THE MAKING OF SADDAM’S EXECUTIONERS: A MANUAL OF OPPRESSION BY PROCEDURES By Robert G. Rabil*
This article, based on official Iraqi documents,(1) examines the numerous procedures of oppression used by the Ba’thi regime of Saddam Hussein to rule Iraq. Planned by the regime’s higher echelons and coordinated among state and party institutions, these procedures reveal how the regime sought to intimidate some citizens while turning others into accomplices.
Since its inception as a modern state, Iraq generous rewards and harsh punishments has been riven by ethnic, religious, tribal, with a relentless drive to exploit Iraq’s social, and political problems, arising in no divisions and forging a symbiosis of tribal small part from the country’s deficient traditions, Ba’th doctrine and his sense of national legitimacy and personality cult. Saddam was not unique as integration. The minority Sunni rulers of a person but his comprehensive and Baghdad sought to handle this problem by methodical procedures of oppression were asserting a strong central government unique. He based his survival on the authority throughout the state. The military regime’s ability to atomize Iraq’s civil emerged as a crucial instrument in the society, including the family unit, and in wielding of power in the 1930s. Imbued by turning many Iraqis into accomplices and deep nationalist feelings and aspirations for oppressors. These formed a class of their pan-Arab unity, Iraqi officers were behind own irrespective of ethnic and religious the coups and counter-coups of 1936- affiliation and included Saddam’s willing 1941.(2) and unwilling executioners. While the But at the same time, the clashes of rival latter participated in Saddam’s misdeeds parties and factions constantly disrupted under pressure and distress, the former, Iraqi stability. Even after the monarchy’s represented mainly by the security forces, overthrow in 1958, there followed a decade were ready and bold participants. of ideological clashes and conspiracies to seize power. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: THE When the Ba’th took control in 1968, it PATH TO POWER was determined to end this era and to Saddam Hussein hails from an area sustain its own rule forever. The new rigorously governed by tribal traditions and regime thus created parallel state structures customs, enforcing a spirit of courage and to ensure its control. But the party itself intrepidity in the face of adversity and came under the grip of the same security harsh conditions. Survival and revenge are men it catapulted to prominence. By the twin pillars of this tribal edifice. controlling Iraq’s security apparatus, Situated on the banks of the Tigris river, Saddam emerged as the lord of Iraq in the Tikrit is the home of the three tribes: al- mid-1970s. Nasir, Sultan and ‘Ajil, from which Building on past experience, Saddam Hussein descends, with al-Nasir being his asserted his rule by combining a system of direct pedigree.
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At the center of tribal traditions are the state. He based himself at the Ministry of rituals every member of these tribes goes Defense instead of the prime minister’s through to encourage a courageous and office and selected trustworthy military remorseless character. Special emphasis is cadres and demoted or retired senior placed on upbringing. Children are raised officers whose loyalty and ideology he by their aunts or uncles so as to be free distrusted. He and other army officers from motherly influence and tender occupied the main posts in the new feelings. At a certain age, the youth are government and the army moved to the forced to slit the throats of chicken to get center of Iraqi politics. accustomed to scenes of blood, ride horses Saddam’s initial rise to prominence and fire from a special rifle, which recoils came after his participation in a failed sharply, to show their manliness. Peace is Ba’th Party attempt to assassinate Qasim in maintained among the tribes according to a October 1959. This era played an important delicate balance of power. Intra-tribal role in shaping Saddam’s political outlook murders are not condoned and every by showing how a constant struggle among murder case is settled by paying a specified forces, influenced by external powers or ransom to the family of the deceased. Yet ideologies, shook the country and murders outside the tribes do not entail eventually subverted Qasim’s rule. Indeed, special arrangement. For example, settling Qasim’s own coalition quickly broke into a murder case involving a Kurd requires no competing factions along political, ethnic, ransom fee. Saddam’s upbringing, like social and religious lines. This polarization other Tikritis, was based on these traditions also affected the army. and values.