DOCSLIB.ORG

Congressional Record—House H5207

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Congressional Record—House H5207 June 27, 2019 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5207 encourage all dairy farmers in New quiring safe and sanitary conditions for Sec. 112. Coordination of voting system security York’s 19th Congressional District to migrant children. Yet right now, chil- activities with use of requirements begin making coverage decisions. dren are imprisoned in appalling and payments and election adminis- The Dairy Margin Coverage program unconscionable conditions. tration requirements under Help America Vote Act of 2002. is retroactive until the beginning of These children have not been wel- Sec. 113. Incorporation of definitions. the year, with applicable payments fol- comed in the spirit of Matthew. In- Subtitle B—Risk-Limiting Audits lowing soon after enrollment. stead, they are in cages, in prison with- Sec. 121. Risk-limiting audits. As dairy farmers continue to face low out adequate food, clean clothing, Sec. 122. Funding for conducting post-election prices and increased market consolida- clean diapers, toothbrushes, access to risk-limiting audits. tion, I hope this program will provide showers, and a comfortable place to lay Sec. 123. GAO analysis of effects of audits. much-needed support during this chal- their head. TITLE II—PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY lenging farm economy. ‘‘Whatever you did unto the least of THROUGH IMPROVEMENTS IN ELECTION As a member of the Agriculture Com- these, you did unto me.’’ ADMINISTRATION mittee, I am deeply committed to sup- Madam Speaker, we will be judged as Sec. 201. Voting system cybersecurity require- porting our dairy farmers, and I will be a nation, as a government, and a people ments. closely following implementation of for our failure to look out for the least Sec. 202. Testing of existing voting systems to the Dairy Margin Coverage program. I of these. May this imprisonment end. ensure compliance with election cybersecurity guidelines and other will continue fighting to give our farm- f guidelines. ers the support and the certainty they Sec. 203. Requiring use of software and hard- need. SECURING AMERICA’S FEDERAL ware for which information is dis- ELECTIONS ACT f closed by manufacturer. Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, pur- Sec. 204. Treatment of electronic poll books as b 0915 suant to House Resolution 460, I call up part of voting systems. the bill (H.R. 2722) to protect elections Sec. 205. Pre-election reports on voting system RECOGNIZING JUDY GENSHAFT usage. (Mr. BILIRAKIS asked and was given for public office by providing financial Sec. 206. Streamlining collection of election in- permission to address the House for 1 support and enhanced security for the formation. minute and to revise and extend his re- infrastructure used to carry out such TITLE III—USE OF VOTING MACHINES marks.) elections, and for other purposes, and MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES Mr. BILIRAKIS. Madam Speaker, ask for its immediate consideration in Sec. 301. Use of voting machines manufactured today I rise to recognize Dr. Judy the House. in the United States. Genshaft, a truly outstanding leader The Clerk read the title of the bill. TITLE IV—SEVERABILITY whose contributions to the Tampa Bay The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursu- Sec. 401. Severability. area as the sixth president of the Uni- ant to House Resolution 460, in lieu of TITLE I—FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR versity of South Florida have been un- the amendment in the nature of a sub- ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE matched, in my opinion. stitute recommended by the Com- Subtitle A—Voting System Security President Genshaft has completely mittee on House Administration print- Improvement Grants transformed USF by helping it achieve ed in the bill, an amendment in the na- PART 1—PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEG- elite status as a preeminent research ture of a substitute consisting of the RITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER- university. The National Science Foun- text of Rules Committee Print 116–20, VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT dation has ranked USF as one of the modified by the amendment printed in SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE. Nation’s top 25 research universities. part A of House Report 116–126, is This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Voter Con- Under Judy’s leadership, USF has adopted, and the bill, as amended, is fidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019’’. considered read. SEC. 102. PAPER BALLOT AND MANUAL COUNT- nearly quadrupled its research port- ING REQUIREMENTS. folio to expand lifesaving research and The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows: (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 301(a)(2) of the Help develop cutting-edge technologies. The America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(2)) school’s success has attracted some of H.R. 2722 is amended to read as follows: the brightest young minds to the Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rep- ‘‘(2) PAPER BALLOT REQUIREMENT.