CDO Explained
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Complaint: Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMPLAINT COMMISSION, [Securities Fraud] Plaintiff, 10-CV-___________ ( ) v. ECF CASE GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. and Jury Trial Demanded FABRICE TOURRE, Defendants. Plaintiff, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission"), alleges as follows against the defendants named above: OVERVIEW 1. The Commission brings this securities fraud action against Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“GS&Co”) and a GS&Co employee, Fabrice Tourre (“Tourre”), for making materially misleading statements and omissions in connection with a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) GS&Co structured and marketed to investors. This synthetic CDO, ABACUS 2007- AC1, was tied to the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) and was structured and marketed by GS&Co in early 2007 when the United States housing market and related securities were beginning to show signs of distress. Synthetic CDOs like ABACUS 2007-AC1 contributed to the recent financial crisis by magnifying losses associated with the downturn in the United States housing market. 2. GS&Co marketing materials for ABACUS 2007-AC1 – including the term sheet, flip book and offering memorandum for the CDO – all represented that the reference portfolio of RMBS underlying the CDO was selected by ACA Management LLC (“ACA”), a third-party with experience analyzing credit risk in RMBS. Undisclosed in the marketing materials and unbeknownst to investors, a large hedge fund, Paulson & Co. Inc. (“Paulson”), with economic interests directly adverse to investors in the ABACUS 2007-AC1 CDO, played a significant role in the portfolio selection process. After participating in the selection of the reference portfolio, Paulson effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped select by entering into credit default swaps (“CDS”) with GS&Co to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS 2007-AC1 capital structure. -
Mortgage-Backed Securities & Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
Mortgage-backed Securities & Collateralized Mortgage Obligations: Prudent CRA INVESTMENT Opportunities by Andrew Kelman,Director, National Business Development M Securities Sales and Trading Group, Freddie Mac Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) have Here is how MBSs work. Lenders because of their stronger guarantees, become a popular vehicle for finan- originate mortgages and provide better liquidity and more favorable cial institutions looking for investment groups of similar mortgage loans to capital treatment. Accordingly, this opportunities in their communities. organizations like Freddie Mac and article will focus on agency MBSs. CRA officers and bank investment of- Fannie Mae, which then securitize The agency MBS issuer or servicer ficers appreciate the return and safety them. Originators use the cash they collects monthly payments from that MBSs provide and they are widely receive to provide additional mort- homeowners and “passes through” the available compared to other qualified gages in their communities. The re- principal and interest to investors. investments. sulting MBSs carry a guarantee of Thus, these pools are known as mort- Mortgage securities play a crucial timely payment of principal and inter- gage pass-throughs or participation role in housing finance in the U.S., est to the investor and are further certificates (PCs). Most MBSs are making financing available to home backed by the mortgaged properties backed by 30-year fixed-rate mort- buyers at lower costs and ensuring that themselves. Ginnie Mae securities are gages, but they can also be backed by funds are available throughout the backed by the full faith and credit of shorter-term fixed-rate mortgages or country. The MBS market is enormous the U.S. -
Hedging Credit Index Tranches Investigating Versions of the Standard Model Christopher C
Hedging credit index tranches Investigating versions of the standard model Christopher C. Finger chris.fi[email protected] Risk Management Subtle company introduction www.riskmetrics.com Risk Management 22 Motivation A standard model for credit index tranches exists. It is commonly acknowledged that the common model is flawed. Most of the focus is on the static flaw: the failure to calibrate to all tranches on a single day with a single model parameter. But these are liquid derivatives. Models are not used for absolute pricing, but for relative value and hedging. We will focus on the dynamic flaws of the model. www.riskmetrics.com Risk Management 32 Outline 1 Standard credit derivative products 2 Standard models, conventions and abuses 3 Data and calibration 4 Testing hedging strategies 5 Conclusions www.riskmetrics.com Risk Management 42 Standard products Single-name credit default swaps Contract written on a set of reference obligations issued by one firm Protection seller compensates for losses (par less recovery) in the event of a default. Protection buyer pays a periodic premium (spread) on the notional amount being protected. Quoting is on fair spread, that is, spread that makes a contract have zero upfront value at inception. www.riskmetrics.com Risk Management 52 Standard products Credit default swap indices (CDX, iTraxx) Contract is essentially a portfolio of (125, for our purposes) equally weighted CDS on a standard basket of firms. Protection seller compensates for losses (par less recovery) in the event of a default. Protection buyer pays a periodic premium (spread) on the remaining notional amount being protected. New contracts (series) are introduced every six months. -
