The and : Playing the American Card Author(s): Ronald T. Libby Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 1, Crisis and Global Restructuring (Winter, 1990), pp. 86-109 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2633631 . Accessed: 03/03/2011 15:52

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http://www.jstor.org The UnitedStates and Jamaica: Playingthe American Card by Ronald T. Libby

Itis commonlyassumed that Jamaica under the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) governmentof EdwardSeaga subordinatedits foreign policies to the United Statesin returnfor economic aid and assistance.For example,Carl Stone (1985b: 292) arguesthat Jamaica under Seaga was a "surrogate"of the United Statesin the Caribbean.Similarly, Evelyne Stephens and JohnStephens (1986: 253) suggestthat Seaga's foreignpolicy toward was designed to winfavor with the Reagan administration. In contrast,Anthony Maingot (1985: 315) arguesthat the leadersof Caribbeanstates have their own reasons for maintaining good relations with Washingtonwhich are not necessarily in conflict with U.S. interests.Indeed, thisraises the question of the"paradox of weak statepower." This is the paradoxof a relativelyresourceless, small state exercising significant influ- ence in internationalaffairs. William Fox (1959: 2) notesin thisregard that in therealm of diplomacy,representatives of great powers have more than once beenoutmatched by small states.' In thisarticle I arguethat under the Seaga administrationJamaica, a small state,exercised significant influence with a greatpower. Moreover, Jamaica's foreignpolicy during this period was notsimply intended to curry favor with theUnited States; it was primarilydesigned with Jamaica's domestic politics in mind. Seaga's skillfulmanipulation of Jamaica'srelationship with the United Statessucceeded in gainingadvantages for Jamaica which far exceeded the country'shistoric importance to the United States. It is arguable,in fact, that theeconomic support which Seaga obtainedfrom the Reagan administration

RonaldT. Libbyteaches political science at SouthwestState University, Marshall, Minnesota. He was SeniorLecturer at theUniversity of the West Indies, Jamaica, during 1984-1985. He is theauthor of ThePolitics of Economic Power in SouthernAfrica (Princeton University Press, 1987) and is currentlyworking on a studyof thePolitical Economy of theWorld Agricultural Crisis.The authorwould like to thankAlex Dupuy and Hoby Spaldingfor their helpful suggestionsfor revising the article. However, the views presented herein are solely the respon- sibilityof the author.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 64, Vol. 17 No. 1, Winter 1990 86-109 C) 1990 Latin American Perspectives

86 Libby/ U.S.-JAMAICA RELATIONS 87 was in conflictwith the declared objectives of U.S. foreignpolicy toward ThirdWorld countries. Jamaica's success in influencingU.S. policywas largelyattributable to theprime minister's diplomacy.

CONSENSUS OF SCHOLARLY OPINION

Recentscholarship has focusedupon the failure of the People's National Party(PNP) governmentof MichaelManley (1972-1980) to carryout its "experiment"with democratic . Levitt (1984: 4) argues,for exam- ple,that the primary responsibility for the failure of the PNP government lies withthe leader of theparty -Manley. He is criticizedfor a lack of realism anda failureto mobilize domestic support for the party's economic policies. Stephensand Stephens (1986) also blameManley for the PNP government's failureto capitalizeupon the most propitious opportunity to carryout its "socialisttransformation"' shortly after the imposition of the bauxite levy in 1974. His failureto act at thattime is regardedas a criticalmistake. The reasonis thatnot only did the levy result in a windfallof government revenue butalso worldeconomic conditions were still favorable for Jamaica. After 1975,however, the world economic downturn practically ruled out the kind of sweepingsocial and economicchange required to implementthe PNP's socialistprogram. This was dueto the fragile multiclass character of support forthe PNP governmentwhich requires vast economic patronage to remain in power. Stephensand Stephens also criticizeManley for unnecessarily antagoniz- ingthe United States by using the rhetoric of anti-imperialism and by making a publicdisplay of diplomaticsupport for .In otherwords, Manley'sgovernment has been criticizedfor inept leadership, including diplomacy,particularly in itsdealings with the United States. Mostdiscussions of Seaga's foreignpolicy have tended to focus upon the so-calledspecial relationship between Seaga and PresidentReagan. How- ever,there is littleanalysis of this relationship other than to note the existence of a personalfriendship between the two leaders and the similarities in their politicalideology. Stephens and Stephens(1986: 251) have observedthat after1980 Seaga effectivelyplayed the "American card" of emphasizing the role of theprivate sector in theJLP government'sdevelopment plan for Jamaica.-They also notethat this was "worthquite a bit"to Jamaica. Exactly howthe diplomatic card was playedand what its significance to Jamaica was, however,is notexplained. In fact,Seaga's diplomaticsuccesses are down- playedby the authors. This is undoubtedlydue to thefact that in theirview 88 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Seaga's economicpolicies "returned" Jamaica to a "dependentcapitalist" pathof development which they regard as retrogradeand self-defeating. However,this view is myopic.As theythemselves note, no democratically electedgovernment of a "peripheralcapitalist" country has yetmade the transformationto "." In thecase of Jamaica,at least, eventhe most optimistic scenario would have allowed the PNP government a baretwo years from 1974 to 1976to mobilize public support for the party's socialistprogram. Furthermore,both the PNP and JLP governments have failed to implement theirpolicies of structurallytransforming Jamaica. The programsof both governmentswere undermined by world economic trends which were largely outsideof their control. Therefore, the real difference between the PNP and JLPgovernments does notlie in theireconomic programs or policiesbut in therealm of political policy and foreign policy. Giventhe criticism of Manley'sleadership of thePNP government,it is ironicthat Seaga's successfuldiplomatic relationship with Washington is discounted.In fact,an examinationof Seaga's foreignpolicy successes, particularlywith the United States, should provide important insights into effectiveleadership for future governments of Jamaica.

