THE FUTURE OF

Katia Glod The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

CONTENTS Executive Summary Executive Summary...... 2 • Belarus has reached a political impasse. Introduction...... 3 Following the rigged August 9 (Re)birth of the Nation...... 4 presidential election and unprecedented The Rise of the New Opposition...... 6 violence against peaceful protesters, The Old Regime...... 8 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has ruled ’s interests...... 10 the country for the past 26 years, has The Economy Matters...... 11 lost legitimacy in the eyes of the public What the West Can Do and the West. He continues, however, to retain power through a high degree and How It Should Prepare...... 13 of repression and the loyalty of his Conclusion...... 15 security services.

• Why this matters. Belarus is a key ally ABOUT THE AUTHOR of Russia. If, as a result of the unrest, Katia Glod is a nonresident fellow with CEPA’s it were to fall under the Kremlin’s Russia program and an independent analyst and control, this would transform the political risk consultant based in London. Glod military balance in . The advises on the politics and economics of former 80-kilometer Suwałki Corridor on the Soviet countries. Glod worked as the Belarus Polish-Lithuanian front is vulnerable representative of the European Endowment to attack from Belarus and the Russian for in and as the Belarus exclave of Kaliningrad. If closed, it consultant for the European Endowment for would cut off the Baltic states from Democracy in Minsk. the European Union (EU) and NATO. Instability in Belarus could spill over into the Nordic-Baltic region through ABOUT CEPA refugees and economic disruption, The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) is and it could also affect other parts a 501(c)(3), non-profit, non-partisan, public policy of Central Europe. Already, the crisis research institute. Our mission is transatlantic: is proving to be a test of Western to promote an economically vibrant, strategically engagement, unity, and values. secure, and politically free Europe with close and enduring ties to the . Our analytical • The revolution is “velvet” not “color.” team consists of the world’s leading experts on Geopolitics barely features in the Central-East Europe, Russia, and its neighbors. Belarusian opposition’s peaceful Through cutting-edge research, analysis, and resistance against Lukashenka’s regime. programs we provide fresh insight on energy, Instead, civic consciousness is growing, security and defense to officials and agencies; we help transatlantic businesses navigate marking an end to the passivity and changing strategic landscapes; and we build disengagement that have largely networks of future Atlanticist leaders. characterized Belarusian society since independence in 1991. Besides the protests, which have at times included All opinions are those of the author(s) and do hundreds of thousands of participants, not necessarily represent the position or views neighborhood groups and other forms of the institutions they represent or the Center of self-organization are mushrooming. for European Policy Analysis. This is a profound and probably irreversible change with long-term Cover: Belarus opposition leader Sviatlana consequences. The paternalistic model Tsikhanouskaya attends a demonstration to reject the presidential election results in underpinning the Lukashenka regime Belarus, in Berlin, , October 5, 2020. is outdated and unsustainable. Credit: REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschke.

2 The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

• The ineffective and divided opposition faithful to its own principles and values of previous years has given way to a and enhance its soft power abroad. new group of opposition leaders who are finding ways to coexist and build a flexible strategy to oust Lukashenka. Introduction These new politicians are, however, Belarus, a strategically located country political ingénues. They need time, of 9.5 million people on the eastern resources, and expertise to be able to border of the European Union, has long translate their demands into effective been considered a stagnant, authoritarian political action. backwater and Russian client . Protests • Lukashenka’s regime is crumbling in against the rigged presidential election on places but has the potential to keep August 9, 2020, demonstrate that behind going for the short or medium term. the superficial stability of Alyaksandr Pervasive state control, both within Lukashenka’s regime, Belarusian society public institutions and society, makes it has been changing. Further radical change difficult to bring it down speedily. For in the medium term is now likely, affecting the most part, the ruling elite have not not only Belarus but the wider region yet realized that Lukashenka’s policies and East-West relations. What would this are doomed and will ultimately ruin change look like? the country. Lukashenka is trying to Belarus is undergoing a pro-democracy engage in a phony dialogue by co- velvet revolution of the type that swept opting and dividing the opposition but across Central Europe in the late 1980s. has neither the willingness nor the The whole of Belarusian society has risen capacity to negotiate seriously. to fight for its rights and values and • Russia is backing Lukashenka as it finds against Lukashenka’s authoritarian policies. him the best guarantor of its interests in Belarus’ uprising is not a color revolution, Belarus at the moment. Yet, the Kremlin like in (2003) or (2004- is trying to increase Belarus’ dependency 5 and 2014), as it is not characterized on Russia through a number of tactics. by strong pro-Western or anti-Kremlin It also fears the domestic spillover sentiments. As in the revolts against effects of the Belarusian revolution communist rule in 1989, the Belarusian and wants to reassert its “sphere of opposition is not represented in any state influence” to the West. structures, which suggests that ’ struggle for freedom may be long and • The West should prepare for a lengthy agonizing. and painful transition in Belarus. It should continue exerting pressure on Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime is the regimes in Minsk and Moscow to personal and monolithic but hopes of its recognize the Belarusian people as a fragility in the face of public protests have political actor and to listen to their been dashed. Lukashenka relies on the demands. It should increase the costs loyalty of the security services and a vast to Russia of its meddling. The West state apparatus, including judges and other should invest in helping civil society public servants whom the government build resilient democratic institutions appoints. He is also backed by Russia, to enable the political change that which fears the spillover effects of Belarus’ society desires. It should also build popular uprising. A successful democratic direct connections with Belarusians transition in Russia’s most important ally and involve them in its networks and would set an inspiring example for the institutions. This will keep the West Russian opposition — and spell serious

3 The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

An opposition activist makes a V-sign during an unauthorized protest. Mass protests orga- nized by the opposition have been taking place in Belarus after the 9 August presidential election. Credit: Stringer/TASS.

problems for the similarly stagnant and is accountable to them. They want to be outdated regime of Russian President recognized as an equal partner by the state Vladimir Putin. The EU and the United and have a say in the governance of their States have little direct leverage over country. This desire runs across all the Belarus. Furthermore, Western engagement social strata.1 with the opposition could be used by Russia as a pretext to undermine Belarus’ The social contract started to erode more sovereignty. than a decade ago as Russia began to reduce its energy subsidies while the reform-shy government in Minsk failed (Re)birth of the to modernize the economy. As a result, Belarus’ economy has stagnated while Nation corruption and malpractice have grown. Lukashenka’s authoritarian, reform- Belarusian society is undergoing a wide blocking rule, enforced by repression social transformation. It is outgrowing the and police violence, sparked public anger paternalistic relationship that Lukashenka during the 2010 presidential elections, has imposed on it for years, whereby the and — more recently than that — in 2017, government provided acceptable living when a wave of protests against taxing standards and in exchange people stayed the unemployed rippled through several away from politics. Now, Belarusians want Belarusian cities. a government of their own choosing that