— Tampa Bay area of Florida, growing resentatives of the United States of America in ‘‘(A) VOTER-VERIFIED PAPER BALLOTS.— enrollment by 40 percent, and USF’s Congress assembled. ‘‘(i) PAPER BALLOT REQUIREMENT.—(I) The graduation rate has tripled with Dr. SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. voting system shall require the use of an indi- vidual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot of Genshaft at the helm. (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Securing America’s Federal Elections Act’’ the voter’s vote that shall be marked and made Summarizing the many accomplish- or the ‘‘SAFE Act’’. available for inspection and verification by the ments of President Genshaft in just 1 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of con- voter before the voter’s vote is cast and counted, minute is impossible. She is a remark- tents of this Act is as follows: and which shall be counted by hand or read by an optical character recognition device or other able woman who has made the Tampa Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Bay region a better place. As she pre- counting device. For purposes of this subclause, TITLE I—FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR the term ‘individual, durable, voter-verified pares to retire, it is my honor to say ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE congratulations to her. paper ballot’ means a paper ballot marked by Subtitle A—Voting System Security the voter by hand or a paper ballot marked Go Bulls. Improvement Grants through the use of a nontabulating ballot mark- f PART 1—PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND ing device or system, so long as the voter shall have the option to mark his or her ballot by CARING FOR THE CHILDREN SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-VERIFIED PERMA- NENT PAPER BALLOT hand. The paper ballot shall be printed or marked in such a way that vote selections, in- (Ms. DEAN asked and was given per- Sec. 101. Short title. cluding all vote selections scanned by voting mission to address the House for 1 Sec. 102. Paper ballot and manual counting re- systems to tabulate votes, can be inspected and minute.) quirements. verified by the voter without training or instruc- Sec. 103. Accessibility and ballot verification for Ms. DEAN. Madam Speaker, there is tion or audited by election officials without the individuals with disabilities. a Gospel reading I like: Matthew 25: aid of any machine or other equipment. Sec. 104. Durability and readability require- ‘‘For I was hungry and You gave me ‘‘(II) The voting system shall provide the voter ments for ballots. food, I was thirsty and You gave me with an opportunity to correct any error on the Sec. 105. Paper ballot printing requirements. paper ballot before the permanent voter-verified drink, a stranger and You welcomed Sec. 106. Study and report on optimal ballot de- paper ballot is preserved in accordance with me, naked and You clothed me, ill and sign. clause (ii). You cared for me, in prison and You Sec. 107. Effective date for new requirements. visited me.’’ ‘‘(III) The voting system shall not preserve the PART 2—GRANTS TO CARRY OUT IMPROVEMENTS voter-verified paper ballots in any manner that That spirit of welcoming and compas- Sec. 111. Grants for obtaining compliant paper makes it possible, at any time after the ballot sion is a part of what defines us as ballot voting systems and carrying has been cast, to associate a voter with the Americans. In fact, we have enshrined out voting system security im- record of the voter’s vote without the voter’s it in our legal code, including laws re- provements. consent. VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 6333 E:\CR\FM\K27JN7.005 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE H5208 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 27, 2019 ‘‘(ii) PRESERVATION AS OFFICIAL RECORD.—The ‘‘(B)(i) ensure that individuals with disabil- out subsection (a) $5,000,000, to remain available individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot ities and others are given an equivalent oppor- until expended.’’. used in accordance with clause (i) shall con- tunity to vote, including with privacy and inde- (2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of con- stitute the official ballot and shall be preserved pendence, in a manner that produces a voter- tents of such Act is amended— and used as the official ballot for purposes of verified paper ballot as for other voters; (A) by redesignating the item relating to sec- any recount or audit conducted with respect to ‘‘(ii) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph tion 247 as relating to section 248; and any election for Federal office in which the vot- (A) through the use of at least one voting system (B) by inserting after the item relating to sec- ing system is used. equipped for individuals with disabilities, in- tion 246 the following new item: ‘‘(iii) MANUAL COUNTING REQUIREMENTS FOR cluding nonvisual and enhanced visual accessi- ‘‘Sec.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Voluntary Voting System Guidelines VVSG 2.0 Requirements for the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0
