June 27, 2019 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5207 encourage all dairy farmers in New quiring safe and sanitary conditions for Sec. 112. Coordination of voting system security York’s 19th Congressional District to migrant children. Yet right now, chil- activities with use of requirements begin making coverage decisions. dren are imprisoned in appalling and payments and election adminis- The Dairy Margin Coverage program unconscionable conditions. tration requirements under Help America Vote Act of 2002. is retroactive until the beginning of These children have not been wel- Sec. 113. Incorporation of definitions. the year, with applicable payments fol- comed in the spirit of Matthew. In- Subtitle B—Risk-Limiting Audits lowing soon after enrollment. stead, they are in cages, in prison with- Sec. 121. Risk-limiting audits. As dairy farmers continue to face low out adequate food, clean clothing, Sec. 122. Funding for conducting post-election prices and increased market consolida- clean diapers, toothbrushes, access to risk-limiting audits. tion, I hope this program will provide showers, and a comfortable place to lay Sec. 123. GAO analysis of effects of audits. much-needed support during this chal- their head. TITLE II—PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY lenging farm economy. ‘‘Whatever you did unto the least of THROUGH IMPROVEMENTS IN ELECTION As a member of the Agriculture Com- these, you did unto me.’’ ADMINISTRATION mittee, I am deeply committed to sup- Madam Speaker, we will be judged as Sec. 201. Voting system cybersecurity require- porting our dairy farmers, and I will be a nation, as a government, and a people ments. closely following implementation of for our failure to look out for the least Sec. 202. Testing of existing voting systems to the Dairy Margin Coverage program. I of these. May this imprisonment end. ensure compliance with election cybersecurity guidelines and other will continue fighting to give our farm- f guidelines. ers the support and the certainty they Sec. 203. Requiring use of software and hard- need. SECURING AMERICA’S FEDERAL ware for which information is dis- ELECTIONS ACT f closed by manufacturer. Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, pur- Sec. 204. Treatment of electronic poll books as b 0915 suant to House Resolution 460, I call up part of voting systems. the bill (H.R. 2722) to protect elections Sec. 205. Pre-election reports on voting system RECOGNIZING JUDY GENSHAFT usage. (Mr. BILIRAKIS asked and was given for public office by providing financial Sec. 206. Streamlining collection of election in- permission to address the House for 1 support and enhanced security for the formation. minute and to revise and extend his re- infrastructure used to carry out such TITLE III—USE OF VOTING MACHINES marks.) elections, and for other purposes, and MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES Mr. BILIRAKIS. Madam Speaker, ask for its immediate consideration in Sec. 301. Use of voting machines manufactured today I rise to recognize Dr. Judy the House. in the United States. Genshaft, a truly outstanding leader The Clerk read the title of the bill. TITLE IV—SEVERABILITY whose contributions to the Tampa Bay The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursu- Sec. 401. Severability. area as the sixth president of the Uni- ant to House Resolution 460, in lieu of TITLE I—FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR versity of South Florida have been un- the amendment in the nature of a sub- ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE matched, in my opinion. stitute recommended by the Com- Subtitle A—Voting System Security President Genshaft has completely mittee on House Administration print- Improvement Grants transformed USF by helping it achieve ed in the bill, an amendment in the na- PART 1—PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEG- elite status as a preeminent research ture of a substitute consisting of the RITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER- university. The National Science Foun- text of Rules Committee Print 116–20, VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT dation has ranked USF as one of the modified by the amendment printed in SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE. Nation’s top 25 research universities. part A of House Report 116–126, is This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Voter Con- Under Judy’s leadership, USF has adopted, and the bill, as amended, is fidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019’’. considered read. SEC. 102. PAPER BALLOT AND MANUAL COUNT- nearly quadrupled its research port- ING REQUIREMENTS. folio to expand lifesaving research and The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows: (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 301(a)(2) of the Help develop cutting-edge technologies. The America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(2)) school’s success has attracted some of H.R. 2722 is amended to read as follows: the brightest young minds to the Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rep- ‘‘(2) PAPER BALLOT REQUIREMENT.— Tampa Bay area of Florida, growing resentatives of the United States of America in ‘‘(A) VOTER-VERIFIED PAPER BALLOTS.— enrollment by 40 percent, and USF’s Congress assembled. ‘‘(i) PAPER BALLOT REQUIREMENT.—(I) The graduation rate has tripled with Dr. SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. voting system shall require the use of an indi- vidual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot of Genshaft at the helm. (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Securing America’s Federal Elections Act’’ the voter’s vote that shall be marked and made Summarizing the many accomplish- or the ‘‘SAFE Act’’. available for inspection and verification by the ments of President Genshaft in just 1 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of con- voter before the voter’s vote is cast and counted, minute is impossible. She is a remark- tents of this Act is as follows: and which shall be counted by hand or read by an optical character recognition device or other able woman who has made the Tampa Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Bay region a better place. As she pre- counting device. For purposes of this subclause, TITLE I—FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR the term ‘individual, durable, voter-verified pares to retire, it is my honor to say ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE congratulations to her. paper ballot’ means a paper ballot marked by Subtitle A—Voting System Security the voter by hand or a paper ballot marked Go Bulls. Improvement Grants through the use of a nontabulating ballot mark- f PART 1—PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND ing device or system, so long as the voter shall have the option to mark his or her ballot by CARING FOR THE CHILDREN SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-VERIFIED PERMA- NENT PAPER BALLOT hand. The paper ballot shall be printed or marked in such a way that vote selections, in- (Ms. DEAN asked and was given per- Sec. 101. Short title. cluding all vote selections scanned by voting mission to address the House for 1 Sec. 102. Paper ballot and manual counting re- systems to tabulate votes, can be inspected and minute.) quirements. verified by the voter without training or instruc- Sec. 103. Accessibility and ballot verification for Ms. DEAN. Madam Speaker, there is tion or audited by election officials without the individuals with disabilities. a Gospel reading I like: Matthew 25: aid of any machine or other equipment. Sec. 104. Durability and readability require- ‘‘For I was hungry and You gave me ‘‘(II) The voting system shall provide the voter ments for ballots. food, I was thirsty and You gave me with an opportunity to correct any error on the Sec. 105. Paper ballot printing requirements. paper ballot before the permanent voter-verified drink, a stranger and You welcomed Sec. 106. Study and report on optimal ballot de- paper ballot is preserved in accordance with me, naked and You clothed me, ill and sign. clause (ii). You cared for me, in prison and You Sec. 107. Effective date for new requirements. visited me.’’ ‘‘(III) The voting system shall not preserve the PART 2—GRANTS TO CARRY OUT IMPROVEMENTS voter-verified paper ballots in any manner that That spirit of welcoming and compas- Sec. 111. Grants for obtaining compliant paper makes it possible, at any time after the ballot sion is a part of what defines us as ballot voting systems and carrying has been cast, to associate a voter with the Americans. In fact, we have enshrined out voting system security im- record of the voter’s vote without the voter’s it in our legal code, including laws re- provements. consent.

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 6333 E:\CR\FM\K27JN7.005 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE H5208 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 27, 2019

‘‘(ii) PRESERVATION AS OFFICIAL RECORD.—The ‘‘(B)(i) ensure that individuals with disabil- out subsection (a) $5,000,000, to remain available individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot ities and others are given an equivalent oppor- until expended.’’. used in accordance with clause (i) shall con- tunity to vote, including with privacy and inde- (2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of con- stitute the official ballot and shall be preserved pendence, in a manner that produces a voter- tents of such Act is amended— and used as the official ballot for purposes of verified paper ballot as for other voters; (A) by redesignating the item relating to sec- any recount or audit conducted with respect to ‘‘(ii) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph tion 247 as relating to section 248; and any election for Federal office in which the vot- (A) through the use of at least one voting system (B) by inserting after the item relating to sec- ing system is used. equipped for individuals with disabilities, in- tion 246 the following new item: ‘‘(iii) MANUAL COUNTING REQUIREMENTS FOR cluding nonvisual and enhanced visual accessi- ‘‘Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible paper RECOUNTS AND AUDITS.—(I) Each paper ballot bility for the blind and visually impaired, and ballot verification mechanisms.’’. used pursuant to clause (i) shall be suitable for nonmanual and enhanced manual accessibility (c) CLARIFICATION OF ACCESSIBILITY STAND- a manual audit, and shall be counted by hand for the mobility and dexterity impaired, at each ARDS UNDER VOLUNTARY VOTING SYSTEM GUID- in any recount or audit conducted with respect polling place; and ANCE.—In adopting any voluntary guidance to any election for Federal office. ‘‘(iii) meet the requirements of subparagraph under subtitle B of title III of the Help America ‘‘(II) In the event of any inconsistencies or (A) and paragraph (2)(A) by using a system Vote Act with respect to the accessibility of the irregularities between any electronic vote tallies that— paper ballot verification requirements for indi- and the vote tallies determined by counting by ‘‘(I) allows the voter to privately and inde- viduals with disabilities, the Election Assistance hand the individual, durable, voter-verified pendently verify the permanent paper ballot Commission shall include and apply the same paper ballots used pursuant to clause (i), and through the presentation, in accessible form, of accessibility standards applicable under the vol- subject to subparagraph (B), the individual, du- the printed or marked vote selections from the untary guidance adopted for accessible voting rable, voter-verified paper ballots shall be the same printed or marked information that would systems under such subtitle. true and correct record of the votes cast. be used for any vote counting or auditing; and (d) PERMITTING USE OF FUNDS FOR PROTEC- ‘‘(iv) APPLICATION TO ALL BALLOTS.—The re- ‘‘(II) allows the voter to privately and inde- TION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT AC- quirements of this subparagraph shall apply to pendently verify and cast the permanent paper TIONS TO ENFORCE ELECTION-RELATED DIS- all ballots cast in elections for Federal office, in- ballot without requiring the voter to manually ABILITY ACCESS.—Section 292(a) of the Help cluding ballots cast by absent uniformed services handle the paper ballot;’’. America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21062(a)) is voters and overseas voters under the Uniformed (b) SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT OF STUDY, TEST- amended by striking ‘‘; except that’’ and all and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act and ING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF ACCESSIBLE PAPER that follows and inserting a period. other absentee voters. BALLOT VERIFICATION MECHANISMS.— SEC. 104. DURABILITY AND READABILITY RE- ‘‘(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR TREATMENT OF DIS- QUIREMENTS FOR BALLOTS. (1) STUDY AND REPORTING.—Subtitle C of title PUTES WHEN PAPER BALLOTS HAVE BEEN SHOWN II of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amend- Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of TO BE COMPROMISED.— ed— 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)) is amended by adding ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—In the event that— (A) by redesignating section 247 as section 248; at the end the following new paragraph: ‘‘(I) there is any inconsistency between any ‘‘(7) DURABILITY AND READABILITY REQUIRE- and electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies deter- (B) by inserting after section 246 the following MENTS FOR BALLOTS.— mined by counting by hand the individual, du- ‘‘(A) DURABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR PAPER new section: rable, voter-verified paper ballots used pursuant BALLOTS.— to subparagraph (A)(i) with respect to any elec- ‘‘SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—All voter-verified paper bal- PAPER BALLOT VERIFICATION lots required to be used under this Act shall be tion for Federal office; and MECHANISMS. ‘‘(II) it is demonstrated by clear and con- marked or printed on durable paper. ‘‘(a) STUDY AND REPORT.—The Director of the vincing evidence (as determined in accordance ‘‘(ii) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this Act, National Science Foundation shall make grants with the applicable standards in the jurisdiction paper is ‘durable’ if it is capable of with- to not fewer than 3 eligible entities to study, involved) in any recount, audit, or contest of standing multiple counts and recounts by hand test, and develop accessible paper ballot voting, the result of the election that the paper ballots without compromising the fundamental integrity verification, and casting mechanisms and de- have been compromised (by damage or mischief of the ballots, and capable of retaining the in- vices and best practices to enhance the accessi- or otherwise) and that a sufficient number of formation marked or printed on them for the full bility of paper ballot voting and verification the ballots have been so compromised that the duration of a retention and preservation period mechanisms for individuals with disabilities, for result of the election could be changed, of 22 months. voters whose primary language is not English, ‘‘(B) READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR PAPER the determination of the appropriate remedy and for voters with difficulties in literacy, in- with respect to the election shall be made in ac- BALLOTS MARKED BY BALLOT MARKING DEVICE.— cluding best practices for the mechanisms them- All voter-verified paper ballots completed by the cordance with applicable State law, except that selves and the processes through which the the electronic tally shall not be used as the ex- voter through the use of a ballot marking device mechanisms are used. shall be clearly readable by the voter without clusive basis for determining the official cer- ‘‘(b) ELIGIBILITY.—An entity is eligible to re- tified result. assistance (other than eyeglasses or other per- ceive a grant under this part if it submits to the sonal vision enhancing devices) and by an opti- ‘‘(ii) RULE FOR CONSIDERATION OF BALLOTS AS- Director (at such time and in such form as the SOCIATED WITH EACH VOTING MACHINE.—For pur- cal character recognition device or other device Director may require) an application con- equipped for individuals with disabilities.’’. poses of clause (i), only the paper ballots taining— deemed compromised, if any, shall be considered SEC. 105. PAPER BALLOT PRINTING REQUIRE- ‘‘(1) certifications that the entity shall specifi- MENTS. in the calculation of whether or not the result of cally investigate enhanced methods or devices, the election could be changed due to the com- (a) REQUIRING PAPER BALLOTS TO BE PRINTED including non-electronic devices, that will assist ON RECYCLED PAPER MANUFACTURED IN UNITED promised paper ballots.’’. such individuals and voters in marking voter- (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT CLARIFYING AP- STATES.—Section 301(a) of the Help America verified paper ballots and presenting or trans- PLICABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE ACCES- Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amend- mitting the information printed or marked on SIBILITY.—Section 301(a)(4) of such Act (52 ed by section 104, is amended by adding at the such ballots back to such individuals and vot- U.S.C. 21081(a)(4)) is amended by inserting ‘‘(in- end the following new paragraph: ers, and casting such ballots; cluding the paper ballots required to be used ‘‘(8) PRINTING REQUIREMENTS FOR BALLOTS.— ‘‘(2) a certification that the entity shall com- under paragraph (2))’’ after ‘‘voting system’’. All paper ballots used in an election for Federal plete the activities carried out with the grant (c) OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Sec- office shall be printed in the United States on not later than December 31, 2020; and tion 301(a)(1) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(1)) recycled paper manufactured in the United ‘‘(3) such other information and certifications is amended— States.’’. (1) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking as the Director may require. (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made ‘‘counted’’ and inserting ‘‘counted, in accord- ‘‘(c) AVAILABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY.—Any by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to ance with paragraphs (2) and (3)’’; technology developed with the grants made elections occurring on or after January 1, 2021. (2) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking under this section shall be treated as non-pro- SEC. 106. STUDY AND REPORT ON OPTIMAL BAL- ‘‘counted’’ and inserting ‘‘counted, in accord- prietary and shall be made available to the pub- LOT DESIGN. ance with paragraphs (2) and (3)’’; lic, including to manufacturers of voting sys- (a) STUDY.—The Election Assistance Commis- (3) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking tems. sion shall conduct a study of the best ways to ‘‘counted’’ each place it appears and inserting ‘‘(d) COORDINATION WITH GRANTS FOR TECH- design ballots used in elections for public office, ‘‘counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) NOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS.—The Director shall including paper ballots and electronic or digital and (3)’’; and carry out this section so that the activities car- ballots, to minimize confusion and user errors. (4) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ried out with the grants made under subsection (b) REPORT.—Not later than January 1, 2020, ‘‘counted’’ and inserting ‘‘counted, in accord- (a) are coordinated with the research conducted the Election Assistance Commission shall submit ance with paragraphs (2) and (3)’’. under the grant program carried out by the to Congress a report on the study conducted SEC. 103. ACCESSIBILITY AND BALLOT Commission under section 271, to the extent that under subsection (a). VERIFICATION FOR INDIVIDUALS the Director and Commission determine nec- SEC. 107. EFFECTIVE DATE FOR NEW REQUIRE- WITH DISABILITIES. essary to provide for the advancement of acces- MENTS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 301(a)(3)(B) of the sible voting technology. Section 301(d) of the Help America Vote Act of Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. ‘‘(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(d)) is amended to read as 21081(a)(3)(B)) is amended to read as follows: There is authorized to be appropriated to carry follows:

