DOCSLIB.ORG

Cradled by Conflict

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Cradled by Conflict EDITED BY SIOBHAN O’NEIL & KATO VAN BROECKHOVEN EDITED BY SIOBHAN O’NEIL & KATO VAN BROECKHOVEN Table of Contents ABOUT THIS VOLUME 7 Trajectories of ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 8 2 ABOUT THE AUTHORS 10 Children Into and PREFACE 14 Out of Non-State EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 16 Armed Groups By Siobhan O'Neil 1 INTRODUCTION 38 A Methodology and Value of Approach 38 Child Recruitment B Evidence Base 38 1 C Organizing Principles 40 and Use by Armed 2 THE STATE OF RESEARCH ON CHILD TRAJECTORIES INTO NSAGS 43 Groups in A Structural-Level Analysis: Necessary and Conducive Contextual Conditions 43 Contemporary B Social-Level Factors That Influence Child Trajectories into NSAGs 50 Conflict C Individual-Level Factors That Influence Child An Introduction Trajectories into NSAGs 54 By Siobhan O'Neil 3 CHILD USE AND EXPERIENCES WITHIN NSAGS 67 1 INTRODUCTION 24 A Roles 68 B Indoctrination and Group Processes 68 2 THE PROJECT 26 C Drugs and Alcohol 69 3 PROJECT COMPONENTS 28 D Identity 69 E Trauma 72 4 TERMINOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY 30 F Differences by Demographics 72 5 A NOTE ABOUT CHILD AGENCY 32 4 HOW AND WHY CHILDREN EXIT NSAGS 74 6 ABOUT THE CHAPTERS IN THIS VOLUME 33 A Desistance and Disengagement 74 B How? 74 C Why? 75 D Why Didn’t They Leave? 75 E Recidivism/Side-Switching 76 5 CONCLUSION – PROSPECTS FOR REINTEGRATION 77 A Complex “I Am Nothing 3 Programming 4 Without a Weapon” Landscape Understanding Child Recruitment and Use by The Prevention of and Armed Groups in Syria and Iraq Response to Child By Mara Revkin Association with Non-State with research assistance by Ahmad Midhi Armed Groups and Mazn Najmaldeen Saber By Kato Van Broeckhoven 1 INTRODUCTION 104 1 INTRODUCTION 80 2 METHODOLOGY 106 2 A SELECTIVE OVERVIEW OF THE PREVENTION 3 OVERVIEW OF NSAGS 107 A Ahrar al-Sham (AS) 108 AND RELEASE AND REINTEGRATION B Groups Self-Affiliated with the PROGRAMMING LANDSCAPE 81 Free Syrian Army (FSA) 108 A Child Protection In Emergencies 81 C Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) 108 B Prevention of Child Association with NSAGs 82 D Hizbullah 109 C Release and Reintegration: The United Nations E Islamic State (IS) 109 Approach to Post-NSAG-Involvement F Jaysh al-Islam (JI) 110 Programming for Children 84 G National Defense Forces (NDF) 110 H People’s and Women’s Protection 3 PREVENTION, RELEASE AND REINTEGRATION Units (YPG/YPJ) 111 IN TODAY'S COMPLEX CONFLICT LANDSCAPE 91 I Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) 111 J Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) 112 A Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism 91 B State of Knowledge 96 4 WHY AND HOW DO NSAGS RECRUIT OR 4 INSIGHTS FROM OTHER FIELDS 97 COERCE CHILDREN INTO THEIR RANKS? 112 A Criminology 97 A Why Recruit Children? 112 B Public Health 98 B Techniques of Recruitment 114 5 CONCLUSION 100 5 WHAT INDIVIDUAL, SOCIAL, AND STRUCTURAL FACTORS INFLUENCE CHILD TRAJECTORIES INTO NSAGS? 116 A Individual-Level Factors 117 B Social-Level Factors 119 C Structural-Level Factors 123 6 WHAT ARE THE EXPERIENCES OF AND ROLES FOR CHILDREN IN NSAGS? 128 A Relationships and Identity 128 B Training and Indoctrination 128 C Roles 129 7 HOW AND WHY DO CHILDREN EXIT NSAGS? 