University of

Canberra

Seamanship and citizenship: a history of the Australian naval and sea movement 1863 – 1952

Frans Karel de Laat

Thesis is prepared in requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

September 2013

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Copyright Statement

I hereby grant the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now all here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright act 1968. I retain all proprietary rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstracts International.

I have either used no substantial portions of copyright material in my thesis or I have obtained permission to use copyright material; where permission has not been granted I have applied/will apply for a partial restriction of the digital copy of my thesis or dissertation.

Frans Karel de Laat

Canberra, November 2013

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Authenticity Statement

I hereby certify that the Library deposit digital copy is a direct equivalent of the final officially approved version of my thesis. No emendation of content has occurred and if there are any minor variations in formatting, they are the result of the conversion to digital format.

Frans Karel de Laat

Canberra, November 2013

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Originality Statement

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial portions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institutions, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in this thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.

Frans Karel de Laat

Canberra, November 2013

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Abstract

This thesis is about the genesis and development of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement between 1863 and 1952. During this period the movement came into being when individual joined colonial naval brigades in New South Wales and in the early 1860s. It only became recognisable as a movement, however, when separate branches of defence-based naval cadet units and community-based sea cadet units were formed between 1898 and 1910. The movement ceased to exist in this dual form in 1952 when the (RAN) assumed responsibility for both branches of the movement. This thesis argues that the existence of the officially sanctioned part-time Naval Reserve Cadet (NRC) branch of the naval and sea cadet movement pre-disposed the RAN to question the need for community-based for the first half of the twentieth century. From its inception, the navy took full responsibility for the organisation, control, personnel and funding of its defence component of the movement. In contrast, the Australian Naval Board consistently resisted the efforts of the community-created sea cadet branch to garner identical input in these four areas.

The fundamental reason for the navy’s reluctance to become involved in the organisation and administration of the community-based sea cadet branch was its potential duplication of the training and recruitment role of the NRC. From 1900 to 1920, community- based sea cadet organisers, particularly those forming nautical offshoots of the church- sponsored Boys’ Brigade, engaged in nautical training as a means of developing citizenship. Because of this maritime emphasis, they received some limited support from the navy, and there was an unsuccessful attempt to have the RAN assume control of these community- based sea cadet units and manage them as a ‘junior NRC’ scheme. From 1920, organisations such as the Boy Scouts’ Association and the Navy League, which dominated the community- based branch of the movement for the next 30 years, started to focus on their role as a recruitment base for the navy and pressed the Naval Board for greater navy commitment to their training and funding needs. Progressively, attempts by these larger community-based sea cadet organisations to have the navy commit fully to providing support, on the same basis that it did for the defence-based NRC, became the fundamental focus of all exchanges between these groups and the Naval Board. Through periods of compulsory cadet training, economic depression and war, discussions between the Naval Board and community-based

v sea cadet organisers progressively came to focus solely on the merits of the RAN administering, and funding, both branches of the movement.

A transition away from this problematic dual system of defence-based and community sponsored naval and sea cadets began in the aftermath of World War II. Influenced by changes in naval and sea cadet policy in Britain, the Naval Board began the process of creating one system of naval and sea cadet administration under the Director of Naval Reserves (DNR). While the two branches were not merged legally, the creation of the Australian Sea Cadet Corps (ASCC), in 1952, to be administered by the RAN alongside the NRC, ended the dual system. Henceforth, the NRC and ASCC were managed in tandem by the DNR and, while the Navy League retained an advisory role, the Australian naval and sea cadet movement was, from this point, effectively under the control of the RAN.

Of course the path of birth, duality and a final coming together under RAN control in the period 1863-1952 was far more convoluted, confused, complex and complicated than the preceding paragraphs are able to convey. The history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement is a knotty and intricate weave – one that this thesis attempts to unravel.

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Table of Contents

Title Page i

Copyright Statement ii

Authenticity Statement iii

Certificate of Originality iv

Abstract v

Table of Contents vii

Acknowledgements viii

Abbreviations ix

Introduction 1

Chapter One – Colonial Origins 1863 -1900 15

Chapter Two – Duality Entrenched 1901-1910 43

Chapter Three – Compulsory Cadets Dominant 1911-1919 76

Chapter Four - Balance Restored 1920-1923 104

Chapter Five – Transition 1924-1932 134

Chapter Six – Hard Times 1933-1934 168

Chapter Seven – At Loggerheads 1935-1938 190

Chapter Eight – War and Policy Changes 1939-1945 216

Chapter Nine – Recognition in Principle 1946-1947 244

Chapter Ten – Dilemma Resolved 1948-1952 274

Conclusion 299

Bibliography 303

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Acknowledgements

Completing this work has brought me into contact with a large number of very helpful people. There are far too many to acknowledge individually. For this reason, I extend my thanks to all of these people, particularly the very helpful staff at the National Archives of , but reserve special thanks for my supervisor, Craig Stockings, my co-supervisor, Eleanor Hancock, and my family. Without Craig and Eleanor’s expert guidance and my family’s endless patience this work would not have been possible.

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Abbreviations

AAC Cadets

AAFC Australian Air Force Cadets

ADFC Cadets

AIF Australian Imperial Force

ANA Australian Natives Association

ANC

ASCC Australian Sea Cadet Corps

ATC

DNAS Director of Naval Auxiliary Services

DNO District Naval Officer

DNR Director of Naval Reserves

DNRM Director of Naval Reserves and Naval Reserve Mobilisation

DRRF Director of Naval Reserves and Reserve Fleet

NAP Naval Auxiliary Patrol

NRC Naval Reserve Cadets

NLSCC Navy League Sea Cadet Corps

RAN Royal Australian Navy

RANB Royal Australian Naval Brigade

RANC Royal Australian Naval College

RANR Royal Australian Naval Reserve

RANR (M) Royal Australian Naval Reserve (Militia)

RANR (O) Royal Australian Naval Reserve (Obligatory)

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RANVR Royal Australian Naval Volunteer Reserve

RN

SDNO Sub-district Naval Officer

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Introduction

‘Sea training must be regarded as an important, actually the most important, section of National training of youth’1

Vice Sir William Creswell

The Australian naval and sea cadet movement began in the colonial era when boys were enrolled as defence-sponsored naval brigade cadets in the early 1860s. A second branch of the movement was born when the first community-sponsored sea cadet unit was formed, in 1900. Both of these groups were taught the training and traditions of the sea and the navy, but one was official and the other unofficial. Although the founding philosophies, sponsors and original structures of these two branches of the movement differed, their training of young boys in the ways of the sea, and the navy, was basically the same. For the official defence-based branch, however, part-time training in maritime skills was predominantly to prepare a boy for continuing service in the adult naval reserve or to apply for entry as an officer or sailor to the full-time navy. Their community-based counterparts, on the other hand, might be encouraged to consider a career in the navy or merchant marine, but the prime purpose of their maritime training was most often envisaged as a way to instil personal qualities of good citizenship, regardless of career choice.

With regards to terminology, no long-term accepted definition exists for the naval and sea cadet movement, but it has become common contemporary practice to refer to the movement as the Australian Navy Cadets (ANC), since the formation of this organisation as part of the Australian Defence Force Cadets (ADFC), alongside the

1 Report by the Director of the Naval Forces on the Naval Defence of the Commonwealth of Australia for the Year 1905, Government Printer, , 1 January 1906, NAA A1194, 20.15/6714. 1

(AAC) and the Australian Air Force Cadets (AAFC) in 2001.2 This practice, however, fails to acknowledge the contribution of some quite large organisations, such as the sea scouting component of the Boy Scouts’ Association, and many smaller independent groups, of widely varying identity and structure across the span of history, that made many, and concerted, efforts to be officially recognised by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). A more correct description recognises these many groups that emulated naval training and traditions, but did not become part of the modern ANC movement. These groups were effectively excluded from the movement when the navy recognised the community-based Navy League Sea Cadet Corps (NLSCC) and created the navy regulated, but still community-based, Australian Sea Cadet Corps (ASCC), alongside the defence-based Naval Reserve Cadets (NRC) in 1952. For this thesis, the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, from 1863 to 1952, is considered to be the combined assemblage of young people in Australia who met in navy-like uniform on an unpaid part-time basis to experience the training and traditions of the navy and the sea under uniformed adult supervision. This dissertation is concerned with the history of this movement, during the period 1863 to 1952, from the time of its colonial origins to the point where it became a recognisable single movement, officially regulated by the navy, alongside the army and air force cadets. Effectively, this formal recognition by the navy, of one of the larger and more prominent parts of the community-based sea cadet movement, created the structure that was to, eventually, become the ANC and, thus, end the navy’s independent stance on considering all nautical groups as potential candidates for support or official recognition. Ultimately, when the modern day ANC was created, in 2001, the Australian naval and sea cadet movement bore little resemblance to the fragmented and complex aggregation of organisations considered in this thesis.

While the evolution and development of the defence-based branch of the movement is reasonably linear and well defined, it is impossible to fully trace, track or describe all of the many community-based nautical youth groups that were conducted in such a way that they could correctly be classified as part of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement. Much of the history of these small offshoots has been lost through the diversity of their activities

2 CAJ Stockings, The torch and the sword: a history of the Army cadet movement in Australia 1866-2004, Thesis (PhD), University of New South Wales, 2006, p. 316. As with many aspects of the formation and administration of the ADFC, this transition was not universally agreed. 2 and their independent outlook, particularly those not associated with the Navy League, the Boy Scouts’ Association or the Boys’ Naval Brigade. This thesis must, out of necessity, therefore, focus on the larger and more significant of these community-based groups. Similarly, the interaction of these many groups with the various iterations of the Australian colonial navies, the RAN and the merchant marine is confounded by the complexity of the development of these entities and their relationship with one another other and their British equivalents.3 Notwithstanding the problems presented by its diverse and fragmented structure (mostly but not solely within the community-based branch), the scope of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement was consistently defined by its volunteer and part- time nature. These two aspects of the movement meant that naval and sea cadet training was open to any boy (and girl as part of various Sea Ranger units of the Girl Guides’ Association, and various independent units, from the late 1930s).4 Thus, apart from a period of conscription of boys for the defence-based NRC, between 1911 and 1929, the movement could be established anywhere that boys, and later girls, and volunteer instructors wished to participate. Moreover, it was the volunteer and part-time nature of both the defence-based and community-based branches of the movement that differentiated them so clearly from remunerated full-time navy cadet training schemes and juvenile reformatory schemes.

When its initial members and units emerged, the Australian naval and sea cadet movement was fragmented and lacked uniformity, with defence-based and community-based units emerging in a different manner in each colony. Nevertheless, by 1910, a recognisable dual system of defence-based naval cadets and community-based sea cadets had crystallised. This essential duality, and the associated differences in purpose and style, endured for over fifty years after Federation. During this period, efforts by community-based sea cadet organisers to create a single movement by combining their units with the defence-based NRC detachments were resisted by a series of Naval Boards. In the aftermath of World War II, and as part of subsequent administrative reform within the RANR, however, the dual naval

3 C Lack, ‘Australia’s Merchant Navy’, Journal of the Royal Historical Society of , vol. 5, no. 5, pp. 1327-1344. 4 Memorandum, Commodore-in-Charge, , to Naval Board Secretary 23 September 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/175. Girls were included in the community-based branch of the movement as members of the sea ranger component of the girl guide movement, and in special sub-sections of a variety of independent units, but their numbers were few in comparison to boy membership of these units. Nevertheless, their participation was sufficient to attract the attention of the press and some independent units approached the navy for support. 3 and sea cadet system was at last administered as one organisation, effectively, when the navy created the ASCC, in 1952. From that point, the ASCC, as a national, and officially- supported, community-based sea cadet organisation was controlled by the RAN, alongside the defence-based NRC.5 While the movement continued as a dual entity for a further 20 years, comprising the legally independent ASCC and the defence-legislated NRC, it did so under a firm RAN umbrella and without the involvement of the many and varied groups that contributed so significantly to its colourful history. In effect, from 1952, the navy assumed responsibility for the organisation, control, personnel and funding of both of these two groups (alongside similar army and air force cadet organisations administered by their parent services), in a form that excluded all other organisations with a seamanship orientation, such as the sea scouts. Arriving at this apparently simple outcome, however, involved 90 years of complex negotiation between the navy and its many naval and sea cadet acolytes.

Both the defence-based and community-based components of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement shared a very long gestation period, between 1863 and 1910, spread across New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. Over a period of more than 100 years, the movement has survived identity crises, financial hardship and occasional notoriety to become a nationally recognised component of the ADFC movement. It survived, and sometimes thrived, through world wars, conscription, mixed political support, numerous internal conflicts and the serious transgressions of some of its leaders. Both the defence- based naval cadets and the community-based sea cadets struggled at times, but it was the struggle and survival of the many heterogeneous community components of the movement that shaped its history. Although not part of the navy, like the defence-based NRC branch, these community-based units depended throughout on support from the RAN, particularly for the loan of equipment and purchase of supplies, and how they were organised and controlled was often the subject of discussion by the Naval Board. For its part, the navy was generally supportive of a range of nautical youth groups, but its officially sponsored part-time NRC branch was well established from an early date and, in comparison, naval authorities were traditionally uncertain about their relationship with the community-based branch of the movement that emerged from 1900. This uncertainty was defined by the enduring key issues

5 Naval Instructions for the Australian Sea Cadet Corps of the 1952, Commonwealth of Australia, Navy Office, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1952. 4 of organisation, control, personnel and funding, which arose in virtually every era of the navy’s relationship with the many community-based sea cadet groups that sought assistance, alongside the defence-based NRC.

The defining character and importance of the dual system, of both naval and sea cadets which arose from a movement with both a defence and community branch (one providing seamanship training and the other more focused on citizenship training), solidified immediately after Australian Federation. During the period, 1901-10, the community-based groups, many wearing navy-like uniforms, first sought significant material assistance from the navy – but this was often in short supply and the navy was regularly forced to arbitrate on the merits of claims from such units. Also, by 1910, the ‘official’ part-time colonial naval brigade cadets in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland had been legislatively incorporated as part-time ‘members’ of the new Australian navy and the community-based sea cadets were perceived by the naval authorities as having no real (defence) value. This contentious early development is an important aspect of the history of the naval and sea cadet movement in the colonial and immediate post-federation period, and the movement in general terms, as it presaged a long standing competition for navy resources. As a component of the navy, the defence-based, part-time naval brigade cadets, first coming to notice in 1863, endured in a generally unaltered form for 90 years, emerging in unit form in 1898 and, effectively, becoming the NRC after Federation.6 As an unregulated initiative, in stark contrast, community-based sea cadet groups had many forms, and unpredictable longevity, but most advocates of this branch saw the navy as a role model and many regarded it as a potential sponsor. It was this form of evolving joint reliance that provides the key context for the history of the movement.

The significance of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement as an object of historical study derives from its spontaneous emergence as Australia’s equivalent of similar overseas organisations, such as the Boys Brigade, Navy League Sea Cadet Corps and the sea

6 Maitland Mercury and Hunter River Advertiser, 27 October 1863, p. 3. This report of the appointment of a cadet to the Newcastle Naval Brigade is the earliest public record I have been able to find in relation to the origin of the naval and sea cadet movement. There may have been earlier enlistments of boys in colonial naval brigades on a part-time basis, possibly informally, but I have not been able to find any incontestable evidence 5 scouts. As a movement, its character was defined by its ability to attract sufficient support from both the navy and the community, particularly in the case of the community-based branch, to endure, and occasionally to thrive, and train tens of thousands of young Australians in seamanship and citizenship. Notwithstanding its essential and problematic duality, and overall lack of a uniform structure, the movement contributed to the personal development of many outstanding alumni, both military and civilian, and its units and individual members participated in many events of public significance. Its virtues have been lauded for more than a century in community halls all over urban and regional Australia, and its value and future have been debated in a succession of parliaments; federal and state. The adventures and achievements of the members of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement have been recorded in newspapers and journals from the time of its inception, but to date its history in any holistic sense has never been told. This thesis aims to contribute to the filling of this historiographical gap.

The history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement forms a very small part of Australia’s maritime history, which, in turn, has been described as being on the periphery of Australian history in general.7 In arguing this perimetric position, Broeze recalls the metaphor of British naval historian John Ehrman that maritime history was not part of the history pie, but a small whole pie with the same ingredients and slices as the big pie.8 One of the slices of maritime history, he contends, is naval history.9 Using Broeze’s analogy, the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement is primarily part of a small maritime portion of Australian historical study and, because of its links to the navy, is closely aligned to a slice of that small portion. Furthermore, Broeze suggests, in mainstream Australian writing, maritime workers have not just remained unnoticed, but have been positively rejected. Thus, maritime workers, including seamen, often appear only at the margins of Australia’s history, if at all.10 Although, Broeze’s observations may be interpreted as giving insufficient weight to the mainstream writing on maritime historical events, such as that by Manning Clark on subjects such as the maritime strike of 1890, there is little evidence that mainstream historical texts have in any way adequately considered the Australian naval and

7 F Broeze, ‘From the periphery to the mainstream: the challenge of Australia’s maritime history’, The Great Circle, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 1-13. 8 ibid., p. 5. 9 ibid. 10 ibid., p. 3. 6 sea cadet movement.11 Thus, naval historians have been left to write on the subject.

For its part, the field of Australian naval history is inexplicably silent on the subject of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, particularly as the movement’s involvement with the Australian navy dates from the 1860s. Furthermore, the movement survived to become a component of the modern ADFC organisation in 2001 and, thus, a component of defence history that stretches unbroken over more than 150 years. With this lineage, it might be assumed, for example, that a place in the Oxford Companion to Australian Military History would be minimal recognition. A cross reference to the ‘Australian Navy Cadets’ did appear in the 1995 and 2004 editions of this volume as part of the entry for the ‘Australian Navy League’ (the principal and official sponsor of a large component of the movement from 1920), but no entry was provided.12 This is an apt exemplar of the peripheral nature of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement in the published record of Australian naval history, and military history generally.

The first historiographical reference to the Australian naval and sea cadet movement occurred in 1986, when Tom Frame listed suggestions for rectifying the significant gaps in Australian naval history.13 His framework for the development of a history of the RAN, from its pre-history until the present day, identified ‘sea cadets/sea scouts’ as one of many areas requiring attention.14 Yet, some twenty five years later, the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement is yet to be told in the manner Frame described. More recently, The Navy and Nation (2006), a seminal work on Australian naval and community affairs, represented an ideal opportunity for recognition of a naval community movement that has involved tens of thousands of defence-based naval cadets and community-based sea cadets, yet none is provided.15 At a broader level, the generally unacknowledged role of the sea, and maritime power, in the development of Australia, lamented over by official RAN researchers as they work to fill this void, gives some insight into, and context to, the absence of writing

11 CMH Clark, A History of Australia: The people make laws, 1888-1915, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1981, pp. 37-52. 12 P Dennis, The Oxford companion to Australian military history, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2008, p. 143. 13 T Frame, ‘75 years of what: an historiographical survey of Australian Naval History’, Sabretache, vol. 27, no. 4, July/September 1987, pp. 4-18. 14 T Frame, ‘Australian Naval History After 75 years’, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, May 1987, p. 49. 15 D Stevens & J Reeve (eds), The Navy and the Nation, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2006. 7 on the naval and sea cadet movement in contemporary texts.16 In the broader context of the popular history of armed conflict, Beaumont argues that the Anzac of popular imagination is a soldier, not a sailor or an airman, and that the disproportionate army representation in both World Wars resulted in the dominance of the Army in the historiography of the Australian defence forces.17

Thus, while the job of filling the wider Australian naval historical void continues, current evidence suggests that the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement has not yet received even the relatively limited attention accorded to so many other areas of Australian naval history.18 As an inter-service comparison, even the earliest scholarly works on the Australian army found a place for the history of the AAC movement.19 Furthermore, a comprehensive history of the AAC was able to demonstrate that, while prior work may have been patchy, it did much to represent the impact of the AAC movement on the community.20 In comparison, the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement has, at best, been documented inconsistently in the popular press, in its sponsors’ journals, and in various unit brochures.21 Such publications, however, do not represent an attempt at scholarly history and the Australian naval and sea cadet movement merits a comprehensive recording of its history. The first aim of this thesis is, therefore, to help fill this clear historiographical shortfall.

Across the decades, the heterogeneous nature of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, particularly the community-based branch, contributed significantly to its wavering fortunes. The navy struggled to cope with demands from community-based units that were so diverse in their aims and lineage, and it did not help that claims by community- based sea cadet organisers of assisting the navy with recruitment were often regarded as dubious by naval administrators. This disagreement on recruitment, between the navy and

16 Semaphore, no 1. 2002; A Forbes & M Lovi (eds) Australian Maritime Issues 2006 – SPC-A Annual, Sea Power Center-Australia, Canberra, 2007. Developing a public understanding of the navy’s role through publication of historical, and contemporary, books and articles is a key function of the RAN Sea Power Centre. 17 J Beaumont, Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2001, p. 3. 18 ibid., pp. 394-399. 19 AN Festberg, The lineage of the Australian Army, Allara Publishing, Melbourne, 1972. 20 CAJ Stockings, The Torch and the Sword, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2008. 21 J Wilkins, Australian Naval Reserves: a brief history: 1859-2002, John M. Wilkins, East Doncaster, 2003; FTG Dixon, Sea Cadets in Queensland, FTG Dixon, Undated typescript supplied to the author, 30 June, 2009; R Fones, In the light of all the years (a history of scouting in Queensland), The Scout Association of Australia, Brisbane, 1992. 8 community-based sea cadet sponsors, grew to have a long-term impact on the relationship between the two organisations. For the movement, and all of its various sponsors, but particularly the RAN, resolving such areas of disagreement, and occasional friction, became integral to arriving at a relatively homogenous entity, from 1952, after some 90 years of struggling with its fragmented identity. In this regard, the piecemeal and disconnected nature of the community-based sea cadet branch of the movement was further complicated by the contemporaneous existence of full-time naval cadet and boy sailor recruitment programs, as well as nautically-flavoured juvenile detention schemes, particularly in the period of its early history. It is fair to suggest that the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, particularly the community-based branch, is a knotty and intricate weave – one this thesis attempts to unravel. The second aim of this thesis is thus to examine the many facets and factors that shaped the movement and to bring clarity to its almost systematically incoherent history.

A key contributing factor to the uncertain development of the movement was the absence of any agreed measure of the effectiveness of the movement as a contributor to the interests of the navy, particularly between the navy and the community-based sea cadet branch. The two most often presented and discussed areas of the potential effectiveness of the community-based sea cadets as a contributor to the navy were recruiting and the provision of a navy presence in the community, particularly where there was no full-time naval presence. Although, these measures were addressed by a succession of Naval Boards and senior naval administrators, I could locate no evidence that there was ever an attempt made to translate this discussion into an official measure that would allow formal reporting on past or potential contributions of the community-based sea cadet branch to the navy. As a result, the community-based sea cadet organisers and their naval administration counterparts had lengthy, but disjointed, discussions on the merits of the movement but remained unable to agree on its effectiveness. The failure to address this issue adequately, on either side, remained a principal impediment to the navy accepting the merits of official recognition for fifty years. Where the merits of the movement were informally accepted it was based on British precedents. As an example, the system of payments to community-based sea cadet units, particularly in the period 1901-10, was based on equivalent payments made in Britain. More significantly, some 50 years later at the end of World War II, it was the formally recorded recruiting role of the British sea cadets that influenced the Australian Naval Board

9 to officially recognise and, ultimately, assume full responsibility for the Australian community-based sea cadet branch.

In the absence of a formal system for assessing their effectiveness in recruiting or public relations, the long-term approach used by many of the community sea cadet organisers was enthusiasm and a single minded view that their role in providing even the most limited seamanship training was a benefit to the navy. More specifically, it was suggested that making boys aware of the excitement and rewards of a naval career increased the likelihood that they would join the navy or naval reserve. For their part, naval administrators were sceptical about the overall impact of recruitment from the community-based sea cadets, but continued to provide unofficial support. Thus, encouragement was provided that sustained the enthusiasm of the organisers for pursuing official recognition and substantial support, while the navy remained unconvinced that anything more than tacit support was warranted. This often blind enthusiasm on the part of the community-based sea cadet organisers coupled with the cyclical nature of political and senior naval administrative appointments resulted in a repetitive exchange that frustrated both parties. The community-based sea cadet organisers settled into a routine of presenting the same arguments in the hope that a new appointee would be more receptive, while a succession of naval administrators remained unconvinced by arguments that included no real evidence of a benefit to the navy, particularly while the defence-based naval cadets were regarded as providing official part-time cadet training suitable for entry to the RAN and RANR. With the community-based sea cadet organisers not presenting a mutual acceptable solution to this dilemma, and the navy not pursuing one, the dual system of defence-based naval cadets and community-based sea cadets persisted through 50 years of dialogue.

It is the third aim of this thesis to contribute to the field of Australian naval and social history by exploring the evolution of the movement, including its origins as small, diverse and unrelated groups. In addition, the navy’s struggle to introduce some uniformity to the community-based sea cadet branch is examined as an important precursor to its eventual commitment to organising and controlling both the defence-based NRC and the community- based ASCC. In this regard, the essential duality of the movement, which was created and sustained by the navy’s continuing support of both groups, is considered by examining the

10 two branches in terms of their respective legislative status and the impact of defence and navy policy. The characteristics of the movement’s duality are presented in terms of the quite different structures that evolved with respect to units, cadet and staff numbers, command and control apparatus, funding, uniforms, equipment and training programs. In the case of the community-based sea cadets, particular attention is accorded to the impact of sponsorship and management on their relationship with the navy. A thorough investigation of themes of differing purpose, structure, form and function, and how this complex and multifaceted paradigm influenced relationships with the navy, is a key outcome of this thesis. In this regard, the Naval Board’s consistent and long-term policy of non-interference in the affairs of the community-based sea cadets, for example, is revealed as a significant underlying aspect of the movement’s history. This is more than a simple narrative. It involves the identification and explanation of the forms and factors that shaped the movement, as well as providing an empirical examination of its fortunes over its 90 year history as a dual organisation.

In terms of thesis structure, the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement consists of a series of events and developments that supports a chronological approach. In Chapter One, the colonial origins of the defence component of the movement are investigated. Different colonial approaches, for example, resulted in individual cadets being enrolled as part of naval brigades formed in the colonies of New South Wales and Victoria, while separate naval cadet units were attached to the naval brigades in coastal Queensland. This chapter concludes with a brief examination of the first small community- based sea cadet unit formed in New South Wales just before the turn of the century. Chapter Two deals with the period 1901-10 and focuses on the formation of the first defence-based national naval cadet movement, as well as the emergence of the first substantial community- based sea cadet groups in Victoria and Queensland. It was during this period that the duality of the movement was fully established, especially as the Boys’ Naval Brigade, a community- based organisation not related to the colonial naval brigades, expanded dramatically in Victoria.

In Chapter Three, the dissertation deals with the impact of compulsory cadet training and . During this period, 1911 to 1919, membership of community-based sea cadet units, such as the sea scouts, was not accepted as providing training acceptable under

11 the compulsory cadet training legislation and, as a consequence, the community-based sea cadet branch languished while the NRC expanded dramatically. Chapter Four, from 1920-23, examines the deepening duality of the movement and the principal focus is on the establishment, by the Navy League, of the Navy League Sea Cadet Corps (NLSCC). In this period, the expanded compulsory NRC remained firmly established as by far the largest component of the movement, although the community-based sea cadets survived as their various sponsors worked hard to establish competing formal structures, such as the NLSCC, sea scouts, and other independent, but still relatively formal, nautical youth groups.

As competition between the two competing branches of the dual movement escalated, Chapter Five examines the expansion of the NLSCC and the Navy League’s efforts to lobby the navy for official recognition, and its attempts to establish itself as the main community- based sea cadet body in Australia. During this period, 1924-1932, the Boy Scouts’ Association also continued to lobby the navy while other sizeable independent sea cadet groups appeared and confused efforts to present a united visage to the RAN. Chapter Six examines how the separately constituted Navy League branches in New South Wales and Victoria attempted to work cooperatively to meet the Naval Board’s requirements for official recognition as the single coordinating body for the community-based sea cadets over the period 1933-4. As Chapter Seven reveals, these cooperative efforts were hindered by the Navy League’s inability to properly control its members’ communication with the RAN in the lead up to World War II (1935-8), as well as naval authorities’ uncertainty about the value of the community-based sea cadets as a source of recruits. Chapter Eight reveals, and investigates why, support for the community-based sea cadets increased during World War II, while the defence-based NRC reinforced its value by providing direct support to the war effort as members of the Naval Auxiliary Patrol (NAP) force. This is also a time when individuals of dubious character are detected for the first time using membership of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement for criminal purposes, with a number of the movement's leaders brought to trial and imprisoned.

Chapter Nine, covering the period 1946 to 1947, examines the first major step towards a united Australian movement by looking at the contribution of the community-based sea cadet movement in Britain during World War II, and how its consequent recognition by

12 the British Admiralty influenced the Australian Naval Board to begin a process of recognising the local community-based sea cadets. The final chapter of the thesis investigates the process, stretched over a five year period from 1948-52, of how and why the independent community-based branch of the movement is finally officially recognised. It traces how the Navy League campaigned successfully to become recognised as the official central governing organisation for all community-based sea cadet units and worked with the RAN to create the ASCC. At the same time, the sea scouting movement, which had been considered for, and almost achieved, official recognition on several occasions, beginning in 1914, was omitted from the final official recognition process, after being included throughout the planning process. This disengagement of the sea scouts left the NRC and the ASCC as the official double prongs of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, although both now under navy control. The chapter concludes with an examination of the convoluted process whereby the navy eventually succeeded in approving instructions that created an Australian Sea Cadet Council to advise on the organisation and control of the ASCC, alongside the NRC, under the direct control of the Director of Naval Reserves (DNR).

While the published record of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement is scant, relevant documents in national and state archives are plentiful. Although the historical significance of this ‘plenty’ is at times questionable, it does provide a useful and verifiable record of the events underlying the more widely reported activities of the movement. Documents in the National Archives of Australia provided the bulk of the primary source material used in this dissertation, with naval records providing a substantial account of many of the movement’s activities from colonial times through to 1952, when the RAN assumed control of the community-based sea cadets alongside the defence-based NRC. Such naval records also contain significant commentary and analysis by members of the Australian Naval Board and other senior naval officers entrusted with the management of the RAN’s relationship with the community-based sea cadet branch.

The navy’s often reflective approach to its involvement with the community-based branch of the movement does much to highlight the factual void between the small number of published ‘popular’ accounts of the movement and the evidence in the public record. This is not so much a chasm, but a clear fissure that requires filling. For their part, the members and

13 supporters of the community-based sea cadet branch were energetic in recording their achievements, but these accounts commonly lacked scholarly rigour and, while containing tantalising material, the many claims found therein could not be verified. In this regard, even modern attempts at recording the history of small slices of the movement provide no assistance, with the lack of any citations to support lengthy and often disjointed accounts of the achievements of the movement only serving to emphasise the importance of the primary sources.22 Notwithstanding this lack of quality secondary material, newspaper reports, memoirs and some unit histories have provided material that complements the primary sources. Nevertheless, the overall record is fragmented and it is from these fragments that this work has been compiled.

The overall contemporary historiographical and historical gap in relation to the Australian naval and sea cadet movement is glaring. Into this gap, this thesis posits a comprehensive and authoritative investigation and analysis of the movement’s activities from the time of its colonial origins to the time of its being brought under navy control in 1952. By focusing on the dual nature of the movement, which endured throughout the major part of its history, this important shortfall in Australia’s naval and social history might begin to be filled and some clarity provided to the confused, disjointed and often conflicting picture that currently exists. While the thesis considers the involvement and influence of such organisations as the NLSCC, Boys’ Naval Brigade, the sea scouting arm of the Boy Scouts’ Association, and other youth organisations, it is not a history of these organisations. The aim of the thesis is to define the Australian naval and sea cadet movement as a cohesive concept, identify its origins, chart its progress and record how its fortunes were shaped by its relationship to the RAN.

22 JM Wilkins, Australian Naval Reserves: a brief history 1859 - 2002, John M. Wilkins, East Doncaster, 2003. 14

CHAPTER ONE

Colonial Origins 1860-1900

The emergence of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement was, for the most part, a confused and uncertain affair. Its history is obscured by a number of related events that attracted more attention then, and retain more historical interest now. The wider debate on the naval and military defence of the colonies demanded the greatest attention. Within this debate, the nascent part-time naval and military (army) volunteers were widely supported by the colonial settlers, but this was an adult fighting force. Strong links to Britain ensured that the Royal Navy (RN) was the focus of naval service and full-time British naval cadetships were the highest priority for boys seeking a serious naval career. Full-time colonial naval cadetships, when created, were few, but received significant public attention. An army cadet system was introduced, in 1866, and immediately dominated colonial thinking on youth defence training. Meanwhile, in addition to these ‘valid’ competing naval and military schemes, all of the eastern colonies, and , had nautically-oriented juvenile reformatory programs, each with profiles that easily eclipsed the naval and sea cadet movement through their numbers and notoriety. Thus, this first chapter of the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement is left to sieve through these many competing influences to find traces of the movement’s genesis and early development.

The earliest traceable colonial origins of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement date back to 1863 when the first part-time cadet was enlisted in the New South Wales Naval Brigade.1 It is somewhat typical of the fragmented and ill-defined nature of the naval and sea cadet movement, that such an important event has thus far attracted little or no attention and remains obscure. The majority of this chapter charts the origins and development of the defence-based branch of the naval and sea cadet movement that emerged in the colonies of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland in the second half of the nineteenth century. The investigation begins with an examination of how the colonial focus on military volunteering, and an enthusiasm for local naval defence, resulted in the creation of part-time colonial navies, which were authorised to include boys as part-time naval cadets. Next, it is revealed how the British system of training ships, both for naval recruitment and as reformatories,

1 Maitland Mercury and Hunter River Advertiser, 27 October 1863, p. 3. 15 influenced the establishment of a variety of nautical training schemes in Australia. Although most of these schemes were not part of the naval and sea cadet movement, as they were neither voluntary nor part-time, they are considered for their, often distracting, influence on the establishment and initial development of the movement. The progress of the movement is then charted, focusing on the divergent nature of early part-time naval cadet service, as established by colonial naval commandants. In contrast to these defence-based and other colonial government nautical training schemes, aimed at juvenile reform, the community- based sea cadet branch of the movement is virtually unknown before Federation, except for a single unit established in New South Wales in 1900. Despite these fragmented and somewhat confused beginnings, the defence-based component was sufficiently well established by 1900 to be included in the Australian colonies’ plans for naval defence after Federation. Nevertheless, lacking a coherent overall identity, the Australian naval and sea cadet movement entered the new century uncertain of its future.

The fragmented origins of the naval and sea cadet movement can be put into perspective by an examination of the dynamic development of the Australian colonies and the associated growth in volunteerism in areas as diverse as sport, social clubs and defence. In the period 1860-1900, life in the Australian colonies was shaped by a series of demographic, social, economic and political developments. New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and were constitutionally independent by 1860, although the British government retained substantial powers.2 By the new century, the colonial capitals pre-1851 gold rush populations, which had numbered in the tens of thousands, had grown to nearly 500,000 in Melbourne, 400,000 in Sydney 135,000 in and 94,000 in Brisbane. Even provincial towns, such as Newcastle (51,000) and Ballarat (40,000), which would feature in the post-Federation development of the naval and sea cadet movement, were significant population centres.3 Melbourne and Sydney’s population increases, which placed them among the top fifty cities in the world, were the result of the mass gold migration of the 1850s and were accompanied by major progress in communications (telegraph, sea and rail), education and economic prosperity.4 The result of this economic upsurge, sustained by the

2 S Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 92. 3 G Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, William Heinemann Australia, Port Melbourne, 1994, p. 84 4 ibid., p. 72. 16 export of wool after gold petered out in the late 1850s, was a rapidly developing industrial and commercial sector, with large public companies and the trade union movement already playing a prominent role.5 Convict arrivals had ceased in 1868 and the colonies were regarded as some of the most democratic societies in the world.6 Into this new society came a spirit of ‘voluntarism’ through clubs, societies, sporting associations and institutes that were to be integral to the creation and development of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement.7 A variety of groups from this volunteer-driven base, such as the Australian Natives Association (ANA), which was formed in 1871 as a friendly society, would figure in the fortunes of the movement, after Federation in 1901, as they turned their attention to advocating and sponsoring Australian citizenship development activities.8 More generally, pride in being Australian gathered momentum as the colonies moves towards nationhood.9 In this environment, colonial volunteers created the first configurations of the naval and sea cadet movement as part of the volunteer naval defence forces, but it was an uneven and uncertain process.10

The establishment of a tradition of military volunteering in the Australian colonies, itself leveraged off and modelled upon the growth of military volunteerism in Britain, was central to the creation of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, as it was to the army cadet movement.11 As early as 1803, Governor King of the colony of New South Wales proclaimed that a corps of volunteers, designated the ‘Loyal Association’, would ‘guard against the first Effects of any unexpected Attack from the Enemy’.12 While the history of the military (army) in colonial Australia has not attracted anything like the attention that has been devoted to the twentieth century army, publications concerning the colonial land forces are nevertheless far more prevalent than those devoted to the colonial naval forces.13 Such army sources are valuable, therefore, as they provide some overall context to the origins of

5 ibid., p. 95. 6 P Knightley, Australia A Biography of a Nation, Jonathan Cape, London, 2000, p. 33. Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, p. 77. 7 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p. 115. 8 M Peel & C Twomey, A History of Australia, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2011, p. 107; Letter, Naval Secretary to General Secretary, Australian Natives Association, 11 August 1913, NAA MP472/1, 1/20/10917. 9 M Peel & C Twomey, A History of Australia, pp.112-113. 10 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, p. 106. 11 CAJ Stockings, The Torch and the Sword. UNSW Press, Sydney, 2008, pp. 7-11. 12 Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser, 11 December 1803, p. 1. 13 J Grey, A military history of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2008, p. 297. 17 colonial defence volunteering, pertinent to the development of the colonial naval brigades, such as how volunteers were recruited to assist in the defence of the colonies long before the withdrawal of British regiments in 1870.14

As Stanley describes them, the volunteers that replaced British troops in the colonies were ‘free men who gave up their leisure to learn to be soldiers’ and were ‘clearly not the products of urban slum or rural squalor forced by destitution to enlist’.15 Thus, the volunteer movement was not inclusive, rather it was often a means to display and acquire social capital. Nor was it predictable, with members able to resign at any time and not able to be trained or disciplined as rigorously as regular troops, or even paid part-time militiamen.16 Furthermore, the colonies were constantly changing between volunteer and partial payment militia systems and were unable to decide on a consistent framework for defence. South Australia, for example, conducted ten inquiries into its defence force between 1854 and 1887.17 Although the primary focus in the colonial era was on military (army) volunteering and associated rifle club organisations, the fear of invasion, most often by the Russians or French, ensured that lines of colonial defence included British and colonial warships, and coastal fortifications.18 Partially because there were so many parties involved, and the high cost of naval defence, what has been described as the ‘thirty year heyday of the colonial navies’, 1860-1890, was a complex affair involving a mixture of ships and men of varying qualities.19 It was from this effort at creating local naval defence organisations that the first members of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement emerged.