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 6333 E:\CR\FM\A27JN7.002 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE June 27, 2019 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5209

‘‘(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.— offer individuals the opportunity to cast votes insufficient to ensure that each State receives ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in para- using a pre-printed blank paper ballot. the amount of the grant calculated under sub- graph (2), each State and jurisdiction shall be ‘‘(IV) TRAINING OF ELECTION OFFICIALS.—The section (b), the Commission shall make such pro required to comply with the requirements of this chief State election official shall ensure that rata reductions in such amounts as may be nec- section on and after January 1, 2006. election officials at polling places in the State essary to ensure that the entire amount appro- ‘‘(2) SPECIAL RULE FOR CERTAIN REQUIRE- are aware of the requirements of this clause, in- priated under this part is distributed to the MENTS.— cluding the requirement to display a notice States. ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in sec- under subclause (III), and are aware that it is ‘‘(d) SURPLUS APPROPRIATIONS.—If the tion 105(b) of the Securing America’s Federal a violation of the requirements of this title for amount of funds appropriated for grants au- Elections Act and subparagraphs (B) and (C), an election official to fail to offer an individual thorized under section 297D(a)(2) exceed the the requirements of this section which are first the opportunity to cast a vote using a blank pre- amount necessary to meet the requirements of imposed on a State and jurisdiction pursuant to printed paper ballot. subsection (b), the Commission shall consider the amendments made by the Voter Confidence ‘‘(V) PERIOD OF APPLICABILITY.—The require- the following in making a determination to and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019 shall ments of this clause apply only during the pe- award remaining funds to a State: apply with respect to voting systems used for riod in which the delay is in effect under clause ‘‘(1) The record of the State in carrying out any election for Federal office held in 2020 or (i). the following with respect to the administration any succeeding year. ‘‘(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR JURISDICTIONS USING of elections for Federal office: ‘‘(B) DELAY FOR JURISDICTIONS USING CERTAIN CERTAIN NONTABULATING BALLOT MARKING DE- ‘‘(A) Providing voting machines that are less PAPER RECORD PRINTERS OR CERTAIN SYSTEMS VICES.—In the case of a jurisdiction which uses than 10 years old. USING OR PRODUCING VOTER-VERIFIED PAPER a nontabulating ballot marking device which ‘‘(B) Implementing strong chain of custody RECORDS IN 2018.— automatically deposits the ballot into a privacy procedures for the physical security of voting ‘‘(i) DELAY.—In the case of a jurisdiction de- sleeve, subparagraph (A) shall apply to a voting equipment and paper records at all stages of the scribed in clause (ii), subparagraph (A) shall system in the jurisdiction as if the reference in process. apply to a voting system in the jurisdiction as if such subparagraph to ‘any election for Federal ‘‘(C) Conducting pre-election testing on every the reference in such subparagraph to ‘2020’ office held in 2020 or any succeeding year’ were voting machine and ensuring that paper ballots were a reference to ‘2022’, but only with respect a reference to ‘elections for Federal office occur- are available wherever electronic machines are to the following requirements of this section: ring held in 2022 or each succeeding year’, but used. ‘‘(I) Paragraph (2)(A)(i)(I) of subsection (a) only with respect to paragraph (3)(B)(iii)(II) of ‘‘(D) Maintaining offline backups of voter reg- (relating to the use of voter-verified paper bal- subsection (a) (relating to nonmanual casting of istration lists. lots). the durable paper ballot).’’. ‘‘(E) Providing a secure voter registration ‘‘(II) Paragraph (3)(B)(iii)(I) and (II) of sub- PART 2—GRANTS TO CARRY OUT database that logs requests submitted to the section (a) (relating to access to verification IMPROVEMENTS database. from and casting of the durable paper ballot). ‘‘(F) Publishing and enforcing a policy detail- SEC. 111. GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT ‘‘(III) Paragraph (7) of subsection (a) (relat- PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS ing use limitations and security safeguards to ing to durability and readability requirements AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM protect the personal information of voters in the for ballots). SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS. voter registration process. ‘‘(ii) JURISDICTIONS DESCRIBED.—A jurisdic- (a) AVAILABILITY OF GRANTS.—Subtitle D of ‘‘(G) Providing secure processes and proce- tion described in this clause is a jurisdiction— title II of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 dures for reporting vote tallies. ‘‘(I) which used voter-verified paper record U.S.C. 21001 et seq.) is amended by adding at ‘‘(H) Providing a secure platform for dissemi- printers attached to direct recording electronic the end the following new part: nating vote totals. voting machines, or which used other voting ‘‘(2) Evidence of established conditions of in- ‘‘PART 7—GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COM- systems that used or produced paper records of novation and reform in providing voting system PLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYS- the vote verifiable by voters but that are not in security and the proposed plan of the State for TEMS AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYS- compliance with paragraphs (2)(A)(i)(I), implementing additional conditions. TEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS (3)(B)(iii)(I) and (II), and (7) of subsection (a) ‘‘(3) Evidence of collaboration between rel- (as amended or added by the Voter Confidence ‘‘SEC. 297. GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT evant stakeholders, including local election offi- PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS cials, in developing the grant implementation and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019), for the AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM administration of the regularly scheduled gen- SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS. plan described in section 297B. eral election for Federal office held in November ‘‘(a) AVAILABILITY AND USE OF GRANT.—The ‘‘(4) The plan of the State to conduct a rig- 2018; and Commission shall make a grant to each eligible orous evaluation of the effectiveness of the ac- ‘‘(II) which will continue to use such printers State— tivities carried out with the grant. or systems for the administration of elections for ‘‘(1) to replace a voting system— ‘‘(e) ABILITY OF REPLACEMENT SYSTEMS TO Federal office held in years before 2022. ‘‘(A) which does not meet the requirements ADMINISTER RANKED CHOICE ELECTIONS.—To ‘‘(iii) MANDATORY AVAILABILITY OF PAPER which are first imposed on the State pursuant to the greatest extent practicable, an eligible State BALLOTS AT POLLING PLACES USING GRAND- the amendments made by the Voter Confidence which receives a grant to replace a voting sys- FATHERED PRINTERS AND SYSTEMS.— and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019 with a tem under this section shall ensure that the re- ‘‘(I) REQUIRING BALLOTS TO BE OFFERED AND voting system which does meet such require- placement system is capable of administering a PROVIDED.—The appropriate election official at ments, for use in the regularly scheduled gen- system of ranked choice voting under which each polling place that uses a printer or system eral elections for Federal office held in Novem- each voter shall rank the candidates for the of- described in clause (ii)(I) for the administration ber 2020, or fice in the order of the voter’s preference. of elections for Federal office shall offer each ‘‘(B) which does meet such requirements but ‘‘SEC. 297A. VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVE- individual who is eligible to cast a vote in the which is not in compliance with the most recent MENTS DESCRIBED. election at the polling place the opportunity to voluntary voting system guidelines issued by the ‘‘(a) PERMITTED USES.—A voting system secu- cast the vote using a blank pre-printed paper Commission prior to the regularly scheduled rity improvement described in this section is any ballot which the individual may mark by hand general election for Federal office held in No- of the following: and which is not produced by the direct record- vember 2020 with another system which does ‘‘(1) The acquisition of goods and services ing electronic voting machine or other such sys- meet such requirements and is in compliance from qualified election infrastructure vendors by tem. The official shall provide the individual with such guidelines; purchase, lease, or such other arrangements as with the ballot and the supplies necessary to ‘‘(2) to carry out voting system security im- may be appropriate. mark the ballot, and shall ensure (to the great- provements described in section 297A with re- ‘‘(2) Cyber and risk mitigation training. est extent practicable) that the waiting period spect to the regularly scheduled general elec- ‘‘(3) A security risk and vulnerability assess- for the individual to cast a vote is the lesser of tions for Federal office held in November 2020 ment of the State’s election infrastructure which 30 minutes or the average waiting period for an and each succeeding election for Federal office; is carried out by a provider of cybersecurity individual who does not agree to cast the vote and services under a contract entered into between using such a paper ballot under this clause. ‘‘(3) to implement and model best practices for the chief State election official and the provider. ‘‘(II) TREATMENT OF BALLOT.—Any paper bal- ballot design, ballot instructions, and the testing ‘‘(4) The maintenance of election infrastruc- lot which is cast by an individual under this of ballots. ture, including addressing risks and clause shall be counted and otherwise treated as ‘‘(b) AMOUNT OF GRANT.—The amount of a vulnerabilities which are identified under either a regular ballot for all purposes (including by grant made to a State under this section shall be of the security risk and vulnerability assess- incorporating it into the final unofficial vote such amount as the Commission determines to be ments described in paragraph (3), except that count (as defined by the State) for the precinct) appropriate, except that such amount may not none of the funds provided under this part may and not as a provisional ballot, unless the indi- be less than the product of $1 and the average be used to renovate or replace a building or fa- vidual casting the ballot would have otherwise of the number of individuals who cast votes in cility which is used primarily for purposes other been required to cast a provisional ballot. any of the two most recent regularly scheduled than the administration of elections for public ‘‘(III) POSTING OF NOTICE.—The appropriate general elections for Federal office held in the office. election official shall ensure there is promi- State. ‘‘(5) Providing increased technical support for nently displayed at each polling place a notice ‘‘(c) PRO RATA REDUCTIONS.—If the amount of any information technology infrastructure that that describes the obligation of the official to funds appropriated for grants under this part is the chief State election official deems to be part

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 6333 E:\CR\FM\A27JN7.002 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE H5210 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 27, 2019 of the State’s election infrastructure or des- ‘‘(ii) The date, time, and time zone when the (2) by adding at the end the following new ignates as critical to the operation of the State’s election cybersecurity incident was detected. paragraph: election infrastructure. ‘‘(iii) The date, time, and duration of the elec- ‘‘(17) The Secretary of Homeland Security or ‘‘(6) Enhancing the cybersecurity and oper- tion cybersecurity incident. the Secretary’s designee.’’. ations of the information technology infrastruc- ‘‘(iv) The circumstances of the election cyber- (c) REPRESENTATIVE OF DEPARTMENT OF ture described in paragraph (4). security incident, including the specific election HOMELAND SECURITY ON TECHNICAL GUIDELINES ‘‘(7) Enhancing the cybersecurity of voter reg- infrastructure systems believed to have been DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE.—Section 221(c)(1) of istration systems. accessed and information acquired, if any. such Act (52 U.S.C. 20961(c)(1)) is amended— ‘‘(b) QUALIFIED ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE ‘‘(v) Any planned and implemented technical (1) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as sub- VENDORS DESCRIBED.— measures to respond to and recover from the in- paragraph (F); and ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this part, a cident. (2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the ‘qualified election infrastructure vendor’ is any ‘‘(vi) In the case of any notification which is following new subparagraph: person who provides, supports, or maintains, or an update to a prior notification, any addi- ‘‘(E) A representative of the Department of who seeks to provide, support, or maintain, elec- tional material information relating to the inci- Homeland Security.’’. tion infrastructure on behalf of a State, unit of dent, including technical data, as it becomes (d) GOALS OF PERIODIC STUDIES OF ELECTION local government, or election agency, who meets available. ADMINISTRATION ISSUES; CONSULTATION WITH the criteria described in paragraph (2). ‘‘SEC. 297B. ELIGIBILITY OF STATES. SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY.—Section ‘‘(2) CRITERIA.—The criteria described in this ‘‘A State is eligible to receive a grant under 241(a) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 20981(a)) is amend- paragraph are such criteria as the Chairman, in this part if the State submits to the Commission, ed— coordination with the Secretary of Homeland at such time and in such form as the Commis- (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by Security, shall establish and publish, and shall sion may require, an application containing— striking ‘‘the Commission shall’’ and inserting include each of the following requirements: ‘‘(1) a description of how the State will use ‘‘the Commission, in consultation with the Sec- ‘‘(A) The vendor must be owned and con- the grant to carry out the activities authorized retary of Homeland Security (as appropriate), trolled by a citizen or permanent resident of the under this part; shall’’; United States. ‘‘(2) a certification and assurance that, not (2) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of paragraph ‘‘(B) The vendor must disclose to the Chair- later than 5 years after receiving the grant, the (3); man and the Secretary, and to the chief State State will carry out voting system security im- (3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as para- election official of any State to which the ven- provements, as described in section 297A; and graph (5); and dor provides any goods and services with funds ‘‘(3) such other information and assurances as (4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the fol- provided under this part, of any sourcing out- the Commission may require. lowing new paragraph: side the United States for parts of the election ‘‘SEC. 297C. REPORTS TO CONGRESS. ‘‘(4) will be secure against attempts to under- infrastructure. ‘‘Not later than 90 days after the end of each mine the integrity of election systems by cyber ‘‘(C) The vendor agrees to ensure that the fiscal year, the Commission shall submit a report or other means; and’’. election infrastructure will be developed and to the appropriate congressional committees, in- (e) REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS.— maintained in a manner that is consistent with cluding the Committees on Homeland Security, (1) USE OF PAYMENTS FOR VOTING SYSTEM SE- the cybersecurity best practices issued by the House Administration, and the Judiciary of the CURITY IMPROVEMENTS.—Section 251(b) of such Technical Guidelines Development Committee. House of Representatives and the Committees on Act (52 U.S.C. 21001(b)) is amended by adding at ‘‘(D) The vendor agrees to maintain its infor- Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the end the following new paragraph: mation technology infrastructure in a manner the Judiciary, and Rules and Administration of ‘‘(4) PERMITTING USE OF PAYMENTS FOR VOT- that is consistent with the cybersecurity best the Senate, on the activities carried out with the ING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS.—A State practices issued by the Technical Guidelines De- funds provided under this part. may use a requirements payment to carry out velopment Committee. ‘‘SEC. 297D. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA- any of the following activities: ‘‘(E) The vendor agrees to meet the require- TIONS. ‘‘(A) Cyber and risk mitigation training. ments of paragraph (3) with respect to any ‘‘(a) AUTHORIZATION.—There are authorized ‘‘(B) Providing increased technical support for known or suspected cybersecurity incidents in- to be appropriated for grants under this part— any information technology infrastructure that volving any of the goods and services provided ‘‘(1) $600,000,000 for fiscal year 2019; and the chief State election official deems to be part by the vendor pursuant to a grant under this ‘‘(2) $175,000,000 for each of the fiscal years of the State’s election infrastructure or des- part. 2020, 2022, 2024, and 2026. ignates as critical to the operation of the State’s ‘‘(F) The vendor agrees to permit independent ‘‘(b) CONTINUING AVAILABILITY OF election infrastructure. security testing by the Commission (in accord- AMOUNTS.—Any amounts appropriated pursu- ‘‘(C) Enhancing the cybersecurity and oper- ance with section 231(a)) and by the Secretary ant to the authorization of this section shall re- ations of the information technology infrastruc- of the goods and services provided by the vendor main available until expended.’’. ture described in subparagraph (B). pursuant to a grant under this part. (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of con- ‘‘(D) Enhancing the security of voter registra- ‘‘(3) CYBERSECURITY INCIDENT REPORTING RE- tents of such Act is amended by adding at the tion databases.’’. QUIREMENTS.— end of the items relating to subtitle D of title II (2) INCORPORATION OF ELECTION INFRASTRUC- ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—A vendor meets the re- the following: TURE PROTECTION IN STATE PLANS FOR USE OF quirements of this paragraph if, upon becoming ‘‘PART 7—GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAYMENTS.—Section 254(a)(1) of such Act (52 aware of the possibility that an election cyberse- PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS AND CAR- U.S.C. 21004(a)(1)) is amended by striking the curity incident has occurred involving any of RYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IM- period at the end and inserting ‘‘, including the the goods and services provided by the vendor PROVEMENTS protection of election infrastructure.’’. pursuant to a grant under this part— ‘‘(i) the vendor promptly assesses whether or ‘‘Sec. 297. Grants for obtaining compliant (3) COMPOSITION OF COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE not such an incident occurred, and submits a paper ballot voting systems and FOR DEVELOPING STATE PLAN FOR USE OF PAY- notification meeting the requirements of sub- carrying out voting system secu- MENTS.—Section 255 of such Act (52 U.S.C. paragraph (B) to the Secretary and the Chair- rity improvements. 21005) is amended— man of the assessment as soon as practicable ‘‘Sec. 297A. Voting system security improve- (A) by redesignating subsection (b) as sub- (but in no case later than 3 days after the ven- ments described. section (c); and dor first becomes aware of the possibility that ‘‘Sec. 297B. Eligibility of States. (B) by inserting after subsection (a) the fol- ‘‘Sec. 297C. Reports to Congress. the incident occurred); lowing new subsection: ‘‘Sec. 297D. Authorization of appropria- ‘‘(ii) if the incident involves goods or services ‘‘(b) GEOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION.—The tions. provided to an election agency, the vendor sub- members of the committee shall be a representa- mits a notification meeting the requirements of SEC. 112. COORDINATION OF VOTING SYSTEM SE- tive group of individuals from the State’s coun- CURITY ACTIVITIES WITH USE OF RE- ties, cities, towns, and Indian tribes, and shall subparagraph (B) to the agency as soon as prac- QUIREMENTS PAYMENTS AND ELEC- ticable (but in no case later than 3 days after represent the needs of rural as well as urban TION ADMINISTRATION REQUIRE- areas of the State, as the case may be.’’. the vendor first becomes aware of the possibility MENTS UNDER HELP AMERICA VOTE that the incident occurred), and cooperates with ACT OF 2002. (f) ENSURING PROTECTION OF COMPUTERIZED TATEWIDE OTER EGISTRATION IST the agency in providing any other necessary no- (a) DUTIES OF ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMIS- S V R L .—Section tifications relating to the incident; and SION.—Section 202 of the Help America Vote Act 303(a)(3) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21083(a)(3)) is ‘‘(iii) the vendor provides all necessary up- of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20922) is amended in the mat- amended by striking the period at the end and dates to any notification submitted under clause ter preceding paragraph (1) by striking ‘‘by’’ inserting ‘‘, as well as other measures to prevent (i) or clause (ii). and inserting ‘‘and the security of election in- and deter cybersecurity incidents, as identified ‘‘(B) CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATIONS.—Each noti- frastructure by’’. by the Commission, the Secretary of Homeland fication submitted under clause (i) or clause (ii) (b) MEMBERSHIP OF SECRETARY OF HOMELAND Security, and the Technical Guidelines Develop- of subparagraph (A) shall contain the following SECURITY ON BOARD OF ADVISORS OF ELECTION ment Committee.’’. information with respect to any election cyber- ASSISTANCE COMMISSION.—Section 214(a) of such SEC. 113. INCORPORATION OF DEFINITIONS. security incident covered by the notification: Act (52 U.S.C. 20944(a)) is amended— (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 901 of the Help ‘‘(i) The date, time, and time zone when the (1) by striking ‘‘37 members’’ and inserting ‘‘38 America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21141) is election cybersecurity incident began, if known. members’’; and amended to read as follows:

