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Vstf Final Report

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Draft for Public Comment – January 2011 VOTING SYSTEMS TASK FORCE Edwin M. Lee, Mayor 1 2 DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 3 4 Recommendations on Voting Systems for the City 5 and County of San Francisco 6 7 A Report by the San Francisco Voting Systems Task Force (VSTF) 8 9 Public Comments Are Invited 10 This report provides strategic guidance to assist the City and County of San Francisco as it 11 considers its next voting system. The report is not intended to be a complete statement of 12 requirements or technical specifications, and is not an exhaustive study of all topics related to 13 voting systems. The VSTF eagerly invites comments from the public, and will consider all 14 comments received within the VSTF scope of work. 15 Submit Comments by Email: 16 [email protected] 17 Submit Comments by Mail: 18 Voting Systems Task Force 19 City Hall, Room 362 20 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place 21 San Francisco, CA 94102 22 Comments due by 5 pm on March 2, 2011 23 Page 1 of 40 Draft for Public Comment – January 2011 1 Table of Contents 2 3 Section 1: Introduction and Background – p. 3 4 5 Mission and Context of the Voting Systems Task Force (VSTF) 6 7 Background on San Francisco’s Current Voting System 8 9 Opportunities Presented by Next Generation Voting Systems 10 11 Section 2: Recommendations – p. 6 12 13 Election Records and Post-Election Audit Procedures – p. 7 14 15 Balloting Systems and Services – p. 15 16 17 Security – p. 23 18 19 Acquisition Strategies – p. 32 20 21 Section 3: Appendix – p. 38 22 A: Concerning the Ranked-Choice Voting Manual Tally Process 23 Currently Used in the City and County of San Francisco 24 25 B: Ranked-Choice Voting Considerations 26 27 Section 4: About the VSTF – p. 40 28 29 Page 2 of 40 Draft for Public Comment – January 2011 1 Section 1 2 Introduction and Background 3 4 Mission and Context of the Voting Systems Task Force (VSTF) 5 6 In September 2008 the San Francisco Board of Supervisors established the Voting Systems Task 7 Force to make recommendations to that body about voting systems standards, design, and 8 development (Ordinance 268-08; 9 www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/ordinances08/o0268-08.pdf). 10 11 The VSTF defines its work as follows: 12 13 Mission: The VSTF’s mission is to advise the City and County of San Francisco on the 14 development and/or acquisition of voting systems that ensure fair and accurate elections, achieve 15 voter intent, and provide for transparency and public auditability of voting systems components 16 and election data. 17 18 Scope and Objective: Activities encompass voting systems and related elections issues that affect 19 or are affected by voting systems and voting system acquisition in the City and County of San 20 Francisco. A “voting system” for this report is defined to be a system of hardware, software and 21 processes which prepares a ballot and records, collects, transmits, counts, and reports on votes 22 and election results as cast by voters. Included in this definition are the associated reports and 23 audit logs which provide information about management of election data in the system and 24 system use, integrity, administrative access, configuration and configuration changes as well as 25 documentation for support, use and training on use of the system. 26 The VSTF report contains recommendations, with supporting rationale, for each of the five areas 27 identified by Section 5.405(b) of the Administrative Code. Recommendations have been 28 collapsed into four topic areas: election records and post-election audit procedures; balloting 29 systems and services; security; and acquisition strategies. This report provides strategic guidance 30 and minimum requirements to assist the City and County of San Francisco as it considers its next 31 voting system. The report is not intended to be a complete statement of requirements or technical 32 specifications, and is not an exhaustive study of all topics related to voting systems. The Board 33 of Supervisors may wish to initiate further investigation of certain topic areas as it considers a 34 direction for San Francisco’s next voting system. 