When they emerged, colonial navy volunteers were fundamentally influenced by the presence of the Royal Navy (RN) which, as naval historian John Bach observed, ‘was the Imperial presence, far more so than the colonial governors, or the British troops that

14 G Davison, J Hirst & S Macintyre (eds), The Oxford Companion to Australian History, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2001, p. 178. 15 P Stanley, ‘Soldiers and fellow countrymen in colonial Australia’, M McKernan & M Browne (eds), Australia: Two centuries of war & peace, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1988, p. 80. 16 ibid., p. 81. 17 ibid., p. 85. 18 ibid., p. 83. 19 ibid. 18 garrisoned the colonies’20 Naval historian Tom Frame attributes the late emergence of naval defence initiatives in the colonies to New South Wales having no value for Britain until the mid-1850s and, when this value was recognised, he observes, it was more due to local defence efforts than to imperial policy.21 McGuire attributed the establishment of the Australian Station of the RN as a separate command, on 25 March 1859, to the representations made by colonial administrators, particularly the Governor of Tasmania, Sir Henry Young, although the first ships of the new squadron did not arrive until 5 September 1891.22 Official Australian Commonwealth historian CEW Bean, on the other hand, had earlier expressed the more specific view that it was the temptation of the colonies to a naval raider, such as the Russian warships reported to be cruising off Cape Horn and Valparaiso in 1854, which had provided the impetus for protecting coastal cities.23 Bean describes how, over the next sixteen years, the colonies made limited attempts to develop their naval forces but that only in 1876 was an agreement reached that Great Britain would maintain sole responsibility for general naval defence, while local ports would be protected by garrisons, fortifications, torpedo boats and a few fast gunboats provided by the colonies and manned by local naval brigades.24 On this basis, but after still further delays, the colonies of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland developed their naval forces leading up to Federation, but without ‘any adequate arrangement for a single defence system’.25

A number of scholarly and popular sources discuss the emergence and development of the Australian part-time colonial naval brigades, but none consider the role of naval brigade cadets.26 As an example, Nicholls describes the development of the naval brigades in

20 J Bach, ‘The Royal Navy in the South West Pacific: the Australian Station 1859-1913’, The Great Circle, vol. 5, no.2, October 1983, p. 116. 21 TR Frame, No Pleasure Cruise: the story of the Royal Australian Navy, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2004, p. 22. 22 FM McGuire, The Royal Australian Navy: its origin, development and organisation, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1948, pp. 49, 51. 23 CEW Bean, ‘The History in Brief of the Royal Australian Navy’, JW Ward (ed), Our Australian Navy: it’s story in word and picture for the people of Australia and , Nautical Societies Council of Australia, Victoria, 1938, p. 9. 24 ibid. 25 ibid., p. 10. 26 J Straczek, ‘Australian Colonial Navies’, Gillett, R (ed) Australia’s Navy: Past, Present & Future, Child & Henry, Brookvale, NSW, 1986, pp. 12-14, FM McGuire, The Royal Australian Navy: its origin, development and organisation, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1948; M Wedd, Australian military uniforms 1800 to 1982, Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, 1982; B Nicholls, Bluejackets and boxers Australia’s naval expedition to the Boxer uprising, Allen and Unwin, North Sydney, 1986; B Nicholls, ‘Colonial naval forces before Federation’, D 19

Australia, after the formation of the Australian Squadron of the RN in 1859, in New South Wales in 1863 and in Victoria around the same time.27 He observed that training was essentially ineffective in New South Wales up to 1900 due to lack of resources, but more effective in Victoria with 135 permanent staff and a naval reserve force of 150. In South Australia, meanwhile, the navy consisted largely of a reserve and little was known of naval brigade activities in Queensland.28 Similarly, an earlier work (providing little in the way of scholarly evidence), reports that the Victorian Naval Brigade consisted of two companies by December 1861 and that the New South Wales Naval Brigade was formed by the Governor, Sir John Young, on 2 May 1863, as a volunteer organisation under the command of Captain Francis Hixson, Superintendent of Pilots and Lighthouses.29 No further information about the Victorians is provided, but the New South Wales Naval Brigade is reported as parading for the first time on 24 May 1863 with two officers and eighteen sailors and that, subsequently, four companies were formed in Sydney and a fifth in Newcastle.30 Additionally, press reports confirm the announcement, on 1 May 1863, of the New South Wales government’s intention to form a naval brigade and to appoint Hixson as captain in charge of three companies of 40 men each.31 Notwithstanding, the apparent general acceptance, particularly in official naval historical accounts, that the forerunners of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve (RANR) originated in New South Wales in 1863, other press reports reveal that part- time adult naval brigade, and possibly cadet, activities originated several years earlier in Victoria.32 Straczek alludes to this possibility and, although he does not provide dates, nor consider naval brigade cadets, his summary of the genesis of the various Australian colonial naval brigades suggests that Australia’s first naval brigade training activities started around 1860 in Victoria.33

Stevens & J Reeve (eds), Southern trident : strategy, history and the rise of Australian naval power, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2001; Outline of Australian naval history, RAN Education Service, Canberra, 1962. 27 Nicholls, Bluejackets and boxers, pp. 15-19. 28 ibid. 29 Wedd, Australian military uniforms, pp. 38-39. 30 ibid. 31 South Australian Advertiser, 2 May 1863, p. 2 & 5 May 1863, p. 2. 32 ‘The Citizen Naval Forces’, Outline of Australian naval history, RAN Education Service, Canberra, 1962, p. 1. 33 Straczek, ‘Australian Colonial Navies’, pp. 12-14. 20

Thus, widening the search to other colonies and earlier events, press reports further identify the Tasmanians as already having considered the formation of a naval brigade as early as October 1860, but taking no action while awaiting a reply to a request to the British government for two gun boats.34 Subsequently, the Tasmanians were envious that they were not included in planning for a national part-time naval force, commencing in November 1860, with the few available places being given to Melbourne.35 In this regard, it had been reported as early, as 10 September 1860, that the Victorian government had announced the appointment of Commander Kay, of the RN, to be captain commanding the ‘Volunteer Naval Brigade’ in Hobson’s Bay and that, by 1 December 1860, the newly formed Williamstown Naval Brigade, in Melbourne, was conducting drills nine times a month.36 Furthermore, further north, as early as 28 October 1861, a meeting of eighty citizens of Sydney was reported to have been convened by Captain M Moriarty, a member of the New South Wales Legislative Assembly, to discuss the immediate establishment of a naval brigade.37 A Naval Brigade Committee was formed, 120 volunteers identified, a budget of £4250 calculated and the need for a nautical school, with associated vessel, was suggested.38 Thus, while the scholarly evidence regarding the formation of naval brigades in Victoria and New South Wales is somewhat limited, press reports confirm, and elaborate on, these events and suggest that any hunt for the origin of the naval and sea cadet movement needs to focus on the period of the early 1860s. Most significantly, these sometimes conflicting accounts suggest that such a search will not be straightforward.

Before beginning a specific search for the colonial origins of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, it is useful to examine further the historical context within which part- time naval brigade cadets had to strive to be involved in defence training and establish an identity. In this era, the search for the origins of the movement is made more difficult by the widespread and imprecise use of the term naval cadet. In particular, this term was used to describe a variety of junior members of naval forces visiting the colonies, full-time appointees to the colonial navies, boys confined in reformatory ships and adult part-time

34 Mercury, 31 October 1860, p. 2. 35 Mercury, 28 November 1850, p. 2. 36 Argus, 12 September 1860, p. 5. 37 Sydney Morning Herald, 29 October 1861, p. 5. 38 Sydney Morning Herald,14 November 1861, p. 5 21 naval brigade members.39 Thus, consideration of these other forms of naval cadetship is germane to understanding how part-time members of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement were consistently confused with unrelated forms of nautical service, schooling or detention and how this contributed to the movements struggle in achieving an unambiguous identity. In order to unravel the origins of the Australian naval cadet movement, furthermore, and clearly identify its membership, it is first necessary to consider how these contemporaneous schemes originated alongside the part-time naval and sea cadets and what aspects of this process made the first elements of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement unique simultaneously unique and somewhat obscure. Although it is a colonial story, strongly influenced by colonial volunteer defence attitudes, it is one with its roots in Britain.

Given the pervasive presence of the RN in the colonial settlement process, it was inevitable that British traditions, including the enlistment of boy sailors, would influence the development of colonial navies. Many colonials had close contact with full-time RN personnel during their passage to Australia and the significance of the colonial reliance on RN ships is clear. For these reasons, it is not surprising that colonial newspaper reports confirm that the term ‘naval cadet’ in the mid-1800s was most commonly used to refer to the officer trainees of the RN and other navies.40 Subsequently, the term acquired more local relevance as boys from Australia joined the RN as officer cadets, between the ages of 12 and 14.41 Through this influence, the image of a boy from the colonies serving full-time in the RN was firmly installed at an early date as the initial primary reference point of what

39 ‘J Winton, ‘Life and Education in a Technically Evolving Navy, 1815-1925’, B Ranft, B & JR Hill (eds), The Oxford illustrated history of the Royal Navy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 266. Officially introduced into the Royal Navy in 1843, the term naval cadet was used widely in all navies of the world for full- time officer trainees. In Britain and Australia, particularly after 1850, the term was used by a range of official and unofficial organisations to describe any form of junior or entry level naval training, including adults. It was this unregulated use of the term that contributed to confusion about the aims of the many naval cadet schemes in both Britain and Australia. 40 From the 1840s, Australian newspapers contained frequent articles reporting the activities of full-time naval cadets aboard visiting ships. 41 Early references to cadets and boy sailors focused on the allocation of training cadetships, as early as 1861, for the purpose of training boys for full-time cadet entry to the Royal Navy. These and similar appointments of boys as full-time cadets to the Australian navy created two classes of local cadet. There were those considered to be part of the Australian navy or sea cadet movement and there were full-time naval cadets, with the latter featuring much more prominently in naval history. 22 constituted a naval cadet.42 Furthermore, such local appointments to a British naval cadetship were a matter of great prestige and attracted significant attention in the colonial media.43

These naval cadetships, however, were not for the ‘average’ colonial lad as the fees, which were rebated for children of naval officers and of certain government officials, were substantial.44 In addition to these very significant financial hurdles, a more salient factor for the average colonial family would have been the lack of any reasonable social expectation that their son would become an officer. In addition, the widely publicised selection process required candidates to be officially nominated, pass a local entrance exam, and attend the official entry examination at the Royal Naval College, at their own expense.45 Although there was agitation in Britain to make naval cadetships more widely available using pre-entry training ships, this was not yet a reality and the majority of colonial parents would have identified more with sailor entry to a life at sea in the ‘lower deck’ than a cadetship leading to a commission.46 Correspondingly, RN officers serving as colonial naval commandants were products of this system and would have been tasked with recruiting local boys as sailors, as well as encouraging applications for RN cadetships from more privileged families. In this way, notwithstanding the independence of the colonies in all matters, particularly defence, the British influence in naval affairs was all but absolute.47

Although needing to adapt navy recruitment to local conditions, colonial naval commandants would have been guided by their experience of British schemes designed to entice boys of lesser means, possibly destitute, to enter the RN or the merchant navy as

42 Argus, 21 January 1860, p. 5. The entry in the Government Gazette calling for nominations for Naval Cadetships received wide publicity including full publication of the letters from the British Admiralty. 43 Launceston Examiner, 22 December 1860, p.4. 44 Memorandum, Premier of Victoria, Naval Defences, 20 May, 1886, NAA A1194, 45.30/27778. 45 Launceston Examiner, 24 March 1860, p. 2S (Supplement). 46 Hobart Town Mercury, 27 March 1860, p. 3. The ‘lower deck’ referred to sailors while the ‘upper deck’ referred to officers. Full time colonial naval cadets were destined to serve in the upper deck, while their boy sailor counterparts would serve in the lower deck. In Britain, the use of the press gang, training ships, reformatories, naval schools and industrial schools were for the recruitment of sailors, who were housed in the lower decks of the ships. 47 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, pp. 128-9. Blainey noted that the colonies ‘gloried’ in being separate and established their own postage systems, immigration procedures, railways and, by 1889, had 30,000 defence volunteers. 23 sailors. Such ‘Training Ships’ (land or sea based), often sponsored by charitable institutions, were distinctly different from a naval cadetship as an officer, although some provided better training and prospects than others.48 Nevertheless, the main emphasis was on recruitment and such schemes exploited a time when many poorer families in Britain and the colonies had more interest in getting their children clothed and fed than providing them with educational and moral instruction.49 Notwithstanding widespread knowledge of the hardships of a life at sea, popular naval and military publications of the time aimed to promote the view that boys could be safely trusted to the care of the British Admiralty.50 Ultimately, the reality was that many of the boys and their parents had few options. In addition, as naval and social historian Michael Lewis observed, the British Admiralty ‘came to the perfectly correct conclusion that the whole voluntary system was best served by boys who, starting young, grew up in the ways of the Service’.51 Thus, RN officers serving as local naval commandants would have considered any initiatives aimed at training local boys for the colonial naval brigades from this British Admiralty standpoint.

Although local conditions were decidedly different from those surrounding the RN, mostly because colonial naval commandants could not call on the services of a large fleet for training purposes, aspects of the naval and sea cadet movement in Britain were very influential in the genesis of the equivalent movement in Australia. In this regard, the principle of ‘growing’ sailors from an early age was, as Lewis observed, endorsed by a British Admiralty that recognised the benefits of identifying, nurturing and sustaining the process of encouraging boys to join the navy through benevolent societies.52 In addition, considering junior sailor recruitment at a broader level, Lewis expressed the view that this move to developing a young volunteer naval force was the beginning of modern personnel management in the RN.53 Hence, at a much more practical level, local naval commandants would have been aware that the transition from the era of the ‘press gang’ to developing and

48 D McLean, Education and Empire: naval tradition and England’s elite schooling, British Academic Press, London, 1999, pp 24-30. 49 ibid. 50 Navy and Army Illustrated, vol. VI, Hudson and Kearns, London, 18 June 1898, pp 309–310. 51 M Lewis, The navy in transition, 1814-1864: a social history, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1965, pp. 176- 177. 52 Lewis, The navy in transition, pp. 176-177; R Pietsch, ‘Urchins for the sea: The story of the Marine Society in the Seven Years War’, Journal of Maritime History, vol. 2, no. 1, 2000, pp.64-83. 53 Lewis, The navy in transition, pp. 176-177. 24 supporting voluntary pre-entry training schemes was permanent.54 Thus, the manner in which the RN managed their recruitment needs, with a plethora of British reformatory ships, naval schools and training ships, would have been the very system that Australian colonial naval commandants regarded as normal and applicable, in some form, for adaptation to local requirements. In Britain, such part-time voluntary pre-entry voluntary schemes were organised by long-standing powerful sponsors.

Although there were many ‘nurseries for the sea’ in Britain, the scheme that most influenced the Australian naval and sea cadet movement was the type of nautical training scheme pioneered by the Marine Society, founded by Jonas Hanway in the 18th Century.55 This was the first recorded non-state institution to provide nautical-based training for boys from the general community. Through its prominence, the Hanway model evolved as a benchmark for determining the exact nature of the various nautically-based youth schemes that were launched in the Australian colonies. In particular, the concept of a principal sponsor, exemplified by Hanway as the founder of the Marine Society, and his purpose in launching a community-based sea cadet scheme, became central to the fortunes of the movement in Australia. In this regard, British schemes were essentially philanthropic and this was an important element that transferred to the colonial experience. In Britain, boys accepted into charitable schemes, such as that sponsored by the Marine Society, were generally from a disadvantaged background, but were accepted voluntarily without a formal judicial order in relation to crime, neglect or other abuse. Hence, there was, technically nothing preventing them from moving on, unlike boys committed to reformatory schools and ships.56 The Hanway model was just one of many, but it is important because it most closely approximated the charitable schemes that sprang up in Australia after Federation and later it was the model, already adopted in Britain, used by the Navy League for its sea cadet corps when it was established in Australia in 1920.57 In colonial Australia, however, no such truly

54 ibid.; JA Simpson & ESC Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford,1989, p. 417. Recruitment into the military, especially the RN, by coercive means was known as being ‘pressed into service’. This was achieved by groups of men employed for the purpose and grouped into what became known as ‘press gangs’. This process and the gangs became widely known and the associated terms became common usage. 55 JS Taylor, Jonas Hanway: Founder of the Marine Society Charity and Policy in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Scholar Press, London, 1985, pp. 1-10. 56 Lewis, The navy in transition, p. 33. 57 The Navy League Journal, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 15. 25 philanthropic nautical schemes existed and the recruitment of part-time naval cadets was, ultimately, left to local naval commandants.

Possibly because there was no uniform British system to follow, the recruitment of part-time naval cadets in the colonies was not only approached in different ways, but was spread over the entire pre-Federation development period of the naval brigades, from 1860 to 1900. Exactly how much this disjointed approach was exacerbated by the creation of British inspired cadet ‘schemes’ to deal with juvenile delinquency is unclear. Nevertheless, it is clear that reformatory schemes were often more prominent in the minds of local administrators of the time and have since attracted significantly more historical attention.58 These were not part of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, however, and their right to be considered as legitimate training schemes for the navy was, eventually, specifically repudiated by defence planners.59 Nevertheless, such corrective schemes merit consideration because of their influence, particularly in the period 1860-1880, in confusing and delaying efforts to create volunteer training schemes of both defence-based naval brigade cadets and community-based sea cadets.

As an example of a typical nautical reformatory scheme, established long before the volunteer community-based sea cadets raised a unit at Snapper Island in Sydney Harbour in 1931, was the nautical training ship NSS Vernon, which was stationed by the New South Wales government on nearby Cockatoo Island, teaching trades such as tailoring, carpentry, shoe and sail making, as well as nautical skills such as compass, lead line, sail drill, reefing, splicing and rowing.60 Vernon remained at Cockatoo Island until 1890, when she was replaced by the much larger 3500 tonne Sobraon. Adding to the longer term confusion surrounding the naval and sea cadet movement, the Sobraon remained until 1911 when she was acquired by the RAN and served as the navy training ship HMAS Tingira until 1927.61 This series of events is an example of how similar, but competing, schemes conspired to

58 A Savige, ‘“Naughty”' Boys: the education of reformatory schoolboys at Lytton 1881-1889’, Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, vol. 15, no. 1, 1993, pp. 33-48. 59 Advertiser, 26 February 1906, p. 7. 60 S Ward, ‘Cockatoo Island: an historical account’, Naval Historical Review, vol. 24, no. 2, June 2003, pp 10- 14 61 MS Clark & J Clark, The Islands of Sydney Harbour, Simon & Shuster, East Roseville, 2000, pp. 155-168. 26 distract and confuse politicians, and other key people in positions to influence the navy, on the value of the naval and sea cadet movement. In addition, many of these potential supporters of the movement were more focused on solving significant social issues, than addressing the development needs of the average colonial boy or solving the navy’s future recruitment problems. The resulting confusion about the aims of the community-based sea cadet branch, when it achieved an identity, was long standing.

The enduring problem of charitable and corrective schemes, with nautical themes, that were confused with the emerging naval and sea cadet movement, contributed to its struggle to attain a single and defined identity and develop credibility alongside the army, and later, the air force cadet movements, which both enjoyed a far less complex genesis and development.62 In comparison, the negative influences on the naval and sea cadets were both strong and varied. In addition to the influences of co-location and juxtaposition of the various non-cadet naval schemes, the portrayal of nautical reformatory programs of the era as a positive aspect of colonial life gives some insight into why these juvenile detention schemes may have been confused with the voluntary Australian naval and sea cadet movement.63 As an example, it was reported that the reformatory ship Sobraon was so popular that ‘some boys committed crimes in order to join her company’.64 In contrast, British schemes were described as horrific with reports of mutiny, arson and murder.65 In addition, some colonial reform schemes were appeared benign and had an education base, as exemplified by the announcement, in 1865, of a ‘Naval Training Ship’ for neglected and criminal boys in the colony of Victoria.66 The Victorian Governor-in-Council established the scheme as an industrial school under ‘The Neglected and Criminal Children’s Act, 1864 ‘on board a Naval Training Ship in Hobson’s Bay’.67 Emphasising the educational as well as reformatory purposes of this schemes, it was announced that George Austin Woods was

62 Stockings, The Torch and the Sword, UNSW Press, pp. 6-35; BJ Videon, Air Training Corps : the first fifty years, Air Training Corps, East Bentleigh, 1991. 63 Ward, ‘Cockatoo Island: an historical account’, pp 10-14. 64 Sydney Training Depot Snapper Island: Maritime Museum Catalogue 2002, Sydney Training Depot (Snapper Island), Drummoyne, 2002. 65 S Jones, ‘Blood red roses, the supply of merchant seamen in the 19th-century’, The Mariners’ Mirror, vol. 58, no. 4, 1972, pp. 440. 66 Letter, Lord Clarence Paget to the Under Secretary of State to the Colonies, Victorian Government Gazette, Gazette 47, 9 May 1865, p.1051. 67 Victorian Government Gazette, Gazette 55, 23 May 1865, p. 1160. 27 appointed to ‘command the Naval Training Ship; and also to be Superintendent of an Industrial School on board’.68 Hence, in some cases, industrial schools, naval training ships and nautical reformatory schemes were often one and the same.69 In addition, some colonial schemes still followed the British practice of using rotting hulks as cheap juvenile detention centres.70 Thus, the long-long standing and deep-seated confusion surrounding reformatories and voluntary nautical training schemes in Britain flowed through to the colonies and left the emerging naval and sea cadet movement very much on the fringe of official and public attention.71

While the role of Australian reformatory ship schemes would eventually be clearly differentiated from naval and sea cadet activities by the Minister for Defence, Thomas Playford, the same cannot be said of the confusion about the role of community-based sea cadets, defence-based NRC and the full-time ‘enlisted’ cadets of the colonial and Australian navies.72 This continuing confusion occurred because the Australian naval and sea cadet movement developed alongside well publicised schemes for enlisting and training boys for full-time roles in the various Australian colonial navies. For example, not to be outdone by the RN and their offer of full-time cadetships for boys from the colonies, local administrators in Victoria established their own position for a naval cadet and, on 16 January 1861, the Argus newspaper in Melbourne, Victoria, listed the position of ‘Naval Cadet’ as attracting annual remuneration of £50 for service on board Steam Sloop Victoria.73 As a full-time paid appointment this role, and the appointee, did not form part of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, which was, possibly, evolving at the same time as part of the part-time Victorian naval brigade, and whose early members, if they existed, did not receive the same attention from the press. It is the degree of the anonymity of the colonial members of the colonial naval brigades that makes the possible true extent of their involvement such an interesting aspect of the genesis of the movement and makes their initial obscurity so relevant

68 ibid. 69 ibid., Gazette 68, 16 June 1865, p.1337. 70 N Richards & SK May, ‘South Australia's floating coffin: the diseased, the destitute, and derelict FitzJames (1852 - c. 1900)’, The Great Circle, vol. 25, no. 1, 2003, pp. 19-39. 71 Jones, ‘Blood red roses: the supply of merchant seamen in the 19th-century’, pp. 438-439. 72 Advertiser, 26 February 1906, p. 7. 73 Argus, 16 January 1861, Supplement. 28 for considering the long-term confusion between the aims of the separate branches of the movement that became so important after Federation.

In contrast to the public announcement of the appointment of a full-time naval cadet, an investigation of part-time defence naval cadet schemes in Victoria reveals the possibility of part-time cadets in the naval brigade, but the evidence is unclear. The public record reveals that, at the time of the enactment of the Victorian Naval Brigade Regulations, in 1860, there were already naval brigades at Williamstown and Sandridge with a combined membership of 215.74 Further exemplifying the confusion regarding the use of the term naval cadets, a press report of 28 November 1860 described this company of naval volunteers in Melbourne as being comprised of 250 naval cadets, when this report was in fact a reference to its adult members.75 Similarly, ‘boys’ have been reported as receiving training as part of the Victorian naval brigade in Warrnambool, Belfast and Portland as early as December 1862.76 In what is another uncertain account, however, the Financial Account Book for the naval brigade at Williamstown records the purchase of 134 meals for ‘Band Boys’, on 10 May 1862, but it is more likely that this was a rank, than concrete evidence that these were junior members of the brigade.77. Still earlier entries, from 23 March 1861, record a variety of band related expenses, but provide no information on the actual number of band members, their ages or membership status.78 It is significant that such unreliable accounts characterise the history of the movement, well into the twentieth century.

It is noteworthy in pursuing this evidence of part-time naval brigade cadets, that the Rules and Regulations of the Victoria Volunteer Naval Brigade contained no age restriction that would have prevented boys joining, with the only restriction on membership being a minimum height of five feet six inches, and even this restriction could be waived.79 Further illustrating the potential difficulty in identifying the exact start date for the enlistment of boys

74 Return of the Volunteer Corps in Victoria on the 1st December, 1860, printed by order of the Legislative Assembly, Argus, 8 February 1861. 75 Mercury, 28 November 1860, p. 2. 76 Jones, Australian Colonial Navies, p. 24. 77 Financial account book, Williamstown Naval Brigade, AWM 1, Item 2/1. 78 ibid. 79 Rules and Regulations for the Guidance of Members of the Victoria Volunteer Naval Brigade, Victorian Government Gazette, Gazette 149, 23 November 1860, pp. 2252-2253. 29 in the Victorian Naval Brigade, the Victorian Naval Forces Revised Regulations of 1890 stated that boys could be engaged in the Naval Brigade, but there were to be no more than two boys per division and they were to be aged 14 to 17 years.80 Some years later, the Victorian Naval Forces General Orders, 1899, required boys to be exercised in both day and night signals and to become thoroughly efficient.81 These conflicting fragments suggest that the term ‘naval cadet’ was ascribed to a range of positions, be they full-time, part-time, adult or boy, thus further obscuring the appointment of voluntary part-time naval cadets, if they were made. If boys in Victoria pioneered the Australian naval and sea cadet movement by their service in the naval brigade, I have not been able to uncover any evidence of their formal appointment or details of their service in terms of the definition developed for this thesis.

While part-time naval cadets could have been present in some form in Victoria from 1860, they were definitely in existence in New South Wales by 1863. The Maitland Mercury and Hunter River Advertiser reported, on 27 October 1863, that a naval brigade was to be formed in Newcastle and that Master George Whyte was to be made ‘a naval cadet of the brigade’. 82 It is clear, therefore, that in New South Wales, the Australian naval and sea cadet movement was officially formed no later than this date.83 Using the case of Master Whyte, it is possible to examine cadet service in the naval brigade more closely and consider the nature of these appointments in terms of the definition of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement. The key issue in determining the origins of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, overall or colony by colony, is how single cadets in naval brigades should be considered alongside the enrolment of boys in the separately formed naval cadet corps of the colonial Queensland Defence Force (Marine) in 1898.84.

Notwithstanding the limited information about naval cadet appointments from 1860 onwards, this one confirmed appointment to the Newcastle Naval Brigade can be used to test

80 Victorian Naval Forces – Revised Regulations under the Defence and Discipline Act 1890, NAA A1194, 20.20/6315, 81 Victorian Naval Forces, General Orders, 1899, HMVS ‘Cerberus’, 1 July, 1899, NAA A1194, 20.20/8789. 82 Maitland Mercury and Hunter River Advertiser, 27 October 1863, p. 3. 83 ibid. 84 Queensland Government Gazette, no. 136m, vol. LXX, 7 November 1898, p. 1147. 30 the definition, presented in the introduction to this thesis, of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement being ‘the combined assemblage of young people in Australia who met in navy-like uniform on an unpaid part-time basis to experience the training and traditions of the navy and the sea under uniformed adult supervision’. If this definition is applied, then Master George Whyte’s appointment to the Newcastle Naval Brigade can justifiably be considered to constitute a formal appointment to the Australian naval and sea cadet movement. Similarly, this definition would encompass naval brigade cadets in Victoria, if identified as being attached to the adult group. The acceptance of this type of appointment as being within the definition provides certainty to the genesis of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement in both New South Wales and Victoria, although the details are scant. In this way, the wider conception of the defence-based branch of the movement being comprised of part-time junior members of the adult force, which was sustained throughout its history, is anchored at its inception.

The search for the exact time and place of the origin of the part-time naval and sea cadet movement, while captivating, is less important than revealing how the original informal membership status of its pioneers was a likely contributor to its disjointed beginnings. In this regard, the long period between the announcement of Whyte’s appointment in New South Wales in 1863 and the first formal record of his successors in the 1880s is typical of both the movement’s fragmentary nature and its associated historical record.85 In this case, more than twenty years passed before formal recognition of New South Wales Naval Brigade cadets occurred, although occasional press reports confirm cadets and midshipmen attending major public events during this period.86 Although one of the defining characteristics of the history of the naval and sea cadet movement in Australia is its lack of continuity, even with the limited evidence, it is hard to imagine that all naval brigade cadets in New South Wales resigned, or were dismissed, and were not replaced, after the announcement of this single appointment in 1863, only to reappear two decades later. Similarly, despite the lack of

85 Colonial Times, 25 June 1839, p. 5; Mercury, 30 April 1921, p. 9; Outline of Australian naval history, RAN Education Service, Canberra, 1962, p. 8. In attempting to define and record part-time naval cadet service, it is noteworthy that historical assertions, and definitions, of colonial ‘naval’ activities remain similarly unresolved, with the service of the Tasmanian government schooner Eliza, launched on 1 August 1935 and initially commanded by Lieutenant Corbett, RN, generally ignored in histories of colonial navies and the Spitfire, in New South Wales, and Victoria, in Victoria, both government sloops launched 20 years later, regarded as the earliest colonial navy ships. 86 Sydney Morning Herald, 20 March 1879, p. 6. 31 evidence of naval cadet activity in Victoria from 1860 to 1880, it is clear that there was no legal impediment to their involvement, although evidence of band boys, and so on, cannot be accepted as proof that naval cadets, within the definition of the movement, actually existed.

While it is tempting to consider a declaration by the Victorian authorities, some 30 years later, that efforts to create a naval cadet corps, as had been done in New South Wales, would result in the first such corps in the colony, as dismissing any contention that the movement originated in Victoria, it really only serves to further confuse the issue.87 Overall, for both New South Wales and Victoria, the failure to formally acknowledge the existence of naval brigade cadets, in some form, is difficult to reconcile, but is not unusual, particularly in the context of the many press references to naval brigade activities with such limited, and vague, references to cadets. Ultimately, the lack of verifiable evidence of continuous service by part-time naval cadets in both colonies emphasises the tentative nature of historical assertions on the movement in this era, on all sides, at least up until the 1880s. This lack of evidence leaves the period 1860 to 1880 as one of the most conspicuous gaps in the history of the movement. Thus, it is highly pertinent that this gap is acknowledged and reflected in official RAN historical accounts of the adult naval brigade in this period.88

From 1880, much more is known of part-time naval cadets in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, but the evidence remains scattered except in the case of Queensland, where a fully documented and unit based scheme was introduced in 1898.89 In New South Wales, for example, Regulations under the ‘The Military and Naval Forces Regulations Act’, of 1882, for the colonial warship Wolverene, further illustrate that flexibility in recruitment remained a key part of the colonial approach to volunteer defence

87 Argus, 9 July 1886, p. 6 88 Royal Australian Navy, Outline of Australian naval history, RAN Education Service, Melbourne, 1955, p. 11; ibid., 1962 edition, p. 2; NA Lambert, Australia's naval inheritance: imperial maritime strategy and the 1880-1909, Maritime Studies Program, Department of Defence (Navy) Canberra, 1998, pp. 1- 2, 22; A brief history of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2013, viewed 20 August 2013, . Lambert, for example, describes the contemporary records of the colonial naval forces as ‘very incomplete’. 89 Queensland Government Gazette, no. 136m, vol. LXX, 7 November 1898, p. 1147.. 32 training and allowed the enrolment of cadets. 90 The ship was to be employed as a naval and gunnery training ship for all naval forces under the act and its control, drill and general management was to be as for the ‘Royal Naval Reserve while training on board any of her Majesty’s Drill Ships in Great Britain’.91 Notwithstanding this apparently rigorous model, any person or persons authorised in writing by the Colonial Secretary were permitted to undergo training in gunnery and small arms drill or other instruction, but not so as to interfere with the training of the naval forces. The ship’s complement provided for boys, any number not exceeding fifty, but the Regulations made no provision for pay, rations or other conditions of service for such boys. In addition, boys were not considered separately in regard to terms of engagement, uniforms and general orders and all official references were to officers and seamen.92 Under these arrangements, part-time boy service in the New South Wales colonial naval forces was legislated and the defence-based branch of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement in this colony was to be organised and controlled using defence personnel and resources. This was a significant development and pre-dated similar moves in Victoria and Queensland but, with such minimal information in the Regulations, the administration of organisation, control, personnel and funding of any defence-based naval cadets remains unclear.

In the colony of Victoria, in 1886, press reports confirm that it was the commencement of naval training on board Wolverene in New South Wales that prompted a number of citizens to urge the Minister for Defence and the Victorian Naval Commandant to establish a corps of naval cadets in Melbourne.93 It was suggested that this corps could be instructed in naval warfare by a drill instructor, who would be appointed by the government, to prepare them for entry to the Victorian colonial naval reserve. The naval volunteer corps in Sydney was referred to as being mainly composed of young men, but there was no specific mention of naval cadets.94 In the previous year, however, British George Tyron had described the colonial naval brigades as a ‘very useful auxiliary and very beneficial to those who joined’ and that the ‘cadet corps was very useful in training young

90 Supplement to the New South Wales Government Gazette, Colonial Secretary’s Office, Sydney, 20 June 1882. 91 ibid. 92 ibid. 93 Argus, 9 July 1886, p. 6. 94 ibid. 33 men’.95 While Tyron was quoted as commenting on naval matters, consistent definitional ‘errors’ in other newspaper accounts of this period makes the reference to cadets far too tenuous to be considered a reference to naval cadets or a confirmation of cadets being attached to the Victorian Naval Brigade prior to 1886. Furthermore, a report of Tyron’s inspection of the Victorian Naval Brigade, in November 1885, reveals that membership was steady at 250 and no mention was made of cadets being in attendance.96 Notwithstanding uncertainty about an existing part-time voluntary cadet corps, Tyron’s support and praise of local naval brigades and cadet corps, of any type, would have been seen as endorsing local action on establishing one.

