PHL204 Introduction to Ethics Course Guide Corse Code

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PHL204 Introduction to Ethics Course Guide Corse Code PHL204 Introduction to Ethics Course Guide Corse Code: PHL204 Course Title: Introduction to Ethics Course Developer/Writer: Dr. A.Z. Ibrahim Department of Philosophy Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria Course Editor: Prof. Andrew Efemini Department of Philosophy University of Port Harcourt 1 Course Guide Introduction Welcome to PHL204: Introduction to Ethics. PHL204 is a three-credit unit course that has a minimum duration of one semester. It is a compulsory course for all B.A. Philosophy students of the University. The course is supposed to expatiate on ethics which the student was informed of in Introduction to Philosophy during the first semester. It aims to enlighten the student about the significance of ethics in philosophy. Course Objectives By the end of this course, the student should be able to: Explain the origin of ethics; Give a definition of ethics; Explain the division of ethics; Discuss the methodology of ethics; Explain the value of ethics; Explain human values; Explain the nature of human conduct; Explain human act; Explain the relationship between ethics and morality; Identify the disparity between ethics and law; Explain the concept of moral law; Discuss the principles of justice and conscience; Give a definition of the concept of good; Identify the good and doing the good; Explain the nature of right and wrong. Explain whether ethics is science or art; Explain the assumption of ethics; Identify some fundamental principles of ethics; Discuss the relationship between ethics and religion Working Through this Course To successfully complete this course, read the study units and do all the assignments. Open the link and read, participate in the discussion forums, read the recommended books and other materials provided, prepare your portfolios, and participate in the online facilitation. Each study unit has introduction, intended learning outcomes, the main content, conclusion, summary and references/further readings. The introduction will tell you the expectations in the study unit. Read and note the intended learning outcomes (ILOs). The intended learning 2 outcomes tell you what you should be able to do at the completion of each study unit. So, you can evaluate your learning at the end of each unit to ensure you have achieved the intended learning outcomes. To meet the intended learning outcomes, knowledge is presented in texts and links arranged into modules and units. Click on the links as may be directed but you are reading the text offline, you will have to copy and paste the link address into a browser. You can print or download the text to save it in your computer or external drive. The conclusion gives you the theme of knowledge you are taking away from the unit. Unit summaries are also presented in downloadable format. There are two main forms of assessments – the formative and the summative. The formative assessments will help you monitor your learning. This is presented as in-text questions, discussion forums and Self-Assessment Exercises. The summative assessments would be used by the University to evaluate your academic performance. This will be given as Computer Based Test (CBT) which serves as continuous assessment and final examination. A minimum of two or maximum of three computer-based tests will be given with only one final examination at the end of the semester. You are required to take all the Computer Based Tests and the final examination. Study Units There are 25 units in this course grouped into five modules. The modules and units are presented as follows: Module 1 Unit 1 Origin of Ethics Unit 2 Definition of ethics Unit 3 Divisions of ethics Unit 4 Methodology of Ethics Module 2 Unit 1 The values of ethics Unit 2 Human Value Unit 3 Nature of human conduct Unit 4 Human act Module 3 Unit 1 Relationship between ethics and morality Unit 2 Ethics and law Unit 3 The concept of moral law Unit 4 Principles of justice and conscience 3 Module 4 Unit 1 Definition of ‗good‘ Unit 2 Knowing the good and doing the good Unit 3 The nature of ‗right‘ and ‗wrong‘ Module 5 Unit 1 Is ethics a science or art? Unit 2 Assumptions of ethics Unit 3 Some fundamental principles of ethics Unit 4 Ethics and religion References and Further Readings Bentham, Jeremy (1825). The Rationale of Reward, trans. R. Smith, J. and H.L. Hunt, London. Bentham, Jeremy (1830). The Rationale of Punishment, trans. R. Smith, Robert Heward, London. Brentano, Franz (2009). The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, Oxon: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Broad, C.D. (1930 and 1967). Five Types of Ethical Theories, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Deigh, John (2010). An Introduction to Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Ltd. Foot, P. Ed. (2002). Theories of Ethics, Oxford: University Press. Graham, G. (2004). Eight Theories of Ethics, London: Routledge. Hare, R.M. (1981). Moral Thinking, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lillie, W. (1971). An Introduction to Ethics, London: Methuen & Co Ltd. Morgan, P. and Lawton, C.A. (2007). Ethical Issues in Six Religious Traditions. Edinburgh University Press. Popkin, R. H. (1993). Philosophy. Oxford, Made Simple Books. Sagi and Statman (1995). Religion and Morality. Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta. Sidgwick, Henry (1962). The Methods of Ethics. London, Palgrave Macmillan. Solomon, R.C and Greene, J.K (1999). Morality and the Good Life, New York, McGraw-Hill. 4 Tannsjo, Torbjorn (2002). Understanding Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Theory, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Presentation Schedule The presentation schedule gives you the important dates for the completion of your computer- based tests, participating in forum discussions and participating at facilitations. Remember you are to submit all your assignments at the appropriate time. You should guide against delays and plagiarism in your work. Plagiarism is a criminal offence in academics and it is highly penalized. Assessment There are two main forms of assignments that will be scored in this course: the continuous assessment and the final examination. The continuous assessment shall be in three-fold. There will be two computer-based assessments which will be given according to the University calendar. The timing must be strictly adhered to. The computer-based assessments shall be scored a maximum of 10% each, while participation in discussion forums and your portfolio presentation shall be scored maximum of 10% if you meet 75% participation. Therefore, the maximum score for continuous assessment shall be 30% which shall form part of the final grade. The final examination for PHL204 will be a maximum of three hours and it takes 70% of the total course grade. The examination will consist of five questions out of which you are expected to answer four. Note: You will earn 10% score if you meet a minimum of 75% participation in the course forum discussions and in your portfolios, otherwise you will lose the 10% in your total score. You will be required to upload your portfolio using google Doc. What you are expected to do in your portfolio is to present your notes or the jottings you made on each study unit and activity. This will include the time you spent on each unit and or activity. How to get the Most from the Course To get the most of this course you need to have a personal laptop and internet facility. This will give you adequate opportunity to learn everywhere you are in the world. Use the Intended Learning Outcomes (ILOs) to guide your self-study in the course. At the end of every unit, examine yourself with the ILOs and see if you have achieved what you need to achieve. Carefully work through each unit and make your notes. Join the online real time facilitation as scheduled. Where you missed the scheduled online real time facilitation, go through the recorded facilitation session at your own free time. Each real time facilitation session will be video recorded and posted on the platform. In addition to the real time facilitation, watch the video recorded summary in each unit. The video/audio summaries are directed to salient part in each unit. You can assess the audio and video by clicking on the links in the text or through the course page Work through all self-assessment exercises. Finally, obey the rules in the class. Facilitation 5 You will receive online facilitation. The facilitation is learner-centred. The mode of facilitation shall be asynchronous and synchronous. For the asynchronous facilitation, your facilitator will: Present the theme for the week; Direct and summarise forum discussions; Coordinate activities in the platform; Score and grade activities when need be; Upload scores into the university recommended platform; Support you to learn. In this regard personal mails may be sent; Send you video and audio lecture and postcards For the synchronous: There will be a minimum of eight hours and a maximum of twelve online real time contacts in the course. This will be video conferencing in the Learning Management System. The sessions are going to be run at an hour per session. At the end of each one-hour video conferencing, the video will be uploaded for view at your own pace. The facilitator will concentrate on main themes that are must know in the course. The facilitator is to present the online real time video facilitation time table at the beginning of the course. The facilitator will take you through the course guide in the first lecture at the start of the facilitation. Do not hesitate to contact your facilitator. Contact your facilitator if you: do not understand any of the study units or the assignments; have difficulty with the self-assessment exercises; have a question or problem with an assignment or with your tutor‘s comments on an assignment.
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