March 2003 Number 18

Iraq: Making Ethnic Peace After Saddam A Conversation with Kanan Makiya and Patrick Clawson

In a seminar session on January 15, 2003, two experts on “Transition to Democracy in Iraq,” a document submit- Iraq spoke about the prevention of ethnic conflict after the ted to the London conference of the Iraqi opposition in expected elimination of Saddam Hussein’s regime through December. These ideas concern the reshaping of the fu- military action. Brandeis professor Kanan Makiya is a leader ture state of Iraq on a non-ethnic and federal basis, ideas of the Iraqi opposition, and Patrick Clawson is deputy direc- that I argued necessarily implied that this future Iraqi tor of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. What state would have to be a “non-Arab state.” Mr. Said follows is an edited version of their remarks and the subse- views this as a fantasy of the U.S. State Department, quent general discussion, moderated by Center fellow whose stooge I am supposed to be, beavering away in Timothy Samuel ShahShah. The seminar was part of the Center’s some basement office in the State Department building, project on Ethnic Partition and U.S. Foreign Policy. as he so colorfully puts it. Would that any of that were even half-true. In fact, Timothy Shah: Kanan Makiya is a professor of Middle the U.S. State Department has labored hard to distance Eastern studies at Brandeis University. Born in Baghdad, itself from me and the whole “Transition to Democracy” he left Iraq to study architecture at MIT and later joined report, and individual officials did everything they possi- Makiya Associates to design and build projects in the bly could to undermine that report during the recent Middle East. He left the practice of architecture to write London conference. Mr. Said’s comments stirred up a Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, originally hornet’s nest of anger amongst Iraqis who quite correctly published in 1989 under a pseudonym. Among his other read his article as an attack on them and their opposi- books is Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and tion to the current regime in Baghdad. Their replies are the Arab World (1993). Dr. Makiya was one of a small appearing virtually every other day in one form or an- group of Iraqi dissidents who met with President Bush other in Hayat, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, and other Arabic news- on January 10 to talk about a post-Saddam Iraq. papers. Unlike Said’s diatribe, the debate that has ensued is KANAN MAKIYA clearly focused on substantive questions: ethnicity and s a way of entry into this topic, I will mention a de- the kind of federalism that might or might not work in Aibate now raging in the Arabic press coming out of post-Saddam Iraq. One of the best contributions critical London. The debate started with an extraordinary per- of my position was by a Lebanese writer, Hassan sonal attack on me by Edward Said of Columbia Univer- Mneimneh, who asks in the December 29 issue of Hayat: sity, which was published in the Arabic daily al-Hayat on Why even begin, as Iraqi oppositionists tend to do, by December 3, 2002. Mr. Said and I have not crossed assuming that a federal system is the best solution to swords in public for at least eight years, so what on earth the problems of the Iraqi state? After all, he says, there could have occasioned this attack? are other ways to decentralize, and each time that a for- Reading between the lines—because most of it is per- mally centralized state has attempted to make the tran- sonal and utterly beside the point—I surmise that he has sition to a federal system (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, taken great offense at two ideas I first proposed in pub- perhaps Czechoslovakia), the experiment has clearly lic last October. The two points were later included in failed. Federalism works best, he argues, when it is a

An Occasional Publication of the Ethics and Public Policy Center Center Conversations matter of uniting already constituted fragments into a Federalism is the thin end of the wedge of democ- larger entity (the United States, Switzerland, perhaps racy in Iraq. It is the first step towards a state sys- even the United Arab Emirates), not when it is a matter tem, resting on the principle that the rights of the of disaggregating an already constituted entity. part or the minority should never be sacrificed to Now there is a great deal in Mneimneh’s argument. the will of the majority. The fundamental principle The case he has marshaled constitutes the most serious of human rights is that the rights of the part, be that challenge to the idea of federalism as applied to Iraq since part defined as a single individual or a whole collec- the Kurdish parliament first adopted the idea in 1992, tivity of individuals who speak another language and followed very shortly thereafter by the Iraqi National have their own culture, are inviolable by the state. Congress