(3) Movements clamoring for Arab Saddam was born into a country glued nationalism and unity--represented mainly together by the British in the 1920s to serve by Nasserists and the Ba’th party--and their interests. Arising from the ashes of movements for social change--represented the Ottoman empire, Iraq comprised the by the Iraqi Communist party--took center three former Ottoman provinces of Mosul stage. Qasim used the Communists to with its Kurdish Sunni majority, Baghdad contain the Arab nationalists but kept them with its Arab Sunni majority, and Basra away from sensitive power centers in the with its Arab Sh’ia majority. The British government or armed forces. Soon, due to favored Arab Sunnis and entrusted the his wariness of the communists’ influence Hashemite family (allies of Britain and within the armed forces, Qasim also forced descendents of the Prophet) to rule Iraq. out Communist officers. Given his From the beginning, the Hashemite weakened support base and an unpopular monarchy lacked legitimacy because of its government campaign against the Kurds, close ties with colonial Britain and its Qasim was toppled by a narrow social base of support. Nationalist/Ba’thist coalition, led by Leading a coalition of Free Officers, General Abd al-Salam ‘Arif, in February modeled on Egypt’s Free Officers’ 1963. movement, General Abd al-Karim Qasim One immediate consequence of the new staged a coup ending the Hashemite coup was the rise of some Tikriti Ba’thi monarchy in July 1958. Qasim attempted senior figures to prominent positions.(4) to impress on Iraq an identity based on This rise coincided with a deadly purge of strident Arab nationalism and domestic Communist soldiers initiated by the social reform. Sustaining his rule and Ba’thists. However, the Bathists’ victory implementing his plan required a was short-lived. ‘Arif outmaneuvered and reorganization of the army as well as the prevented them from consolidating power,
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 39 Robert G. Rabil then removed them in a counter-coup in was established to assume authority and the November 1963. This episode in Ba’thi new government drew its members from history destroyed any internal democracy. the Ba’th Party and dissident officers.(5) Nor would it let the army be the arena for Although Bakr took over the presidency, political conflict. Next time, the Ba’th the officers assumed many ministerial party was determined to destroy all rivals posts including the premiership. This and monopolize all power so as not to fall power sharing arrangement did not sit well again. It was ready for a ruthless with the Ba’th Party’s ambitions and before Ba’thization of Iraqi society and the armed long, on July 30, it carried out a new coup forces. removing the officers from power. Ironically, the removal of the Ba’th Once it regained power, the Ba’th Party from the ‘Arif regime, coupled with the set about imposing its ideological, political assumption of the Ba’th Party to power in and administrative control over society and Syria, enhanced the position within the state, particularly the army. One lesson the party of some Tikritis including Saddam Ba’thists drew from the past decade was Hussein and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. In that the army constituted a principal threat. early 1964, Michel Aflaq, a Syrian who This was compounded by the lack of faith was co-founder and main ideologue of the the party had in the existing security forces. Ba’th Party and secretary-general of its Consequently, the new rulers began a National Command, made Saddam systematic campaign rooting out potential secretary of a newly constituted Iraqi opposition in the army and recruiting into Regional Command. Bakr and Saddam its higher echelons loyal Ba’thist officers. participated in a major reorganization of In addition, they gave Saddam the task the party, while at the same time fighting of creating an independent security the ‘Arif regime. apparatus whose task would be to eliminate In July 1965, divisions within the Iraqi dissidents and groups that could form an government’s ranks culminated in the mass opposition. Out of this attempt to penetrate resignation of Nasserist ministers. Less and monitor state and society, a deliberate than a year later, ‘Arif died in obscure plan to create parallel structures to control circumstances when his helicopter crashed the state and all other organs of civil on its way to Basra in April 1966. A society emerged. Central to this plan was military-civilian confrontation ensued, and the attempt to imbue Iraq’s society with the rival factions could not agree on a Ba’thi pan-Arab nationalist doctrine.