4 The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

Ahead of the August 9 presidential The driving force behind these protests are election, opposition candidate Sviatlana the generations that came of age during Tsikhanouskaya’s campaign rallies drew the 26 years of Lukashenka’s rule — people unprecedented numbers across the country. in their 40s and younger. An opinion poll The public’s main complaints related to the suggests that Tsikhanouskaya’s core group of absence of the rule of law, administrative supporters are people in their 30s and 40s mismanagement, the boorishness of (and some between the ages of 18 and 29).4 Lukashenka and public officials and their disregard for people’s views, and old- The opening of the borders following fashioned Soviet-era ideas on how to run the breakup of the and an economy. the growth of the Internet pulled these younger generations into cultural and Recent polls also suggest a profound information globalization. Independent transformation in the public’s views on the and social media have also grown over role of the state since the mid-2000s. For the past decade, breaking the information example, the number of respondents who monopoly of state-owned media that share the principles of a market economy strengthened the regime’s grip. The grew twofold since 2008 and reached 40% promise of stability, highly welcome to the in 2018 (compared with 25% in favor of a traumatized Soviet-era population, is no planning economy and 25% undecided).2 longer as compelling. People want a new, Similarly, only 20% of respondents in 2018 exciting vision of the future, in which preferred a job at a state-owned company they can play an active role. This aspiration while 40% preferred a state-guaranteed will likely become stronger as the share salary, compared with 60% in both cases of younger generations, further distanced in 2008. As Oksana Shelest, a sociologist, from their country’s Soviet past and more rightly put it: “People had been ready for exposed to and attracted by neighboring much more in their personal development Europe, grows larger. or the development of their business than the state had been allowing them. … The protesters have shown unprecedented Sooner or later people had been arriving at levels of organization. The foundation of the conclusion that the state in its current such organization was laid earlier in the form was not doing anything useful, year during the COVID-19 pandemic, when and that was prompting their desire for a strong volunteer movement emerged change.”3 to help medical workers and save lives after the regime had downplayed the The protests that followed the August severity of the health crisis and failed 9 election have been unprecedented to adequately prepare the health sector. in size and their geographical spread The added value was new horizontal ties as well as in the ages and professions between people and the acquired skill of of the protesters. They spread across self-help. This process reached new heights the whole of the country, including during the August 9 presidential campaign to small villages. Factory workers and and has manifested itself vividly in the doctors, businesspeople and sportspeople, solidarity and self-organization trends students and pensioners are all marching that have been visible in recent months. together in protest against the lawlessness Examples include women’s movements, unleashed by the regime. At the core of students’ groups, strike committees, their protest is the demand for dignity and various professional associations (such as respect for individual rights, namely being Sportspeople for Honest Elections, Medical able to choose one’s own government and Workers against Violence, and University to express opinions publicly without fear Teachers for Freedom of Expression), and of violence and repression. widespread local community activism.

5 The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

People get together in their neighborhoods and respect for human life. Belarusians to exchange news and discuss politics — qualify their protest as supporting the experts lecture on a variety of sociopolitical values of humanity. Society is uniting and historical subjects, such as democratic against state oppression and getting reforms in Belarus before Lukashenka’s stronger in its unity. In short: this is the election as president in 1994. delayed (re)birth of a civic nation.

In mid-September, Belarusians had raised more than $6 million to support the The Rise of the victims of repression and police brutality as well as those who were dismissed or New Opposition decided to resign in disagreement over the regime’s policies.5 Solidarity has also been A new generation of more involved demonstrated in protests at universities, citizens is matched by a new generation secondary schools, factories, and private of political leaders, quite unlike the companies. marginalized, divided, and discredited traditional opposition, which was rooted in These initiatives are grassroots, creative, the nationalist dissident movement of the and disciplined. They undermine the 1980s and 1990s. The traditional opposition, viability of the regime and lay down the such as, for example, the Belarusian social and cultural foundations for future Popular Front and its offspring parties, concerted public action. This is building stressed cultural, historical, and linguistic democracy bottom-up. Civil society is issues over economic problems, often developing in leaps and bounds. There is with an explicit (and, to many, alienating) a growing interest among Belarusians to anti-Russia tone. More moderate, centrist, learn how politics works and how they can or left-wing opposition got caught up influence decision-making. The emerging in criticizing Lukashenka and failed to activism is trying to find legal ways to promote an alternative political vision push its agenda. Its scale is large enough to to win over voters. Since 2006, the resist suppression, even when taking into opposition, penetrated by the regime and account the high level of repression that with some leading figures in exile, was is traumatizing the nation. Surveys show unable to unite to mount an effective front that people are increasingly taking to the against Lukashenka. street because they are angry about state- sponsored violence and repression. Anger The new opposition includes professionals has replaced fear and protesters are willing with diverse backgrounds and skills, to stay out in the streets for longer periods which they have brought to politics. Viktar of time. This is fundamentally different Babaryka, the jailed former banker, and his from the public apathy that resulted from team are managers, lawyers, and public suppressed protests in the past.6 relations specialists who were behind Tsikhanouskaya’s election campaign, which These initiatives are, therefore, likely to rallied previously unrepresented strata of continue to manifest themselves in the society. Valer Tsapkala and Paval Latushka evolving political process and may become are former government officials. Maria institutionalized. Society will continue Kalesnikava is a musician and a cultural to make its voice heard and seek to be manager, while Vadzim Prakopieu is a the agent of its own fate. Such changes restaurateur. These people better reflect in Belarusian society appear irrevocable, the breadth of society, are less focused on as public anger at the stolen election and ideology, and are united by the common continued violence on the part of the state goal of removing Lukashenka’s anachronistic goes beyond politics and draws on strong regime. New political figures continue to cultural traditions of peaceable interaction appear as repression pushes existing ones

6 The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

into jail or exile. The wide spread of social Social media is also playing a media is also playing a crucial role in helping opposition leaders overcome their crucial role in helping physical absence from Belarus, which might have proven a great weakness just a few opposition leaders overcome years ago. There is the danger, however, that their physical absence leaders in exile have fewer practical links to society and may eventually be perceived as from Belarus being out of touch.