at its very Federalism is about the rights of those collective important meeting in parts of the mosaic that is Iraqi society. Majority rule “There is only one very powerful Salaheddin in northern is not the essence of a federal democracy; minority argument for trying to tailor the Iraq. Since that seminal rights, or the rights of the part, including ultimately idea of federalism to Iraqi condi- year, Iraqis in opposition individual human rights, are. have simply taken it for tions . . .: to keep the Kurdish Now just what is this thing that we Iraqis seek to re- granted that the future people inside Iraq as Iraqis and imagine today? There are those who see Iraq as nothing post-Ba’ath state would more than a peculiarly shaped piece of geography cob- not as a people . . . forever be “federal” in some bled together by the great powers a century or so ago. I sense or another. Many straining to separate and estab- disagree. Iraq is an idea with the potential to uplift us, to people aren’t sure ex- lish their own state.” impel us forward politically. The problem is to rediscover actly what “federalism” that idea. The seeds of it lived among the men and means. Nonetheless, women of my father’s generation—and mine was the the idea is commonly accepted in the opposition’s po- generation that did away with that. We who believed in litical parlance—and that represents a major depar- great all-embracing ideologies of one sort or another— ture from Arab politics in general. nationalism, socialism, Marxism, more recently political Mneimneh correctly points out a number of ways Islamism—were the ones who so gravely damaged or in which a federalist approach to the problems of Iraq tarnished the centrality of the idea of Iraq during the might fail. I would perhaps go even further than he has 1960s and ‘70s. These great ideologies planted the seeds to say that there is really only one very powerful argu- of the exclusionary spirit that still haunts and inhabits ment for trying to tailor the idea of federalism to Iraqi many parts of the Iraqi opposition. conditions in the post-Saddam period: to keep the Towering above all these pernicious “isms” and their Kurdish people inside Iraq as Iraqis and not as a people destructiveness are various forms of ethnic nationalism who, because of their particular history, are forever and religious sectarianism—pioneered at the hands of straining to separate and establish their own state. If I the Ba’ath, to be sure, but reasserted more recently in am wrong in this assessment—if it turns out, for instance, the mirror reflections of that Arab nationalist ideology, in a national referendum during the transition period that reflections that take the shape today of Kurdish, Turkmen, the Kurdish people are not particularly anxious to sepa- and Assyrian nationalisms. This kind of nationalism, not rate, and that the whole issue of federalism is a kind of patriotism, is the great scourge of the Middle East. If we nationalist power-grab by Kurdish political parties—then let it set the agenda of a new federal Iraq, then indeed the case for federalism folds, it seems to me. Mneimneh’s fears and worries could prove right, and we Somehow, I do not think that a referendum among could see an even darker page in the country’s history Kurds will produce such surprising results. Federalism than the one that has preceded it. For federalism to work has profound implications for all Iraqis, of course, but it in Iraq, it seems to me, it must build on what I called in a is an idea driven originally by the whole Kurdish experi- recent article in al-Hayat the “Iraqiness” of Iraq. Love of ence in Iraq. No doubt it has been and will continue to Iraq as a whole entity needs to be elevated politically over be exploited for all sorts of crass political purposes; yet I all forms of identity politics. suspect that on some fundamental level it genuinely cor- From these considerations flow the following ob- responds to how most Kurds wish to resolve the dilemma servations about federalism in Iraq. First, it seems to me of their political identity in a future Iraq. that no Iraqi should ever again think of using force to In the report “Transition to Democracy in Iraq,” fed- keep the Kurds inside Iraq. That method was tried and eralism is placed at the center of a new, complete vision carried to the ultimate extreme of genocide in Hussein’s of the future Iraqi state. This is the paragraph that best Anfal operations in 1988. Yet it failed. Political persua- sums it up: 2 Iraq: Ethnic Peace After Saddam sion is the only alternative to force. If the Kurds cannot We have spelled out many other details in the “Transi- be persuaded, if they have adopted federalism not be- tion to Democracy” document, which I submit to you as cause they really want it but because the regional situa- so far the only thought out—if incomplete—plan for a tion does not allow them to have their own separate state future Iraqi state. carved out of northern Iraq, then