EMERGENCE OF THE JLP GOVERNMENT

The JLPgovernment of EdwardSeaga emergedfrom the generalelection. The partywon the election with 59 percentof the vote and 51 ofthe 60 parliamentaryseats. The turnout was a recordhigh of 77 percent of all eligiblevoters. The JLP receivedstrong electoral support from all classesand groups in Jamaican society as shownin an electionstudy of 944 votersby Carl Stone (1985a): Theurban unemployed cast 60 percentof their votes forthe JLP; skilledworkers, 52 percent;white collar workers, 63 percent;business and managerialclass, 86 percent;farm labor, 58 percent; andsmall peasants, 65 percent. Stone's(1981, 1982) electionstudies show that the swing away from the PNP to theJLP in 1980 was uniformthroughout the society. A majorityof all majorgroups polled, for example, indicated their voting preference for theJLP.4 The polling results showed that by a widemargin the most important electionissue was thecondition of thenational economy. For example, in a September1980 poll Stone (1981: 11) foundthat economic issues (especially unemployment,shortages of goods, and economicrecovery) were most importantto51 percentof respondents inthe major urban areas, to 66 percent of thosein smallertowns, and to 61 percentof respondentsinrural areas. Libby/ U.S.-JAMAICA RELATIONS 89

Stoneconcludes that the massive swing away from the PNP government was due largelyto theadverse impact of the depressed economy which was perceivedto be theresult of the government's economic "mismanagement," growingunemployment, decline in real wages,the business community's fearof the"left-wing" of thePNP, as well as dwindlingresources for party patronage.These combined to shatter the PNP's fragilecross-class coalition of politicalsupport. Theeconomic issue was a particularlytelling factor in the election because of themulticlass nature of partypolitics in Jamaica.Both major political partiesare supportedby groupswith widely different social and economic interests.The PNPand the JLP are led by middle-class elites, both have labor wingsand representatives inthe business community, both use armedurban gangs to controlpolitical unrest among the poor,and both tendto be nonideological(the exception perhaps being the PNP government from 1972 to 1980).s Thistends to make the parties highly dependent upon economic revenues andlargess to reward the disparate class intereststhat support their electoral organizations.Therefore, itis almostaxiomatic that a severedownturn in the Jamaicaneconomy alienates substantial segments of a rulingparty's political alliance.Therefore, when government patronage in theform of jobs, con- structioncontracts, and other personal benefits begins to dry up, the party in powerbegins to lose itspolitical constituency. Stephens and Stephens (1986: 320-345)criticize 's program of social democracyon the groundsthat it failedto transcendthe cross-class social base of thePNP government'ssupport by building a mass-basedsocialist movement empha- sizingprograms and ideology rather than patronage.

U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON JAMAICAAND THE CARIBBEAN

In orderto appreciateSeaga's diplomaticstrategy toward the United Statesunder the Reagan administration, it is firstnecessary to understand Washington'sCaribbean policy. From the perspective of theU.S. govern- ment,Jamaica under Seaga was one of itsmost important political allies in theCaribbean and perhaps in Latin American in general. It was also regarded as oneof the most consistent supporters of U.S. policiestoward Third World countries.I arguethat Seaga's skillfuldiplomacy is largelyresponsible for thisperception. The traditionalAmerican definition of theCaribbean (called theCarib- bean Basin underthe Reagan administration) includes the Commonwealth and non-Commonwealthterritories of the Caribbeanas well as Central 90 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

America.Given this conception, the incoming Reagan administration per- ceived a seriesof breakdownsin thetraditional order of theregion. For example,the Somoza regimein Nicaraguawas overthrownby theFrente Sandinistade LiberacionNacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front, FSLN) in 1979; therewas a civilwar in El Salvadorand growing guerrilla activityin Honduras and Guatemala. There were also violent independentista protestsagainst the United States in Puerto Rico; therewas a left-wingcoup in Suriname,outbreaks of nationalist violence in the French colonial territo- riesof Guadeloupe and Martinique, and a left-wingcoup in in 1979. Consistentwith the administration'spreoccupation with the Soviet Union's"aggressive (expansionist) empire" and with Cuba's roleas a policy instrumentfor the assault against American security in theWestern Hemi- sphere(Sanchez, 1983: 44), thefalling dominoes in theCaribbean were attributedtoSoviet-Cuban expansionism. From the point of view of the "new right"in theReagan administration, these falling or fallendominoes had to be stoppedor reversedor Americancredibility as a globalpower would be in question.Reagan's 1980 electioncampaign had scoredeffectively in attackingPresident Carter's failure to project the image of a strongAmerica abroad.Hence, one of the cardinal tenets of the new Reagan administration's foreignpolicy was toregain respect for the United States as a worldpower. The logicalplace to rebuildits tarnished image was in itsown "backyard." Therefore,the CaribbeanBasin became a testingground for rebuilding America'sprestige as a globalpower. In thisregard, Grenada was of specialimportance soon after the Reagan administrationtook office.For almosttwenty years there were no new regimesin theCaribbean patterned after the Cuban Revolution. The blood- less coup of March 1979 whichbrought the Marxist-Leninist-inspired People'sRevolutionary Government (PRG), led byMaurice Bishop and the New JewelMovement (NJM), to powerin Grenadachanged that. Bishop was an enthusiasticexponent of the Cuban model of development. Speaking at thesixth summit conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1979,for example,he saidthat "It [Cuba]is nowthe best example in the world of what a smallcountry under socialism can achieve"(Bishop, 1982: 94). Bishop's statementssuch as "Cuba laidthe basis for Grenada and " and "If therehad been no Cuban Revolutionin 1959 therecould have been no Grenadianrevolution in 1979" (1982: 114)encouraged Washington's splash- ingdomino rationale. The symbolicimportance of the leftist coup in tinyGrenada with its 133 squaremiles and population of 92,000 to theReagan administration cannot be exaggerated.For example,during his visitto the Caribbeanin 1982, Libby/ U.S.-JAMAICA RELATIONS 91

Reaganstated: "All of us are concernedwith the overturn of Westminster parliamentarydemocracy in Grenada. That country now bears the Soviet and Cubantrademark, which means that it will attempt to spread the virus among itsneighbours" (Caribbeani Contact, May 1982).

THE ALIGNMENT OF JAMAICA'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH THE UNITED STATES

The Seaga administrationhad a twofoldsignificance in U.S. foreign policy.First, Seaga defendedAmerica's Caribbean policy, and second,he portrayedJamaica as thepreferred U.S. developmentrole model for Third Worldcountries. In returnfor performing these two roles,Seaga secured politicalconcessions from the Reagan administration. We shallexamine how Seaga,as therepresentative ofa smallstate, gained influence with a dominant power. Seaga's principalmodus operandi was to establishhis unrivaled political leadershipof Jamaica.To thisend, he set outto repudiatethe foreign and domesticpolicies of his predecessor,Michael Manley. Ironically, however, Seaga adoptedsome of Manley'sown leadershipstrategies in orderto repudiatehim. For example, Seaga brokewith the JLP's traditional isolation- istforeign policy and adopted a high-profilediplomatic posture. In departing fromthe JLP's diplomatic tradition, Seaga was undoubtedlyimpressed by Manley'shighly publicized diplomatic initiatives in supportof theNon- AlignedMovement and the New InternationalEconomic Order (NIEO). However,instead of using Jamaica's foreign policy to align the country with ThirdWorld countries, Seaga usedit to gain influence with the United States. In theprocess of rejectingManley's Third World diplomacy, Seaga aligned Jamaica'sforeign policy with the United States. Seaga gainedinfluence with the U.S. governmentby defending its Carib- bean policy.He did thisthrough diplomatic initiatives in two areas of importanceto Washington-Cubaand Grenada.Seaga brokeoff Jamaica's diplomaticrelations with Cuba, arguing that this was necessaryto contain thespread of Cuban communist influence in the Caribbean. His government defendedthe U.S. invasionof Grenada in 1983on thesame grounds -con- tainingcommunist influence in the Caribbean. While there is noquestion that Seaga personallyabhored Castro's Cuba, his actions served domestic politi- cal purposes.Not only was thisa devicefor repudiating Manley's leadership butit also presentedto theReagan administration the image of a Caribbean countrythat was a stalwartsupporter of theUnited States. Seaga shrewdly 92 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES cultivatedthis image amongAmerican policymakers, in partto extract politicalconcessions. An indicationof the success of this strategy is thathis governmentreceived unprecedented levels of foreign aid andassistance.