In New South Wales, meanwhile, from 1885, the records of service of part-time naval brigade cadets provide indisputable evidence of the presence of members of the movement, but their status as officer cadets sustains the uncertainty about the status of this group. The New South Wales Army and Navy List of 1893 included three cadets and four midshipmen serving with the naval brigade in 1893.97 Their dates of commission ranged from 16 May 1885 for the most senior through to 16 March 1892 for the most junior cadet.98 As midshipman is a rank in the modern ANC, but also the RAN, the question arises again as to the exact status of these midshipmen and cadets in the New South Wales Naval Brigade. Just as the part-time Australian NRC, from 1907, were part of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve (RANR), but also part of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, it is arguable that these part-time naval brigade cadets were their colonial equivalent.99 On the other hand, it can be argued they were members of what was then the only colonial naval force in New

95 Argus, 17 January 1885, p. 10. 96 Argus, 10 November 1885, p. 5. 97 The New South Wales Army and Navy List 1893, Government Printer, Sydney, 1893. 98 ibid. 99 ‘PI Blackwell & the Royal Australian Naval Brigade, The Royal Australian Naval Brigade 1914-1920 (a brief history and nominal roll) compiled by P.I. Blackwell , PI Blackwell, Newport, 1996, pp. 1-8; ‘The Naval Reserves’, Outline of Australian naval history, RAN Education Service, Canberra, 1973, pp. 63-68; A brief history of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2013, viewed 20 August 2013, . Confusion about the long-term identity of the NRC is paralleled by confusion about the long-term identity of the adult naval reserve in Australia, as it assumed a multiplicity of roles assisting the permanent forces, as reflected in the RAN’s official contemporary historical perspective of the RANR and earlier historical summaries of the colonial and Australian naval reserves, from 1863. For this thesis, as with the use of the term NRC to refer to the various forms of the defence-based Naval Reserve Cadets, the term RANR is used as a general reference to the Australian naval reserve in all its many forms, except where specifically required (as when referring to commissions in the RANVR). 34

South Wales and that these cadets cannot therefore be classified as members of the movement.100

An examination of the records of the midshipmen and cadets of the New South Wales Naval Brigade, who served with the naval contingent that deployed to the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900, clarifies the issue of their membership of the movement.101 A number of these cadets became prominent Australian naval officers and the Australian Dictionary of Biography recounts that Reginald Charles Creer and Herbert Victor Creer began their career as cadets in the New South Wales Naval Brigade in 1898, after completing their education at Sydney Boys’ High School.102 Although the Creer brothers’ service is not acknowledged in a way that confirms their status as members of the naval and sea cadet movement, their shipmate on the China deployment, Cadet LS Bracegirdle, decided to pursue a full-time naval career.103 The service of this cadet (as Rear-Admiral Leighton Seymour Bracegirdle) has been formally researched and published by the Australian War Memorial with his service during this period described as that of ‘a Cadet with the NSW Naval Brigade (a reserve force)’.104

From the official acknowledgment of the nature of his service, it can be accepted that Bracegirdle and his colleagues, and earlier members of the New South Wales Naval Brigade, were naval brigade cadets and members of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement as defined in this thesis. In addition, although more symbolically than historically significant, this conclusion supports the claim that William George Whyte of the Newcastle Naval Brigade, or any cadet that is subsequently discovered to have enlisted earlier as a naval brigade cadet, in New South Wales of Victoria, was the first member of the Australian naval

100 ibid. 101 The New South Wales Army and Navy List, 1900, Corrected to 15 October 1900, Government Printer, Sydney, 1900. These entries have considerable additional significance as they indicate that without any apparent change in official status, the first cadets of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement served overseas. 102 JP Fielding, 'Creer, Herbert Victor (1881 - 1969)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 8, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1981, pp 143-144. 103 The New South Wales Army and Navy List, 1899, Corrected to 30 September 1899, Government Printer, Sydney, 1899. 104 Australian War Memorial Display, Rear Admiral Leighton Seymour Bracegirdle, Canberra, viewed 26 February 2010. 35 and sea cadet movement. All such speculation, however, needs to be considered in the context of later assertions, arising during the establishment of the national defence-based NRC, after Federation, that the only defence-based naval cadet corps in existence by 1906 was in Queensland.105 Although this elongated, and fruitless, search for a comprehensive description of the origins of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, prior to 1898, provided little real clarity, it provides an important historical perspective for the longstanding contradictions about the genesis of the movement, which have continued into the twenty first century.106

If lack of, or contradictory, evidence leaves distinct uncertainty surrounding the genesis of naval brigade cadets in New South Wales and Victoria, and their credentials for membership of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, this is not the case in Queensland. The Queensland Defence Force (Marine) came into existence some decades after its New South Wales and Victorian equivalents when the Jervois Report, published in Brisbane on 31 August 1877, recommended the formation of a naval brigade of 110 officers and men for Brisbane, Rockhampton and Maryborough.107 As it transpired, it was 1885, before such a naval brigade was formed with 85 volunteers enrolled under the command of Lieutenant W Drake.108 Likewise, 12 years later, it was Drake who established the first ‘pure’ naval cadet units of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement under official naval organisation and control with the same personnel and funding processes as were provided to the adult force.109

The history of the Queensland Naval Cadet (QNC) corps, which is documented comprehensively in both the public record and the press reports of the day, shows that this component of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement pioneered the long standing model of part-time naval cadet units attached to the adult RANR. Thus, the Queensland colonial naval cadet corps was the first true forerunner of the NRC, in its 21st Century form,

105 Minute, Creswell, No 05/1125, 20 February 1906, NAA B168, 1902/131 PART 13. 106 Wilkins, Australian Naval Reserves: a brief history: 1859-2002, John M. Wilkins, East Doncaster, 2003 107 JS Robinson, Arms in the Service of Queensland 1859-1901, JS Robinson, Kedron, 1997. 108 Brisbane Courier, 21 January 1885, p. 4. 109 Letter, Drake to Chief Secretary, 15 Dec 1896, Queensland State Archives (QSA), 5384, 861771. 36 because its cadets were organised in a manner that was adopted by all Australian states after Federation and remained unchanged through to the modern era.110 Hence, as the model upon which all subsequent NRC units of the movement were based, the genesis of the QNC merits detailed examination.

Despite its eventual emergence, in 1898, as the first fully-formed unit of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, the QNC corps was conceived originally in a different form when, on 15 December 1896, the now Captain Walton Drake, as Acting Naval Commandant, Queensland Marine Defence Force, recommended the acquisition of a cadet training ship for reformatory purposes.111 In this case, Drake reported that he had received applications from boys and their parents for admission to the RN, and for service on board the Queensland gunboats, and he considered that naval training for boys, between the ages of 10 and 15 years, would prevent their ‘becoming a public danger by acquiring idle and objectionable habits’.112 Drake outlined a scheme, which he envisaged would accommodate 200 boys, to be supervised and supported by a staff of 14 full-time personnel and explained that the system adopted would be along the lines of naval training vessels in England ‘where it has been worked out to a state of perfection’.113 Drake had a corvette in mind, which would probably accommodate the number of boys envisaged but, if it was decided to increase the number, he was of the view that a hulk could be easily and economically fitted for the purpose.114 Drake saw this scheme not as a means of staffing the RN or the Queensland colonial navy, although he felt it could serve this purpose, but more as a strategy to remove ‘a danger to the social life of the colony’.115

While Drake was not successful with his proposal for a reformatory scheme, which would have been outside the scope of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, he continued campaigning for local naval training, this time involving volunteer naval cadets. In

110 FTG Dixon, The View From Where I Stand: Fifty Years of the Sea Cadet Corps in Queensland, FTG Dixon, Aspley, 2010. 111 Letter, Drake to Chief Secretary, 15 Dec 1896, QSA 5384, 861771.

37 his next submission, on 28 June 1897, he recommended a scheme for the provision of seamen for service in British ships and the formation of an Australian naval reserve.116 Under this new model, Drake expanded his original training ship scheme to include boys in a future Queensland volunteer naval cadet corps to be trained for service in British warships, colonial ships or doing shore duty with the naval brigade.117 This was the beginning of a formal initiative based on the view that maritime training for boys was a goal appropriate to the colony’s boys, from both a citizenship and navy recruiting point of view. There was vigorous parliamentary debate of the Drake proposal and, although opinions varied on the recruiting benefits, the social value in training boys in a nautical environment was broadly supported.118 In Queensland, the time and mood was right for action on creating a more formal system of training boys for a life at sea as part of the part-time naval brigade.

In contrast to its diverse and obscure antecedents in southern colonies, the Australian naval and sea cadet movement in Queensland was enacted under government legislation and with the full sponsorship of the Queensland Naval Forces. On 10 December 1898, the Deputy Governor directed it to be notified that he had ‘in pursuance of the provisions of “The Defence Acts”, 1884 to 1896’, approved the formation of ‘The Maryborough Naval Cadet Corps and ‘The Cairns Naval Cadet Corps’.119 Under an amended schedule for the Queensland Defence Force (Marine), naval cadet corps were added as a ‘Marine Force to be Established’ in the Southern and Northern Military Districts of Queensland.120 Each corps was to consist of two first-class petty officers, two second-class petty officers, and 46 cadets.’121 The intention to form these officially legislated defence-based naval cadet units in Queensland was publicly announced in the Brisbane Courier, on 24 February 1899, where it was reported that, although the boys had been selected, and the uniforms were ready, drill had not commenced owing to one of the principal instructors being ill. Nevertheless, it was suggested, if the Maryborough and Cairns corps were successful, that it was Captain Drake's

116 Letter, Drake to Chief Secretary, 28 June 1897, Queensland Maritime Museum (QMM) Pixley Papers (no series identifier). 117 ibid. 118 Brisbane Courier, 8 Nov 1899, p.6 119 Brisbane Courier, 14 November 1898, p. 4. In considering the lineage of the movement, it is arguable that the modern day TS Cairns and TS Maryborough could claim to be the founders of the ANC. 120 Queensland Government Gazette, vol. LXX, no. 136, 7 November 1898, p. 1147. 121 ibid. 38 intention to establish a third corps in Brisbane.122 In this regard, questions by members of the Queensland parliament on why naval cadet corps had been established first at Maryborough and Cairns, but not in Brisbane, prompted the Minister for Defence, James Dickson, to announce that no application has been made for a corps in Brisbane, otherwise one would have been formed.123 These politicians and their Brisbane constituents were no doubt appeased when, on 27 November 1899, the Brisbane Courier reported the formation of the ‘Brisbane Naval ’ with four first-class petty officers, four second-class petty officers and 92 cadets’.124 Thus, the voluntary part-time QNC had arrived in the capital of Queensland and their tenure as a fully-formed component of the naval and sea cadet movement was to be permanent, although the nature and continuity of the movement would ebb and flow.

The foundation and comparatively rapid growth of the QNC under the organisation and control of the Queensland Naval Commandant was unique. Notwithstanding the lack of a precedent in other colonies, the QNC quickly became a viable state-wide organisation with companies in Brisbane (2), Maryborough (1), Bundaberg (1), Rockhampton (1), Mackay (1) and Cairns (1).125 Nevertheless, there remained a lingering support for reformatory training ships in the colony, which the Defence Minister, Dickson, sought to dismiss with the argument that naval cadet corps had already been established at Maryborough and Cairns and, in view of the looming of Federation, it was inadvisable to interfere with this system. Furthermore, Dickson observed, the contention put forward in the parliament that boys from naval cadet schemes did not pursue a career at sea, arose from confusing the idea of naval cadet training ships with those established for reformatory purposes.126 Thus, even where it seemed that a sustainable training model had been established with the full support of the navy, the new naval cadet movement was subject to pressure, and resultant confusion, arising from supporters advocating other, non-volunteer, youth-based nautical schemes.

122 Brisbane Courier, 24 February 1899, p. 6. 123 Brisbane Courier, 8 November 1898, p. 6. 124 Queensland Government Gazette, vol. LXXII, no. 156, 22 November 1899, p. 1207; Brisbane Courier, 27 November 1899, p. 4. 125 HE Harrington, ‘The Harrington Papers’, Naval Historical Review, vol. 17, no. 4, 1996, pp. 19-28 126 Brisbane Courier, 8 November 1899, p. 6. 39

In addition to the significance of its structure as the first fully formed defence-based naval cadet organisation, there are several additional aspects of the genesis of the QNC that warrant further examination. Organisationally, the corps was not only fully aligned with the adult force, but was accorded the same formal acknowledgment of appointments, resignations and dismissals in the Government Gazette.127 Furthermore, unlike its southern colonial counterparts, the corps grew quickly in numbers and command structure when, on 14 March 1900, the size of the QNC was increased to 53 per company and it was announced that each company was to have one ‘Lieutenant Commanding’ and two ‘Sub–’, thus increasing the state-wide establishment of the QNC to 212.128 Hence, in a very short time, the QNC had developed into an integral part of the Queensland navy and when, on 30 April 1900, the Chief Secretary's Office announced the appointment of WR Creswell, as a Captain in the Queensland Defence Force (Marine), with effect from 1 May 1900, a fruitful association for the defence-based naval cadets was created. Under Creswell’s command, the QNC continued to grow and, even when the size of a cadet company was reduced to 51, in November 1900, the establishment of additional cadet units in Bundaberg, Rockhampton and Mackay meant that this Queensland corps had reached a total establishment of 357 personnel. In comparison, the total Queensland Defence Force (Marine) at this time numbered 1125 so that naval cadets comprised 31.7 percent of total naval personnel numbers in Queensland.129 In further recognition of their status, the QNC were provided with their own distinctly engraved ‘Q.N.C’ bayonets.130

At an official level, the significance of the newly created QNC is illustrated by the formal recognition they received from Creswell in Queensland naval defence plans.131 Significantly, in view of how the movement developed, Creswell’s early deliberations on the purpose of the part-time local naval cadets described the Australian naval and sea cadet movement as a dual, defence and community, organisation with quite different organisational

127 Queensland Government Gazette, no. 156, vol. LXXII, 22 November 1899, p. 1207. 128 Queensland Marine Defence Force, General Orders, 6 April 1900, QMM Pixley Papers. 129 Proclamation, ‘Detailed Establishments for Queensland Forces (Marine)’, 16 November 1900, QMM, Pixley Papers. 130 Martini-Enfield Mk II Artillery Carbine : Queensland Naval Cadets. Australian War Memorial Collection REL23054 , viewed 17 February 2009. 131 Report on Naval Defence, 1900, QSA, 5384, 861771. 40 and control structures, but still competing for navy personnel support and funding.132 In his plans for the Queensland navy, he described the naval cadets as more of an educational than a defence movement, but one that he thoroughly endorsed from an educational point of view. Furthermore, he considered the popularity of the movement as a sign that there was a need for a training ship for boys in the colony so that ‘many lads would thus have a good and honourable sea career open to them, who at present only swell the labour market’.133 It was at this point, as well, that Creswell formally introduced the term ‘volunteer naval cadets’, as he considered this type of naval cadet training as a pre-cursor to a sea career, and provided the first attempt at defining both the movement’s nature and purpose.134 These were the earliest indications that the defence-based naval cadets might play a greater role in crewing a home grown navy, especially if Creswell was involved in future planning for Australia’s naval defence.

Although the still somewhat disjointed defence-based naval cadets dominated the colonial period, there is evidence that at least one community-based unit was founded before 1901. Pioneering the popular model of community-based sea cadet units being founded by individual members of the community, a local yachtsman from Hunters Hill in Sydney, Harry Shelley, formed the Parramatta Naval Cadets, in 1900, without the involvement of the local naval brigade.135 The aim of this pioneering community-based sea cadet organisation was to train young people in the traditions of the sea and the British navy, and it was reported to have operated until the introduction of universal training in 1911, but little is known of its exact beginnings or activities.136 Fortunately, as appears to be the case with many such local community-based naval cadet initiatives, the Parramatta Naval Cadets’ activities later attracted further attention from the press and this foundation unit is further considered as part of a much broader consideration of the many community-based sea cadet units that emerged after Federation.137

132 ibid. 133 ibid. 134 ibid. 135 ‘Sydney’ Training Depot Snapper Island: Maritime Museum Catalogue 2002, Sydney Training Depot (Snapper Island), Drummoyne, 2002. 136 ibid. 137 Launceston Examiner, 31 December 1903, p. 7. 41

So, at the end of a forty year period of fragmented and erratic development, the colonial defence navies in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland had assumed and maintained full responsibility for the organisation, control, personnel and funding of their part-time naval cadet forces, in varying forms. Although structurally misaligned, and virtually unrecognised outside Queensland, these colonial defence-based naval cadets shared the one characteristic that would be sufficient to provide a basis for a national defence cadet organisation that would one day develop into the NRC. They were organised and controlled by their respective colonial navies and their identities were defined by this stewardship, which was longstanding in the case of New South Wales and Victoria, but quite recent in Queensland. This one certain aspect of the defence-based naval cadets identity may partly explain why the dual system that emerged was so resistant to change. As part of the legislated naval forces, the defence-based naval cadets became the standard against which the many and varied community-based sea cadet groups, established throughout the country after Federation, were considered when they approached the navy for assistance. For the next fifty years the navy would struggle with the concept of being pressed to be responsible for the organisation, control, personnel and funding of community-based units, when it had its own defence-based NRC corps to fulfil its essential seamanship training and recruiting needs for the RAN and RANR. The ensuing and sustained campaign by many community-based sea cadet organisations to get the same level of navy support that was provided automatically to the defence-based NRC created the dual structure, of part-time defence-based naval cadets within defence and part-time community-based sea cadets outside defence, which defined the movement for the next fifty years.

42

CHAPTER TWO

Duality Entrenched 1901-1910

At Federation, in 1901, the various colonial components of the naval and sea cadet movement had a low profile and a fragmented structure, as did the adult colonial defence forces.1 Before many years, however, this low profile would be lifted by the type of enthusiasm for supporting public events that would become synonymous with the movement, particularly the community-based branch.2 In a noteworthy example, in 1908, a great amount of publicity was given to members of the Ballarat Naval Cadet Corps when they marched, because defence authorities had refused to pay their rail fare, from Ballarat to Melbourne to participate in the festivities surrounding the visit of the (Great White) American fleet.3 Under the command of JH Adeney, the detachment marched in ‘complete field order’ and ‘every encampment’ was declared to be ‘as it would be in front of the enemy’.4 Adeney, the ‘tiny lieutenant’ as he was referred to in the press, was reported as saying that ‘it should be understood that the cadets placed no reliance on help, and could trust entirely to their own transport’.5 At the end of their march, Adeney’s cadets were met by the Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, the member for Ballarat, who joked that as the cadets had advanced so threateningly near to Melbourne there was nothing for him to do but capitulate.6 Presumably Deakin’s comments referred to the surrender of Melbourne and not to changing the ruling on refusing to pay for the cadets’ rail fares. Either way, this remote unit of community-based sea cadets, had successfully brought to the Prime Minister’s attention how they were supportive of defence activities and pressed their case for his (financial) support in the future. As the movement developed, both the defence-based and community-based branches would demonstrate such enthusiasm, but first a movement had to take shape.

At the beginning of the period 1901-10, the few existing part-time naval and sea cadet units needed influential champions if the movement was to become a significant part of the

1 R Norris, The Emergent Commonwealth Australian Federation: Expectations and Fulfilment 1889-1910, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1971, p. 109. 2 Argus, 29 August 1908, p. 19. 3 Sydney Morning Herald, 26 August, 1908, p. 9. 4 Argus, 29 August 1908, p. 19. 5 ibid. 6 ibid. 43 new Australian cadet movement, dominated by the existing army cadet organisation. Auspiciously for the movement, these champions appeared, at the beginning and the end of the decade, in the form of the first Commonwealth Director of Naval Forces, Captain WR Creswell, and the Queensland Naval Commandant, Captain JT Richardson. This chapter examines how Creswell planned to create a truly national defence-sponsored naval cadet corps, under navy control, while still supporting the increasing number of community-based sea cadet groups. The issues driving the divergent development of these two branches of the movement are considered, including the dominance of the army in the national cadet planning process, Creswell’s independent plans (for a combined junior and senior defence-based naval cadet organisation) and community-based suggestions for a national naval cadet scheme. The chapter concludes by scrutinising why proposals for the unification of the defence-based NRC and community-based sea cadets, championed by Richardson, were unsuccessful, and how the duality of the movement was thus confirmed, just when it appeared possible that a viable single entity, organised and controlled by the navy, might be formed.

During the period 1901-1910, Australia was subject to far reaching political, industrial and social changes, including Federation, the foundation of the Federal Labour Party, and the introduction of industrial arbitration, age and invalid pensions, and voting rights for non-indigenous women.7 After a long gestation period, the Commonwealth of Australia had begun on 1 January 1901 with Edmund Barton as the first Prime Minister and Queensland’s Sir James Dickson as Defence Minister.8 Notwithstanding the official proclamation of the new nation, and unlike how the declaration of independence formed the post-colonial United States of America, considerable British Colonial Office involvement in the Federation process ensured that the British influence in Australia, and in the individual states, remained strong.9 After Federation, many of the powers of the former colonies, exercised through the new state governments, were retained with the states keeping control of railways, education, land, social welfare and many other matters.10 In 1903, as part of the development of the maritime industry, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin began a campaign to

7 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, pp. 143-151. The Australian Labour Party changed its name to the Australian Labor Party in 1916 and the original spelling is used in this thesis in references to this political party up to time of that change being made. 8 J Reynolds, Edmund Barton, Bookman Press, Melbourne, 1979, pp. 136-191. 9 ibid., pp. 173-180. 10 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, p. 134. 44 bring maritime employment under the federal system, a policy he pursued throughout 1904.11 By 1906, an industrial agreement had been signed between the Australian Steamship Owners’ Federation and the Federated Seaman’s Union of Australasia and, in 1908, the union movement began the process of forming a maritime council.12 This was a dynamic period for maritime employment, in the merchant sector at least.

Against this background of political economic and social change, the Commonwealth of Australia assumed control of the naval and military forces of the states under section 69 of the Constitution, on 1 March 1901, when the navy consisted of, as Norris described it, a ‘few old and unseaworthy ships, gun and torpedo boats.13 Over the next fifteen years, this aging fleet was replaced by a battle cruiser, three light cruisers and three .14 There was to be considerable debate over Australia’s future naval and military defence role, however, before the first squadron of the Royal Australian Navy arrived at Sydney, on 4 October 1913, from British shipyards.15 The new Commonwealth government acted on its financial responsibility for defence finances immediately and, by July 1901, the new Minister of Defence, Sir John Forrest, was making it clear that he intended to keep a tight rein on the defence budget. He indicated that little more would be spent on defence than in the past and that the £800,000 available for the defence force, plus an additional £108,000 paid to Britain per annum for the RAN Auxiliary Squadron on station, would be used to fund a citizen soldier model similar to that of .16 In this regard, Crowley observes, the Defence Act of 1903 established little more than the principles that the forces should consist entirely of citizen soldiers and that there would be no overseas compulsory military service in wartime.17 In addition, the new parliament, especially its Labour members, was reluctant to commit itself to expensive military establishments.18 This was especially so since the Braddon

11 FK Crowley, ‘1901-1914’, FK Crowley (ed), A New History of Australia, William Heinemann, Melbourne, 1974, p. 281; Singleton Argus, 14 July 1904, p. 1. 12 Sydney Morning Herald, 17 September 1906, p. 6 & 15 July 1908, p. 10. 13 R Norris, The Emergent Commonwealth, p. 107. 14 ibid. 15 Crowley, '1901 -- 1914', pp. 291-295; D Stevens & J Reeve (eds), Southern trident : strategy, history and the rise of Australian naval power, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2001, p. 1. 16 Capricornian, 13 July 1901, p. 12. 17 Crowley, '1901-1914', p. 276. 18 ibid. 45

Clause forced the new Commonwealth to return at least three quarters of all custom duties, a key source of revenue, to the states until 1910.19

It did not take long, however, before international events, such as the rapid rise of as a world power with the defeat of the Russian navy and the growth of German naval power, forced concerns about local defence more to the forefront of the federal political agenda.20 In August 1908, while the Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, hosted the admirals of the US Pacific Fleet at a state banquet, and no doubt admired their sixteen white-painted battle ships, the population flocked to see this ‘Great White Fleet’ and wondered why there was no Australian navy providing an escort.21 Early in 1909, the Fisher government ordered three destroyers from the British government and in November of that year another Deakin government approved a new scheme of naval defence that would include an Australian unit of the Royal Navy eastern fleet.22

In the context of this wider post-Federation defence background, part-time defence service had immediately assumed some importance when, on 20 May 1901, the Labour party included ‘a citizen army’ as one of the five central planks of its political platform.23 By 1905, future Labour Prime Minister, Billy Hughes, was advocating compulsory instruction for men and boys in military and naval drill and supported the formation of an Australian National Defence League to advocate its introduction.24 The debate on the value of conscription and citizens forces continued throughout this period, with the Deakin government in favour of cadet training for boys.25 Consideration of the future of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, therefore, unfolded against a broader post-Federation discourse concerning the sharing of powers between the Commonwealth and the states, including the formation of a new Australian defence force. Thus, after Federation, efforts to create a national volunteer naval cadet corps were initiated within the wider ambit of Forrest’s efforts in introducing a

19 FG Clarke, Australia in a Nutshell: A narrative History, Rosenberg Publishing, Dural, 2003, p. 170; Launceston Examiner, 20 March 1900, p. 4. 20 Crowley, '1901-1914', p. 293. 21 ibid., p. 294; Sydney Morning Herald, 22 August 1908, p. 14. 22 Crowley, '1901-1914', p. 294. 23 Clark, The people make laws, 1888-1915, p. 198. 24 ibid., p. 294. 25 ibid., p. 296. 46

Defence Bill, in 1901, aimed primarily at avoiding extravagant expenditure through reliance on citizen soldiers.26 This first Defence Bill has been described as a ‘hotch-potch of State Acts designed chiefly to amalgamate the existing systems’.27 Economy remained the main goal and the first General Officer Commanding the Commonwealth Military Forces, Major- General Sir Edward Hutton, struggled to implement the reforms he planned for the new federal force under constant curbing of defence expenditure.28 For the part-time defence- based naval cadets, and emerging community-based sea cadets, the disparate and disjointed nature of the movement up to 1900 was going to be a significant impediment to their participation in the amalgamation of the existing state structures and the creation of a single national corps, particularly in such an austere defence planning environment.

Prior to Federation, each colony had controlled its own defence forces, and the naval brigade cadets in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland had been under the direct control of the colonial navies.29 Thus, the future of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement was always going to depend on the support of the state naval commandants, who were charged with forming the Australian navy at Federation. In their ‘Report of the Conference of Naval Officers’, held in Melbourne in 1901, Captains Creswell, Collins and Hixson, along with Commanders Drake and Tickell, outlined an overall scheme for an Australian navy.30 Ultimately, it was Creswell who was entrusted with making the submission to the government and, in September 1901, he presented his case for local naval defence of the colonies, in which he included the key role that cadets might play in capitalising on his vision of 'the nation's genius for sea enterprise’.31 In pursuit of this aim, Creswell recommended that boys of approved character should be trained and given the opportunity to pursue a sea career, with a selected number to be enrolled in the navy and the remainder in the merchant marine.32 These ideas were then further developed, in a submission to the Senate, on 7 February 1902, where he included provision for a ‘Cadet

26 Norris, The Emergent Commonwealth, p. 122. 27 ibid. 28 ibid, pp. 123-128 29 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, p. 128 30 Commonwealth of Australia, The Senate, Report of the Conference of Naval Officers assembled at Melbourne Victoria to consider the question of Naval Defence for Australia, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1901, p. 6. NAA A1194 45, 30/27778. 31 GL Macandie, The genesis of the Royal Australian Navy: a compilation, Government Printer, Sydney 1949, pp. 303-307. 32 ibid. 47

System’ and a local training ship or ships for Australian boys.33 It appeared that Creswell’s experience of the defence-based naval cadets in Queensland had done a lot to overcome the potential negative impact of the relative anonymity of the movement elsewhere.

The first part of the development process that Creswell considered was the combining of the remnants of the colonial defence-sponsored naval brigade cadets, of which little was officially known. There had been limited official reporting of naval cadet activities prior to Federation upon which advocates could build impetus for retaining and growing what had been thus far achieved. As an example, in the ‘Annual Reports of Naval Commandants’ for the period 1902-03, Creswell provided the only report on naval cadets, although it was very positive.34 Confirming the uncertainty of service by individual boys, and their adult counterparts, in colonial naval brigades, reports from other states exposed systemic organisational problems and in some cases, such as in South Australia, a significant number of discharges due to poor attendance.35 Nevertheless, important broader developments began to unfold on 27 May 1902, when Creswell and Tickell submitted to the Secretary of the Department of Defence, former naval officer RH Muirhead Collins, a plan for the federal organisation of the permanent naval forces and the partially paid (part-time) naval forces. 36 The basic aim was to bring all Commonwealth naval forces under one command, with one system of training, and recommendations included the unification of the state based volunteer naval brigade cadets as part of an Australian navy manned by locally trained personnel.37

As Creswell was strongly influenced by his experience of the Queensland naval cadet system, referring to both its system of organisation and its training successes in his plan for a national part-time naval cadet scheme, his views on this one fully formed pre-Federation defence-based cadet organisation provide useful background to what followed. In his report as Commandant of the Queensland Naval Force, submitted on 4 September 1903, Creswell

33 Report by Captain Creswell on the best method of employing Australian Seamen in the defence of commerce and ports, Government Printer, Victoria, 1902, NAA A1194, 45.30/27778. 34 Annual Reports of Naval Commandants for year 1902-03, NAA B168, 11903/4450. 35 B Nicholls, Statesmen & Sailors: A History of Australian Maritime Defence 1870-1920, B Nicholls, Balmain, 1995, p. 78. 36 Letter, Creswell to Secretary, Department of Defence, 27 May 1902, NAA B168, 1902/2441 PART 22. 37 ibid. 48 included a separate section on cadets in which he declared that ‘the corps of volunteer cadets have been in every way a success’, where boys of fifteen to eighteen years of age had ‘joined with readiness’ and ‘made considerable progress’.38 As a practical example, Creswell described how a party of naval cadets training in Mackay, in the north of the state, had ‘conducted their drills well, made very good shooting and proved themselves to be excellent material for a naval force’.39 For these reasons, Creswell observed, there could be no better investment in defence than the funds invested on these corps and, noting that the cadets received no pay and were supplied only with uniforms and equipment, he suggested that a corps of 500 could be raised in Queensland alone. 40

Thus, Creswell’s early vision for the defence-based naval cadets was positive and surprisingly expansive, given that it had to be presented within an atmosphere of defence frugality.41 In support of his case for an expanded national voluntary part-time naval cadet corps, Creswell pointed out that the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Fanshawe, had inspected the Brisbane naval cadets on 15 August 1903 and praised them and the system under which the corps was raised. He expressed concern, therefore, regarding the decline of the QNC, which had 380 members on 30 June 1901, but had been reduced to 297 in 1902 and 206 in 1903.42 Creswell’s concern about the potential demise of the QNC further illustrates his need to counteract the limited official profile of the part-time naval cadets, particularly in a defence planning scenario dominated by the value of the citizen soldier. The naval cadet corps, and the navy, needed significant political backing if they were to get funding and official support for the expensive business of acquiring ships and training boys for future careers in an Australian navy.

Auspiciously, during this crucial period, a significant role in the development of the Australian navy, and its hitherto unrecognised part-time naval cadets, was played by the

38 Report by Captain WR Creswell on the Queensland Naval Force 1902/3, 4 September 1903, NAA B168, 11903/4450. 39 ibid. 40 ibid. 41 ibid. 42 ibid. 49

Minister for Defence in the Deakin government, Austin Chapman.43 Specifically, on 31 December 1903, Chapman identified the need to improve the situation of the naval cadets, such as they existed in various states according to their pre-Federation systems, and remarked that the limited development and recognition of the naval cadet movement was linked to chronic under resourcing of the adult naval brigades with which they were associated. Chapman was astonished to find that the adult naval forces in New South Wales had not had a vessel of any kind suitable for training afloat for some time. For the most part, he observed, they had been training ashore, with occasional boat drills in small craft, such as cutters and whalers. Chapman was adamant that the naval forces of the commonwealth were not going to be wiped out as the result of the current naval agreement with Britain. On the contrary, he declared, such naval forces were to be strengthened and the system of training improved. In particular, it had been suggested to him that there should be more training for boys, an idea of which he approved. On this subject, Chapman explained, there would be two distinct classes of boys. One would be boys taken on permanently, just as they were in the RN, but he also hoped to institute a federal volunteer cadet force, consisting of school boys, and those who had recently left school, who would be trained in much the same way as the members of the state-based naval brigades.44 Chapman, it seemed, considered himself to be pioneering the defence component of the movement, in New South Wales at least.

To provide an adequate system of naval cadet training, Chapman contended, there was to be a drill ship maintained as part of the Australian Auxiliary Squadron and he envisaged an arrangement where members of the naval forces, cadets and all, would be given an opportunity to receive periodical instruction on board one or other of the vessels of the squadron. Announcing Sydney as the ‘natural naval headquarters of the Commonwealth’, where he hoped to be able to do a great deal of work, Chapman commented that he had found that there was a very efficient naval cadet corps in Queensland and he hoped to see a similar corps of 1000 naval cadets established in New South Wales. On this subject, he remarked, he had heard a great deal about the community-based Parramatta River naval cadets, organised by Mr Shelley, which had survived Federation, and he was going to take an early opportunity

43 Launceston Examiner, 31 December 1903, p.7. 44 ibid. 50 to see them at work.45 In regard to other training schemes, Chapman expressed his support for military cadets and rifle clubs and declared that, using his powers under the Defence Act, he intended to appoint committees of the most competent men in each branch of the naval and military forces to report on these matters.46 Moreover, as part of this process, Chapman remarked, he had already advised the Australian Senate of his intention to ‘offer naval cadets similar advantages to those given to military cadets’ (army).47 With this high level of political support, the fledgling part-time naval cadets, it seemed, were to be part of broader defence plans, possibly including the community-based naval cadet unit at Parramatta.