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 6333 E:\CR\FM\A27JN7.002 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE June 27, 2019 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5211 ‘‘SEC. 901. DEFINITIONS. ‘‘(C) accounts for all ballots validly cast re- the item relating to section 303 the following ‘‘In this Act, the following definitions apply: gardless of how they were tabulated and in- new item: ‘‘(1) The term ‘cybersecurity incident’ has the cludes a precise description of the manner in ‘‘Sec. 303A. Risk-limiting audits.’’. meaning given the term ‘incident’ in section 227 which the ballots are physically stored, includ- of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. ing the total number of physical groups of bal- SEC. 122. FUNDING FOR CONDUCTING POST- ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS. 659). lots, the numbering system for each group, a (a) PAYMENTS TO STATES.— Subtitle D of title ‘‘(2) The term ‘election agency’ means any unique label for each group, and the number of II of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 component of a State, or any component of a ballots in each such group. unit of local government in a State, which is re- ‘‘(b) REQUIREMENTS.— U.S.C. 21001 et seq.), as amended by section sponsible for the administration of elections for ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.— 111(a), is amended by adding at the end the fol- Federal office in the State. ‘‘(A) AUDITS.— lowing new part: ‘‘(3) The term ‘election infrastructure’ means ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Each State and jurisdiction ‘‘PART 8—FUNDING FOR POST-ELECTION storage facilities, polling places, and centralized shall administer risk-limiting audits of the re- RISK-LIMITING AUDITS vote tabulation locations used to support the sults of all election contests for Federal office administration of elections for public office, as held in the State in accordance with the require- ‘‘SEC. 298. PAYMENTS FOR POST-ELECTION RISK- LIMITING AUDITS. well as related information and communications ments of paragraph (2). ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall pay technology (including the technology used by or ‘‘(ii) EXCEPTION.—Clause (i) shall not apply to on behalf of election officials to produce and any election contest for which the State or juris- to States the amount of eligible post-election distribute voter guides to elections), including diction conducts a full recount through a man- audit costs. voter registration databases, voting machines, ual adjudication of voter intent. ‘‘(b) ELIGIBLE POST-ELECTION AUDIT COSTS.— electronic mail and other communications sys- ‘‘(B) FULL MANUAL TABULATION.—If a risk- For purposes of this section, the term ‘eligible tems (including electronic mail and other sys- limiting audit conducted under subparagraph post-election audit costs’ means, with respect to tems of vendors who have entered into contracts (A) corrects the reported outcome of an election any State, costs paid or incurred by the State or with election agencies to support the adminis- contest, the State or jurisdiction shall use the local government within the State for— tration of elections, manage the election process, results of the manual adjudication of voter in- ‘‘(1) the conduct of any risk-limiting audit (as and report and display election results), and tent conducted as part of the risk-limiting audit defined in section 303A) with respect to an elec- other systems used to manage the election proc- as the official results of the election contest. tion for Federal office occurring after the date ess and to report and display election results on ‘‘(2) AUDIT REQUIREMENTS.— of the enactment of this part; and behalf of an election agency. ‘‘(A) RULES AND PROCEDURES.— ‘‘(2) any equipment, software, or services nec- ‘‘(4) The term ‘State’ means each of the sev- ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after essary for the conduct of any such risk-limiting eral States, the District of Columbia, the Com- the date of the enactment of this section, the audit. monwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American chief State election official of the State shall es- ‘‘(c) SPECIAL RULES.— Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, and tablish rules and procedures for conducting ‘‘(1) RULES AND PROCEDURES.—The Commis- the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Is- risk-limiting audits. sion shall establish rules and procedures for lands.’’. ‘‘(ii) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The rules and pro- submission of eligible post-election audit costs (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of con- cedures established under clause (i) shall in- for payments under this section. tents of such Act is amended by amending the clude the following: ‘‘(2) INSUFFICIENT FUNDS.—In any case in ‘‘(I) Rules and procedures for ensuring the se- item relating to section 901 to read as follows: which the amounts appropriated under sub- curity of ballots and documenting that pre- ‘‘Sec. 901. Definitions.’’. section (d) are insufficient to pay all eligible scribed procedures were followed. post-election audit costs submitted by States Subtitle B—Risk-Limiting Audits ‘‘(II) Rules and procedures for ensuring the with respect to any Federal election, the amount SEC. 121. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS. accuracy of ballot manifests produced by juris- of such costs paid under subsection (a) to any (a) IN GENERAL.— Title III of the Help Amer- dictions. ica Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is ‘‘(III) Rules and procedures for governing the State shall be equal to the amount that bears amended by inserting after section 303 the fol- format of ballot manifests and other data in- the same ratio to the amount which would be lowing new section: volved in risk-limiting audits. paid to such State (determined without regard to this paragraph) as— ‘‘SEC. 303A. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS. ‘‘(IV) Methods to ensure that any cast vote ‘‘(A) the number of individuals who voted in ‘‘(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: records used in a risk-limiting audit are those such Federal election in such State; bears to ‘‘(1) RISK-LIMITING AUDIT.—The term ‘risk- used by the voting system to tally the results of limiting audit’ means, with respect to any elec- the election contest sent to the chief State elec- ‘‘(B) the total number of individuals who tion contest, a post-election process that— tion official of the State and made public. voted in such Federal election in all States sub- ‘‘(A) has a probability of at least 95 percent of ‘‘(V) Rules and procedures for the random se- mitting a claim for eligible post-election audit correcting the reported outcome if the reported lection of ballots to be inspected manually dur- costs. outcome is not the correct outcome; ing each audit. ‘‘(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— ‘‘(B) will not change the outcome if the re- ‘‘(VI) Rules and procedures for the calcula- ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby authorized ported outcome is the correct outcome; and tions and other methods to be used in the audit to be appropriated to the Commission such sums ‘‘(C) involves a manual adjudication of voter and to determine whether and when the audit of as are necessary to carry out this part. intent from some or all of the ballots validly cast each election contest is complete. ‘‘(2) AVAILABILITY.—Any amounts appro- in the election contest. ‘‘(VII) Rules and procedures for testing any priated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain ‘‘(2) REPORTED OUTCOME; CORRECT OUTCOME; software used to conduct risk-limiting audits. available without fiscal year limitation until ex- OUTCOME.— ‘‘(B) PUBLIC REPORT.— pended.’’. ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—After the completion of the ‘‘(A) REPORTED OUTCOME.—The term ‘reported (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of con- outcome’ means the outcome of an election con- risk-limiting audit and at least 5 days before the tents of such Act, as amended by section 111(b), test which is determined according to the can- election contest is certified, the State shall pub- is further amended by adding at the end of the vass and which will become the official, certified lish a report on the results of the audit, together items relating to subtitle D of title II the fol- outcome unless it is revised by an audit, re- with such information as necessary to confirm lowing: count, or other legal process. that the audit was conducted properly. ‘‘(B) CORRECT OUTCOME.—The term ‘correct ‘‘(ii) FORMAT OF DATA.—All data published ‘‘PART 8—FUNDING FOR POST-ELECTION RISK- outcome’ means the outcome that would be de- with the report under clause (i) shall be pub- LIMITING AUDITS termined by a manual adjudication of voter in- lished in machine-readable, open data formats. ‘‘Sec. 298. Payments for post-election risk- tent for all votes validly cast in the election con- ‘‘(iii) PROTECTION OF ANONYMITY OF VOTES.— limiting audits. test. Information and data published by the State SEC. 123. GAO ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF AUDITS. ‘‘(C) OUTCOME.—The term ‘outcome’ means under this subparagraph shall not compromise the winner or set of winners of an election con- the anonymity of votes. (a) ANALYSIS.—Not later than 6 months after test. ‘‘(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Each State and juris- the first elections for Federal office is held for ‘‘(3) MANUAL ADJUDICATION OF VOTER IN- diction shall be required to comply with the re- which States must conduct risk-limiting audits TENT.—The term ‘manual adjudication of voter quirements of this section for the first regularly under section 303A of the Help America Vote Act intent’ means direct inspection and determina- scheduled election for Federal office held more of 2002 (as added by section 121), the Comp- tion by humans, without assistance from elec- than 1 year after the date of the enactment of troller General of the United States shall con- tronic or mechanical tabulation devices, of the the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act duct an analysis of the extent to which such au- ballot choices marked by voters on each voter- and for each subsequent election for Federal of- dits have improved the administration of such verified paper record. fice.’’. elections and the security of election infrastruc- ‘‘(4) BALLOT MANIFEST.—The term ‘ballot (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ture in the States receiving such grants. manifest’ means a record maintained by each ju- ENFORCEMENT.—Section 401 of such Act (52 (b) REPORT.—The Comptroller General of the risdiction that— U.S.C. 21111) is amended by striking ‘‘sections United States shall submit a report on the anal- ‘‘(A) is created without reliance on any part 301, 302, and 303’’ and inserting ‘‘subtitle A of ysis conducted under subsection (a) to the Com- of the voting system used to tabulate votes; title III’’. mittee on House Administration of the House of ‘‘(B) functions as a sampling frame for con- (c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of con- Representatives and the Committee on Rules ducting a risk-limiting audit; and tents for such Act is amended by inserting after and Administration of the Senate.

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 6333 E:\CR\FM\A27JN7.002 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE H5212 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 27, 2019