Non-Binding Summary of Terms Series a Preferred Stock Financing
NON-BINDING SUMMARY OF TERMS SERIES A PREFERRED STOCK FINANCING NewCo Biosciences, Inc. March 9, 2013 This Term Sheet summarizes the principal terms of the Series A Preferred Stock Financing of the Company. Issuer: NewCo Biosciences, Inc. (the “Company”). Investors: ABC Venture Partners IV, LP and its Affiliates (“ABC”), XYZ Partners, LP (“XYZ,” and each of ABC and XYZ, a “Co-Lead Investor”), and other investors approved by both Co-Lead Investors and the Company. Collectively, the Co-Lead Investors, the holders of the bridge notes on an as-converted basis (the “Bridge Note Holders”) and other investors and holders of Series A Preferred Stock shall be hereinafter known as Investors. Pursuant to the terms of the bridge notes, all outstanding bridge notes will convert into Series A Preferred Stock at the First Tranche Closing. Amount of Financing: $15,000,000 to $17,000,000 in two tranches (the “First Tranche” Comment [1]: The proposed and the “Second Tranche”, collectively, the “Tranches”) in the investment is a range since there may amounts set forth below (exclusive of debt converting at the First be other investors coming in or the Tranche Closing), with each such Tranche becoming due as set forth valuation may change during due in the “Closings” section below. diligence. § First Tranche: 40% of the total investment amount Comment [2]: To reduce their risk, the investors will allocate money in § Second Tranche:60% of the total investment amount two chunks or tranches, based on The Investors total capital commitments are as follows: milestones. For the company, this guarantees a stock price and valuation § ABC: Up to $5,000,000 for a significant period of time, reducing the amount of negotiations § XYZ: Up to $8,000,000 required for a series B. -
Modern Money Mechanics
Modern Money Mechanics A Workbook on Bank Reserves and Deposit Expansion Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Modern Money Mechanics The purpose of this booklet is to desmmbethe basic Money is such a routine part of everyday living that process of money creation in a ~actionalreserve" bank- its existence and acceptance ordinarily are taken for grant- ing system. l7ze approach taken illustrates the changes ed. A user may sense that money must come into being either automatically as a result of economic activity or as in bank balance sheets that occur when deposits in banks an outgrowth of some government operation. But just how change as a result of monetary action by the Federal this happens all too often remains a mystery. Reserve System - the central bank of the United States. What Is Money? The relationships shown are based on simplil5ring If money is viewed simply as a tool used to facilitate assumptions. For the sake of simplicity, the relationships transactions, only those media that are readily accepted in are shown as if they were mechanical, but they are not, exchange for goods, services, and other assets need to be as is described later in the booklet. Thus, they should not considered. Many things -from stones to baseball cards be intwreted to imply a close and predictable relation- -have served this monetary function through the ages. Today, in the United States, money used in transactions is ship between a specific central bank transaction and mainly of three kinds -currency (paper money and coins the quantity of money. in the pockets and purses of the public); demand deposits The introductory pages contain a briefgeneral (non-interest-bearingchecking accounts in banks); and other checkable deposits, such as negotiable order of desm'ption of the characte*ics of money and how the withdrawal (NOW)accounts, at all depository institutions, US. -
Incentives and Tranche Retention in Securitisation: a Screening Model
BIS Working Papers No 289 Incentives and tranche retention in securitisation: a screening model by Ingo Fender and Janet Mitchell Monetary and Economic Department September 2009 JEL classification: D82, D86, G21, G28. Keywords: Retention requirements, Screening incentives, Securitisation, Tranching. BIS Working Papers are written by members of the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank for International Settlements, and from time to time by other economists, and are published by the Bank. The papers are on subjects of topical interest and are technical in character. The views expressed in them are those of their authors and not necessarily the views of the BIS. Copies of publications are available from: Bank for International Settlements Communications CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland E-mail: [email protected] Fax: +41 61 280 9100 and +41 61 280 8100 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). © Bank for International Settlements 2009. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated. ISSN 1020-0959 (print) ISBN 1682-7678 (online) Incentives and Tranche Retention in Securitisation: A Screening Model Ingo Fender (Bank for International Settlements) and Janet Mitchell (National Bank of Belgium and CEPR)y First draft: November, 2008z This version: September, 2009 Abstract This paper examines the power of di¤erent contractual mechanisms to in‡uence an originator’schoice of costly e¤ort to screen borrowers when the originator plans to securitise its loans. The analysis focuses on three potential mechanisms: the originator holds a “vertical slice”, or share of the portfolio; the originator holds the equity tranche of a structured …nance transaction; the originator holds the mezzanine tranche, rather than the equity tranche. -