132 A Individual-Level Factors 132 B Social-Level Factors 132 C Structural-Level Factors 132 8 OBSTACLES TO DISENGAGEMENT AND REINTEGRATION 134 9 CONCLUSIONS 137 Table of Contents “I Joined to Save Beset on All Sides 5 My People” 6 Children and the Landscape of Conflict in North East Nigeria Children and Non-State By Hilary Matfess, Armed Groups in Mali Graeme Blair, and Chad Hazlett By Jaimie Bleck, Marc-André Boisvert, and Boukary Sangaré 1 INTRODUCTION 178 2 METHODOLOGY 180 1 INTRODUCTION 142 3 CHILDREN’S PATHWAYS INTO 2 BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT 144 ARMED GROUPS 181 3 MALIAN NSAGS 146 A Child Recruitment into Boko Haram 181 B Child Recruitment into Vigilante Forces 187 4 THE USE OF CHILDREN BY NSAGS 150 5 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 151 4 CHILDREN’S ROLES IN ARMED GROUPS 6 MODES OF CHILD RECRUITMENT 151 IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA 191 A Boko Haram 191 7 PATHWAYS INTO MALIAN ARMED B Children’s Roles in the CJTF and Other GROUPS 152 Vigilante Groups 197 A Structural-Level Factors 153 B Social-Level Factors 159 5 EXIT FROM ARMED GROUPS AND LIFE C Individual-Level Factors 163 AFTER DISENGAGEMENT 198 A Exiting from Boko Haram 198 8 ARMED GROUPS’ USE OF CHILDREN 170 B Exiting from Vigilante Groups and the CJTF 201 9 EXIT – HOW AND WHY CHILDREN LEAVE NSAGS IN MALI 171 6 CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ASSISTING DISENGAGED CHILDREN 202 10 CONCLUSION: OBSTACLES TO RELEASE AND REINTEGRATION 174 7 CONCLUSION 205 7 Navigating 8 The Road to a Challenges in Child Better Future By Siobhan O’Neil and Kato Van Broeckhoven Protection and the with research assistance by Kabba Williams Reintegration of 1 INTRODUCTION 236 2 KEY INSIGHTS 237 Children Associated A Multidimensional Causality 237 B The Narrative of Violent Extremism vs. with Armed Local Realities 237 C Terminology Matters 238 Groups D The Fallacy of Neutrality 239 E Community Mobilization vs. By Mark Drumbl and Gabor Rona Individual Recruitment 239 F The Fluidity of Association and Membership 240 1 INTRODUCTION 210 G Differences Inside and Outside Conflict Theatres 240 H Risks, Needs, and Resilience 241 2 THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 213 I The Appeal of Armed Groups 241 A Scope of Application of the Three Main J Old Problems, Continued Challenges 242 International Legal Frameworks 213 K Disengagement and Desistance 246 B Content of International Human Rights Law and L Reintegrate into What? 247 International Criminal Law Applicable to Children 216 3 PROGRAMMING IN CONTEMPORARY 3 TODAY’S REALITY FOR CHILDREN IN ARMED CONTEXTS 247 CONFLICT AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: A Enduring Challenges and New Dynamics 249 PROTECT OR PUNISH? 220 B The Nature of Today’s Conflicts and the A Contemporary Realities 220 Groups Fighting Them 250 B What Happened to Cause This Shift? 222 C PVE/CVE 251 C Why This Matters 224 D Nature of the State Response 253 4 APPLYING THE “BEST INTERESTS OF THE 4 CONCLUSION 253 CHILD” PRINCIPLE IN CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 225 A Targeting 225 B Grounds and Procedures for Deprivation of Liberty 226 C Treatment of Children Deprived of Liberty 227 D Trials / Due Process 227 5 ADDITIONAL ISSUES FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE ELABORATION 228 6 CONCLUSION 232 6 TAMBO, COLOMBIA A girl plays at the playground of her school in Tambo Colombia, which is located in front of a police station and has been caught in the cross fire betweeen the police and armed groups for years. —August 2016 Diego Ibarra Sánchez 7 About This Volume The United Nations University (UNU) is a global think tank established by the United Nations General Assembly. The mission of UNU is to contribute, through collaborative research and education, to efforts to resolve the pressing global problems of human survival, development, and welfare that are the concern of the United Nations, its Peoples, and Member States. UNU’s Centre for Policy Research, in Tokyo, and its Office at the United Nations, in New York, are at the forefront of the University’s efforts to bring evidence into United Nations policy processes. This initiative was established as a joint project of the two UNU entities, with the support of UNICEF, the DDR Section of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Governments of Switzerland and Luxembourg. In July 2018 the UNU Centre for Policy Research will relocate to New York and merge with the UNU Office at the United Nations. The new institution will remain