As part of the overall naval defence development process, navy administrators had made tentative plans to include a naval cadet component under the new federal naval framework and, with growing support from Chapman, it seemed that these plans might come to fruition. In Brisbane, on 30 November 1903, Queensland Naval Commandant, Creswell, and Commander of the Victorian Naval Forces, WJ Coloquhoun, met to draft Regulations under the Defence Act for the unification of the naval defence forces of the different states. Creswell planned that ‘the cadet system which has been established with such success in Brisbane will be extended to the other States, and provision will be made for utilising their services when they have completed their cadetship’.48 Subsequently, defence policy on naval cadets was officially legislated under the Defence Act 1903-1904. The Act and Regulations provided for the Commonwealth of Australia to establish and maintain naval and military (army) cadets consisting of boys over twelve years of age who were attending school, or youths between fourteen and nineteen years of age who were not attending school. Such cadet corps made up of youths not attending school would be called Senior Cadet Corps.49 Under the Act and Regulations, such cadets could be issued with arms and ammunition, but they would not be liable for active service. Officers and non-commissioned officers of cadet corps could be appointed as prescribed without regard to the age limits set for cadets. 50 With

45 Sydney Morning Herald, 4 September 1926, p. 13. As with so many community-based units, Shelley’s unit survived independently until the beginning of World War I, at which point it was disbanded. Shelley later threw his support behind the Navy League and its cadet corps. 46 Launceston Examiner, 31 December 1903, p. 7. 47 Adelaide Advertiser, 23 November 1903, p. 5. 48 Extract, Brisbane Courier, 30 November 1903, NAA B168, 1902/748 Part 1. 49 Defence Act 1903-1904–Regulations and Standing Orders for the Naval Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia, NAA A1194/1, 20.20/32558. 50 ibid. 51 the announcement of the appointment of Creswell as national Naval Director, in December 1904, the future of the defence-based naval cadets appeared assured, with only the details of organisation, control, personnel and funding to be decided.51

As it transpired, from an organisational and administrative point of view, the new defence legislation of 1903 made only limited provision for the organisation of defence-based naval cadets and did not address in any way the issue of bringing community-based sea cadets under the Act. The Defence Act stated, in Section 62(6), that all military (army) cadet corps were under the orders of the district commandant, but did not make specific provision for a separate command structure for the defence-based branch of the naval cadet movement, such as had existed in colonial Queensland. Nevertheless, the Act did provide, in Section 4, for state naval commandants to be responsible to the Naval Board for the command and discipline of their respective divisions of the naval forces, of which naval cadets would be a part. In this regard, there were definitions provided of what constituted naval cadet service and provision was made for the writing of naval cadet Regulations.52 As such, under Part 11 of the Act, Regulations could be made for the maintenance, control, regulation and training of cadet corps and, in Part 3 of these Regulations, pertaining to the naval militia and volunteers, there was provision for entry and promotion of seamen, stokers and boys.53 Thus, some aspects of the system whereby naval brigade cadets in New South Wales and Victoria were administered as an integral part of the adult force might be used in preference to the Queensland system of separately formed naval cadet units. Whichever model was used, under these new legislative provisions, a dual system for the naval and sea cadet movement was entrenched, as the defence-based branch would continue to be organised and controlled under the Defence Act, while the few existing community-based sea cadet groups had not been included and were yet to be considered in any way by the navy. In addition, the further alignment of the defence-based naval cadets with the adult force was reinforced by the decision to acknowledge service in a Senior Cadet Corps, in an application for appointment as a full-time naval officer for example, on the same basis as service by adult sailors.54

51 Brisbane Courier, 20 December 1904, p. 5. 52 ibid. 53 ibid. 54 ibid. 52

Meanwhile, in contrast to the legislative framework provided for the defence-based naval cadets, individual and institutional sponsors were forming community-based sea cadet groups, in an unregulated manner, in various parts of Australia, and remained completely independent of the navy. At this point, although it was an individual, Harry Shelley, who had introduced the concept of a community-based sea cadet unit in Sydney 1900, it was an institution, the Boys’ Brigade, which began to popularise this aspect of the movement, particularly in Melbourne. A church-based philanthropic organisation, the Boys Brigade formed its first ‘military style’ Australian units in Sydney in 1882, but it was in Melbourne that it became the first large institution to become involved in the Australian naval and sea cadet movement through its ‘naval style’ offshoot, the Boys’ Naval Brigade.55 Although only a small component of its parent organisation, the Boys’ Naval Brigade progressively established many units, involving thousands of boys learning basic seamanship, as an adjunct to the bible class activities of the Boys’ Brigade movement. The first Boys’ Naval Brigade was established by Warrant Officer Robert Kearns, of the Williamstown Naval Depot, in 1901-02 in conjunction with the St Andrews Sunday School and, over the next four years, further companies were formed around Melbourne and in Ballarat.56

While defence-based naval cadets were given an identity as members of the Australian Navy, the rapidly expanding community-based sea cadet branch remained independent and outside of the control of the navy, although its units were already being assisted informally by navy personnel, such as Kearns, with the full knowledge of the naval authorities. 57 Notwithstanding the close relationship created by the provision of such informal support, an initial opportunity to create an all encompassing and combined defence- based and community-based Australian naval and sea cadet movement was missed when future recognition of these fledgling community-based groups was not provided for under the Defence Act. It is possible, to some degree, to account for this missed opportunity by simply noting the very short time that the community-based sea cadets had existed (three years)

55 Hoare, Boys, Urchins, Men, p. 49. Although the two organisations were unrelated, the use of the words ‘naval brigade’ by various colonial naval brigades and by the Boys’ Naval Brigade contributed still further to the already confused identity of the naval and sea cadets. 56 ibid. 57 Minute, Creswell to Naval Board, 13 June 1910, NAA MP178/2, 2129/4/16. 53 compared to the defence-based naval cadets (up to 40 years). In addition, with such an uncertain and obscure identity, it is arguable that the ready acceptance of the duality of the movement suggests some early measure of ‘split’ thinking based on the training of the newly legislated part-time defence-based naval cadets being exclusively in seamanship, in preparation for a sea career, while community-based sea cadet training had a strong citizenship, and moral, focus. As the community-based branch expanded (soon to substantially outnumber the defence-based naval cadets) and sought more substantial navy support for their activities, these differences became clearer and the dual system solidified. It is significant that this duality remains generally unrecognised in the public record, with the Australian War Memorial, as a contemporary example, still considering the Boys’ Naval Brigade to have been a formed unit of the Victorian Navy.58

The Victorian community-based branch grew very rapidly and, by 1907, it was reported that there were 1350 boys and non-commissioned officers and 120 officers in 39 companies in the Boys’ Naval Brigade in Victoria, although both the Boys’ Brigade and its defence-based naval counterpart were declining or static in the other states.59 Furthermore, in Victoria in the period 1907-10, these early community-based units flourished and public comment and reporting on the activities of the various Boys’ Naval Brigades was extensive.60 The public record in this era shows a diverse range of community-based sea cadet units receiving some level of defence support in Victoria during this period, but the Boys’ Naval Brigade was the most prominent and best exemplified the nature of the community-based branch of the movement at the time.61 The Melbourne Boys’ Naval Brigade Battalion, for example, which had been formed in 1907, reached its maximum strength by 1909 but had ‘collapsed’ by 1914, yet it was a significant part of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement during this period.62 Although raised as a ‘Boys’ Naval Brigade’, the activities of this organisation encompassed much more than learning seamanship and are indicative of the broader mandate of such sponsor organisations, which included many church and philanthropic groups. This was consistent with the Boys’ Brigade’s British foundations

58 Sennet hat : Boys' Naval Brigade, Victorian Navy. Australian War Memorial Collection REL28316. , accessed 17 February 2009. 59 Hoare, Boys, Urchins, Men, pp. 50-51. 60 File Registers, Boys Brigades – Miscellaneous, 1906 – 1912, NAA B414, 330/1. 61 ibid. 62 Hoare, Boys, Urchins, Men, p. 12. 54 where, by the end of the 1890s, 50,000 members were reported to be ‘serving’ in every protestant denomination as well as in groups such as the Church Lads’ Brigade, Boys’ Life Brigade and the Catholic Boys’ Brigade.63

Despite their sectarian and recreational focus, there was a practical component of community-based sea cadet activities in the decade after Federation that involved a focus on seamanship training to prepare the boys for naval service.64 Consideration of this aspect of naval and sea cadet training in this formative era provides an important insight into efforts by the earliest organisers of the movement to promote navy recognition of their efforts, particularly in the lead up to the formation of a national naval cadet corps. In this regard, a Boys’ Naval Brigade training camp, in early 1904, illustrates both the role played by sea training and early efforts to elicit navy more substantial navy support.65 As an early example of the style and substance of these activities and how they already involved the navy, the Melbourne Argus reported, on 20 February 1904, that 120 boys of the Williamstown and St Kilda companies of the Boys’ Naval Brigade had arrived safely at Swan Island by the steamer Vulcan. They were to go into camp on the following Monday and Chief Gunner Kearns of the Victorian Navy was to be their instructor. To be sure that their work did not go unnoticed, the brigade invited the Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, to observe their training, and the Earl of Jersey, a former Governor of New South Wales, to be the inspecting officer. In addition, these dignitaries were accompanied by Captain Creswell, who was reported as taking a ‘lively interest in the brigade’s welfare’.66

As a result of Deakin’s visit, the Minister for Defence, Thomas Playford, also decided to observe the activities of these ‘junior naval cadets’ at Swan Island and was reported as saying ‘it was probable that some practical steps will be speedily taken to forward the movement’.67 In further comments on what he saw, Playford spoke to the press about the concept of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, its alignment with military (army)

63 ibid., p. 24. 64 Minute, Minister of State for Defence to the Prime Minister, 15 March 1902, NAA B168, 1902/748 Part 1. 65 Argus, 25 March1904, p. 6. 66 Argus, 20 February 1904, p. 19 66 Mercury, 3 January 1906, p. 3. 67 Adelaide Advertiser, 26 February 1906, p. 7. 55 cadets and its distinctly different role from that of ‘training ships for reformatory boys’.68 On the issue of reformatory ships, he made the distinction between their ‘inmates’ and the volunteer naval and sea cadet movement very clear by stating emphatically that ‘we don’t want reformatory boys for our cadet corps, but reputable lads, so anything we did would have no relation to reformatory boys’.69 Thus, although the recreational aspects of their activities were well recognised, the positive aspect of being potential navy volunteers provided the community-based sea cadets with a profile that provided at least some alignment with their defence-based counterparts. This perceived alignment, and further potential confusion, was made more likely by the sharing of facilities like Swan Island, and the attendance of the same naval personnel such as Chief Gunner Kearns, as the nucleus for later defence-based naval militia and cadet mobilisation training, although this training was in no way recreational.70

These snippets, selected from a plethora of similar articles, provide an insight into the nature of Boys’ Naval Brigade activities and clearly illustrate an early focus on garnering official recognition, as well as confirming the positive view of the movement at a political and vice-regal level. The significance and success of such lobbying efforts is reflected in subsequent plans by Creswell, in late 1905, to install the community-based arm of the movement, as exemplified by the Boys’ Naval Brigade, along with the defence-based naval cadets, as a fully united navy cadet movement administered by the navy.71 For their part, Boys’ Naval Brigade organisers were willing participants in this process and submitted their own plans for an ‘Australian naval cadet scheme’, drawn up by a voluntary conference of their officers, to be used by Creswell as part of his formal submission on creating a combined movement.72 Notwithstanding the continuing legislative duality of the movement, involvement of the Boys’ Naval Brigade in the naval cadet planning process represented an opportunity for the fledgling dual system to be re-appraised – and potentially united under a single organisational umbrella.

68 ibid. 69 ibid. 70 Commonwealth Naval Forces of Victoria, Mobilisation Orders for Easter Training, 1909, NAA MP178/2, 2286/5/20. 71 Minute, Creswell, No 05/1125, 12 December 1905, NAA B168, 1902/131 PART 13. 72 Adelaide Advertiser, 5 February 1906, p. 5. 56

In addition to its engagement of government and defence officials, the Boys’ Naval Brigade was now in a rapid growth phase and its visible presence was firmly established in Melbourne, in relatively close proximity to national defence and navy headquarters.73 Furthermore, and notwithstanding that its ideological base was theological, not military or naval, the wider Boys’ Brigade organisation had shown itself to be more than willing to embrace a range of sponsors, and imbibe their values, if this meant provision of the facilities needed to train 14 to 21 year olds.74 Considered from a perspective of convenience, however, the Boys’ Naval Brigade’s engagement with the navy was only a small part of the wider Boys’ Brigade movement, which was driven by its creed of reverence, discipline, self-respect and Christian manliness.75 More specifically, this flexibility reveals that the Boys’ Naval Brigade, despite its name, was not a naval organisation per se and, given its broad and non- military aims, was an unlikely candidate to be merged with the defence-based NRC. Nevertheless, its organisers presented themselves as enthusiastic and had embraced the navy, up to a point, with 33 companies providing the necessary information to submit a formal report of their activities to Navy headquarters on 4 October 1908.76

The fluctuating fortunes of the Boys’ Naval Brigade was one of the earliest and clearest indications that the search for a single, over-arching controlling body for the Australian naval and sea cadet movement would be difficult, if not impossible. It illustrated clearly that, while the defence-based naval cadets, Parramatta River Naval Cadets and the many and diverse ‘Boys’ Naval Brigades’ can be correctly described as naval and sea cadets in terms of this thesis, they were divided, fundamentally, on issues of organisation, control, personnel and funding by the nature of their founding organisations.77 In this regard it is useful to consider that the army cadet movement had no such challenges, being well established in schools by 1890, with nearly 5,000 twelve-to-fourteen year old Victorian school children, for example, training in the school cadet corps and a further 10,100

73 Hoare, Boys, Urchins, Men, p. 12. 74 ibid., p. 27. 75 ibid., p. 23. 76 Registration booklets for correspondence files, multiple number series (Defence), NAA B414, WHOLE SERIES 77 The term ‘Boys’ Naval Brigade’ came to be synonymous with any community-based sea cadet unit, regardless of its affiliation status, such was the dominance of this organisation in this era. Naval cadet corps considered by the navy to be Boys’ Naval Brigades included the Brisbane Institute of Social Service Naval Cadets, Bowen House School Naval Cadets, the Legion of Scouts, Church Lads Brigades and the Australian Lads Infantry Brigade, NAA B414, 630/1/-. 57 instructed in compulsory military drill.78 Furthermore, this mostly school-based system of military, pseudo-military and youth development training characterised the army cadet movement throughout its history.79 For this thesis, the changing character of the community- based sea cadet branch of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, and how it made the overall movement unstable and difficult for the navy to understand (and impossible to control), is an essential underlying aspect of the examination of the movement’s long-term difficulties, particularly compared to the defence-based NRC.

The nature of the community side of the dual naval and sea cadet system may have been to some extent defined by the wider Boys’ Naval Brigade, as the pre-eminent community-based naval and sea cadet sponsor organisation of this period, but individual advocates soon started to appear. This phenomenon of the independent advocate would develop into a long-term source of annoyance for both the movement and the navy as more concerted attempts were made to work cooperatively. In this early example, on 9 November 1905, Ballarat community-based sea cadet organiser, JH Adeney, presented the Prime Minister, Deakin, who was also his local member of parliament, with a seven point plan for consideration at a forthcoming ‘Conference on the Cadet System’80. This plan provided for the enrolment of boys aged 15 to 18 years of age as part-time naval cadets for a period of three years, with their parents or guardians to be responsible for navy-supplied arms and uniforms, to be trained by instructors of the naval forces at naval drill sheds and, where possible, in gun boats. In support of his plan, Adeney pointed out that practical experience in Queensland and elsewhere had proven that such boys were keenly enthusiastic about naval work and, while no retainer was to be paid, he recommended that promising boys should be provided with the opportunity to join the Australian naval forces. For his scheme, Adeney envisaged a naval cadet brigade of 1000 boys allocated across Queensland (250), Victoria (250), (100), New South Wales (300) and Tasmania (100).81 While the 1000 was small compared to the projected initial army cadet membership of 20,000, soon to be expanded to 60,000, the proposal gives some insight into the broader level of community

78 GL Buxton, ‘1870-1890’, FK Crowley (ed), A New History of Australia, William Heinemann, Melbourne, 1974, p. 200. 79 Stockings, The Torch and the Sword, pp.1-2. 80 Letter, Adeney to Deakin, 9 November 1905, NAA B168, 1902/131 PART 13. 81 ibid., Adeney was from Ballarat and there was no explanation provided on why South Australia did not figure in his cadet plan 58 interest in the creation of a comparable national naval cadet scheme at the time and the type of support Creswell might receive for his plans.82 In addition, Adeney’s proposal provides a glimpse into the type of enthusiasm for assisting the navy, which would be more a bane than a boon for Creswell’s successors.

At an official level, based on his positive views of the pioneering defence-based naval cadet corps in Queensland, Creswell, as the first Australian Director of Naval Forces, had plans for a national naval and sea cadet scheme that were even more expansive than that of Adeney.83 In his first annual report in 1905, he devoted considerable attention to an overall system of naval training, and much of it related to cadets. After making detailed comments about the specialist nature of naval training, particularly compared to military (army) training, he provided a concise, but unequivocal, description of the system of naval cadet training that he thought needed to be put in place. Creswell recommended that a ‘young Cadet Corps’ should be exercised in boat work, while senior cadets should be taken to the sea in training ships, with boys who intended to make the sea their profession to be given one year’s training and then required to join the naval militia and do annual continuous training at sea.84 In his broad-based vision for the naval cadets, Creswell recommended that boys from coastal and fishing villages should be given the opportunity to join every branch of sea training, including marine engineering.

To accomplish his plans, Creswell envisaged Commonwealth training ships being technical marine schools as well as schools for gunnery training. In relation to the naval and sea cadet movement, Creswell planned that part-time cadets would be part of a larger naval training continuum, which would include school naval cadets, aged 13 to 16, senior cadets, aged 17 to 19, plus boys serving in training ships who would be trained for the merchant navy. The success of junior and senior cadet training in Queensland was considered as

82 Register, 4 December, 1905, p. 5. The Boys’ Naval Brigade is reported to have been established in Ballarat at this time and it is possible that the name was used in describing Adeney’s group, although the popularity of the movement also makes it possible that two units existed. The naval records for the Ballarat Naval Cadet Corps have been destroyed, but surviving correspondence registration booklets list the corps as separate from the Boys’ Naval Brigade. 83 Report by the Director of the Naval Forces on the Naval Defence of the Commonwealth of Australia for the Year 1905, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1 January 1906, NAA A1194, 20.15/6714. 84 ibid. 59 providing evidence of the merits of these proposals.85 Although Creswell did not specifically refer to existing community-based sea cadet groups in his recommendations, the potential formal involvement of boys from the age of 13 years, and in schools, suggested a broader base for the movement than might have been the case if the model was derived purely from the existing defence-based naval cadet corps. In addition, his reference to junior cadets encompassed the developing community-based sea cadet units, such as the Brisbane Social Service Institute, which he later considered for formal navy recognition.86 Although Creswell’s plan for training junior cadets was revised later on the basis that these younger boys would not be physically capable of undertaking navy boat work, his immediate plan included both defence-based naval cadets and community-based sea cadets in one scheme under navy control.87

As Creswell was developing his plans for a national naval cadet movement, separate plans were being developed for what was proposed as a combined navy and army movement. This formal process, initially planned as a combined naval and military activity, had commenced on 27 July 1904 with the publication of the ‘Cadet Forces of Australia (Scheme of Organisation)’, but this report of conference proceedings provided only for a military (army) system of cadets organised on Commonwealth lines.88 There was no mention of naval cadets and navy representatives were not involved in the development of this scheme. What resulted was a plan for army cadets as defined by the statement that the ‘whole of the existing Cadet Forces of the various States of the Commonwealth shall be embodied into one Military Service’, and it provided for instruction in military drill and rifle shooting for school boys, as well as other boys who might have left school’.89

Although Creswell was now developing a plan for a separate naval cadet corps, independently of the army driven process, he had not abandoned possible involvement in an

85 ibid. 86 Minute, Creswell to Richardson, 3 March 1910, NAA MP178/2, 2129/4/16. 87 Report by the Director of the Naval Forces on the Naval Defence of the Commonwealth of Australia for the Year 1905, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1 January 1906, NAA A1194, 20.15/6714. 88 Report of Conference Proceedings, Cadet Forces of Australia (Scheme of Organisation). Government Printer, Victoria, 27 July 1904, NAA A1194, 20.15/6718. 89 ibid. 60 inter-service initiative completely and attempted to develop a comprehensive Australian naval and sea cadet plan that considered all the options and issues. In doing so, he had specifically addressed the matter of the ‘Conference on a National Cadet System’ and conveyed to the Secretary of Defence, Muirhead Collins, on 12 December 1905, that ‘(u)nfortunately the Conference has been held in the interval without Naval representation, which, in a question of Defence, should surely have been included’.90 For his part, Collins had responded that the ‘Minister will be glad if the Director of Naval Forces will prepare and submit a draft scheme embodying regulations and estimate of cost for enrolment, & training of Naval Cadets’.91 Thus, having successfully drawn Collins’ attention to the oversight of not being consulted regarding a possible combined navy and army scheme, Creswell was now able to submit a draft naval cadet scheme, plus ‘Regulations for Boys’ Naval Brigades or Cadet Corps’ on 20 February 1906.92

As background to his formal cadet submission, Creswell provided an overview of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement. He observed that the only naval cadet corps still effectively maintained by Government by 1906 existed in Queensland, for youths of 15-18, and that the only other existing corps had been the result of private effort by Sunday Schools, leagues, and associations for the improvement of boys. For these latter groups, which he collectively referred to as ‘Boys’ Naval Brigades’, Creswell noted that naval dress and something of a naval character was an incentive to enrolment. In this way, practically by their own efforts, he observed, these Boys’ Naval Brigades had made considerable progress while being presided over by administrative systems best described as a union of committees. Under the circumstances, Creswell thought, it seemed better to involve the present committees, and all those interested in ‘Boys’ Naval Brigades’, to help further the wider movement and, for this reason, he had requested that representatives of these committees outline a scheme for more advanced training and a general expansion of the movement, which he had included as part of his submission. Notwithstanding, as Creswell pointed out, it had to be kept in mind that the main object of the committees of the Boys’ Naval Brigades was the moral improvement of the boys and that their better discipline and defence value to

90 Minute, Creswell, No 05/1125, 20 February 1906, NAA B168, 1902/131 PART 13. 91 ibid. 92 Minute, Creswell to the Minister of State for Defence, 20 February 1906, NAA B168, 1902/131 PART 13. 61 the Commonwealth were only ‘by products’.93 Thus, in his formal submission, by including material provided by the official Victorian Boys’ Naval Brigade organisers, Creswell appeared to be recommending a combined naval and sea cadet movement of both defence- based and community-based naval cadets, notwithstanding that one group was focused on seamanship and the other on citizenship.

As one of the most significant initiatives in the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, Creswell’s plan for a national naval cadet scheme merits special consideration. Highlighting both the community-based and defence-based aspects of his submission, Creswell emphasised that he had incorporated the proposals of both the representatives of the Boys’ Naval Brigades in Victoria and those of the ‘Conference on a National Cadet Scheme’.94 Furthermore, he emphasised that he had adopted the proposed rules of the national cadet scheme wherever they were applicable to the naval cadets. In a fully inclusive national scheme administered by the navy, Creswell proposed to raise 3500 Junior Cadets (12 - 15 years old), and 1000 Senior Cadets (15 - 19 years old), with the Senior Cadets to be managed on an equal footing with the naval militia, using the same organisation, officers, instructional staff, and so on. In the case of Junior Cadets, the provision of boats was still under consideration, but, for the present, the training boats of the naval forces were to be made available as far as possible. Further, Creswell focused on the economy of his scheme, declaring that ‘any movement of this kind must have before it a certain and definite end that will recoup the country’s expenditure’.95 In this regard, he argued that there was greater value in naval training over army training in economic terms. This was because adult citizen soldiers could be trained from any aspect of civilian life, but it was preferable that citizen sailors had some maritime background and this pre-training could be provided, partially, by the naval cadet scheme. In addition, he observed, while military (army) training and service had only a defence value, naval training had an additional value, of preparing trainees for merchant navy service.96

93 ibid. 94 ibid. 95 ibid. 96 ibid. 62

Creswell’s 1906 scheme had not just breadth, but depth. He planned that Junior Cadets would complete one period of ten days continuous training annually in a sea-going training ship or with boats from shore, while Senior Cadets would be attached to the naval forces for annual training. There was to be progression throughout to the level of ‘training seaman’, followed by enlistment in the navy or merchant marine.97 The proposed scheme also provided for effective use of resources, with training ships to be used for training cadets and adult seamen, as well as being used as naval technical schools for training naval and merchant marine officers in navigation, nautical astronomy and science, gunnery, surveying and practical marine engineering. Moreover, Creswell regarded the advantage of such schools to a ‘Maritime State’ as self-evident and he argued that the proposed cadet system needed real training ships if anything like an adequate return was to be gained from the investment.98 This was a plan for a numerically strong and fully integrated naval and sea cadet movement, which Creswell regarded as having significant implications for Australia’s naval defence and maritime affairs.

Ensuring that his vision was integrated with broader defence legislation and plans, Creswell’s draft Regulations were adopted from the Defence Act and he described in detail how naval cadet units would be formed and trained under these Regulations. The proposed new scheme made provision for both defence-based naval cadet units and community-based sea cadet units where the latter could be organised, as Creswell explained, by any ‘Church, Sunday School, School, League or District where facilities exist for boating exercise’.99 Elaborating on how the community would be involved, Creswell explained how applications for the formation of community-based detachments could be forwarded, through state naval commandants, for approval by the Governor General in Council, by three or more responsible persons acting as a ‘Managing Committee’ that could make a constitution governing the internal working of their own detachment. 100 Providing for significant defence control of the new scheme, in addition to the legislative content, Creswell adopted a number of clauses

97 ibid. 98 ibid. 99 ibid. 100 ibid. 63 from the Military Cadet Regulations in relation to how naval cadets would be managed at schools and in relation to their fitness, inspections and drill. 101

Annual funding for the Senior Cadet component of Creswell’s proposed 1906 scheme was, subject to parliamentary approval, to be a sum of one pound for each Senior Cadet that was ‘efficient’ in terms of their training regime. The money was to be used for supply and maintenance of uniforms, expenses incidental to musketry practices, drills, continuous training and the attendance by Senior Cadets at one weekly drill, from 8 pm to 9 pm, and one half day parade a month from 3.30 pm to 5.30 pm. Initially, a total budget for junior cadets of £2665 and for senior cadets of £1000 was forecast, to be broken down on a state by state basis. Creswell noted that the supply of rifles had to be considered, observing that there were 400 rifles in Queensland, which were used by the QNC, and that about 1200 or 1500 additional rifles would be required without delay. Uniforms and arms would be furnished to every naval volunteer cadet corps member on the basis that their parents or guardians signed a ‘Form of Agreement’ that their sons would serve for twelve months and they (the parent or guardian) would be held responsible for the good order and safe custody of all Government property.102 If this scheme was implemented, Australia would have a formally regulated naval cadet movement, which incorporated both defence-based and community-based branches, just five years after Federation.

In 1906, however, before his naval and sea cadet plan was implemented, Creswell was dispatched to investigate naval developments in Britain and the report he submitted upon his return, while it provided an overview of progress in full-time cadet training, did not address part-time naval cadet schemes in Britain or Australia.103 Nevertheless, based on his 1906 proposal, provision was made for a Junior Cadet Corps in the ‘Provisional Regulations for the Naval Cadet Corps’, which went before the Australian House of Representatives on 3 July 1907.104 In contrast to Creswell’s earlier work, this was not a complete plan for a well-

101 ibid. 102 Proposed Regulations, Naval Volunteer Cadet Corps, NAA B168, 1902/131 PART 13. 103 Report of the Director of the Naval Forces on his visit to England in 1906 to inquire into the latest naval developments, 21 September 1906, NAA A1194, 45.30/27776. n Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), no. 27, 3 July 1907, p. 23. 64 defined and comprehensive scheme for naval cadets.105 Significantly, the focus of the entire scheme had shifted, to ‘Senior Cadet Corps’ with possible ‘further extensions’.106 Somehow, the execution of the Creswell grand plan for a unified Australian naval and sea cadet movement had been revised on a much narrower basis. Thus, the details of his vision remain only as a tantalising reminder of what might have been achieved, if future Naval Boards had inherited such a comprehensive scheme for administering the organisation, control, personnel and funding of all naval and sea cadets units in Australia.

Although Creswell’s grand integrated scheme was not to be, a reduced national plan nonetheless went ahead with the defence-based naval cadets becoming the official national branch of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement. The new combined army-navy structure was made formal with the enrolment of the first cadets under the new Commonwealth scheme taking place in Melbourne on 14 March 1907.107 This coincided with the formation of the volunteer RANR of which it became a part.108 After 1907, the defence-based naval cadets were recognised progressively in official Commonwealth publications, but this scant reporting of limited progress reflected Creswell’s concerns about the dominance of the army. For example, in the Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No 1, 1901-1907, naval cadets were described briefly as being organised with the aim of embracing all branches of a seaman’s training, generally with instruction given voluntarily by members of the naval forces.109 In contrast, army cadet activities were described in much more detail, including accounts of attendance and training for every state. This evidence of growing disparity in the extent of reporting of navy and army cadet activities is a further illustration of the relative continuing official anonymity of the naval and sea cadets at this time, particularly when considered in the context of Creswell’s concerns about army cadet domination.110 Such inter-service competition was to be an enduring aspect of what became the combined ADFC movement, particularly as the community-based branch moved closer to official recognition in 1952.

105 ibid. 106 ibid. 107 Mercury, 14 Mar 1907, p. 5. 108 NS Pixley, ‘William Rooke Creswell’, Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, vol. 11, no. 1, 1979-80, p. 43. 109 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 1, 1908, p. 895. 110 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 2, 1909, p. 1078. 65

Notwithstanding the disappointment of the abandoned Creswell plan and a declining official presence, a positive aspect of the movement in the decade following Federation was its increasing popular profile, with substantial press reporting of activities involving both defence-based naval cadets and community-based sea cadets becoming common. As well as illustrating the type of support that helped the movement survive, these reports provide further insight into the public confusion about the nature of the movement, which contributed to its blurred identity. As an example, enthusiastic observers of the defence-based naval brigade cadet activities in 1906 described it as a relatively new organisation in Victoria, but one that had formerly existed in Queensland, where it had 300 members before being disbanded on the orders of the Minister of Defence, Sir John Forrest.111 Elsewhere, on 10 April 1907, it was reported that nine naval volunteer cadets from Rockhampton Naval Brigade in Central Queensland had fired heavy guns aboard the gunboat Paluma and there was ‘room for some good lads in the Cadets’.112 The following year, on 24 May 1908, 400 naval brigade cadets were reported as being inspected at a parade in Sydney by New South Wales Governor, Sir Harry Rawson.113

In contrast, the widely reported activities of the community-based sea cadets, dominated by the Boys’ Naval Brigade, were distinctly less defence focused, and often included providing light entertainment to raise funds, but still attracted considerable press attention.114 The popular view, thus remained that the main function of the Boys’ Naval Brigade was to bring ‘the young people into a position to be influenced by the church and its interests’.115 Nevertheless, despite unification plans having lapsed, it was still being reported, in 1907, that the Boys’ Naval Brigades in Victoria would be accepted as part of the Senior Naval Cadet system, after the naval cadet system operating in Queensland was extended to New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia.116 These disparate accounts are just a few of the many that contributed to creating and maintaining the confused nature of the

111 Launceston Examiner, 25 January 1906, p. 4. 112 Morning Bulletin, 10 April, 1907, p. 5. 113 Chronicle, 30 May 1908, p. 41. 114 Portland Guardian, 18 January 1907, p. 2. 115 Bendigo Advertiser, 16 May 1907, p. 8. 116 Adelaide Advertiser, 8 February 1907, p.9. 66 movement as it struggled to present a cohesive identity, that might somehow approach that of the army cadets, to politicians, government and the public.

While the community-based sea cadets were seeking recognition and increased funding, the much smaller defence-based naval cadets remained fully supported by the navy budget and, in New South Wales, the quota of 100 unpaid seamen cadets was reported as being full at 31 December 1907.117 Although with no sea training being conducted, an average of 21 days training was completed on land by these New South Wales cadets, while a full quota of 170 Victorian naval cadets completed an average of four days training at sea and 16 on land. In Queensland, the quota of 215 was not full, but 179 unpaid cadets completed an average of six days training at sea and five days on land, while in South Australia a full quota of 56 cadets served an average of six days at sea and fifteen days on land. No returns were included for Tasmania, Western Australia or the .118 Thus, the much smaller defence-based national naval cadet contingent began a fully regulated navy training regime, while the community-based sea cadets conducted activities as they saw fit, but kept the government and the navy apprised of their efforts.

For his part, by 1908, Creswell had shifted his focus to the defence-based Senior Cadets and was now emphasising that naval cadet service had a valuable by-product socially for the community in usefully employing and occupying lads at a critical age, 15-19, many of whom without such an interest would be ‘idling at night in the streets’.119 Furthermore, even for these older boys, he was now hesitant about estimating the naval cadets’ value for naval service, although he was still of the view that they could provide a few recruits for the permanent naval force.120 Thus, in the two years since his grand plan of a fully integrated cadet system and naval force, Creswell had reconsidered the value of the naval cadets and decided that the naval militia should be open to only a selected proportion of cadets when

117 Annual Return Military and Naval Resources - All States 191, NAA MP84/1, 1972/3/87. 118 ibid. 119 Report by the Director of the Naval Forces on the Naval Defence of the Commonwealth of Australia for the Year 1907, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1 January 1908, NAA A1194, 20.15/6714. 120 ibid. 67 they reached the age for adult entry.121 Yet, he was still positive about the overall future success of the movement, attributing its attractiveness to the interesting nature of the work in the corps, namely boating, gun drill, knotting, and splicing which he felt was alluring to boys keen to learn anything that would make them ‘handier and generally more useful in their everyday life’.122 Therefore, although there were limited opportunities for part-time adult entry after cadet training, Creswell now envisaged that a Senior Naval Cadet system could be established at all important coastal towns and that an instructor should be appointed at each.123 In this way, the defence-based naval cadets were conceived and continued to form part of the RANR for decades to come. The community-based sea cadets, however, so long as they coveted an experience with a defence focus, were now left to wait for an opportunity for vacancies to arise in the defence-based naval cadets or to become one of 30,000 junior army cadets.124

At this point it seemed that there was no prospect of a combined community and defence-based naval cadet scheme, but one last effort from the north rekindled the idea, carried the unification debate through the end of the decade and resulted in Creswell unequivocally confirming the duality of the movement. On behalf of the Brisbane Institute of Social Service, on 18 November 1908, Commander WJ Weatherill, a retired member of the Queensland colonial naval forces, requested, that the Queensland Naval Commandant, Captain JT Richardson, provide rations for a sea cadet training camp.125 Richardson recommended approval, but Creswell, refused on the basis that there was no funding provided for assistance to such charitable organisations.126 Establishing a familiar pattern for deciding the appropriate level of support to be provided by the RAN to community-based sea cadet units, the Naval Board confirmed, on 16 January 1909, that there was no budget for rations for this ‘Boys Brigade’ and it was not possible to grant the request.127 Simultaneously, this policy of austerity was reflected publicly elsewhere, in February 1909,

121 ibid. 122 ibid 123 ibid. 124 Williamstown Chronicle, 6 April 1907, p. 2. 125 Letter, Weatherill to Richardson, 18 December 1908, NAA 84/1, 630/1/13. 126 Letter, Richardson to Collins, 2 April 1908; Internal File Minute, Creswell, 10 April 1908. NAA 84/1, 630/1/13. 127 File Minute, Naval Board Secretary, Application for rations for Institute of Social Service Cadets at Easter Training, 1909, 16 January 1909, NAA 84/1, 630/1/13. 68 when the Victorian Boys’ Naval Brigades advised the Minister for Defence, GF Pearce, that they were being completely ignored by the Defence Department in their attempts to be supplied with obsolete fire arms and bayonets.128 For his part, Pearce observed publicly that he providing the community-based sea cadet branch of the movement with close to £1000 of direct support that he was not happy that he was getting value from his investment.129 Further perspective to Pearce’s view is provided by comparing the investment in the community-based sea cadet branch, which was not controlled by the Defence Department, to the total 1909-10 Naval Forces budget of £63.168.130

Given this firm stance, by Pearce and the Naval Board, on limiting support to community-based units, it is all the more surprising that the Naval Board invited further consideration of the Queensland request for assistance just as Richardson was in the process of mobilising the Queensland permanent naval force, naval militia and cadets for their annual Easter mobilisation exercise.131 After it had initially ruled that it would not subsidise community-based sea cadet rations, the Naval Board appears to have been a contributor to its own future difficulties, in terms of the endless submissions it would, from this point, receive for funds and equipment, because it invited Richardson to re-apply after gathering more information.132 In particular, it was decided that, if the Brisbane Social Service Institute met certain conditions, the Naval Board would be prepared to recommend a grant.133 Hence, on 19 March 1909, Richardson provided the Secretary of Defence, Collins, with a comprehensive report on the corps and recommended a grant for at least 100 cadets.134 For his part, Creswell now recommended that this should be approved.135 Richardson, having succeeded with the Brisbane Institute unit, decided to request support for the Bowen House School Junior Cadet Corps.136 Moreover, after succeeding in gaining partial funding for all Queensland community-based sea cadets, he decided to try to bring them fully under his

128 Argus, Melbourne, 17 February 1909, p.4. 129 Argus, 1 March 1909, p. 9 130 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 4, 1911, p. 1098. 131 Commonwealth Naval Forces, Queensland, Mobilisation Orders for Easter, 1909, NAA MP178/2, 2286/2/77. 132 File Minute, Naval Board Secretary, Application for rations for Institute of Social Service Cadets at Easter Training, 1909, 16 January 1909, NAA 84/1, 630/1/13. 133 ibid. 134 Minute, Richardson to Collins, 19 March 1909, NAA 84/1, 630/1/13. 135 Minute, Creswell to Richardson, 28 May 1909, NAA 84/1, 630/1/13. 136 Minute, Richardson to Collins, 17 April 1909, NAA 84/1, 630/1/13. 69 formal control and unify the defence-based NRC and the community based sea cadets, as Creswell had originally planned in 1905.137

At this point, Creswell promptly explained that this was not possible as the community-based sea cadets in question were raised as a ‘Boys’ Naval Brigade organisation’ governed by the conditions approved by the minister.138 In addition, Creswell left no doubt as to why community-based sea cadets, exemplified by the Boys’ Naval Brigade, should not be made part of the navy.139 In briefing the Naval Board, Creswell reiterated the principle that the Boys’ Naval Brigades were established for the moral and social improvement of lads by Sunday school societies, leagues and other philanthropic associations and the naval uniform was adopted to attract boys to their respective corps. Being in sympathy with the social purposes for which the brigades were in existence, Creswell observed, the ‘Naval Department’, when applied to by these leagues, ‘gladly afforded’ them every assistance by voluntary work of its officers and men.140 For their part, however, although raised entirely to promote the social improvement of the boys and not in any way for naval defence, these leagues thought that the uniform they had adopted gave them certain claims on the Defence Department. Though these claims could not really be substantiated, Creswell reflected, a grant was already payable to such corps if they could comply with certain qualifying regulations, but no further assistance should be provided.141

Moving on to address the essential duality of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement directly, Creswell further emphasised the legal status of defence-based cadets as members of the navy, under Section 62 of the Defence Act, as the key issue in relation to the taking over of Boys’ Naval Brigades as Junior Naval Cadets. In this regard, he explained, the junior military (army) cadets were all organised according to their different schools under the supervision of the officers-masters of these schools (government officers holding honorary commissions) and with a special staff of army instructors. In comparison, there was no such

137 Minute, Richardson to Collins, 21 February 1910, NAA MP178/2, 2129/4/16. 138 Minute, Creswell to Richardson, 3 March 1910, NAA MP178/2, 2129/4/16. 139 Minute, Creswell to Naval Board, 13 June 1910, NAA MP178/2, 2129/4/16. 140 ibid. 141 ibid. 70 organisation for naval cadets, no staff existed specially for their instruction and, regardless, the navy already had ample work for its instructors. To try to emulate the military (army) senior cadet organisation was both undesirable and would require a considerable increase in instructional overheads. Furthermore, Creswell concluded, any expenditure required would be for the social and moral improvement of the boys, which could ‘scarcely be included in Naval Defence’.142 Creswell’s opinion of the community-based branch was clear. Under ‘the system in vogue in Victoria where officers of the leagues running Boys’ Naval Brigades had full charge and responsibility of the boys, knew them and were used to looking after them, and where a grant was paid, the ‘limit of assistance from the naval department had been reached’ he declared.143

In considering the organisation and control of the community-based sea cadets at this time, it is important that Creswell regarded the responsible officers of the leagues as being the counterparts of schoolmasters who were in charge of military (army) cadets. More specifically, he was of the view that for the naval department to accept charge of large numbers of ‘these very small boys’ was undesirable and work quite foreign to a defence department. 144 In addition to these philosophical objections, Creswell considered that the decision by the leagues in Victoria, when he was preparing the navy cadet scheme, not to subject themselves to navy Regulations demonstrated that they agreed with his view on the navy not taking charge of such community-based units. For these reasons, he considered that the proposal from Richardson to take charge of ‘some 200 small boys’ would be unwise to confirm.145 In addition, Creswell observed, the projected cost for additional instructional staff in Brisbane alone, should the navy take responsibility for community-based units, was £700. Furthermore, if approval was given to this request, there could be no reasonable grounds for refusing ‘requests of the same kind from every other seaport town throughout the Commonwealth’.146 At the same time, the defence-based NRC, both senior and junior, were already undertaking regular sea training at all major ports between Brisbane and Cairns, he

142 ibid. 143 ibid. 144 ibid. 145 ibid. 146 ibid. 71 observed.147 In making this clear transition from being a supporter of a single naval and sea cadet movement to being a guardian of the dual system of defence-based and community- based branches, Creswell had presented arguments that would be revived by naval administrators, and considered by a succession of Naval Boards, for over four decades. For their part, organisers of the community-based branch would show substantial dedication to their nautical themed citizenship training throughout this time, as demonstrated by the originator of this attempt at achieving unification, Weatherill, who submitted identical requests for navy support for the next 15 years.148

As a result of these representations by Creswell, Pearce, made the decision that the naval brigades should carry on ‘under present conditions, pending the decision on the constitution of the naval forces under the Naval Defence Bill’.149 More significantly, this protracted exchange of views, involving Richardson, Collins, Creswell, Pearce and the Naval Board reveals just how deeply the dual nature of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement was influenced by Creswell. Also, it shows that he was of the view that the Victorian community-based sea cadet representatives were reluctant to accept navy regulation of their organisation, control and personnel, although they were keen to be funded by a grant. These revelations are all the more significant because Creswell had earlier outlined in great detail his personal plan for an organisation that, while based within both defence and the community, would be fully administratively integrated with the navy, with the full cooperation of the community. It seems that both sides were wary of the responsibilities associated with creating an organisation that was fully controlled by the navy, but imposed specific responsibilities on the community-based organisers and supporters. Equally, from the community-based sea cadets’ side, these sponsors were from diverse groups and, while generally happy to take the subsidy by meeting certain standards, appeared reluctant to cede any real control to the navy. Moreover, Creswell was focused on furthering the navy’s interests on a broader front, dominated by funding issues, since the Colonial Conference in London in 1907.150 Adding yet another complication, as the first decade of the new nation

147 Return showing Dates and Periods of Continuous Training afloat for the Year 1910-11, Queensland Naval Militia and Cadets, NAA MP178/2, 2286/2/90. 148 Letter, Weatherill to Victualling Store Officer, Sydney, 18 August 1925, NAA MP151/1, 434/201/1018. 149 Letter, Collins to Richardson, 5 July 1910, NAA MP178/2, 2129/4/16. 150 CMH Clark, A history of Australia V The people make laws, p. 295. 72 headed towards a close, there was continuing pressure for the introduction of compulsory naval and military training, for men and boys, which would have to be fully funded by the navy.151 In this context, it is understandable that Creswell may have revised his enthusiasm for a national junior naval cadet scheme, purely based on funding pressure, and chosen to disengage the navy from the process of taking over existing community-based sea cadet units and, thus, risking being in charge of a wider, and potentially very unwieldy national organisation.152

As the decade drew to a close, he non-defence status of the community-based branch, particularly how it was organised, was still more emphatically confirmed when, on 4 January 1909, representatives of the ANA in Western Australia met with Pearce and urged him to provide a grant to establish a Boys’ Naval Brigade in their state as he planned to do in South Australia. Pearce made it clear that Boys Naval Brigades would have to be placed on a ‘more serviceable’ basis before any more money could be provided as they had been started in a very haphazard fashion and would have to be completely reorganised. Furthermore, he regarded it as absurd that a Boys’ Naval Brigade had been formed at Ballarat, an inland town, where the boys had no chance of receiving practical training. In any event, Pearce observed, the whole matter of defence was under consideration.153 Pearce’s comments provide a further insight into how, during this period of naval development, even the most enthusiastic supporters of the naval and sea cadet movement often failed to differentiate between the defence-based naval cadets and the community-based sea cadets. The prominence of the Boys’ Naval Brigade, formed by the community, and the origins of the defence-based naval cadets as part of the colonial naval brigades would have added to the confusion, particularly for supporters in remote regions, such as Western Australia, that were far distant from where the movement had originated and where its future was being decided. The minister, on the other hand, remained in no doubt in relation to the degree of organisation and control he wanted before he would consider providing funding to new community-based sea cadets units, particularly if they were remote from available or possible future sea training facilities.