so be it. I for one will What is sorely missing at the moment is a dialogue support them in this separatist venture, however unwise between the Kurdish professionals who at the behest of I may think it to be even from the point of view of Kurdish their parties drew up the draft constitution for a federal self-interest. Iraq constituted along ethnic lines, and the authors of Second, it seems to me that no federal system can the “Transition to Democracy” document, who reject such be built in Iraq on the basis of accepting the de facto an approach. I have been in discussion with Kurdish lead- situation in Iraqi Kurdistan today. The current bound- ers about such a dialogue and intend to initiate it at the aries created by the arbitrary designation of the safe- forthcoming conference of the Iraqi opposition in north- haven areas in 1991, and the balance-of-power arrange- ern Iraq. Such a dialogue could go a long way toward ments between the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party), the development of an all-Iraqi position on this thorny the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), and the Iraqi re- issue of federalism. gime, must be reconsidered on a rational and strictly administrative basis with the explicit intention of not con- Timothy Shah: Thank you, Dr. Makiya. Speaking next is secrating ethnicity as the basis for territorial divisions. Patrick Clawson, deputy director of the Washington In- Third, the Kurdish militias, or peshmerga, must be stitute for Near East Policy and co-convener of the study persuaded to disarm themselves during the transitional group that in 2001 issued the report Navigating Through period, as part of the whole internal security package of Turbulence: America and the Middle East in a New Cen- the new Iraqi state. Disarmament must be accomplished tury. Dr. Clawson edited the recent volume How to Build by the Kurdish organizations themselves. Otherwise a New Iraq After Saddam. He is also senior editor of the there is a real dan- Middle East Quarterly. “A federal system must be based ger that the Ameri- cans or the Turks PATRICK CLAWSON on completely open borders will do it by force, anan Makiya has addressed the issues of federal- with . . . total freedom of move- and that will be a ca- K ism with respect to Iraqi domestic politics with great ment for people and capital tastrophe for Iraq. skill and insight. Now I want to talk about how some of Certainly I do not these issues look to Iraq’s neighbors and to the United between regions.” think that any Arab States, and why there is strong support for federalism Iraqis should be in- but lack of clarity about what that concept means. volved in this, given the terrible history of Kurdish suf- Let me begin with the pervasive fear throughout the fering at the hands of Saddam. Middle East that we are approaching another moment The fourth important consideration for federalism like that at the end of World War I, a moment when the in Iraq is that law and order in a future federal state must map of the Middle East is going to be redrawn. The phrase involve local agencies at the regional level—and in re- “Sykes-Picot” keeps popping up; there is fear that, as in gions dominated by Kurds, these will no doubt be over- the secret 1916 agreement between Britain and France whelmingly Kurdish—with a single all-powerful, all-Iraqi for dismembering the Ottoman Empire, outside powers federal policing agency empowered to act inside the re- are engaging in some secret plan for redrawing the map. gions in pursuit of constitutionally proscribed criminal The concern is as much about redrawing the political activity. map as it is about redrawing the geographic boundaries Fifth, a future federal system must be based on com- of the states. But there is a powerful sense that there are pletely open borders, with no border control points. There plans to completely transform the region, and that these must be total freedom of movement for people and capi- plans will be as unsuccessful as the Sykes-Picot agree- tal between regions. The various regional parliaments ment, nicely summarized by one author as “the peace to should not have the authority to pass any laws obstruct- end all peace.” ing individual ownership or the movement of capital and In particular we see a situation in which each of the people across regional boundaries. six neighbors of Iraq fears the others will gain influence These are, it seems to me, the minimum ground at its expense. For instance, the Saudis are petrified that rules for making federalism work in Iraq. And I know this new Iraq may in fact be a democratic Iraq in which that many individual Kurds support them. Some of the the Shi’a community has such a large voice that Iran, major organizations do not, and others are wavering. which is run by Shi’ite clerics, will be able to have great 3 Center Conversations influence within Iraq. They also fear that it would set a from the Ottoman days and are basically Turkish both