–5, 50; post-Cold War international Rajoelina, Andry, 281 environment, 16–20, 24, 27; and regime Rally for Mali, 298 outcomes, 3–5, 20–7, 34, 37, 78, 82, 83, Ramahazomanana, Liva, 281

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Index 511

Ranariddh, Prince Norodom, 332–6 legislature in, 63, 192–4; leverage in, 24, Ratsiraka, Didier, 29, 277–80, 345 53, 186–7, 190, 217, 220, 232–3, 352, 361, Ratsiraka, Roland, 281 373; linkage in, 46, 53, 186–7, 375; Ravalomanana, Marc, 279–81 opposition in, 70, 192, 197–8, 349; Rawlings, Jerry, 82, 299–305, 307, 343 organizational power in, 25, 35, 57, 59, 60, Razaleigh, Tengku, 62, 320, 323–4 63, 65, 66, 68, 73, 83, 90, 187–201, 231, RB (Benin Resistance), 294–5 233, 343–4, 347, 349, 350, 357, 379–80; Reagan administration, 148, 153 parliamentary rebellion (1993)in,191–3; Reformasi movement, 55, 325–7 regional power, role as, 50, 98, 119, 185, Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance), 201, 203–5, 206, 207, 229; 247–50 super-presidentialism in,78, 80, 183, 193; Republican Party of Armenia, 211–13 U.S. role in, 186, 195, 199 restricted democracy, 14. See also hybrid regime Russian Popular Democratic Union, 199 revolution, and state cohesion 61, 361–3 Russia’s Choice, 187, 193–4 Revolutionary Armed Forces (Cuba), 363 Russia’s Democratic Choice, 187 Rhodesia, 239, 239, 248 Rutskoi, Alexander, 192–3 Rice, Condoleezza, 206 Rybkin bloc, 194 Robles, Rodolfo, 165 Rodney, Walter, 147 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 82, 221, 224–8, 354 Roessler, Philip, 54 Saba Saba, 267 Romania, 4, 33, 78, 252 Sachs, Jeffrey, 133 civil society in, 100, 102; competitive Saitoti, George, 270 authoritarianism in, 17, 21, 22, 87, 89, Salinas, Carlos, 47, 151, 153, 154, 156 98–103, 128–9, 341, 370; constitution in, Salleh, Abbas, 323 79; constitutional reform in, 80; elections, Samphan, Khieu, 333 civil liberties and playing field in, 28, 99, Sam Rainsy Party (Cambodia). See SRP 101–3, 117; electoral authorities in, 99; Sanader, Ivo, 118 ethnic divisions in, 100, 229;EUrolein, Sandinista National Liberation Front. See 49, 91, 98, 100–3; linkage in, 48, 51, 52, 78, FSLN 83, 90–1, 98, 100–4, 117, 132, 375; leverage Sandinista Popular Army (Nicaragua). See EPS in, 42, 83, 98, 101, 104, 233, 373;NATO Sandinista regime, 14, 49, 65, 77, 139, 140–5 role in, 103, 163; organizational power in, Sangheli, Andrei, 231 30, 98–103, 347, 379–80; opposition in, Santiago Declaration (1991), 131 100–2; U.S. role in, 98, 101, 103 Sarkisian, Serzh, 207, 212–13 Romanian Intelligence Service. See SRI Sarkisian, Vazgen, 211 Romanian Humanist Party, 99 Sata, Michael, 291 Rome Peace Accords (1992), 247, 248 Saudi Arabia, 7, 41, 319, 361 Rosales, Manuel, 178 SBU (Committee on Security in Ukraine), Rose Revolution, 212, 225 214 rotten-door transitions. See transitions, rotten Schedler, Andreas, 15 door Schmitter, Philippe, 81 Rubia, Charles, 267 scope. See party strength; state coercive capacity Ruffo, Ernesto, 151 SDF (Social , Cameroon), Russia, 4, 41, 187 260–2 as black knight, 41, 185–6, 201, 214, 221, SDP (Social Democratic Party, Croatia), 117 232; Chechen war and, 194, 196; civil SDSM (Social Democratic Movement of society in, 197–9; competitive Macedonia), 125–7 authoritarianism in, 3, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, Seck, Idrissa, 276 34, 82, 89, 183–201, 233–4, 342, 370, 371; Securitate, 99 constitution in, 79, 80, 183; Constitutional security forces (including armed forces, Court in, 192; constitutional referendum military, police), 57–60, 77, 345, 354–5 in, 192–3; discretionary state control of and parties, 67–8; and playing field, 10;in economic power in, 190, 194–6; elections, Albania, 120–1, 122, 124; in Armenia, civil liberties and playing field in, 8, 9, 10, 58–9; 208–9, 210, 211, 212, 358;in 11, 13, 28, 58, 191–201;EUrolein,186; Belarus, 202, 205; in Benin, 292, 293;in