(6) presidential candidate other than ‘Abd al- But contrary to its ideological Rahman ‘Arif, brother of the late president. commitments to socialism and modernity, The second ‘Arif regime was torn from its the new regime relied more on tribal beginning by power struggles among the solidarity than party loyalty. In this respect, nationalists on one side, and between the thanks to his tribal affiliation to Bakr, civilians and the military on the other. Saddam was appointed, in November 1969, Weakened by these struggles, the regime vice-president of the republic and deputy became increasingly isolated. At the same chairman of the RCC. time, it, like its predecessor, tried to The party was so confident in its drive strengthen the security apparatus and to Ba’thize Iraq’s society that it publicly subject Iraqis to widespread surveillance. declared its aims to impose and maintain On July 17, 1968 dissident army its total ideological and political hegemony officers with the help of the Ba’th Party over state and society during its 1974 carried out a military coup. A conference.(7) Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)
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This obsession was not limited to In April 1979, Saddam succeeded Bakr indoctrinating Iraqis and crushing dissent. and masterminded the purge of the Ba’th It was stridently chauvinistic as well. In party and RCC from perceived disloyal 1970 the regime opened the Ottoman and/or critical members. With the onset of archives, in which Iraqis were classified as the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 Saddam launched either Ottoman or Persian subjects, and a new era of rule in Iraq best described by launched a campaign of mass expulsion Kanan Makiya as the “republic of fear.” against all Iraqis of Persian “origin.” This campaign reached its apex in early 1980 OPPRESSION BY PROCEDURES: when Saddam, within the context of TRANSFORMING IRAQI SOCIETY subduing the Islamist opposition led by the The war with Iran marked a major Da’wa party, issued several RCC decrees, change in the nature of the Iraqi regime and including RCC decree 22/23/1807 of how it ruled. During the first half of the March 11, 1980 and RCC decree 666 of 1980s, Saddam strove to make Iraq a May 7, 1980, stipulating the deportation fiefdom for the Tikritis. Tikritis filled the and revocation of Iraqi citizenship from most sensitive posts in the state and Iraqis of “Persian” origin.(8) The especially in the security apparatus. magnitude of this campaign was so large Simultaneously, Saddam began usurping that the regime established detention the power of the Ba’th party and turning it centers for such Iraqis between the ages of into an organization of mobilization, 18 and 28.(9) indoctrination and control, especially of Saddam’s role in implementing the domestic threats. party’s program was critical. Thanks to his They directed the party that supervised control of the security apparatus, he was the creation of the parallel structures of the able to wield the real power in the parallel regime and catapulted many Tikritis to organizations that lay behind the state’s high positions in the security services. But facade. In addition, although his power the real change, the focus of this paper, base relied on his Tikriti connection, he did came in how Saddam managed to fragment not shy away from eliminating any claim to and atomize Iraq’s civil society by leadership within his extended tribe, let imposing a comprehensive and methodical alone within Ba’thi circles.(10) But repressive system on Iraqis and by seeking Saddam’s power was not confined to the to turn them into accomplices of the regime use of terror. He mastered the party’s and executioners of its policies. This policy system of severe punishments and systematically targeted civil society in generous financial rewards and promotions general and its nucleus, the family, in not only to ensure loyalty but also to lure particular. In other words, if you were not supporters. In this respect, the party’s and, affiliated with the regime, including the in particular, Saddam’s access to Iraq’s Ba’th, or an informer for it, you would face riches following the rise in oil prices after physical and subsistence hardship. 1973 enabled him to allocate and distribute Thanks to this policy there exists no the dividends of this wealth. Party control civil or societal structure outside those of over the state was completed in 1977 when the regime and the Ba’th party. In this way, the Ba’th Regional Command was merged the regime makes sure, as expressed in with the RCC and all Regional Command Ba’th dogma, that the party remains the members became state ministers. At the vanguard and basis of society, making same time, while Bakr was Iraq’s Saddam the lynchpin upon which Iraq’s president, Saddam effectively controlled existence hinges. Correspondingly, the the state.