151 ibid. 152 Adelaide Advertiser, 5 February 1906, p. 5. 153 Daily News, 4 January 1909, p. 7. 73

The situation did not change when Labour’s Pearce was succeeded by the Protectionist, Joseph Cook, who made it clear that the government of the day did not regard Boys’ Naval Brigades and similar community-based sea cadet organisations as being part of the defence forces, although portions of the training may have been aligned.154 In speaking at the presentation of colours to the Brunswick Boys’ Naval Brigade, Cook commented that, if it was found necessary to transform such brigades into military (army) cadets, the people would understand that it was for the best.155 Furthermore, he observed, in the lead up to compulsory training, the government was contemplating both the impact of the planned legislation on the Boys’ Naval Brigades and the likely cost of assuming responsibility for its activities.156 Ultimately, the decision on assuming responsibility for all components of the sea cadet movement and the creation of a unified naval and sea cadet movement was deferred by the government of the day.157 On their side, the Boys’ Naval Brigade organisers found that their initial enthusiasm for nautical activities waned and they were forced by circumstance or lack of funding to disband units or turn them into non-naval boys clubs.158 Ultimately, by 1914, the Boys’ Naval Brigade had collapsed and was not to feature significantly in the future fortunes of the naval and sea cadet movement.159 Nevertheless, in what turned out to be its zenith, in the period 1901-10, this organisation had a very strong influence on the community-based sea cadet branch of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement and had many advocates who would have been happy to see a combined movement under the full control of the Naval Board.

During the period 1901-10, the philosophical duality of defence-based naval cadets and community-based sea cadets, born of the colonial era, was transformed into a legal and structural reality. This transition began when the new defence-based national naval cadet organisation was formed into units attached to their parent navy units under the Naval Defence Act. In contrast, the community-based sea cadets were left largely to rely independently on community support for training resources, volunteer instructors and funding

154 Adelaide Advertiser, 17 October 1910, p.11. It is not clear if the minister envisaged that the members would become army cadets or if the reference to military cadets was a result of the army centric planning for the future compulsory cadet system, which would include naval cadets. 155 ibid. 156 ibid. 157 Letter, Collins to Richardson, 5 July 1910, NAA MP178/2, 2129/4/16. 158 Coburg Leader, 17 February 1911, p. 4. 159 Hoare, Boys, Urchins, Men, p. 12. 74 of other needs, such as rations for camps, although limited funding and other support was often provided by the navy. In addition, the few school units that were successfully established were the result of work by community leaders and private educational institutions, not the defence and public education departments, as had occurred in the case of the army cadets.160 For their part, despite an identical earlier proposal by Creswell having been allowed to lapse, the Queensland Naval Commandant proposed taking over the organisation and control of Boys’ Naval Brigades, and other sea cadet units. This takeover was to include a policy which would guarantee a financial subsidy for each cadet and the supply of equipment and instructors. Although this regional case for unification of the two arms appeared strong, stronger national opposing arguments resulted in the Australian naval and sea cadet movement retaining a dual identity. These arguments against unification, supported by the Minister of Defence, were based on the view that existing community-based sea cadet units were outside the remit of defence, sponsored (appropriately) by philanthropic individuals and organisations, and primarily provided instruction in character, discipline and loyalty. A key figure in all of these events was the Director of Naval Forces, Captain WR Creswell. As a result of these influences, the Australian naval and sea cadet movement entered the era of compulsory cadet training as a dual organisation of defence-based naval cadets under RAN control and community-based sea cadets, with no defence control, receiving limited, and mostly informal, support, after being formally acknowledged as not being part of the government legislated cadet structure.161

160 Letter, Naval Commandant to Under Secretary of Public Instruction, Queensland, 11 June 1908, QSA 6477, 997062. 161 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 4, 1911, p. 1081. 75

CHAPTER THREE

Compulsory Cadets Dominant 1911-1919

Australia legislated for peace-time conscription for military training of all able bodied white male boys and men in the Defence Act of 1909, while Britain was still locked in a debate on the need for compulsory military service.1 In this way, from 1911, the Australian naval and sea cadet movement was transformed by the introduction of compulsory military (army) and naval training for boys.2 The provisions of this ‘Universal Training Scheme’ made cadet training, in some form, compulsory for all boys from the year that they turned 12 until they turned 18, at which time compulsory training was continued until the age of 25 in the adult military forces.3 The cadet branch of the wider scheme was administered by a formal national structure controlled by the army, which also trained most of the cadets as less than five percent, on average, were allocated to the navy.4 The chapter begins with an examination of the initial impact of ‘boy conscription’ on the existing naval and sea cadet organisation. In this regard, the rapid growth of the now compulsory defence-based NRC branch is compared to the declining fortunes of the community-based sea cadet branch, thus revealing a loss of equilibrium between the movement’s dual branches. Notwithstanding this imbalance, during this period the sea scouts became very active in the community-based sea cadet branch of the movement, for the first time, and this chapter features an examination of a comprehensive bid by their sponsor, the Boy Scouts’ Association, for formal navy recognition and support, including exemption from compulsory defence-based training. The chapter concludes with a review of how compulsory cadet membership altered the nature of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement by forcing the navy to take responsibility for the organisation, control, personnel and funding of over 3000 defence-based NRC, while community-based sea cadets were provided with minimal support.

1 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 5, 1911, p. 1084; RJQ Adams & PP Poirier, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900-18, Macmillan Press, London, 1987, pp. 33-38. 2 Stockings, ‘The torch and the sword’, pp. 74-111. 3 KS Inglis, ‘Conscription in Peace and War, 1911-1945’, Forward, R & RHW Reece, Conscription in Australia, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, Brisbane, 1968, p. 27. As Inglis observes, although the term universal was a practical misnomer as more than one third of eligible trainees were exempted on the basis of living too far away from a drill hall, more than five miles, more than 20,000 parents exposed themselves to prosecution when more than half of those boys required to register failed to do so. 4 Universal Training in the Naval or Military Forces, Notes of Lectures by the Quartermaster-General 1911, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1911, NAA A1194, 45.30/27777. 76

The period 1911-19 in Australia was dominated by World War I and, domestically, national unrest over issues such as compulsory naval and military training and attempts to introduce conscription for overseas war service.5 In terms of scale alone, the introduction of compulsory naval and military training for boys had resulted, by 1915, in 636,000 enlistments, 34,000 prosecutions for failure to attend training and 7000 detentions. The numbers involved in adult compulsory training were larger still, but proposals to introduce adult conscription for overseas service, in 1916 and 1917, were rejected.6 From a naval perspective, in the lead up to World War I, opposing Labour and Fusionist politicians were divided on the issue of imperial control of the nascent Australian navy.7 The context for this disagreement had been created when, on 22 August 1909, the British government had amended the Colonial Naval Defence Act 1865, to provide for members of the Australian navy to serve with the RN in an emergency and to allow Australian navy ships to be placed under the control of the British Admiralty.8 Prior to the federal election of 13 April 1910, the Labour party basically supported a navy owned and controlled by Australia, while the Fusionists favoured financing the building of ships for the RN.9 When Labour won the election, on 29 April, and Andrew Fisher became Prime Minister and George Pearce Minister for Defence, Australian policy favoured an Australian navy with locally trained seamen 10 As members of the citizen naval forces, the defence-based Senior Naval Cadets were now part of the plan for manning the new Australian fleet.11

In November 1910, the Attorney General, William Morris Hughes introduced the bill that ensured the introduction of a compulsory military training system, initiated in the

5 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, pp. 156-161; Clark, The people make laws, 1888-1915, pp. 310-312; Knightley, Australia A Biography of a Nation, pp.61-74; Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, pp. 155 – 166. 6 G Davidson, J Hirst & S Macintyre (eds), The Oxford Companion to Australian History, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2001, p. 146. 7 DC Gordon, ‘The Admiralty and Dominion Navies’, 1902-1914, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 33, no. 4, pp.407-422; FB Eldridge, A History of the Royal Australian Naval College, Georgian House, Melbourne, 1949, pp. 7-9. 8 Argus, 23 August 1909, p. 6 9 Clark, The people make laws, 1888-1915, p. 310. 10 ibid., p. 313. 11 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 4, 1911, p. 1097; G Pearce, Proposals for the recruiting and training of the Australasian portion of the Personnel that will be required for manning HMAS Ships which will form the fleet unit, Department of Defence, Melbourne, 1 November 1911, NAA MP178/2, 2230/3/56. 77

Defence Act of 1909 by the previous Deakin government.12 Subsequently, in an election speech on 1 April 1913, Fisher declared that Labour had created a new democratic defence force in which ‘Australian navy boys could begin below decks and rise to the top’.13 Fisher’s defence proposals provided for a budget increase of £4,000,000 and included plans for a new battleship, three destroyers, two submarines, a supply ship, the establishment of a naval aviation school and the development of significant further shipbuilding facilities.14 Notwithstanding this proposed investment in naval ships and bases, and the new compulsory naval and military training scheme, the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) which fought in World War I consisted entirely of volunteers, commanded in the main by British generals (at least in the early years), and the new Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was placed under the control of the RN.15 In preparation for this likely eventuality, it had already been decided prior to the war that as many Australian ‘permanent’ or full-time officers as possible of both the navy and army would receive part of their training in British ships, or in the British or Indian armies.16

Although fought mostly in Europe, the human and economic impact of World War I on Australia was severe. While the navy was active close to home at the start of the war, including the sinking of the German raider Emden by HMAS Sydney, the remainder of the war was fought by the army with devastating losses.17 Of the 417,000 men enlisted between 1914 and 1917, 331, 000 served overseas and two out of three were killed or wounded.18 At home, the impact on shipping activity and the reduction in export and import contracted the economy by 10 percent, increased unemployment and left Australia with a national debt of £700,000,000.19 Notwithstanding these negative effects, the war also reshaped the Australian economy in a positive way, as the scarcity of imports stimulated local manufacturing.20 Despite this stimulus and its positive impact on local industry, some degree of social unrest

12 Clark, The people make laws, 1888-1915, p. 325. 13 ibid., p. 354. 14 Argus, 1 April 1913, p. 6. 15 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p. 157. 16 AW Jose, History of Australia: from the earliest times to the present day, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1929, p. 212. 17 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, p. 154 18 ibid., p. 163. 19 ibid., pp. 160-161, 163 20 ibid., p. 157 78 emerged during the war years, including a general strike by 95,000 workers in New South Wales over the introduction of time cards and a mutiny by 15,000 troops in Sydney over increased training hours.21 Adding to an already stressful post war scenario, at the end of the war, a world-wide flu epidemic killed 40,000,000 people, including 12,000 in Australia, and many returning troops were placed in quarantine.22 The aftermath of World War I, in terms of what might have been had 60,000 young men not died is unknowable, yet for many contemporary observers and subsequent historians the war had somehow made Australia a nation.23 In a similar way, the significance of service by past members of the naval and sea cadet movement, at home and overseas, cannot be comprehensively re-told in this thesis, but the few available records of those who served illustrate how the war, inevitably, provided the greater part of the context for this period of the movement’s history.24

As compulsory part-time training for all Australian boys swelled the ranks of the defence-based NRC, the community-based sea cadets were proportionately regarded by the navy and army as being of no defence value.25 For the RAN, and the Defence Department generally, the focus was on the many members of the defence-based NRC who moved directly into the navy gun line or the army front line as they completed compulsory training and enlisted to fight in the war.26 Thus, in this period of compulsory training, the division between the defence-based NRC and the community-based sea cadets became more pronounced than ever. This was due not only to the dramatic increase in the size of the defence-based NRC branch under compulsory training, particularly compared to the dwindling community-based sea cadet groups, but also the impact of military (army) administration of the overall scheme. This combination of factors made this a unique period in the life of the naval and sea cadet movement. In a similar way, the previous paucity of official national historical material on the naval and sea cadet movement was reversed, somewhat, as the era of cadet conscription is comprehensively recorded in the official annals

21 Knightley, Australia A Biography of a Nation, pp. 82. 22 ibid., p. 91. 23 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, pp. 159-160. 24 Royal Australian RANR, District of New South Wales, (HMAS Penguin – Sydney Branch and Newcastle Branch) ANR Ledger, NAA A9887, 4; Argus 4 September 1915, p. 13. 25 Universal Training in the Naval or Military Forces, Notes of Lectures by the Quartermaster-General 1911, Government Printer Melbourne, 1911, NAA A1194, 45.30/27777; Letter, Naval Secretary to the Private Secretary to the Governor of Victoria, 9 June 1914, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 26 Argus, 4 September 1915, p. 13. 79 and historical texts due to its political and social significance.27 With far fewer numbers than the defence-based army scheme, however, and a much lower profile, the history of the defence-based NRC in this period has rarely been considered by past historians and, when included, is recorded more from the point of view of clarifying the dominance of the army.28 In contrast to the published record, which fails to provide a comprehensive description of the movement at this time, primary sources relating to naval cadets are more abundant for this period and provide some detail on how the compulsory training era affected both branches of the movement.

In addition to the detailed information contained in the naval records of this period, some important navy-specific context is provided by a manuscript, prepared by AW Jose, which records some uniquely naval aspects of the compulsory cadet scheme.29 In this manuscript, prepared as part of his official history of World War I, Jose observed that the introduction of compulsory cadet training completely altered the character of the RANR as it suddenly became first a ‘foster-mother’, and then the permanent home to those young Australians who preferred naval to military training.30 Under compulsory cadet training, the navy had first choice from each year’s intake and was able to select as many defence-based NRC members as required and, as Jose explains, cadets chose naval service so freely that selections had to be made based on the boys’ intended occupations and the distance of their home from the naval drill room. Numerically, the impact of compulsory training is well illustrated by the growth of the defence-based NRC from a membership of 748, on 30 June 1911, to 3322 cadets in training at the outbreak of World War 1 in 1914, alongside 2173 adult naval officers and men.31 Furthermore, as Jose noted, this was the time when the term ‘NRC’ officially came into common usage to more succinctly describe the defence-based part-time naval reserve cadets.32 In contrast, the community-based sea cadets had no such identity, as

27 LC Jauncey, The Story of Conscription in Australia, Allen and Unwin, London, 1935; JM Main, Conscription: The Australian Debate, 1901-1970, Cassell, North Melbourne, 1970; TW Tanner, Compulsory citizen soldiers, Alternative Publishing Co-operative, Waterloo, NSW, 1980 28 J Barrett, Falling in: Australians and “boy” conscription, 1911-1915, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1979, pp.72-225. 29 [Official History 1914-1918 War, manuscripts:] Volume IX, The Royal Australian Navy by Arthur W Jose. Chapter 12, "The Royal Australian Naval Brigade", typed draft. AWM 44, 9/14 Part 1. 30 ibid. 31 ibid., Commonwealth Year Book, no. 5, 1912, p. 1075; 32 Official History 1914-1918 War, manuscripts:] Volume IX, The Royal Australian Navy by Arthur W Jose. Chapter 12, "The Royal Australian Naval Brigade", typed draft, AWM 44, 9/14 Part 1. 80 their sponsors engaged independently in a heterogeneous array of privately provided citizenship and seamanship training activities. Thus, from this point, the defence-based branch of the dual system of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement can be formally described as consisting of the NRC, engaging in seamanship training as part of the RANR, while the community-based sea branch lacked a clear identity as it continued to evolve under the auspices of a virtually unlimited range of community sponsors.33

With the introduction of compulsory training, a weighty array of paperwork, organisation and physical effort was required to shape the NRC into the newly legislated naval component of the compulsory cadet scheme, alongside the army cadets.34 While standard texts on this era of Australian ‘conscription’ provide details of the administration of the scheme, they are invariably generic or army oriented.35 Hence, a closer examination of the naval aspects of the compulsory cadet scheme is merited, principally to trace the unique navy aspects of the scheme, but also to reveal how navy organisation and control during this period set a definitive standard for subsequent consideration of recognition of the many future iterations of the community-based sea cadet branch of the movement. From a legal standpoint, the defence-based naval cadets were transformed into the NRC by the enactment of the ‘Regulations and Instructions for Universal Training Royal Australian RANR’.36 Under these Regulations and Instructions, the RANR was defined as the Royal Australian Naval Reserve (O), Obligatory, and included both the adult force and the Senior Naval Cadets.37 A senior cadet was defined as a person between the ages of 14 and 18, while the adult force was that portion over the age of 18.38 Junior Cadets were defined as those from 12-14 years of age.39 The enactment of these formal Regulations and Instructions is

33 Commonwealth Year Book, no.5, 1912, pp. 1075-6. The duality of the movement was confirmed with the NRC officially described as the ‘Naval Volunteer Cadets’ branch of the Commonwealth Naval Forces serving alongside the ‘Permanently Employed’ branch and the ‘Naval Militia’ branch, while the community-based sea cadets were overlooked. 34 Universal Training in the Naval or Military Forces, Notes of Lectures by the Quartermaster-General 1911, Government Printer Melbourne, 1911, NAA A1194, 45.30/27777. 35 LC Jauncey, The Story of Conscription in Australia, Allen and Unwin, London, 1935; JM Main, Conscription: The Australian Debate, 1901-1970, Cassell, North Melbourne, 1970; TW Tanner, Compulsory citizen soldiers. Alternative Publishing Co-operative, Waterloo, NSW, 1980. 36 Regulations for Universal Training – Royal Australian RANR (O), NAA A1194, 12.11/4343. 37 ibid. 38 ibid. 39 ibid. 81 important, but it was how they impacted on the navy’s organisation and control of the NRC that is the real story of this period in the movement’s history.40

Under compulsory training, the factors governing the selection of NRC trainees were similar to those that had previously influenced navy administrators’ views on the establishment of pre-conscription NRC units and their hesitation about the organisation of some community-based sea cadets units. Selection criteria such as residential proximity to ports, maritime experience and the needs of the navy dominated, especially as lack of numbers was no longer a problem. Future NRC members were selected from the most convenient locations, based on the existing navy organisation, so that there could be direct progression into the RANR and the cadets could serve their adult obligation in the same location.41. In specific naval defence locations, such as Thursday Island, Port Fairy and Portland, all boys liable for cadet training had no choice but to become naval cadets.42 As well, naval training was conducted virtually as one system, with cadets transitioning at 18 to adult activities, such as compulsory sea training, where adult naval trainees were obligated to do 25 days annual training, seventeen at sea, compared to the infantryman’s total of sixteen days land training.43

Discipline was strictly enforced in all aspects of the compulsory cadet scheme, which meant that compulsory NRC members faced penalties if they failed to meet their training obligations. This issue of compulsion, and the associated penalties for failure to attend training sessions, raise an important question. As these boys were no longer volunteers, were they really members of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement or are they more properly described as members of the naval forces? In his thesis, Stockings accepted senior army cadets under universal training as part of the army cadet movement and set a precedent

40 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 5, 1912, pp. 1080-90. The 1912 Commonwealth Year Book provides a comprehensive description of all aspects of the compulsory adult and cadet training scheme, particularly administration, training, exemptions and penalties for prevention or evasion. 41 Royal Australian Naval Reserve, Universal Training Register, Port Fairy, NAA CT190/21, 1921/1. 42 J Barrett, Falling in: Australians and “boy” conscription, 1911-1915, p.72; Letter, Naval Secretary to DNR, 26 October 1911, NAA MP178/2, 799/1/48. 43 ibid, p. 73. 82 that there is no compelling reason to question.44 In contrast, Stockings considered the school- based junior cadet scheme to be outside the ‘definition of true cadets’ on the basis that they were ‘nothing more than classes of schoolboys undergoing pseudo-military instruction during school hours’.45 As with Stockings treatment of senior army cadets, there is no reason to deviate from this position for Junior Naval Cadets. Nevertheless, the struggle by naval administrators to have naval content included in the junior cadet syllabus is considered within this dissertation as part of the wider issue of how navy training was a minor part of the overall compulsory cadet scheme in numbers, content and influence.46 It is the administration of Senior Naval Cadets, however, that reveals the full extent of what could be achieved in NRC training when the navy had complete responsibility for the organisation, control, personnel and funding of such a large corps.

While the pre-1911 Australian naval and sea cadet movement was built on uncertainty in policy, funding and administration, particularly for the community-based sea cadets, the introduction of the compulsory cadet scheme brought about an instant transformation, in the form of rigidly applied legal and administrative systems for the NRC branch, which made the duality of the naval and sea cadet system still more pronounced.47 In framing the legislation, the Minister for Defence, Joseph Cook, had noted that Boys’ Naval Brigades and Boy Scouts were not provided for as part of the compulsory cadet scheme. At the same time he canvassed the possibility of their having some extra military value that warranted extending the application of the Boys’ Naval Brigade capitation grant, of 7s 6d per annum, to the army- oriented Boy Scouts.48 Army administrators, however, considered that mounted cadets, boy scouts, boy’s brigades and similar organisations should not be included in the new arrangements and, if they continued on a voluntary basis, would not be interfered with, but neither would their members be excused from training in the compulsory units organised under the Defence Act.49 The navy adopted a similar policy but this did not deter the sea scouts from appealing against this decision to the Naval Board and a sea scout’ submission,

44 Stockings, ‘The torch and the sword’, p.75. 45 ibid. 46 Letter, Victorian DNO to DNR, 18 June 1912, NAA MP472/1, 5/12/6119. 47 Universal Training in the Naval or Military Forces, Notes of Lectures by the Quartermaster-General 1911, Government Printer Melbourne, 1911, NAA A1194, 45.30/27777. 48 CPD, no. 42, 19 October 1909, p, 4677. 49 Universal Training in the Naval or Military Forces, Notes of Lectures by the Quartermaster-General 1911, Government Printer Melbourne, 1911, NAA A1194, 45.30/27777. 83 initiated in 1914, for recognition of their voluntary training, as an alternative that would allow full exemption from the compulsory cadet scheme, is considered later as part of an example of the community-based branch’s efforts to remain relevant during the compulsory training era..50

As regards the expanded NRC branch, from the outset of the compulsory training era, although the army provided overall national administration of the scheme, it was clear that it would be managed separately as part of the navy. In this regard, in 1911, Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson had delivered ‘Recommendations on the Naval Forces of the Commonwealth’, which suggested that cadets allotted to the naval forces should come under the conditions to be laid down for the naval volunteer reserve and should be encouraged to remain in the reserve after the period of their obligatory service in the citizens forces had expired.51 In addition, the number of compulsory cadets, as recommended by Henderson, was to be limited to estimates of the number of men needed to fill specific number of jobs within the adult naval force after significant wastage. For these reasons, Henderson specified that the number of cadets to be allotted to the navy as part of the compulsory scheme, on 1 July 1911, should be based on the requirements on 1 July 1916, ‘say 2000’, on a basis that allowed for wastage of 800 Senior Naval Cadets in the first year, 750 in the second year, 700 in the third year and 650 in the fourth year.52

As it transpired, the 1911 Defence Progress Report on the Navy noted that the selection of Senior Naval Cadets had been carried out by DNOs in July and a total of 3,200 had been selected from the maritime disciplines in the neighbourhood of the ports concerned.53 Regulations governing the Senior Naval Cadets had been introduced and instruction had commenced in all districts, but there had been a problem with getting suitable drill halls and with the supply of uniforms. Generally, it was reported that ‘the inauguration

50 Letter, Commissioner for Sea Scouts to the Military Secretary to the Governor, 19 April 1920, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 51 The Naval Forces of the Commonwealth, Recommendations by Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson, 1 March 1911, NAA A1194 45, 30/27777. 52 ibid. 53 Defence Progress Report on the Navy, Government Printer, Victoria, 18 October 1911, NAA A1194, 45.30/27777. 84 of the naval portion of the Universal Training System has been very satisfactory, and there is no difficulty in obtaining the numbers required, as the naval training appears to be attractive’.54 At this early stage, it appeared that the naval component of the compulsory cadet scheme was successfully underway, but even these early difficulties seemed to indicate that the new scheme retained a distinct identity that was perhaps more consistent with the pre-compulsory NRC branch than a fully fledged, albeit part-time, branch of the navy.

Notwithstanding its early administrative lapses, and its part-time status, the now compulsory NRC organisation benefitted from a considerable and consistent administrative commitment from the navy, which illustrates how navy systems of organisation, control, personnel and funding could be fairly readily extended to a much enlarged part-time naval cadet force. In terms of the functioning of the system, the initial organisation of naval cadets took place at a local level during two annual registration periods in January and February each year. The District Naval Officer (DNO) then arranged with the local military (army) authorities for musters in early March of all persons registered who resided within naval training areas. At these musters, the DNO then selected for naval training the number of boys of the age of 14 authorised for his district.55 In a new and formidable defence-based naval cadet branch, the national ‘Authorised Complement of Cadets’ was 3300, plus those recruited in three areas, Thursday Island, Port Fairy and Portland, where all boys eligible under the scheme were to be enrolled in the NRC.56 As part of this process, the introduction of compulsory cadet training introduced a degree of navy planning and organisation to the NRC that was in stark contrast to its limited commitment to the immediate post-Federation cadets of the colonial naval brigades and the uncontrolled growth of the community-based sea cadets between 1901 and 1910.

After the commencement of compulsory training in 1911, membership of the NRC, in line with stated naval policy, was consistently a little over 3000 until the scheme was

54 Defence Progress Report on the Navy, Government Printer, Victoria, 18 October 1911, NAA A1194, 45.30/27777. 55 Regulations for Universal Training–Royal Australian Naval Reserve (O), NAA A1194, 12.11/4343. 56 ibid. 85 progressively wound down in the 1920s, and then eventually abandoned in 1929.57 Despite allowances for ‘wastage’, senior NRC numbers were generally consistent, starting with a membership of 3103 reported on 31 December 1911.58 In the next year, reported on 23 October 1912, there were 3228 Senior Naval Cadets (those born in the period 1895 to 1898), plus a special administrative and instructional staff provided from the permanent naval forces of 136 officers and men under the command of the Director of Naval Reserves (DNR). As a comparison, there were 875 adult members in the RANR at this time.59 A subsequent report of membership, on 1 September 1913, listed 4550 Universal Trainees but did not list Senior Cadets separately.60 A further report, on 29 April 1914, presented senior NRC membership figures for 30 June 1913 (2983), 15 March 1914 (3062) and 31 March 1915 (3166). Essentially, by 1915, senior NRC numbers had stabilised around 3000.61 Although, by September 1917, there were 3796 compulsory naval cadets organised and administered by DNOs under the national command of the Director of Naval Auxiliary Service (DNAS), at a cost of £3 per cadet per annum, but there were some lingering organisational problems to be overcome.62

While early official reports of the naval aspects of compulsory cadet training showed a rapidly expanded, but stable, NRC organisation, the speed of this expansion was not without its challenges. The extent of these difficulties was reported, on 30 June 1912, by the Minister for Defence, George Pearce, who had been an acknowledged advocate of the navy since 1908, when the Director of Naval Forces, Creswell, had praised him for taking immediate action in acquiring new destroyers, as the new Defence Minister in the Fisher government.63 In addition, Pearce had been one of the few politicians who responded positively to lobbying by the National Defence League in 1906 for the introduction of

57 Memorandum, DNRM to Naval Secretary, 7 July 1920; Extract from Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, No.17, dated 25 February 1921; NAA MP472/1, 5/21/616. Mercury, 8 November 1929, p.6. 58 Naval Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia, Strength on 31st December 1911, NAA MP472/1, 5/12/2825. 59 The Royal Australian Navy, The Vessels of the Fleet Unit, 1 November 1912, NAA MP472/1, 40/12/7936. 60 Reports, Strength of Naval Forces of the C’Wealth, NAA MP472/1, 2/14/3386. 61 Naval Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia, Strength on 31st March, 1915, NAA MP472/1, 2/14/3386. 62 Letter, DNAS to Minister for the Navy, 13 September 1917, Sea Power Centre-Australia (SPC-A) 23B. Further illustrating the complexity in the form and administration of the RANR, the role of Director of Naval Reserves (DNR) was re-titled the Director of Naval Auxiliary Services in 1914, but this change was not formalized until 1919, by which time the RANR (Sea-going) had been renamed simply the RANR, but the RANR (M) and (O) been become the Royal Australian Naval Brigade (RANB). 63 Norris, The Emergent Commonwealth, pp. 141-142. 86 compulsory defence training.64 For a committed supporter, Pearce was surprisingly candid in his initial review of the naval aspects of the compulsory cadet system.65 When the scheme commenced, Pearce noted, 3225 trainees had been allotted to the RANR and an administrative and instructional staff was created, but there had been staffing problems and, on 1 July 1911, the date fixed for obligatory training to commence, staff levels were fifty percent below authorised strength. These shortages decreased during the year, Pearce observed, but at no time did this staff reach its full strength, plus there had been a lack of suitable warrant officers to act as assistants to DNOs and some staff had been described as not having the confidence to do their jobs. These deficiencies were attributed to the new style of training and the naval staff having to adapt to an entirely new organisation, Pearce reported, with compulsory NRC training very much delayed because of the short space of time between the issue of the navy order for the scheme and its commencement. In addition to these staff training and organisation problems, Pearce further noted, poor cadet attendance continued to plague the scheme and the compulsory naval cadets were entirely ignorant of drill, ‘restive’ under discipline and prone to inattention.66 These remarks by Pearce on the RAN’s early experiences of compulsory training suggested that navy organisation and control did not, at this point, guarantee the creation of a well ordered NRC cadet system and that the navy was no more immune than the army to apathy and animosity among some of its compulsory cadets.67

As the compulsory cadet training scheme progressed and the benefits of full organisation and control delivered by a compulsory system developed, especially with the involvement of permanent personnel, the navy was able to deliver a much improved NRC system, and within three years the compulsory naval cadets were more seriously regarded as candidates for full-time naval training. As an example, on 1 July 1912, 750 Senior Naval Cadets were transferred to the adult reserve forces, but the navy was more in need of full- time recruits.68 Consequently, during the period 1912-27, the training ship Tingira operated afloat in Rose Bay as a training ship for full-time boy entrants to the navy, after previously

64 ibid., p. 140. 65 Universal Training–Report of the Minister for Defence of the Progress of, to 30th June, 1912–Royal Australian Naval Reserve “O” (Cadets), NAA A1194, 45.30/27777. 66 ibid. 67 Barrett, Falling in: Australians and ‘boy’ conscription, pp.72-5 68 Commonwealth, Year Book, no. 6, 1914, p. 1049. 87 being a floating reformatory for juvenile offenders.69 As the compulsory training scheme developed, now Rear Admiral and First Naval Member, WR Creswell, became a strong advocate of compulsory Senior Naval Cadets being ideal candidates for transfer to Tingira and, by 13 May 1914, he was advocating their recruitment from the compulsory cadet scheme. In this regard, Creswell observed that the Senior Naval Cadets were already well known individually to their officers and instructors, had been under naval command long enough to obey an order and were fixed residents of a port with local ties. Furthermore, with their homes in the vicinity of ports likely to be visited occasionally by their ships, this would have a settling effect and, in cases of desertion, which he believed would be much less frequent, there was a better chance of apprehension’.70 In contrast to the benefits of recruiting from the NRC, Creswell was of the view that civilian based full-time recruiting favoured the entry into service of the unemployed who were likely to desert when the work was found to be ‘irksome or its novelty wore off’.71 It seemed that Creswell’s views about the value of part-time naval cadets had swung back to the earlier more positive position of his Queensland experience.

