Politics and Policy Making at the 1996-1997European Union
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POLITICS AND POLICY MAKING A T THE 1996-1997EUROPEAN UNION INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE Brendan Patrick Gerard Smith London School of Economics and Political Science Department of International Relations Submitted for the degree of Doctor o f Philosophy PhD Summer Term June 1999 UMI Number: U127089 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U127089 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 r \ l Acknowledgements Acknowledgements This thesis would not have seen the light of day but for a lot of generous and supportive people. First and foremost, I am indebted to the officials from the various Member State Foreign Offices, Embassies, and Permanent Representations, along with those from the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council Secretariat, who provided me with a rich and valuable insight to the IGC negotiations. I am especially grateful to Joseph McCartin MEP, who, having held a seat at the European Parliament since the first direct elections in 1979, opened many a door to some key players at the IGC. The thesis has also benefited from a number of seminars and conferences both within the LSE and elsewhere. I remain indebted to all the participants in these fora, particularly Benedikte Brincker of the European Institute, LSE and Alexander Stubb of the Department of International Relations, LSE. I would also like to extend a warm thanks to Barbara Lippard and Andreas Maurer of the Institut fur Europaische Politik, Bonn and Alfred Pijpers, Suzanne Nollen, Jan Q.Th. Rood, Rob de Wijk, Madeleine O. Hosli, and Alfred van Staden of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague. On two separate occasions, and at incredibly short notice, Alfred Pijpers and the Clingendael researchers provided me with a ‘home’ as I researched on the Dutch Presidency during the IGC. The advice and support of my supervisor, William Wallace, was invaluable. William has been much more than a PhD supervisor, he has been a mentor. His insatiable energy and enthusiasm for research and learning proved inspirational over the three years, particularly at the darker moments when the thesis seemed to be going nowhere. For this I remain eternally grateful. Finally, the sharp pen of Cormac McKeever saved me from the embarrassing typographical and grammatical errors that continued to evade my eye no matter how many times I read the thesis. Of course, despite the input of these many colleagues and friends, I alone remain responsible for the content of this thesis. Brendan Smith London, 19 June 1999. Abstract Abstract The thesis analyses the negotiations at the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of the European Union (EU) and outlines an array of ideas, interests and issues at stake for the actors involved. The thesis has three objectives: (1) to explain the 1996-97 IGC negotiations which led to the Amsterdam Treaty, (2) to identify the key players throughout this process and (3) to examine the concept and characteristics of the EU IGC. This thesis aims to provide both breadth and depth in its analysis, presenting an overview of almost all the significant topics on the IGC agenda while focusing on three major issue areas: institutional reform, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). At the same it concentrates on the governments of Britain, France and Germany, while outlining the positions of all other governments and the European institutions. The thesis has three basic lines of argumentation. The first argues that the 1996-97 IGC was an incremental process where member governments often had poorly defined objectives, leaving the process to drift along with little direction for the greater part of the sixteen months. In turn governments either drifted into agreement without being fully aware of the consequences of their decisions, or they postponed taking decisions on difficult and divisive issues until a future IGC or the post negotiation phase. The second argument relates to the key players in the IGC process. While all member governments played a role in the IGC process the most influential actor was the Dutch Presidency, followed by the Irish Presidency and the French, British and German governments. Given that the Presidencies played such an important role it is also possible to gain some insight to the ‘behind the scenes’ role of the Council Secretariat. Finally, there were also occasions when the Commission also proved influential. The third strand of argumentation relates to the concept of the IGC, arguing that since