an independent think tank within the United Nations system, combining research excellence with deep knowledge of the multilateral system to generate innovative solutions to today’s and tomorrow’s global public policy challenges. Acknowledgments This edited volume and the research it represents would not have been possible without the generous support and partnership of UNICEF, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Governments of Luxembourg and Switzerland. This initiative benefit- ed greatly from UNICEF funding that was provided by the European Union through its Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through its Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The editors wish to thank representatives from these institutions who served as members of the Project Steering Group and who provided support and guidance over the last two years, particularly Ibrahim Sesay, Saudamini Siegrist, and Tasha Gill of UNICEF; Isabella Castrogiovanni of the UNICEF Middle East and North Africa regional office (MENARO); Simon Yazgi, Thomas Kontogeorgos, and Christopher O’Donnell of the Disarmament, Demobi- lization and Reintegration (DDR) Section of DPKO; Hanna Bodenmann of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations in New York; Marielle Mumenthaler of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; and Olivier Maes and René Lauer of the Permanent Mission of Luxembourg to the United Nations. We are indebted to colleagues at UNU who provided key support in the production of this edited volume, notably James Cockayne, Alexandra Cerquone, Serwah Asante, Julia Blocher, Nadeshda Jayakody, Sebastian von Einsie- del, Adam Day, and Cale Salih. We owe a debt of gratitude to UNICEF and DPKO field staff (particularly Solange Vasse and Ndiaga Diagne of MINUSMA) and other partners in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, Syria, Mali, and Nigeria, who facilitated research visits. The project would not have been possible without their unfailing support. We wish to express our appreciation to members of the Project Advisory Group for their advice and counsel over the course of this project.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Situation Sécuritaire Dans Le Centre Du Mali, Ofpra, 12/11/2019
    MALI 12 novembre 2019 Situation sécuritaire dans le centre du Mali Avertissement Ce document a été élaboré par la Division de l’Information, de la Documentation et des Recherches de l’Ofpra en vue de fournir des informations utiles à l’examen des demandes de protection internationale. Il ne prétend pas faire le traitement exhaustif de la problématique, ni apporter de preuves concluantes quant au fondement d’une demande de protection internationale particulière. Il ne doit pas être considéré comme une position officielle de l’Ofpra ou des autorités françaises. Ce document, rédigé conformément aux lignes directrices communes à l’Union européenne pour le traitement de l’information sur le pays d’origine (avril 2008) [cf. https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/lignes_directrices_europeen nes.pdf ], se veut impartial et se fonde principalement sur des renseignements puisés dans des sources qui sont à la disposition du public. Toutes les sources utilisées sont référencées. Elles ont été sélectionnées avec un souci constant de recouper les informations. Le fait qu’un événement, une personne ou une organisation déterminée ne soit pas mentionné(e) dans la présente production ne préjuge pas de son inexistence. La reproduction ou diffusion du document n’est pas autorisée, à l’exception d’un usage personnel, sauf accord de l’Ofpra en vertu de l’article L. 335-3 du code de la propriété intellectuelle. Situation sécuritaire dans le centre du Mali Table des matières 1. Le contexte général .......................................................................................... 4 1.1. Une région en proie à des « violences d’une extrême gravité » .......................... 4 1.2.