TITLE II—PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY (b) OTHER CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS.— (2) PROCEDURE FOR TESTING.— THROUGH IMPROVEMENTS IN ELECTION Section 301(a) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), (A) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle B of title II of the ADMINISTRATION as amended by section 104, section 105, and sub- Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971 SEC. 201. VOTING SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY RE- section (a), is further amended by adding at the et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the fol- QUIREMENTS. end the following new paragraphs: lowing new section: (a) BALLOT TABULATING DEVICES.— Section ‘‘(10) PROHIBITION OF USE OF WIRELESS COM- ‘‘SEC. 232. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION OF BAL- 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 MUNICATIONS DEVICES IN SYSTEMS OR DEVICES.— LOT MARKING DEVICES. U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section 104 and ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—No system or device upon ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Any State or jurisdiction section 105, is further amended by adding at the which ballot marking devices or optical scanners which intends to use a ballot marking device end the following new paragraph: are configured, upon which ballots are marked (other than a ballot marking device used exclu- ‘‘(9) BALLOT TABULATING METHODS.— by voters (except as necessary for individuals sively to comply with the requirements of section ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The voting system tab- with disabilities to use ballot marking devices 301(a)(3)) in an election for Federal office may ulates ballots by hand or through the use of an that meet the accessibility requirements of para- submit an application to the Commission for optical scanning device that meets the require- graph (3)), or upon which votes are cast, tab- testing and certification under this section. ‘‘(b) APPLICATION, ASSIGNMENT, AND TEST- ments of subparagraph (B). ulated, or aggregated shall contain, use, or be ING.— ‘‘(B) REQUIREMENTS FOR OPTICAL SCANNING accessible by any wireless, power-line, or con- ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—An application under sub- DEVICES.—Except as provided in subparagraph cealed communication device. section (a) shall be submitted not later than 18 (C), the requirements of this subparagraph are ‘‘(B) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Each State and juris- months before the date of the election for Fed- as follows: diction shall be required to comply with the re- eral office in which the ballot marking device is ‘‘(i) The device is designed and built in a man- quirements of this paragraph for the regularly intended to be used and shall contain such in- ner in which it is mechanically impossible for scheduled election for Federal office in Novem- formation as the Commission requires. ber 2020, and for each subsequent election for the device to add or change the vote selections ‘‘(2) ASSIGNMENT.—Upon receipt of an appli- on a printed or marked ballot. Federal office. cation for testing under this section, the Com- ‘‘(11) PROHIBITING CONNECTION OF SYSTEM TO ‘‘(ii) The device is capable of exporting its mission shall contract with a qualified inde- THE INTERNET.— data (including vote tally data sets and cast pendent user experience research laboratory for ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—No system or device upon vote records) in a machine-readable, open data the testing of whether the ballot marking device which ballot marking devices or optical scanners standard format required by the Commission, in intended to be used by the State or jurisdiction are configured, upon which ballots are marked consultation with the Director of the National meets the requirements of section 301(a)(12)(B). Institute of Standards and Technology. by voters, or upon which votes are cast, tab- ‘‘(3) REQUIREMENTS FOR TESTING.—Any con- ‘‘(iii) The device consists of hardware that de- ulated, or aggregated shall be connected to the tract described in paragraph (2) shall require monstrably conforms to a hardware component Internet or any non-local computer system via the qualified independent user experience re- manifest describing point-of-origin information telephone or other communication network at search laboratory to— (including upstream hardware supply chain in- any time. ‘‘(A) not later than 30 days before testing be- formation for each component) that— ‘‘(B) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Each State and juris- gins, submit to the Commission for approval the ‘‘(I) has been provided to the Commission, the diction shall be required to comply with the re- protocol for the simulated election scenario used Director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Se- quirements of this paragraph for the regularly for testing the ballot marking device; curity, and the chief State election official for scheduled election for Federal office in Novem- ‘‘(B) use only protocols approved by the Com- each State in which the device is used; and ber 2020, and for each subsequent election for mission in conducting such testing; and ‘‘(II) may be shared by any entity to whom it Federal office.’’. ‘‘(C) submit to the Commission a report on the has been provided under subclause (I) with (c) SPECIAL CYBERSECURITY RULES FOR CER- results of the testing. independent experts for cybersecurity analysis. TAIN BALLOT MARKING DEVICES.— ‘‘(4) QUALIFIED INDEPENDENT USER EXPERI- ‘‘(iv) The device utilizes technology that pre- (1) IN GENERAL.—Section 301(a) of such Act ENCE RESEARCH LABORATORY.—For purposes of vents the operation of the device if any hard- (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section 104, this section: ware components do not meet the requirements section 105, and subsections (a) and (b), is fur- ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘qualified inde- of clause (iii). ther amended by adding at the end the fol- pendent user experience research laboratory’ ‘‘(v) The device operates using software for lowing new paragraph: means a laboratory accredited under this sub- which the source code, system build tools, and ‘‘(12) BALLOT MARKING DEVICES.— section by the Election Assistance Commission compilation parameters— ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a voting sys- in accordance with standards determined by the ‘‘(I) have been provided to the Commission, tem that uses a ballot marking device, the ballot Commission, in consultation with the Director of the Director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure marking device shall be a device that— the National Institute of Standards and Tech- Security, and the chief State election official for ‘‘(i) is not capable of tabulating votes; nology and the Secretary of Homeland Security. each State in which the device is used; and ‘‘(ii) except in the case of a ballot marking de- ‘‘(B) CRITERIA.—A laboratory shall not be ac- ‘‘(II) may be shared by any entity to whom it vice used exclusively to comply with the require- credited under this subsection unless such lab- has been provided under subclause (I) with ments of paragraph (3), is certified in accord- oratory demonstrates that— independent experts for cybersecurity analysis. ance with section 232 as meeting the require- ‘‘(i) no employee of, or individual with an ‘‘(vi) The device utilizes technology that pre- ments of subparagraph (B); and ownership in, such laboratory has, or has had vents the running of software on the device that ‘‘(iii) meets the requirements of clauses (iii) during the 5 preceding years, any financial rela- does not meet the requirements of clause (v). through (viii) of section 301(a)(9)(B). tionship with a manufacturer of voting systems; ‘‘(vii) The device utilizes technology that en- ‘‘(B) REQUIREMENTS.— and ables election officials, cybersecurity research- ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—A ballot marking device ‘‘(ii) any group of individuals conducting tests ers, and voters to verify that the software run- meets the requirements of this subparagraph if, under this section collectively meet the following ning on the device— during a double-masked test conducted by a qualifications: ‘‘(I) was built from a specific, untampered qualified independent user experience research ‘‘(I) Experience designing and running user version of the code that is described in clause laboratory (as defined in section 232(b)(4)) of a research studies and experiments using both (v); and simulated election scenario which meets the re- qualitative and quantitative methodologies. ‘‘(II) Experience with voting systems. ‘‘(II) uses the system build tools and compila- quirements of clause (ii), there is less than a 5 ‘‘(c) REVIEW BY INDEPENDENT BOARD.— tion parameters that are described in clause (v). percent chance that an ordinary voter using the ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall sub- ‘‘(viii) The device contains such other security device would not detect and report any dif- mit for approval to an independent review board requirements as the Director of Cybersecurity ference between the vote selection printed on the established under paragraph (3) the following: and Infrastructure Security requires. ballot by the ballot marking device and the vote ‘‘(A) Any protocol submitted to the Commis- ‘‘(C) WAIVER.— selection indicated by the voter. sion under subsection (b)(3)(A). ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—The Director of Cybersecu- ‘‘(ii) SIMULATED ELECTION SCENARIO.—A simu- ‘‘(B) Any report submitted to the Commission rity and Infrastructure Security, in consultation lated election scenario meets the requirements of under subsection (b)(3)(C). with the Director of the National Institute of this clause if it is conducted with— ‘‘(2) FINAL APPROVAL.—Not later than the Standards and Technology, may waive one or ‘‘(I) a pool of subjects that are— date that is 12 months before the date of the more of the requirements of subparagraph (B) ‘‘(aa) diverse in age, gender, education, and election for Federal office in which a State or (other than the requirement of clause (i) there- physical limitations; and jurisdiction intends to use the ballot marking of) with respect to any device for a period of not ‘‘(bb) representative of the communities in device, the independent review board shall re- to exceed 2 years. which the voting system will be used; and port to the Commission on whether it has ap- ‘‘(ii) PUBLICATION.—Information relating to ‘‘(II) ballots that are representative of ballots proved a report submitted under paragraph any waiver granted under clause (i) shall be ordinarily used in the communities in which the (1)(B). made publicly available on the Internet. voting system will be used. ‘‘(3) INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD.— ‘‘(D) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Each State and juris- ‘‘(C) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Each State and juris- ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—An independent review diction shall be required to comply with the re- diction shall be required to comply with the re- board established under this paragraph shall be quirements of this paragraph for the regularly quirements of this paragraph for the regularly composed of 5 independent scientists appointed scheduled election for Federal office in Novem- scheduled election for Federal office in Novem- by the Commission, in consultation with the Di- ber 2024, and for each subsequent election for ber 2022, and for each subsequent election for rector of the National Institute of Standards Federal office.’’. Federal office.’’. and Technology.

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 6333 E:\CR\FM\A27JN7.002 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE June 27, 2019 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5213

‘‘(B) QUALIFICATIONS.—The members of the office held in November 2020 and each suc- rected toward commercial advantage or private independent review board— ceeding regularly scheduled general election for monetary compensation that is unrelated to car- ‘‘(i) shall have expertise and relevant peer-re- Federal office. rying out legitimate research or cybersecurity viewed publications in the following fields: cog- (b) ISSUANCE OF CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINES activity.’’. nitive psychology, experimental design, statis- BY TECHNICAL GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT COM- (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made tics, and user experience research and testing; MITTEE.—Section 221(b) of the Help America by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to and Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20961(b)) is amended elections for Federal office held in 2020 or any ‘‘(ii) may not have, or have had during the 5 by adding at the end the following new para- succeeding year. preceding years, any financial relationship with graph: SEC. 204. TREATMENT OF ELECTRONIC POLL a manufacturer of voting systems. ‘‘(3) ELECTION CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINES.— BOOKS AS PART OF VOTING SYS- ‘‘(4) PUBLICATION.—The Commission shall Not later than 6 months after the date of the en- TEMS. make public— actment of the Securing America’s Federal Elec- (a) INCLUSION IN DEFINITION OF VOTING SYS- ‘‘(A) any protocol approved under this sub- tions Act, the Development Committee shall TEM.—Section 301(b) of the Help America Vote section; issue election cybersecurity guidelines, including Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(b)) is amended— ‘‘(B) any report submitted under subsection standards and best practices for procuring, (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by (b)(3)(C); and maintaining, testing, operating, and updating striking ‘‘this section’’ and inserting ‘‘this Act’’; ‘‘(C) any determination made by an inde- election systems to prevent and deter cybersecu- (2) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of paragraph pendent review board under paragraph (2). rity incidents.’’. (1); ‘‘(d) CERTIFICATION.—If— SEC. 203. REQUIRING USE OF SOFTWARE AND (3) by redesignating paragraph (2) as para- ‘‘(1) a ballot marking device is determined by HARDWARE FOR WHICH INFORMA- graph (3); and the qualified independent user experience re- TION IS DISCLOSED BY MANUFAC- (4) by inserting after paragraph (1) the fol- search laboratory to meet the requirements of TURER. lowing new paragraph: section 301(a)(12); and (a) REQUIREMENT.—Section 301(a) of the Help ‘‘(2) any electronic poll book used with respect ‘‘(2) the report submitted under subsection America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as to the election; and’’. (b)(3)(C) is approved by a majority of the mem- amended by sections 104, 105, 201(a), 201(b), and (b) DEFINITION.—Section 301 of such Act (52 bers of the independent review board under sub- 201(c), is amended by adding at the end the fol- U.S.C. 21081) is amended— section (d)(2), lowing new paragraph: (1) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as ‘‘(13) REQUIRING USE OF SOFTWARE AND HARD- then the Commission shall certify the ballot subsections (d) and (e); and WARE FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS DISCLOSED BY marking device. (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the fol- MANUFACTURER.— ‘‘(e) PROHIBITION ON FEES.—The Commission lowing new subsection: ‘‘(A) REQUIRING USE OF SOFTWARE FOR WHICH may not charge any fee to a State or jurisdic- ‘‘(c) ELECTRONIC POLL BOOK DEFINED.—In SOURCE CODE IS DISCLOSED BY MANUFACTURER.— tion, a developer or manufacturer of a ballot this Act, the term ‘electronic poll book’ means ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—In the operation of voting the total combination of mechanical, marking device, or any other person in connec- systems in an election for Federal office, a State tion with testing and certification under this electromechanical, or electronic equipment (in- may only use software for which the manufac- cluding the software, firmware, and documenta- section.’’. turer makes the source code (in the form in (B) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.— tion required to program, control, and support which will be used at the time of the election) the equipment) that is used— (i) Section 202(2) of the Help America Vote Act publicly available online under a license that of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20922(2)) is amended by insert- ‘‘(1) to retain the list of registered voters at a grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, polling location, or vote center, or other location ing ‘‘and ballot marking devices’’ after ‘‘hard- perpetual, sub-licensable license to all intellec- ware and software’’). at which voters cast votes in an election for tual property rights in such source code, except Federal office; and (ii) The heading for subtitle B of title II of that the manufacturer may prohibit a person such Act is amended by inserting at the end ‘‘; ‘‘(2) to identify registered voters who are eligi- who obtains the software from using the soft- ble to vote in an election.’’. Ballot Marking Devices’’. ware in a manner that is primarily intended for (iii) The table of contents of such Act is (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Section 301(e) of such or directed toward commercial advantage or pri- Act (52 U.S.C. 21081(e)), as amended by section amended— vate monetary compensation that is unrelated to (I) by inserting ‘‘; Ballot Marking Devices’’ at 107 and as redesignated by subsection (b), is carrying out legitimate research or cybersecurity amended— the end of the item relating to subtitle B of title activity. II; and (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘paragraph ‘‘(ii) EXCEPTIONS.—Clause (i) does not apply (2)’’ and inserting ‘‘paragraphs (2) and (3)’’; (II) by inserting after the item related to sec- with respect to— tion 231 the following: and ‘‘(I) widely-used operating system software (2) by adding at the end the following new ‘‘Sec. 232. Testing and certification of ballot which is not specific to voting systems and for paragraph: marking devices.’’. which the source code or baseline functionality ‘‘(3) SPECIAL RULE FOR ELECTRONIC POLL SEC. 202. TESTING OF EXISTING VOTING SYSTEMS is not altered; or BOOKS.—In the case of the requirements of sub- TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH ‘‘(II) widely-used cybersecurity software section (c) (relating to electronic poll books), ELECTION CYBERSECURITY GUIDE- which is not specific to voting systems and for LINES AND OTHER GUIDELINES. each State and jurisdiction shall be required to which the source code or baseline functionality comply with such requirements on or after Jan- (a) REQUIRING TESTING OF EXISTING VOTING is not altered. uary 1, 2020.’’. SYSTEMS.— ‘‘(B) REQUIRING USE OF HARDWARE FOR WHICH SEC. 205. PRE-ELECTION REPORTS ON VOTING (1) IN GENERAL.—Section 231(a) of the Help INFORMATION IS DISCLOSED BY MANUFACTURER.— SYSTEM USAGE. America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971(a)) is ‘‘(i) REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF HARDWARE.—A (a) REQUIRING STATES TO SUBMIT REPORTS.— amended by adding at the end the following State may not use a voting system in an election Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 new paragraph: for Federal office unless the manufacturer of U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended by inserting ‘‘(3) TESTING TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH the system publicly discloses online the identi- after section 301 the following new section: GUIDELINES.— fication of the hardware used to operate the sys- ‘‘(A) TESTING.—Not later than 9 months before tem. ‘‘SEC. 301A. PRE-ELECTION REPORTS ON VOTING SYSTEM USAGE. the date of each regularly scheduled general ‘‘(ii) ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS election for Federal office, the Commission shall FOR CUSTOM OR ALTERED HARDWARE.—To the ‘‘(a) REQUIRING STATES TO SUBMIT RE- provide for the testing by accredited laboratories extent that the hardware used to operate a vot- PORTS.—Not later than 120 days before the date under this section of the voting system hard- ing system or any component thereof is not of each regularly scheduled general election for ware and software which was certified for use widely-used, or is widely-used but is altered, the Federal office, the chief State election official of in the most recent such election, on the basis of State may not use the system in an election for a State shall submit a report to the Commission the most recent voting system guidelines appli- Federal office unless— containing a detailed voting system usage plan cable to such hardware or software (including ‘‘(I) the manufacturer of the system publicly for each jurisdiction in the State which will ad- election cybersecurity guidelines) issued under discloses online the components of the hard- minister the election, including a detailed plan this Act. ware, the design of such components, and how for the usage of electronic poll books and other ‘‘(B) DECERTIFICATION OF HARDWARE OR SOFT- such components are connected in the operation equipment and components of such system. WARE FAILING TO MEET GUIDELINES.—If, on the of the system; and ‘‘(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Subsection (a) shall basis of the testing described in subparagraph ‘‘(II) the manufacturer makes the design (in apply with respect to the regularly scheduled (A), the Commission determines that any voting the form which will be used at the time of the general election for Federal office held in No- system hardware or software does not meet the election) publicly available online under a li- vember 2020 and each succeeding regularly most recent guidelines applicable to such hard- cense that grants a worldwide, royalty-free, scheduled general election for Federal office.’’. ware or software issued under this Act, the non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable license (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of con- Commission shall decertify such hardware or to all intellectual property rights in the design tents of such Act is amended by inserting after software.’’. of the hardware or the component, except that the item relating to section 301 the following (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made the manufacturer may prohibit a person who new item: by paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to the obtains the design from using the design in a ‘‘Sec. 301A. Pre-election reports on voting sys- regularly scheduled general election for Federal manner that is primarily intended for or di- tem usage.’’.