In general terms, Creswell was convinced of the potential, but hitherto wasted, value of the compulsory NRC scheme as an agent of full-time recruitment for the navy. At the same time he was pointedly aware of the complex and changeable perception, held by senior navy leaders, of the nature of the training provided to the part-time NRC and their community-based sea cadet counterparts. In a further critical analysis of the navy’s recruiting problems, Creswell observed that the actual number of NRC members available for entry into Tingira varied from about 2000 on 1 July in any year (of whom 1100 were brand new entries) gradually declining to about 1500 as the end of the financial year approached. Further, he asserted that, ‘as these lads are distributed amongst 18 ports, it will be seen that there is not very much hope for a regular flow of recruits from this source, he observed, and that, on 26 June 1914, ‘last week no boys were entered in ‘Tingira’’.72 An additional telling observation by Creswell was that compulsory Junior Cadets were not of interest to him as there was ‘no

69 T Martin, ‘HMAS Tingira’, Naval Historical Review, vol. 19, no. 4, 1998, p. 9. 70 Memorandum, Creswell to Naval Secretary, 13 May 1914, NAA MP472/1, 5/14/3709. 71 ibid. 72 ibid. 88 room for boys in seagoing ships’. Nevertheless, he remained of the view that it needed to be impressed on DNOs that a steady flow of suitable candidates for Tingira was needed.73

Thus, although sceptical of their value some four years before, Creswell now regarded the part-time compulsory NRC as an important potential source of desirable recruits. In addition, Creswell’s observations confirm that attracting and retaining full-time entrants to the navy was a difficult task that was potentially made easier by NRC training under the compulsory cadet scheme. Moreover, his comments reinforced the premise that naval training was not for everybody and, thus, any indication of interest in a sea going career made the potential candidate worth pursuing. The nautical interest and even limited training, therefore, of not just the NRC, albeit it unwillingly elicited from the majority of these, but also of the few remaining community-based sea cadet units continued to both fascinate and frustrate the navy leadership. Finally, in considering the many factors raised by Creswell about HMAS Tingira, it is essential to an understanding of the navy’s recruitment problems to be aware that boys joining as full-time sailors, between the age of 14 ½ and 16, had to sign on until they reached the age of 25.74 Furthermore, unlike their part-time counterparts, they could expect to spend a substantial amount of that time at sea.

An additional enticement for service within the compulsory part-time NRC, as opposed to the army equivalent, was the opportunity for advancement, although no more than four percent of the cadet strength could be ‘Petty Officer Cadets’ and no more than 8 percent could be ‘Leading Cadets’. Nevertheless, the training syllabus provided that a cadet who had ‘shown aptitude and fitness to take charge of a squad’ might be promoted by the DNO.75 In this regard, a notable aspect of compulsory training was the well documented progression of Senior Naval Cadets, from first to fourth year, through examinations based on a detailed syllabus. These examinations required cadets to show proficiency in field exercises, ammunition and boating and there were additional requirements for specialists, such as Signalman Cadet.76 The implementation of such standards, as part of the navy’s organisation

73 ibid. 74 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 7, 1914, p. 950. 75 Regulations for Universal Training - Royal Australian Naval Reserve (O), NAA A1194, 12.11/4343. 76 ibid. 89 and control of the NRC, demonstrates how a combined movement, organised by the navy, might be administered. In addition, comments by NRC members of the era indicate widespread general acceptance of the navy part of the scheme and pride in being hand-picked and passing the selection process, although some boys reported that the threat of being sent to the army cadets was the real reason for the popularity of the navy scheme.77 Regardless of the motivation, there was evidence that a well organised NRC scheme was attractive to some boys of this era, particularly compared to the army alternative.

While efforts were made to make compulsory NRC training attractive to boys with no sea experience, it was those who had already commenced a civilian sea career who enjoyed unique privileges under the scheme. As an example, NRC members employed in merchant vessels were able to register for their compulsory training in either the district or town where their ship was registered or where they had signed their articles of employment. Furthermore, if the ship was not registered, or they had not signed articles, they could elect to register in any training area.78 Notwithstanding such privileges, NRC members employed in the merchant navy were kept under strict surveillance. For example, before they could go to sea, they had to obtain a ‘Permit to Proceed to Sea’ that verified that they had complied with the requirements of the Defence Act.79 In addition, the Shipping Master in Sydney had to be advised, in a separate process, that the Defence Department had no objection to the particular cadet proceeding to sea.80 Even with these checks in place, to ensure compliance, the navy was required to ascertain, through army area officers, that sea-going boys were registered and enrolled in the NRC, and DNOs had to make enquiries of the shipping companies if boys liable for compulsory training were working on any of their vessels.81

The special attention accorded to sea-going naval cadets was illustrated in the second year of the scheme, when, on 8 August 1912, the Defence Minister, Pearce, advised Senator Robert Guthrie (an ex-sailor and South Australian Fusionist), that every opportunity was

77 Barrett, Falling in: Australians and ‘boy’ conscription, p. 224 78 Regulations for Universal Training - Royal Australian Naval Reserve (O), NAA A1194, 12.11/4343. 79 Cadets-General-Cadet FW Roberts, 1912 quota, AWM 61, 426/1/123, 80 ibid. 81Memorandum, DNR to Naval Secretary, 19 February 1912, NAA MP472/1, 1/15/6683. 90 being provided to allow cadets employed at sea to perform their training at the most convenient port. Furthermore, Pearce observed, although proposed amendments to the Defence Act made it possible for a trainee to be punished for missing even one statutory parade, this was not to be enforced in the case of sea-going persons, who would be dealt with annually on their merits. Additionally, cadets on long voyages were entitled to be exempt from a portion of the required training in proportion to the period for which they were absent. Further emphasising the privileged position of sea-going NRC members in the scheme, Pearce provided details of the mere 43 merchant navy boys, among more than 3,000 NRC members and 90,000 army cadets, and reported that there had been only two cases of sea- going cadets experiencing difficulty in performing the drills required.82 For their part, navy administrators observed that crews in harbour had their evenings to themselves, so there should be no excuse for cadets failing to perform the necessary night drills and, furthermore, that shipping companies were quite agreeable to letting the boys have time off as convenient for the daylight drills.83 These special arrangements made it clear that the navy regarded this group as an important part of the compulsory cadet scheme, despite there being so few of them, and illustrates the special view held, not just by the navy, of the value of sea going experience.

It is self evident that a fourfold increase in the size of the NRC under the compulsory system would have had a considerable impact on the navy budget for reserve cadets. Hence, as the compulsory NRC branch was being provided with full uniform and training supplies in the middle of World War I, it was not surprising that the cost of training resulted in a suspension of the scheme as early as 1916.84 The 1914/15 navy budget reported the cost of supplying the obligatory NRC to be close to £8000 for items such as 1265 rifles and slings, 468,550 rounds of ammunition, 2800 cap ribbons, 1100 boots, and so on.85 As the scheme matured, the budget was reduced, as various stock items were built up, and the 1916/17 allocation was just over £6500 for items such as 2800 serge suits, 1000 duck suits, 1800

82Letter, Pearce to Guthrie, 8 August 1912, NAA MP472/1, 1/15/6683. 83 Memorandum, DNR to Naval Secretary, 17 August 1912, NAA MP472/1, 1/15/6683. 84 Circular, Adjutant General to All Military Districts, 28 May 1917, NAA MP472/1, 5/17/3676; Commonwealth Year Book, no.6, 1913, p. 1068. 85 Naval Reserves - Estimates 1914-15, NAA MP472/1, 3/16/4020. 91 white caps, and so on, but funding was consistently insufficient to meet the training costs.86 As a result, senior cadet training was suspended for the quarter ended 13 December 1916 and it was further decided that, in calculating the efficiency of senior cadets for the year 1916-17, attendance for the full statutory requirements of 64 hours would not be required, provided the full proportion of compulsory drills for the remaining three quarters of the years, namely a total duration of 48 hours, had been completed.87 In addition to these reductions in attendance requirements, further attempts at economy included allowing naval cadets to wear their first issue of boots for work or other purposes and, thus, get full-time use out of them for at least six months. In exchange for this concession, the cadets’ parents were expected to replace the boots, when worn out, in a style suitable for the drill activity.88 These sorts of measures attracted considerable attention and the Minister for Navy, Jens Jensen, was moved to observe in defence of such action, as an example, that wearing the boots as allowed by the Regulations, when attending drill, would result in the equivalent of twenty two days use, whereas the new ruling allowed for approximately six months wear.89

At another level, although there was no practical seamanship training for junior cadets in schools, the navy made every effort to extract what value it could from this part of the compulsory scheme by the introduction of basic maritime subjects into the junior cadet syllabus, as had been urged by the Australian Natives Association in relation to voluntary cadet training some years before.90 This was not achieved in any systematic manner, however, as the junior cadet training syllabus in schools, for boys aged 12 to 14, was designed essentially as an army program and naval administrators had to engage in a retroactive campaign to introduce nautical subjects. Although not fully formed units of the NRC, and hence not part of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, the junior cadets were of particular interest to the navy as future Senior Naval Cadets or as candidates for the full-time navy. Hence when, on 18 June 1912, the Victorian DNO, Captain JT Richardson, noticed in the Argus that the Minister for Defence, Pearce, was convening a meeting of

86 Naval Reserves - Estimates 1916/17, NAA MP472/1, 3/16/4020 87 Circular, Adjutant General to All Military Districts on the subject ‘Efficiency – Senior Cadets – 1916-17’, 28 May 1917, NAA MP472/1, 5/17/3676. 88 Minute, DNR to DNOs, 2 October 1915, NAA MP472/1, 13/16/4804. 89 Letter, Jensen to Ready, 2 August 1916, NAA MP472/1, 13/16/4804. 90 Letter, General Secretary, Australian Natives Association, to Minister of Defence, 4 October 1909, NAA MP178/2, 2310/8/13. 92 education and defence representatives to discuss junior cadet training, without including the navy, he volunteered to attend.

An enthusiastic naval and sea cadet supporter who had championed navy support of the community-based sea cadets when serving in Queensland, Richardson contacted Navy Headquarters and arranged to be appointed as the navy representative. At the conference, he recommended that the compass and semaphore alphabet should be taught in state schools along with the junior cadet subjects of physical exercise and squad drill without weapons.91 After the addition of swimming to the subject list at Navy Headquarters, Richardson’s recommendations were put to the conference considering junior training in Melbourne on 23 and 24 July 1912 and it was agreed that the ‘Mariners’ Compass and Elementary Signalling’ would be listed as an optional subject for junior cadet training in certain specified state schools in naval training areas’.92

In addition to the need for Richardson to make a special effort to get junior naval training included as part of the school component of the compulsory cadet scheme, the navy’s marginal role in the wider Universal Training Scheme was well illustrated by the perceived insignificance and inconvenience of having to consider junior navy cadet training at all.93 At the conference it was listed under ‘minor matters briefly mentioned’ and there was a notation that it was done at the ‘the pressing instance of Captain Richardson, District Naval Office, Victoria’.94 Further limitations were placed on Richardson’s achievement, when the implementation of naval subjects within the junior cadet school-based curriculum was restricted to a limited number of coastal towns and on the basis that the subjects were to be accepted as an alternative to swimming in the winter months.95 Nonetheless, the inclusion of the Mariners’ Compass and Elementary Signalling in the junior cadet training textbook gave all junior cadets exposure to not just the technical aspects of semaphore, but also historical

91 Letter, Richardson to DNR, 18 June 1912, NAA MP472/1, 5/12/6119. 92 Conference of Representatives of State Education Departments held in Melbourne on 23rd and 24th July, 1912, for the purpose of considering the Progress and Future of Physical and other Junior Cadet Training, NAA MP84/1, 1832/13/573. 93 Letter, DNO Queensland to Director of Education, 17 August 1912, QSA 6477, 997066. 94 ibid. 95 ibid. 93 material such as the Battle of Trafalgar and the flagging of vessels under the Colonial Defence Act, 1865.96 Moreover, the change allowed the navy to engage with junior cadets, in naval districts, and it was decided that a naval instructor would instruct each class under arrangements made between the DNO and the director of education in each state. The final outcome was that, on 16 August 1912, the army’s Adjutant General initiated the process for amending the Universal Training Regulations to include the Mariners’ Compass and Elementary Signalling in the list of optional junior cadet subjects.97

Despite what appeared to be a general concession, the changes to the junior cadet syllabus were made on the basis that the navy was to be given coverage in the compulsory junior cadet syllabus only in areas in close proximity to naval bases, where Senior Naval Cadets would be selected. Thus, junior naval cadet training remained a limited adjunct to army cadet training and the majority of boys in the scheme were not exposed to naval ideas. The nature of these types of limitations and the naval cadets’ marginal status within the compulsory cadet training scheme was well described by John Barrett in Falling in: Australians and “boy conscription”.98 Barrett mostly considered land forces, and only occasionally referred to naval cadets, as those called up for the army outnumbered them by 40 to one. He further highlights the borderline status of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement in this era with his comments that ‘to the study of compulsory training in Australia, the development of an Australian Navy is merely a side issue’ and that the several hundred volunteer naval cadets in existence at the time of the introduction of the Universal Training Scheme were ‘mere playful youngsters’.99

Another new experience for the relatively small, compared to the army, NRC contingent, and their navy commanders, were the army disciplinary procedures. From a legal and discipline standpoint, the compulsory cadet scheme had not only transformed the shape of the NRC branch of the movement but compulsion required that, notwithstanding its minor role, the navy was required to meet strict standards in implementing the prescribed

96 Department of Defence, Junior cadet training: text book, 1916, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1916. 97 Minute, Adjutant General to Director General Medical Services, 23 April 1913, NAA MP84/1, 1939/3/238. 98 J Barrett, Falling in: Australians and ‘boy’ conscription, p. 9. 99 ibid. 94 disciplinary measures for truancy, particularly if detention was warranted.100 Legal control of the cadets under the compulsory scheme did not, however, necessarily equate to effective discipline as delays in providing training quickly deteriorated into more serious issues of discipline, for both the navy and the army. These disciplinary problems and the resources they consumed provide an insight into one aspect of why the wider scheme ultimately failed and, from a navy perspective, it may provide traces of why future Naval Boards were consistently wary of a permanently expanded naval and sea cadet movement. During the compulsory era, both the navy and army cadet organisations grew dramatically and their parent organisations struggled with the organisation and control of this process. There were 3045 naval cadets in training on 1 March 1912 being organised and controlled as part of a permanent sea going naval force of only 632 and an administrative staff of 118. In comparison, 88,849 army senior cadets were part of a permanent Army of 2023, with 217 area officers, 21,429 militia and 127 volunteers.101 Although the naval ratio of cadets to full- time naval members was only five to one (in comparison to the full-time Army members being outnumbered forty to one by their cadets), each force faced a considerable challenge in implementing the compulsory scheme, and punitive measures were a key part of attempts to keep on top of attendance and general discipline.102

In an attempt to control poor attendance, both fines and confinement in custody were imposed and, after cadet detention became a common punishment from 1913, it was the manner in which detention was served by cadets that made it an important part of how the scheme was controlled.103 For example, cadets committed to detention as a punishment for training truancy were conveyed in departmental wagons to the barracks where they would be detained in custody until the expiration of the period for which they were committed. In addition to the theatrics of this process, its initial introduction was strictly regimented with twenty five prosecutions to be brought in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne in the first instance. This process involved the navy from the outset as, by arrangement with the DNO, each party of twenty five cadet offenders was to include two Senior Naval Cadet offenders

100 P Brock, Against the draft, essays on conscientious objection from the radical reformation to the Second World War, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006, pp. 195-221. 101 Strength of naval and military forces for years 1911-1912, NAA MP84/1, 1856/7/522 102 Department of Defence, Defence Act 1903-1912: regulations (provisional) and standing orders for the military forces of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1908, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1913. 103 ibid. 95 and the proportion of expenditure was to be allotted to the naval authorities. As soon as one party had been dealt with, similar action would be taken with other offenders in parties of twenty five. In addition, DNOs were required to provide quarterly reports on ‘penalties inflicted’, from which the Naval Secretary compiled a ‘Return Of Fines Inflicted Upon Military Trainees’ for the Army Adjutant General.104

There was no doubt that detention was a euphemism for imprisonment as parents were to be informed immediately of the period of detention and the hours during which visitors were admitted (with no visit to exceed fifteen minutes). Similarly, detention was not a part-time or week day only affair, with divine services to be conducted for detainees within the barracks on Sundays. There must have been some recreation time, nonetheless, as books magazines and newspapers were allowed if provided by relatives or obtained from other sources.105 Nevertheless, Regulation 30, under the Defence Act, which authorised such detentions, as Jauncey describes it, ‘cleared the way for the imprisonment of youths in fortresses’ and provides one of the most notorious memories of the history of Australian conscription.106

Although predominantly work-oriented and resented by a significant number of navy and army cadets, the compulsory cadet scheme provided Australian boys with some sporting and recreational opportunities through participation in competitions like that in place for international rifle shooting. Perhaps unexpectedly, given their focus on seamanship, the naval cadets excelled in shooting and the public record and newspaper reports provide substantial evidence of the participation and success of the volunteer Australian naval and sea cadet movement in the various shooting competitions of this era.107 These competitions were fully sponsored by the Defence Department and DNOs were diligent in their encouragement and administration of the naval cadet involvement in the most prestigious of these events, the Imperial Challenge Shield. In an early example, on 20 March 1911, the Victorian DNO,

104 Memorandum, Naval Secretary to Director of Naval &Military Audit, 11 November 1916, NAA MP472, 5/16/8337. 105 Circular No. 1, Adjutant General to Military Commandant, All Military Districts, I.G., Secretary, and Members of the Military Board, 2 January 1913, NAA MP84/1, 1939/3/232. 106 Jauncey, The Story of Conscription in Australia, p. 30. 107 Stockings, The Torch and the Sword, p. 51. 96

Richardson, nominated a team of 58 senior naval cadets in the Imperial Challenge Shield competition from a total membership of 770.108 South Australia quickly enrolled two teams of eleven cadets (one junior and one senior), on 26 March 1911, and, as other navy teams formed around the country, the NRC fully embraced one of the most prominent and prestigious shooting competitions in the history of the Australian defence cadet movement.109

In addition to enthusiasm, the comparatively small and far flung naval cadet teams demonstrated considerable skill in shooting and¸ in 1912, the Imperial Challenge Shield was won by a team of nine Senior Naval Cadets from Albany. For this achievement they won The Challenge Shield, The Bronze Replica, 10 Silver Medals and £15. Other navy prize winners at this completion included the “A” Co., Naval Cadets, Largs Bay, South Australia who were placed sixth and received £3 and “D” Co., Naval cadets, South Australia who placed seventh and won £3 in the junior competition.110 These positive results were highlighted in reports on the efficiency of the compulsory naval cadets, particularly as equipment, such as targets, was often not available.111 Despite these occasional setbacks, the NRC won the Imperial Challenge Shield again, in both 1914 and 1915, and, although they did not retain the trophy in 1916, 15 of naval cadet teams were placed in the top fifty out of 321 teams that competed in that year.112

The success of Australia’s NRC in the competitions for the Imperial Challenge Shield competition inspired supporters and resulted in lobbying for the establishment of a local naval drill competition.113 Consideration of how this seemingly benign attempt to emulate the British system of shooting competitions turned into a headache for the navy is instructive because it illustrates how, even under the umbrella of the compulsory training scheme, public involvement in naval and sea cadet training could result in, potentially, considerable and unwelcome expenditure for the navy. Plans for a local scheme came to the navy’s attention when, on 7 March 1913, the Minister for Defence, Pearce, accepted Senator AM Blakey’s

108Memorandum, Richardson, to Secretary of Defence, 20 March 1911, NAA MP472/1, 2/13/3237. 109Memorandum, South Australian DNO to DNR, 26 March 1911, NAA MP472/1, 2/13/3237. 110 Adelaide Advertiser, 12 September 1912, p. 19 111 Memorandum, DNR to Naval Secretary, 18 August 1913, NAA MP472/1 5/13/8954. 112 Letter, DNAS to Minister for the Navy, 13 September 1917, SPC-A 23B. 113 Letter, Secretary, ANA, to Minister for Defence, 17 March 1913, NAA MP472/1 2/12/3237. 97 offer of a Challenge Shield for naval cadets to be provided by the Australian Natives Association and the Australian Steamship Owners’ Federation.114 The association proposed to provide a shield or shields to the value of £50 for annual competitions for Senior Naval Cadets with the object of attaining a higher standard of efficiency in naval exercises and drills. Competitions were to be held, if possible, in Melbourne and Sydney alternately and would be for two separate prizes.115

Unlike the Imperial Challenge Shield competition, however, which was conducted in local areas using international rules, this event was to bring together naval cadets in one location at a cost of £560. Only after the donation of the new shields had been accepted did it become obvious to the naval authorities that conducting the competition as suggested by the sponsors would cost more than ten times the value of the donated shields. For this reason, it was decided to hold the competition in local areas between 7 May and 4 July 1914 in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Fremantle and Hobart.116 It seemed that a solution had been reached, but the sponsors were not happy.117 They argued that the naval cadets were being treated differently to the military (army) cadets and they wanted Pearce to give instructions that one centralised competition should be held in Melbourne. For his part, Pearce explained that the cost of conducting the competition at one centre was prohibitive, whereas holding it in each state would cost much less. Furthermore, the strength of the military (army) cadets was approximately 87,000 and the naval cadets about 3000. For this reason, and having regard to the large number of naval cadets involved in the already organised competition, Pearce explained that it had been decided not to interfere with the arrangements already in place for that year, although the decision would be reconsidered next year.118 Thus, it seemed that the matter was finally settled, but the sponsors were still not happy and, demonstrating how such matters could assume proportions well beyond what the Naval Board might consider desirable, Senator McDougall called on Pearce to explain his decision to the Senate, which Pearce did on 22 May 1914.119

114 Letter, Pearce to Blakey, 7 March 1913, NAA MP472/1, 1/20/10917. 115 Letter, Naval Secretary to General Secretary, ANA, 11 August 1913, NAA MP472/1, 1/20/10917. 116Letter, Naval Secretary to Blakey, 2 April 1914, NAA MP472/1, 1/20/10917. 117 Minute, Secretary of Defence to Naval Secretary, 9 May 1914, NAA MP472/1, 1/20/10917. 118 ibid. 119 CPD, no. 21, 22 May 1914, p. 1430. 98

Ultimately, with approval for a state by state competition finally achieved, the Senior Naval Cadet competition went ahead and was won by naval cadets from New South Wales.120 Even then, problems with funding continued as, on 18 July 1914, the New South Wales DNO, Commander F Brownlow, asked Admiral Creswell for £20 to ‘make a good show’ for the Governor General, who was presenting the shields.121 Creswell replied on the same day by telegram that he did not consider the occasion called for any ‘unusual’ expenditure.122 There is no evidence that future naval cadet competitions were the subject of any great controversy, although changes had to be made at times due to the lack of naval personnel available to officiate.123 Notwithstanding the occasional need for economy, the local competition remained strong for some time, with 40 of the prizes in the 1920 competition being won by Australian teams and the overall competition won by the NRC team from Cairns.124 Subsequent newspaper reports recorded the success of volunteer Australian naval cadet competitors through to 1928, at which time general interest from Australia was reported to have waned.125 Nevertheless, the original drawn out and high profile exchange over a ‘simple’ cadet shooting competition is important because it reveals the degree of continuing parsimony applied to even defence-based naval cadet activities at the time, and the level of scrutiny involved, and what community-based sea cadet units might expect if they made similar requests. More broadly, while the navy might endorse, and fund, some activities that had a recreational aspect, the primary focus for the NRC would be seamanship and defence.

With so much of the navy’s attention being directed towards the compulsory naval cadets, both officially and publicly, it would not have been surprising if community-based naval and sea cadet activity had ceased, mostly due to lack of navy support. This was, however, not the case. The community-based branch of the movement lived on and continued to seek navy support and recognition. Indeed, applications were still being

120Letter, DNR to Naval Secretary, 8 July 1914, NAA MP472/1, 1/20/10917. 121 Telegram, Brownlow to Creswell, 18 July 1914, NAA MP472/1, 1/20/10917. 122 ibid. 123 Minute, DNR to Second Naval Member, 6 December 1920, NAA MP472/1, 1/20/10917. 124 The Times, 9 November 1920, p. 9. 125 Argus of 28 May 1928, p. 14. It was reported that the Senior Imperial Rifle Challenge Shield had been won by the Royal Australian Naval Reserve team from Newcastle (New South Wales), but disappointment was expressed in the decrease in the number of Australian competitors. 99 received for support of new Boys’ Naval Brigade units as late as 1914, but the navy was not sympathetic, particularly when proposed units were well away from any sort of sea training facility. As an example, on 16 July 1914, Captain Walter Simpson advised the navy that he had 20 years sea service and would like to start a Boys’ Naval Brigade unit at Lidcombe in Sydney, where he had support from others in the area with experience of Boys’ Naval Brigade activities in England.126 In his advice to the Naval Board, on 25 July 1914, the DNR, Commander J Beresford, advised that he did not see that there was any benefit that would accrue to the navy by the establishment of a ‘Boys’ Naval Brigade’ in the Lidcombe district.127 Beresford pointed out that Lidcombe was about ten miles from Sydney and four miles from Parramatta and was situated in a military training area and not a naval one. Furthermore, he observed, if approval were given, the unit would probably want to be supplied with the necessary gear for instruction and other support.

Notwithstanding Beresford’s advice and the remoteness of the proposed unit from sea facilities, the Naval Board expressed the view, on 1 August, that it had no objection to the proposal, which was good for recruiting, but could not supply gear or incur any expense in connection with the brigade.128 Simpson’s proposal took an interesting turn when, on 10 August, he advised that as part of his scheme he would ‘like permission to wear the Uniform’.129 To this, the Naval Board Secretary, GL Macandie, advised Simpson, on 14 September 1914, that ‘permission to wear the Naval Uniform can only be granted to Officers of the Permanent or Citizens Naval Forces’.130 This seemingly innocuous exchange provides an early glimpse into a defining aspect of the community-based branch of the movement, particularly from this point onwards, where the desire of the volunteer instructor to wear the uniform of the RAN resulted in periodic transgressions and caused some major problems for the navy.

126 Letter, Simpson to Macandie, 16 July 1914, NAA MP472/1, 2/14/5602. 127 Memorandum, Beresford to Macandie, 31 July 1914, NAA MP472/1, 2/14/5602. 128 ibid. 129 Letter, Simpson to Macandie, 10 August 1914, NAA MP472/1, 2/14/5602. 130 Letter, Macandie to Simpson, 14 September 1914, NAA MP472/1, 2/14/5602. 100

Unlike proposals of the type put forward by Simpson, the focus of the organisers of the community-based sea cadets during the compulsory training era was predominantly on gaining acceptance of their training as equivalent to what was prescribed under the compulsory scheme and, thus, gaining an exemption from the scheme for their members.131 In this regard, and demonstrating the unending complexity of the community-based branch of the movement, it was the sea scout arm of the Boy Scouts’ Association, not the Boys’ Naval Brigade, that proceeded to launch an official bid for recognition that would run for six years. Boy Scout founder, Lieutenant-General Robert Baden Powell, had foreshadowed the possibility of such a bid at his highly publicised tour to officially launch the Australian sea scouts, in May 1912, some two years after they had been established by local volunteers.132 Baden-Powell described his scheme as one that he believed would secure recruits for the Australian navy, as sea-scouting had been such a success in England that the British Admiralty had recognised the sea scouts without being asked.133 The sea scouts lengthy campaign for navy recognition commenced unofficially when, on 27 May 1914, the Private Secretary to the Governor of Victoria, asked the navy for the ‘official view taken of the Victorian Sea Scouts’ section of the Boy Scouts Association’.134 On 9 June 1914, the Naval Board Secretary, Macandie, advised that ‘nothing is known of this movement’ and that it ‘would seem to be only in the process of organisation’.135 Although they had Vice-Regal support and were in close proximity to Navy Headquarters, the sea scout organisers would have to make a formal proper case, rather than an informal approach through the Governor’s office, particularly when the navy had little knowledge of their existence. It was over two years before this happened.

In a development that further demonstrated the convoluted nature of the community- based sea cadet branch in this era it was, eventually, the Society of the Ancient Mariners of Victoria, on 17 August 1916, that advised the Minister for the Navy, Jens Jensen, that they had founded the sea scouting movement in Melbourne two years earlier.136 As a further development, the society advised that they had decided to establish a permanent nautical

131 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 5, 1912, pp. 1075-6 132 Morning Bulletin, 30 May 1912, p. 8; Launceston Examiner, 20 August 1910, p. 3. 133 ibid. 134 Letter, Private Secretary to Naval Secretary, 27 May 1914, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 135 Letter, Naval Secretary to Private Secretary, 9 June 1914, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 136 Letter, Ancient Mariners to Jensen, 17 August 1916, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 101 training school and a suitable location had been found at Albert Park for which they were seeking navy assistance. With regard to navy involvement, it was observed that the proposed scheme would in no way interfere with compulsory cadet training, as the sea scouts trained boys from 11 to 14 years. Essentially, the request was being made for official navy recognition and, if possible, some financial assistance.137 Jensen was quick to advise the society, on 5 September 1916, that ‘as proper provision has been made for the training of all boys in the Commonwealth on attaining the age of 14 years the Department cannot see its way to accept any responsibility for boys who are younger’.138

While this refusal to assist on the grounds that the compulsory cadet scheme was meeting the navy’s needs is pertinent to understanding the marginal nature of the community- based branch of the movement at this time, the comments of the Second Naval Member, Captain A Gordon Smith, are of greater significance for understanding the long term duality of the movement that continued after the cessation of the compulsory system.139 Smith observed that the army had not yet recognised the wider boy scout movement and recommended that neither the government nor the Naval Board should recognise the sea scouts of Victoria until the land-based boy scout movement generally was officially recognised. In addition, he noted, the sea scout scheme was purely local and full of vague aspirations that might not be realised, nor did he think that under the control of the Ancient Mariners of Victoria it was likely to expand to become of national importance. On the other hand, if it did reach this level, the proposal might be reconsidered.140 Smith had made it clear that a national sea scout organisation, preferably organised by a boy scout organisation recognised by the army, might merit consideration for some recognition but, for now, this local scheme showed little potential for such development. Smith’s comments are all the more significant because they foreshadowed the Naval Board’s most long standing and insurmountable objection to recognising the community-based sea cadets – the lack of a formal national organisation with which the RAN could agree and implement organisation, control, personnel and funding arrangements.

137 ibid. 138 Letter, Jensen to Ancient Mariners, 5 September 1916, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 139 Commonwealth Naval Board Minute, 29 August 1914, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 140 ibid. 102

Thus, the Australian naval and sea cadet movement arrived at the end of ten years of compulsory cadet service with the NRC absorbing the bulk of the navy’s available cadet resources, but individual community-based sea cadet groups still being formed and seeking navy assistance. In addition, the sea scouts had made a bid for official recognition and support, through the Society of Ancient Mariners. Although this initial application was unsuccessful, it demonstrated that the Naval Board was amenable to an approach from a viable national organisation that might be able to represent the community-based sea cadets. In this regard, with the Boys’ Naval Brigade on the wane, it was the sea scouts that appeared most likely to fill this role from 1911 -19, but they were soon to be joined by a competitor. The New South Wales branch of the British Navy League of Australia were preparing to launch a community-based naval cadet corps based on the model that had evolved from the work of the Marine Society in Britain.141 The British Navy League, founded in 1894 as a RN lobby group, had sponsored Naval Lads’ Brigades to form the Navy League Boys’ Naval Brigade and, by 1919, 34 of these brigades were granted British Admiralty recognition as the Navy League Sea Cadet Corps (NLSCC).142 With a naval and sea cadet pedigree dating from 1785, including recruiting for the RN, this new style of organisation might succeed where the sea scouts had, thus far, failed to sway the navy on the merits of recognising and fully supporting community-based sea cadet units.

141 JS Taylor, Jonas Hanway Founder of the Marine Society Charity and Policy in Eighteenth Century Britain, Scolar Press, London, 1985. 142 R Woodman, … of daring temper 250 years of the Marine Society, Marine Society (Seafarers’ Libraries), London, 2006, p. 89.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Balance Restored 1920-1923

The period 1920-23 was an important one for the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, largely because an emergent community-based branch (consisting mostly of sea scout troops and NLSCC units) progressed to the brink of being officially recognised by the navy, although not in the same form as the compulsory NRC. This chapter begins with an examination of the foundation and initial growth of the NLSCC. Thereafter, a bid for official navy recognition of the community-based sea scouts, conducted by the Boy Scouts’ Association, is considered. This is followed by consideration of an early bid by the newly formed NLSCC to secure official recognition and the navy’s consideration, and ultimate rejection, of the case for official recognition of the two most prominent community-based sea cadet schemes in this era. This analysis examines the criteria set by the navy in reviewing these bids for official recognition and the basis for the final rejection decision. The chapter concludes with an examination of the decline of compulsory cadet training and its effect on membership of the NRC.

In June 1919, represented by WM Hughes and Sir Joseph Cook, Australia signed the Treaty of Versailles as an independent nation and became one of the 42 nations represented as full members when the League of Nations met for the first time in November 1920.1 At home, in the aftermath of the war, the wounded and disabled, and widows and their children, had to be cared for as tens of thousands of returned servicemen looked for work. Unexpected high levels of unemployment and continuing industrial disputation resulted, particularly in the coal mines and on the waterfront.2 For those who could find employment, the working week was long, but most wage earners had Saturday afternoon off to play sport and Sunday was for church, with few shops and no places of entertainment open for business. At least half of Australia’s children went to Sunday Schools.3 Public loyalty to Britain and sentiment for the Empire was particularly strong after the war, to the point where a disloyal, angry

1 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, pp.159-160. 2 ibid., pp. 162-163. 3 ibid., p. 163. 104 statement about Britain by the member for Kalgoorlie, Hugh Mahon, led to his formal expulsion from the Federal parliament and the calling of a by-election for his seat, which he lost.4 Public meetings were held to declare faithfulness to the Empire and, on 19 July 1920, the King and Empire Alliance was formed to promote the welfare of the British Empire and to discourage disloyal doctrines.5 This was a time when a range of movements aggressively pursued political, industrial, religious, racial and broader social ends, but it was the empire loyalists that were of particular relevance to the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, because of the work of the Navy League.6

From a navy perspective, the period 1920-3, was the beginning of an era, 1920-1938, where ambitions, both in Britain and Australia, for the development of the RAN were not necessarily matched by the needed levels of planning, cooperation or funding.7 Although the RN transferred six destroyers and six submarines to the RAN, expanding the RAN to 26 surface ships, six submarines and a number of auxiliary ships, the international focus was on disarmament and the Commonwealth Government announced large reductions in naval funding for the 1922-23 financial year.8 Shipbuilding was heavily curtailed and the number of civilian staff employed by the navy, 3000 in 1918, was reduced to 382 by 1931.9 Thus, the period 1920-23 was defined by the Washington Naval Treaty limiting the size and number of naval armaments, budget cuts, the placing of ships in reserve, restrictions on citizen force training and depot closures.10 Nevertheless, these constraints on the RAN may not have been obvious to members of the community, or keen future naval and sea cadets, as 600 officers and sailors marched through the streets of Sydney on 16 June 1921.11 A year earlier, a similar ‘Great Naval Review’ had taken place in Melbourne on 28 May 1920, so the image of a successful and well funded navy, apparently able to support new community-based sea

4 ibid., p. 166. 5 Knightley, Australia: A Biography of a Nation, p. 97. 6 ibid., pp. 98-106. 7 Frame, No Pleasure cruise, pp.129-148. 8 ibid., pp. 137-138. 9 ibid., pp. 136-137. 10 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 129. 11 Sydney Morning Herald, 16 June 1921, p. 8. 105 cadet units, would have given some encouragement to the Navy League in their effort to launch their new sea cadet scheme.12

Thus, as post war naval austerity increased, from 1920, the British Navy League branches in Australia progressively took a prominent role in supporting the activities of various types of youth groups, but especially community-based sea cadet organisations, including the sea scouts. It was their formation of the NLSCC, also in 1920, however, that created a permanent focal point for the duality of the naval and sea cadet movement until unification with the defence-based NRC in 1952. The Navy League was formed in England in 1894 and action was taken to create an Australian branch in Sydney in January 1896.13 By 1903, there were branches of the British Navy League in Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Adelaide and Hobart, but a meeting held in Queensland, in August 1903, with the aim of forming an Australian navy league was met with disapproval by the Secretary of the (British) Navy League in Sydney, George Craig.14 In trying to establish an independent Australian navy league, the Queenslanders were focused primarily on securing local naval training for ‘Australian boys, for Australian ships in Australian waters’ and a resolution was passed that provision should be made for training ships for the preparation of Australian youths for a naval career.15 This first attempt at establishing an Australian navy league was short lived and it was not until June 1915 that the Navy League of Australia was established in Victoria and a Sydney branch formed in November 1917.16 Demonstrating the lack of continuity in the Navy League, and its future naval cadet corps, and providing some evidence as to why activity would centre on Sydney and Melbourne for the next thirty years, the Hobart branch of the Navy League of Australia was not opened until April 1951.17

As a navy lobby group, established under the auspices of the parent organisation in Britain, the Australian branches of the Navy League were single-minded advocates of the RN

12 Argus, 28 May 1920, p. 8. 13 Argus, 28 December 1894, p. 3; Daily News, 22 January 1896, p.6. 14 Brisbane Courier, 26 August 1903, p. 4. 15 Brisbane Courier, 1 August 1903, p. 6. 16 Argus, 25 June 1915, p. 10; Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 1917, p. 1.. 17 Mercury, 21 April 1951, p. 7. 106 and RAN.18 In Australia, the Navy League regarded the full-time naval training ship, Tingira, as an excellent way of preparing boys for adult service in the navy and encouraged the part-time cadets of the NLSCC, when training commenced in 1920, to join the full-time navy by this avenue.19 In this way, the first Australian NLSCC units were focused on seamanship training to prepare for entry to the navy as well as citizenship training through the development of characteristics such as obedience, self reliance and service to the community.20 From the point of commencement of its community-based sea cadet activities, the Navy League declared, and never retreated from, a commitment to creating a scheme along similar lines to that existing in England, where the Navy League and the Marine Society were officially recognised by the British Admiralty as important pre-entry training institutions.21 This early declaration of an intention to follow the British model enshrined the expectation within the Navy League that the navy would be heavily involved in helping with organisation, control, personnel and funding for the NLSCC, including the provision of suitable training vessels.22 This goal of eliciting formal support for the NLSCC quickly became the key issue in the Navy League’s relationship with the navy and remained so for the next 35 years.