    [Show full text]
  • Freedom Or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq Hannibal Travis
    Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 4 Spring 2005 Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq Hannibal Travis Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr Recommended Citation Hannibal Travis, Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq, 3 Nw. J. Int'l Hum. Rts. 1 (2005). http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol3/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. Copyright 2005 Northwestern University School of Law Volume 3 (Spring 2005) Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights FREEDOM OR THEOCRACY?: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ By Hannibal Travis* “Afghans are victims of the games superpowers once played: their war was once our war, and collectively we bear responsibility.”1 “In the approved version of the [Afghan] constitution, Article 3 was amended to read, ‘In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.’ … This very significant clause basically gives the official and nonofficial religious leaders in Afghanistan sway over every action that they might deem contrary to their beliefs, which by extension and within the Afghan cultural context, could be regarded as
    [Show full text]
  • FINAL REPORT Quantitative Instrument to Measure Commune
    FINAL REPORT Quantitative Instrument to Measure Commune Effectiveness Prepared for United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mali Mission, Democracy and Governance (DG) Team Prepared by Dr. Lynette Wood, Team Leader Leslie Fox, Senior Democracy and Governance Specialist ARD, Inc. 159 Bank Street, Third Floor Burlington, VT 05401 USA Telephone: (802) 658-3890 FAX: (802) 658-4247 in cooperation with Bakary Doumbia, Survey and Data Management Specialist InfoStat, Bamako, Mali under the USAID Broadening Access and Strengthening Input Market Systems (BASIS) indefinite quantity contract November 2000 Table of Contents ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.......................................................................... i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................... ii 1 INDICATORS OF AN EFFECTIVE COMMUNE............................................... 1 1.1 THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE..............................................1 1.2 THE EFFECTIVE COMMUNE: A DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS..........................................2 1.2.1 The Development Problem: The Sound of One Hand Clapping ............................ 3 1.3 THE STRATEGIC GOAL – THE COMMUNE AS AN EFFECTIVE ARENA OF DEMOCRATIC LOCAL GOVERNANCE ............................................................................4 1.3.1 The Logic Underlying the Strategic Goal........................................................... 4 1.3.2 Illustrative Indicators: Measuring Performance at the
    [Show full text]
  • FALAISES DE BANDIAGARA (Pays Dogon)»
    MINISTERE DE LA CULTURE REPUBLIQUE DU MALI *********** Un Peuple - Un But - Une Foi DIRECTION NATIONALE DU ********** PATRIMOINE CULTUREL ********** RAPPORT SUR L’ETAT DE CONSERVATION DU SITE «FALAISES DE BANDIAGARA (Pays Dogon)» Janvier 2020 RAPPORT SUR L’ETAT ACTUEL DE CONSERVATION FALAISES DE BANDIAGARA (PAYS DOGON) (MALI) (C/N 516) Introduction Le site « Falaises de Bandiagara » (Pays dogon) est inscrit sur la Liste du Patrimoine Mondial de l’UNESCO en 1989 pour ses paysages exceptionnels intégrant de belles architectures, et ses nombreuses pratiques et traditions culturelles encore vivaces. Ce Bien Mixte du Pays dogon a été inscrit au double titre des critères V et VII relatif à l’inscription des biens: V pour la valeur culturelle et VII pour la valeur naturelle. La gestion du site est assurée par une structure déconcentrée de proximité créée en 1993, relevant de la Direction Nationale du Patrimoine Culturel (DNPC) du Département de la Culture. 1. Résumé analytique du rapport Le site « Falaises de Bandiagara » (Pays dogon) est soumis à une rude épreuve occasionnée par la crise sociopolitique et sécuritaire du Mali enclenchée depuis 2012. Cette crise a pris une ampleur particulière dans la Région de Mopti et sur ledit site marqué par des tensions et des conflits armés intercommunautaires entre les Dogons et les Peuls. Un des faits marquants de la crise au Pays dogon est l’attaque du village d’Ogossagou le 23 mars 2019, un village situé à environ 15 km de Bankass, qui a causé la mort de plus de 150 personnes et endommagé, voire détruit des biens mobiliers et immobiliers.
