The United States and Jamaica: Playing the American Card Author(S): Ronald T
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The United States and Jamaica: Playing the American Card Author(s): Ronald T. Libby Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 1, Caribbean Crisis and Global Restructuring (Winter, 1990), pp. 86-109 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2633631 . Accessed: 03/03/2011 15:52 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Latin American Perspectives. http://www.jstor.org The UnitedStates and Jamaica: Playingthe American Card by Ronald T. Libby Itis commonlyassumed that Jamaica under the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) governmentof EdwardSeaga subordinatedits foreign policies to the United Statesin returnfor economic aid and assistance.For example,Carl Stone (1985b: 292) arguesthat Jamaica under Seaga was a "surrogate"of the United Statesin the Caribbean.Similarly, Evelyne Stephens and JohnStephens (1986: 253) suggestthat Seaga's foreignpolicy toward Cuba was designed to winfavor with the Reagan administration. In contrast,Anthony Maingot (1985: 315) arguesthat the leadersof Caribbeanstates have their own reasons for maintaining good relations with Washingtonwhich are not necessarily in conflict with U.S. interests.Indeed, thisraises the question of the"paradox of weak statepower." This is the paradoxof a relativelyresourceless, small state exercising significant influ- ence in internationalaffairs. William Fox (1959: 2) notesin thisregard that in therealm of diplomacy,representatives of great powers have more than once beenoutmatched by small states.' In thisarticle I arguethat under the Seaga administrationJamaica, a small state,exercised significant influence with a greatpower. Moreover, Jamaica's foreignpolicy during this period was notsimply intended to curry favor with theUnited States; it was primarilydesigned with Jamaica's domestic politics in mind. Seaga's skillfulmanipulation of Jamaica'srelationship with the United Statessucceeded in gainingadvantages for Jamaica which far exceeded the country'shistoric importance to the United States. It is arguable,in fact, that theeconomic support which Seaga obtainedfrom the Reagan administration RonaldT. Libbyteaches political science at SouthwestState University, Marshall, Minnesota. He was SeniorLecturer at theUniversity of the West Indies, Jamaica, during 1984-1985. He is theauthor of ThePolitics of Economic Power in SouthernAfrica (Princeton University Press, 1987) and is currentlyworking on a studyof thePolitical Economy of theWorld Agricultural Crisis.The authorwould like to thankAlex Dupuy and Hoby Spaldingfor their helpful suggestionsfor revising the article. However, the views presented herein are solely the respon- sibilityof the author. LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 64, Vol. 17 No. 1, Winter 1990 86-109 C) 1990 Latin American Perspectives 86 Libby/ U.S.-JAMAICA RELATIONS 87 was in conflictwith the declared objectives of U.S. foreignpolicy toward ThirdWorld countries. Jamaica's success in influencingU.S. policywas largelyattributable to theprime minister's diplomacy. CONSENSUS OF SCHOLARLY OPINION Recentscholarship has focusedupon the failure of the People's National Party(PNP) governmentof MichaelManley (1972-1980) to carryout its "experiment"with democratic socialism. Levitt (1984: 4) argues,for exam- ple,that the primary responsibility for the failure of the PNP government lies withthe leader of theparty -Manley. He is criticizedfor a lack of realism anda failureto mobilize domestic support for the party's economic policies. Stephensand Stephens (1986) also blameManley for the PNP government's failureto capitalizeupon the most propitious opportunity to carryout its "socialisttransformation"' shortly after the imposition of the bauxite levy in 1974. His failureto act at thattime is regardedas a criticalmistake. The reasonis thatnot only did the levy result in a windfallof government revenue butalso worldeconomic conditions were still favorable for Jamaica. After 1975,however, the world economic downturn practically ruled out the kind of sweepingsocial and economicchange required to implementthe PNP's socialistprogram. This was dueto the fragile multiclass character of support forthe PNP governmentwhich requires vast economic patronage to remain in power. Stephensand Stephens also criticizeManley for unnecessarily antagoniz- ingthe United States by using the rhetoric of anti-imperialism and by making a publicdisplay of diplomaticsupport for Fidel Castro.In otherwords, Manley'sgovernment has been criticizedfor inept leadership, including diplomacy,particularly in itsdealings with the United States. Mostdiscussions of Seaga's foreignpolicy have tended to focus upon the so-calledspecial relationship between Seaga and PresidentReagan. How- ever,there is littleanalysis of this relationship other than to note the existence of a personalfriendship between the two leaders and the similarities in their politicalideology. Stephens and Stephens(1986: 251) have observedthat after1980 Seaga effectivelyplayed the "American card" of emphasizing the role of theprivate sector in theJLP government'sdevelopment plan for Jamaica.-They also notethat this was "worthquite a bit"to Jamaica. Exactly howthe diplomatic card was playedand what its significance to Jamaica was, however,is notexplained. In fact,Seaga's diplomaticsuccesses are down- playedby the authors. This is undoubtedlydue to thefact that in theirview 88 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES Seaga's economicpolicies "returned" Jamaica to a "dependentcapitalist" pathof development which they regard as retrogradeand self-defeating. However,this view is myopic.As theythemselves note, no democratically electedgovernment of a "peripheralcapitalist" country has yetmade the transformationto "democratic socialism." In thecase of Jamaica,at least, eventhe most optimistic scenario would have allowed the PNP government a baretwo years from 1974 to 1976to mobilize public support for the party's socialistprogram. Furthermore,both the PNP and JLP governments have failed to implement theirpolicies of structurallytransforming Jamaica. The programsof both governmentswere undermined by world economic trends which were largely outsideof their control. Therefore, the real difference between the PNP and JLPgovernments does notlie in theireconomic programs or policiesbut in therealm of political policy and foreign policy. Giventhe criticism of Manley'sleadership of thePNP government,it is ironicthat Seaga's successfuldiplomatic relationship with Washington is discounted.In fact,an examinationof Seaga's foreignpolicy successes, particularlywith the United States, should provide important insights into effectiveleadership for future governments of Jamaica. EMERGENCE OF THE JLP GOVERNMENT The JLPgovernment of EdwardSeaga emergedfrom the October 1980 generalelection. The partywon the election with 59 percentof the vote and 51 ofthe 60 parliamentaryseats. The turnout was a recordhigh of 77 percent of all eligiblevoters. The JLP receivedstrong electoral support from all classesand groups in Jamaican society as shownin an electionstudy of 944 votersby Carl Stone (1985a): Theurban unemployed cast 60 percentof their votes forthe JLP; skilledworkers, 52 percent;white collar workers, 63 percent;business and managerialclass, 86 percent;farm labor, 58 percent; andsmall peasants, 65 percent. Stone's(1981, 1982) electionstudies show that the swing away from the PNP to theJLP in 1980 was uniformthroughout the society. A majorityof all majorgroups polled, for example, indicated their voting preference for theJLP.4 The polling results showed that by a widemargin the most important electionissue was thecondition of thenational economy. For example, in a September1980 poll Stone (1981: 11) foundthat economic issues (especially unemployment,shortages of goods, and economicrecovery) were most importantto51 percentof respondents inthe major urban areas, to 66 percent of thosein smallertowns, and to 61 percentof respondentsinrural areas. Libby/ U.S.-JAMAICA RELATIONS 89 Stoneconcludes that the massive swing away from the PNP government was due largelyto theadverse impact of the depressed economy which was perceivedto be theresult of the government's economic "mismanagement," growingunemployment, decline in real wages,the business community's fearof the"left-wing" of thePNP, as well as dwindlingresources for party patronage.These combined to shatter the PNP's fragilecross-class coalition of politicalsupport.