2008 U.S. CDO Outlook and 2007 Review: Issuance Down in 2007 Triggered by Subprime Mortgages Meltdown; Lower Overall Issuance Expected in 2008
STRUCTURED FINANCE Special Report 2008 U.S. CDO Outlook and 2007 Review: Issuance Down in 2007 Triggered by Subprime Mortgages Meltdown; Lower Overall Issuance Expected in 2008 AUTHOR: CONTENTS: Jian Hu 1. Summary Senior Vice President (212) 553-7855 2. U.S. CDO Issuance Fell for the First Time since 2002 [email protected] 3. While Slightly Down in Volume, SF CDOs and CLOs Continued to Dominate U.S. CDO Issuance in 2007 CO-AUTHOR:1 4. Strong First and Second Quarters Offset Declines in the Suzanna Sava Assistant Vice President - Third and Fourth Quarters of 2007 Analyst 5. Unprecedented SF CDO Downgrades in 2007 Shatter (212) 553-1621 [email protected] Historical Record 6. Overall U.S. Financial Market Conditions Remain Difficult CONTACTS: 7. Generally Slower Issuance and More Negative Rating Yuri Yoshizawa Activity Are Expected Heading into 2008 Group Managing Director (212) 553-1939 [email protected] 1. SUMMARY Yvonne Fu Team Managing Director (212) 553-7732 2008 OUTLOOK [email protected] To increase transparency on the macroeconomic and financial framework William May that underpins its risk assessments, Moody's has published a baseline Team Managing Director outlook for the global economy, as well as three potential economic risk (212) 553-3868 [email protected] scenarios. These economic scenarios are intended to help Moody's ana- lysts formulate the outlooks for their specific markets using a consistent WEBSITE: set of assumptions that envisage various stressed economic and financial www.moodys.com conditions. The baseline outlook is inspired by major international organizations' eco- nomic outlooks. -
How Risky Are Structured Exposures Compared with Corporate Bonds?
How Risky are Structured Exposures Compared with Corporate Bonds? William Perraudina and Astrid Van Landschootb a Imperial College and Bank of England b National Bank of Belgium Abstract This paper compares the risk of structured exposures with that of defaultable corporate bonds with the same agency ratings. Risk is defined in a variety of ways including return volatility, value-at-risk, expected shortfall and betas with credit portfolios. * The views expressed are those of the authors and not of the institutions to which they are affiliated. 1 Introduction Understanding the relative risks involved in investing in different sectors of credit markets will always be important for market participants and regulators alike. However, the debate about capital initiated by the Basel Committee’s recently published proposals on regulatory capital make this issue especially topical (See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004)). In brief, the Committee’s proposals involve requiring each bank to hold capital to cover its banking book credit exposures largely based on the rating of these exposures.1 For bonds and loans, the ratings for most banks will be internally generated based on systems approved by supervisors. For structured products, the ratings will be mostly agency ratings provided by the major international rating agencies. Whether internal or external, the rating for an exposure is based on its expected loss or default probability. These aspects of an exposure are not the same as the exposure’s unexpected loss, which is generally thought to be an appropriate basis for setting capital. But experience suggests that, for reasonably homogeneous categories of assets, one may expect to find a stable relationship between expected loss and default probabilities and hence ratings on the one hand and unexpected loss and hence capital on the other hand. -
Glossary of Bond Terms
Glossary of Bond Terms Accreted value- The current value of your zero-coupon municipal bond, taking into account interest that has been accumulating and automatically reinvested in the bond. Accrual bond- Often the last tranche in a CMO, the accrual bond or Z-tranche receives no cash payments for an extended period of time until the previous tranches are retired. While the other tranches are outstanding, the Z-tranche receives credit for periodic interest payments that increase its face value but are not paid out. When the other tranches are retired, the Z-tranche begins to receive cash payments that include both principal and continuing interest. Accrued interest- (1) The dollar amount of interest accrued on an issue, based on the stated interest rate on that issue, from its date to the date of delivery to the original purchaser. This is usually paid by the original purchaser to the issuer as part of the purchase price of the issue; (2) Interest deemed to be earned on a security but not yet paid to the investor. Active tranche- A CMO tranche that is currently paying principal payments to investors. Adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM)- A mortgage loan on which interest rates are adjusted at regular intervals according to predetermined criteria. An ARM's interest rate is tied to an objective, published interest rate index. Amortization- Liquidation of a debt through installment payments. Arbitrage- In the municipal market, the difference in interest earned on funds borrowed at a lower tax-exempt rate and interest on funds that are invested at a higher-yielding taxable rate. -