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 6343 E:\CR\FM\A27JN7.002 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE H5214 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 27, 2019 SEC. 206. STREAMLINING COLLECTION OF ELEC- outcomes. Ineffective and vulnerable website. They gained access to a data- TION INFORMATION. equipment can also discourage partici- base with information on millions of Il- Section 202 of the Help America Vote Act of pation in Federal elections. linois voters and extracted data on 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20922) is amended— (1) by striking ‘‘The Commission’’ and insert- It comes to the floor after the Com- thousands before the activity was de- ing ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Commission’’; and mittee on House Administration held tected. (2) by adding at the end the following new three hearings in the first 6 months of H.R. 2722 responds to this emergency subsection: this year that addressed the integrity that we find ourselves in as a nation. ‘‘(b) WAIVER OF CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS.— of our elections. In February the com- We ought to be doing everything we Subchapter I of chapter 35 of title 44, United mittee held the ‘‘For the People: Our can to bolster the security and integ- States Code, shall not apply to the collection of American Democracy’’ hearing, where rity of our elections from interference information for purposes of maintaining the the integrity of our democracy—in- and hacking. clearinghouse described in paragraph (1) of sub- The bill’s section 102 requires that section (a).’’. cluding critical steps to improve the security and reliability of our election States transition to voting systems TITLE III—USE OF VOTING MACHINES that use individual, durable, voter- MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES infrastructure—was addressed. On May 8 the committee held an elec- verified paper ballots, which means a SEC. 301. USE OF VOTING MACHINES MANUFAC- paper ballot marked by the voter by TURED IN THE UNITED STATES. tion security hearing where we heard testimony about the urgent need to up- hand or through the use of a non-tab- Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of ulating ballot marking device or sys- 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section grade our election infrastructure and 104, section 105, section 201(a), 201(b), 201(c), the lack of ongoing investment in the tem. Voter-verified paper ballots are and section 203(a), is further amended by add- wake of new threats. the best way to ensure that a voter’s ing at the end the following new paragraph: And on May 21 the committee held an ballot accurately reflects their choices ‘‘(14) VOTING MACHINE REQUIREMENTS.—By oversight hearing of the Election As- and is counted as cast. Paper can be not later than the date of the regularly sched- sistance Commission, an agency that audited. In the last Presidential elec- uled general election for Federal office occur- tion, approximately 20 percent of reg- ring in November 2022, each State shall seek to plays a central role in supporting elec- tion administration in this country. istered voters cast their ballot on vot- ensure that any voting machine used in such ing machines that do not have any election and in any subsequent election for Fed- I will remind this House that earlier eral office is manufactured in the United this year, the Director of National In- kind of paper backup. States.’’. telligence published a report stating The National Academies of Sciences, that our adversaries and strategic com- Engineering, and Medicine concluded TITLE IV—SEVERABILITY that paperless systems ‘‘should be re- SEC. 401. SEVERABILITY. petitors ‘‘probably already are looking to the 2020 U.S. elections as an oppor- moved from service as soon as pos- If any provision of this Act or amendment sible.’’ tunity to advance their interests. made by this Act, or the application of a provi- In at least 40 States, elections are sion or amendment to any person or cir- ‘‘They may also use cyber means to carried out using machines that are at cumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the ‘directly manipulate or disrupt elec- least a decade old. And like any tech- remainder of this Act and amendments made by tions systems—such as by tampering nology, they are susceptible to increas- this Act, and the application of the provisions with voter registration or disrupting ing failure with age. One witness at our and amendment to any person or circumstance, the vote tallying process—either to shall not be affected by the holding. election security hearing, Lawrence alter data or to call into question our The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, Norden of the Brennan Center for Jus- voting process.’’’ tice at NYU Law School, explained as amended, shall be debatable for 1 Last year he said that ‘‘the warning that some State officials have ‘‘had to hour equally divided and controlled by lights are blinking red’’. . . . turn to eBay to find critical compo- the chair and ranking minority mem- Special Counsel Robert Mueller nents like dot-matrix printer ribbons, ber of the Committee on House Admin- noted in Volume One of his report that decades old storage devices, and analog istration. the Russian military ‘‘targeted individ- modems.’’ Aging systems also fre- The gentlewoman from California uals and entities involved in the ad- (Ms. LOFGREN), and the gentleman quently rely on unsupported software ministration of the elections. Victims like Windows XP and 2000, which may from Illinois (Mr. RODNEY DAVIS) each included U.S. State and local entities, will control 30 minutes. not receive regular security patches such as State boards of elections, sec- and are thus more vulnerable to the The Chair recognizes the gentle- retaries of State, and county govern- woman from California. latest methods of cyberattack. ments, as well as individuals who This bill addresses many other cyber- GENERAL LEAVE worked for those entities. The GRU security best practices besides paper- Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I also targeted private technology firms based systems. ask unanimous consent that all Mem- responsible for manufacturing and ad- The bill in section 111 authorizes a bers may have 5 legislative days in ministering election-related software $600 million Election Assistance Com- which to revise and extend their re- and hardware, such as voter registra- mission grant program to assist States marks and to insert extraneous mate- tion software and electronic polling in securing election infrastructure. rial on H.R. 2722. stations.’’ States may use the money to replace The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there In April, FBI Director Christopher their aging equipment with voter- objection to the request of the gentle- Wray called Russia’s interference ef- verified paper ballot voting systems, woman from California? forts a ‘‘significant counterintelligence but also ongoing maintenance of elec- There was no objection. threat,’’ and said that the 2018 mid- tion infrastructure, enhanced cyberse- Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I terms were a ‘‘dress rehearsal for the curity and operations of IT infrastruc- yield myself such time as I may con- big show’’ of the 2020 Presidential elec- ture, and enhanced cybersecurity of sume. tions. voter registration systems. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong sup- Early voters in Georgia in 2018 saw Originally, the bill, as introduced, port of H.R. 2722. The SAFE Act is crit- machines deleting votes and switching would have authorized $1 billion for ical legislation to invest in and up- them to other candidates. The ma- this initial round of surge funding; grade the machinery of American de- chines where voters saw this occur however, during the Committee on mocracy. It will help us combat the na- were purchased in 2002. During early House Administration’s markup, the tional emergency facing our country. voting in Texas in 2018 some electronic committee approved an amendment in It will improve the resilience of elec- voting machines deleted votes and the nature of a substitute that author- tion infrastructure used in Federal switched them between candidates. The ized $600 million instead. Combined elections. machines were used in 78 of 254 Texas with the $380 million that Congress ap- Aging equipment, under-resourced ju- counties. propriated last year in election secu- risdictions, and interference by foreign In June of 2016 the Russian GRU com- rity grants, this funding reaches the $1 entities or non-state actors leaves the promised the computer network of the billion that experts have said is nec- system vulnerable to exploitation that Illinois State Board of Elections by ex- essary to implement these necessary can undermine confidence in election ploiting a vulnerability in their protections.

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\A27JN7.002 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE June 27, 2019 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5215 The bill also provides in section 111 Every American—no matter what It is common sense that if there is an $175 million in biennial maintenance their choice in politics—should know attempt to hack a State election, the funding. Cybersecurity threats will not that their vote will be counted as cast. State election official should be noti- dissipate, they will only evolve. State Madam Speaker, I reserve the bal- fied, but they are currently not able to election officials have told us repeat- ance of my time. let a State know if it has been at- edly they need more funding and a sus- Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. tacked. If DHS is the one that sees this tainable source of funding. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such attack from a foreign country, they Section 103 of the SAFE Act fosters time as I may consume. can’t notify State election officials be- innovation for voters living with dis- Madam Speaker, in the 2016 election, cause, in many cases, they don’t have abilities. It provides grant funding for we saw a very real threat to our Nation security clearance. the study, development, and testing of when Russia interfered in our elections Our bill clears this up. Those State accessible paper ballot voting, verifica- by using a misinformation campaign officials deserve the right to know who tion, and casting mechanisms. It ex- through social media and attacking is trying to attack their elections in pressly requires States to ensure that voter registration databases. While each State in this great Nation. individuals with disabilities and others this interference from Russia is unac- My good friend, Congresswoman are given an equivalent opportunity to ceptable, I feel it is necessary to point TORRES, stated at the Rules Committee vote, including with privacy and inde- out that there is no evidence that any hearing on Monday night that she pendence, in a manner that produces voting machines were hacked in the doesn’t trust her State election offi- voter-verified paper ballots as for other 2016 or even in the 2018 elections. cials in California to have security However, this does not mean that voters. clearances. Personally, I don’t feel that there isn’t a need for election and cy- The bill fosters accountability for way, and I think other Members of bersecurity improvements for State election technology vendors. It would Congress may agree with me. election systems. On this point, I know create a qualified election infrastruc- State officials should know if there is my friends and colleagues on the other ture vendor designation where the a threat to their election system, and side of the aisle, including the distin- Election Assistance Commission, in co- DHS should be the one telling them. guished chairperson of our Committee ordination with the Department of To sum up the Election Security As- on House Administration, we all agree Homeland Security, would craft cri- sistance Act, our solution provides that no one—and I mean, no one— teria that vendors would follow to re- much-needed election security im- ceive the qualified designation. This should interfere with our elections. provements and reinforcements for would include reporting any known or Every Americans’ vote should be local election officials, without over- suspected cybersecurity incidents in- counted and protected. stepping the States’ authority to deter- volving election infrastructure to both Last Congress $380 million were ap- mine and maintain their own elections. the EAC and DHS, as well as affected propriated to States to upgrade their Unfortunately, I can’t say the same election agencies. election security. Also, election infra- for the bill we are voting on today. The bill in sections 201 and 203 also structure was designated as critical in- Madam Speaker, I reserve the bal- includes open-source provisions, re- frastructure in response to the U.S. In- ance of my time. quiring use of software and hardware telligence Community’s reports that Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I for which information is disclosed by the Russian Government attacked. yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman manufacturers. This will allow cyberse- b 0930 curity experts and the public to vet the from California (Mrs. DAVIS), a member security of election systems regardless This allowed the Department of of the House Administration Com- of the technology used. Homeland Security to begin providing mittee. As amended in the committee, the additional cybersecurity assistance to Mrs. DAVIS of California. Madam bill in section 121 requires States to State and local election officials. Speaker, I rise in support of the SAFE adopt risk-limiting audits. Risk-lim- Work has been done to help States Act. iting audits are the gold standard of improve their election security, and No matter what my colleagues con- post-election audits. They involve hand more work must be done. This is why clude about the Mueller report, I think counting a certain number of ballots our committee Republicans, all of us we can all agree it shows our elections using advanced statistical methods to on the House Administration Com- are under foreign attack. determine with a high degree of con- mittee, introduced H.R. 3412, the Elec- What would happen if a foreign gov- fidence that the reported election out- tion Security Assistance Act, to assist ernment actually succeeded in chang- come is accurate. The SAFE Act re- States in their election security ing the results of a Federal election? quires States to implement risk-lim- strengthening efforts. All bad actors have to do is break iting audits because they go hand in This realistic legislation provides through the defenses of even one—even hand with paper ballots. We need au- $380 million in Federal grants to States one—of the over 10,000 election admin- dits to ensure that ballot marking de- to update their aging and at-risk elec- istration jurisdictions in our country. vices or optical scanners were not tion infrastructure, while also requir- As we all know, questionable results hacked and that the reported results ing State and local officials to have in just one county can derail an entire are accurate. some skin in the game. We require a 25 Presidential election and throw our Second, as amended in committee, percent match to ensure that they un- country into a tailspin. the bill in section 201 includes specific derstand they are getting the best Election security is national secu- cybersecurity standards to apply to op- equipment that is going to protect rity. Election machinery is the ma- tical scanner voting systems and an- their voters’ rights to have their votes chinery of democracy. other set of standards to apply to bal- counted and protected. The SAFE Act gives States what lot marking devices. These will apply In addition, our bill is the only bill they need to upgrade and maintain safe equally to current and future tech- that creates the first ever Election and resilient election infrastructure. nology. For example, H.R. 2722 pro- Cyber Assistance Unit, aimed at con- In the House Administration Com- hibits the use of wireless communica- necting our State and local election of- mittee, we debated whether paper bal- tions devices and internet connectivity ficials with leading election adminis- lots are the safest way to go. It does in voting systems upon which ballots tration and cybersecurity experts from seem ironic that our answer to cyberse- are marked by voters or that otherwise across the country. curity, in fact, is old school, but we mark and tabulate ballots. Our bill also empowers State officials know what works. Madam Speaker, H.R. 2722 is an es- by providing security clearances to our As Oregon’s Secretary of State Den- sential step forward in shoring up our election officials to better facilitate nis Richardson said, ‘‘You can’t hack election infrastructure and investing in the sharing of information and requir- paper.’’ We can recount and audit paper secure elections. I ask the House to ing the Department of Homeland Secu- ballots with a certainty that we just pass this legislation and bolster the rity to notify State election officials of don’t have with machines. trust and confidence in our system cyberattacks and any foreign threats Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. that all Americans expect and deserve. within the State. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\K27JN7.008 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE H5216 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 27, 2019 the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. This is a massive technical challenge Madam Speaker, I urge my col- BAIRD). in a country of hundreds of millions of leagues to support this critical meas- Mr. BAIRD. Madam Speaker, I thank people, 50 States, and thousands of ju- ure. the gentleman from Illinois for yield- risdictions, especially in the computer Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. ing me time. age. We need voter-certified, paper-bal- Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to Madam Speaker, keeping our elec- lot voting systems in every State in the gentleman from Florida (Mr. tions safe from cyberattacks and fraud the Union. We need risk-reducing au- WALTZ), another good friend of mine is not and should not be a partisan pri- dits. We need real accountability for from the great State of Florida. ority. election vendors. We need voting ma- Mr. WALTZ. Madam Speaker, elec- H.R. 2722 has been rushed to the chines manufactured in the United tion security is especially significant House floor without giving the Science, States, where our democracy is cre- to Floridians. Two Florida counties Space, and Technology Committee the ated, too. were breached in the 2016 election as a opportunity to hold even a single hear- Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. result of Russian spear phishing tar- ing on the bill or the subject matter. Madam Speaker, I certainly hope my geting county election officials. The problem with rushing this bill good friend from Maryland (Mr. As Members of Congress, obviously, through Congress is that it will have a RASKIN) changes his mind and wants we are not here to relitigate 2016 but to significant negative impact on NIST’s more Republican governments, but I work toward bipartisan solutions to de- fend the 2020 elections from foreign in- ability to work with State and local don’t think that is going to happen, even today, on the House floor. trusion. governments to identify standards and I am disappointed that the majority best practices for election security. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. is rushing this partisan proposal to the Our priority in Congress should be to floor this week and has bypassed Re- develop useful tools that empower YOHO). Mr. YOHO. Madam Speaker, I thank publicans who have shown interest in States and local officials to ensure my friend from Illinois for yielding. working on election security. Just yes- their elections are secure, accessible, I rise today as a Member from the terday, the Science, Space, and Tech- and accurate. great State of Florida. We all recall nology Committee held a hearing on In fact, our secretary of state in Indi- the 2000 Presidential election. What election vulnerabilities and potential ana, Ms. Connie Lawson, has done a re- happened in Palm Beach County turned solutions. That hearing occurred markable job leading the effort to add into a national punch line, ‘‘the hang- after—after—this proposal had been in- safeguards to our elections process, en- ing chad.’’ troduced and a day before it will re- suring it is completed with integrity. The Democratic bill before us today ceive a vote on the House floor. Given the opportunity, I believe that would mandate paper ballots and make This proposal throws $1.3 billion at our committee could come to an agree- our elections a technology-free zone. I, the problem without careful consider- ment, in a bipartisan manner, to up- too, am worried about malign actors ation by the authorizing committees. date NIST’s election and security ac- like Russia and China when it comes to This proposal also excludes bipartisan tivities. our cybersecurity network. However, solutions, like the one I am drafting Congress should focus on legislation let us not throw out the baby with the with Representative STEPHANIE MUR- that provides much-needed improve- bath water. PHY from Florida. ments and reinforcements for local of- Many of my colleagues submitted Our proposal, the ALERTS Act, ficials without overstepping the States’ commonsense amendments that would would require Federal agencies to re- authority to maintain their elections. improve the bill, amendments address- port to the Department of Homeland Madam Speaker, because of the lack ing ballot harvesting and ensuring Security if an election intrusion is of following regular order, the com- State matching funds. Yet, Democrats, identified and require DHS to notify mittee has never been given the oppor- under another closed rule, are forcing State and local officials of the breach, tunity to ensure those issues are ad- passage on a one-sided bill with no unless the information is deemed to dressed. prospect in the Senate and no chance compromise intelligence sources. Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I of being signed by the President. Federal, State, and local officials yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Madam Speaker, I sincerely hope we have a duty to notify voters in Florida Maryland (Mr. RASKIN), a member of address these issues in a bipartisan and voters across the country impacted the House Administration Committee. manner that reflects well on this body by election attacks, a duty that was Mr. RASKIN. Madam Speaker, I rise and the American people. not upheld by the FBI in the wake of in support of the SAFE Act because Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I the 2016 elections and a duty that the Vladimir Putin conducted a sweeping am pleased to yield 1 minute to the ALERTS Act, this bipartisan proposal, and systematic campaign to disrupt gentlewoman from Georgia (Mrs. would require. and destabilize our Presidential elec- MCBATH), a new Member of Congress. At yesterday’s Science, Space, and Mrs. MCBATH. Madam Speaker, I tion in 2016. Technology Committee hearing, the rise in support of H.R. 2722. Our elec- Some say we can’t pass the SAFE secretary of Oklahoma’s State Election tions are the foundation of our democ- Act to guarantee the security of our Board recommended a State and local racy, but they face increasing threats. reporting requirement like the elections, that because of federalism, There is bipartisan agreement that we should let the States work it out on ALERTS Act. we must do more to guard against So, testimony and a recommenda- their own. these threats to our most fundamental tion—both—were not considered by the But we are not the fragmented, di- democratic process. Our elections must authors of this bill. vided States of America. We are the allow us to truly hear the voices of Madam Speaker, I request that my United States of America, and that is every American voter. colleagues oppose this bill, and imme- the way we were designed. My home State of Georgia has re- diately following this vote, I ask Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitu- cently taken steps to safeguard its vot- Democrats and Republicans to come tion, Madam Speaker, says Congress ing processes from cybersecurity together to work toward a bipartisan ‘‘shall guarantee to every State in this threats, and this bill would provide election security package. union a republican form of govern- necessary funding to support these ef- Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I ment, and shall protect each of them forts in Georgia and across our coun- am pleased to yield 1 minute to the against invasion.’’ try. gentleman from Illinois (Mr. CASTEN). What does it mean by ‘‘republican This legislation will strengthen the Mr. CASTEN of Illinois. Madam form of government’’? It doesn’t mean partnership of the Election Assistance Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. a Republican Party form of govern- Commission, the Department of Home- 2722, the SAFE Act. ment. It means a representative form land Security, and our State election Among the many disturbing revela- of government. That means we must officials. tions in the Mueller report, we learned have a system that accurately trans- Together, we must modernize our that Russian intelligence officers suc- lates the popular will into the election election infrastructure and ensure the cessfully infiltrated the computer net- of a Congress. security of our democracy. work in my home State at the Illinois