bad example for the Saudi Shi’a community, which has ethnically and linguistically, the Turkish government feels few political rights. The Turks, too, fear that Iran would very attached to them and finds it politically convenient have considerable influence. And Iran is not much hap- to exaggerate the attachment. This is going to be an is- pier about the idea of strong autonomy for a Kurdish re- sue. After years of suppression of Turkish identity, even gion—after all, Iran itself is 40 percent non-Persian. In- more than suppression of Kurdish identity, undoubtedly deed, most of Iraq’s Arab neighbors are pretty artificial the percentage of people in Iraq who regard themselves countries. Saudi Arabia is a union of three regions that as Turkmen has decreased. And I tend to doubt that the historically had little to do with one another. Syria is not Turkish government is correct in its insistence that Kirkuk much more of a natural country. remains a majority Turkmen city. Yet dealing with the There are powerful reasons why we should all be issue of the Turkmen minority and other minorities in interested in seeing a federal state in Iraq, and why that the Kurdish areas will be very difficult. goal has become a Another big problem is that of the internally dis- mantra adopted by the placed people. Iraq has probably 3 million internally dis- “Oil revenues come like manna United States. But that placed people out of a population of 22 million resident from heaven to the central Iraqi federal state, I Iraqis and 3 million outside the country. Many of those government; there are . . . no would hope, will in- internally displaced people are Kurds who had to flee clude not one Kurdish from areas controlled by Baghdad or face forced Arab- constraints upon the . . . use of region but several. Ide- ization. They are going to want to return home—to this money, because the citizens ally, to my mind, the homes that were purchased and are now inhabited by do not pay taxes to produce it.” eighteen provinces of other people. This will be a source of great difficulty. Iraq should all have the Whether or not the internally displaced people re- same degree of auton- turn to their homes, there are going to be significant omy; there should not be some special status for the Kurdish minorities outside the Kurdish region. Probably Kurdish region. That would help with several issues. One at least a million Kurds will remain outside any Kurdish is that in oil-rich countries like Iraq, the oil revenues come provinces or Kurdistan that could be created. There has like manna from heaven to the central government; there to be some way of guarding minority rights. Moreover, are essentially no constraints upon the government’s use establishing a single Kurdish autonomous region would of this money, because the citizens themselves do not be asking for trouble, because that region would consid- pay taxes to produce it. All too often the government de- er itself the voice of cides to spend vast sums on military weapons, which the Kurds, no mat- “Every Arab intellectual and they can use to destabilize their region. If instead the oil ter what was said revenue were distributed to the provinces, it would stand about geographical every Arab government is going a much better chance of being used for such things as definition. It might to be extraordinarily suspicious education and health and economic development. A try to assert itself of anything that reduces the role province is not likely to seek nuclear weapons on its own. as the voice of the of the Sunnis.” A provincial-level federalism would be useful, then, Kurds who live out- to combat the natural trend in a country like Iraq toward side this region as an overly centralized state run by a powerful autocrat, well. And protecting the rights of the large minorities and to reduce the dynamic seen in the OPEC countries within the region would very likely be difficult. of everybody wanting to control the central government And by the way, the Kurds themselves are divided! in order to have the oil money, thus stifling civil society. We are talking about a people who fought a civil war Furthermore, a provincial-level federalism makes among themselves in the mid-1990s. The reality is that sense for reducing the problems of the minorities in the there isn’t a Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq Kurdish region. This region is not simply Kurdish. In the at present—there are two, one controlled by the Patriotic last reliable Iraqi census that asked questions about Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the other controlled by the ethnicity, the census of 1958, more than a third of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). It makes much more inhabitants of the Kurdish areas identified themselves sense, therefore, to do some minor adjustments in pro- as non-Kurd. There is a significant minority of Assyrians, vincial boundaries to recognize this reality. I think there Chaldeans, and