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Ba’th became a medium through which headquarters and tries to recruit him. At the Saddam’s cult of personality was nurtured. end of the interview, Security demands At this point, it is important to outline from the applicant a written pledge the procedures the regime employed to indicating whether he will or will not achieve its goal. In order for any Iraqi to cooperate.(13) Security then creates a file have a certain job, become an agent of a on him and assigns it to a security officer company, acquire a sales license, or who will be his handler. It also requests practice a profession, his application that the applicant write an initial report cannot be processed before it is reviewed about any information he has on the and approved by the General Directorate of opposition, saboteurs (including any within Security, known as Security or in Iraqi his family) and deserters. After vetting all parlance Amn.(11) Among the security the information, Security then judges apparatus, the General Directorate of whether he is qualified for the job. Security deals with domestic threats, Applicants who decline to cooperate including recruiting Iraqis. Approval is with Security will not be considered for the solely based on the applicant’s readiness to job and become both suspects and targets “cooperate” with security and thus become of the regime’s reprisals. On the other an informer. hand, besides approving their applications, The minute an application is filled, a Security rewards its new informers on the copy is sent to the provincial Directorate of basis of the importance of the information Security, which orders a comprehensive that they provide.(14) By this background check on the applicant from comprehensive system, the regime not only both the Mukhtar (chief of village) and the deepened the fragmentation of society but directorate of Security where he resides. As also forced many Iraqis to become specified by Security, the Mukhtar has to informers and spies. provide extensive information, including his “nationality" (Kurdish, Sunni, or Shi’a), EDUCATION AS A SYSTEM FOR political orientation, the names of people CONTROL AND RECRUITMENT with whom he usually associates, his The Ba’th party places great emphasis attitude and his family’s attitude toward the on pedagogy. It is through education that regime, and whether he or any relatives the Ba’th highlights and perpetuates its have in the past opposed the regime. dogma. But in Iraq under Saddam, the At the same time, the local Directorate education system emerged not only as a of Security conducts its own investigation means to indoctrinate students with Ba’thi of the applicant, based on specific ideology but also as a way to monitor and questions from headquarters. As shown for recruit both teachers and students. Saddam example, in the Sulaimaniya Directorate of gradually eroded the power, independence Security’s letter number QSH/10971 of and purpose of the Ba’th party by turning it September 7, 1986, the questions are into an organization whose main function almost identical to those provided to the was to monitor society and secure the mukhtar with the addition of whether local regime against domestic threats. The party security “has cooperated with the applicant became controlled by the same security in the interest of security work.”(12) apparatus it created to control state organs. A personal data sheet is then created for This is illustrated, as we shall see, by the him containing the information provided methodical and categorical rules the party both by the mukhtar and local security. imposed at the behest of the security Next, Security, either at the provincial or apparatus on Iraq’s educational system. district level, summons the applicant to its
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These rules attempt to deny education 10. Contribution to Qadisiyat Saddam and work to students and teachers who do [Iran-Iraq war] not embrace Ba’thi ideology with the cult 11. Attitude toward Training of Saddam at its center, decline Ba’th 12. Number of Father’s Citizenship membership and cooperation with Security, Certificate and have relatives associated with 13. Name of Mukhtar [village chief] saboteurs. All this is foisted on a system 14. Reputation [political attitudes] of already adopting a discriminatory Student and Family educational policy based on ethnic and 15. Student’s Grade Average for Last Year religious affiliation. In addition, in the 16. Comments(16) General Directorate of Security’s telegram number 62439 of November 11, 1980, the As illustrated by this register, the Ba’th Directorate established a branch, keeps extensive records on every student codenamed M85, to monitor the activities with the main objective of monitoring and of students throughout their academic life recruiting them. Once students are including at universities.(15) recruited, they become part of the whole At this point it is important to note that surveillance system. Students that engage the Ba’th party, besides its central in activities considered threatening to headquarters in the capital, has national security (such as demonstrating) headquarters on the governate (provincial) will have their records “marked” and sent level (called Section), on the district level to the General Directorate of Security, (called Branch), and on the sub-district which in turns orders that their applications level (called Division). Within the party to higher learning institutions be there are several bureaus, including the rejected.(17) In addition to that, the Ba’th Bureau of Youth and Students. Following regularly sends all registers to their Security guidelines, this Bureau keeps corresponding provincial Directorate of registers on all schools and in which Security, which compiles them and then politically related information on students sends lists comprising the names of and their families is regularly recorded and secondary school graduates applying for updated. admission into Iraqi universities to all A sample register, issued by the Ba’th Security branches. Every branch will party, Bureau of Youth and Students of receive the list of students residing in its Sulaiminya Secondary School for Girls, sector. Along with the lists, Security orders contained the following categories: that every branch mark the nationality of every student according to a color code: 1. Name Red for Kurds, Yellow for Muslim Arabs, 2. Date and Place of Birth Green for Christians, and the word 3. Nationality Turkmen would be written next to the 4. Religion names of members of that community.