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\K27JN7.009 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE June 27, 2019 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5217 State Board of Elections. They Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to It is clear that Congress must take accessed the personal information of the gentleman from California (Mr. action. Passage of the SAFE Act will millions of voters and stole thousands CALVERT). secure our elections by updating our of voter records before being detected. Mr. CALVERT. Madam Speaker, as a election infrastructure, speeding up the As far as we know, this breach has Member from California, it is hard for transition to paper ballots, and making not affected the results of any subse- me to believe that the majority could necessary investments in cybersecu- quent elections, but it desperately un- possibly propose an election security rity. derscores the need for much greater bill that doesn’t address the major vul- Every Member of Congress took an election security moving forward. nerabilities related to ballot har- oath to protect this Nation from Now, officials in my home State and vesting. threats foreign and domestic, and I others around the country have worked Ballot harvesting is where paid cam- urge my colleagues to honor that oath. tirelessly to secure these vulnerabili- paign operatives collect up to hundreds Let’s protect our democracy while we ties over the past 3 years, but without or even thousands of ballots and drop still have one. the help of the Federal Government, them off at polling places or an elec- Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. they can only do so much. It is past tion office. The practice is ripe for Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to time that we step up and give States fraud and a recipe for disaster. Any se- the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. the resources they need to ensure our rious effort to secure elections would LOUDERMILK), my fellow House Admin- elections and our voters are safe in the address it. istration Committee Republican and upcoming election. Let’s be clear: We want to give people one of my good friends here in Con- Our democratic system depends on who need it an opportunity to vote by gress. the consent of the governed. That is far mail, and we want to look for ways to Mr. LOUDERMILK. Madam Speaker, too fragile to take lightly. And our make it easier for disabled or elderly I thank my good friend from Illinois, constituents’ trust and the independ- Americans to participate in our elec- an exceptional baseball player, as well, ence of our democracy depend on it. tions. My concern is inserting cam- for yielding this time. Madam Speaker, for these reasons, I paign operatives into the ballot-han- Look, this is something I am very urge my colleagues to vote for the dling process without any safeguards. passionate about, and I am a bit sur- SAFE Act on the floor today. In California, paid campaign staff prised that one of my colleagues from can collect hundreds of ballots without b 0945 Georgia would speak against this bill having to disclose who they are work- Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. or even support this bill. ing for. When they hand over those bal- Let’s be frank. Yes, the Russians are Madam Speaker, look, I respect and lots to election officials, there is no re- agree with my good friend from Illinois bad. They are very bad. They seek to quirement to even provide their name. do harm to America, and they have (Mr. CASTEN), my colleague. We want Some of my friends across the aisle been attempting to influence our elec- to protect our home State. We saw in- claim that the real problem is bad ac- tions for many years. trusion into our Illinois State Board of tors committing fraud. But it is the Yes, we need to be concerned about Elections voter registration system. It very practice of ballot harvesting being election security. But if you want to is something that had to be addressed. the problem. The reality is this process secure our election system, this is the I am happy to report, after talking is an open invitation for fraud. That is exact opposite of what we should be with the State Board of Election offi- why most States have banned the prac- cials, they have been given resources doing. tice. The State of Georgia has recognized already appropriated by a Republican Ignoring the most notable threat to this. Just this year, our State legisla- majority Congress, Republicans in the election security is unacceptable in a ture overwhelmingly passed a bill to Senate, and President Trump last year so-called election security bill. to effectively ensure that that informa- Madam Speaker, American voters de- spend $150 million to upgrade our elec- tion is not vulnerable again. serve better. I urge my colleagues to tronic voting machines so that they What we are debating here today is a oppose this bill until we can get serious will produce a verifiable ballot that bill that will put more unfunded and about real threats to our democracy. represents the way the person voted at underfunded mandates on States like Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I the machine. Illinois. That is not what our local yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman This is the direction we should be election officials in my district asked from Virginia (Ms. WEXTON). going, not to eliminate electronic bal- for. Ms. WEXTON. Madam Speaker, in lots, not eliminate the efficiency that The reason Illinois was able to pro- 2016, Russian hackers tried to break you get when you can walk in. tect itself and ensure that it didn’t into Virginia’s election system. In re- The verifiable aspect of it, a voter is happen again in the extremely high, sponse to this information, Virginia given a card, after it is verified who the historic turnout of the 2018 midterm took active steps to secure the integ- voter is. When a voter walks into a vot- election was because they were given rity of our elections. We sped up our ing precinct, they fill out the paper- the flexibility to spend the HAVA transition to paper ballots to ensure work and show their ID, and they are funds that Republicans in Congress en- that our elections were secure and the given a card that identifies that they sured that the State of Illinois had, results could be verified and audited. have been certified. They insert that leading to a Democratic majority in But it is not just about any one elec- card and vote electronically, and then the midterm elections. tion or just about any one adversary. it will produce a printed receipt that No one is questioning the safety and Passing the SAFE Act is about secur- they can verify that this is the way security of our midterm elections. No ing our elections from all threats, for- they voted. That receipt goes into a one has told me that any foreign entity eign or otherwise. These threats are box that is used for a recount. That is hacked into any institution, voter reg- coming for us in every State, red or a secure voting system that also em- istration system, or machines. Maybe blue, rural or urban. braces technology. DHS hasn’t called me, even though I In 2016, State election websites in Il- This bill would take us back decades. think I have a security clearance, so linois and Arizona were hacked by in- It is like when a student takes an SAT they could. truders that installed malware and exam. They fill out the little bubbles, But they can’t call our local election downloaded sensitive voter informa- and then it runs through an electronic officials, under this bill, if it happens tion. counter. again because they don’t have security In 2018, electronic voting machines in Look, even in our own hearing, the clearance. That is why our bill is a bet- Georgia and Texas deleted votes for chief technologist at the Center for De- ter choice. certain candidates or switched votes mocracy and Technology agreed when I The one that is on the floor today from one candidate to another. brought this scenario forward, that we does not address the concerns of States In Johnson County, Indiana, e-poll use the technology of DREs that then like mine, and it certainly does not ad- books failed in 2018, halting voting en- will print a verifiable ballot or a re- dress the concerns of States like Cali- tirely for 4 hours, with no extension of ceipt. He said that those were abso- fornia. polling hours. lutely safe.

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\K27JN7.011 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE H5218 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 27, 2019 Now, here is the problem. When we I am very proud of this legislation, bersecurity standards and prohibits wireless go to paper ballots, and everyone is and I am proud of this Speaker, proud and internet connectivity on systems that going to fill out these paper ballots, we of the leadership, to say that we are count ballots or upon which voters mark their are talking long lines. We are talking going to be first on the line to tell ballots or systems are configured. about fewer people being able to get to America we believe in safe, equal, and The SAFE Act also limits state expenditures the polls. fair elections. on goods and services with grant monies pro- Madam Speaker, when we decide to I ask my friends to support this legis- vided under this Act to purchases from ‘‘quali- vote on this bill, the last thing you are lation. fied election infrastructure vendors.’’ going to say from that rostrum is Madam Speaker, as a senior member of the The EAC, in coordination with DHS, estab- Members will cast their votes via elec- Committees on the Judiciary and Homeland lishes the criteria for achieving the status of tronic device. Why? It is efficient. We Security, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2722, ‘‘qualified election infrastructure vendor,’’ have a verifiable way of making sure the ‘‘Securing America’s Federal Elections which includes maintaining IT infrastructure in that we can see the way we voted on Act’’ or SAFE Act. a manner consistent with the best practices this board up here or on a printed piece I strongly support this legislation because provided by the EAC and agreeing to report of paper we can get in the back. This is the linchpin of representative democracy is any known or suspected security incidents in- because of efficiency. public confidence in the political system, re- volving election infrastructure. Madam Speaker, can you imagine if gime, and community. Madam Speaker, there is compelling reason we had to do paper ballots or voice vote That confidence in turn rests upon the ex- every one of the many amendments we for the Congress to pass the SAFE Act by tent to which the public has faith that the sys- overwhelming margins in the House and Sen- have on these appropriations bills? We tem employed to select its leaders accurately would never go home. We would be here ate because to date the President and his Ad- reflects its preferences. ministration has shown little interest or inclina- 24 hours a day. At bottom, this means that all citizens cast- The American people expect us to tion in taking effective action to deter and pre- ing a vote have a fundamental right and rea- vent interference by foreign powers in Amer- live by the same laws that they have to sonable expectation that their votes count and live by. We should embrace technology ican elections. are counted. Let us remember that the Intelligence Com- and make it secure, not revert back This concern is particularly salient because munity Assessment (‘‘ICA’’) of January 2017 decades to old technology. of the unprecedented interference by a hostile Look, the reality is, this bill would assessed that Russian President Vladimir foreign power to secure victory for its pre- subject us to the problem of people Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 ferred candidate in the 2016 presidential elec- walking up with boxes full of aimed at the U.S. presidential election in tion and the determination of that hostile preprinted ballots, all across the Na- which Russia’s goals were to undermine pub- power to repeat its success in future American tion, and they could drop those in at lic faith in the U.S. democratic process, deni- elections. the last minute. We need to verify that grate Democratic presidential candidate and That is why it is necessary to pass H.R. people voting are who they are. implacable foe of Vladimir Putin, former Sec- 2722, the SAFE Act, so comprehensive elec- Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I retary of State Hillary Clinton, facilitate the tion security reform measures can be imple- yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman election of Vladimir Putin’s preferred can- mented. from Texas (Ms. JACKSON LEE), my col- didate, Donald J. Trump. Specifically, the SAFE Act authorizes a league from the House Judiciary Com- $600 million Election Assistance Commission Russia’s interference in the election proc- mittee and Homeland Security Com- (EAC) grant program to assist in securing esses of democratic countries is not new but mittee. a continuation of the ‘‘Translator Project,’’ an Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Speaker, election infrastructure and a $5 million grant program to study and report on accessible ongoing information warfare effort launched by I thank the gentlewoman from Cali- Vladimir Putin in 2014 to use social media to fornia for her leadership. paper ballot voting systems. The bill provides grants to State and local manipulate public opinion and voters in west- There is not a time that I go home ern democracies. that they don’t ask me how we will se- election officials to replace aging voting ma- chines with voter-verified paper ballot voting Instead of supporting the unanimous as- cure our elections. I am proudly sup- sessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, porting the Securing America’s Fed- systems and grants to support hiring IT staff, cybersecurity training, security and risk vulner- the President attacked and sought to discredit eral Elections Act, the SAFE Act, and and undermine the agencies and officials re- I am asking why our colleagues are ability assessments, and other activities to se- cure election infrastructure. sponsible for detecting and assessing Russian fighting against Americans having the interference in the 2016 presidential election right to vote. The bill also provides states with $175 mil- lion in biannual sustainment funding to help as well as those responsible for investigating The SAFE Act authorizes a $600 mil- and bringing to justice the conspirators who lion Election Assistance Commission maintain election infrastructure and, to ensure States can maintain security gains, provides committed crimes against the United States grant program. It provides States with our law enforcement. $175 million in biannual sustainment each State with no less than $1 per voter who And to add shame to insult and injury, at a funding to help maintain election in- participated in the most recent election to meeting in Helsinki, Finland, rather than em- frastructure. maintain election security. Voting machines are required to be Under the legislation, voting machines are bracing the conclusions of the U.S. Intel- manufactured in the United States. required to be manufactured in the United ligence Community, the President of the States are mandated to conduct risk- States and states are mandated to conduct United States sided with Russian President limiting audits. risk-limiting audits, a critical tool to ensuring Vladimir Putin in heaping scorn on the IC’s as- Another very important feature of the integrity of elections. sessment regarding Russian interference and the SAFE Act is that it requires ac- These audits, which involve hand counting a called the U.S. Justice Department investiga- countability for election technology certain number of ballots and using statistical tion into Russia’s interference led by Special vendors and sets cybersecurity stand- methods to determine the accuracy of the Counsel Robert Mueller ‘‘the greatest political ards. original vote tally, are effective at detecting witch hunt in history.’’ As a member of the Subcommittee on any incorrect election outcomes, whether As the Mueller Report concluded, ‘‘The Rus- Cybersecurity, recognizing what hap- caused by a cyberattack or something more sian government interfered in the 2016 presi- pened in 2016, I want to make sure that mundane like a programming error. dential election in sweeping and systematic the Russian adversaries, the Russian The SAFE Act also directs the National fashion.’’ military, are not our poll watchers, are Science Foundation to administer a $5 million In his only public remarks made since he not our secretaries of states, are not grant program to study and report on acces- was appointed Special Counsel, Robert the vendors for our machines. sible paper ballot verification mechanisms, in- Mueller reiterated at his farewell press con- I want to make sure for minorities, cluding for individuals with disabilities, voters ference held at the Department of Justice on every vote counts, and for every Amer- with difficulties in literacy, and voters whose May 29, 2017, the ‘‘central allegation of our in- ican, every vote counts. primary language is not English. dictments—that there were multiple, system- I want to end voter suppression. The Madam Speaker, another salutary feature of atic efforts to interfere in our election’’ and that way we do this is to have safe elec- the SAFE Act is that it requires accountability ‘‘allegation deserves the attention of every tions. for election technology vendors and sets cy- American.’’

VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:24 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 9920 E:\CR\FM\K27JN7.013 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE June 27, 2019 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5219 Madam Speaker, American elections are to Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. I We have significant resources that be decided by American voters free from for- yield the gentleman from Alabama an are going to be brought to bear to build eign interference or sabotage, and that is why additional 30 seconds. up, to fortify the election security in- I support and urge all my colleague to vote to Mr. PALMER. My colleagues on the frastructure of our country. This is pass H.R. 2722, the ‘‘Securing America’s Fed- other side continue to offer radical and what the public wants to see. They eral Elections Act’’ or SAFE Act. unworkable policies to revamp our want to be ready for the 2020 election. Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. election system. Security risks do exist We have risk-limiting audits to make Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to within our ballot boxes, but this bill is sure that States across the country are the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. not the answer. This bill will just add figuring out what is going on. Where do PALMER), our Republican Policy Com- to the existing risks, and I cannot sup- we make changes? How do we protect mittee chair. port it. ourselves? Mr. PALMER. Madam Speaker, I I urge my colleagues to oppose the Paper ballots. We have had a lot of thank the gentleman from Illinois, who bill. discussion about that today. Paper bal- is also a good friend, for the work he is Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, may lots are incredibly important in terms doing on this, trying to bring some I inquire how much time remains on of boosting the confidence of the public transparency to what is really going on each side. that elections will be carried out in a here. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gen- way that you can verify the tally, peo- There are numerous reasons that tlewoman from California has 14 min- ple have the confidence that when they mandating paper ballots isn’t work- utes remaining. The gentleman from go to the ballot box, they put their bal- able. They are susceptible to fraud; Illinois has 121⁄2 minutes remaining. lot in there, that that vote will be they are inefficient; and they are anti- Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I counted. quated. I have seen, over the years, yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from We have no time to waste. We need to where the joke was ‘‘one man, one Maryland (Mr. SARBANES). get this done now if we are going to be vote,’’ where it was ‘‘one suitcase, one b 1000 ready for the 2020 election. vote,’’ with people bringing in paper Mr. SARBANES. Madam Speaker, I Bob Mueller came along with his re- ballots. We have seen a situation thank the gentlewoman for yielding. port and he said that the Russian inter- around the country now where that is I very strongly support the SAFE ference was sweeping and systematic in still a bit of a problem. Act. This is something that the Demo- 2016. For argument’s sake, though, let’s crats have been focused on from day Every leader in our intelligence com- just say that paper ballots were fool- one. Day one meaning, the day after munity has also echoed the fact that proof and didn’t come with their own the 2016 election, when we saw the at- 2016 was a dress rehearsal. They are set of problems or security concerns. I tacks that had come in against our de- coming in 2020. would still be concerned about the im- mocracy, we realized we were very ex- We need to be ready. We need to pro- pact this bill would have on the major- posed, and we needed to take action. tect our elections. Let’s support the ity of our States. This is our chance to stand up SAFE Act. The mandate, in and of itself, is trou- against interference from foreign ad- Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. bling. Twenty-nine out of our 50 versaries who are trying to hack in, Madam Speaker, I yield myself as States, plus the District of Columbia, sow discord, undermine our elections, much time as I might consume. would have to completely revamp their and create havoc here in our own coun- Madam Speaker, I agree with my current election systems. This is both try. This is fundamental to protecting good friend from Maryland. We as Re- costly and time-intensive. There is our democracy. publicans and Democrats need to do nearly zero chance this can be adopted So we were on the case from the be- the patriotic thing and make sure that by the 2020 elections. The funding in ginning. We convened the Election Se- our elections are protected. the bill makes it clear that they realize curity Task Force, which was led by And I do agree that the Russians this is not enough money to pay for ZOE LOFGREN, Bob Brady, BENNIE tried to interfere in our election proc- this and, if it is not, it would be on a THOMPSON and others. They looked at ess with misinformation campaigns. pro rata share. That means it is an un- all of the best practices that we need to But I also want to ask my colleagues funded mandate in violation of the Un- put in place to make sure that our on the other side of the aisle, if their funded Mandate Reform Act. elections are strong and sturdy, and concentration on election security hap- It is easy for Federal lawmakers here how do we fortify them, and they pro- pened the day after the 2016 election, in D.C. to gloss over the impact this duced those recommendations. why in the world didn’t the administra- Federal mandate would have, but the We then took those recommendations tion who was in the White House at the numbers don’t lie. Only 18 States cur- and we put them into H.R. 1, the For time when the intelligence analysts rently use a paper-only voting system, the People Act, and we passed those on were talking about how other foreign as the bill would mandate. Not to men- March 8 of this year, because we knew entities, including Russia, were want- tion, this bill would also impact those that this was a priority and that there ing to interfere in our elections, why 18 States, including my home State of is no time to waste. didn’t they do something about it? Alabama. Now, our Republican colleagues, un- Why are we here today? Just a few days ago, the House Com- fortunately, did not want to go along Why didn’t it happen before the 2016 mittee on Science, Space, and Tech- with those broad, sweeping reforms election, when our intelligence ana- nology held a hearing on ‘‘Election Se- that were contained in H.R. 1, includ- lysts said nefarious activity was mov- curity: Voting Technology ing election security measures. So we ing against the United States of Amer- Vulnerabilities,’’ where Oklahoma’s made it easy for them, we said, ‘‘Okay. ica? Secretary of the State Election Board We will start to break those things out. They did nothing. The Obama admin- Ziriax pointed out that this bill would We will take the election security istration did nothing. They let it go. require the use of recycled paper, piece and we will bring it as a separate Now we are here watching the new which would be impossible to use with bill to the floor of the House.’’ That is Democrat majority that was elected in Oklahoma’s current paper ballot sys- the SAFE Act. But we still, appar- 2018, after explosive turnout in our tem because the fibers found in recy- ently, don’t have their support. midterm elections, their first bill, H.R. cled paper would cause repeated false This is their opportunity, this is 1, that every member of the Demo- readings. their chance to stand up and show their cratic majority cosponsored and sup- While this may seem like a small or patriotism, to defend our democracy, ported, that is the solution? silly detail, this is just one example of to protect our Constitution, to make The solution is to add millions of the great impact this bill will have on sure that our elections are going to be taxpayer dollars and then the first ever all States, with many considerations safe. corporate dollars into their own con- that have yet to be vetted properly. So let’s talk about what is in the gressional campaign accounts? The SPEAKER pro tempore. The SAFE Act, the Safeguarding America’s No one has ever said that is the solu- time of the gentleman has expired. Federal Elections Act. tion to too much money in politics or

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\A27JN7.003 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE H5220 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 27, 2019 to election security. Not one time have of America in a green way; cleaner gov- has been starved for funding for years, I had a constituent say that to me. ernment by passing H.R. 1—one of the a couple of dollars for every person in Now, we have got to come together component parts of what we are com- our country to honor the vision of our and do what is right. ing together around today. Founders of a democracy where every- We have yet to address any of the As we approach the Fourth of July, one who is eligible to vote can vote and issues that were laid out in the Mueller we must remember the oath that we everyone’s vote is counted as cast. report. This bill we are debating today take to support and defend the Con- Next month, we will advance further does not address any of them. This is a stitution and to protect the American legislation to protect our national se- discussion about what happened in 2016 people, which demands that this House curity and prevent foreign interference without a discussion of what is needed of Representatives take urgent action. in our elections. in our States and local election au- We must legislate, we must inves- Madam Speaker, I commend the dis- thorities. tigate, and we must litigate to protect tinguished chairman of the Homeland That is what is wrong with this bill, our national security, defend our de- Security Committee, Mr. BENNIE too. It is hypocrisy at its greatest. mocracy for the people. THOMPSON, for the great work that he Madam Speaker, I reserve the bal- Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s re- has been doing with his task force and ance of my time. port revealed an all-out attack on our his committee and other members who Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I elections by the Russians, concluding are working with him as we go forward. yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman that they ‘‘interfered in the 2016 Presi- We are pleased that the administra- from California (Ms. PELOSI), the dential election in sweeping and sys- tion has agreed to provide an all-Mem- Speaker of the House. temic fashion.’’ ber briefing on election security that Ms. PELOSI. Madam Speaker, I Top intelligence and security offi- will happen in July, so we can get the thank the gentlewoman for yielding, cials have made clear that these at- facts. We have been trying to get the the chair of the House Administration tacks continue. They are happening, facts. Committee, Congresswoman ZOE LOF- and they are happening now. Some people around here may think GREN, of whom we are very proud in This spring, FBI Director Chris Wray that it is okay to just make policy California. I thank her for leading us warned of a ‘‘365-day-a-year threat’’ without the facts. We are evidence- on this path of patriotism and respect- from the Russians, explaining that based, scientifically oriented, truth- ing the oath of office we take. their attacks in our elections were sim- and-knowledge based on how we go for- Madam Speaker, it is just a joy to be ply ‘‘a dress rehearsal for the big show ward, and we look forward to that having this opportunity to speak out in 2020.’’ briefing. for the sacred oath to vote, the sacred This House has a patriotic duty to We also look forward to July 17, blessing, the right to vote as we leave protect our democracy from these at- when Special Counsel Robert Mueller to go on the Fourth of July break. tacks. This is a matter of national se- will come forward and give testimony. Madam Speaker, I thank the mem- curity. That is why the Democrats first Our national security is being threat- bers of the House Administration Com- act in the majority was to advance, as ened, and the American people need an- mittee: Mr. BUTTERFIELD, whom we I mentioned, H.R. 1, For the People swers. heard from yesterday; Mr. RASKIN; Mr. Act, to secure our elections. This is not to be fearmongering. This AGUILAR; Congresswoman SUSAN DAVIS, Today we are building on that is to be smart and to anticipate a who presented to us earlier; and to all progress with the Securing America’s known challenge that exists and to do of you. Federal Elections Act, which takes ur- something about it. Madam Speaker, I thank Mr. SAR- gently needed action to further We can’t just talk about the Mueller BANES. He has been the face of the fu- strengthen America’s defenses. report and saying what it says about ture. He has been speaking out against This bill closes dangerous gaps in our the Russian interference in our elec- the misrepresentations that have hap- election systems and brings our secu- tions, unless we are ready to do some- pened, the propagandizing that has rity into the 21st century. thing about it. Today we are, thanks to happened by foreign governments in I know that other Members have spo- our distinguished chair, Chairwoman our election. ken about the provisions of the bill, LOFGREN. Yes, we won the election. We won the but I just would really like to know There is a need for bipartisan support election because the American people from my Republican friends what is for our critical commonsense action to were sick and tired of what the Repub- wrong with replacing outdated, vulner- secure our elections. licans were putting forth. We won the able voting equipment? What is wrong Unfortunately, Senator MCCONNELL, election in the most gerrymandered, with requiring paper ballot voting sys- a self-described crepehanger, has vowed voter suppressed political arena you tems to ensure the integrity of our to kill our bills in the Senate, while could imagine, and yet the American elections? What is wrong with enacting the President openly declares that he people came forward. strong cybersecurity requirements for sees no problem with foreign inter- One the biggest messages we had in elections technology vendors and vot- ference in our elections. the campaign was H.R. 1, to reduce the ing systems? The GOP Senate and the White House role of dark, special-interest money in We must be relentless in the defense are giving foreign countries the green politics, to stop the systemic inten- of our democracy, fighting on all fronts light to attack our country, but the tional voter suppression by the Repub- to keep America safe. House will do our patriotic duty to pro- licans across the country, to stop polit- There is a reason why the Russians tect America. ical gerrymandering on all sides. are interfering in our elections, and Madam Speaker, as we approach the Let’s do it in a nonpartisan way. Let other countries may be too, but we can Fourth of July holiday, I urge my col- the chips fall where they may, and to document with full confidence from the leagues to remember the oath we took do so in a way that we are taking a intelligence community that the Rus- and the democracy we defend, and to piece of it today to talk about pro- sians are. It is because they want to af- join me in a strong bipartisan vote to tecting our electoral system. fect the outcome of the elections, so defend America’s security. In a short while, we will take up the they can affect the policy. This isn’t about politics. It is about Voting Rights Act that is also part of I think it was really sad, I was sad to patriotism. As our Founders said at the H.R. 1. hear, and, hopefully, it will be re- beginning of the Constitution in its So this H.R. 1 was very supported by tracted, that the President gave a preamble, we do this for the people. the Democrats, very publicized to the green light to the Russians to do it Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. American people, and part of our For again. Really? Really? Madam Speaker, I yield myself such the People agenda: lower healthcare This week, we are advancing appro- time as I may consume. costs by lowering the cost of prescrip- priations legislation that provides $600 Madam Speaker, I agree with my dis- tion drugs and protecting the pre- million for election security grants to tinguished colleague from California existing conditions benefit; bigger pay- States, and increases funding for the that we do need to have the ability for checks by building the infrastructure Election Assistance Commission, which the Department of Homeland Security

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\K27JN7.015 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE June 27, 2019 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5221 and our intelligence officials to notify should have done something. You are Madam Speaker, I rise this morning our State and local election officials if darn right the Obama administration in strong support of H.R. 2722. It is past they see nefarious activity, but right should have done something. You are time that this Congress act boldly in now under the bill we are debating darn right they should have done it response to the foreign interference today, that would not be the case, be- when they first heard about it before that took place in our 2016 elections, cause in many cases, DHS won’t talk the 2016 election, and now here we are and that is exactly what this bill does. to local election officials or State elec- to fix it. The gentleman from Ohio, the rank- tion officials because they don’t have And today’s bill is clearly not a fix. ing member of the committee, I say to security clearances. We have got some issues, and it is him it is disingenuous to point the fin- Our bill, pushed by the Republicans really interesting to see my colleagues ger at the Obama administration. That on the House Administration Com- from California come up and not want may or may not be accurate, but let us mittee, would allow the communica- to address a practice like ballot har- look forward. tion to take place. vesting that is illegal in the State of This legislation provides $600 million b 1015 North Carolina, where a Republican in grants to State and local officials to who did it is likely to go to jail for it, secure election infrastructure and re- You know, we hear a lot of talk but the same process is legal in the place aging voting machines with about patriotism coming up on the State of California—disastrous. voter-verified paper ballot voting sys- Fourth of July. I believe we are all pa- You want to talk about trying to de- tems; $175 million to States every 2 triots in this institution, but I believe, termine the outcome of elections? We years to maintain elections infrastruc- also, we have to govern together. We were working on a bipartisan so- have put forth amendment after ture. It requires States to implement lution to election security, and all of amendment to address ballot har- risk-limiting audits; it prohibits inter- the sudden, we were told no more nego- vesting, with complete party-line votes net accessibility or connectivity for de- tiations. That is not how I thought this against making sure the process that is vices on which ballots are marked or institution worked. I thought we could illegal in North Carolina that a Repub- tabulated; and it sets long-needed cy- work together. lican operative will likely go to jail for bersecurity standards for vendors. Well, I do want to respond to a couple is completely legal in States like Cali- I ask my colleagues, let us look for- of comments that my colleague from fornia. ward. Let us protect the right to vote. California made. She may have men- And you want to talk about deter- Let us protect the ballot of every tioned H.R. 1. H.R. 1 was the Demo- mining the outcome of an election? American citizen. crats’ attempt to address not only too Come on. Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. much money in politics, they said; I yield 1 minute to the gentleman Madam Speaker, I yield myself such they also wanted to address election from Georgia (Mr. LOUDERMILK), my time as I may consume. security. good friend. Madam Speaker, I really respect my Clearly, what H.R. 1 did was do noth- Mr. LOUDERMILK. Madam Speaker, colleague from North Carolina, and I ing to affect the money that is coming I thank my friend from Illinois for do want to correct him a little bit. into politics, and it is not doing enough yielding this minute to me. I am from Illinois, not Ohio. I would to ensure that our elections are not im- The distinguished Speaker talked never mistake the gentleman from pacted by foreign entities with nefar- about misinformation, and I agree. North Carolina as being from some- ious intentions. There is a lot of misinformation out place like South Carolina. But the gen- Our bill today that we hoped could there about elections and election se- tleman from North Carolina is a good have been debated but was voted down curity and a lot of that that goes on friend. on a party-line vote in the House Ad- around here. Let’s be factual here. Look, we all have disagreements on ministration Committee earlier this There has been zero solid evidence of this House floor, but that doesn’t mean week, just a few days ago, we hoped we voter suppression during the last elec- we are disagreeable when it comes to could have come up with that, that is a tion, which had the largest turnout in having good friendships, and I thank bipartisan solution that would have the history of this Nation. Our own him for his courtesies and thank him worked. What works, our last speaker committee held seven field hearings for his friendship. said, was this. Clearly, that is not what across the Nation, with zero solid evi- The State of North Carolina is a works. dence of voter suppression, but the great example of why we need to do What works isn’t voting for a bill only acts of voter suppression that better, why we ought to go back to the like H.R. 1 that votes to put the first they tried to bring up had to deal with drawing board. ever corporate money directly into purging voter rolls. Let’s take this bill off the floor. Let’s every Member of Congress’ campaign We actually had one hearing in get back to bipartisan negotiations, be- accounts. What works, clearly, is not Broward County. What is Broward cause in States like North Carolina and taxpayer money to fix that problem County known for? Voter irregular- States like Illinois where local election when there are not enough corporate ities. Why? Many times, why? Because officials have bought machines, they malfeasance funds. That is not what of paper ballots. bought machines, maybe they have the American people wanted. But yet this is the direction we are current optical scan machines, but the And what would have worked would going in, and the distinguished Speaker requirement in this bill, as the Okla- have been the last administration, the said we are taking it into the 21st cen- homa secretary of state said, the re- Obama administration, listening to tury. Show me how. How is this taking quirement of this bill to have recycled their intelligence agencies and doing us into the 21st century? It is taking us paper through ballots, many of the al- something about nefarious activities back decades. ready purchased optical scan machines before the 2016 election, not the day Look, if the Russians were actually that would be required for every local after, when Democrats decided to take physically invading our Nation with and State election official to purchase this issue on. bombers and tanks, this bill would be after the year 2022 may not be able to And then all I ever hear is they are the equivalent of giving our military read the ballots on recycled paper. So going to blame MITCH MCCONNELL. pellet guns and paper airplanes to you are going to have to reinvest hard- Well, I had no idea, before 2016, that thwart the attack. This is taking us earned tax dollars where many local the Obama administration ceded Presi- away from election security. communities in our great States have dential authority to the Senate major- Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I already invested in updating their elec- ity leader. I had no idea that happened. yield 1 minute to the gentleman from tion security with the most secure Everything is MITCH MCCONNELL’s North Carolina (Mr. BUTTERFIELD), a election equipment that they felt was fault, right? He is the one who told the valued member of the House Adminis- going to protect them. intelligence agencies to stand down. tration Committee. Washington should not be telling our Are you kidding me? Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Madam Speak- local officials what to buy, especially And now we hear we should have er, I thank the chair of our committee when there are provisions in this bill done something. You are darn right we for yielding me time this morning. that make equipment that would fit