other Christian groups, but a larger is- should be three provinces: the PUK province, an enlarged sue is the Turkmen population. In that 1958 census, the KDP province (which used to be two), and the Kirkuk Turkmen were 9 percent of the population of Iraq. Since province, where there would be a great mélange of the Turkmen are, for all intents and purposes, leftovers people—including almost all of the Turkmen, Chaldeans, 4 Iraq: Ethnic Peace After Saddam a fair chunk of the Assyrians, a significant Kurdish mi- course assume it’s natural for them to have this dispro- nority, and some Arabs as well. It would be much easier portionate share. Not just Edward Said but every Arab to deal with the problem of Kirkuk if there were several intellectual and every Arab government is going to be different ethnic groups there, all roughly the same size, extraordinarily suspicious of anything that reduces the so that ethnicity would not become the basis of politics role of the Sunnis. in that province. Indeed, I don’t know of any Arab government that To create a Kurdish autonomous region would also wants to see democracy in Iraq. Why? Because they don’t create problems in the rest of Iraq, because there would want to see the Shi’as have a role proportionate to their then be a particularly difficult balance between the Sunni share in the population. And if the issue becomes an is- and Shi’a communities. The biggest minority problem in sue of Sunni versus Shi’a, the Shi’a community will have the future Iraq, I would argue, will be not the Kurdish major internal problems. It is overwhelmingly a commu- problem, for which the solution is relatively envisionable, nity that is somewhat secular, and it is certainly not well but the Sunni problem. The Sunni Arab minority, which represented by the rather pathetic religious leaders who is no more than 20 or 25 percent of the population, has are left after twenty years of Saddam’s aggression. For historically dominated Iraqi politics, business and trade, these Shi’a religious leaders to be called upon to repre- the army, the media, and the universities. The Sunnis of sent the community would be disastrous.

DISCUSSION

Timothy Shah: Thank you, Dr. tic that there is going to be a wave quite understand how that has come Clawson. There is obviously a great of democracy in the region. It’s a fas- to be seen as a right-wing Republi- deal to discuss, and I now invite ev- cinating situation: the voices of can idea. And if I were active in the eryone else to join the conversation. the rabid Republican conservative Democratic Party I would be worried [All participants will be identified at movement are the ones talking about the way these political lines the end.] about how good it is to see democ- seem to be drawn. I go on radio talk racy, to see people empowered, to shows repeatedly defending the idea Chaim Kaufmann: I wonder wheth- see minorities being able to express that democracy is good for the er the fears all over the Persian Gulf themselves, to see civil society freed, people in the Middle East, and people region that what’s in store for them to see more respect for a free press. who call in to NPR shows like “Talk will be as bad as Sykes-Picot or Meanwhile many people in the left of the Nation” seem to regard me as worse might not in fact be perfectly wing are saying, “Come on, it’s un- some rabid conservative ideologue justified. Whether, as you say, it’s in realistic to expect that people want for such views. terms of explicit line-drawing on that, and it would be inappropriate if maps or other interference, we have it came, because it would mean in- Chaim Kaufmann: I think a lot of the Bush administration officials saying stability in the region.” answer has to do with people’s ex- that after we execute regime change But I think the people of Iraq pectations about how much addi- in Iraq we will have tremendous new themselves are interested in democ- tional direct American intervention leverage on the internal politics of racy and are going to be able to do there will be in other countries’ do- Iran, Saudi Arabia, even Syria. The better. Earlier today I was chairing mestic politics. administration’s favorite right-wing a talk at our institute by Shafeeq friends outside are saying exactly the Ghabra, a prominent Kuwaiti who Patrick Clawson: This administra- same thing, only in more florid runs a think tank at Kuwait Univer- tion has made it extremely clear that terms. Why shouldn’t people in the sity. He spoke eloquently about how the kind of direct intervention it is region be afraid? the forces of democracy and liberal- thinking of is along the lines of what ization will be unleashed—particu- we did in the 1980s in Eastern Eu- Patrick Clawson: Overwhelmingly, larly in the Persian Gulf but through- rope. It is the “City on the Hill” idea— what those “right-wing” people are out the Arab world as well—once holding up the example. It’s the en- saying is that after the overthrow of Saddam is gone and