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512 Index

security forces (cont.) intervention in, 46, 104, 109–10, 113; Botswana, 255; in Cambodia, 329, 330, opposition in, 69, 106–8, 110–12, 183–4, 331–2; 333, 335; in Cameroon, 258–9, 260; 348, 349, 356; organizational power in, 29, in Croatia, 114–15; 117; in Cuba, 362;in 55, 31, 61, 62, 65, 66, 68, 85, 105–13, 114, Dominican Republic, 134, 135; in Gabon, 125, 183–4, 347, 349, 350, 351, 356, 263, 264; in Georgia, 55, 59, 221, 222; 223, 379–80; U.S. role in, 39, 49, 108–11, 220 225–6; in Ghana, 300; in Guyana, 146, Serbian Orthodox Church, 108 199; in Haiti, 46, 55, 59, 172, 173–4, 176, Serbian Radical Party. See SRS 177, 354; in Kenya, 266, 269, 273;in Serrano, Jorge, 51 Macedonia, 125, 126, 128; in Madagascar, Seˇ selj,ˇ Vojislav, 108–9 277, 280, 281; in Malawi, 282, 283, 284, sequencing, of reforms, 357–8 287; in Malaysia, 318, 319–20, 325, 326, Sharetskii, Semyon, 204 327; in Mali, 297; in Mexico, 45, 48, 152, Shevardnadze, Eduard, 16, 55, 220–6, 228, 233, 156; in Moldova, 229; in Mozambique, 345, 354 247, 249–51; in Nicaragua, 139, 142; 145, Shining Path, 162, 165 146; in North Korea, 362;inPeru,165, Shushkevich, Stanislau, 202 168; in Romania, 99, 100, 101; in Russia, Sidibe,´ Mande,´ 298 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192–3, 194, 194; Sierra Leone, 15, 32 232; in Senegal, 274; in Serbia, 48, 65, 68, Sihanouk, King Norodom, 332, 334 105, 106, 110, 111; in Slovakia, 92–3;in SIN (Peruvian National Intelligence Service), Taiwan, 312, 314, 316; in Tanzania, 251; 162–5, 167–9 in Ukraine, 214–15, 216, 218; in Zambia, Singapore, 34, 58, 321, 343, 350 288, 289; in Zimbabwe, 239, 242, 243, 244, single-party dictatorship/regime, 3, 7, 19, 27, 246. See also state coercive capacity; 236, 259, 263, 278, 288. See also full organizational power; countries by name authoritarianism Sedition Act (Malaysia), 321 Siradeghian, Vano, 210 Semangat ’46 (Malaysia), 323–4 Sithole, Ndabaningi, 241 semi-authoritarianism, 16. See also Skach, Cindy, 78 