CONTAINING CUBAN INFLUENCE

Seaga severeddiplomatic relations with Cuba in 1982ostensibly because Cuba was interferinginJamaica's internal affairs. This actionhad a highly symbolicsignificance, however, in termsof Jamaicanpolitics. It involved, amongother things, the expulsion of the Cuban ambassador, Senior Estrada. His visibilityin thecompany of MichaelManley and hisverbal attacks on theJLP made his continued presence in Jamaica after Seaga cameto power politicallyuntenable. The fearof a Cuban-Jamaicanaxis in the Caribbeanwas a matterof concernto Washingtoneven before the Reagan administration took office. Cooperationbetween the PNP and the Cuban CommunistParty was, for example,worrisome to theCarter administration when National Security AdvisorZbigniew Brzezinski emerged as Carter'schief foreign policy advisorin 1979. They were particularlyconcerned about the so-called Brigadistaprogram of interparty exchanges involving the training of between 300 and 400 Jamaicansin Cuba and thepresence of about200 Cubansin Jamaicabetween 1975 and 1980 (interviewwith D.K. Duncan,November 5, 1985). Stephensand Stephens(1986: 108) estimatethere were 1,400 participantsin theBrigadista program. The formationof the Jamaica Home Guard as a local communityadjunct tothe police in combating growing incidents of criminal violence, patterned afterthe Cuban model, also concernedWashington. The fear was thatCuban influencewould radicalizethe PNP and encouragea left-wingcoup in Jamaicacomparable with the NJM coup led by Bishop in Grenada. Stephens and Stephens(1986: 189-191)point out that Seaga encouragedthis fear in policymakersin Washington.In fact,he plantedthe seed of a fear in Washingtonof a left-wingpolitical coup within the PNP government as early as 1977.For example,in a speechin Washingtonin October1977, Seaga expressedhis alarm that Cuban influence was growingin Jamaica, Grenada, Guyana,and Trinidad.In subsequentstatements, Seaga claimedthat left- wingradicals had subvertedthe PNP government,and thisthreatened de- mocracyin Jamaica. By repudiatingCuban influence in thePNP government,Seaga was also repudiatingwhat appeared to Washington to be thepotential reemergence of Cubancommunist influence in Jamaica.This was evidentduring President Libby/ U.S.-JAMAICA RELATIONS 93

Reagan's1982 "working holiday" in the Commonwealth Caribbean. During hisvisit to Jamaica, Reagan declared that Seaga had"rescued" Jamaica from a governmentthat was "virtuallyunder communist control" (Caribbean Contact,May 1982). A recentexample of Seaga's manipulationof Washington's fear of com- munistinfluence within the PNP was put forthin the aftermathof the disastrousmunicipal elections of July1986 in whichthe opposition PNP received58 percentof thepopular vote and won 12 out of the 13 parish elections;Scaga threatenedto resignas theleader of the ruling JLP. On October12, 1986, Seaga announcedthat he would not seek reelection as leaderof theparty and thathe intendedto resignhis primeministry on August12, 1987. The effect of this action was tosilence (at least temporarily) hiscritics within the party and thereby enable him to reshuffle his cabinet to reassertcontrol of theparty. It also had theeffect of shockingWashington intomaking political concessions by urging the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to relaxits stringent conditions for financial assistance to Jamaica. Followingthe pattern set during the second Manley government (1976- 1980),an acrimoniousconflict broke out between the Seaga governmentand officialsfrom the IMF, World Bank, and USAID justprior to theannounce- mentof the 1986-1987 budget in May 1986.6 Seaga refusedto accepttheir conditions for assistance such as devaluing theJamaican dollar, making additional budget cuts, and announcingprice controlsfor a long listof consumercommodities, claiming that it was a prescriptionfor "no growth."After three successive years of "austerity," includinga severedecline in GDP of 4 percentin 1985,it was necessary, accordingto Seaga, to "shiftto thenext phase of meaningfulgrowth." The timingof Seaga's actionwas undoubtedlyrelated to theforthcoming local governmentalelections held in July 1986. Seaga's threatto resignappears to havejolted Washington into action. Theirlingering fear of a resurrectedleft-wing-oriented PNP governmentof Jamaicaunder the influence of Cuba andfollowing a Third World diplomatic strategyapparently persuaded the Reagan administrationto press for a relaxationof the conditions set by the IMF andaid agenciesfor Jamaica. The successof Seaga's strategywas announcedin January 1987. The IMF agreed to a standbycredit of U.S.$132.8 millionwithout the previouslystated conditions. Manleysought to exercise similar influence with Jamaica's major creditor countries-Britain,the United States, and -in 1977 topersuade the IMF to softenits conditions for a loan.While he succeeded,there are two importantdifferences between the strategies adopted by Manley and Seaga. First,Manley's government was onlyable to securea two-yearstandby for 94 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

U.S.$74 millionwhich was 120 percentof Jamaica's quota-wholly inade- quatefor Jamaica's needs at the time. By contrast, the standby loan that Seaga receivedfrom the IMF inJanuary 1987 raised the Fund's lending to Jamaica to450 percentof its quota - themaximum permitted - and the conditions for itwere far more lenient that those given to Manley. Second,and moreimportant than the amount of financialassistance or even the conditionsfor it, was Washington'sreason for interveningon Jamaica'sbehalf. Manley's appeals to Washington for help in persuading the IMF andaid agenciesto soften their conditions for economic assistance were basedupon human rights or the basic human needs of the Jamaican people. However,after the Carter administration shifted its primary interest in the regionaway fromhuman rights toward national security considerations, Manley'sappeals did not carry much weight. Seaga, in contrast, appealed to Washingtonfor assistance on the basis of U.S. nationalinterests in the Caribbean.In otherwords, Seaga capitalizedupon Washington's perception (whichhe helpedto shape and reinforce)that it was in theU.S. national interestto supporthis government. In fact,Seaga's diplomaticsuccesses with Washington were a principal source of demoralizationwithin the PNP. While Manley and the PNP leadershiprecognize that the continued decline of Jamaica'seconomy is a serioushandicap for any incominggovernment, a more serious problem facingthem is thetask of persuadingWashington that a PNP government does notpose a threatto theUnited States and therefore deserves economic assistancecomparable to thatreceived by Seaga's government.Manley has madestrenuous efforts in speaking engagements in the United States for the past severalyears to counteractWashington's perception of thePNP as a communistthreat. This is partialtestimony to Seaga's successin cultivating thatimage of thePNP in Washington.It also helpsexplain Manley's purge ofthe PNP "left-wing"and the fact that he nowblames them for the party's resoundingelection defeat in 1980.