Pricing a Collateralized Debt Obligation • a Collateralized Debt
Pricing a Collateralized Debt Obligation • A Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) is a structured fi- nancial transaction; it is one kind of Asset-Backed Security (ABS). • A Manager designs a portfolio of debt obligations, such as corporate bonds (in a CBO) or commercial loans (in a CLO). • The Manager recruits a number of investors who buy rights to parts of the portfolio. 1 • Each investor buys the right to receive certain cash flows derived from the portfolio, divided into tranches. • The senior tranche has first call on the cash flows (interest and principal), up to a set percentage. • The junior tranche has next call, again up to a set percent- age. • Remaining cash flows are passed through to the equity tranche. 2 • Simplified example: suppose that the portfolio consists of two corporate bonds, B1 and B2, and neither pays interest. • The bonds are priced at b1 and b2 at t = 0. • Each bond returns 1 at t = T if its issuer is not in default, and 0 if the issuer has defaulted. • The matrix D is: In default: Neither Issuer 1 Issuer 2 Both Cash erT erT erT erT B1 1 0 1 0 B2 1 1 0 0 3 • D is 3×4, so N = 3 < n = 4, and the market is not complete. • Now 0 1 1 B C S0 = @ b1 A : b2 −rT • If 0 < bi < e ; i = 1; 2, then S0 = D where 0 1 (1 − p1)(1 − p2) B (1 ) C −rT B p1 − p2 C = e B C @ (1 − p1) p2 A p1p2 rT and pi = 1 − e bi; i = 1; 2. -
Why Cdos Work
Why CDOs Work Jon Gregory1 Revised version, 3rd March 2014 1. Introduction The growth of the structured credit market gave rise to many complex collateralised debt obligation (CDO) structures. An investment in a CDO can be broadly characterised paying a return as compensation for exposure to a certain range of losses on a static or managed portfolio. Precise quantification of the risks in a CDO is complex since one needs to assess the multidimensional loss distribution for the underlying portfolio. Prior to the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2007, the CDO was a successful financial innovation. Investment banks made large profits from structuring CDOs and hedge fund and real money investors generally made good returns, at least when judged against the credit rating of the underlying investment. Banks also utilised CDOs so as to achieve “regulatory arbitrage” in relation to their capital requirements (a topic not dealt with in this article). Other players in the CDO market gained also, for example rating agencies earned good fees for rating the plethora of CDO structures and monoline insurers collected significant premiums for insuring or “wrapping” senior CDO tranches. However, the global financial crisis was partly catalysed by an implosion of the CDO market. CDOs have been blamed for causing the crisis, pricing models for CDOs have been heavily criticised, litigation has been rife and investor demand has almost disappeared. All players in the CDO market, notably banks, rating agencies as well as investors have suffered as a result. Banks lost billions of dollars due to failed hedging and write-downs due to the counterparty risk in trades with failing monoline insurers. -
Incentives and Tranche Retention in Securitisation: a Screening Model
Incentives and Tranche Retention in Securitisation: A Screening Model Ingo Fender (Bank for International Settlements) and Janet Mitchell (National Bank of Belgium and CEPR)y First draft: November, 2008z This draft: May, 2009 Abstract This paper examines the power of di¤erent contractual mechanisms to in‡uence an originator’schoice of costly e¤ort to screen borrowers when the originator plans to securitise its loans. The analysis focuses on three potential mechanisms: the originator holds a “vertical slice”, or share of the portfolio; the originator holds the equity tranche of a structured …nance transaction; the originator holds the mezzanine tranche, rather than the equity tranche. These mechanisms will result in di¤ering levels of screening, and the di¤erences arise from varying sensitivities to a systematic risk factor. Equity tranche retention is not always the most e¤ective mechanism. The equity tranche can be dominated by either a vertical slice or a mezzanine tranche if the probability of a downturn is likely and if the equity tranche is likely to be depleted in a downturn. In addition, a vertical slice is unlikely to dominate both the equity tranche and the mezzanine tranche, unless the vertical slice is very "thick". Monetary and Economic Department, Bank for International Settlements, Central- bahnplatz 2, 4002 Basel, Switzerland, tel: +41 61 280 8415, email: [email protected] yFinancial Stability Department, National Bank of Belgium, Boulevard de Berlaimont 14, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium, tel: +32 2 221 3459, email: [email protected] zThe views expressed in this paper remain those of the authors and do not necessarily re‡ect those of the BIS or the NBB.