authoritarianism skewed playing field. See playing field semi-democracy, 14–15. See also hybrid regime Skocpol, Theda, 57 semi-presidentialism, 78, 183, 228, 346 Slovak Democratic Coalition, 96 Senegal, 4 Slovakia, 4, 78, 81, 346 competitive authoritarianism in, 17, 21, 22, civil society in, 92; competitive 33, 34, 261, 274–6, 305–8, 342, 370, 371; authoritarianism in, 21, 22, 33, 34, 82, 87, constitutional reform in, 80; elections, civil 89, 91–7, 128–9, 342, 370; Constitutional liberties and playing field in, 28, 30, 274–6; Court in, 93; constitutional reform in, 93; electoral authorities in, 276; leverage in, elections, civil liberties and playing field in, 273, 373; linkage in, 273, 275, 375; 31, 93–7; ethnic divisions in, 94, 100;EU opposition in, 274–6, 355; organizational role in, 48–9, 91–2, 94–7; legislature in, power in, 26, 65, 70, 237, 263, 265, 273–6, 95–7; leverage in, 42, 50, 91, 96–7, 90, 233, 354, 379–80 373; linkage in, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 52, 73, Senegalese Democratic Party. See PDS 78, 90–1, 95–7, 117, 132, 228, 326, 352, Senghor, Leopold´ Sedar,´ 274 375;NATOrolein,97; opposition in, Serbia, 3, 4, 33, 78, 124, 242, 354 94–7; organizational power in, 30, 85, civil society in, 109, 112; competitive 91–7, 347, 379–80; U.S. role in, 94–5 authoritarianism in, 3, 12, 16, 20, 21, 22, Slovak Intelligence Service, 92–3 33, 76, 82, 87, 104–13, 128–9, 342, 370; Slovak National Party, 96, 97 discretionary state economic power in, Slovenia, 81 106; elections, civil liberties and playing Snegur, Mircea, 228–231 field in, 8, 10, 20, 30, 90, 104–13;and Snyder, Richard, 14 ethnic civil war, 85, 91, 104–10, 116;EU Sobchak, Anatolii, 196 role in, 49, 108, 111–113; legislature in, Social Christian Reformist Party (Dominican 107–8, 111–12; leverage in, 42, 104–5, Republic). See PRSC 108–13, 233, 373; linkage in, 48, 51, 73, Social Democratic Front (Cameroon). See SDF 104–5, 108–13, 117, 375; nationalism as Social Democratic Movement of Macedonia. ideology in, 105–7, 113;NATO See SDSM