Tsikhanouskaya, the likely winner of The new opposition also lacks real political the August 9 election, is providing experience and a longer-term strategic the opposition moral leadership and vision to overcome Lukashenka. Its current inspiration, recognized both domestically strategy focuses on the short term — and abroad. She has come a long way, to persuade the regime to hold a new from running in the election hoping to presidential election. The opposition seeks help her husband ( jailed vlogger and to achieve this goal by putting pressure political prisoner Syarhey Tsikhanouski) on the regime domestically and abroad, to becoming a real politician, influencing and hoping that an economic downturn the political agenda in Belarus and meeting will accelerate the process. Such political leading international figures (for example, naivety is the consequence of Lukashenka’s she has met French President Emmanuel personalized regime that eviscerated Macron and German Chancellor Angela public institutions, for example, political Merkel). Tsikhanouskaya has formed a team parties or citizens’ lobbying groups. of advisers7 whose goal is to work with the Lukashenka communicates directly with Coordination Council — an umbrella civil people, bypassing other political actors and society organization that emerged after reducing the parliament and government the August 9 election — to produce policy to instruments for rubber stamping and proposals for a new vision of Belarus and implementing his orders, rather than coordinate civil society initiatives aimed at for legislating and managing. As a result, eroding the foundations of the regime and neither politicians nor civic groups ever building democratic institutions in Belarus. learned the skills of political maneuvering and vying for real power. These political Two months after the election, Latushka, skills will inevitably be learned as the a senior-government-minister-turned- process unfolds further, but the pace of this opposition-leader, set up a new opposition learning may determine the duration of the body, Public Anti-Crisis Management. current stalemate as well as its outcome. Its self-proclaimed goal is “ensuring the objectives of a dialogue and stability during The opposition also needs a strategy to the transit of power to democratic forces.”8 splinter the ruling elite as well as the One of the tasks of the body is to mount security services and the military. This will international pressure on the regime. It be decisive in ousting Lukashenka. The seeks to do this by, for example, gathering challenge for the opposition will also be evidence of the laundering of Lukashenka’s maintaining a broad ideological front that money overseas. Although the opposition unites people behind a common goal while has so far managed to avoid a clash of engaging new political figures. Lastly, personalities by focusing on the common Tsikhanouskaya, the Coordination Council, goal of removing Lukashenka, there are and the Public Anti-Crisis Management now too many competing bodies vying for body will need to retain society’s trust to influence and distracting from practical keep it mobilized. They need to be more action. transparent in their work and find effective mechanisms for public debate and wider

7 The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

People gather to mourn the death of Belarusian anti-government protester Roman Bondarenko, who was allegedly beaten by the country’s security forces in Minsk, outside the Belarusian embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine November 13, 2020. A placard displays images depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President . Credit: REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko.

social engagement with their programs. According to the only nationwide study Tsikhanouskaya’s support is over 50%,9 available to date, Lukashenka fails to while the Coordination Council had a receive strong support in any single social 96% approval among more than 500,00010 group, and his approval rating before the Belarusians polled in September. At the August 9 election was between 13% and same time, it is not clear to the public 18%.15 what precise tasks and activities the Coordination Council is undertaking.11 Lukashenka lost legitimacy both from his defeat at the ballot box and the immoral, brutal behavior of his security forces. The Old Regime He relies on the loyalty of the “siloviki,” or security forces; the pervasive state Support for Lukashenka has steadily apparatus, running from the Presidential declined over the past decade. According Administration all the way down to the to the last survey by a mainstream village level; as well as on the appointees independent pollster, the Independent of this state apparatus, such as top Institute for Socio-Economic and Political managers at state companies and public 12 Studies, in 2016, Lukashenka had a 29.5% institutions, judges, and others. Total 13 electoral rating. In April, a poll by a support from these quarters, beefed up state-run National Academy of Sciences by potential backing from some of the 14 put his approval rating in Minsk at 24%. elderly population, mostly those living in

8 The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

the countryside, could not be more than be at the forefront when this time comes. 20% to 25%.16 Yet, both the rent from There are also those who believe the access to state resources and a certain propaganda that the protests are instigated complacency about the post-election terror by the West.20 is keeping top officials loyal. Support from middle and lower-level functionaries is The security services — whose numbers ambiguous. Former government officials are considered to be much higher 21 and journalists say in private that civil than the EU average — enjoy similar servants feel demotivated by the current perks attached to their jobs and some political crisis and muddle through with are complacent about the post-election their duties. crimes. Their thinking is manipulated by state propaganda and many likely lack Despite some defections,17 there may be still the education to make an independent many more reasons why most officials are informed analysis. Similarly, managers not shifting their loyalty just yet. On the at public institutions and state-owned one hand, there is a lack of understanding companies, judges and some of budgetary that Lukashenka’s policies will ultimately employees feel compelled to fulfil the do the country harm. These officials fail regime’s orders for fear of losing their to comprehend the irrevocable processes jobs. The state exercises control over them that have taken hold in society and expect through a system of short-term contracts, that the protests will be suppressed by salary reductions, and increasingly repression and the jailing of activists. Large politically motivated prosecution. Network numbers of officials do not see themselves pressure, as well as the opposition’s ability responsible for the election fraud and the to establish contact with the moderate atrocities committed by the regime. On the elements within the regime, the security other hand, there are the material and status services, and the military will be a decisive perks that officials gain from their position, factor in the erosion of the state system. for example, high and stable salaries or free housing and discounted mortgages. While Lukashenka is a ruthless dictator. It is for some, these are more important than not in his nature to make compromises. moral considerations, others fear that they He has repeatedly vowed to defend his may not be able to secure an equally good power until the bitter end. It would be job if the regime were to fall. Some officials extremely difficult, if not impossible, to might not support Lukashenka’s policies bring him to a genuine dialogue. That but want to reap the material benefits while is why the regime’s main strategy is to they can. They believe that the time to jump repress, demoralize, and exhaust protesters off the regime’s ship has not yet come. as well as make them feel outnumbered and ineffective. Journalists are arrested for Many officials do not see Tsikhanouskaya reporting on the demonstrations, doctors and the opposition as a viable alternative. for speaking up against violence, lawyers They would prefer a strong leader with for defending the rights of the victims, a managerial background, a clear plan sportspeople for calling for fair rules, of action, and guarantees of their status and members of the emergency services under a new government. Without these for saving demonstrators who jump into factors, they believe, chaos might follow lakes to escape riot police. Lukashenka has after Lukashenka’s departure.18 Some of the appointed several top “siloviki” officials ruling elite hope that Russia will install as inspectors to Minsk and the Brest and a palatable successor to Lukashenka, who Hrodna regions, which have been most will retain their functions and status.19 active in protesting.22 This is another step Some hope that the regime will gradually toward bringing Belarus closer to a military start modernizing itself and that they may , following the appointment