    [Show full text]
  • Inventaire Des Aménagements Hydro-Agricoles Existants Et Du Potentiel Amenageable Au Pays Dogon
    INVENTAIRE DES AMÉNAGEMENTS HYDRO-AGRICOLES EXISTANTS ET DU POTENTIEL AMENAGEABLE AU PAYS DOGON Rapport de mission et capitalisation d’expérienCe Financement : Projet d’Appui de l’Irrigation de Proximité (PAIP) Réalisation : cellule SIG DNGR/PASSIP avec la DRGR et les SLGR de la région de Mopti Bamako, avril 2015 Table des matières I. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 3 II. Méthodologie appliquée ................................................................................................................ 3 III. Inventaire des AHA existants et du potentiel aménageable dans le cercle de Bandiagara .......... 4 1. Déroulement des activités dans le cercle de Bandiagara ................................................................................... 7 2. Bilan de l’inventaire du cercle de Bandiagara .................................................................................................... 9 IV. Inventaire des AHA existants et du potentiel aménageable dans les cercles de Bankass et Koro 9 1. Déroulement des activités dans les deux cercles ............................................................................................... 9 2. Bilan de l’inventaire pour le cercle de Koro et Bankass ................................................................................... 11 Gelöscht: 10 V. Inventaire des AHA existants et du potentiel aménageable dans le cercle de Douentza ............. 12 VI. Récapitulatif de l’inventaire
    [Show full text]
  • M700kv1905mlia1l-Mliadm22305
    ! ! ! ! ! RÉGION DE MOPTI - MALI ! Map No: MLIADM22305 ! ! 5°0'W 4°0'W ! ! 3°0'W 2°0'W 1°0'W Kondi ! 7 Kirchamba L a c F a t i Diré ! ! Tienkour M O P T I ! Lac Oro Haib Tonka ! ! Tombouctou Tindirma ! ! Saréyamou ! ! Daka T O M B O U C T O U Adiora Sonima L ! M A U R I T A N I E ! a Salakoira Kidal c Banikane N N ' T ' 0 a Kidal 0 ° g P ° 6 6 a 1 1 d j i ! Tombouctou 7 P Mony Gao Gao Niafunké ! P ! ! Gologo ! Boli ! Soumpi Koulikouro ! Bambara-Maoude Kayes ! Saraferé P Gossi ! ! ! ! Kayes Diou Ségou ! Koumaïra Bouramagan Kel Zangoye P d a Koulikoro Segou Ta n P c ! Dianka-Daga a ! Rouna ^ ! L ! Dianké Douguel ! Bamako ! ougoundo Leré ! Lac A ! Biro Sikasso Kormou ! Goue ! Sikasso P ! N'Gorkou N'Gouma ! ! ! Horewendou Bia !Sah ! Inadiatafane Koundjoum Simassi ! ! Zoumoultane-N'Gouma ! ! Baraou Kel Tadack M'Bentie ! Kora ! Tiel-Baro ! N'Daba ! ! Ambiri-Habe Bouta ! ! Djo!ndo ! Aoure Faou D O U E N T Z A ! ! ! ! Hanguirde ! Gathi-Loumo ! Oualo Kersani ! Tambeni ! Deri Yogoro ! Handane ! Modioko Dari ! Herao ! Korientzé ! Kanfa Beria G A O Fraction Sormon Youwarou ! Ourou! hama ! ! ! ! ! Guidio-Saré Tiecourare ! Tondibango Kadigui ! Bore-Maures ! Tanal ! Diona Boumbanke Y O U W A R O U ! ! ! ! Kiri Bilanto ! ! Nampala ! Banguita ! bo Sendegué Degue -Dé Hombori Seydou Daka ! o Gamni! d ! la Fraction Sanango a Kikara Na! ki ! ! Ga!na W ! ! Kelma c Go!ui a Te!ye Kadi!oure L ! Kerengo Diambara-Mouda ! Gorol-N! okara Bangou ! ! ! Dogo Gnimignama Sare Kouye ! Gafiti ! ! ! Boré Bossosso ! Ouro-Mamou ! Koby Tioguel ! Kobou Kamarama Da!llah Pringa!