(18) 5. Current Residence Another process to recruit teachers 6. Political Orientation parallels the one to recruit students. The 6-1 Type Ba’th launches periodic campaigns to 6-2 Party Rank recruit “independent” teachers, including 6-3 Division recent politically independent graduates. 6-4 Name of Person in Charge Every teacher is required to write a pledge 7. Profession of the Father indicating whether he will join the 8. Birth Place party.(19) Subsequently, at the order of the 9. Birth Place of Grandfather Qutr’s (in Ba’th lexicon Iraq as a region)
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Secretary Bureau, in conjunction with importantly, as implementers of his Security, the Ba’th creates lists of teachers policies. who refused Ba’th membership and passes In addition, Saddam paid close attention them on to Security.(20) In addition, the to the process of recruiting Security party orders that a special form be created personnel. In addition to recruiting the top for every teacher on the list, which includes personnel mainly from his tribe and information about the teacher such as: affiliated ones within the Sunni triangle in political orientation; whether he has first or the middle of the country, he put all second degree relatives who are either Security personnel through a careful sentenced, executed, or with the review process before finally hiring them. opposition; name of the Ba’th Party After their hire, Security personnel were member who tried to recruit the given strict guidelines. For example, no teacher.(21) Security official could marry before Finally, the party orders that the Security conducted a background check on teachers who refused Ba’th membership be the prospective bride and agreed to the dismissed from the teaching marriage.(27) profession.(22) Equally significant, Equally significant, Saddam granted Security orders the dismissal of teachers Security personnel more power than any who it designates as “unqualified” to teach. other state officials. Security officials This designation is tied to the regime’s throughout Iraq answered only to their policy of collective punishment whereby directors in the provinces, who in turn teachers who have family members answered to the director of the apparatus overseas, who are considered “escapees”, within the office of the president. In other are dismissed.(23) It goes without saying words, governors had no official power that many teachers and students join the whatsoever over Security officials.(28) In Ba’th Party and thus are compelled to practice, a sergeant in Security had more engage in activities—including spying on clout than a governor. In return for their others--supporting the regime. total loyalty, Saddam heaped all kinds of rewards on them ranging from specially SADDAM AND SECURITY tailored suits to cash bonuses to plots of Nowhere is the collusion of many Iraqis land.(29) with the regime more pronounced than in Among the Security apparatus, the the relationship between Security and the General Directorate of Security sat on the regime in general, and Saddam in top of the state hierarchy to monitor and particular. Following his assumption of the recruit Iraqis as well as suppress presidency, Saddam did not relinquish his opposition. Besides maintaining records on direct authority over the Security apparatus Iraqis, it strove to have the largest number but remained fully in charge as he of spies throughout Iraqi society. Not only expanded and diversified it.(24) In the did it coordinate with the Ba’th or state early 1980s he severed any connection organs to recruit spies but also aggressively between the Ministry of Interior and the pursued enlisting ordinary as well as Security apparatus and brought them under influential Iraqis of all types, even within the aegis of the Office of the President.(25) families.(30) Every provincial Directorate Indeed, Saddam personally intervened in of Security tried to establish a network of many cases involving security officers and spies covering the whole province, from informers.(26) In addition to monitoring village, to quarter, to sub-district, to each other, the apparatus’s personnel serve district. According to official Iraqi as the ears and eyes of Saddam and, most documents, including records of payments,
44 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) The Making of Saddam’s Executioners: A Manual of Oppression by Procedures many Iraqis collaborated with Security, individually. It was also Security that providing information in Ba’thi lexicon on supervised the wholesale elimination of “everything that might negatively affect the villages deemed “prohibited for security public welfare,” including delicate reasons.”(35) Its association with the information on their own families.(31) regime was so deep that almost all Security Iraqis approached by Security could personnel had “blood on their hands.” either cooperate and be generously Security participated in grand plans such as rewarded or face all kinds of pressure to do operation Termination of Traitors, which so. The method of payment--tangible such culminated in the Anfal campaign, and as cash or indirect such as promotion-- daily operations running the gamut from depended on the quality of information. It executing to displacing Iraqis.(36) is worth noting here that the Mukhtar Examples abound. At the order of (village chief), though not a security Saddam, Security officials were at the official but an agent, played an important forefront in pursuing and executing Da’wa role in providing Security with all kinds of (Islamist Shi’a) party members as information on his community.