9 The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

of the “siloviki” to top positions in the government and Presidential Russia’s interests 23 Administration earlier this year. Russia is pursuing its own interests in Yet, as protests have continued unabated, Belarus by backing Lukashenka. Although the regime is thinking of a more complex Lukashenka is an enfant terrible for the strategy to eschew reform. To win time Kremlin, with his constant attempts to play and shift the focus away from the stolen both sides in the broader geopolitics of election, Lukashenka is going through the Russia and the West, he is at the same time motions of initiating constitutional reform, Belarus’ most pro-Russian politician. It is which he has been promising since 2018, in Moscow’s interest to keep him in power lately under pressure from the Kremlin.24 and more dependent on Russian support. This is, however, a sham. The process The Kremlin views the protesters as pro- lacks transparency and does not involve Western. This paranoid and conspiracy- consultation with wide civil society or the inspired thinking fails to accept that real opposition. The regime’s strategy is to the revolution is a genuinely bottom-up engage pro-government NGOs, parties, and affair. The Kremlin does not recognize experts while co-opting and dividing the Tsikhanouskaya as a legitimate player opposition to impose the approval of its (Russia has put her on a “wanted” list) as constitutional reform. it cannot accept a leader chosen by the people rather than by the nomenklatura The proposed amendments and the behind closed doors. It fears that the Belarusian revolution may spill over into Russia. It is in Moscow’s interest to Russia is putting pressure on Lukashenka keep Lukashenka in power to carry out constitutional reform that would devolve some of his powers to and more dependent on other state organs or introduce a party- Russian support. based political system. In both cases, it would be easier for the Kremlin to exert influence on dispersed decision- timeframe for their adoption remain making centers than on an unpredictable unknown. The leaked draft, however, Lukashenka, with all the power in his suggests further infringements on hands. It is far from certain, however, citizens’ rights, such as a ban on public that Russia will succeed in its effort. organizations to “interfere into state Lukashenka is a skillful manipulator and affairs” and on individuals with a criminal has managed to escape Russian pressure record to hold state posts, as well as the in the past. For years, Belarus has been ability of the state to restrict the right to receiving discounted energy from Russia strike.25 Lukashenka may try to endorse as a partner in the , a dormant the amendments at the All-Belarusian and largely artificial that People’s Assembly (a quasi-Soviet gathering has failed to advance due to Lukashenka’s of public officials and handpicked loyal unwillingness despite his many pledges representatives of society, which has been to the contrary. Similarly, Lukashenka has endorsing Lukashenka’s five-year policy refused to recognize Russian control over plans) planned to be held next year. It Crimea, or independence of is also possible Lukashenka may try to and , despite substantial Kremlin constitutionalize this organ, becoming the pressure. Yet, lack of public support at chair of its presidium, thereby solving the home and severed ties with the West have transition question while retaining the diminished his room for maneuver. In the reins of power.26 meantime, the Kremlin is looking for a

10 The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

pliable successor. Belarusian officials might welcome a Kremlin-nominated successor The Economy Matters if that person would guarantee their The economy will influence the protest positions. dynamic, and it can also be exploited Plan B for the Kremlin would be to weaken by Russia. A downturn might intensify Lukashenka’s regime politically and the protests, leading to a national strike economically in order to de facto manage and a split in the elite, or even push it from Moscow. This would give Russia a Lukashenka into dialogue, but it might chance to flex its muscles to the West by also make workers more cautious and turning Belarus into a “festering wound” mindful of protecting their income. For on the EU’s periphery, akin to Transnistria27 example, following Tsikhanouskaya’s or the Donbas. Russia openly started its call for a national strike on October 26, hybrid intervention in Belarus immediately workers from only several large state- owned companies organized protests at after the August 9 election, when it 35 deployed squadrons of disinformation their workplace. The government has and PR specialists to Belarus,28 while also much leverage over employees at state- threatening a direct intervention under the owned companies and public institutions, guise of reinstalling law and order.29 Top such as through a short-term contract officials of Russia’s Federal Security Service system, a ban in the labor legislation that (FSB) were spotted several times in Minsk, prohibits strikes with political demands, where they met the Belarusian leadership. and intimidation by the “siloviki.”

If the Kremlin continues to deny the Belarus’ economy is in a dire state. It is recognition of the will of the Belarusian experiencing severe structural, financial, people, it may stir up an anti-Russia monetary, and fiscal difficulties, which sentiment in Belarus, with potential long- are bound to worsen as the political term costs. For example, moving Belarus crisis deepens. Traditional weaknesses toward deeper integration with Russia in associated with the failure to carry out the Union State would likely increase the market reforms, such as large finance- protests. In Belarus, public support for draining state-owned enterprises a geopolitical orientation toward Russia (SOEs), obstructions to private business had already dipped30 nearly twofold over development, low productivity, energy the course of less than three years — to dependency on Russia, and trade and fiscal 32% in June.31 On the other hand, support imbalances, are compounded by the losses for closer relations with the EU had gone caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the up by 10% to 29%.32 This trend has likely crackdown on civil society. The economic intensified since August 9. forecast before the August 9 election was a slump of 4% to 6%.36 The regime is Although direct military intervention by incapable of remedying the situation as the Russia in Belarus cannot be completely “siloviki” are in charge of the economy. ruled out, it would be the least likely option for the Kremlin to pursue. Such a The risk of fiscal and financial crises is move would entail large financial, security- growing. In mid-September, the rating military, and reputational costs. It would be agency Standard and Poor’s changed the outlook for Belarus’ long-term credit taken highly negatively both inside Belarus 37 (less than 4%33 of Belarusians supported rating from stable to negative. The country’s gross reserves were depleted in accession to Russia in June) and inside 38 Russia (where such support was 13%34 in August by $1.4 billion after Belarusians August), and might hurt Putin’s fragile rushed to withdraw their deposits from ratings. the banks and buy foreign following the post-election crackdown.