    Voluntary Voting System Guidelines VVSG 2.0 Requirements for the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0 February 10, 2021 Prepared for the Election Assistance Commission At the direction of the Technical Guidelines Development Committee 1 Acknowledgements Chair of the TGDC: Dr. Walter G. Copan Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Gaithersburg, MD Representing the EAC Standards Board: Robert Giles Paul Lux Director Supervisor of Elections New Jersey Division of Elections Okaloosa County Trenton, NJ Crestview, FL Representing the EAC Board of Advisors: Neal Kelley Linda Lamone Registrar of Voters Administrator of Elections Orange County Maryland State Board of Elections Orange County, CA Annapolis, MD Representing the Architectural and Transportation Barrier, and Compliance Board (Access Board): Marc Guthrie Sachin Pavithran Public Board Member Public Board Member Newark, OH Logan, UT Representing the American National Standards Institute (ANSI): Mary Saunders Vice President, Government Relations & Public Policy American National Standards Institute Washington, DC Representing the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers: Dan Wallach Professor, Electrical & Engineering Computer Science Rice University Houston, TX Representing the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED): Lori Augino Judd Choate Washington State Director of Elections State Elections Director Washington Secretary of State Colorado Secretary of State Olympia, WA Denver, CO 2 Requirements for VVSG 2.0 February 10, 2021 Individuals with technical and scientific expertise relating to voting systems and equipment: McDermot Coutts Geoff Hale Chief Architect/Director of Technical Computer Security Expert Development Washington, DC Unisyn Voting Solutions Vista, CA Diane Golden David Wagner Accessibility Expert Professor, Electrical & Engineering Grain Valley, MO Computer Science University of California-Berkeley Berkeley, CA 3 Public Working Groups discussed and developed guidance to inform the development of requirements for the VVSG.
    [Show full text]
  • Election Auditing
    ELECTION AUDITING KEY ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES SUMMARY REPORT ELECTION AUDIT SUMMIT DECEMBER 7-8, 2018 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The coordinators of this summary report extend their deepest appreciation to each of the panelists who participated in the Election Audit Summit, without whom this report could not have taken form, and to all those involved in making the event and this report possible, especially Claire DeSoi, Daniel Guth, and Kathryn Treder. They also gratefully acknowledge the many attendees of that summit, who continue to advance the conversa- tion on election administration and auditing in the United States. DISCLAIMER The findings, interpretations, and conclustions expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of the California Institute of Technology or the Massachu- setts Institute of Technology. The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project and the MIT Election Data & Science Lab encourage dissemination of knowledge and research; this report may be reproduced in whole or in part for non-commercial or educational purposes so long as full attribution to its authors is given. PREFACE On December 7 and 8, 2018, The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project (VTP) hosted the Multidisciplinary Conference on Election Auditing, or “Election Audit Summit,” for short, at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech- nology in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The conference was organized by a small group of academics and practitioners from across the United States: » R. Michael Alvarez (Caltech) » Jennifer Morrell (Democracy Fund, Election Validation Project ) » Ronald Rivest (MIT) » Philip Stark (UC Berkeley) » Charles Stewart III (MIT) Inspired by the groundswell of interest in risk-limiting audits and other rig- orous methods to ensure that elections are properly administered, the confer- ence assembled an eclectic mix of academics, election officials, and members of the public to explore these issues.