OVERTHROWING "MARXISM" IN GRENADA

Close interpartyrelations between the PNP in Jamaicaand theNJM in Grenada even before Bishop came to power in 1979 contributedto Washington'sfear of Cuba's spreadinginfluence in the Caribbean. The close relationshipbetween the two parties was evident,for example, in the fact that thePNP adoptedthe NJM as a "fraternalsocialist party" despite the tension thiscreated between the PNP governmentof Jamaicaand theGrenadian governmentof Eric Gairy. Libby/ U.S.-JAMAICA RELATIONS 95

Afterthe 1979 coup in Grenadaand theNJM's seizure of power,the PNP playedan instrumentalrole in persuading the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to accept the participationof Grenadaunder the Bishop governmentdespite grave misgivingson the partof severalCaribbean governments.Manley himself maintained a close personalrelationship with Bishopand in 1979 he sponsoredBishop's new government for recognition at themeeting of theNon-Aligned Movement (NAM) inHavana (interview withP.J. Patterson, December 4, 1984).In fact, it was Manley'sspeech before theNAM meetingin which he embraced the fraternal party relations among theCuban Communist Party, the PNP, and theNJM that set offsignals of alarmin Washington. WhenSeaga was electedto office in October1980 by the largest popular majorityever, he setout to repudiateManley's leadership of Jamaica. This extendedto Jamaica's relationship with Grenada under the PNP government. FromSeaga's pointof view, it was largelyfortuitous that the condemnation of Manley'ssupport for the Bishop government was seenby Washington to be an attackon the expansionof Soviet-backedCuban influencein the Caribbean.Therefore, while Seaga's policytoward Grenada had theeffect ofaligning Jamaica's foreign policy with U.S. Caribbeanpolicy, his principal motivationwas to asserthis own foreignpolicy by rejectingManley's policies. Seaga playedan activerole in reversing Manley's efforts to legitimate the newgovernment of Grenada.For example, at the September 1981 Common- wealthCaribbean foreign ministers' meeting, Seaga said thathe supported the U.S. govemment'sexclusion of Grenadafrom the recently proposed CaribbeanBasin Initiative(CBI) since,according to him,Cuba and other countries(i.e., socialistbloc) would takecare of Grenada'sneeds (Latin AmericanRegional Reports [LARR], August 20, 1982). At the first CARICOM Heads of GovernmentConference held in 1982 afterthe PRG came to powerin Grenada,Seaga supporteda resolutionby theBarbadian PrimeMinister, Tom Adams,which was designedto isolateGrenada. The resolutionrecommended changing the CARICOM treatyto excludecoun- trieswhich deviated from the norms of parliamentary democracy - an action clearlydesigned to isolateGrenada. Seaga also playeda rolein mobilizing Commonwealth Caribbean support forthe U.S. invasionof Grenada. For example, Seaga attendedan extraordi- narymeeting of the Organizationof EasternCaribbean States (OECS) comprisedof Antigua, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis,St. Lucia,St. Vincentand theGrenadines, and Grenada(which was absentfor obvious reasons.).Tom Adams,the Barbadian Prime Minister, was theonly other non-OECSrepresentative besides Seaga at themeeting. 96 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

The meetingwas held two days after"bloody Wednesday" in which MauriceBishop, three cabinet members, and twolabor leaders were killed in Grenadaand fourdays before the U.S. invasionof Grenadaon October 25, 1983.The leaders"voted" (by some accountsendorsed a U.S. request) forAmerican assistance to invadeGrenada to disbandthe new military governmentcalled the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) led by Gen- eralHudson Austin. The declaredpurpose of the"request" was to removethe military junta, set up an interimcivilian government in itsplace leadingto elections,and restoreWestminster democracy in Grenada.However, the real impetus behindthe Eastern Caribbean states' support for this action was theirfear that theGrenadian coup would encourage revolutionary political activity in their owncountries. Bishop'spolitical statements after taking power in 1979 wereused by Seaga andothers to substantiateGrenada's alleged threat to OECS member states.For example, in a speechto the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana in September1979, Bishop said that"the balance of forces in theworld" was changingand there was "beingbuilt a newCaribbean -Jamaica, Guyana, a newGrenada, Dominica, St. Lucia" (Bishop,1982: 97). The October1983 militarycoup in Grenadawhich was allegedlyinspired by theleft wing's dissatisfactionwith Bishop's "petty-bourgeois" inclinations and his refusal to sharepower with Bernard Coard, the military leader who led thecoup, gave Seaga andthe Barbadian Prime Minister, Tom Adams, the opportunity to mobilizethe leaders of the Eastern Caribbean islands against Grenada on thebasis of their fear of an evenmore radical regime led by Coard (see Payne et al., 1984: 150-151). Afterthe U.S. invasion,Seaga continuedto pursuea foreignpolicy that reversedManley's policy and also had theeffect of aligningJamaica with theUnited States. For example, Jamaica contributed about 300 ofthe roughly 400 combinedtoken peace-keeping force of the six EasternCaribbean countriesinvolved in theGrenadian invasion (Daily Gleaner,January 6, 1985). Jamaicaalso participatedin U.S. militarymaneuvers in 1986 called OceanVenture 86. Themaneuvers were held in Grenada and the Puerto Rican islandof Vieques,involving 20,000 soldiers from the United States, Vene- zuela,Jamaica, Barbados, and Antiguaand Barbudaas well as thePuerto Ricannational guard.7 Seaga was also one ofthe most outspoken and articulate defenders of the Grenadianinvasion. The UnitedStates relied upon Seaga and Adams,in particular,to justify their action. For example, in United Nations debates on theGrenadian issue, Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick relied upon statements by Seaga in respondingto criticism.She pointedout thatJamaica and Libby/ U.S.-JAMAICA RELATIONS 97