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Index 513

Social Democratic Party (Croatia). Stalinist rule, legacies, of, 85, 342. See also See SDP countries by name Social Democratic Party (Romania). See PSD Stambolic, Ivan, 106, 111 Social Democratic Party (United) (Ukraine), Stanisiˇ c,´ Jovica, 110 216 state coercive capacity, 54–55 Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia, and authoritarian stability/instability, 23, 105 25–6, 55–61, 71–2, 339, 340, 343–4; 345, Socialist International, 113, 134 349, 351, 354–8, 361–3;cohesion,35, Socialist Party of Albania. See PS 58–61, 77; and democratization, 26; Socialist Party of Senegal. See PS informal institutions and, 28; Socialist Party of Serbia. See SPS material/nonmaterial sources of, 60–1, 73, social linkage. See linkage 376, 377; measurement of, 59, 61, 376–7; Societies Act (Malaysia), 321 and opposition strength, 25, 69–70;parties Soglo, Nicephore,´ 63, 291–6, 340 as extension of, 62; and party strength, Soglo, Rosine, 294–5 67–8; scope of, 23, 58–9, 67–8. See also Somoza, Anastasio, 138–9 individual countries; security forces Soong, James, 311, 317 state collapse, 32, 91, 119, 122, 170, 342. See SOP (Party of Civic Understanding, Slovakia), also countries by name 96 state control, and discretionary economic Soros, George, 219, 325 power. See economic control South Africa, 56, 69, 238, 243, 247, 248 state strength. See state coercive capacity Southeast Asia, 236, 331, 334. See also Asia; Stojiljkovic,´ Vlajko, 110 countries by name stolen elections. See elections, stolen Southeast Europe, 87, 117. See also countries by sub-Saharan Africa name closed regimes in, 360; democratization, lack South Korea 56, 69 of in, 82; leverage in, 53, 236; linkage in, Soviet Union 44, 46, 53, 181, 236; opposition in, 69, 236; client states of, 17, 247, 293, 344, 361–2; organizational power in, 71, 236; collapse of, 17, 81, 185, 191–2, 203, 209, post-Cold War international environment 215, 221, 230, 329, 361, 362, 363; isolation in, 18–19; transnational advocacy networks from of West, 184–5; legacies of, 50, 73, in, 40; vulnerability to external pressure in, 87; sphere of influence of, 92, 119 41, 43, 236 Soviet Union, former. See former Soviet succession, 26, 64, 68, 72 Union and authoritarian stability/instability, 347–8; Spain, 69, 88, 374 in competitive authoritarian regimes, 28–9; SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia), 105–8, 111, 113, in Armenia, 212; in Gabon, 265; in Kenya, 354 270–1, 307; in Malawi, 283, 286;in Srebrenica massacre, 109 Malaysia, 327; in Mali, 298, 307;in Sri Lanka, 32 Mexico, 172; in Mozambique, 248, 251;in SRI (Romanian Intelligence Service), 99 Peru, 172;inRussia,195, 199; in Tanzania, SRP (Sam Rainsy Party), 11, 335–6 252; in Ukraine, 218; in Zambia, 290, 291; SRS (Serbian Radical Party), 108, 113 in Zimbabwe, 244, 245 Stabilization and Association Agreement, 112, Sudan, 46, 109, 170 116, 118, 122, 123, 127 Sufi Muslim brotherhoods, 274 Stabilization and Association Process, 116 sultanistic regime, 7, 353. See also full stable authoritarianism authoritarianism in Africa, 237, 306; in Asia, 337; across cases, super-presidentialism, 78, 80, 183, 193, 233, 341–2, 358, 368–9; and black knight 359, 360 support, 233, 342; definition of, 22, 25, Supreme Court, 359 368–9; and economic development, 75;in in Ghana, 302–3; in Mexico, 79; in Malaysia, former Soviet Union, 234; and linkage, 322, 323; in Malawi, 285, 286; in Mexico, 71–2, 181, 336–7, 360–1; and leverage, 79; in Nicaragua, 144–5;inPeru,164;in 186, 237, 360–1; and multicandidate Zimbabwe, 20, 243. See also countries by elections, 22; and opposition protest, 184; name and political parties, 26, 62, 65, 67, 153, SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service, Russia), 270, 213, 353. See also authoritarianism 188