the first Conference the IGC has evolved, being gradually institutionalised into the European Union. Contents Contents Abstract List of abbreviations List of tables INTRODUCTION- Objectives, methodology, structure, argument and sources OBJECTIVES 1 METHODOLOGY 2 STRUCTURE 3 ARGUMENT 6 SOURCES 9 Contents PART I-TH E IGC CHAPTER I Defining an IGC INTRODUCTION 12 1. DEFINING AN IGC - THE THREE CATEGORIES 12 Legal & Specific 12 2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IGC 14 Article 236 - An Insufficient Definition 15 Two Successes - ECSC & EEC 16 Two Failures - EDC/EPC & Fouchet Plan 17 Moving Away from the Constitutional IGC 18 3. INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL IGC 24 CONCLUSION 26 Contents CHAPTER II Setting a Framework on the Negotiations at an IGC INTRODUCTION 28 1. RATIONAL CHOICE 29 2. NEOFUNCTIONALISM 33 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT A CONSTITUTIONAL IGC 36 Introduction 36 Community features 36 Participants at an IGC 37 Negotiations at an IGC 46 An Incremental Process 54 CONCLUSIONS 55 Contents PARTII-OVERVIEW OF 1996-97 IGC CHAPTER III The pre-negotiation stage: setting the agenda and defining the approach INTRODUCTION 58 1. THE MAASTRICHT INFLUENCE 59 Specific Articles 59 Ratification Crisis 61 Functioning of TEU 63 2. EVOLUTION OF THE AGENDA 64 Enlargement - An Overall Theme? 64 European Councils 65 Reflection Group 66 National Positions 69 3. ATTITUDES AND APPROACHES 85 Introduction 85 Britain 85 Germany 87 France 89 Franco-German Partnership 91 European Commission 96 European Parliament 97 CONCLUSIONS 99 Contents CHAPTER IV Overview o f the IGC Process INTRODUCTION 101 1. BACKGROUND 102 Three Levels of Negotiation 102 Negotiating Styles 104 2. ISSUES AT THE CONFERENCE 107 Introduction 107 Arriving at a Mandate 108 Development of the Mandate 111 3. OVERVIEWS OF NEGOTIATIONS FROM TURIN TO DUBLIN TO AMSTERDAM 114 Introduction 114 Italian Presidency 115 Irish Presidency 116 Dutch Presidency - Moving to the End-Game 122 Key Individuals and Meetings 125 4. OVERSHADOWING EVENTS 127 Introduction 127 British and French Elections 127 Qualifying for EMU 129 Employment and EMU 132 BSE Crisis 133 CONCLUSIONS 135 Contents PART III-TH E NEGOTIATIONS CHAPTER V Institutional Reform INTRODUCTION 138 1. LINKAGE 139 2. QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING 141 Introduction 141 German Position 142 British Position 143 French Position 145 Negotiations 145 3. RE-WEIGHTING 149 Introduction 149 German Position 150 British Position 150 French Position 151 Negotiations 151 Contents 4. COMMISSION RE-SIZING 158 Introduction 158 French Position 159 British Position 159 German Position 161 Negotiations 161 Summary 167 5. EXTENSION OF CO-DECISION 168 Introduction 168 Negotiations 168 CONCLUSIONS 171 Contents Chapter VI Justice and Home Affairs INTRODUCTION 174 1. COMMUNITARISATION OF THIRD PILLAR 175 Background 175 French Position 178 German Position 180 British Position 184 Negotiations 186 Summary 196 2. CRIME AND SECURITY 196 Background 196 Introduction 197 German Position 198 British Position 198 French Position 199 Negotiations 200 3. SCHENGEN AND BORDER CONTROLS 205 Background 205 Introduction 206 French Position 206 German Position 207 British Position 208 Contents Negotiations 210 CONCLUSIONS 214 Contents CHAPTER VII Common Foreign and Security Policy INTRODUCTION 217 1. WEU-EU RELATIONS 218 Background 218 Introduction 222 German Position 223 British Position 226 French Position 227 Negotiations 228 2. CFSP PROCEDURES 237 Background 237 Introduction 239 Policy-Planning Capability 239 Common Strategy 242 Mr.CFSP/High Representative 244 3. DECISION-MAKING 248 Introduction 248 German Position 249 British Position 250 French Position 250 Negotiations 251 CONCLUSIONS 253 Contents PARTIV- CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER VIII Conclusions INTRODUCTION 256 1. FIRST OBJECTIVE - NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS AT THE 1996-97 IGC 257 Ambiguous Objectives 258 Lack of Direction 259 Unintended Outcomes 261 Postponement 262 2. SECOND OBJECTIVE - KEY PLAYERS IN THE PROCESS 264 Presidencies 264 French Government 266 German Government 267 Franco-German Axis 267 British Government 269 Council Secretariat, Commission and European Parliament 270 3. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 272 Intergovemmentalism 272 Contents Neofunctionalism 278 An Incremental Process 281 4. THIRD OBJECTIVE - EVOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE IGC 285 5. IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 288 CONCLUSIONS 292 Bibliography Appendices List o f Tables and Figures List of