11 The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

People protest against presidential election results during an opposition demonstration near a plant of the heavy off-road vehicles manufacturer MZKT in Minsk, Belarus August 17, 2020. Credit: REUTERS/Vasily Fedosenko.

This left the disposable share of reserves the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and at a $2.9-billion low. 39 The banking the World Bank, have not given Belarus any sector is experiencing serious liquidity large loans since 2016 due to its failure to shortages, exacerbated by a large number carry out the agreed reform agenda. Russia of nonperforming loans owed by the SOEs has not been generous over the last several (15% of the total banks’ liabilities). The years either.43 Belarus’ only remaining Belarusian has depreciated by around option was borrowing on international 30% since the beginning of the year and markets. Although it raised $1.25 billion via the current account deficit has widened to a Eurobond placement in June, at a high 6% $1.1 billion.40 interest rate, the election crackdown has now pushed the yield up to 10%, which no Belarus has a rapidly growing foreign debt, longer makes Eurobonds a viable option. largely denominated in hard currency, which further exacerbates pressure on the Financial support from Russia will be national currency. The publicly guaranteed crucial for the Lukashenka regime’s external debt increased by nearly $1 billion survival. Putin had promised $1.5 billion from January to July and reached $17.8 during the September 14 meeting with billion on August 1.41 Over the next five Lukashenka in Sochi, but this money is years, Belarus has to pay back around $3 unlikely to reach Belarus. It will likely be billion annually.42 For the small Belarusian used to refinance Belarus’ foreign debt to economy, this is a significant challenge for Russia (two-thirds of Belarus’ total foreign which it will require external financing. public debt is owed to Russia) and pay International financial institutions, such as its liability to the Russian energy giant

12 The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

Gazprom (more than $330 million). In pervasive state control, both within the exchange for continued financial assistance, public institutions and society at large, Russia is likely to demand control may suggest a lengthy and excruciating of Belarus’ SOEs that are of strategic transition with more repression in the importance to Russia, such as Belaruskali, short term. A dialogue with Lukashenka’s one of the world’s largest producers and highly personalized regime is unlikely, exporters of potash fertilizer, the Naftan either in the short or in the long run, oil refinery, the Beltopgaz consumer gas although a significant economic decline or distribution network, the Minsk Wheeled the Kremlin’s tight squeeze might spur it Tractor Plant, and other heavy truck and to adopt a slightly more flexible position. military production companies (some The declining economy, repression, and of which are important suppliers to the the lack of prospects for the immediate Russian army). future may push a significant proportion of the younger population to emigrate. Belarus’ budgetary deficit may reach $2.1 Yet, it is clear that the changes that have 44 billion by the end of the year. Apart taken hold in Belarusian society cannot be from being hit by a decline in trade and reversed. Society will continue to manifest a consumption slump as a result of the its demands in one form or another until it COVID-19 pandemic, Belarus is also losing achieves them. significant revenue it received from refining Russian crude. For example, The US, the EU and the UK should between January and June, it exported consider what Belarus means for its 42.6% less oil products than in 2019.45 principles and values, as well as for Before the pandemic hit oil demand, regional security, and devise its strategy Belarus’ losses from Russia phasing out accordingly. It should retain a long- discounts on its crude supplies to Belarus term perspective, bracing for potentially (as a result of domestic tax reform) were long-standing uncertainty and political estimated to reach $9 billion by 2024.46 instability in Belarus. Labor migration, capital flight, decreased foreign investment, and a further The response from the West should be productivity slump resulting from the three-pronged: pressure, solidarity, and deepening political crisis in Belarus may support. cause government losses between $2.5 47 • The West should maintain pressure on billion and $5 billion. As of October 1, the regime in Minsk and its backers in 2,000 IT specialists from a once-thriving the Kremlin to stop repression against industry that accounts for 5% of Belarusian society and start a national dialogue. exports, had left for Ukraine. Twelve IT It should also make it more costly for companies had reportedly decided to move 48 the Kremlin to continue its hybrid to and 85 to . intervention in Belarus. The West should, however, try and engage the middle and lower levels of the regime What the West Can with a view to undermining it.

Do and How It Should • The West should show solidarity and increase its engagement with the Prepare people of Belarus. Not recognizing At the time of writing, the most likely Lukashenka’s legitimacy while scenario in Belarus is a long-term erosion receiving Tsikhanouskaya at the top of the regime through mounting social international level is a good step. As pressure. The absence of meaningful pro-Western attitudes in Belarus are democratic structures and a system of likely to grow, the West should use its

13 The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

soft power to engage Belarusians more the issuance of Schengen visas to in its institutions and practices. Belarusians.

• The West should support the fledging • Both Belarus and Russia should be civil society in Belarus through both warned that further sanctions would immediate help to fight state repression follow if the regime in Minsk continues and continuous financial assistance to engage in violence and political and expertise in building resilient repression. The costs of the Kremlin’s democratic structures and political hybrid — or potentially direct — institutions. intervention should be increased. Stronger sanctions could, for example, • Offering funds for a Marshall Plan-type target companies owned by oligarchs instrument ($3 billion to $5 billion) close to the regimes in Minsk or to help a new democratic government Moscow. They could also limit Belarus’, rebuild the Belarusian economy could and further restrict Russia’s, borrowing encourage the elite to defect from the on international markets — a measure regime. that might be felt strongly, bearing in mind the current deficits in the The West should consider the following countries’ budgets.50 concrete steps in the areas outlined above:

• Follow the example set by Belarus’ • Solidarity could be expressed in letters Baltic neighbors by adopting targeted, and short videos from professional comprehensive, Magnitsky Act-type associations, political parties, sanctions on those responsible for individual politicians, and businesses electoral fraud, post-election violence, containing condemnation of the and ongoing political repression in authorities’ actions and expressing Belarus. The list should include not support for the people of Belarus. just top officials, but also members Professional organizations could also of the electoral authorities at all carry out training and other pro levels, riot police and other Interior bono educational activities to share Ministry troops dispersing peaceful information and boost the knowledge, demonstrations, investigators from the skills, and morale of Belarusian KGB and the Investigative Committee, counterparts in this difficult time. as well as prosecutors responsible for • The West should freeze financial arbitrary arrests and judges handling aid to state institutions. These funds down politically motivated sentences. should instead be redirected to civil Sanctions on their family members society to offer financial assistance and should also be considered as often the rehabilitation to victims of repression children of these individuals study or and political persecution. Overall, work abroad, and such sanctions may financial assistance to nonstate actors serve as an effective deterrent. But if should be significantly increased. For the West plumps for limited targeted years, Belarus had been overlooked by sanctions it could do more harm than international donors due to the lack good as Belarusian authorities tend of prospects to embark on reforms. to retaliate to the detriment of the This must change. Belarusian society Belarusian people — consider, for has demonstrated that it is ready to example, the demand to cut back the be an agent of its own fate. But it number of staff at the embassies of needs help and expertise in building two EU member states (Lithuania and resilient democratic institutions, 49 ) in Minsk, which imperils which will lay the groundwork for future political change. As the West

