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After the 'Nkomati Accord'-The ANC Must Rethink Its Strategy 2 1NQABA

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After the 'Nkomati Accord'-The ANC Must Rethink Its Strategy 2 1NQABA No. 13 - March-May 1984 Price 50c' YA BASEBENZI Journal of the Marxist Workers' Tendency )f the African National Congress Lesson* Editors' Introduction: After the 'Nkomati Accord'-the ANC must rethink its strategy 2 1NQABA •;•;•;•;•;•;•;•;•:•;•:•;•; • :•:•:•:•:•:•;•:•:•: v;v;vx-y •'-;•"•*•••"•*•'•*•••'•"•••;•:•:• :•:•:• :->o w-:-ra •;-;•;-;%%-"• *•"•*• *•"•••"••• '•***' ".•.".•.•.•.•.•.••••.'.•.•.•.•>.•.•?.•.-.•.•.•.-,-.•,•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•,•.•.*.'.•.•.•-••• .•.•.•.•.•.•.•.-.•.-.•,-.•.-,•••#•.•.• .•.•.•.'.•••.'.•.•.-.•.*. Blind alley Editors' Inqaha has argued consistently that a guerilla strategy is a blind alley in South Africa, falsely raising hopes of victory which this method of struggle cannot fulfil. It strengthens the enemy which it is intended to weaken; it Introduction diverts the efforts of many militant youth from the essen­ tial tasks of mass organisation; and it has retarded (he understanding of the working class that the only road to victory lies through the mobilisation of their own power. After the 'Nkomati Accord'-the Now the Accord of Nkomaii has cast its own brutal light upon the issue. ANC must rethink its strategy Underpinning the ANC's strategy has been the belief that secure military bases could be built up in neighbour­ ing countries as the movement for independence and ma­ jority rule advanced down the continent to the borders The Nkomaii peace pact between [he South African of South Africa itself. Then (so the thinking went), from government and the Irelimo government of Mozambique these 'Frontline States', mounting pressure of armed ac­ makes the publication of this pamphlet on the "Lessons tions by the fighters of MK could eventually cripple the of the 1950s" all the more timely. South African state. Why? Because the pact can only drive home the realisa­ It must surely be admitted now that that conception tion among the black working people of South Africa that of the liberation struggle lies in ruins. they are their own liberators—that no-one else can do the job for them. It can only spur on the search within the rising working-class movement for the policies, methods Reality of political organisation, strategy and leadership necessary (or a suecessiul revolutionary struggle. In fact, the 'Accord' between South Africa and The decade of the 1950s was in many ways a forerunner Mozambique only makes publicly obvious what has long and 'dress rehearsal' for the mass movement today, now been the reality in Southern Africa. facing even greater and more bitter battles against the Capitalist South Africa, with its developed modern in­ bosses and their racist state. Understanding the lessons dustry, towers more and more over the whole sub­ of the 1950s—understanding, in particular, why the continent. It is an imperialist power—weak in world terms movement of that time ended in division and defeat— but a giant on the scale of Africa. The financiers and can be a precious asset today, helping to forewarn monopolists who head its ruling class need the markets, activists against old errors and pitfalls. the raw materials and the labour power of the whole region to fuel their machinery of exploitation and profit. Their drive to dominate Southern Africa politically Tremendous struggles follows from an economic drive. To safeguard their posi­ tion in South Africa itself, they must extend their power The 1950s was a period of tremendous struggles, beyond its borders. The might of their industry gives them involving in actions, at one time or another, hundreds the economic and military means to blackmail and bully of thousands of people over the length and breadth of their weak and crisis-torn neighbours. the country. As a result, the 'national independence' of the coun­ Thai was the period which established the tradition of tries of Southern Africa is an empiv and brittle shell— the ANC as the focal point for united mass resistance; and will remain so until the capitalist class and capitalist which raised its now-imprisoned leaders to unequalled state in South Africa is overthrown. prominence; which produced the Freedom Charter; and which gave birth to SACTU as the first national non- racial trade union federation based on African workers. Main threat While the traditions of the 1950s still echo strongly in the movement today, it is not widely known or The main threat to the ruling class in South Africa, understood, especially among the younger generation of as their own strategists recognise, comes fom the awaken­ militants, precisely what policies, methods and tactics ing power of the black working class. were followed by the leadership at that time—and with Industrial development has given SA capitalism the what results. means to build a formidable state apparatus, based on In that respect the memory of the 1950s has been eclips­ white privilege and domination, designed for the armed ed by the ANC's pursuit for the past twenty years of a repression of the black working-class majority. But this strategy of "armed struggle". It is the carrying out of same industrial development, by raising the strength. bombings and other guerilla actions by units of Umkhon- cohesion and consciousness of the workers, drives them lo we Si/we which has become the hallmark of the ANC. towards their task of overthrowing the state and putting mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm^mmmmm^mm^mmmm& INQABA 3 *:"Xv:&y:W:$:*x^^ • t .V.V.'