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514 Index

Sweden, 34, 66, 374 and control of legislature, 63; endogeneity of, Sy, Moustapha, 275 80; in Africa, 80;inArmenia,212;in Symonenko, Petro, 217 Azerbaijan, 80; in Belarus, 80, 183, 205, Syria, 29 359; in Benin, 296;inBurkinaFaso,80;in Cameroon, 80, 262, 359;inChad,80;in TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth Dominican Republic, 359; in Gabon, 80, of Independent States program), 89, 185 265, 359; in Ghana, 304; in Kenya, 270;in Tadic,´ Boris, 113 Malawi, 286, 359; in Mali, 298;in Taiwan, 4, 78, 181, 305 Namibia, 80; in Nicaragua, 145; in Niger, and China, 310, 313–16, 318; civil society in, 80;inPeru,80, 359; in Russia, 183, 199, 309, 312, 313, 316; competitive 200; in Serbia, 108; in Taiwan, 313;in authoritarianism in, 3, 16, 21, 22, 309, Tajikistan, 80; in Togo, 80; in Uganda, 80; 313–18, 337–8, 341, 370, 371; in Ukraine, 80, 183, 218; in Venezuela, 80; constitutional reform in, 313, 316; in Zambia, 359; in Zimbabwe, 80. See also discretionary state economic power in, constitutional reform 315; elections, civil liberties and playing Ter-Petrosian, Levon, 29, 77, 82, 207–10, field in, 10, 11, 28, 58, 312–18; legislature 212–13 in, 313; leverage in, 53, 83, 310, 373; Tevoedjre, Albert, 295 linkage in, 44, 47, 53, 71, 73, 78, 83, Thailand, 32 310–18, 319, 375; opposition in, 69, 311–7, Third Wave regime transitions, 37–8, 69, 83 349, 351, 357; organizational power in, 55, Thompson, Mark, 349 59, 62, 64, 68, 73, 74, 299, 304, 312–17, thug mobilization, as opposition strategy, 30, 325, 328, 348, 349, 356, 357, 379–80; U.S. 32 role in, 310–14 Tiananmen Square, 1989 repression, 57, Taiwanese Democratic Movement Overseas, 100 311 Tito, Josip Broz, 114 Taiwan Revolutionary Party, 311 Together for Macedonia coalition, 127 Tajikistan, 80, 352 Togo, 80 Tanganyika. See Tanzania Toledo, Alejandro, 52, 162, 168–70, 342 Tanganyika African National Union. See Tontons Macoutes, 172 TANU Toure,´ Amadou Toumani, 297, 298–9 Tangwai, 313 Toussaint, Yves, 175 TANU (Tanganyika African National Union), Traditionalist Party (Georgia), 223 252 Trajkovski, Boris, 126 Tanzania, 4, 42, 266 transitional democracies, 3, 27 civil society in, 252; competitive transitions, 3–4, 26–7 authoritarianism in, 20, 21, 22, 76, 251–4, hard door, 356; rotten door, 69, 354–6. See 305–8, 342, 370; constitutional reform in, also countries by name 80; discretionary state economic power in, transnational advocacy networks, 18, 39, 40, 51. 253; elections, civil liberties and playing See also civil society; NGOs field in, 252–4; leverage in, 251, 254, 373; transnational human-rights networks. See civil linkage in, 251, 375; opposition in, 252; society; See NGOs organizational power in, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, transnational civil society. See civil society 237, 252–4, 258, 379–80 transnational NGO networks. See NGOs Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of transnational party networks, 48–9, 89, 95 Independent States program. See TACIS Transnistria, 229 Technical Secretariat for Election Traore,´ Moussa, 297 Administration (Mozambique), 250 Treaty of Amsterdam, 88 technocratic linkage. See linkage Tsvangirai, Morgan, 241, 243–6 Tekere, Edger, 62 TTS (Youth Aware of Responsibilities, Tembo, John, 282–3, 287 Madagascar), 277 Temnyki, 11 Tudela, Francisco, 167, 169 Temporary Provisions (Taiwan), 313, 315 Tudman, ¯ Franjo, 49, 79, 82, 113, 115–116, 118, 10 House Party Cells, 63, 252 129 term limits, 359 turbas divinas, 141, 143

