Field Evaluation of the System for the Effective Control of Urban Environment Security (SECURES): Final Report on the Dallas Field Trial
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The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: Document Title: Field Evaluation of the System for the Effective Control of Urban Environment Security (SECURES): Final Report on the Dallas Field Trial Author(s): Lorraine G. Mazerolle Ph.D.; James Frank Ph.D.; Dennis Rogan Ph.D.; Cory Watkins; Colleen Kadleck M.S. Document No.: 180113 Date Received: January 7, 2000 Award Number: 96-MU-MU-0018 This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally- funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. A FIELD EVALUATION OF TEE SYSTEM FOR THE EFFECTIVE GONTROL OF -URBAN ENVIRONMENT SECURITY S SECURES^"): FINAL REPORT ON THE DALLAS FIELD TRIAL Submitted to the National Institute of Justice Award Number 6-897 1-OH-IJ Lorraine Green Mazerolle, Ph.D. University of Cincinnati James Frank, Ph.D. University of Cincinnati Dennis Rogan, Ph.D. President Statistical Analysis for Law Enforcement Strategies Cory Watkins, Ph.D. University of Central Florida and Colleen Kadleck, M. S. Center for Criminal Justice Research University of Cincinnati October, 1999 This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. A FELD EVALUATION OF THE SYSTEM FOR THE &Fl?ECTIvECONTROL OF -6A.N ~NWRONMENT SECURITY (“SECURESm”): FINAL REPORT ON THE DALLAS FIELD TRIAL EXECUTIVESUMMARY SECURESm (@stem for the Effective control of urban &ironment Security) is described as a technologically advanced acoustic sensing system capable of idenwg, discriminating, and reporting gunshots within one second of a shot being fired. The technology was developed by Alliant Techsystems, Inc. through knding by the Department of Defense. AUiant Techsystems, Inc. envisioned the SECUREP technology as a rapid response tool: they suggested the technology could increase police response time by 85 percent, increase the apprehension rate of shots fired offenders by 40 percent, and increase the survivability rate of gunshot victims by 50 percent. Approximately 80 pole Units are required to cover a one square mile area at a cost of approximately $5,500 per month to lease a system covering one square mile. Pole units cost $1,750 each and the batteries last approximately 2 months. SECURESTUwill cost a police department at least $72,480 per 10,000 people to install and use in any one calendar year. a Oak Cliff TX, a neighborhood of approximately one square mile, was selected as the experimental test site due to its high incidence of random gunfire. The field test comprised installation of 86 pole units on utility poles. 75 pole units were erected at intersections, 9 were in alleys, and 2 were on streets in the target area. a The SECURESm technology “downtime” during the field trial in Dallas, TX was 10,349 minutes of the total running time of 76,740 minutes (1 1.9 percent of the time). 26 pole unit batteries had to be replaced over the course of the SECURESTU trial phase. Citizen calls for random gunfire (signal 6Gs) were considered priority 4 level calls in the Dallas Police Department. Dispatchers had a one hour window to dispatch random gunfire ‘ calls for service. A new signal code was incorporated into the Dallas CAD system that represented a SECURESTMidentified call for random gunfire (signal 6s). This signal code was designed to assist the Evaluation Team in understanding how officers respond to citizen calls for service versus SECURESm identified calls for service. 1 This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 0 There were 215 alleged gun shots identified by the SECURESm technology during the trial phase (October 25, 1996 to December 16,1996). Of the 215 SECURESm alerts, 23 (10.7 percent) could bt matched against a citizen call about a shot fired. This means that either citizens Simply do not call the police very frequently about shots being fired and the Dallas Police Department has a large under-reporting rate of shots being fired or the gunshot location system has a very high rate of false positive recordings of shots being fired. 0 During our field trial in Dallas, the police responded to 151 SECURESm alerts and 39 citizen calls about random gunfire. These 190 (15 1 + 39) police radio runs all took place in the one square mile community of Oakcliff during the two months of field testing. Our study finds that the extra 151 SECURESm dispatched radio runs over and above the citizen-initiated calls during the two-month field trial represents almost a five-fold increase I (190/39=4.87) in the number of police dispatches to random gunfire problems. 0 Examination of the Dallas Police Department call data indicated that dispatchers took longer on average to dispatch a SECURESTMidentified call (17.88 minutes) than a citizen identified call (13.25 minutes). Officers also took longer to arrive on the scene of a SECURESm identified call (24.41 minutes) than a citizen identified call (17.78 minutes) about random gunfire. 0 We compared response time for random gunfire calls before and during the SECURESfM field trial. Our analysis reveals that random gunfire calls for service (citizen initiated only) were not only dispatched quicker during the pre experimental phase but officers arrived quicker, they spent less time on the call and processed the call more quickly. 0 Examination of average response times for random gunfire calls for service prior to SECURESTMtesting (citizen initiated only) versus average response times during field testing (citizen and SECURESm initiated combined) indicated that, while the random gunfire call load increased dramatically, the average amount of time devoted to any one call (citizen or SECURESm) was relatively stable when the pre-experimental phase was compared to the experimental phase. 0 Findings from the call data analysis were inconsistent with officer perceptions of speed of response and time spent on 6G versus 6s calls for service. Officers indicated that they believed their responses to 6G and 6s calls were similar. Officers believed they spent the same or less time on a 6s call than a 6G call. The call data indicated that officers spend more time handling a SECURESm alert than a citizen identified call for random gunfire. 0 Oficers indicated that they did not believe that the SECURESTMtechnology would increase apprehension rates or survival rates. A substantial number of officers (79.4 percent) stated that they thought the SECURESTMsystem would help police focus on random gunfire “hot spots.” .. 11 This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE I. INTRODUCTION ...................................... ................ 1 .. II.GUNSANDCRIMEPR0BLEMS .......................................... 3 The Gun Problem in the United States ................................... 3 Gunsandcrime ..................................................... 3 Random Gunfire Problems ............................................. 5 . III. POLICE STRATEGIES TO REDUCE GUN PROBLEMS ..................... 7 N .THE SECURES^ GUNSHOT LOCATION SYSTEM ........................ 11 P V .DALLAS AS A RESEARCH SITE ......................................... 14 Experimental Site Selection ........................................... 14 Implementation of SECURESTMin the Experimental Test Site ............... 16 Roles of the Dallas Police Department and AUiant Techsystems. Inc. .......... 19 VI . THE DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT COMPUTER AIDED DISPATCH SYSTEM ..................................................... 22 VII . SECURESTMSYSTEM PERFORMANCE ................................. 30 VIII . RESPONSE TIME ANALYSIS ......................................... 44 Gunshot Location Systems as a Rapid Response Tool ....................... 44 Response Time Analysis .............................................. 48 IX . RELATIONSHIP OF RANDOM GUNFIRE CALLS TO ARREST AND OFFENSE DATA ................................................................... 59 X . IMPACT OF SECURESTM ON THE POLICE ORGANIZATION ................61 WorkloadAnalysis ................................................... 61 Cost Analysis ....................................................... 63 XI . POLICE OFFICER PERCEPTIONS OF THE RANDOM GUNFIRE PROBLEM AND SECURES^ EFFECTIVENESS .............................. 67 Patrol Log Analysis .................................................. 67 Police Ofiicer Survey Results .......................................... 70 Summing Up Police Perceptions ........................................ 86 XII . CONCLUDING COMMENTS .......................................... 88 REFERENCES ..........................................................