14 The Future of Belarus: A ‘velvet,’ but not ‘color,’ revolution heralds dramatic change in the medium term

deals with new civil society actors, it should find untraditional ways to Conclusion channel such support. Solidarity funds Belarus is undergoing a deep political that Belarusians have set up to raise crisis. It faces a prolonged period of financial support, as well as student uncertainty. Lukashenka’s regime has the exchange programs and international potential to maintain control in the short trade union and political party run. However, in the long run it will be networks, may prove effective. unable to suppress the wide-ranging social • Other important programs to consider transformations that have taken hold. Civil should support the access of citizens society will continue to self-organize and to information and debates on the demand to be the agent of its own fate. current and future situation, as well The autocratic state system that has held a as to counter Russian disinformation tight grip on Belarus for the past 26 years and state propaganda. Examples could has started to crumble. It will take time include supporting independent and considerable effort for the nascent media and social media channels, civil society to build effective political such as Telegram, which have become institutions that can erode the regime and an important political voice and reflect the will of the people. source of information for millions The West must come out strongly in of Belarusians. Organizing cultural support of Belarusian society. By doing so, events in neighboring EU countries, it would not only stay faithful to its own through which Belarusians could learn values and principles but also help the about European historical and political people of Belarus build the kind of future heritage and get more involved with that would benefit it — a future that would European networks, would also be help strengthen peace and prosperity in helpful. Europe.

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Endnotes 1 Sociologist Oksana Shelest, who has been conducting interviews with anti-government protesters, says “protests and the movement for change have spread across all societal layers. [Protesters] are from different generations and different social strata — they are people working both in the state and private sector… Teachers, medical workers, IT specialists, actors, sportspeople...” In RFI. “‘Голос улиц’: социология белорусского протеста.” 19 октября. 2020https://www.rfi.fr/ru/%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B0/20201019-%D0%B3%D 0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%81-%D1%83%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%86-%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE %D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81%D1%8 1%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0. [RFI. “‘The voice of the street’: the sociology of the Belarusian protests.” RFI October 19.] 2 Mia Research. “Опрос. Изучение ценностей белорусского общества.” 13 июня 2018. http://www.kef.by/publica- tions/research/opros-izuchenie-tsennostey-belorusskogo-obshchestva/. [Mia Research. “A survey. Studying the values of Belarusian society.” Mia Research June 13, 2018.] 3 RFI. “‘Голос улиц’: социология белорусского протеста.” 19 октября. https://www.rfi.fr/ru/%D0- %B5%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B0/20201019-%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1 %81-%D1%83%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%86-%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%- BE%D0%B3%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81%D1%81%D0%BA%D0 %BE%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0. [RFI. “‘The voice of the street’: the sociology of the Belarusian protests.” RFI October 19.] 4 Zahorski, Ales. “Multilevel regression with poststratification for the national level Viber/Street poll on the 2020 presidential election in Belarus.” arXiv.org, Cornell University. Accessed October 8, 2020. https://arxiv.org/ abs/2009.06615?fbclid=IwAR04jaNWA2bTEgOLeo8Q031o6Ures9yaviHD78sY8cnf1FQNW366Yr0gVj0. 5 Наша Ніва. “Белорусские фонды солидарности собрали более 6 миллионов долларов.” 15 верасня 2020. https:// nashaniva.by/?c=ar&i=259076&lang=ru. [Nasha Niva “Belarusian solidarity funds have collected over $6m.” Nasha Niva, September 15, 2020.] 6 Belsat TV. “‘Люди готовы выходить целый год.’ Андрей Вардомацкий рассказал, что произойдет с протестом с наступлением холодов.” 1 ноября 2020. https://belsat.eu/ru/news/lyudi-gotovy-vyhodit-tselyj-god-andrej-vardo- matskij-rasskazal-chto-proizojdet-s-protestom-s-nastupleniem-holodov/?fbclid=IwAR0R6n4m5itoIyLV1-OMBH- M1s4ZMLDp_thRDB4jEJePJ48JVxh42P69GpSs. [Belsat TV. “‘People are ready to protest for the whole year.’ Andrey Vardomatsky says what will happen to protests when the cold weather arrives.” Belsat TV November 1, 2020.] 7 Although some of Tsikhanouskaya’s advisers have been drawn from the old opposition, their experience of dea- ling with the regime may prove helpful. 8 Павел Латушко. Pavel Latushka. Telegram Channel, October 28, 2020. Accessed on November 6, 2020. https://t. me/s/latushka. 9 One survey estimated Tsikhanouskaya’s support before the August 9 elections as 75% to 80%. See, Zahors- ki, Ales. “Multilevel regression with poststratification for the national level Viber/Street poll on the 2020 presidential election in Belarus.” arXiv.org, Cornell University. Accessed October 8, 2020. https://arxiv.org/ abs/2009.06615?fbclid=IwAR04jaNWA2bTEgOLeo8Q031o6Ures9yaviHD78sY8cnf1FQNW366Yr0gVj0. Another post-election survey said 52.2% of respondents voted for Tsikhanouskaya. See, Astapenia, Ryhor. “What Belaru- sians Think About Their Country’s Crisis.” Chatham House. October 21. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/10/ what-belarusians-think-about-their-countrys-crisis. 10 Координационный Совет. “500 000 беларусов поддержали Координационный Совет.” 26 верасня 2020. https:// rada.vision/500-000-belarusov-podderzhali-koordinacionnyj-sovet. [Coordination Council. “500,000 Belarusians support the Coordination Council.” Coordination Council September 26, 2020.] 11 Based on the author’s private conversations with Belarusians in September and October. 12 The Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies closed down in 2016 following a crackdown on its surveyors by the state.