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Index 515

Turkey, 14, 32, 88, 208 in Africa, 236; in Albania, 123; in Armenia, Turkmenistan, 19, 80 207–8, 210, 212; in Belarus, 205–6;in tutelary regime, 14, 32. See also hybrid regime Cameroon, 261; in Croatia, 116; in Cuba, Tymoshenko, Yulia, 31, 216–18, 220 362; in Dominican Republic, 133–7;in Georgia, 226, 228; in Guyana, 145–9;in UDF (United Democratic Front, Malawi), Haiti, 39, 171–7; in Kenya, 267; in Malawi, 283–7 286; in Malaysia, 324–7; in Mexico, Uganda, 32, 171, 34, 46, 80, 251, 343 149–51, 154–9; in Nicaragua, 138–45;in Ukraine, 4, 24, 33, 78, 183, 185 Peru, 161–3, 165, 167, 169; in Romania, competitive authoritarianism in, 3, 12, 14, 15, 98, 101, 103; in Russia, 186, 195, 199;in 21, 22, 82, 89, 183–6, 215–20, 342, 370, Serbia, 39, 49, 108–11, 220; in Slovakia, 371; Constitutional Court in, 218; 94–5; in Taiwan, 310–14; in Ukraine, 219 constitutional reform in, 80; elections, civil United States Agency for International liberties and playing field in, 8, 9, 10, 11, Development. See USAID 13, 20, 28, 29, 58, 215–20;EUrolein,214, United States Information Agency. See USIA 218, 219; leverage in, 24, 42, 181, 185–6, Unity (Russia), 189, 47, 196–7 214, 220, 221, 232–3, 340, 373; linkage in, Unity bloc (Armenia), 211 86, 214, 218, 220, 221, 340, 375; Universities and University Colleges Act opposition in, 69, 183–4, 205–6, 212, (Malaysia), 321 216–19, 233–4, 245, 348, 349;Orange UNO (National Opposition Union, Revolution in, 31, 54, 70, 185, 193, Nicaragua), 49, 141–3 218–19, 348; organizational power in, 25, unstable authoritarianism 30, 31, 60, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 77, 83, in Africa, 237, 282, 287, 306; in Americas, 181, 186, 193, 200, 213–20, 224, 340, 345, 178; across cases, 340, 341–2, 369; 350, 357, 379–80; U.S. role in, 219 definition of, 22, 369; and Eastern Europe, Ukrainian Communist Party, 215 128; and economic crisis, 346–7;informer UMNO (United Malays National Soviet Union, 234; and regime trajectories, Organization), 12, 50, 64, 79, 318–28, 344, 21–2, 37;scoringof,369 354 UNTAC (UN Transition Authority in UN. See United Nations Cambodia), 331–2, 334–5 UNDP (National Union for Democracy and UN Transition Authority in Cambodia. See Progress, Cameroon), 31, 261–2 UNTAC uneven playing field. See playing field, uneven UPC (Cameroon People’s Union), 261 Union of Right Forces (Russia), 198 USAID (United States Agency for International UNIP (United National Independence Party, Development) Zambia), 64, 65, 263, 276, 288–9, 307 in Albania, 123; in Eastern Europe, 185;in United Civic Party (Belarus), 206 Guyana, 148; in Russia, 195; in Slovakia, United Democratic Front (Malawi). See UDF 92, 96 United Kingdom, 17–18, 146, 147, 236, 238, USIA (United States Information Agency), 142 311, 319, 374 USSR. See Soviet Union United Labor Party (Armenia), 212 Uzbekistan, 7, 8, 16, 33, 45, 46, 80 United Malays National Organization. See UMNO Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution. See United National Independence Party (Zambia). AREMA See UNIP Venezuela United National Movement (Georgia), 225–6, as black knight, 131, 179; competitive 227 authoritarianism in, 4, 16, 32, 82, 178–9; United Nations constitutional reform in, 80; electoral in Albania, 122; in Cambodia, 330–3, 334, authorities in, 12; opposition in, 30; 335; in Haiti, 177; in Macedonia, 125–6;in leverage in, 131; U.S. foreign policy Mozambique, 247, 249; in Nicaragua, toward, 131 141 Venice Commission, 89, 185 United Russia, 189, 197–201 Vietnam, 138, 329–31, 361 United States, 17–18, 39, 40, 41–2, 47, 85–6, violent struggle, as source of cohesion 26, 61, 261, 224, 318, 327, 344, 352–3, 362 65, 361, 362