Barbadoswere "the key states in theregion" and thatthey fully supported theinvasion (Washington Times, October 30, 1983:43). Seaga's importance to Washingtonwas relatedto the almostuniversal condemnation of the invasion.Only Jamaica, Barbados, and the OECS statessupported the U.S. action. Seaga also playeda role in fosteringthe formation of a pro-American governmentofGrenada. For example, in August 1983, Seaga helpedto merge threeconservative Grenadian parties into one majorparty -the New Na- tionalParty (NNP) ledby Herbert Blaize. The outcome of the December 1984 electionin Grenada in which the NNP won 14 ofthe 15 parliamentaryseats was a sourceof relief both in Washington and Kingston. Seaga's supportof the NNP was notsimply a strategyto cement relations withthe United States. It was a logicalextension of theJLP's effortsto repudiatethe PNP and to capitalizeon a popularissue at home.Lingering publicfear of thePNP's pro-Cuban,socialist sympathies was thenand has remainedthe PNP's mosttroublesome election issue. Seaga's politicalacumen in this regard was evidentin his decision to call generalelections shortly after the Grenadian invasion and two years before they were constitutionallyrequired. The Jamaicanvoter interpreted Jamaica'sinvolvement in theinvasion of Grenadaas a defeatfor Cuba and theSoviet Union. The timingof thegeneral elections in December1983 and the PNP's refusalto contest the election on whatmany saw as disingenuousgrounds (a ''gentleman'sagreement" not to hold general elections until a newvoter's list was compiled)resulted in the JLP's winning 54 ofthe 60 parliamentaryseats by default.Seaga's emphasisupon removing Cuban "subversion" in Gre- nada,therefore, was notsimply a matterof pandering to Washington'scold war fears.Rather it was based upona carefulreading of Jamaicanpublic opinionand a shrewdsense of political timing.

JAMAICAAS A DEVELOPMENT ROLE MODEL

The secondway in which Jamaica's foreign policy was alignedwith U.S. policywas throughSeaga's developmentalmodel for Third World countries. Seaga elaborateda twofolddevelopmental doctrine which was designedto alignJamaica's developmental policy with U.S. policyand to rationalize largeinflows of American foreign aid. Whilethese policies appeared to be contradictory,they were, in fact, part of a singlediplomatic strategy by Seaga to discreditManley and the PNP and at the same timegain maximum influencewith Washington. 98 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

The onlycontradiction was inWashington's support for the dual strategy proposedby Seaga. The largeaid flowto Jamaica under the Reagan admin- istrationwas in conflictwith the administration'semphasis upon private sector-ledgrowth in ThirdWorld countries. In orderto understandthe purposeof Seaga's alignmentof Jamaica's development policy with that of theUnited States, it is necessaryto brieflyexamine each.

REAGAN'S THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Earlyin hisfirst administration, President Reagan adopted a highprofile hard-lineapproach to Third World aid and debtproblems. In a bluntspeech tothe 1981 annual meeting of the IMF andWorld Bank, Reagan said that the UnitedStates would oppose efforts for substantial increases in IMF/World Banklending to bail out Third World countries that were swamped with rising debtsand huge oil bills.He calledfor an endto squabbling between rich and poor countriesand said that"unless a nationputs its own financialand economichouse in order, no amountof aid willproduce progress." At themeeting, the UnitedStates forged a commonfront among the industrialpowers and successfully rebuffed almost every demand from Third Worldcountries for more aid on softerterms. Reagan's solution for all but thepoorest of the poor (i.e., Sub-Saharan Africa) was a growing,prosperous U.S. economy.The implicationsfor developing Third World countries were clear.In orderfor them to takeadvantage of thespread effects of a growing U.S. economythey would have to follow free-market policies which would removebarriers to U.S. tradeand investment. Withinthis framework, the Reagan administration adopted an economic policytoward the Caribbean that distinguished itfrom previous administra- tions.The centerpiece of the policy was theCaribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) whichwent into effect in early 1984. Its stated purpose was to helpremove U.S. tradebarriers which blocked potential exports of CaribbeanBasin countries(20 countrieswere eligiblein December1984). The declared purposeof the plan was togive these countries a competitive edge over other ThirdWorld countries (although not over producers in the United States, the VirginIslands, and Puerto Rico) by granting twelve-year duty-free entry into theU.S. marketfor certain categories of exports. Secretaryof StateGeorge Shultz explained the innovation of U.S. eco- nomicpolicy toward the region at theeighth annual conference on Trade, Investment,and Development in the Caribbean Basin in in December Libby/ U.S.-JAMAICA RELATIONS 99

1984. He said thatU.S. foreignassistance would not play the dominant role itonce did. Officialforeign assistance accounted for 40 percentof net capital inflows toLatin American and Caribbean countries during the 1960s with another 40 percentcoming from foreign direct investment. During the 1970s, external commercialbank financing became the major source of capitalfor these countries.One majorconsequence of thiswas a burgeoningexternal debt whichgrew from approximately $75 billionin 1974to $336 billionin 1983. Externaldebt was thusgrowing at about 20 percentper year. Shultz predicted thatat currentrates of externalborrowing the region's external debt would riseto a staggering$620 billionby the end of 1989.This is wellbeyond their capacityto repayeven the interest on theloans. Shultzargued that not only are thereinsufficient sources of external lendingto continuethis level of externalborrowing, but also U.S. foreign assistancewould not be forthcomingto fillthe gap. The secretaryunder- scoredthe Reagan strategy of removingtrade and investmentrestrictions betweenthe United States and regionalstates as thechief prescription to reversetheir economic stagnation and decline. The Reagan position was that tradeprotectionism made these small economies dependent upon restricted, unprofitablemarkets and inefficient state enterprises which diverted scarce resourcesaway from more productive economic activity.