    [Show full text]
  • Criminogenic Patterns in the Management of Boko Haram's
    Third World Quarterly ISSN: 0143-6597 (Print) 1360-2241 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20 Criminogenic patterns in the management of Boko Haram’s human displacement situation Medinat A. Abdulazeez & Temitope B. Oriola To cite this article: Medinat A. Abdulazeez & Temitope B. Oriola (2018) Criminogenic patterns in the management of Boko Haram’s human displacement situation, Third World Quarterly, 39:1, 85-103, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2017.1369028 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1369028 Published online: 14 Sep 2017. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 204 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ctwq20 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY, 2018 VOL. 39, NO. 1, 85–103 https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1369028 Criminogenic patterns in the management of Boko Haram’s human displacement situation Medinat A. Abdulazeeza and Temitope B. Oriolab aDepartment of History and International Studies, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria; bDepartment of Sociology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY This article interrogates the management of the internal displacement Received 22 December 2016 caused by the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The study utilizes Accepted 15 August 2017 qualitative methods to explicate the lived realities of internally KEYWORDS displaced persons (IDPs) at three IDP camps. It accentuates the Boko Haram invention of criminogenic patterns that have fostered several state terrorism crimes in the management of the displacement situation. A series human displacement of cyclical patterns is highlighted: these patterns are constituted by Internally Displaced Persons and constitutive of the social conditions of the IDPs.
    [Show full text]
  • Jihadism in Africa Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances
    SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber (Eds.) Jihadism in Africa Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances RP 5 June 2015 Berlin All rights reserved. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2015 SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the execu- tive board of the Institute. They express exclusively the personal views of the authors. SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN 1863-1053 Translation by Meredith Dale (Updated English version of SWP-Studie 7/2015) Table of Contents 5 Problems and Recommendations 7 Jihadism in Africa: An Introduction Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber 13 Al-Shabaab: Youth without God Annette Weber 31 Libya: A Jihadist Growth Market Wolfram Lacher 51 Going “Glocal”: Jihadism in Algeria and Tunisia Isabelle Werenfels 69 Spreading Local Roots: AQIM and Its Offshoots in the Sahara Wolfram Lacher and Guido Steinberg 85 Boko Haram: Threat to Nigeria and Its Northern Neighbours Moritz Hütte, Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber 99 Conclusions and Recommendations Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber 103 Appendix 103 Abbreviations 104 The Authors Problems and Recommendations Jihadism in Africa: Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances The transnational terrorism of the twenty-first century feeds on local and regional conflicts, without which most terrorist groups would never have appeared in the first place. That is the case in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Syria and Iraq, as well as in North and West Africa and the Horn of Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • Witch Hunts and the Sexual Assault Enterprise on the Modern Campus
    Witch Hunts and the Sexual Assault Enterprise on the Modern Campus I. Introduction On December 13, 2013, Amherst College expelled a student for violating its disciplinary code, concerning Sexual Misconduct Policy: Sexual Assault .1 This decision may seem innocuous, but in reality it effectively proclaimed the student guilty of rape and demolished his professional and academic career. Furthermore, while punishing a rapist is commendable, the facts of the situation present an entirely different interpretation. On February 4-5, 2012, the accused student (known as John Doe) and the accuser (known as Sandra Jones) returned to Jones’ room, where Doe’s girlfriend also lived. Sometime during the night, Jones engaged in sexual activities with Doe. After one year and nine months, Jones filed an official complaint with Amherst, alleging Doe raped her. 2 In merely six weeks between the filing of the complaint and the disciplinary ruling, the college’s investigator conducted interviews that constituted all the evidence gathered for the case. The investigator found that: Jones changed her story concerning whether she ever consented to the act; one of Jones’ witnesses blatantly lied about the encounter; evidence showed that Jones lied about sending texts to another student concerning the encounter (though the investigator never interviewed that student). 3 Despite knowing of a witness who had evidence that called the accusations into question, the investigator never pursued contacting that witness.4 Interestingly, the investigator made no conclusions as to whether Doe sexually assaulted Jones, but did determine that Doe blacked out from alcohol intoxication and could not recall anything. 5 Despite having no clear findings, Amherst expelled Doe approximately one month after the 1 Complaint and Jury Demand at 15, Doe v.