The creation and development of NLSCC units, as a key part of the Navy League mission, received significant coverage in most editions of the organisation’s flagship publication, The Navy League Journal.23 The journal’s abundant content on overall youth development activities, furthermore, made it clear that the league was a passionate supporter of many existing groups, including the boy scouts. Articles, editorial comment and a monthly news section on the development of the NLSCC, however, held pride of place, commencing in June 1920 with the announcement of the intention to establish the first NLSCC company.24 Inspired by similar British and Canadian corps, where cadets had volunteered for service in the RN and merchant marine during World War 1, senior school boys and those who had left school, but were ‘outside the scope of the Commonwealth

18 Woodman, … of daring temper 250 years of the Marine Society, p. 89.. 19 The Navy League Journal, vol.1, no. 2, p. 4. 20 ibid., vol. 1, no. 6, p. 16. 21 ibid., vol. 1, no. 3, p. 15; R Woodman, … of daring temper 250 years of the Marine Society, p. 89. 22 The Navy League Journal, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 15. 23 ibid., vol.1, nos. 2-6. 24 ibid. 107

Compulsory Training Act’, were invited to join the NLSCC as volunteers.25 Appeals to the Navy League membership for support emphasised citizenship with a ‘selection’ of boys with a ‘penchant’ for the sea to be taught obedience, self reliance and service to the community as part of the first unit of the NLSCC in Australia.26 Thus, what was to become, eventually, the pre-eminent Australian community-based sea cadet organisation was inspired by the navy recruitment achievements of its overseas counterparts, but would focus on engendering good citizenship, rather than purely teaching seamanship.

The inaugural NLSCC unit, when it was established in 1920, appeared more than adequately subscribed with cadets and training personnel. It comprised seven volunteer instructors, an honorary chaplain, a medical officer, a surgeon dentist, and 52 cadets. A systematic scheme of training had been formulated and its members were to have a fully qualified physical instructor. In addition to weekend training, there was to be one evening per week devoted to illustrated lectures on the history of the RN, the Empire’s merchant marine and other appropriate subjects. The boys were also to be encouraged to engage in sports such as football, swimming, boxing, cricket and hockey. Finally, should NLSCC members want to go to sea at a suitable age, every effort would be made to encourage and assist them to fulfil their ambitions.27 Enthusiastic supporters described the new unit as a trial on a purely voluntary basis.28 Notwithstanding its trial status, expansion of the new scheme was immediate and, in October 1920, it was reported that this first unit had a membership of 66, comprising 12 honorary officers and 54 boys.29 By November, this foundation unit was well established and it was reported that its members were receiving instruction in calisthenics, squad drill, mariners’ compass, oarsmanship, knotting and splicing, signalling, swimming and the casting and reading of the hand lead. 30 The first NLSCC unit appeared to be popular, well organised and controlled, with adequate personnel and resources, and not in need of help from the RAN.

25 ibid., vol. 1, no. 6, p. 16. 26 ibid. 27 ibid. 28 ibid., vol. 1, no. 6, p. 18. 29 ibid., vol. 1, no. 7, p. 20. 30 ibid., vol. 1, no. 8, p. 18. 108

While the Navy League was the sponsor and organiser of the various NLSCC units that followed, it did not fund its units centrally in the same manner that the navy funded the defence-based NRC. This was a volunteer activity for all concerned and each unit was operated independently. Notwithstanding the heavy emphasis on citizenship and recreational activities, it was quickly made clear that an important aim of the Navy League was to assist boys, when they left school, to find jobs on merchant vessels or gain acceptance into the naval training vessel, Tingira, to serve with the RAN. Hence, despite appearing to be well supplied with both benefactors and resources, immediate pleas for assistance were directed specifically at the naval authorities (and shipowners) on the basis that this was the beginning of a force that would ultimately benefit the country at large, and the RAN and merchant navy in particular.31 In this context, the NLSCC grew rapidly and, by December 1920, the membership goal was set at 300, uniforms were being made and more equipment was being sought.32 As the new venture expanded, the Navy League announced that this new group of community-based sea cadets would benefit from having a sponsor that was singularly focused on the development of Australia as a powerful maritime nation and the role of young people in achieving that goal.33 This prime sponsor was, of course, not just the Navy League, but the RAN.

Although the Navy League was a strong supporter of the Boy Scouts’ Association, it was inevitable that the two organisations would be competing for limited navy and other support. At this point, although the Navy League was philosophically much more closely aligned with the navy, the sea scouts still regarded their training as deserving of the navy support they had been seeking. Thus, as the Navy League had been preparing to launch the NLSCC, a formal submission for assistance by the Australian Commissioner for Sea Scouts was made to the navy, on 19 April 1920, and prompted a full review by the Naval Board of sea scouting activities in Australia. 34 This submission relied on the precedent that sea scouting units worldwide had been officially recognised by the British Admiralty as pre-entry training organisations to the full-time navy, and it expressed the hope that recognition in

31 ibid., vol. 1, no. 8, p. 18. 32 ibid., vol. 1, no. 9, pp. 12, 16. 33 ibid., pp. 16, 18. 34Letter, Commissioner for Sea Scouts to the Military Secretary to the Governor, 19 April 1920, NAA : MP525/1, 357/1/7. 109

Australia would follow, thus ensuring the same level of support enjoyed by overseas units, particularly access to navy training facilities and equipment. As part of the national review process that followed, all DNOs submitted information on sea scouting activities in their area, which was combined to form the first national picture of the community-based sea scouts of this era. While the individual state reports were not in a standard form, the process introduced, de facto, the model whereby central review, reporting and control of community- based sea cadets became the responsibility of the office of the DNR. Furthermore, the process of conducting national reviews of the whole or parts of the movement was undertaken by a succession of DNRs and, at a critical stage, the Naval Intelligence Division (NID), making this first national review an important reference point for considering the many similar later processes and outcomes. For this reason, and because the DNOs provided considerable comment on issues central to the navy’s relationship with the community-based sea cadets, these sea scout submissions are examined in detail.35

As a consequence of the sea scouts’ submission to the navy, the DNOs from each state provided detailed, but disparate, accounts that highlighted the continuing fragmentary nature of the community-based branch of the movement. In addition to their comments on the sea scouts, a number of DNOs reviewed the broader naval and sea cadet movement as it existed in their area. The first report, received on 31 August 1920, from New South Wales reported that no official sea scout movement existed in that state, but that there was a project ‘in view’ in conjunction with the ‘ordinary Boy Scout Movement’ to inaugurate a ‘sea scout’ section.36 To this end, a troop had started with 12 boys over 16 years of age who, although required to do military compulsory training, had also voluntarily joined the sea scouts. Subsequent information, provided on 2 September 1920, revealed that the committee of the Boy Scouts’ Association had granted permission to Scoutmaster LE Forsythe of North Sydney to form a troop of sea scouts registered as the 1st Port Jackson Sea Scout Troop. In this regard, Forsythe had conveyed that the movement was only in the ‘initiatory’ stage, but

35 The role of Director of Naval Reserves (DNR) was incorporated, for various periods, into the boarder roles of Director of Naval Reserves and Naval Reserve Mobilisation (DNRM) and Director of Naval Reserves and Reserve Fleet (DRRF). For clarity and continuity in relation to the function applicable to the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, the term Director of Naval Reserves (DNR) is used throughout the main body of the thesis, while citation use the full titles, where these have been used in the original correspondence, which was not always the case with the shorter form, DNR, sometimes being used. 36 Memorandum, DNO NSW to DNRM, 31 August 1920, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7 110 there were 15 boys aged between 15 and 18 years who voluntarily attended on Saturday afternoons, which did not clash with their compulsory training.37

Demonstrating the key role of volunteers in the creation and survival of the movement, other pertinent details about this small Sydney sea scout troop included that they met at the residence of Forsythe, who was a returned ‘AIF man’ and an enthusiast in signalling.38 The proposed training program for the troop was 25 days coursework per annum in signalling and elementary wireless and the uniform worn was a blue jersey and pants, seaman’s cap and cover, with a ‘Sea Scouts’ ribbon, lanyard and scarf, which the scouts provided at their own expense.39 This overview by Forsythe is important for two reasons. First, it provides evidence of the existence of a well established sea scout troop in New South Wales that appeared to have no organisation, control, personnel or funding issues that would concern the Naval Board. Second, Forsythe went on to successfully apply the same model to the development of what could be regarded as the most successful Australian naval and sea cadet unit of any era, the Sydney Training Depot (honouring the first HMAS Sydney) at Snapper Island in Sydney Harbour.40 Forsythe’s dominant role in so many of the exchanges between the RAN and the community-based sea cadet branch of the movement, from 1920 to 1950, illustrates how this aspect of the movement could be heavily influenced by individuals in a way that mitigated against the formation of the stable national governing body the navy was seeking. At the beginning of the period 1920-3, however, it was the lack of uniformity of the internationally organised sea scouting sections of the Boy Scouts’ Association that embodied this flaw in the community-based sea cadet branch.

The size and form of sea scouting units varied from state to state and DNOs provided reports that highlighted this variance and, in some cases, included their views on what role the navy might play in the organisation and control of such units. In Tasmania, there was only one sea scout troop, at the remote town of Burnie, and the observation was made that

37 Memorandum, DNO NSW to DNRM, 2 September 1920, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 38 ibid. 39 ibid. 40 Snapper Island, Sydney, Leasing, 17 August 1931, NAA, 6074, A6074T1, PO826, 443 1 5525 4 7 5- 13; MS Clark & J Clark, J, Islands of Sydney Harbour, Kangaroo Press, Sydney, 2000. 111

‘there appears to be no tendency or desire whatever to form Sea Scout Troops in any Naval Training Area’.41 In regard to the movement in general, the Tasmanian DNO recommended that the sea scouting movement should either be kept removed from naval recognition or, if naval recognition were given, it should be a condition that the sea scouts would be trained under at least partial naval control. Such a move, however, was considered disadvantageous because it would necessitate increased expenditure for adult naval staff, training and other support, plus the sea scout troop at Burnie already had on loan certain naval stores from the Navy Store, Melbourne. 42 Thus, in Tasmania, there was naval support for greater control of the community-based sea cadets, but concern also about the impact on local personnel and funding. Meanwhile, the Western Australian sea scouting movement was reported as being confined to the metropolitan and Bunbury districts with training centres at Perth, South Perth, Osborne, Cottesloe and Fremantle, but that it was proposed to extend the districts of enrolment as the movement developed. The organisation was described as ‘a laudable one’, in supporting the development of a ‘clean living, healthy and intelligent youth’, but not such that it ‘superseded’ the compulsory cadet training prescribed in the Naval Defence Act.43 Further, as naval authorities in Western Australia observed, the nature of the training laid down by the Boy Scouts’ Association involved mostly supervision and control that could be better provided in schools.44

The report from South Australia, submitted to naval headquarters on 5 October 1920, was even more emphatic and dismissive than those from other states. It declared that the sea scouting movement in South Australia was merely an off-shoot of the boy scouting movement that had not reached any stage of efficiency.45 This was primarily, it was observed, because the central administration of the boy scouting movement contained ex- army senior officers, who were only able to advance the overall movement from a soldier’s point of view. In addition, this South Australian report expressed the view that the sea scout organisation lacked keen administrative control and did not have a uniform system for proper training. Despite these shortcomings, it was still considered that the sea scouts might prove a

41 Memorandum, DNO TAS to DNRM, 16 September 1920, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 42 ibid. 43 Memorandum, DNO WA to DNRM, 18 September 1920, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 44 ibid. 45 Memorandum, DNO SA to DNRM, 5 October 1920, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 112 valuable avenue of primary training for entry to the Senior Naval Cadets but that, under no circumstances, should the sea scouting movement officially be permitted to overlap compulsory NRC training. In principle, it was concluded, the movement was more appropriately ‘a question for the patriotism of citizens, connected either with shipping or yachting in the various ports’.46 Thus, overall, focusing on the issues of organisation, control, personnel and funding, these reports portrayed the community-based sea cadets as being distinctly different from their NRC counterparts and confirmed the stance of the Naval Board that sea scout training was not equivalent to the training provided under the compulsory cadet scheme. Moreover, DNO comments supported the view that community-based sea cadet citizenship and seamanship training was more appropriately conducted by civilian maritime organisations or civilian volunteers with maritime interests.

Aside from the common thread of limited numbers and units, the view from Queensland, on 12 October 1920, did nothing to clarify the divergent views from the other states on other aspects of community-based sea cadet training and introduced a potential personnel problem in the likely need to appoint different classes of officers for the community-based sea cadets and the NRC.47 Moreover, from a training perspective, it was observed that sea scouts seldom joined the movement before 14 years of age, at which point they were already eligible for compulsory training and any extra instruction in sea scouting would have to be given in the boys’ own time. As part of this process, sea scout officers would require official ‘recognition’ and difficulty would be experienced in defining the line of demarcation between sea scout officers and RANR officers.48 A further Queensland submission, on 18 November 1920, raised additional organisation, control and funding issues that focused on two nucleus sea scout units of an experimental nature. It was reported, from observations of physical standards, training and practical work, that future sea scout recruiting in Queensland would be based around boys over 16 years of age, who would be of a sufficient physical standard to conform to arduous naval training. Preliminary training would be for a shore scout unit, although practical seamanship, small boat work and sailing would be provided as opportunities arose. Lack of funds was a problem, but it was hoped that

46 ibid. 47 Memorandum, DNO QLD to DNRM, 12 October 1920, NAA: MP525/1, 357/1/7. 48 ibid. 113 the sea scouting movement’s governing body in the state, the Boys Scouts’ Association, would be able to establish a more permanent branch of the sea scout movement in the near future.49 Further demonstrating the uncertainty of this era with respect to sea scout units in Queensland, a history of the boy scouting in this state provided substantial reporting of sea scouting, but only from 1935 and noted, inexplicably, that in the late 1920s there were only nine sea scouts in Queensland.50

Notwithstanding the mixed messages in the state reports regarding the state of the community-based branch of the movement, the DNR, Captain JT Richardson, recommended to the Second Naval Member, Captain C Talbot, on 21 December 1920, that formal naval support should be provided for the sea scouts.51 He stopped well short, nevertheless, of recommending full recognition and exemption from the provisions of the compulsory cadet scheme. In summarising the national picture, Richardson emphasised the funding problems in Queensland, assistance provided to the fledgling troop in New South Wales and general inefficiency in South Australia, due chiefly to its restricted financial position and limited training facilities. With regard to Western Australia, Richardson acknowledged only a single sea scout crew being formed at Fremantle, ignoring those in Perth, and observed that, in Tasmania, despite the troop at Burnie with 61 members, there appeared to be no desire, on the part of the DNO, to form sea scouts in the state as the ‘provisions of Compulsory Training Act fulfil requirements’.52 Thus, although support from DNOs and the DNR was equivocal, the sea scouting arm of the Boy Scouts’ Association had succeeded in making the Naval Board aware of its role in the naval and sea cadet movement. The scope of this review, furthermore, demonstrated that the Naval Board was serious about considering the merits of the community-based sea cadets, even though it was heavily committed to a much enlarged compulsory NRC. Moreover, comments by some DNOs revealed a local view that there was merit in supporting the sea scouts, perhaps even bringing them under naval control, but that the inconsistency of the sea scouts’ achievements and the lack of a viable local and national organisation appeared, as yet, to be insurmountable obstacles to an official role for this part of the movement.

49Memorandum, DNO QLD to DNRM, 18 November 1920, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 50 Fones, In the light of all the years, p. 43. 51 Minute, DNRM to Second Naval Member, 21 December 1920, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 52 Departmental policy in regard to recognition of Boy Scouts’ Organisation, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 114

As the sea scouts’ bid for official recognition was being considered by the Naval Board, the Navy League in New South Wales made a parallel submission for formal navy support.53 The forming of the Navy League’s first Australian unit of the NLSCC, and this further bid for support from an empire-wide organisation, further complicated the navy’s incomplete understanding of the community-based branch of the movement, especially when compared to the defence-based NRC. It was this commencement of a series of multiple, and simultaneous, submissions for RAN support that made the period 1920-3 an early watershed in the navy’s long quest to unravel its relationship with these non-defence units. Perhaps a more farsighted view, particularly at this still formative stage of the movement, was that of the DNO in South Australia who had observed as part of the national review of sea scouts that the community-based branch of the movement was more appropriately a question for the patriotism of citizens, connected either with shipping or with yachting in the various ports’, not the RAN.54 Thus, with the Navy League also seeking official support, and a request on its agenda to approve the resumption of compulsory adult reserve training, which had been suspended for the year 1919-20, the Naval Board finally considered official recognition of the sea scouts on 19 January 1921.55

In what must have seemed a promising sign for the sea scouts’ bid, Richardson initially presented a draft set of recognition conditions to the Naval Board that proposed that in each state a Board of Control would manage the various units and that all communication between the navy and the various sea scout units would be through these Boards of Control. In addition, care would be taken to observe that these new instructions referred solely to ‘Sea Scouts’ and that other similar movements such as the ‘Navy League Scouts, etc.’ were not be referred to or included.56 The First Naval Member, Rear Admiral EPFG Grant, regarded the draft plan as sound, supported it and the Naval Board approved the proposed recognition of the ‘Sea Scouts’, subject to the minister’s assent.57 The Minister for Navy, WL Smith, approved the Naval Board decision on 26 January 1921 and a memorandum to DNOs was

53 Letter, Milson to Naval Board Secretary 16 September, 1922, NAA SP339/1, 10/2/54. 54 Memorandum, DNO SA to DNRM, 5 October 1920, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 55 Minute, DNRM to Naval Board, 18 January 1921, NAA MP472/1, 5/21/615. 56 Extract, Naval Board Minutes, 19 January 1921, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 57 ibid. 115 despatched on 10 February 1921.58 Thus, notwithstanding the recent emergence of the NLSCC and the inconsistent support from state DNOs, it appeared that a momentous crossroads had been reached, for the sea scouts at least, in the evolution of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement.

At this point, official naval recognition of the sea scouts, and the provision of many potential, but as yet unclear, benefits, was subject only to a Board of Control in each state being formed and approved through action to be coordinated by the DNOs. As was the case with their reports on the sea scouts, the responses to the Naval Board and ministerial decisions were quite varied among the DNOs in each state. Furthermore, their responses provide an early example of how attempts to have the community-based branch of the movement officially recognised were characterised by changes of mind at all stages of the process. In Tasmania, the required conditions were ‘considered quite satisfactory’, had been accepted by the overall scout movement in that state and an application for formal recognition, in accordance with the requirements of the Naval Board minute, was to be made in due course.59 In South Australia, on the other hand, the Executive Council of the Boy Scouts’ Association had advised that it was already the ‘Board of Control’ for both the ‘Boy Scouts’ and the ‘Sea Scouts’ and, if the Naval Board was prepared to accept this existing organisation, that is the existing Executive Council, they would appreciate any assistance rendered.60 In contrast, the official navy view from South Australia was that there was no reason to be optimistic about sea scout activities in that state as, although the sea scouts in the state mustered every Thursday evening, their training ‘shed’ offered very little opportunity (for conducting naval activities) and, together with the absence of instructional gear, rendered successful training practically impossible. Furthermore, while the sea scouts did the same work as boy scouts they were, in addition, supposed to do some boat work, know the navigation marks on the river and be able to describe the coast and inlets within a radius of two miles, but this instruction appeared to be lacking.61 In Victoria, the sea scouts provided all the information required by the Naval Board and were able to advise how the navy could assist them, but their reply did not address in any way the ‘Board of Control’ solution the

58 ibid. 59 Memorandum, DNO TAS to DNRM, May 1921, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 60 Memorandum, DNO SA to Secretary, Navy Office, 10 May 1921, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 61 ibid. 116 navy was seeking.62 Thus, from having a fully approved official recognition solution, subject only to the formation of Boards of Control, the sea scout position appeared to be weakening, due mainly to lack of support in some states and associated evidence of a lack of consistency in organisation and control.

After reviewing the replies from the various state sea scout administrators, on 25 June 1921, Richardson presented the acting First Naval Member, Commodore CT Hardy, and acting Second Naval Member, Captain JF Robins, with a number of decisive observations.63 In particular, he expressed the view that the state sea scout movements were working in a disjointed and isolated manner with none of the unity of control and organisation that would ensure uniformity in governance or procedure. In addition, Richardson now observed, the personnel of the units were chiefly recruited from localities remote from naval training areas and, therefore, outside the possible scope of the existing RANR organisation. Moreover, there were insufficient RANR personnel to undertake any additional work or accept any additional responsibility in connection with the sea scouting movement and the existing instructional staff would be fully occupied in the near future owing to the resumption of compulsory training from 1 July 1921, under a revised syllabus, and could not be spared for duty with the sea scouts. In contrast to his previous stance as a champion of the community- based sea cadets, as the Queensland DNO many years earlier, Richardson now expressed the view that it was ‘obvious that no definite Naval result can be obtained from these movements in their present unsatisfactory state’.64

Yet, notwithstanding these strong reservations and concern regarding resource constraints, Richardson went on to conclude that it was ‘considered desirable from a Tingira recruiting point of view and to otherwise create a Naval atmosphere that these Sea Scouts should be brought under official Naval recognition and assisted in every possible way’.65 Furthermore, he recommended that ‘some consideration should be given to the matter of official recognition of these Sea Scouts as soon as a general organisation or body of control is

62 Memorandum, DNO VIC to DNRM, 2 June 1921, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 63 Memorandum, Richardson to Hardy and Robins, 25 June 1921, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 64 ibid 65 ibid. 117 formed’, but that ‘definite action by the Naval Board in this direction is undesirable until general control is established’.66 Anticlimactically, considering the work that had been done, Robins replied, in a hand written note, that ‘No further action appears necessary at this point’.67 Thus, at the conclusion of the first truly comprehensive analysis of the merits of formally assisting a significant component of the community-based sea cadets, as represented by the sea scouts, the Naval Board had decided that the circumstances were not right for making a commitment to the organisation, control, personnel and funding of this branch of the movement, alongside the NRC. Furthermore, the Naval Board’s decision appeared to indicate that unless there was easy acceptance, by the Boy Scouts’ organisation in this case, of the navy’s proposal for the organisation of state-based Boards of Control to assist in administering its formal support and recognition of the community-based branch of the movement, the navy was not interested in pursuing the matter.

In a still further demonstration of how the navy’s consideration of various and subsequent submissions from the community-based sea cadet branch would ebb and flow, and always be subject to inter-organisation rivalry, the Naval Board decided to reconsider official recognition of the sea scouts, after diligent DNOs continued to provide reports on their progress. In particular, new submissions, in July and August 1921, highlighted the existence of a permanent Board of Control in Tasmania and the establishment of new units in Launceston and Hobart.68 In New South Wales, the Boy Scouts’ Association Council had advised that it was quite prepared to adopt the Naval Board’s conditions, but wanted it understood that the NLSCC was a quite separate organisation from the sea scouts.69 From Queensland, in contrast, it was reported that the sea scout branch of the Boy Scouts’ Association was in abeyance.70 With this additional information, Richardson prepared a further submission for the Naval Board expressing the view that the overall position was still not considered to be ‘altogether satisfactory’.71 He now observed that, in the majority of states, the sea scouts were simply a branch of the Boy Scouts’ Association and, if the sea

66 ibid. 67 ibid. 68 Memorandum, DNO TAS to DNRM, 23 July 1921, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 69 Memorandum, DNO NSW to DNRM, 9 August 1921, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7 70 Memorandum, DNO QLD to DNRM, 11 August 1921, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 71 Memorandum, DNRM to Assistant Secretary Finance and Second Naval Member, 7 October 1921, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 118 scouts were given official recognition, the navy would need to extend this to the boy scouts, which could in no way be considered necessary or desirable from a naval point of view. Furthermore, there was no central body controlling the movement for the whole of the Commonwealth and giving oversight to the movement would require considerable increased expense on instructional equipment, while there was a shortage of training staff within the full-time navy and overall continuing demand for economy.72

In advising that he was unable to recommend any further action on the matter, Richardson noted that the navy had been endeavouring, with little or no success, to infuse some activity into the various controlling bodies in different states, but they did not seem at all desirous of co-operating in order to get assistance.73 Finally, in this supplementary submission, Richardson now made it clear that he did not support recognition and, when the matter was considered again, Hardy decided that the matter should be dropped so that Richardson’s organisation could devote itself fully to the RANR.74 In this way, as the result of a national review process and a serious attempt to recognise the sea scouts, the Naval Board decided that the RANR, and its defence-based cadets, were the main priority for Richardson and his staff. On the other hand, after receiving serious consideration from the Naval Board as a potential national and state coordinator of the community-based sea cadets, the sea scouts had done little to give Richardson the impression that they were now unenthusiastic about forming the type of centralised controlling body the navy was seeking. Thus, in a very short time, the sea scouts had gone from a position of being recommended for official navy endorsement to being regarded as not being sufficiently keen to work with the navy to warrant considering the diversion of resources away from the NRC.

Not long after the sea scouts’ bid for assistance had been concluded, the Navy League, which had been seeking informal support from the navy since its establishment in late 1920, decided to make its first formal bid for official recognition. Specifically, on 16

72 The Policy and Rules of the Scout Association of Australia, The Scout Association of Australia, Sydney, 1996. The scouting movement, although international, was governed on a state or regional basis. Thus, the navy’s desire for a national controlling body was in conflict with the scouts’ basic governance model. 73 Memorandum, DNRM to Assistant Secretary Finance and Second Naval Member, 7 October 1921, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 74 ibid. 119

September 1922, the New South Wales Navy League requested recognition from the RAN, and the associated provision of support with equipment and personnel, on the same basis as was provided to the Navy League in England, which was recognised by the British Admiralty.75 Notwithstanding its recent fruitless efforts with the sea scouts, the Naval Board instructed the Commodore Superintendent and Senior Naval Officer for New South Wales, H Edwards, to meet with the officers of the Navy League and ascertain what form such official recognition might take.76 The Navy League officers met with Edwards in late October and a list of ‘objects to be gained’ by ‘formal recognition’ was submitted on 15 November 1922.77 This first ever formal bid, which specifically excluded ‘cash grants’, focused on annual inspections by a naval officer, loan of equipment and honorary commissions as sea cadet officers in the Royal Australian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RANVR), for Navy League officers, as occurred in the RN. Other requests included a trophy for annual competition among units and permission to use the words ‘Officially recognised by the Australian Naval Board’.78 Although the wording of requests and submissions varied as the Navy League expanded and its personnel and funding requirements increased, first in New South Wales and then in other states, the essence of later submissions did not differ greatly from this first effort at matching the benefits enjoyed by the Navy League cadet organisation in Britain. Hence, this initial Navy League submission, as a benchmark for all later submissions, is considered in the same detail as that of the sea scouts, particularly as the sea scout submission was further considered by the Naval Board and the two organisations merits were compared. As with the first major sea scout submission, particular attention is paid to the role of naval administrators in identifying the key issues, which differed significantly for the two organisations, and advising the Naval Board.

As he was the navy’s official representative in this matter, it is important to reflect on how Edwards advised the Navy League though the process of applying to the Naval Board. His guidance was formal and very specific and included a paragraph by paragraph critique of the Navy League submission, noting that ‘no cash grants’ required was the ‘secret of

75 Letter, Milson to Macandie, 16 September 1922, NAA SP339/1, 10/2/54. 76 Memorandum, Macandie to Edwards, 17 October 1922, NAA SP339/1, 10/2/54. 77 Letter, Edwards to Honorary Secretary, Navy League NSW, 20 October 1922; Letter, Honorary Secretary, Navy League NSW, to Edwards, 15 November, 1922, NAA SP339/1, 10/2/54. 78 ibid. 120 success’, but that the bid might be spoiled by asking for a trophy.79 Thus, omitting the request for a trophy, Edwards submitted the proposal ‘for favourable consideration’ to the Naval Board Secretary, Macandie, on 18 November 1922. In doing so, he observed that the NLSCC should be given every encouragement as 320 boys had joined the corps and a few had later joined the navy training ship HMAS Tingira where they had been spoken of in favourable terms by the Commanding Officer.80 With this support from Edwards, the New South Wales Navy League appeared to have made a promising start in its bid to be accepted by the Naval Board, despite being organised only in New South Wales.

Meanwhile, for an organisation that had been recently assessed by the naval administration as not yet worthy of official recognition, and probably lacking genuine interest in the process, the Boy Scouts’ Association was surprisingly persistent and did not intend to leave the way open for the Navy League to be the only candidate for navy support. In submitting a further sea scout request to the Naval Board, on 22 November 1922, Richardson, noted once more that the failure to progress the navy’s request for the formation of a Board of Control in each state still stood in the way of affording official recognition to sea scout organisations.81 In addition, he observed, consideration was now being given to extending official recognition and possible assistance to the NLSCC. In this regard, Richardson continued, the Navy League was a distinct organisation from the sea scouts, and there appeared to be no possibility of the two bodies acting in conjunction for the purpose of obtaining official recognition by the Naval Board. Furthermore, pointing out that the Boy Scouts’ Association was an empire organisation, Richardson recommended that they should be asked to advise Edwards, who was working on the Navy League submission, what form official recognition should take, including what method of rendering assistance was envisaged. Furthermore, in conjunction with the sea scout request, Richardson suggested, similar action should be taken with regard to the NLSCC.82 Thus, at this early but critical point in the process of considering recognition of the community-based sea cadets, the naval

79 Letter, Edwards to Honorary Secretary, Navy League, NSW, 16 November 1922, NAA SP339/1, 10/2/54. 80 Memorandum, Edwards to Macandie, 18 November 1922, NAA SP339/1, 10/2/54. 81 Memorandum, DNRM to Second Naval Member, 22 November 1922, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. The Navy League bid was already being processed at this stage, but may have by-passed Richardson on its way to the Naval Board Secretary from the Commodore Superintendent, Sydney. 82 ibid. 121 administration was placing the sea scouts and the NLSCC in direct competition with each other for official recognition and support.

Although the Navy League and Boy Scouts’ Association soon realised they appeared to be rivals for navy recognition, the sea scouts wanted the navy to consider an alternate solution. While the administrators of the sea scouts had come down firmly, on 20 September 1922, against any merger with the Navy League, they were now prepared to consider a state Board of Control to embrace both the NLSCC and the sea scouts.83 Thus, pursuing some form of recognition, the New South Wales sea scout organisation advised Edwards, on 27 December 1922, that there were now 37 sea scout members of the Port Jackson troop and that more troops were being formed with the anticipated strength expected to be in the vicinity of 75 by the end of January.84 Furthermore, the terms of official recognition were specified as boats and gear on loan or for purchase, at the lowest possible sale price of such items, and the introduction of the British Admiralty practice of a grant for efficient members.

Notwithstanding this British precedent, the sea scouts conceded that some difficulty might arise in obtaining such a concession in Sydney and it was proposed that the boats and gear on loan could be provided in lieu of the capitation grant. On the matter of organisation and control, it was stressed that ‘no lad is eligible for Sea Scouts membership until he has attained the age of 15 years and (is) able to swim fifty yards fully clothed’.85 These new proposals were inconsistent with previous navy administrators’ perceptions of a lack of interest by the sea scouting movement, but this was not a national submission. Nevertheless, with this renewed enthusiasm in New South Wales, the sea scouts provided the navy with an opportunity to support a nautical youth training scheme with international governance, royal patronage, a recognised ‘non-navy like’ uniform and an established reputation for youth development. In addition, the sea scouts’ willingness to be subject to the same Board of Control as the NLSCC presented the navy with a still further opportunity to bring two quite

83 Letter, Honorary Chief Commissioner to Edwards, 20 September 1922, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 84 Letter, Honorary Chief Commissioner to Edwards, 27 December 1922, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 85 ibid. 122 distinct community-based sea cadet organisations under one model of organisation and control.

While the overall navy position on the relative support to be provided to the sea scouts and NLSCC remained unclear, and to some degree contradictory, the process of somehow recognising the NLSCC and accepting partial responsibility for their organisation, control, personnel and funding continued. On 8 January 1923, Macandie advised Edwards that the Naval Board had approved his recommendations of annual inspection of the NLSCC by a naval officer and loan of stores to the value of £25. 86 The granting of honorary commissions in the RANVR, for members of the Navy League acting as adult instructors of these units, was not approved, but the Naval Board had no objection, and considered it desirable, that Navy League sea cadet staff joined the volunteer reserve and received commissions, when eligible.87 In this way, the Naval Board, which had deferred action on the recognition of the sea scouts, was taking definitive steps towards recognition of the NLSCC in New South Wales, beginning with exercising control through unit inspections and funding the loan of stores. Furthermore, the indication of a preference that Navy League sea cadet officers should join the RANR provided guidance on the issue of personnel standards. It appeared that the Navy League was being supported and encouraged in ways that the sea scouts had not been.

Meanwhile, with a renewed sea scout bid for recognition before them, the Naval Board decided to seek further advice on how the army viewed official recognition of scouting organisations and, on 5 February 1923, the new DNR, Commander LS Bracegirdle, reported on the army’s policy on scouting organisations.88 Bracegirdle advised the Naval Assistant Secretary (Personnel), Commander CA Parker, that he had met with Generals CH Foott and TH Dodds regarding the military (army) attitude to official recognition of scout organisations and that army authorities were not disposed towards recommending official recognition for such organisations’.89 Demonstrating how approving policy changes subject to certain

86 Memorandum, Macandie to Edwards, 8 January 1923, NAA SP339/1, 10/2/54. 87 ibid. 88 Minute, Bracegirdle to Parker, 5 February 1923, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 89 ibid. 123 conditions being met could result in confusion, Parker advised that he was of the view that the matter had already been settled and that official recognition had already been granted to both the sea scouts and the NLSCC.90 What is more, Parker was not easily dissuaded from his point of view and referred to the navy’s decision, of 10 February 1921, noting that it ‘promises recognition to sea scout organisations, provided that a Board of Control was formed in each State, and that certain other minor conditions were fulfilled’.91 Seeking clarification, Parker asked Bracegirdle if it was in fact the case that the sea scout organisation was now thoroughly organised with a definite Board of Control each State.92 If this were so, he observed, the Naval Board had already given approval of recognition and assistance to the sea scouts equivalent to that recently approved for the NLSCC, namely official recognition, loan of instructional appliances and detailing of officers to hold periodical inspections.93 It seemed that in the Personnel Branch of the navy, at least, the community-based sea cadets were already regarded as an officially recognised organisation, but not with any clarity.

As the navy Head of Personnel Branch, Parker pressed his case with Bracegirdle by referring to the sea scouts’ position that it was impossible to bring the NLSCC under the same organisation as the sea scouts which, in any event, he considered immaterial as the Naval Board had recognised the NLSCC as a separate entity. In this regard, Parker declared, ‘we cannot do less for the Sea Scouts than is being done for the NLSCC’.94 For his part, Bracegirdle agreed, on 13 February 1923, that there should now be afforded to the sea scouts similar official recognition as that afforded to the New South Wales NLSCC ‘if the previous decision is to be adhered to’.95 Notwithstanding these comments, Bracegirdle observed that granting such recognition to the New South Wales sea scouts would most probably lead to requests for similar treatment from other branches of the same movement and possibly in locations where there was no naval organisation.96 In addition, official recognition apparently included loaning of stores, which appeared to be definitely contrary to the military (army) policy in this regard. Furthermore, Bracegirdle pointed out, it needed to be

90 Minute, Parker to Bracegirdle, 10 February 1923, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 91 ibid. 92 ibid. 93 ibid. 94 ibid. 95 Minute, Bracegirdle to Parker, 13 February 1923, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 96 ibid. 124 understood that the RANR, in all sub-districts, was reduced to the minimum requirements for that force, so stores could not be issued on loan to these non-defence organisations.97 Thus, despite strong favourable arguments from the navy’s Head of Personnel Branch, the concept of recognising both the sea scouts and NLSCC, and under one agreement, was rejected. Moreover, while the Naval Board had, effectively, declined to approve recognition to the sea scouts on the grounds of insufficient organisation and control overall (due to the sea scouts failure to establish satisfactory Boards of Control), Bracegirdle remained concerned about the more specific issue of the navy’s inability to provide organisation, control and personnel to community-based sea cadet units in districts where there was no naval organisation.