(32) instructed by RCC decree number 461 of Building on information provided by the March 31, 1980;(37) in the wholesale Ba’th and the Mukhtars, Security even deportation of Iraqis of “Iranian origin” as periodically recorded the new birth ordered by RCC decree 22/23/1807 of statistics throughout every sector of every March 11, 1980;(38) in executing deserters province, noting the political orientation of and draft dodgers as ordered by Saddam in the fathers of the newly born.(33) his letter number 3/2/973/K of June 21, Equally significant, the regime regularly 1984;(39) in liquidating saboteurs and their launched campaigns to recruit informers collaborators;(40) in detaining the families among the families of saboteurs, a of saboteurs;(41) in detaining the families designation that included all those who of those who fled to Iran;(42) and in actively or passively opposed the regime. countless other actions. In reality, these campaigns were part of the During times of national security crises, psychological warfare that the regime Saddam gave Security officials and other employed on the saboteurs and their state officials significant powers to do as families with the dual objectives of they saw fit. In this respect, during the creating doubts among them and recruiting regime’s anti-Kurdish campaign of 1987- some of them. An example of the official 1988, Saddam not only mobilized a wide instructions that became typical, especially range of officials from the lowest to during the 1980s, are included in RCC highest ranking but also granted them great letter/Northern Affairs Committee number leeway to accomplish the mission, that of 4/380 of December 12, 1981. This RCC killing and displacing a large number of letter decreed that detained saboteurs’ Kurds.(43) This, seemingly, was also part family members should be prodded to of the regime’s strategy of spreading the become good citizens and that some be responsibility for actions taken. Indeed, released so as to create doubts whether pro-government Kurdish militia, known as they were informers and to encourage Jahsh (a pejorative name literally meaning others to be recruited.(34) mule) participated actively in attacking The security apparatus directed the most their fellow Kurds and in the wholesale horrible actions and atrocities committed destruction of many Kurdish villages by the regime. It was mainly Security that during operation Termination of executed, detained, tortured, deported, and Traitors.(44) displaced Iraqis collectively or
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Significantly, this circle of complicity deepening the population’s dependence on was not confined to Security and state it for basic services and employment. This officials, accomplices and spies. The alone, however, cannot answer the difficult regime did not shy away from attempting question as to why so many Iraqis to make the victims themselves complicit. cooperated with the regime. According to Office of the President’s True, it is the harsh measures Saddam letter number MH1/2080 of October 14, imposed on Iraqis that pressured them into 1984, Security officials were instructed to cooperating with the regime. Still, one commute the death sentences of all Da’wa cannot discount the notion that many state party members who executed their party officials, especially Security personnel, colleagues, to life imprisonment.(45) were receptive to Saddam’s orders in that Needless to say, all state officials, they efficiently implemented them without including Ba’th party members, were wrestling with any moral questions. expected to carry out the regime’s orders, Importantly, defection from or which included divulging information on insubordination in Security, unlike the one’s own family.(46) Otherwise, they army, was rare and most disciplinary could face harsh punishments including actions taken by the regime against execution.(47) Security personnel involved civil crimes and infractions such as rape, taking bribes, SADDAM’S WILLING or stealing.(49) EXECUTIONERS? Thus one can safely argue that Security As shown by official Iraqi documents, personnel, along with other senior officials, Security and a vast network of spies were Saddam’s willing executioners; while undergirded the Iraqi regime and were not for the most part the regime’s informers confined to a single ethnicity or religious were Saddam’s unwilling executioners. Let affiliation. As documents show, while us not forget that Iraqis have been heavily many senior figures of the apparatus were indoctrinated and militarized under tribally affiliated with Saddam, a Saddam, nor that Saddam himself is the significant number of lower ranking product of the modern political landscape members and most informers were not of the region in general and Iraq in Sunnis. In addition, non-Sunnis, especially particular, especially since 1958. Shi’ites, are present at all levels of It was the confluence of the distressing government, including Saddam’s inner socio-political conditions of the country circle.(48) Therefore, while it is true that with both the strident Ba’th doctrine and the regime is governed mainly by Tikriti the conspiratorial formative experience of Sunnis, still it is inadequate to define its the Ba’th Party that produced many identity as exclusively or strictly Sunni. He Saddams. There was never a shortage of may have thought that the more he spread people ready to pledge allegiance to him, complicity, the stronger was the sector of creating a class of oppressors and Iraqis who supported his rule. accomplices irrespective of ethnic and/or It should be noted that many Iraqis religious affiliation. refused to cooperate with the regime, even Central to this, Saddam, more than any in the face of threats to their physical or other Middle Eastern leader, deepened the mental well-being. On the same grounds, ethnic, religious, social, and political while it is difficult to estimate the large divides in the country. On the one hand, he number of Iraqis who cooperated with the intensified the enmity among and between regime, it is clear that this cooperation was Iraq’s communities, thereby creating a largely the result of the regime’s policy of common denominator of collective distrust.