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13 Tut.by. “НИСЭПИ: Рейтинг Лукашенко немного подрос, но пока ниже 30%.” 29 июня 2016. https://news.tut.by/ politics/502386.html. [Tut.by. “IISEPS: Lukashenka’s rating grows a little but is still below 30%.” Tut.by June 29, 2016.] 14 Lukashenka’s approval rating is usually several percentage points higher than his electoral rating. Koktysh, Marina. “Центризбирком надо разгонять.” Narodnaya Volya. 19 июня 2020. https://www.facebook.com/ notes/%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%82%D1%8B %D1%88/%D1%86%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B1%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B- A%D0%BE%D0%BC-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%BE-%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%BD% D1%8F%D1%82%D1%8C/3082482335169821. [Koktysh, Marina. “Central Election Commission should be dissol- ved.” Narodnaya Volya. June 19, 2020.] 15 Zahorski, Ales. “Multilevel regression with poststratification for the national level Viber/Street poll on the 2020 presidential election in Belarus.” arXiv.org, Cornell University. Accessed October 8, 2020. https://arxiv.org/ abs/2009.06615?fbclid=IwAR04jaNWA2bTEgOLeo8Q031o6Ures9yaviHD78sY8cnf1FQNW366Yr0gVj0. 16 Author’s own calculations, based on the following data: 300,000 (the approximate number of police and security forces, including internal troops and the army), 150,000 (the approximate number of civil servants, multiplied by two to account for spouses), 600,000 (the elderly population living in the countryside, who can be partially considered Lukashenka’s core electorate as per the survey quoted above), and 6.5 million voters. 17 Mainly from the diplomatic service, the world of sport and the state-owned mass media, as well as from the police and other security services, and also the prosecutors’ offices. 18 RFE/RL. “‘Беларускі пратэст – гэта пажар на балоце.’ Інтэрвію экс-амбасадара Ігара Ляшчэні.” 1 кастрычніка 2020. https://www.svaboda.org/a/30870636.html. [RFE/RL. “‘Belarusian protests are like a swamp fire.’ An inter- view with ex-Ambassador Ihar Lyaschenya.” RFE/RL October 1, 2020.] 19 RFE/RL. “На што разьлічвае беларуская намэнклятура? Меркаваньні Ляшчэні і Ярашука.” 26 кастрычніка 2020. https://www.svaboda.org/a/30913849.html. [RFE/RL. “What does the Belarusian nomenklatura rely on? Opinions of Lyaschenya and Yarashuk.” RFE/RL October 26, 2020.] 20 Shraibman. Telegram channel. Accessed on October 14, 2020. https://t.me/s/shraibman. 21 Belarus has a very high number of police officers per 100,000 citizens — 1,442, much higher than the European average of 326 in 2017. See, Tut.by. “Сколько в Беларуси милиционеров? А сколько человек в армии? Пробуем подсчитать число силовиков.” 24 июля 2020. https://42.tut.by/693948. [Tut.by. “How many policemen are in Belarus? And how many people are in the army? Trying to calculate the number of the siloviki.” Tut.by July 24, 2020.] 22 On October 29, Lukashenka appointed former State Secretary of the Security Council of the of Belarus Valer Vakulchyk, former Interior Minister Yury Karayeu, and his deputy, Alyaksandr Barsukou, as inspectors to the Brest and Hrodna regions and to Minsk, respectively. 23 In January, Lukashenka appointed former KGB head Siarhey Serhiyenka as the head of the Presidential Adminis- tration. This was followed by the appointment of Raman Halouchanka, the former head of the military industry and former KGB and State Security Council member, as prime minister. 24 Tut.by. “Лавров: чтобы белорусский народ был един, мы должны пресечь ультиматумы, попытки насильственных протестов.” Tut.by 14 октября 2020. https://news.tut.by/economics/704055.html?f&fbclid=IwAR17B9AR- N2ILtyNQqQspq493Y0GHZB4MM-50SHc25CX40pZ0bf4W6P_YFZs. [ Tut.by. “Lavrov: in order to keep the Belarusian people united, we must stop ultimatums and attempts of violent protests.” Tut.by October 14, 2020.] 25 HEXTA Live. Telegram channel. “Сегодня Владимир Путин заявил, что слова Лукашенко о возможности изменений в Конституцию – это значительный шаг навстречу оппонентам.” Live. Telegram channel 29 октября 2020. Accessed on November 2, 2020. https://t.me/s/nexta_live. [NEXTA Live. Telegram channel. “Today Vladimir Putin stated that Lukashenko’s words about potential changes to the Constitution is a significant step towards opponents.” NEXTA Live. Telegram channel.. October 29, 2020. Accessed on November 2, 2020.] 26 Mifologiya Belarusi. “Analiz propagandy, politiki i prava.” Telegram channel. Accessed on November 2, 2020. https://t.me/s/belarus_mythology. [The Mythology of Belarus. “The Analysis of Propaganda, Politics and the Law.” Telegram channel. Accessed on November 2, 2020.]