    [Show full text]
  • Rapport Mission D'évaluation Rapide Des Besoins Suite À L'attaque D
    Rapport Mission d’évaluation rapide des besoins suite à l’attaque d’Ogossagou. Mopti le 24 Mars 2019 Photo pendant la Mission Mopti, le 26 mars 19 Présentation du cercle de Bankass Le cercle de Bankass compte 12 communes rurales : Bankass, Baye, Diallassagou, Dimbal-Habbé, Kani - Bonzon, Koulogon-Habbé, Lessagou-habbé, Ouenkoro, Segué, Sokoura, Soubala et Tori. Le conseil communal de Bankass qui est l’organe de décision est composé de 23 conseillers dont 2 femmes. Le bureau communal organe exécutif est constitué du Maire et de ces 3 adjoints. L’état est représenté par le sous-préfet qui réside au niveau du chef-lieu même de la commune qui est Bankass. La commune couvre une superficie de 1 200 km² et comprend 26 villages inclus Ogossagou et 23 Hameaux pour une population estimée à 31 996 habitants (RGPH 2009) dont 52 % sont des femmes. Les Dogon, Dafing, Peulh, Samogo, Mossi sont les principales ethnies qu’on y rencontre dans la commune. Contexte Le cercle de Bankass est aujourd’hui le point culminant du conflit intercommunautaire dans la région de Mopti. Depuis le début de l’année 2019, le cercle de Bankass a enregistré plusieurs cas d’attaques impliquant les groupes armés. Le 1er janvier 2019 le village de Koulogo a enregistré plus de 30 morts, plusieurs blessés et déplacés. Les acteurs humanitaires et le gouvernement ont apporté des aides alimentaires, non alimentaires et financiers. Plusieurs attaques isolées ont suivi celle de Koulogo tel que : - Le 19 Janvier 2019 à 18h, le hameau Youssouf gorè dans la Commune de Sègue, a été la cible d’une attaque des hommes armés non identifiés.
    [Show full text]
  • False Allegations of Sexual Assault
    47VAW3877VAW161210.1177/1077801210387747Lisak et al.Violence Against Women Symposium on False Allegations of Rape Violence Against Women 16(12) 1318 –1334 False Allegations of Sexual © The Author(s) 2010 Reprints and permission: http://www. Assualt: An Analysis of Ten sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1077801210387747 Years of Reported Cases http://vaw.sagepub.com David Lisak1, Lori Gardinier2, Sarah C. Nicksa2, and Ashley M. Cote2 Abstract One of the most controversial disputes affecting the discourse related to violence against women is the dispute about the frequency of false allegations of sexual assault. In an effort to add clarity to the discourse, published research on false allegations is critiqued, and the results of a new study described. All cases (N = 136) of sexual assault reported to a major Northeastern university over a 10-year period are analyzed to determine the percentage of false allegations. Of the 136 cases of sexual assault reported over the 10-year period, 8 (5.9%) are coded as false allegations. These results, taken in the context of an examination of previous research, indicate that the prevalence of false allegations is between 2% and 10%. Keywords false allegations, sexual assault Rape is unique. No other violent crime is so fraught with controversy, so enmeshed in dispute and in the politics of gender and sexuality. For example, despite decades of careful social science research, prevalence rates are still frequently challenged on political grounds, and bold assertions are made in the absence of any data (e.g., MacDonald, 2008; Roiphe, 1993). And within the domain of rape, the most highly charged area of debate concerns the issue of false allegations.
    [Show full text]
  • Nigeria's Boko Haram
    Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions Lauren Ploch Blanchard Specialist in African Affairs March 29, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43558 Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions Summary Boko Haram, a violent Nigerian Islamist movement, has grown increasingly active and deadly in its attacks against state and civilian targets in recent years, drawing on a narrative of victimization and vengeance for state abuses to elicit recruits and sympathizers. The group’s April 2014 abduction of almost 300 schoolgirls drew particular international attention, including from the Obama Administration and Members of Congress. Its high death toll and its pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL or ISIS) in March 2015 have further raised the concern of U.S. policy makers. The group has sought to rebrand itself as the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP), though it remains more popularly known by its original nickname. The State Department has named several individuals linked to Boko Haram, including its leader, Abubakar Shekau, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, and the group was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the State Department in November 2013. More than 15,000 people are estimated to have been killed by Boko Haram, including more than 6,000 in 2015 alone, making it one of world’s deadliest terrorist groups. By U.N. estimates, roughly 2.8 million people have been displaced by Boko Haram-related violence in the Lake Chad Basin region, where approximately 5.6 million are in need of emergency food aid.
    [Show full text]