SEAGA*S DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Seaga's twofolddevelopment policy aligned Jamaica with U.S. policy towardThird World countries and at the same time enabled Seaga to extract largeaid flowsfrom Washington. The firstpolicy strategy, the Caribbean Basin Initiative(CBI), meshedwith Washington's policy of emphasizing privatesector-lcd growth in ThirdWorld countries. The second policy strategywas designedto appeal to U.S. nationalsecurity concerns in the Caribbeanand was predicatedupon large amounts of economic assistance to theCaribbean. However, once again,Seaga's strategywas notsimply de- signedto curryfavor with Washington. His policieswere primarily intended to assertSeaga's politicalleadership by repudiatingManley's economic policies.We shallbriefly examine Seaga's strategiesto understandhow he has usedthem to gainpolitical influence with Washington. By endorsingthe U.S. CaribbeanBasin Initiative(CBI), Seaga was not merelyaping Washington's line. In fact, he can claim, with some justification, authorshipof the philosophy underlying CBI. Seaga laidout the rationale for 100 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES theCBI inOctober 1979 while he was theleader of the opposition JLP. In a campaignspeech to the diplomatic corps in Kingston in October 1980 (before thegeneral election in Jamaica and also before the U.S. presidentialelection), Seaga contrastedthe JLP's position with that of the PNP government. In the speech,Seaga said thatJamaica's foreign policy under a JLP governmentwould be compatiblewith Jamaica's domestic policy. Failure to synchronizethe two under the Manley government was, in Seaga's opinion, thereason it had failed.According to Seaga, Manleyconducted Jamaica's foreigneconomic policy as if thecountry were a less developedcountry (LDC) whereas,in truth,Jamaica was a middle-levelcountry or a more developedcountry (MDC). Seaga said thatJamaica was moreproperly describedas being"highly placed" in thecomparative social and economic peckingorder of the Third World (Sunday Gleaner, October 14, 1979). The significanceof thisdistinction in Seaga's logicis crucialfor under- standinghis foreign economic policy. The basiccharacteristic of a middle- levelcountry according to Seaga was thatit was typicallya market economy withan activeand large-scaleprivate sector. By contrast,a less developed countrywas characterizedby a centrallyplanned economy, and had high levelsof statecontrol and a largepublic sector which dominated the econ- omy.Following this line of thinking,Seaga concludedthat because of the differentstructural characteristics of LDCs and MDCs, theirneeds were different.For example, because of the important role of the private sector in MDCs, theireconomies were allegedly more receptive to trade than aid. By contrast,the dominance of the public sector in LDCs was said to maketheir economiesmore responsive to aid thantrade. Giventhis logic, Seaga concludedthat the structure ofJamaica's economy requireda foreigneconomic policy which would increase trade and invest- mentflows to its private sector. He declared,therefore, that a JLPgovernment wouldplace greatemphasis upon negotiating international market prefer- ences forJamaica's exports and would instituteinvestment incentives to stimulatethe growth of thecountry's private sector. Seaga attackedManley's preoccupation with establishing a New Interna- tionalEconomic Order (NIEO) on groundsthat he misunderstoodthe struc- tureof Jamaica's economy. Seaga arguedthat Manley's pursuit of the NIEO in theNon-Aligned Movement mistakenly associated Jamaica with LDCs. The dominanceof thestate sector in thesecountries led themto advocate policieswhich discouraged private sector growth. However, since Jamaica's economydepended upon private sector growth, the LDC policyprescription was detrimentaltoJamaica's growth. Seaga underscoredthe contradiction between Jamaica's domestic econ- omyand its foreign economic policy under the PNP government by pointing Libby/ U.S.-JAMAICA RELATIONS 101 to theflawed logic of itssupport for a NIEO. He explainedthat countries such as Jamaicawhich required markets and increasedprivate investment and tradefor theireconomic growth would benefitthe least fromthe achievementof NIEO objectives.8 The NIEO agendawas gearedprimarily to increase aid flowsor to relieve debtburdens of state-dominatedLDCs withtheir "nonproductive" sectors. Hence,the identificationof Jamaica'sinterests with the NIEO was mis- placed.Seaga also attackedthe Manley government's high-profile support fortheir world pressure politics directed primarily atthe United States on the groundsthat it alienated Jamaica's chief trading partner. Seaga arguedfor this position at theCommonwealth Heads of Govern- mentConference in Melboumein 1981. In a majoraddress on theworld economy,Seaga admonishedheads of ThirdWorld governments to cease lookingto aid as compensationfor their declining terms of trade. Instead, he stressedthat the only real solutionto theireconomic difficulties was the productionof internationallycompetitive goods and servicesfor the world market(Daily Gleaner, September 8, 1981). The seconddevelopmental strategy employed by Seaga was a campaign designedto securelarge U.S. economicassistance in orderto counterthe threatof Soviet-backed Cuban influence in the Caribbean. To thatend, Seaga appealedfor a "MarshallPlan type operation" for the Caribbean and Central Americawhich would double the level of officialAmerican aid to U.S. $3 billionper year.Seaga soughtto justifythis unprecedented level of U.S. assistancein terms of East-West conflict by claiming that the Caribbean Basin was thenext "hot spot" of the world (Sunday Gleaner, October 14, 1979). Seaga arguedthat all effortsto dateat regionaland subregional coopera- tionsuch as theCentral American Common Market, CARICOM, and the CaribbeanDevelopment Bank had failed to address the pressing problems of theregional states stemming from inadequate capital to finance development, energy,food, trade, and to cope with unemployment and poverty. He asserted thatthe recent "Cuban thrust" into the region was designedto exploitthese problems. Seaga saidthat faced with economic crisis, these countries were forced to makea choiceof developmentstrategies. As of 1979,there were only two modelsavailable to them.One was themodel pioneered by PuertoRico in the1 950s called"Operation Bootstrap" and the other model was theCuban oneof a Marxist-Leniniststate with imperialist ambitions that was supported by theSoviet Union. Neither model was appropriateto theneeds of Carib- bean states.The PuertoRican modelwas uniqueby virtueof itspolitical statuswith the United States, and the Cuban model was a threatto parliamen- tarydemocracy. 102 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Accordingto Seaga, thecrisis in theCaribbean called for regional soli- darityin orderto focusupon the developmental needs of thesestates. In takingthis position, Seaga openlychallenged the South-South strategy of the Manleygovernment. Instead, Seaga calledfor a combinedU.S.-Caribbean strategyto combatthe threatof Cuban communism.Seaga repeatedly stressedthis theme at meetings of the OAS, CARICOM,the Commonwealth Heads of Government,and in publicand privategatherings in theUnited States.

POLITICAL CONCESSIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES

By aligningJamaica's foreign policy with the United States, Seaga was able to securelarge-scale U.S. economicassistance plus supportfor loans frominternational agencies. Seaga's abilityto secureforeign assistance was in itselfa repudiationof MichaelManley, whose government was denied similarassistance. In fact,Seaga openlyboasted that unlike Manley, he was ableto secure international financial support for Jamaica. He hasspecifically pointedout thathis governmenthas been able to "pass theIMF test"for furtherlending. Hence, Seaga usedhis ability to obtain foreign assistance to reinforcehis popular image as a manof action and a "financialwizard." The politicalsignificance of U.S. aid to Jamaicaunder the Reagan administrationwas thatit enabled Seaga tofulfill a majorcampaign promise. The JLP's 1980 campaignwas basedlargely upon a programto restorethe country'seconomic growth. The newgovernment's first order of business in thisregard was torefinance Jamaica's external debt. Table 1 showsthat Seaga was, indeed,successful in this regard. Table 1 presentsdata on thesectoral composition of Jamaica'sforeign debt between1980 and 1984. Jamaica'sexternal debt increasedfrom U.S.$865.1in December 1980 to U.S.$1,695.8 million in July 1984. The data indicatea significantshift in the nature and source of Jamaica's foreign loans. The shiftwas fromhigh-interest, short-term commercial loans on whichthe Manleygovernment was forcedto rely,to long-term,low-interest official loansprimarily from USAID and theWorld Bank. This trend continued in 1985 withJamaica receiving U.S.$88.6 millionin totalassistance from internationalagencies. In 1986,however, the figure declined to only U.S.$4.7 million,undoubtedly reflecting the country's virtually unmanageable debt situationwhich has tendedto discouragefurther substantial lending to Jamaica.Table 2 showsthe total U.S. assistanceto Jamaicafrom 1972 to 1988. Libby/ U.S.-JAMAICA RELATIONS 103

TABLE 1 RefinancingJamaica's External Debt (U.S.$ millions)

Decemnber1980 July1984 Sourceof Loans Loan % Loan % PercentChange

WorldBank 97.8 11.3 325.8 19.2 + 232.1 Inter-American 48.2 5.6 105.0 6.2 + 117.8 DevelopmentBank USAID 46.1 5.3 387.1 22.8 + 739.7 CommercialBanks 351.1 40.6 512.3 30.2 + 45.9 Other 321.9 37.2 365.6 21.6 + 13.5 Total $865.1 100.0 $1,695.8 100.0

SOURCE: Dail Gleaner(November 30, 1984).