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27 Салiдарнасць. “Чалый: Цель Путина — превратить Беларусь в Приднестровье.” 1 верасня 2020. https://gazetaby. com/post/chalyj-cel-putina-prevratit-belarus-v-pridnestrove/168512/. [Solidarity. “Chaly: Putin’s objective is to turn Belarus into .” Gazetaby September 1, 2020.] 28 For example, RT specialists came to Minsk to replace those members of the Belarusian National State TV and Radio Company who quit their jobs in protest against the partial and distorted coverage of the election and post-election protests. 29 Karmanau, Yuras, and Isachenko, Vladimir. “Putin: Russia is ready to provide security help to Belarus.” Reu- ters. August 27, 2020. https://www.startribune.com/belarus-leader-accuses-neighbors-of-waging-hybrid- war/572236862. 30 Наша Ніва. “Вардомацкий утверждает, что число сторонников союза с Россией за год обвалилось с 60% до 40%.” 5 февраля 2020. https://m.nashaniva.by/ru/articles/245616/. [Nasha Niva. “Vardomatsky argues that the number of supporters of a union with Russia has dropped from 60% to 40%.”Nasha Niva February 5, 2020.] 31 Ekho Moskvy. “Павел Латушко: Путин должен доверять белорусскому обществу, а не Лукашенко.” 4 октября. http://brestnote.by/24094-pavel-latushko-putin-dolzhen-doveryat-belorusskomu-obschestvu-a-ne-lukashenko. html. [Ekho Moskvy. “Putin should trust Belarusian society, not Lukashenko.” October 4, 2020.] 32 Ibid. 33 Наша Ніва. “Вардомацкий утверждает, что число сторонников союза с Россией за год обвалилось с 60% до 40%.” 5 февраля 2020. https://m.nashaniva.by/ru/articles/245616/. [Nasha Niva. “Vardomatsky argues that the number of supporters of a union with Russia has dropped from 60% to 40%.”Nasha Niva February 5, 2020.] 34 Никитин, Дмитрий.. “Почти четверть граждан поддерживают идею объединения с Белоруссией. Россияне стали лучше относиться к соседям.” Открытые медиа, 16 сентября 2020. https://openmedia.io/news/n3/pochti-chet- vert-grazhdan-podderzhivaet-ideyu-obedineniya-s-belorussiej-rossiyane-stali-luchshe-otnositsya-k-sosedyam/. [Nikitin, Dmitry.. “Nearly a quarter of citizens support the idea of unification with Belarus.”Open Media. Sep- tember 16, 2020.] 35 Неведомская, Татьяна. “Общенациональный страйк: кто и как бастует в Беларуси.” DW. 29 октября 2020. https:// www.dw.com/ru/obshhenacionalnyj-strajk-kto-i-kak-bastuet-v-belarusi/a-55434678. [Nevedomskaya, Tatyana. “National strike: Who and how is protesting in Belarus.” DW. October 29, 2020.] 36 See, for example, “Republic of Belarus.” IMF (International Monetary Fund). n.d. Accessed October 8, 2020. https:// www.imf.org/en/Countries/BLR. 37 TASS. “S&P changed outlook for Belarus’ sovereign credit rating to negative.” TA S S September 12, 2020. https:// tass.com/economy/1200123. 38 Национальный банк Республики Беларусь. n.d. “Международные резервные активы и ликвидность Республики Беларусь в иностранной валюте на 01.10.2020.” Accessed November 2, 2020. https://www.nbrb.by/statistics/ss- tandard/report.asp. [National Bank of the Republic of Belarus. n.d. “International reserves and foreign currency liquidity of the Republic of Belarus as of 01.10.2020.” National Bank of the Republic of Belarus. n.d Accessed No- vember 2, 2020.] 39 Ibid. 40 Национальный банк Республики Беларусь. n.d. Платежный баланс Республики Беларусь за январь-июнь 2020 года. Accessed 8 октября 2020. https://www.nbrb.by/statistics/balpay/analytical6/current. [National Bank of the Republic of Belarus. n.d. “The balance of payments of the Republic of Belarus in January-June 2020.” National Bank of the Republic of Belarus. n.d. Accessed October 8, 2020.] 41 Редакция Myfin.by. 2020. Внешний“ долг в Беларуси.” 31 августа 2020. https://myfin.by/wiki/term/vnesh- nij-dolg-v-belarusi. [Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Belarus. 2020. “Belarus’ foreign debt.” Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Belarus, August 31, 2020.] 42 In March-December, Belarus has to pay back $3.1 billion. See, ПраймПресс.. “Обязательства Беларуси по выплате госдолга в 2020 г. будут выполнены – Румас.” 14 мая 2020. https://primepress.by/news/finansi/obya- zatelstva_belarusi_po_vyplate_gosdolga_v_2020_g_budut_vypolneny_rumas-20445/. [PrimePress..“Belarus’ public debt liabilities in 2020 will be paid back – Rumas.” PrimePress May 14, 2020.] 43 Loans from have been tied to Chinese investment projects in Belarus. The only Chinese credit that is not tied so such projects — $500 million — was granted in December 2019.

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44 Интерфакс-Запад.. “Минфин Беларуси ожидает резкий рост дефицита бюджета до $2,1 млрд. в г.” 5 августа 2020. https://interfax.by/news/policy/ekonomicheskaya_politika/1280170/. [Interfax Zapad. “Belarus’ Finance Ministry expects the sharp rise of $2.1bn in the budgetary deficit in 2020.”Interfax Zapad August 5, 2020.] 45 Интерфакс-Запад. “Экспорт нефтепродуктов из Беларуси в I полугодии упал на 42,6% — статданные.” Ex-Press. by. 7 сентября 2020. https://ex-press.by/rubrics/ekonomika/2020/09/07/eksport-nefteproduktov-iz-belaru- si-v-i-polugodii-upal-na-426-statdannye. [Interfax-West. “Belarus’ exports of oil products fell by 42.6% in the first half of the year — statistical data.”Ex.Press.by. September 7, 2020.] 46 Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta. “Бюджет потеряет 9 млрд долларов от выпадающих нефтяных доходов?” 11 декабря 2019. https://neg.by/novosti/otkrytj/byudzhet-poteryaet-9-mlrd-dollarov-ot-vypadayuschih-neftyanyh-dohodov. [Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta. “Belarus will lose $9bn from phasing out oil revenues.”Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta. De- cember 11, 2019.] 47 Роменский, Владимир. “‘Отдавать пока есть чем, тем же Беларуськалием.’ Как Лукашенко будет расплачиваться с Путиным за помощь России.” TV Dozhd. 14 сентября 2020. https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/vechernee_shou/kre- dit-516025/. [Romensky, Vladimir. “There is yet something that the debt can be repaid with, for example, Bela- ruskali. How Lukashenko will pay to Putin for help.” TV Dozhd. September 14, 2020.] 48 Zhegulev, Ilya, Margaryta Chornokondratenko, and Andrius Sytas.. “With warm words and fast visas, neighbours woo IT workers fleeing Belarus.”Reuters . October 1, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/belarus-elec- tion-tech-idUSKBN26M5FJ. 49 Tut.by. “‘Ввиду однозначной деструктивной деятельности.’ Посольствам Литвы и Польши придется сократить штат.” 2 октября 2020. https://news.tut.by/economics/702634.html. [Tut.by. “Considering the destructive acti- vity. Lithuania’s and Poland’s Embassies will have to cut back their staff.”Tut.by October 2, 2020.] 50 ФИНМАРКЕТ. “Дефицит бюджета РФ в 2020 году может составить около 5% ВВП.” 3 июля 2020. http://www. finmarket.ru/main/article/5268945. [FINMARKET.RU. “The budgetary deficit may reach around 5% GDP.”FIN - MARKET.RU July 3, 2020.]

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