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This condition served to alleviate the But it was the March 1991 uprising that burden of cooperating with the regime in a exposed in graphic detail the real views of way Iraqis could justify on the grounds that the people. Rebel Shi’as in the south of “if I did not cooperate with the regime Iraq attacked government buildings and others would.” And it served to fuel rivalry facilities and killed many Iraqi and Ba’th among Iraqis with the result that they officials. Kurdish rebels stormed found it more convenient to cooperate with government headquarters, especially those the regime to preempt their competitors of security, and murdered Iraqi officials, from doing so. some of whom were thrown from the roofs At the same time, Saddam brutally of their headquarters before cheering forged a symbiosis between tribal crowds.(54) These actions continued until traditions, Ba’th ideology, and his the government suppressed the uprising personality cult. In addition to appointing with even higher levels of violence. a large number of officials on the basis of tribal affiliation and enforcing a tribal code CONCLUSION of rule, Saddam fused his personality cult For any post-Saddam regime, one of the with the Ba’th doctrine so as to become not most important issues will be deciding only the indispensable leader but also the where the guilt lies for the former “messiah” leader who finally appeared to government’s violations of human rights save Iraq and the Arab nation. According and international law. The capture of some to Ba’thi literature, “Saddam Hussein is not of Iraq’s archives in 1991 has already a traditional leader, he is a defender shown many things about the regime’s (combatant), thinker, and a human being operations and responsibilities for these possessing leadership qualities unavailable actions. If the regime is overthrown, far to others…He is unlike any other leader. more detailed and extensive information on He fundamentally possesses the talent for these things will come to light. leadership, hallowed by inspiration and Two important principles should be ingenuity.”(50) maintained: a clear distinction between the In another piece of literature, Saddam’s regime’s willing and unwilling participants birth is qualified as the coincidence and the avoidance of any bloodbath fueled whereby life became transformed into by a general desire for revenge. Another political struggle.(51) Given that the Ba’th point, of course, would be that any future original platform had been to assert its regime must be able to provide stability hegemony over state and society, Saddam without repeating the mistakes of the past. projected himself as a god-like figure to be not only followed but also emulated. Iraqis *Dr. Rabil served with Red Cross in who thought otherwise would be guilty of Lebanon, taught at Suffolk University and both sedition and betraying the leader. currently is the project manager of Iraq Yet this does not mean that the mass of Research and Documentation Project at Iraqis accepted this worldview in their the Iraq Foundation, Washington, DC. He hearts. Where possible, the regime’s is the author of Embattled Neighbors: officials and agents were targeted for Lebanon, Syria, Israel (Lynne Rienner revenge. Informers, especially Mukhtars, Publishers, 2003). The author extends his were constant targets for assassination, thanks to IRDP research team. especially in Iraqi Kurdistan.(52) Iraqi officials, especially security ones, were 1. During the March 1991 uprising in Iraq, targets for both assassination and Kurdish opposition groups kidnapping.(53) captured huge quantities of Iraqi
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government documents primarily 7. See The Ba'th Arab Socialist Party, The belonging 1968 Revolution in Iraq: Experience and to Iraqi intelligence. Thanks to efforts by Prospects: The Political Report of the Kanan Makiya and Human Rights Eighth Congress of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Watch, these documents were transferred Party in Iraq, January 1974 (London: to the United States where the Ithaca Press, 1979). Senate Foreign Relations Committee took 8. For the RCC decrees see respectively charge of them. Along with Iraq Research and Documentation government officials, Human Rights Project-North Iraq Data Set [hereafter Watch/Middle East first examined these IRDP-NIDS] [713267 and 1373111], documents, which were subsequently given available at URL: in digital format to the Iraq