35 Timeframe for Recommendations: San Francisco is currently under contract with Sequoia 36 Voting Systems, and has the option to extend that contract through elections in 2013. The VSTF 37 has identified several opportunities for improving public confidence in the City’s use of Sequoia 38 Voting Systems. However, this report primarily suggests minimum requirements for the City and 39 County of San Francisco’s next voting system (to be implemented for elections in 2014, if 40 feasible). VSTF recommendations can be found in Section 2 of this report. Page 3 of 40 Draft for Public Comment – January 2011 1 Audiences: Our recommendations are intended to provide guidance to a variety of audiences 2 including: 3 • the San Francisco Board of Supervisors 4 • the Department of Elections 5 • the Elections Commission 6 • San Francisco voters 7 8 9 Background on San Francisco’s Current Voting System 10 11 On March 31, 2005, the City and County of San Francisco Department of Elections (DOE) 12 initiated a Request for Proposals (RFP) process seeking bids for a new voting system, including 13 equipment and services, to collect, count, tabulate, and report votes (see DOE RFP for a New 14 Voting System at http://www.sfgov2.org/index.aspx?page=1869). In December 2007, the San 15 Francisco Board of Supervisors approved a contract with Sequoia Voting Systems for voting 16 systems/services (http://www.sfgov2.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=152). 17 Sequoia replaced Elections Systems and Software (ES&S) with which the City had been under 18 contract through the 2007 election cycles. 19 The Sequoia system was implemented beginning with the February 2008 election. The contract 20 runs through December 2011. The contract with Sequoia Voting Systems for a voting system and 21 associated services is valued at $12,650,233.35 (see Resolution 654-07). The DOE has the option 22 to renew the contract two times, each time for one year and has indicated that it anticipates 23 extending the Sequoia contract through the end of 2013. Were it to do so, the DOE estimates that 24 annual maintenance would be approximately $400,000, and services per election would be 25 approximately $500,000. With three elections scheduled in 2012, the projected cost would be 26 approximately $1.9 million. With one election scheduled in 2013, the projected cost would be 27 approximately $900,000 (two year total: $2.8 million) 28 29 Opportunities Presented by Next Generation Voting Systems 30 The City and County of San Francisco is prudent to begin considering the characteristics of the 31 voting system it would like to implement after its contract with Sequoia terminates, and to 32 consider whether a new acquisition model is feasible. In fact, the City is in good company. 33 Across the nation, jurisdictions are grappling with how to provide elections that are accurate, 34 fair, secure, transparent, and accessible, and with how to evaluate the merits of various systems 35 and acquisition models. The conversation about next generation voting systems is becoming 36 increasingly robust and is generating opportunities for collaboration and information sharing. An 37 effort to study future voting systems has been undertaken by at least two other jurisdictions 38 including: 39 Page 4 of 40 Draft for Public Comment – January 2011 1 County of Los Angeles (California) Voting Systems Assessment Project (VSAP) 2 http://www.lavote.net/voter/VSAP 3 Travis County (Texas) Elections Study Group 2009 4 http://www.co.travis.tx.us/county_clerk/election/study_group_2009 5 The San Francisco Department of Elections (DOE) under the capable leadership of Director John 6 Arntz has run smooth elections by establishing best practices and security protocols. Yet, the 7 VSTF believes that there is room to improve the underlying voting system and the procedures 8 that accompany the elections process. The VSTF has identified opportunities for improvement in 9 several core areas: 10 11 • intent of voter and accessibility 12 • audit and verification procedures 13 • security 14 • transparency 15 16 At the heart of the challenge is the current nature of the private vendor marketplace, which is 17 characterized by a lack of competition, restrictive vendor contracts, and undisclosed software 18 code. This situation is compounded by a challenging and costly regulatory structure which 19 further constrains innovation. The VSTF believes that the City and County of San Francisco 20 should be an active participant in the movement toward more transparent voting systems, and 21 should consider a broad range of possibilities regarding the business and partnership model it 22 will pursue to acquire/develop San Francisco’s next voting system. This could include 23 collaborating with other jurisdictions, academic institutions, or non-profit organizations. 24 25 The VSTF has framed its recommendations to address the core challenges described above. 26 While a flawless voting system in not attainable, VSTF members hope that this strategic 27 guidance will help the City and County of San Francisco move toward a system that earns the 28 highest level of public confidence. 29 Page 5 of 40 Draft for Public Comment – January 2011 1 SECTION 2 2 RECOMMENDATIONS 3 4 This report is intended to provide strategic guidance and minimum requirements to 5 guide the City and County of San Francisco’s as it considers its next voting system. 6 Recommendations encompass four primary topic areas: election records and post- 7 election audit procedures; balloting systems and services; security; and acquisition 8 strategies.
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