The data in Table 2 indicatethe high levels of U.S. foreignassistance receivedby Jamaicaduring the Seaga administration.Aid increasedfrom only U.S.$14.6 millionin 1980 to U.S.$140.7 millionin 1982, Seaga's secondyear in office.During Seaga's sevenyears in office,Jamaica was amongthe top 20 U.S. aid recipientsout of roughly 115 recipientcountries. Jamaicaranked within the top 10 U.S. aid recipientsif the figuresare calculatedon a percapita basis. For example, in 1985 Jamaica ranked number 15 outof 116recipients or number 5 on a percapita basis. This high level of U.S. economicassistance continued. For example,during fiscal year 1987, estimatedU.S. assistanceto Jamaica of U.S.$86.5 millionplaced it number 17 outof 115 aid recipients and the congressionally requested figure for 1988 of U.S.$107.8 would place Jamaica 16 outof 116 recipients. Jamaicaalso receivedspecial treatment by theReagan administration in its 1989 budgetproposal. For example,aid cutsto Jamaicaand balanceof paymentsassistance, suspended in 1988,were restored (LARR, March31, 1988: 7). Therefore,despite the overall decline in U.S. developmentassis- tancefor the 1980-1988 period, U.S. economicassistance to Jamaica contin- ued at a highlevel (see Sewell andContee, 1987: 1022).

THE LIMITATIONS OF SMALL POWER INFLUENCE

Seaga's skillfuldiplomacy toward the United States netted Jamaica sub- stantialforeign economic assistance. This success is particularlynoteworthy in lightof theU.S. government'sdeclared policy of refusingto "fillin the 104 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

TABLE 2 TotalU.S. Assistanceto Jamaica, 1972-1988 (U.S.$ millions)

Fiscal Year TotalAssitance 1988 107.8a 1987 86.5b 1986 122.8 1985 163.4 1984 114.2 1983 107.0 1982 140.7 1981 75.1 1980 14.6 1979 18.0 1978 23.3 1977 32.1 1976 5.1 1975 4.3 1974 13.2 1973 8.4 1972 6.1

SOURCE: USAID, 1987, 1983. a. Requested. b. Estimated.

(investment)gap" in capitalresources required for the economic growth of ThirdWorld countries. Despite Secretary Shultz's statements to thateffect, Jamaicaunder Seaga was a majorexception to thatpolicy. It received substantiallong-term, low-interest official loans in place of theshort-term, commerciallyoriented loans on whichhis predecessor was forcedto rely. Nevertheless,this political concession from Washington was notsuffi- cientto reverse or even arrest the long-term weakness of Jamaica's traditional exportindustries-bauxite/alumina andsugar. In essence,Seaga's abilityto securelarge foreign loans enabled his governmentto financeimports and gave himtime to tryto correctthe structural weakness in the country's internationaltrading relationships. However,a structuraladjustment of Jamaica's economy has not occurred. Forexample, the CBI was inauguratedin 1983 andyet Jamaica's nontradi- tionalexports (primarily garment exports and winter vegetables) have failed to offsetthe huge losses to the economydue to thefall in international demandfor bauxite/alumina. Table 3 showsthe decline in Jamaica's bauxite/ aluminaearnings and the country's trade balance for the years 1984 through 1986. Libby / U.S.-JAMAICA RELATIONS 105

TABLE 3 Jamaica'sBalance of Payments, 1984-1986, Selected Indicators (U.S.$millions)

Indicator 1984 1985 1986a Total Exports (fob) 702.4 568.6 580.0 Bauxite/alumina 443.5 289.7 286.9 Total Imports(cif) 1183.3 1143.6 942.8 Trade Balance -480.9 -575.0 -362.8

SOURCE: U.S. Departmentof Commerce (1987:3). a. Projected.

TABLE 4 Jamaica'sGDP Decline,1985 (%)

Sector Real GDP Real Growth Agriculture 8.8 -3.4 Export (1.3) (-3.3) Domestic (4.6) (-1.3) Manufacturing 15.7 -0.2 Mining 5.1 -19.5 Construction 5.4 -13.5 Services 65.0 -3.2 Total GDP 100.0 -3.7 SOURCE: U.S. Departmentof Commerce (1987: 5).

Jamaica,in fact, ran a largenegative trade balance during Seaga's entireterm ofoffice largely because of the decline of the bauxite/alumina industry. This resultedin a hugeexternal debt of about U.S.$3.7 billion in 1986.Even more alarmingis the factthat the debt serviceratio (interest payments as a proportionof principal payments) had risen to a staggering81.1 percentand Jamaica'sdebt service ratio as a percentof total exports was about42 percent. Fora small,resource-poor country like Jamaica, this is a virtuallyunpayable foreigndebt. Table4 showsthe overall decline in Jamaica's economy during 1985. The onlybright spot in Jamaica's economy was in thetourist industry which has now become the single largestsource of foreignexchange earnings (U.S.$442 millionprojected in 1986) and garmentexports to the United States.Garment exports to theUnited States were an estimatedU.S.$56 millionand foodstuffswere U.S.$29 millionin 1985. Ironically,however, neitherof thesegrowth areas was due to theCBI. For example,garment 106 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES exportsto theUnited States were stimulated by a bilateralCaribbean Basin TextileProduct Program ("super 807") thatguarantees duty-free access for apparelmade from fabric woven and cutin theUnited States and sewnin Jamaica. The politicalconsequences of thedecline of Jamaica'seconomy have beendevastating. The cross-classsupport that brought Seaga intopower in 1980 was undermined.All majorclasses-including trade unions, agricul- turalassociations, civil service, teacher and studentassociations, and busi- nessgroups except the very rich - protestedthe effects of the country's severe economicdeterioration. Recent opinion polls revealed the depth of hostility to Seaga's economicpolicies whichwere blamed forJamaica's severe economicdecline. For example, the Stone polls conducted in December 1988 justbefore the February 9, 1989,general elections, which brought Manley's PNP governmentback to powerfor a thirdterm, showed the extent of the populardisillusionment with Seaga's leadership.The Stonesurvey revealed thatthe JLP trailed the PNP amongwhite-collar workers and lower-income professionalsby 55 percentto 45 percent.Similarly, the PNP led theJLP amongmanual workers by a marginof 62 percentto 24 percent(LARR, February23, 1989:2). The PNP won thegeneral election by 57 percentof thepopular vote and securedat least44 of the60 seats in theHouse of Representatives.Manley won by a landslideequal to Seaga's electionvictory overthe PNP in 1980.

