Timor-Leste Mission Review

Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:05 AM Page 82 3.13.7 Timor-Leste The first full year of the UN Integrated Mis- national institutions, compared to the efforts sion in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was completed of predecessor missions. In particular, UNMIT’s in 2007. Authorized in August 2006, UNMIT challenge will be to demonstrate its effective- was deployed in the aftermath of two bloody ness in restoring public order, rebuilding trust months, April and May, that year, when large in the police, and reforming the wider security parts of state security institutions collapsed sector. and the fledgling nation lurched dangerously toward civil conflict. Instead of completing its expected drawdown in 2006, the severe down- Background turn in events required the UN to return in Soon after Timor-Leste declared independence greater numbers with the likelihood of staying from Portugal in 1975, Indonesia invaded and for several years. then annexed the territory. A brutal twenty- UNMIT is a multidimensional mission four-year occupation followed, during which with a wide mandate including political arbi- over 100,000 Timorese suffered conflict-re- tration, security and judicial sector reform, lated deaths.1 In August 1999, the people of and socioeconomic development. The mis- Timor-Leste chose autonomy in a referendum sion’s success will be assessed by its capacity supervised by the United Nations, resulting in to better help build effective and sustainable Indonesia agreeing to the country’s independence. Pro-Indonesian militias launched a cam- paign of violence soon after, leading to the deaths of approximately 2,000 Timorese and the dislocation of tens of thousands more. Following military intervention by an Australian-led coalition under UN mandate, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established in October 1999 as the territory’s administrative authority for an intermediary period, and to ensure a peaceful transition to independence. Although UNTAET was responsible for a relatively small territory compared to other UN peacekeeping missions, its mandate was colossal: in effect, to build a state from scratch. The would-be nation had few formal accouter- ments of sovereignty on which to build a state: no ministries, no institutions, no police, and just a handful of courts. For reasons of occupation and dislocation, indigenous resources to animate these institutions were limited, and a 82 Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:05 AM Page 83 TIMOR-LESTE • 83 mass exodus of Indonesian civil servants prior to and immediately following the territory- UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) wide violence and destruction had left an enormous capacity vacuum. Two of the most • Authorization and 25 August 2006 (UNSC Res. 1704) credible indigenous institutions, the Conselho Start Date Nacional da Resistencia Timorense (CNRT) • SRSG and Atul Khare (India) (the political umbrella), and the Forças Arm- Head of Mission adas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste • Chief Military Colonel Graeme Roger Williams (FALINTIL), were on the one hand voluntar- Liaison Officer (New Zealand) ily disbanded, and on the other hand sidelined • Police Commissioner Rodolfo Aser Tor (Phillipines) at the onset of the UNTAET mission. • Budget $153.2 million (1 July 2007–30 June 2008) During the three years of UN administra- • Strength as of Military Observers: 32 tion, Timorese politicians progressively as- 31 October 2007 Police: 1,464 sumed governing authority, establishing a International Civilian Staff: 333 national governing council and electing a par- Local Civilian Staff: 771 liament and president. On 20 May 2002, the UN Volunteers: 118 country became independent, with resistance For detailed mission information see p. 321. hero Jose Alexandre Kay Rala “Xanana” Gus- mão sworn in as its first president and the gov- ernment led by the Frente Revolucionária do International Security Forces (ISF) Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN), one of the parties that had declared independence twenty-seven years previously. The challenges • Authorization Date 20 June 2006 (UNSC Res. 1690) the new state would face were underscored by • Start Date May 2006 stark economic data released at the time: the • Force Commander Brigadier John Hutcheson (Australia) UN’s 2002 Human Development Report ranked • Budget $87.4 million (October 2006–September 2007) Timor-Leste as the poorest country in Asia. • Strength as of Troops: 1,020 Following independence, UNTAET was 30 September 2007 succeeded by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), with a mandate to provide interim law enforcement and public security, and to assist in the development of a to coordinated development assistance. UNOTIL new law enforcement agency, the East Timor was scheduled to end in May 2006, a decision Police Service (later called Policia Nacional de influenced by member states’ reluctance to Timor-Leste [PNTL]). UNMISET was also fund it further. mandated to contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of Timor- Leste, and provide assistance to core adminis- The 2006 Crisis trative structures critical to the viability and po- The violence that erupted in Timor-Leste in litical stability of the country. A new Timorese 2006 demonstrated that the national and inter- defense force (the FALINTIL–Forças Armadas national efforts over six and a half years had de Defesa de Timor-Leste [F-FDTL]) was cre- not succeeded in developing and nurturing ated, but a large number of demobilized fight- new state institutions. Judged with the benefit ers were not incorporated into it. UNMISET of hindsight, many of the institutions created was followed by the UN Office in Timor-Leste by the UN and bequeathed to the new state (UNOTIL) in 2005, a much smaller mission were simply not fit for their purpose. The than its predecessors, and conceived as a bridg- short time-frame was not the only factor: the ing operation to transition from peacekeeping manner in which the UN and donor countries Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:05 AM Page 84 84 • MISSION REVIEWS approached statebuilding in Timor-Leste can Gusmão over the appropriate governmental be faulted in other respects. During the UN mechanisms for power-sharing. The PNTL and transitional administration, Timorese partici- the F-FDTL were at best incapable of control- pation in the process was frequently sidelined ling, and at worst complicit in, crime and law- by the presence of a large number of interna- lessness. Under the circumstances, the small tional advisers and overreliance on “off the UNOTIL mission, without any military contin- shelf” models, with limited consideration of gent, tried its best to assist the parties to re- their appropriateness in the Timorese context. solve the crisis peacefully. In one of the most The newly created security sector institu- tragic events in this harrowing time for the UN, tions were especially frail, and tensions within the police chief of the UNPOL mission was and between the PNTL and the F-FDTL were fired upon as he attempted to negotiate safe important factors in the renewed violence. passage for PNTL officers hemmed in their Compared to the police, the F-FDTL was rela- headquarters by F-FDTL soldiers. Eight un- tively neglected by the international community armed PNTL were shot dead in the attack.3 (including in terms of the mandates given to By late May, security had largely col- UNTAET and UNMISET), and poorly funded lapsed, prompting the president, the prime by donors.2 Alleged unfair treatment within the minister, and the president of the national par- ranks ignited discontent. In February 2006, 400 liament to request international assistance to officers (later 594) went on strike over discrim- help stabilize the situation. Defense forces ination in promotions and ill-treatment. The de- from Australia and New Zealand arrived in cision of the F-FDTL commander to dismiss Dili on 26 May, calming the situation in part- these officers in March 2006 prompted demon- nership with formed police units from Portugal strations that descended into violence. The acri- and Malaysia. In these circumstances, a prior mony escalated in the following months, and decision to downsize and withdraw the UN acquired a regional character, as armed groups presence seemed untimely. A multidimensional from Timor’s eastern and western provinces assessment team led by a Special Envoy of the clashed. The police forces split along similar Secretary-General, Ian Martin (former Special geographic lines, reflecting a perception that Representative in the UN Mission in East Timorese from the west of the country had not Timor [UNAMET]), recommended a larger carried their weight during the armed resis- peacekeeping mission, one focused on security tance. Youth gangs, often politically manipu- and judicial sector reform. lated and sparked by tensions emanating from Security Council Resolution 1704 was beliefs that the easterners had usurped residen- passed on 25 August 2006, paving the way for tial property and market stalls in the capital, the establishment of UNMIT. The mission’s clashed throughout the city. In April–May broad mandate include support of the 2007 2006, thirty-seven people died, many houses elections, institutional reform of the police and were destroyed, and 150,000 Timorese—15 armed forces, justice sector development, relo- percent of the entire population—were dis- cation of displaced persons, use of good offices placed from their homes amid the violence. to assist reconciliation of a fractured polity, and Within the space of a few months, many a coordinating role in executing the “compact” of the institutions established with the assis- through which Timorese national development tance of the UN appeared to be rapidly unrav- plans, the UN, and bilateral donors are to be eling. The tensions laid bare the long-standing dovetailed in the provision of humanitarian as- animosities between and within the political sistance and the promotion of sustainable de- elite, and the sharp rivalries between the po- velopment.

Load more