.V.V.V.V.V.V.V.V.V .V-V-WiV-'-"-"."-'-"-••"•'.•»' .'.V.V.V.V.'.V.V.'.V.V.V.V.V.V.V.V.V.V ^^^:v•^^:.:^.^^^x.^^:.^^xo^:•xo•^x•:•^^:•:•^:•x•:o:•^:o^:•:•:o^^:•^^^:•:o:<•:'^:•x•^^:•^:'^x•^:•^^x an end to the racist, capitalist system. In the hope—which will prove vain—of warding off to everyone, the ANC can emerge strengthened. this threat, the South African regime now conjures with 'constitutional reform', intended to disperse the black Origins working class and divide it against itself on ethnic or tribal lines. This pamphlet shows that the origins of the ANC's turn Economics and politics intermesh. Foreign policy is an in the 1960s to the policy of guerillaism lay in the failure extension of domestic policy. The plan to construct a of its leadership to appreciate (hat the achievement of 'constellation' of dependent black satellite-states around national liberation and democracy in South Africa the golden sun of 'white' urban industrial centres, can­ depends on a successful struggle of the working class not limit itself to (he Bantustans alone. against their capitalist exploiters. It reaches out, striving to draw in by force also The turn to guerillaism came at the end of a long period Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe of mass struggles, which lacked nothing when it came to and even countries beyond. It seeks by these means to courage, militancy and self-sacrifice, but which were con­ ground the whole scheme on firmer foundations; to keep stantly crippled by the lack of a coherent revolutionary its greedy grip on Namibia even while negotiating 'in­ conception and strategy on the pari of the leadership. dependence'; and—by breaking out of political isolation The cause of this, in turn, was a refusal to recognise internationally—to lean more openly on the now surrep­ the class nature of the struggle, and a fruitless search for titious backing of the major imperialist powers. democratic concessions through compromise with the liberal wing of the capitalist class. The turn to "armed struggle" was an attempt to deal Introduction with increasingly vicious state repression. But it was a continuation of an old mistake in a new and worse This introduction to "Lessons of the 1950s" is not the form—for it abandoned all efforts to build systematically place for a full analysis of the Nkomati Accord and its the organised power of the working class; hoped to likely consequences; nor for a study of the irreconcilable substitute for this power the actions of secret armed units; contradictions which will cause the strategy of the SA and sought its allies in the diplomatic forums of (he regime—despite the pliability of its neighbour United Nations, the governments of Africans states, etc. governments—eventually to fail in both its domestic and The Nkomati Accord has given a rude shock to this international aspects. entire policy—and it highlights the fact that effective The point to make here is this: the ANC leadership solidarity in Southern Africa means the unity of the work­ itself will be compelled, sooner or later, by the realities ing class of the whole region in a common struggle. All of the struggle, by these and subsequent events, to change else is illusory. its strategy. It will be compelled to turn from its reliance Moreover, it must be recognised that our only reliable on guerillaism to rely upon the movement of the work­ ally internationally is the working class struggling against ing class, for no other force exists with the potential to exploitation in all capitalisi countries and againsi political take on effectively the power of the SA state. oppression in both the West and the East. The sooner this fact is recognised and this turn made, the better. Digest lessons Made easier To make a succesful turn to a new strategy it will be necessary fully to digest the lessons of the 1950s, the Unwittingly, in fact, the ANC policy of guerillaism period when the ANC stood openly at the head of the made it easier for South Africa to turn the screws on the mass movement. neighbouring states, for the regime was able to use Today the UDF is regarded by millions of working peo­ the pretext of attacking "terrorism" to cover its tactics ple in South Africa as a forerunner for the eventual re- of military aggression and economic strangulation. emergence of the ANC once again in its former role. That Now the policy of guerillaism has suffered a public is why the launching of the UDF last year was greeted defeat.
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