Iraq becomes a couragement of liberal and demo- Saddam Hussein, they are optimis- force for good in the region. I don’t cratic ideals and values. This is going 5 Center Conversations to be great for the National Endow- particular model Iraq would head to- other idea of federalism, because ment for Democracy and other such wards, but the logic of the two is quite their idea of it—partly for the reasons things that we don’t usually associ- different. Patrick went into concerning the re- ate with the Republican Party. So here gional situation and the Iraqi situa- we find Republicans who are enthu- Kanan Makiya: I was not aware of tion—is not going to work. I don’t siastic about spreading the message that article, but I will certainly look it think we can construct a workable of the glories of democracy to the rest up. I think Iraq will have to be very Iraq on that basis. of world. If I were a liberal Democrat, much a “holding together” federation I would be outraged at how they have if it is going to work. Claudia Winkler: Dr. Makiya, do you taken over my agenda. favor using the provinces as the com- Patrick Clawson: However, it would ponents of a federalist system? If not, Kanan MakiyaMakiya: My own experience be a peculiar type of “holding to- what other units would you use? confirms this very same phenom- gether” federation. There’s a bizarre enon, over and over again. People situation at the moment: the critics Kanan Makiya: Like Patrick, I would who are supporting Iraqi democrats of Kurdish autonomy are saying, “Oh very much like to start with the ex- today, who are pushing the bound- my goodness, don’t go to war, be- isting eighteen provinces and not aries on this question, are coming cause who knows what that could mess around with the current bound- from the new conservative right in do for the Kurds,” but there has been aries during the transitional period, this country. In Arab politics, you get de facto Kurdish independence for and then conduct detailed discus- lambasted for that, but I welcome it. the last twelve years. It is extremely sions with the various parties to see And liberals from the very sort of difficult for Kurdish authorities to if minor adjustments could be made. circles that I came from talk about keep student radicals from trying However, amongst Iraqis there is a democracy in the Middle East or to assert Kurdish independence. sudden rush to draw maps. We in the about structural change in Iraq as Michael Rubin, who taught for a year Iraqi opposition group decided to put something they are afraid of. I’ve at Kurdish universities, has some all such map-drawing projects aside even heard them worry about desta- wonderful examples of this—for ex- and concentrate on the idea that, at bilizing Saudi Arabia! Why anybody ample, the students going on strike least during the transitional period, would think that the current order in when university authorities insisted we would work with the existing the Arab world is something to be on raising the Iraqi flag above the provinces. preserved is an utterly amazing thing Kurdish flag. Or the regular fights that Having one Kurdish region would for me. But that’s in fact what is go- go on when Kurdish authorities in- be a big mistake, because that would ing on. sist that everybody get Iraqi drivers’ inevitably lead toward a notion that licenses. So it is the Kurdish author- Iraq is a tripartite state. But having Ashutosh Varshney: A few years ago ity that is insisting on holding the several Kurdish regions, several Columbia professor Alfred Stepan state together against these radicals. Sunni regions, and several Shi’a re- wrote an article on federalism in the The Kurds don’t have to use Iraqi gions could result in a complex in- Journal of Democracy [“Federalism textbooks, but they do. I think a fu- terplay. Local and national politics and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. ture Iraqi federation would be an would be very, very interesting. Model,” October 1999], and the po- intriguing mixed case of “holding litical-science profession is increas- together” and “coming together” Patrick Clawson: Sometimes prov- ingly accepting the distinction he federalism. inces or states are used to provide a draws between a “coming together” balance among ethnic groups so that federalism and a “holding together” Kanan Makiya: The Kurdish idea of you can have, for instance, a bicam- federalism. The difference is that ex- federalism, at least as developed in eral legislature. Iraq in fact had this isting units constitute a center in the a draft constitution that the KDP put during the monarchy, with represen- “coming together” federalism, while forward, is very much one of accept- tatives of the provinces directly in the “holding together” type, a cen- ing the de facto situation and simply elected. But I don’t see how that can ter or constitution exists that creates calling it federalism. It’s not really the be used to solve the problem of the the units. American