CONCLUSION

Seaga's skillfuldiplomacy toward the United States produced unprece- dentedlevels of American economic aid which helped to support his govern- ment.However, Seaga's principaldomestic and foreignpolicy objectives werenot exclusively nor primarily designed to serve U.S. policyobjectives. Rather,Seaga's policieswere designed primarily to assertthe preeminence of hispolitical leadership of Jamaica. To the extentthat Seaga's repudiationof Manley'spolicies aligned Jamaicanforeign policy with the United States, it served Seaga's interests. However,this is notto say thatU.S. interestswere necessarily advanced to thesame degree. In fact,Seaga's successfuldiplomacy toward Washington resultedin a contraventionofWashington's own policy toward Third World countries,emphasizing their reliance upon the private sector instead of large flowsof U.S. aid. This contradictionis all themore apparent given that Jamaica,unlike El Salvadorand Honduras, did not receive large-scale U.S. militaryassistance. Libby/ U.S.-JAMAICA RELATIONS 107

Nevertheless,Seaga's success in securingpolitical concessions from Washingtonwas notsufficient to sparehis governmentthe political conse- quencesof prolongedeconomic decline. The fragilemulticlass nature of Seaga's rulingJLP as well as the rivalPNP will make any government vulnerableto theeffects of prolongedand severeeconomic decline. How- ever,almost any government of Jamaica(including the PNP) willundoubt- edlybe obligedto exerciseeffective diplomatic strategies for securing the kindof political concessions which Seaga gainedfrom the United States. In the absence of alternativemajor new sourcesof economicassistance, Jamaica'sdebt burden and the continued shortage of foreignexchange will almostcertainly make the country'srelationship with the UnitedStates critical.Therefore, if nothingelse, Seaga's diplomaticstrategy toward the UnitedStates should provide useful insights for the currentand future governmentsof Jamaicaas well as othersmall states in theirdealings with greatpowers.

NOTES

1. Fora discussionof the paradox of weak state power in international relations see Lindell andPersson (1986), Handel(1981), Singer (1972), and Sveics (1970). 2. Stephensand Stephens (1 986: 189) arguethat the JLP also playedthe American card even beforecoming to powerin 1980. For example,in 1977 theJLP conducted a HumanRights Campaign(a majortheme of the Carter administration's foreign policy especially before Andrew Young'sdeparture from the administration in 1979). The campaignwas designedto discredit thePNP governmentinthe eyes of the United States on thegrounds that Manley's government massivelyviolated the human rights of JLP supporters. 3. This is notto deny,however, that economic policies followed by boththe Manley and Seaga governmentsdid not contribute to Jamaica'seconomic decline. For example, expansion- arybudget policies followed by theManley government despite the downturn in thecountry's exportearnings and theSeaga administration'sderegulation policies leading to increasecon- sumerimports undoubtedly compounded the country's serious external economic difficulties. Fora discussionof the domestic sources of Jamaica's economic decline under the Manley and Seaga regimessee Boyd(1986) andSharpley (1984). 4. Stephensand Stephens(1986: 83, 244-245,398) arguethat a class realignmentwhich occurredin the1976 general election won by thePNP was notreversed in the1980 election despitea swingaway fromthe PNP. However,evidence to supportthis assertion is at least premature.The basis fortheir claim are polls conducted by Stone(1981: 37) whichshow that theunemployed and unskilled category of votersdeclined from 60 percentvoting for the PNP in the1976 general election to 40 percentvoting for them. The basisof their argument appears to be thatthe unemployed and unskilledgroup included a highproportion of youths who were formerlyexcluded from the politicalcommunity. Part of the appeal of Manley'ssocialist ideologywas designedto mobilizethe "black masses' in supportof the PNP's "socialist movement.However, as theauthors themselves note, when the economic hardships of the depressedeconomy and the insecurity brought on by gun violence, particulary inthe urban areas, 108 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES increased,their "weak,""partisan attachment" to thePNP brokedown and they easily defected 1986:245). Therefore, itremains to be seenwhether the partisan loyalties of this group transcend narrowconsiderations of patronage. 5. Thisis notto suggest the absencc of differences inthe social makeup and leadership style of partyelites, however. For a discussionof these differences see Robertson(1972) and Stone (1980). 6. Thetendency in the literature is to focus upon the IMF as theprincipal source of Jamaica's economicausterity under the second Manley government. The IMF hasbeen blamed for disarray withinthe PNP overwhether to acceptthe Fund's austerity policy and for popular disaffection fromthe PNP governmentresulting from the economy's decline. See, forexample, Girvan, Bernal,and Hughes (1980). Whilethe IMF personifiedthe external nature of Jamaica's forced austerityand forthat reason symbolized the political dilemma facing the PNP, the real source of theausterity was thefailure of thecountry's traditional export industries-bauxite/alumina andsugar. Both industries have been in serious decline since 1975, necessitating massive foreign borrowingto sustainhigh levels of importation.Both the Manley and Seaga governmentshave beenforced to deal withan adverseeconomic situation largely outside of Jamaica's control. A majordifference between the two is thatSeaga hasbeen far more successful in obtaining foreign loans and credits,primarily from the United States, in copingwith this situation of forced austerity. 7. The U.S. proposalof 1982 to forma Caribbeanregional army has been shelvedby Washington.The reasonfor this was thedeath, in 1985,of the principal supporter of the plan in theCaribbean -Tom Adams.His successor,, opposed the plan, and other leaders ofEastern Caribbean states who formerly expressed support have either been voted out of office or theyhave reconsideredtheir position. A morelikely reason for the changeof heartby Caribbeanleaders is thefact that opposition parties in severalstates where governments had expressedsupport are gaining in strength and opposition to U.S. militaryinfluence in the region is growing.(See LARR,May 10, 1985: 1; October2, 1986:5; May 14, 1987: 3.) 8. Seaga's criticismof Jamaica'ssupport of the NIEO underManley's leadershipis paradoxical.The reasonis thatSeaga's principalclaim to politicalsuccess was his abilityto securehigh levels of foreign aid andconcessionary loans - principalplanks of the NIEO agenda. Furthermore,his governmenthas acknowledgedthat the major barriers impeding investment areof the government's own making. Decision-making is slow, too many bureaucratic approvals arerequired, and procedures are too complex.

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