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The New Normal China Model

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The New Normal China Model view in browser 2 3 M A R C H 2 0 1 5 the new normal China model among the wealth of weekly commentary, we track local issues with global impact Rarely has so much been read into the political demise of a middle-ranking official as is now extracted from the case of Qiu He 仇和. The fall of the Yunnan deputy Party secretary, declares People's Daily (see below), directly implicates the current development model. This 'old normal', riddled with coercion and illegality, has been a root cause of local government debt, overcapacity and civil unrest. Is People's Daily foreshadowing the theme of next week's Bo'ao Forum? We can expect to see the China model reinvented in the AIIB and 'belt and road' strategies; Qiu He and his model will be rejected and a 'new normal' of consensual, transparent and sustainable development declared. Mr Qiu, please stay behind after the meeting Lin Yichen 林亦辰 | People's Daily Overseas Edition Former Kunming Party secretary Qiu He symbolised an era in Party rule. Qiu's Kunming paralleled Bo Xilai's 薄熙来 Chongqing, major cities run on a mix of unscrupulous 'kiss-up, kick-down' and turbo-charged populist urban development. Eager to divest the Party image of such local strongmen, the current administration removed Qiu hard on the heels of this year's National People's Congress meeting, as it did with Bo two years ago. The fourth of Xi's 'four comprehensives'—comprehensively disciplining the Party—as well as Li Keqiang's 李克强 'unscrupulous behaviour will not be tolerated' (renxing) are underscored. short of opening fire, what can China do about Myanmar? Zhuge Dayu 诸葛大鱼 | People's Daily Overseas Edition Solidarity with ethnic Chinese under fire in Myanmar's northern Kokang region clashes uneasily with a key national interest: a Southwestern channel to the Indian Ocean. Without this corridor, China's 'Maritime Silk Road' strategy is liable to be thwarted. Non-intervention must be finessed as non-government intervention, finds this People's Daily op-ed. While restricted to diplomacy, China need not play its cards obsessively close, but adopt the practice of other actors, not least Japan, whose Nippon Foundation is acting as 'a front for expanding [Japan's] influence in Myanmar', asserts People's Daily. 'NGOs' from China should help African civil society Zeng Jianzhong 曾建中 | Economic Observer 'Firms are turning towards Africa ever faster on an ever-larger scale', finds CPPCC globalist Han Fangming 韩方明, 'yet we have got ahead of ourselves and problems are likely to occur'. Unimaginable a few years ago, the idea of Chinese NGOs being part of a solution, it seems, is one whose time has come. China's aid methods urgently need to be transformed, agree other specialists. Legislative and other support for NGOs setting up overseas is a first step, proposes one of them: next comes using them as vectors of aid in combination with Chinese firms abroad. Such reinvention of the NGO wheel is likely to be supported by the UN and other global agencies, and may propel rapid developments back on the home front. Drop me a line... 保持联系吧! David +86 10 6417 2551 Han Fangming 韩方明 CPPCC National Committee Foreign Affairs Committee Founder of the Charhar Institute, an independent foreign policy think tank, Han represents the increasing individualisation of thought and commentary in this field. He espouses universal values in the context of the national interest. Han's Charhar is one of the emerging global policy think tanks in China. Liu Guijin 刘贵今 former special representative for African affairs Cost-benefit analysis of aid to Africa, argues Liu, shows China benefits. His appointment in 2002 represented a commitment to African relations. Liu remains an expert with a large media presence. His recent commentary supporting Chinese civil organisations working in Africa to enhance China's international image signals a need to shift gears diplomatically in Africa. Wang Xingzui 王行最 China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation Over a long career shrewdly navigating China's complex regulatory and political climate, Wang has developed effective poverty relief strategies. He has, for example, encouraged peasants with scant collateral to negotiate loans in groups—their local knowledge of who is trustworthy helping to lower banks' risk overheads. Campaigning to end cost cutting that restricts civil organisation staffing, Wang contends that a Philanthropic Law should permit, and exempt from taxation, for-profit projects undertaken by NGOs. L E A D E R S H I P O N T H E M O V E Xi Jinping 习近平, accompanied by a record 80 senior leaders, 65 CEOs and presidents of China's Fortune 500 companies and the like, will attend the Bo'ao Forum from 26 to 29 March. Finance will as usual claim centre stage, but this year will be strongly flavoured by outward investment policies. On 28 March, Lou Jiwei 楼继伟 will meet the IMF, WB and others to discuss global monetary governance On 29 March, Zhou Xiaochuan 周小川 will meet counterparts from Germany, US and Australia to discuss economic and monetary policy The chairmanship alternates annually between the Premier and the General Secretary, this year's chairmanship falling to Xi Jinping. It is probably no accident that founding membership of the AIIB is closing just ahead of the Forum. The Chinese press expect Xi to hold aloft a large clutch of acceptances, including prized ones from close US allies South Korea and Australia. J U S T I N C A S E Y O U M I S S E D I T . cp.leads—geo-strategic trends Li Keqiang’s policy show Xi Jinping left with a world to win cp.signals—domestic policy signals judicial agenda: indicating East while turning West new Foreign Investment Law responds to the market cp.focus—exploratory analysis The project system: China's fiscal pacemaker and its cyclical legacy 4th Plenum: narrowing the space for special interests cp.record—systematic policy audits Social Policy Record Economy Record Governance and Law Record cp.public hip flicks for sinophiles Copyright © 2015 China Policy, All rights reserved. This email was sent to [email protected] why did I get this? unsubscribe from this list update subscription preferences China Policy · Chaoyang District · Beijing, Beijing 100027 · China .
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