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516 Index

Vital Forces (Madagascar), 278–9 Yoshiyama, Jaime, 166 VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Young Democrats (Malawi), 285 Revolutionary Organization), 125–8 Youth Aware of Responsibilities (Madagascar). Voninahitsy, Jean Eugene, 279 See TTS Yugoslavia Wade, Abdoulaye, 31, 275–6 and army, 105, 114, 125;andfederal war institutions, 104, 105, 107, 108, 106, 124, and state/party cohesion, 55–6, 73, 77, 87, 91, 129, 169; and military intervention, 109, 345, 346, 358, 376, 377; in Armenia, 209; 220 in Cambodia, 331; in Croatia, 114, 115;in Yukos, 194, 198–9 Mozambique, 248; in North Korea, 362;in Yushchenko, Viktor, 217–20, 340 Serbia, 104, 105; in Tanzania, 251 Washington Protocol (1992), 131 Zafy, Albert, 278–80 Way, Lucan, 56, 57, 357 Zaire. See Congo West, the Zajedno, 108 post-Cold War shift in foreign policy, 17–18; Zakaria, Fareed, 15 and international post-Cold War Zambia, 4, 42, 246 environment, 363; linkage to, 5, 45, 70, competitive authoritarianism in, 12, 14, 17, 228; divergent foreign policy objectives, 21, 22, 82, 288–91, 305–8, 342, 370, 371; 40, 41, 363; and diffusion effects, 17;and constitutional reform in, 80, 289, 290; external assistance, 17; and conditionality, elections, civil liberties and playing field in, 17–18. See also leverage; linkage 13, 28, 30, 288–91; leverage in, 228, 276, Western democratizing pressure. See 288, 289, 340, 373; linkage in, 24, 51, 52, conditionality; democratizing pressure; 276, 352, 375; opposition in, 69, 288–91, leverage 348, 349, 355; organizational power in, 25, Western democracy-promotion strategies. See 26, 29, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 77, 237, 246, 251, democratizing pressure 263, 276, 288–91, 340, 345, 347, 349, 350, Western leverage. See leverage 354, 379–80 Western linkage. See linkage Zambian Congress of Trade Unions. See Western pressure. See democratizing pressure. ZCTU Westminster parliamentarism, 80 ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), Wheatley, Jonathan, 223 26, 65, 200, 242, 238–46, 248, 256, 305, Wolchik, Sharon, 54 308, 345 Woldenberg, Jose,´ 160 Zanzibar, 252, 253, 254 Working People’s Alliance (Guyana). See WPA Zapatista National Liberation Army. See EZLN World Bank Zapatista uprising, 45, 48, 156–8 and Cambodia, 334; and development, 74–5; ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union), and domestic technocrats, 47; and Haiti, 240 176; and Malaysia, 325;andPeru,163, 168; ZCTU (Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions), and Serbia, 107; and Zambia, 290 241, 245 World Trade Organization, 47, 151 ZCTU (Zambian Congress of Trade Unions), World United Formosans for Independence, 288 311 Zedillo, Ernesto, 47, 82, 151, 158–9 WPA (Working People’s Alliance, Guyana), Zelaya, Manuel, 179 147, 148 Zhvania, David, 219, 220 Zhvania, Zurab 224–5 (Russia), 198 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir 200 Yanukovych, Viktor, 29, 193, 216, 218, 220 Zimbabwe, 4 Yaounde´ Declaration, 260 civil society in, 238, 240; competitive Yavlinsky, Grigorii, 194 authoritarianism in, 3, 12, 17, 20, 21, 22, Yeltsin, Boris, 10, 11, 63, 65, 66, 80, 82, 109, 33, 34, 76, 82, 206, 240–6, 305–8, 342, 370, 183, 186–97, 214, 215, 216, 233, 344, 371; Congo conflict and, 241; 359 constitutional reform in, 80; discretionary Yerkrapah (Defenders of the Land, Armenia), state economic power in, 240; elections, 208–11 civil liberties and playing field in, 8, 10, 13,

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Index 517

20, 28, 30, 58, 240–6; High Court in, 243; Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. See leverage in, 238, 352, 373; linkage in, 48, ZCTU 238, 375; opposition in, 70, 238, 240–1, Zimbabwe National Army. See ZNA 348, 349, 356; organizational power in, 23, Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army. See 26, 55, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 68, 70, 73, ZIPRA 74, 77, 83, 237, 238–40, 251, 255, 273, 345, Zimbabwe Unity Movement. See ZUM 347, 350, 356, 379–80; role of past violent ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary conflict in, 201, 238–40, 255, 288, 354; Army), 239 Supreme Court in, 20, 243 ZNA (Zimbabwe National Army), 239 Zimbabwe African National Union.See ZUM (Zimbabwe Unity Movement), 240–1 ZANU Zurabishvili, David, 225, 226 Zimbabwe African People’s Union. See ZAPU Zyuganov, Gennady, 194–5, 198, 200

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