    [Show full text]
  • Election Security in All 50 States Defending America’S Elections
    KATHERINE FREY/GETTY IMAGES KATHERINE Election Security in All 50 States Defending America’s Elections By Danielle Root, Liz Kennedy, Michael Sozan, and Jerry Parshall February 2018 WWW.AMERICANPROGRESS.ORG Election Security in All 50 States Defending America’s Elections By Danielle Root, Liz Kennedy, Michael Sozan, and Jerry Parshall February 2018 Contents 1 Introduction and summary 6 Glossary 10 Factors and methodology 28 State grades and analysis 30 Alabama 114 Montana 33 Alaska 117 Nebraska 36 Arizona 120 Nevada 40 Arkansas 124 New Hampshire 43 California 127 New Jersey 46 Colorado 130 New Mexico 50 Connecticut 133 New York 53 Delaware 136 North Carolina 56 District of Columbia 140 North Dakota 59 Florida 143 Ohio 63 Georgia 147 Oklahoma 66 Hawaii 150 Oregon 69 Idaho 153 Pennsylvania 72 Illinois 156 Rhode Island 75 Indiana 159 South Carolina 79 Iowa 162 South Dakota 82 Kansas 165 Tennessee 85 Kentucky 169 Texas 88 Louisiana 173 Utah 91 Maine 177 Vermont 94 Maryland 180 Virginia 97 Massachusetts 183 Washington 100 Michigan 187 West Virginia 104 Minnesota 190 Wisconsin 107 Mississippi 194 Wyoming 110 Missouri 197 Conclusion 200 Endnotes Introduction and summary In 2016, America’s elections were targeted by a foreign nation-state intent on infiltrating and manipulating our electoral system. On September 22, 2017, it was reported that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) notified 21 states that they were targeted by hackers during the 2016 election. Among those states notified by DHS were: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington.2 Arizona, California, Iowa, Texas, and Wisconsin were also among those states originally contacted by DHS.
    [Show full text]
  • Election Auditing
    ELECTION AUDITING KEY ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES SUMMARY REPORT ELECTION AUDIT SUMMIT DECEMBER 7-8, 2018 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The coordinators of this summary report extend their deepest appreciation to each of the panelists who participated in the Election Audit Summit, without whom this report could not have taken form, and to all those involved in making the event and this report possible, especially Claire DeSoi, Daniel Guth, and Kathryn Treder. They also gratefully acknowledge the many attendees of that summit, who continue to advance the conversa- tion on election administration and auditing in the United States. DISCLAIMER The findings, interpretations, and conclustions expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of the California Institute of Technology or the Massachu- setts Institute of Technology. The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project and the MIT Election Data & Science Lab encourage dissemination of knowledge and research; this report may be reproduced in whole or in part for non-commercial or educational purposes so long as full attribution to its authors is given. PREFACE On December 7 and 8, 2018, The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project (VTP) hosted the Multidisciplinary Conference on Election Auditing, or “Election Audit Summit,” for short, at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech- nology in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The conference was organized by a small group of academics and practitioners from across the United States: » R. Michael Alvarez (Caltech) » Jennifer Morrell (Democracy Fund, Election Validation Project ) » Ronald Rivest (MIT) » Philip Stark (UC Berkeley) » Charles Stewart III (MIT) Inspired by the groundswell of interest in risk-limiting audits and other rig- orous methods to ensure that elections are properly administered, the confer- ence assembled an eclectic mix of academics, election officials, and members of the public to explore these issues.
    [Show full text]
  • Vstf Final Report
    Draft for Public Comment – January 2011 VOTING SYSTEMS TASK FORCE Edwin M. Lee, Mayor 1 2 DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 3 4 Recommendations on Voting Systems for the City 5 and County of San Francisco 6 7 A Report by the San Francisco Voting Systems Task Force (VSTF) 8 9 Public Comments Are Invited 10 This report provides strategic guidance to assist the City and County of San Francisco as it 11 considers its next voting system. The report is not intended to be a complete statement of 12 requirements or technical specifications, and is not an exhaustive study of all topics related to 13 voting systems. The VSTF eagerly invites comments from the public, and will consider all 14 comments received within the VSTF scope of work. 15 Submit Comments by Email: 16 [email protected] 17 Submit Comments by Mail: 18 Voting Systems Task Force 19 City Hall, Room 362 20 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place 21 San Francisco, CA 94102 22 Comments due by 5 pm on March 2, 2011 23 Page 1 of 40 Draft for Public Comment – January 2011 1 Table of Contents 2 3 Section 1: Introduction and Background – p. 3 4 5 Mission and Context of the Voting Systems Task Force (VSTF) 6 7 Background on San Francisco’s Current Voting System 8 9 Opportunities Presented by Next Generation Voting Systems 10 11 Section 2: Recommendations – p. 6 12 13 Election Records and Post-Election Audit Procedures – p. 7 14 15 Balloting Systems and Services – p. 15 16 17 Security – p.
    [Show full text]