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\K27JN7.017 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE H5222 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE June 27, 2019 those guidelines illegal to use or are called election security. We still have was entirely within the jurisdiction of inoperable even if they have purchased not addressed the problem that if DHS, the House Administration Committee, it. We have got to do better. if our same intelligence officials who with one exception. There was a line on We all want to protect this great Na- told the Obama administration that page 11 of the committee mark that au- tion. We all want free and fair elections there was foreign interference in our thorized a study by the NSF. The so that every vote is counted and pro- 2016 elections and the Obama adminis- Science, Space, and Technology Com- tected. Let’s do it together. Let’s do it tration did nothing about it—because, mittee waived jurisdiction on markup right. why? Because of MITCH MCCONNELL. It because it was just a study, and that Let’s make sure we address some is MITCH MCCONNELL’s fault. was very clear. DHS concerns. Let’s put a cybersecu- Seriously, come on. Get real here. We This bill has proceeded in the regular rity assistance unit together like we are legislators. We are an equal branch order. It has been noticed according to have tried to do. of government. There is absolutely no our rules. And it brings us here today Let’s outlaw ballot harvesting, be- way any administration cedes author- to test whether we are going to meet cause I know we have got bipartisan ity to anybody in this legislative insti- the challenge that faces us in ballot se- support in working together on that tution. curity: whether we are going to allow issue, especially with my good friend The Obama administration failed to the Russians to attack our country by from North Carolina, Mr. BUTTERFIELD. address the problem of election inter- trying to steal our election next year I look forward to working with him on ference in 2016, and here we are today or not. this. I know he and I both have con- trying to make sure that we fix it. This Mention has been made about the cerns about this process, and I thank attempt to fix it is a partisan attempt need for bipartisanship. I work often on him for his willingness to sit down and at ensuring that our elections authori- a bipartisan basis with Members of the talk. ties and our States and our local elec- other party. I will say that we have We can do better. The bill on the tion officials have a top-down, feder- tried in vain to have the Republican floor today is not better. Let’s do it. ally mandated approach that is going Members buy into the need to require Let’s work together. Pull this bill off to potentially cost them millions of best practices for next year’s election, the floor. We have got a lot of other taxpayer dollars that they have al- and we couldn’t reach agreement. issues to debate today. ready inserted into their own budgets We decided that it is our responsi- Madam Speaker, I reserve the bal- over the last few years. bility to move forward, and that is why ance of my time. Our local officials have told us they we are here today. Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, we want flexibility. Cybersecurity con- Just a mention on unfunded man- have no additional speakers, so if the cerns are where they have invested dates, we are authorizing about $1 bil- gentleman would like to yield back, I much of the $380 million that we put lion. $380 million was appropriated last will close. forth in the last Congress. year, and as the Speaker mentioned, Let’s make sure we spend the money Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. we are appropriating this year an addi- that we have already appropriated; Madam Speaker, how much time do I tional $600 million for ballot security. have left? let’s make sure we take a common- This bill authorizes the $600 million The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. sense approach; and let’s give our elec- that we are appropriating, and we JACKSON LEE). The gentleman from Il- tion officials, Republicans and Demo- think it is important that that money crats from throughout this great Na- linois has 23⁄4 minutes remaining. The flow to the States to harden our sys- gentlewoman from California has 9 tion, the ability to address the con- tems so the election cannot be stolen minutes remaining. cerns they know are weakest in their by our enemies. It is ironic that some Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. own system. Let’s not have some bu- on the other side of the aisle have com- Madam Speaker, I yield myself the bal- reaucrat out here in a concrete build- plained about unfunded mandates at ance of my time. ing determining what is going to work the same time they tried to impose a 25 Madam Speaker, well, clearly the best in the State of Texas, in the State percent match requirement on States timekeeper is wrong. I obviously of Illinois, in the State of California, or for receiving these funds that they thought I had more, but I am not able anywhere else. need to get to harden our system. Madam Speaker, I yield back the bal- to debate that today. I will go ahead Just a comment on DREs, DREs are ance of my time. and close. not as unsafe as pure electronic voting, Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I I do want to thank my colleague but they are not best practices. yield myself such time as I may con- from California and also the members Much has been mentioned about the of the House Administration Com- sume. I think it is important to address a State of Georgia. It is worth noting mittee, where we have an opportunity few of the issues that have been raised that the Georgia legislature ignored to come together, but this bill is just in the course of this debate. the advice they got from computer sci- simply another partisan bill by the ma- First, we are moving forward with entists that what they were doing did jority aimed at federally mandating the SAFE Act because of a sense of ur- not meet best practices for ballot secu- election standards, like mandating gency that we have about the 2020 elec- rity. that States exclusively use paper bal- tion. That sense of urgency was fueled A study published by Georgia Tech lots, effectively banning any type of by the Director of National Intel- indicated that most voters did not ac- digital recording device that would ligence, and it was fueled by the Direc- tually look at the receipt when it was have even a verified paper backup. tor of the FBI who told us that red printed. They also point out that even The committee even had one hearing lights, warning lights were flashing though printed ballots, when voters do on this issue with Commissioners from and that the 2016 election was just a look at them, include the names of the EAC—remember, that agency that prelude to what the Russians were candidates, votes will be encoded in one speaker earlier said was getting a going to do in the 2020 election. We feel barcodes that humans can’t authen- pittance of dollars, small amounts of a sense of urgency. ticate and that are subject to hacking. dollars over the last few years. Only in As has been mentioned by others, ‘‘There’s nothing speculative about this institution is $380 million given by H.R. 1 included provisions about ballot these vulnerabilities,’’ said a Georgia the Republican majority here in the security. But I introduced this bill, the Tech computer professor and former House in the last Congress and signed SAFE Act, on May 14 because it was chief technology officer for Hewlett- into law by the President of the United specifically addressing election secu- Packard. ‘‘If exploited, it would affect States, only in this institution is $380 rity, and, also, we made some addi- the result of the election. It’s not a se- million a little bit. A lot of that money tional enhancements to H.R. 1 relative cure system.’’ still hasn’t even been spent by our to cybersecurity and the like. We need to fix these things not be- local election officials. cause it is partisan but because we So here we are today debating a bill b 1030 need to protect America. that is going to basically commit 1.3 We drafted the bill with the assist- The idea that we would allow this billion taxpayer dollars toward so- ance of the Parliamentarian so that it just to be decided at a local level is

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\K27JN7.019 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE June 27, 2019 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H5223 wrongheaded. If the Russians launched trolled by the chair and ranking minority under U.S. custody at our border. Ev- missiles at the counties of the United member of the Committee on Appropria- erybody has read the news articles and States, we wouldn’t say, well, that is tions. The previous question shall be consid- everybody has seen the pictures. We just a local issue. We would say, no, ered as ordered on the motion to its adoption have a moral obligation to move for- without intervening motion. that is an attack on the United States ward. To try to delay consideration of of America. POINT OF ORDER a bill to help these children I think is We need to harden our systems and Mr. COLE. Madam Speaker, pursuant a mistake. protect our country. to section 426 of the Congressional Madam Speaker, I reserve the bal- Madam Speaker, I strongly urge the Budget and Impoundment Control Act ance of my time. adoption of this measure. of 1974, I make a point of order against Mr. COLE. Madam Speaker, I yield I would like to read from a letter consideration of the rule, House Reso- myself such time as I may consume. that we received just yesterday from lution 466. Madam Speaker, actually, on that, the NETWORK Lobby for Catholic So- Section 426 of the Budget Act specifi- we have a great deal in common with cial Justice. In their last paragraph, cally states that the Rules Committee one another. We, too, think we ought the Catholics say: may not waive the point of order pre- to address this matter quickly. scribed in section 425 of that same act. In a secular democracy, elections are the As I am sure my friend recalls, we closest thing we have to a sacrament. We House Resolution 466 makes in order have tried on 16 different occasions know that nefarious foreign and domestic ac- a motion ‘‘without intervention of any over the last 8 weeks to bring legisla- tors continue to meddle in our democratic point of order.’’ Therefore, I make a tion that would alleviate this problem systems, and we have been put on notice that point of order, pursuant to section 426 to the floor. Our friends rejected that previous efforts were only trial runs, pre- of the Congressional Budget Act, that every single time. sumably for our next election in 2020. The this rule may not be considered. We also have a bill that has been NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gen- passed by the Senate 84–7: a bill where considers our elections to be sacrosanct and tleman from Oklahoma makes a point that Congress must pass the SAFE Act to 35 Democrats—about three-quarters of protect them. of order that the resolution violates the number of Democrats—supported, a section 426(a) of the Congressional This bill is supported by a broad sec- bill that we know would solve, a bill Budget Act of 1974. that if we would bring to this floor we tor of civil rights groups, including the The gentleman has met the threshold NAACP and Common Cause. It deserves can pass immediately and it would go burden under the rule and the gen- to the President’s desk; it wouldn’t all of our support. tleman from Oklahoma and a Member I urge my colleagues to support H.R. have to go back to the Senate. So my opposed each will control 10 minutes of 2722 to ensure the security of our Na- friends, by not accepting an over- debate on the question of consider- tion’s election infrastructure. whelmingly bipartisan bill by the Sen- ation. Following debate, the Chair will Madam Speaker, I yield back the bal- ate and simply moving it on, are the put the question of consideration as ance of my time. ones who are actually imposing a delay the statutory means of disposing of the The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time here. point of order. for debate has expired. What they have got in front of us The Chair recognizes the gentleman Pursuant to House Resolution 460, that we will consider later today, if from Oklahoma. the previous question is ordered on the they are successful, frankly, is some- Mr. COLE. Madam Speaker, I yield bill, as amended. thing we know the Senate is unlikely myself such time as I may consume. to accept. I have not heard from the The question is on the engrossment Madam Speaker, the bill before us and third reading of the bill. President, but given the scope of the today provides no CBO cost estimate, changes inside the bill, these are all The bill was ordered to be engrossed so we literally have no idea as to and read a third time, and was read the changes that, in some cases, failed yes- whether or not there are additional un- terday in the Senate—reductions in third time. funded mandates being imposed on the The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursu- spending for the military and for the States. We do know that the States are Border Patrol—that the administration ant to clause 1(c) of rule XIX, further already having to use their scarce re- consideration of H.R. 2722 is postponed. has already signaled they will reject. sources to deal with this border crisis, There is a simple solution here. We f and the legislation before us today does could simply take the Senate bill up PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION nothing to alleviate that. that has passed 84–7—overwhelming OF THE SENATE AMENDMENT TO Indeed, my colleague from Texas (Mr. support on both sides of the aisle—get H.R. 3401, EMERGENCY SUPPLE- BURGESS) made that very point and of- that bill down to the President, and MENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR fered an amendment, which was re- the money could start flowing imme- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE jected by the committee, to consider diately. If we proceed as my friends AND SECURITY AT THE SOUTH- reimbursing the State of Texas over want to proceed, we are simply going ERN BORDER ACT, 2019 $800 million for their expenses. Those to be playing ping-pong back and forth. same kinds of expenses—probably not Mr. MCGOVERN. Madam Speaker, by Madam Speaker, I reserve the bal- direction of the Committee on Rules, I to that magnitude—have been under- ance of my time. call up House Resolution 466 and ask taken by other States. Madam Speak- Mr. MCGOVERN. Madam Speaker, I for its immediate consideration. er, we don’t think that we should pro- yield myself such time as I may con- The Clerk read the resolution, as fol- ceed until we have that information sume. lows: and the House has a chance to consider Madam Speaker, I am surprised that that. my colleagues on the Republican side H. RES. 466 Madam Speaker, I reserve the bal- hold this institution in such low es- Resolved, That upon adoption of this reso- ance of my time. teem. We are the House of Representa- lution it shall be in order to take from the Mr. MCGOVERN. Madam Speaker, I tives. Our voice matters. Speaker’s table the bill (H.R. 3401) making emergency supplemental appropriations for claim time in opposition to the point of On this issue, the House voted first the fiscal year ending September 30, 2019, and order. on a measure to try to help provide for other purposes, with the Senate amend- The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gen- some assistance to these children at ment thereto, and to consider in the House, tleman from Massachusetts is recog- the border. Then the Senate passed a without intervention of any point of order, a nized for 10 minutes. different version. The way it is sup- motion offered by the chair of the Com- Mr. MCGOVERN. Madam Speaker, I posed to work is we have a negotiation mittee on Appropriations or her designee yield myself such time as I may con- and we try to come to agreement and that the House concur in the Senate amend- sume. come up with a compromise bill. So the ment with an amendment consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 116–21. The Madam Speaker, what we are trying idea that somehow we don’t matter in Senate amendment and the motion shall be to do here is bring a bill to the floor to the House, that we shouldn’t matter in considered as read. The motion shall be de- help alleviate the suffering of children the House, that we should just accept batable for one hour equally divided and con- who, in my opinion, have been abused whatever the Senate does, to me, I find

VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:12 Jun 28, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\K27JN7.021 H27JNPT1 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HOUSE