federalism is the result of thinking through the con- preeminent role of Shi’ites in the “coming together” type, and it turns cept of federalism. It virtually creates country. It is very hard to come up out to be the exception; most federa- a separate state within a larger with a set of provincial boundaries tions in the world are of the “holding framework of the state. We are try- that don’t leave a majority of the together” type. I don’t know which ing to bring or pull the Kurds into an- provinces with a Shi’a majority. And 6 Iraq: Ethnic Peace After Saddam since the Sunnis are also worried Kanan Makiya: I don’t think he friendly tyrants in the Middle East, a about some sort of a Shi’a-Kurdish could get very far with this. Remem- number of whom are very good at combination, decreasing the number ber the precedent here: 1991, when being our friends and at portraying of Shi’a-majority provinces might not a much larger force gathered and democratic forces as hostile to us. get you very far anyway. everybody talked of the Arab states I wish I were as optimistic as My point is that I don’t think you rising up from one end of the Arab Kanan about how this debate is go- can resolve Sunni concerns by cre- world to the other. Now Saddam has ing to come out. I think it’s raging ating a bicameral legislature with been discredited in the Arab world within the American body politic. representation of the provinces in far more than he was back then. He And that’s why I think it is particu- one place. Personally, I think there is recognized to be a brutal ruler. larly unfortunate that people who is a lesson to be learned from the Also, his army is a fraction of the size should be allies in promoting democ- Nigerian election rules, which re- it was then. As I told President Bush, racy in the Middle East—in seeing quire that in order to be represented I think the American army will be democracy gain the same impor- in parliament, a party has to pass a welcomed with sweets and flowers tance there that it has achieved in certain threshold of votes in each when they first go in there. The pos- Latin America and other places—are province. sibility, then, of the Arab world rally- abandoning it. I’m very disappointed ing around Saddam is very, very when I go to websites of the people Radwan Masmoudi: Both of you remote. who are bringing all those anti-war were perplexed that neoconser- As for Israel: there is simply no protestors to Washington. I chal- vatives and right-wing conserva- military need for Israel to get in- lenge you to find any discussion tives are promoting democracy in volved in the war, and the United there about democracy in Iraq, much Iraq and in the Arab world. The ma- States does not want it involved. less in the rest of the Middle East. jority of Arabs and Muslims are even It could very well be that the pro- more skeptical that America is all of democracy forces in the Bush admin- David Fabrycky: I have two ques- a sudden interested in promoting de- istration won’t win. There is a divi- tions. First, I know that Crown Prince mocracy in an Arab country. They sion inside the U.S. government over Hassan of Jordan caused quite a stir don’t believe it. They say that the real how far you go in democratizing by participating in the London con- reasons are oil and Israel and that Iraq. Also, from my point of view, the ference of the Iraqi opposition last we are not going to see democracy Bush administration isn’t emphasiz- July, and I’m wondering whether ei- through in Iraq. In the end, they say, ing enough the importance of work- ther of you, following the Afghan we will end up with another dictator ing with and cultivating an Iraqi part- model, sees any usefulness for sym- in Iraq, which I think would be a ma- ner. That means there isn’t going to bols such as the Hashemite monar- jor setback for peace and democracy be a pole for disaffected Iraqi troops chy in post-Saddam Iraq. Second, a in the region. So that’s the real fear to rally around. An Iraqi partner lot of commentators say the Iraqi that people in the Arab world and the could work on undermining what- opposition really doesn’t have a lot Muslim world have about the inva- ever fighting spirit may exist inside of internal legitimacy in Iraq. If this sion of Iraq. Iraq, which I think will be very low. is so, what forces within the country I have two questions. First, how All sorts of things could be done if today could provide the political will real is the concern that Israel will greater attention were paid to culti- for a unified Iraq after Saddam? get involved in this war, either mili- vating an Iraqi partner, especially if tarily against Iraq or by using the the goal is democracy and not some- Kanan Makiya: I don’t think there war to displace large numbers of thing else. will be much support for a return to Palestinians out of the West Bank So we are still a long way from the monarchy in Iraq. I know some and Gaza? Second, Saddam is ob- seeing democracy actually