48 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) The Making of Saddam’s Executioners: A Manual of Oppression by Procedures not object to granting an applicant a front of the class and asked: ‘Do Kerosene Sales license after he your parents say anything bad about the pledged to cooperate with the apparatus. government?’ The whole class was See IRDP-NIDS [692254, 692252, staring at me. Stunned and scared, I 692260, 692255, 692253]. answered, ‘No.’ But when one of my 15. IRDP-NIDS [1373810]. classmates said in passing that Iran was not 16. See register of Sulaimaniya Secondary so bad, she disappeared the School in IRDP-NIIDS next day, along with her family.” Zainab [1270813-1270892]. Al-Suwaij, “Iraqi People Yearn to 17. IRDP-NIDS [1042115]. Taste Freedom Again,” USA Today, 18. IRDP-NIDS [1270981]. January 13, 2003. 19. IRDP-NIDS [322102]. 31. IRDP-NIDS documents were withheld 20. IRDP-NIDS [322096, 322091, 322092, due to their sensitive nature and 322093]. implications. 21. IRDP-NIDS [322104]. 32. No individual can become a Mukhtar if 22. IRDP-NIDS [322099]. he refuses to cooperate with 23. IRDP-NIDS [1273159, 1273187, Security. 1273159]. 33. See IRDP-NIDS [328414, 328413]. 24. For detailed information on the 34. IRDP-NIDS [1430631]. Security apparatus and their functions, 35. IRDP-NIDS [860012-14, 862113-17]. see Ibrahim al-Marashi, “Iraq’s Security 36. For complete details on the regime’s and Intelligence Network: A Guide 1987-1988 anti-Kurdish campaign, and Analysis,” Middle East Review of represented by Operation Termination of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Traitors, and the huge bureaucracy Vol. 6, involved in it, see Robert G. Rabil, No. 3 (September 2002). “Operation “Termination of Traitors”: 25. See IRDP-NIDS [1346796, 656959]. The Iraqi Regime Through Its Documents,” 26. For example, Saddam issued an RCC Middle East Review of International decree increasing the family’s Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3 retirement salary of a martyr, who was a (September 2002). Mukhtar. See IRDP-NIDS [1393768]. 37. IRDP-NIDS [1372984]. Another example involved Saddam’s order 38. IRDP-NIDS [713267]. See also IRDP- to defer the promotion of a Security NIDS [1373111, 1372850, 713218, officer because he committed a “vile action 1395165]. against” a female. See IRDP-NIDS 39. IRDP-NIDS [1165878]. [671762]. 40. IRDP-NIDS [1373970, 657347]. See 27. IRDP-NIDS [696258, 696259, also translated IRDP-NIDS documents on 1402110]. IRDP web-site. 28. IRDP-NIDS [695816]. 41. IRDP-NIDS [1370817, 1343280, 29. IRDP-NIDS [1165827, 1165659, 657347]. 1165932]. 42. IRDP-NIDS [717546]. This document, 30. A chilling account is provided by bearing record number 54819 and Zainab Al-Suwaij: “On TV, we watched transmitted to Sulaimaniya Directorate of Saddam reward fathers with large cash Security through General prizes for turning in sons who had Directorate of Security’s telegram number deserted the army. Even children are not 55156 of October 21, 1982, spared. When I attended fourth instructs the “following measures grade in 1981, my teacher called me to the
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 49 Robert G. Rabil concerning the families of individuals who Labor,” in IRDP-NIDS [690632-41]. fled to the side of the Persian enemy: 52. IRDP-NIDS [1393777, 1393636, a- If the escapee is married, then his 1393914]. wife and children will be detained. 53. For example, according to several b- If the escapee is single, then his intelligence reports from the General father and mother will be detained. In the Directorate of Security, the Patriotic Union event they were of Kurdistan (PUK) executed a deceased, the most influential member in significant number of prisoners in the the family will be detained. Khatay prison in May 1985. See c- To detain the escapee’s brothers IRDP-NIDS [749176-9]. who are in the military. 54. Personal accounts by Kurds. One of the d- The above measures must be first Security headquarters to be applied against families who were detained attacked and its officials thrown from since the beginning of the war with the windows and balconies was Rania’s. Persian foe; continue applying them…” 43. See Rabil, “Operation “Termination of Traitors””. 44. Ibid. 45. IRDP-NIDS [1395012]. 46. The level of the regime’s penetration of civil society in general and the family in particular is revealed in a letter by Sulaimaniya Directorate of Security in which it congratulates a Security official for surrendering his military deserter brother. See IRDP- NIDS [1394712]. 47. IRDP-NIDS [1372648, 322745]. 48. Former Prime Minister and deputy minister Muhammad Hama al-Zubeidi, a Shi’a, had been infamously known as Saddam’s “Shi’a thug.” He was central in brutally suppressing the Shi’a uprising of March 1991 after the Gulf War with tens of thousands killed. 49. Of the thousands of documents the author has been inspecting, none so far has dealt with cases of defection from or insubordination in Security. However, defections did occasionally happen. 50. See Ba’th literature, bearing the title “Valiant Comrade Saddam Hussein, Leader of the Party, Revolution, and March,” in IRDP-NIDS [2168409-16]. 51. See Ba’th literature, bearing the title “The Role of Leadership and the Fashioning of the Perception of the Ba’th
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