happen- people argue for it, but my instincts viously a dictator and not popular ing. I think it is important to say that. say the prospect doesn’t have much in Iraq, but he is trying to rally sup- Nonetheless, there has been a real popular support. Certainly, those of port against a foreign invasion. change in U.S. foreign policy. us who are involved in the transition Arabs and Muslims tend to unite document are taking the position when there is a fear of a foreign in- Patrick Clawson: On the point about that we ought to leave these ques- vasion. How real is the risk that people in the Middle East being sus- tions open even during the constitu- Saddam would succeed in rally- picious of U.S. intentions: they have tional period itself so that the mon- ing support among Iraqis and other every reason to be, because for a archists have a chance to fight it out Arabs in fighting the invaders? long time we have worked with electorally. If it turns out that I am 7 Center Conversations wrong and there is strong sentiment sensus will develop among the op- of U.S. and British ground troops in for the monarchy, then maybe the position elements on this issue of a Turkey so that we would have a large Crown Prince would be a very seri- non-ethnic federalism as the road interventionary force. It’s not clear ous contender. map for Iraq’s future? And how im- that Plan A is going to work. If it Your other question was about the portant is it that there be some kind doesn’t, we’ll need to come up with Iraqi opposition abroad, whether it of consensus before the possible Plan B fast. My Plan B would be to enjoys legitimacy within Iraq itself. I coming conflict occurs—precisely work closely with the peshmerga to think there is a serious myth afloat because of the grim prospect of the give them something to do. Other- in parts of the Bush administration peshmerga moving into Kirkuk or the wise their impulse would be to find that there is something called the au- 400 Arabized villages in the Kurdish something to do, and what they thentic opposition that is inside the area and establishing on the ground would want to do is exactly what Jay country and something inauthentic a reality that the United States and mentioned: go into the Arabized vil- that is supposedly outside. One rea- others might then have to alter? lages and go into Kirkuk. son why not enough attention has been paid to the Iraqi opposition that Kanan Makiya: Although there are already exists outside Iraq is the be- no signs of it yet, I am hoping that DISCUSSION PARTICIPANTS lief that inside Iraq there are all these the United States will have thought Kanan MakiyaMakiya, Brandeis Univer- forces that we are going to be able through these questions before it sity; Patrick Clawsonwson, Washington to work with tomorrow. But when enters Iraq. What we don’t want is a Institute for Near East Policy; Timo- you consider the fact that the only situation in which it enters only part thy Samuel ShahShah, Ethics and Public kind of politics possible inside Iraq for of Iraq and leaves northern Iraq Policy Center; David FabryckyFabrycky, De- the better part of twenty years has alone, further consecrating that di- partment of Defense; Chaim Kauf- been either Ba’athist politics or con- vision. This is a problem that needs mannmann, Lehigh University; Radwan spiracy-against-the-Ba’athists poli- to be thought about now. Our docu- MasmoudiMasmoudi, Center for the Study of tics, you realize that there is not a lot ment, “Transition to Democracy in Islam and Democracy; Jay Tolsonolson, there to work with on the day after. Iraq,” started the process. U.S. News & World Report; Ashutosh Varshney, University of Michigan; Jay Tolson: Professor Makiya, what Patrick Clawson: The U.S. gov- and Claudia Winklerinkler, The Weekly are the odds that some kind of con- ernment’s Plan A is to put thousands Standard.

THE CENTER AND “CONVERSATIONS”

he Ethics and Public Policy Center was established in 1976 to clarify and reinforce the bond between Tthe Judeo-Christian moral tradition and the public debate over domestic and foreign policy issues. Its program includes research, writing, publication, and conferences. “Center Conversations,” edited by senior editor Carol Griffith, are based on conferences and seminars related to various Center projects. They cost $3 per copy (postage included). Previous titles include:

12. The New Christian Right in Historical Context 15. Islam: A Primer Leo Ribuffo and David Shribman Roy Mottahedeh and Jay Tolson 13. The Rights and Wrongs of Religion in Politics 16. Religion and Terrorism Stephen Carter and Jeffrey Rosen Bruce Hoffman and Jeffrey Goldberg 14. Religion, Culture, and International Conflict 17. Hindu Nationalism vs. Islamic Jihad After September 11 Cedric Prakash, Teesta Setalvad, Kamal Chenoy, Samuel P. Huntington Sumit Ganguly, Sunil Khilnani, and Jonah Blank Ethics and Public Policy Center 1015 Fifteenth Street NW, #900
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