As this new navy involvement in the community-based sea cadet branch continued, with discussions surrounding organisation, control and personnel management apparently proceeding without incident, it was not long before other navy departments began to voice objections to funding any form of community-based sea cadet organisation. As an example, on 2 March 1923, naval stores personnel made it clear to the Naval Board that loaning of stores to community-based sea cadet organisations was tantamount to a gift, which was not permitted.98 Furthermore, if stores were provided on loan to sea scout organisations, they would have to be taken from RANR or sea going stores.99 This introduced the simple, but powerful, argument that funds spent on community-based sea cadet units could not be spent on naval defence. For their part, on 6 March 1923, the navy personnel authorities observed that it was undesirable for navy policy on sea scouts to be in conflict with military (army) policy on boy scouts generally and it was proposed that the Naval Board reject the sea scouts requests, but allow them to purchase any gear they required.100 As a potential solution to this issue, naval stores administrators observed that recent changes to the procedures for sale of unserviceable items would allow the sea scouts to bid for stores though the District Contract Board.101

97 ibid. 98 Minute, Director of Naval Stores to Second Naval Member, 2 Mar 1923, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 99 ibid. 100 Minute, Assistant Secretary, Personnel, to 2nd Naval Member, 6 March 1923, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 101 ibid. 125

Following the receipt of this advice expressing doubts about the merits and legality of its actions, the Naval Board advised senior navy administrators, on 17 March 1923, that the general policy of recognition of community-based sea cadet organisations was now being reconsidered.102 This was followed, on 10 April 1923, by advice to state DNOs that as Defence Department policy in regard to official recognition of Boy Scouts’ Associations on the whole was being reconsidered, the Naval Board was unable to approve any sea scout requests for official recognition, including the loan of stores.103 Thus, with its attention now drawn to the funding implications of assisting the community-based sea cadets, particularly the effect on RANR and sea going stores, the Naval Board had decided to place further support decisions on hold. What had seemed like a process that was progressing well, and showing promise of providing community-based sea cadet organisations with some benefit from a new arrangement with the navy, was now, apparently, likely to require considerable reworking if not an entirely new approach.

While the sea scouts and the NLSCC were engaged in the process of seeking official navy recognition, the compulsory NRC branch was experiencing its own funding challenges. A wider political decision had been taken to reduce adult and senior cadet training, mostly on financial grounds, and plans were made for the overall scheme to be curtailed.104 The navy’s 1922/23 budget papers, nonetheless, emphasised the importance of the compulsory RANR to the requirement that, ‘unlike the army’, defence policy required the naval reserve to be constantly ready for immediate mobilisation, particularly as the full-time force had been reduced.105 At this point, however, and notwithstanding the navy’s desire to maintain the RANR and NRC at full strength, the Department of Defence budget for the 1922/23 financial year, required the Naval Board, on 20 April 1922, to order that ‘Senior Cadet training will be limited to those youths who are in their 16th and 17th years, and training areas selected must be areas in which training for the Military Forces are also carried out’.106

102 Memorandum, Naval Board Secretary to the Commodore Superintendent, 17 March 1923, NAA MP525/1, 357/1/7. 103 Circular, DNRM to DNOs, 10 April 1923, NAA, MP525/1, 357/1/7. 104 Stockings, The Torch and the Sword, pp. 84-85. 105 Memorandum, DNRM to Finance Member, 1 July 1922, NAA MP525/1, 12/6/22. 106 Memorandum, Naval Finance & Civil Member to DNRM, 20 April 1922, NAA MP525/1 12/6/69. 126

For his part, Bracegirdle advised the Naval Board that he considered that even this reduced scale was impractical as the 1922/23 salary budget for permanent naval staff to support the RANR was now just £67,000 (down from £70,000 for 1921/22) and the contingency budget was £27,200 (down from £32,700 for 1921/22).107 Along with these funding concerns, he presented what he described as ‘mature consideration of various proposals for the reduction of compulsory training under the Defence Act’.108 As part of his argument, he put the view that the military (army) authorities should continue to enrol Junior Cadets at 12 years of age, because it involved such a small expenditure, and that they should continue the current system of registration and retain the current system of training senior cadets from 14 to 17 years of age. On the other hand, he recommended that all quotas of the citizens’ forces older than the 1904 quota (18 years of age) should be exempt from all further training under the Defence Act, with the exception of such officers and higher ratings who volunteered to continue serving under the conditions applying at the time.109

Bracegirdle based his recommendations on the view that Junior Cadet training was easy to administer because it was conducted with the full cooperation of schools, which made tracing defaulters much simpler.110 On the other hand, from 14 years of age, when many boys were outside the school system, it became very hard to enforce attendance without a large staff of military police. Furthermore, by 16 years of age, it was practically impossible to enforce enrolment and he favoured a virtual volunteer system. Basically, as Bracegirdle summarised, the cadet system was valuable as a feeder system to the citizen forces and interfering with it to any serious extent would reduce the whole value of the compulsory training system, but there was no urgent need to retain Senior Naval Cadets, whose exemption would result in an enormous saving. Thus, he recommended a reduction in senior cadet and adult training, for 1922/23, and then increasing numbers progressively each year up to 1929/30. In this way, should finances require it, reductions could be repeated but the organisation could remain intact and be supplemented to any required extent in case of

107 Memorandum, DNRM to Finance Member and Second Naval Member, 21 April, 1922, NAA MP525/1 12/6/69. 108 ibid. 109 ibid 110 Submission, DNRM to Second Naval Member, 21 April 1922, NAA MP525/1, 12/6/69. 127 emergency. Bracegirdle strongly recommended that the Naval Board place his plan before the Council of Defence.111

Notwithstanding Bracegirdle’s confidence in the value of his views, other views presented to the Naval Board did not concur with his opinions and some naval administrators suggested that there was no need to change the organisation of the NRC at all. For example, on 18 May 1922, the ‘Head of N’ (an internal title used for the Assistant Secretary – Department of Navy and Head of the Civil Branch), G Sharp, expressed the view that there was nothing in recent ministerial directions that affected the current organisation of the citizen forces as they only affected training for one year.112 Therefore, Sharp observed, unless it was the government’s intention to permanently revise the provisions of the Defence Act, there appeared to be not much cause for apprehension, particularly as the immediate effect on attendance was minimal with only one intake of cadets not required to train in the financial year 1922/23.113 Notwithstanding Sharp’s assurances, an exchange of correspondence commenced, on 2 June 1922, with regard to the closure of RANR sub- districts at Thursday Island, Townsville and Albany owing to the restriction of compulsory training.114 In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defence, the DNR, now Captain J Richardson, recommended the retention of the naval drill halls on the basis that it was probable that at least some of these buildings would be required on various future occasions, such as during visits of Her Majesty's Australian fleet. As it transpired, while the drill halls in Townsville and on Thursday Island were retained, the Albany naval drill hall, home of the Albany NRC, was disposed of to a local yacht club and the process of permanently reducing the compulsory NRC program began.115

Despite the many options canvassed for maintaining aspects of the compulsory cadet scheme, the cessation of Junior Cadet training, on 30 June 1922, was the first major step in withdrawing the universal training presence in Australian communities and heralded the

111 ibid. 112 Memorandum, Head of N Branch to Second Naval Member, 18 May 1922, NAA MP525/1, 12/6/69. 113 ibid. 114 Memorandum, DNRM to Secretary of Defence, 2 June 1922, NAA MP 525/1, 114/5/38. 115 ibid. 128 overall demise of the scheme.116 Interestingly, the subsequent winding down of compulsory senior cadet training demonstrated the links that the NRC, in some areas, had developed with the community, although this influence was not enough to reverse decisions on local closures. As an example, when the Western Australian naval authorities, on 28 June 1922, closed the Albany drill hall, they became aware that there was a replica of the Imperial Challenge Shield won by the Albany NRC included in the drill hall inventory.117 As two of the members of the team were killed in the war and the remaining four members were still in Albany it was decided to place the shield in the Albany Town Hall in recognition of their service, with subsequent navy policy for the disposal of such trophies ensuring such historic pieces would not be lost.118 On this occasion, although the Albany community benefitted from the disposal of the equipment at the naval drill hall to the Albany Men’s Social and Sports Club, such closures were not always without acrimony.119

In another example, in Queensland, the people of Townsville protested when the Defence Department tried to remove to Melbourne, as part of the eventual Townsville NRC closure, items such as trophies, honour boards, shields, flags, rifles and gymnasium gear.120 In this case, the protest was directed at the Minister for Defence, Massy Greene, on behalf of the citizens of Townsville and the Naval Association.121 It was quickly decided that all the trophies would remain at ‘that port under the Military Authorities’.122 This was clearly not good enough for the people of Townsville and, some three months later, the trophies were put on display in the local town hall.123 This type of ‘ownership’ behaviour was all the more interesting as it was more usually and historically associated with community-based sea cadet units, which were provided with the bulk of their material and moral support by the town. In contrast, the NRC was fully aligned with the defence organisation and, as such, the community usually had very limited input. It seemed that the expanded compulsory cadet scheme had resulted in greater engagement with the community, particularly in towns with little navy presence, This was all the more significant, because this support of cadets under

116 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 15, p. 917. 117 Minute, DNO WA to DNRM, 28 June 1922, NAA MP525/1, 114/5/45. 118 Minute, DNRM to Director Naval Stores, 22 July 1922, NAA MP525/1, 114/5/45. 119 Minute, DNO WA to DNRM, 4 September 1922, NAA MP525/1, 114/5/45 120 Naval General Trophies won by Townsville Naval Cadets, NAA A457, R405/6. 121 Telegram, Green to Prime Minister, 6 June 1922, NAA A457, R405/6. 122 Letter, Prime Minister to Mayor of Townsville, 18 July 1922, NAA A457, R405/6. 123 Letter, Prime Minister to Mayor of Townsville, 30 October 1922, NAA A457, R405/6. 129 the compulsory scheme might not have been expected in view of the widely publicised issues of poor attendance and lack of discipline. Moreover, it was a sign that, for remote regions in particular, the difference between the defence-based branch and the community-based branch of the naval and sea cadet movement was not as clear as it was for naval administrators.

From 1922, in line with the drawing down of compulsory cadet training, the disposal of training facilities was progressing at all centres, although some naval districts managed to retain their facilities. For example, it was decided to retain the drill hall and boat shed on Thursday Island in 1923 for use by HMS Fantome under the supervision of the Sub-Collector of Customs, although it was no longer required for cadet training.124 The overall naval organisation of the compulsory cadet scheme was being dismantled, however, and, on 3 February 1923, Bracegirdle reported that, prior to 1923, there were four divisions (quotas) of senior naval cadets undergoing annual training, but now the active training of cadets was limited to two divisions, aged 16 and 17 years.125 He observed that the policy of limiting the number of cadets under annual training to two divisions or quotas was recognised in all branches of the defence forces and it was essential that the RANR Regulations be amended to provide for the concentration of what was four years training into two years. This was to be accomplished by a careful revision of the nature and subjects of instruction and Bracegirdle provided a new syllabus to achieve the reduction in training time. It is noteworthy that these new provisions still allowed cadets to do voluntary training to prepare themselves as candidates for entry to the navy as midshipmen.126 In this way, as the navy acknowledged the inevitable demise of the compulsory cadet scheme, it worked to retain its benefits for recruiting officer and sailors.

Suspension of NRC training in some areas, and the disposal of training facilities and equipment, were not the only economy measures forced on the defence-based branch of the movement as the navy organisation was altered to make cadets a more integral part of the RANR. For example, on 14 October 1922, it was decided that adult members of the citizens’

124 Minute, Naval Board Secretary to Sub-Collector of Customs, Thursday Island, 5 January 1923, NAA MP525/1, 114/5/33. 125 Minute, DNRM to the Second Naval Member, 3 February 1923, NAA: MP525/1, 160/1/63. 126 ibid. 130 forces and senior cadets would be committed to the same detention camps, although adult members of the citizens’ forces would be quartered and trained separately from the cadets.127 Less controversially, naval cadets and adults were to work more closely in routine activities and, under the Regulations and Instructions for the Royal Australian Naval Reserve 1924, cadets could volunteer for service in RANR bands and might be appropriated for band duties under conditions prescribed in the ‘Regulations for Adult members of the Citizens Naval Forces’.128 In effect, the declining compulsory cadet scheme was encouraging the absorption of the NRC into a fully integrated RANR. In this regard, the Regulations and Instructions provided a comprehensive syllabus for all cadets, who were to be trained using this syllabus unless ordered otherwise by the DNR. In particular, it was required that, at the commencement of their training, cadets would be selected by the DNO and allotted to a branch of the RANR provided that the branch was represented in the ‘Adult Strength Establishment’ for the naval district.129 In this way, the system of commencing occupational training for the adult force at the cadet level was maintained and strengthened.

Initial curtailment of compulsory training did not result in major immediate reduction in numbers or in the range of training occupations available to Senior Naval Cadets and, on 15 May 1923 there was still a combined RANR membership of 3896, mostly cadets.130 Further, the branches still available to cadets included general service, signals, wireless, stoker, artisan (to include those who would become engine-room artificers, electrical artificers, ordnance artificers, shipwrights, joiners, blacksmiths and painters) and miscellaneous (to include those who would become writer, victualling, sick berth, cook and steward ratings). In addition, the Regulations provided that selection should be dependent on the capacity of a cadet to pursue the trade which he followed or intended to follow in civil life, and by the degree of efficiency it was expected he could attain if selected. Illustrating the continuing high level of organisation in the compulsory scheme, the syllabus was very detailed and listed each branch’s subjects, the hours required for completion for each subject and the course content. In addition, there was specific guidance for promotion, as by

127Circular, Adjutant General to All Headquarters, 14 October 1922, NAA MP525/1, 347/1/9. 128 Navy Office, Regulations and Instructions for the Royal Australian RANR 1924, Volume II, Addenda, Government Printer, Melbourne, December, 1924, NAA A1194, 20.20/14125. 129 ibid. 130 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 15, p. 624. 131 attending voluntary drills and instruction cadets could prepare themselves to be candidates for full-time service as midshipman, engineer midshipman and paymaster midshipman.131 In this way, the navy alignment of the NRC was strengthened and any similarity to the community- based sea cadet branch was commensurately decreased. This is important, as the duality of the movement was dependent on the navy’s perception that there were two distinct organisations with completely different organisation, control, personnel and funding systems. Thus, these actions under the compulsory cadet scheme entrenched the duality of the movement because, while the Navy League and Boy Scouts’ Association were working diligently to close the gap, these community-based sea cadet units had none of the systems or support needed to emulate the NRC, particularly in occupational skills training.

Notwithstanding the impending reduction in numbers, the compulsory NRC remained the main part-time training focus of the naval authorities in the later part of this era, from 1922 to 1923, alongside full-time training for officers and sailor entrants at the naval college and HMAS Tingira.132 Nevertheless, although declining to recognise either the NLSCC or the sea scouts, the navy continued to provide some limited support to community-based sea cadet activities. This was particularly important for the NLSCC, which had successfully developed a close relationship with the community as the mainstay of its expansion, yet struggled to get staff, training venues and equipment. 133 In its first annual summary of cadet activities, in 1923, the Navy League revealed that it had concluded the year with a severe shortage of honorary officers and instructors and a lack of suitable waterfront depots. Nevertheless, it reported the growth of the NLSCC from 24 cadets in 1920, to 120 in 1921, 283 in 1922 and 364 in 1923. During this period, the focus on navy engagement continued, with the Navy League reporting the loan of five service cutters from the navy and the enlistment of seven NLSCC members in the RAN, while a number of boys (unspecified) had joined the merchant navy.134 In this way, although still heavily outnumbered by the compulsory NRC, and competing for the navy’s attention with the sea scouts, the NLSCC was making progress, although only in New South Wales. Meanwhile, sea scout troops continued to make independent submissions for loan of equipment, which were being refused

131 ibid. 132 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 15, 1922, p. 223. 133 The Navy League Journal, vol.4, no. 10, pp. 10, 12. 134 ibid. 132 by the navy on grounds of the need for economy and because consideration of official recognition of the scout movement was being held in abeyance until the following year.135

Overall, the period 1922-23 represented a few short years of concentrated effort that to a large degree decided the longer-term future of the naval and sea cadet movement. The community-based branch saw the emergence of the NLSCC and the persistence of the Boy Scouts’ Association, championing the sea scouts. At the same time, the defence-based branch was again being reshaped by the winding down of the wider compulsory cadet scheme, which forced further integration of the NRC with the adult reserve. The dual nature, defence and community, of the movement had been reinforced by the failure of the sea scouts’ bid and the community-based sea cadets were no closer to formal naval recognition. The NRC had consolidated their position as an integral part of the navy under the compulsory cadet scheme, despite reduced numbers and other cutbacks. For their part, while they had failed to gain acceptance of their training as an alternative to compulsory naval cadet training, the sea scouts remained committed to garnering some recognition and support from the navy. Meanwhile, the Navy League was pressing hard for formal recognition based on the British model. In rejecting any prospect of cooperation, both the Navy League and the Boy Scouts’ Association, representing the sea scouts, presented the Naval Board with a divided front to further complicate what was already a fragmented community-based branch of the movement. In this way, while the numerical balance and relative fortunes of the two branches of the movement had been restored, to some extent, naval polices on cadet funding and organisational control still strongly favoured the NRC. Philosophically, the movement remained one entity, on the basis of both branches comprising groups of boys attending part- time nautical training. Its underlying duality, nevertheless, as two distinctly different branches was still defined by the contrast between the navy’s complete control over the NRC (with their singular focus on seamanship training) and its resistance to taking any responsibility for the community-based sea cadet branch (with its primary focus on citizenship training).

135 Letter, Naval Board Secretary to District Scout Commissioner, Burnie, 22 November 1923, NAA MP124/6, 422/201/3. 133

CHAPTER FIVE

Transition 1924-1932

From 1924 to 1932, as the compulsory cadet scheme continued to be wound down by the Australian government, prior to its eventual cessation in 1929, the community-based sea cadets, initially, struggled to remain viable. Notwithstanding their respective difficulties, however, the two branches of the Australian naval and sea movement survived. The NRC continued as part of the navy on a volunteer basis, attached to RANR depots, while various community-based sea cadet units, with a diverse mix of officers and supporters, continued to elicit navy support. The beginning of this chapter focuses on the further evolution of the NLSCC, in New South Wales, between 1924 and 1928. During this period, the Navy League continued to develop its relationship with the navy, although it initially placed its claims for official recognition by the Naval Board in abeyance. In addition, despite the demise of the compulsory cadet scheme in 1929, the Navy League’s sea cadet organisation failed to expand outside New South Wales until the establishment of the Victorian NLSCC in 1932. The second aspect examined in the transformation of the movement during this period is the transformation of the NRC, after 1929, into a small volunteer organisation, although still under the full control of the navy. In the third phase of this period, attention turns to fresh and concerted efforts by the Navy League, between 1929 and 1932, to secure official recognition by the navy. The chapter concludes with a summary of the Naval Board’s stance on official recognition in the face of an expanding community-based sea cadet branch, with apparently unlimited enthusiasm for involving the navy in its activities.

The Prime Minister for the major part of the period 1924-32 was Stanley Melbourne Bruce.1 A wealthy businessman, Bruce had grand visions for Australia’s future, including a possible population of up to 300,000,000 people.2 Notwithstanding this vision, Bruce has at the same time been described by some as an unimaginative man with few points of identification with ordinary Australians.3 Rather, Bruce had a great sense of the importance of Britain and, particularly at two Imperial Conferences, in 1923 and 1926, he was focused on

1 J Brett, ‘Stanley Melbourne Bruce 9 February 1923 – 22 October 1929’, M Grattan (ed), Australian Prime Ministers, New Holland, Sydney, 2000, pp. 127-138. 2 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, p. 170. 3 Brett, ‘Stanley Melbourne Bruce’, p. 138. 134 strengthening imperial economic and defence ties.4 It was Bruce’s successor, James Scullin, Prime Minister from 1929 to 1932, who finally abolished the much reduced compulsory cadet scheme and made heavy cuts in defence spending, but Scullin is better remembered for his attempts to implement Labor’s policies on child endowment, old age pensions, unemployment insurance, and other social reforms in very difficult economic times.5 In the mid-1920s, the Federal government did not lack revenue as federal taxes exceeded the budget, but the states were short of funds due to limited taxation powers and the impact of inflation on their fixed grants from the federal government.6 An attempt by the federal Treasurer, Earle Page, to rectify this situation, in 1923, was rejected by the state premiers and it was not until 1927 that the Commonwealth took over responsibility for state debts in return for the states’ agreement that loan policies of all governments would in future be decided by the federal Loan Council.7 Despite this progress on more equitable financial management of government revenue, employment remained uncertain for many workers and there was a large transient workforce.8 Blainey describes the ‘chequered boom of the 1920s’ as coming to a close in October 1929, as the great depression began. Prices on the New York stock exchange fell by about 40 percent in two months and the prices of Australia’s main exports almost halved in the next three years.9 By 1932, the unemployment rate exceeded 30 percent, one of the highest levels of unemployment in the world, and large numbers of unemployed men queued for jobs and camped out in town and country showgrounds, as they moved from place to place looking for work.10 Against this bleak economic backdrop, both branches of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement struggled to be adequately funded.

At the beginning of this eight year period, in 1924, the navy’s fortunes were reversed by the announcement by the Bruce government of a naval expansion program, as part of an overall five year wider defence development initiative, with an investment of £6,250,000 in

4 ibid., p. 133. 5 J Molony, ‘James Henry Scullin 22 October – 6 January 1932’, M Grattan (ed), Australian Prime Ministers, New Holland, Sydney, 2000, p. 147. 6 H Radi, ‘1920-1929’, F Crowley (ed) A New History of Australia, Heinemann Australia, Melbourne, 1974, p.385. 7 ibid., pp. 385-386 8 ibid., p. 388. 9 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, p. 174. 10 ibid., pp. 174-175. 135 ships and associated support.11 This five year development program saw five ships added to the fleet, the addition of a further 581 sea going personnel and an increase in the naval reserve, before the Depression slowed and eventually reversed these gains.12 This reversal of the navy’s fortunes due to the Depression has been described by Frame as ‘disastrous’, with major fleet reductions, 61 officers and 639 sailors from the full-time navy retrenched, many without receiving their entitlements, the naval college at Jervis Bay relocated to Flinders Naval Depot in Victoria and the full-time RAN reduced to .340 officers, 25 full-time cadets and 2776 sailors by 1932.13 Any apparent navy immunity to funding constraints that may have emerged in the period of revival were well and truly dashed by the Depression and suggested the Naval Board’s capacity to fund the defence-based naval cadets might be as much in doubt as its capacity to assist the community-based sea cadet branch.

During the period 1924-32, the Navy League worked diligently to become the pre- eminent community-based sea cadet organisation in the eyes of the Naval Board. The saga of these efforts by the Navy League is informed by both the official navy record and the Navy League’s long standing journal. Even with these sources, however, the challenge of accurately tracing the Navy League’s role in developing the community-based sea cadets and, by necessity, reconciling the navy and Navy League positions is considerable, particularly as the Navy League Journal featured extensive coverage of sea cadet activities, but gave little publicity to its discussions with the RAN. For this reason, the Navy League’s concise history of the events of this period, published in 1986, in the form of a retrospective by the President of the League, is useful in illustrating this dilemma and in providing a fitting introduction to an examination of the uncertain development of the community-based sea cadet branch during this period.14 In 1986, the Navy League recorded that its first Australian branch was formed in Victoria in 1915 and that a branch was formed in New South Wales no later than 1928, but probably earlier.15 The Navy League New South Wales branch, in contrast, had meticulously recorded the establishment and progress of the NLSCC, from 1920 to 1932, in

11 Grey, A Military History of Australia, pp. 129-30. 12 ibid., p. 130. 13 Frame, No Pleasure Cruise, pp. 142-43. 14 The Navy League Journal, vol. 48, no. 3, p. 39. 15 ibid. 136 the same flagship journal in which the later retrospective article appeared.16 In addition, Navy League publications, such as the Rules and Regulations Governing the Navy League Sea Cadet Corps New South Wales 1934, record the branch being formed on 26 November 1917 and the NLSCC commencing on 21 October 1920.17 The errors in this seminal retrospective, while likely attributable to an identical error in an earlier retrospective of both the British and Australian NLSCC, illustrate the complexity of recording the history of a volunteer movement with limited resources and no full-time support staff.18

Continuing its history of the Navy League in Australia, with particular relevance to the period 1924-32, the 1986 retrospective describes the League as a defence or navy lobby group that developed into a sea cadet training organisation which, by 1932, had established sub-branches in Tasmania and Victoria devoted to cadet training, mainly of boys in the 14 to 18 year age range. In addition, the NLSCC is described as the naval equivalent of the army school cadets and the Air Training Corps, growing from a membership of ‘about’ 430 in 9 units in 1948/49, to 883 in 18 units in 1953, and finally 2500 in 38 units in 1963.19 While noted as speculative, these attendance figures are useful as a comparison to the membership of 364 reported by the Navy League at the end of 1923, as reported in chapter four, and the report of 400 Sydney based NLSCC visiting the Garden Island naval base on 9 April 1924.20 Allowing for some error, these reports indicate that there was variable, but unsustained, growth in the membership of the NLSCC over a 20 year period, with a membership in 1948 equivalent to that in 1923, and thus provides essential context to the Navy League’s efforts to gain official recognition in the period 1924-32, and to navy scepticism regarding the league’s membership claims.21 This conundrum is the starting point for this chapter and its examination of the efforts of the community-based sea cadets, particularly the NLSCC, to be seen by the navy as a credible pre-entry training organisation, equal to the NRC, which would, therefore, be able to provide recruits for the navy if provided with adequate resources.

16 The Navy League Journal, vol.1, no. 2, p. 4. The Navy League Journal appeared monthly from 1920 to 1932, but thereafter did not appear for five years, before re-appearing less consistently until its rebirth as a new journal, The Navy, which provided significantly less coverage of sea cadet activities. 17 Rules and Regulations Governing the Navy League Sea Cadet Corps New South Wales 1934, The Navy League, New South Wales, Sydney, 1934. 18 J Clark, ‘The Navy League Sea Cadets’, The Navy, vol.12, no. 3, March 1949, pp. 17-19, 48 19 The Navy League Journal, vol. 48, no. 3, p. 39. 20 ibid., vol. 4, no. 12, p. 16. 21 ibid., vol. 11, no. 2, p. 3. 137

The duality of the movement at this time was clearly defined by the differences between the NRC and the community-based sea cadets, and their respective principal foci on teaching seamanship and citizenship, one within defence and the other outside defence. There were notable instances involving serving naval personnel, however, where this difference became quite blurred and this would have added to the confusion confronting the Naval Board. As an example, a group of naval officers at the Flinders Naval Depot in Victoria, where there was no RANR or NRC unit, decided to start a private naval cadet corps. In this case, on 28 August 1926, the Captain Superintendent of Training at the Flinders Naval Depot, HJ Feakes, advised the Naval Board Secretary, Macandie, that a naval cadet corps was being raised locally by the officers of the depot and permission was sought for the purchase of material from the clothing store to be made up into uniforms.22 Feakes advised Macandie that similar corps were in existence at the ‘Home Depots’ and were understood to be most popular.23 In the case of this proposed corps, Feakes expressed the view that such a corps would be of great benefit in the local district, where attractions for boys were practically non- existent, and he anticipated that about 30 boys would become members. Most of these boys, he advised, were sons of naval ratings or employees attached to the depot and works department. All necessary funds to finance the corps were being raised privately, Feakes observed, and it was proposed that the corps would be called the ‘Cerberus Naval Cadet Corps’.24

With regard to supplying Feakes’ proposed corps, the navy’s Director of Victualling, C Massey, supported the proposal, on 6 September 1926, on the basis that all stores applications were to be signed for by the officer in charge of the corps and approved by the Captain Superintendent. 25 For his part the Finance Member of the Naval Board, TJ Thomas, commented that he had no objection to the proposal, but that some further information on the

22 Minute, Feakes to Macandie, 26 August, 1926, NAA MP124/6, 434/201/940. 23 ibid. It is not clear, but it can be assumed that Feakes was referring to the NRC units attached to RANR depots in each state. His intention to fund the Cerberus unit and establish it as a community-based sea cadet unit, rather than apply to establish a NRC unit, would have been determined by the absence of an RANR branch at the Flinders Naval Depot. 24 ibid. 25 Minute, Massey to Naval Board, 6 September 1926, NAA MP124/6, 434/201/940. 138 status of the corps seemed necessary.26 Similarly, on 1 October 1926, the Second Naval Member, Captain HP Cayley, commented that, in view of the great value from a naval point of view of ‘such institutions as was now proposed to form’ at the Flinders Naval Depot, he recommended that the minister's approval be given to the sale to the new unit of certain service clothing.27 With regard to this arrangement, he noted that the ‘Cerberus Naval Cadet Corps’ would not be an official body, but would be somewhat similar to the community- based sea cadets at Sydney and other ports. 28 The corps would be purely voluntary as regards both instructors and cadets and would be under Feakes supervision. The First Naval Member, Rear-Admiral WR Napier, strongly concurred with these views.29 As a result, on 19 October 1926, Macandie advised Feakes that the sale of small quantities of material for the Cerberus Naval Cadet Corps had been approved.30

Although it was disbanded in February 1936 due to lack of interest among the local boys, the Cerberus Naval Cadet Corps is important as an illustration of the willingness of the Naval Board to support a community-based sea cadet unit organised and controlled by serving navy personnel, although funded by the community within the naval base.31 Furthermore, the stipulation that Feakes was to supervise the unit created the anomalous situation of a community-based sea cadet unit being, effectively, organised and controlled by the navy. Moreover, the Naval Board’s approval of these arrangements emphasises the difficulty it had in unravelling how much responsibility it might actually take when such organisations involved serving navy personnel, albeit on a voluntary basis, and were conducted on a navy base. It was against this background, of the navy requiring its own personnel to fully fund a community-based sea cadet unit on a naval base, that the Navy League set about convincing the Naval Board that it warranted official recognition and support equivalent to the NRC.

26 ibid. 27 Minute, Cayley to Macandie, 1 October 1926, NAA MP124/6, 434/201/940. 28 ibid. 29 ibid. 30 Minute, Macandie to Feakes, 19 October 1926, NAA MP124/6, 434/201/940. 31 Minute, Pope to Macandie, 28 May 1937, NAA MP124/6, 422/201/60. 139

While it placed its efforts to gain official recognition in abeyance for the initial part of the period 1924-32, the Navy League continued to enjoy more than philosophical support from the RAN, while the sea scouts naval involvement appeared to wane. At major Navy League events, presided over by recently retired RAN personnel and attended by long standing and high profile supporters, such as Harry Shelley and Captain Frank Hixson, it was not unusual for an RAN band to provide the entertainment.32 Notwithstanding the naval pomp and ceremony associated with these events, the Navy League presented a broad citizenship model of youth training to its members and to the general public with articles on ‘The Psychology of the Boy’ appearing alongside editorials attacking politicians for failing to support a warship construction program.33 Nevertheless, as it more fully established itself in New South Wales at the beginning of this period, the Navy League moved its headquarters to a building next to Royal Navy House in Grosvenor Street, Sydney. It also set about publicising its independent training efforts in making the NLSCC a success, by announcing the acquisition of a sail training ship, Lindstol, to be used for weekend instruction, by RAN volunteers, and recognising in print those cadets who had joined the RAN.34 In addition, the service of cadets who had joined the merchant navy was reported, with many, apparently, having chosen merchant service over the RAN and accounts of their voyages to Great Britain, the Continent and various Pacific Islands were promoted as providing exciting reading for current cadets.35

During this period, the Navy League became still more dynamic in the face of adversity and its appeals for funding and volunteers were not restricted to the Navy League Journal, nor did the league attempt to conceal its fragility in having units, in this case the North Sydney Company, made potentially unviable by the resignation of just one volunteer.36 Similarly, in more prominent press publications, where it featured alongside other youth groups such as the Boy Scouts, the Young Australia League, YMCA and Boys Brigade, it was not unusual for the Navy League’s role as a provider of training for a sea career to

32 The Navy League Journal, vol.4, no. 2, p18. 33 ibid., vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 1, 10-15, 20. 34 ibid., vol. 5, no. 4, p. 16; Sydney Morning Herald, 4 August 1924, p. 8. 35 ibid., vol. 6, no. 3, p. 17. 36 Sydney Morning Herald, 23 September 1925, p. 18. 140 overshadow its citizenship training role.37 Furthermore, even with some units struggling, it wanted to expand and, unlike the RAN, the Navy League did not regard proximity to the sea as a pre-requisite for involving communities in the community-based branch of the movement and targeted Penrith in Sydney’s far western suburbs as a potential centre for a new depot.38

Although local support was limited, visiting navies provided opportunities for training of cadets with Japanese, British and American fleet units visiting Sydney in the first half of 1924.39 Nevertheless, and as might be expected, the Navy League’s primary focus remained the RAN, where they took every opportunity to be involved with navy activities, such as when 200 cadets were reported as marching though the main streets of Sydney accompanied by the band of HMAS Sydney.40 Assisted by enthusiastic supporters, who were strongly opposed to the decision to cease full-time RAN ‘boy training’, and a local press that was willing to provide space for lengthy articles, the Navy League was able to advance its credentials as a seamanship training organisation, with 400 boys enrolled, for which the ‘main idea’ was ‘to train boys for the merchant service or for the Royal Australian Navy’.41 In its 1928 Annual Report, the Navy League summarised its many accomplishments, but acknowledged publicly that the greatest impediment to a full attainment of its objectives was the limited number of subscribers.42 Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Navy League used its well developed defence network to arrange accommodation at army depots for residential courses such as that conducted by the Mosman corps at Newcastle in September 1928.43 Thus, with limited support from the RAN and no further attempts at attaining official recognition and support, the Navy League was still able to conduct a wide range of citizenship activities and assist both the RAN and the merchant marine by encouraging boys to pursue a career at sea, although the organisation’s efforts were still characterised by inconsistency and struggle.

37 ibid., 17 July 1924, p. 8. 38 ibid., 14 August 1924, p. 10. 39 Sydney Morning Herald, 29 January 1924, p. 10; Hawkesbury Herald, 3 April 1924, p. 4; Hawkesbury Herald, 17 April 1924, p. 1. 40 Sydney Morning Herald, 24 July 1926, p. 16. 41 ibid., 4 September, 1926, p. 13; 3 November 1926, p. 6; Royal Australian Navy, Outline of Australian naval history, RAN Education Service, Melbourne, 1949, p. 15. 42 Sydney Morning Herald, 15 May 1928, p. 12. 43 ibid., 24 September 1928, p. 7. 141

In New South Wales, although the compulsory NRC scheme was running down, this did not automatically translate to increased support for the community-based sea cadet branch as a whole. The Naval Board remained of the view that it was not authorised to fund community-based sea cadet units and, as a further complication, requests were still being submitted independently by Navy League sea cadet units without reference to the Navy League state committee. As an example, on 12 March 1928, Major EIC Scott, President of the Navy League Mosman Sub-Branch, applied directly to navy stores administrators for support because his unit was losing recruits almost daily due to an inability to obtain uniforms. 44 On this occasion, however, because there was a quantity of small sizes for which there appeared to be no demand, it was recommended that these uniforms should be made available to Scott. Furthermore, in addition to the impact of the curtailment of the part-time compulsory scheme, navy stores personnel acknowledged that there was now a lack of need for boys’ uniforms in the full-time navy due to the abolition of boys’ entry to the full-time force through the Training Ship Tingira. 45

The full scope of these changes in boy recruiting was revealed when Scott’s request was considered by the Naval Board, on 28 March 1928, and it was reported that there was no demand for 719 serge jumpers and 926 pairs of serge trousers in boys sizes, attributed directly to the cessation of recruiting of boys to the full-time navy and the suspension of training of NRC members between the ages of 14 and 16. 46 The request from the Mosman Navy League was regarded, therefore, as providing an opportunity to dispose of a sizable portion of these surplus stocks. Thus, notwithstanding Scott’s independent request, with reference to the Navy League state committee, the Naval Board was willing to assist the community-based sea cadets, but only on a cash basis. In addition, navy administrators were quite prepared to overlook the fact that the stores had been ‘earmarked’ for the sea scouts.47 High level discussions between the navy and the community-based sea cadets were about to resume in earnest and, as this example reveals, independent unit submissions were still being

44 Letter, Scott to Massey, 12 March 1928, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 45 Letter, Massey, to the Director of Victualling, 20 March 1920, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 46 Minute, Director of Victualling to Naval Board, 28 March 1928, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 47 ibid. 142 approved in the absence of a centralised Board of Control. Moreover, there appeared to be confusion, on both sides, about who could make submissions, the process of setting of priorities between the different community-based sea cadet organisations and how much unofficial support the navy was prepared to provide.

As the Navy League resumed its campaign for support in 1928, the extent of the confusion surrounding support of the community-based seas cadets was highlighted further by the New South Wales Navy League headquarters attempts to secure uniforms, and an annual cash grant, on a state-wide basis at the same time as individual units, such as the Mosman Sub-Branch, applied independently for support. Compounding such confusion, the Navy League made its new application for recognition and support, on 17 March 1928, not to the navy, but directly to the Minister for Defence, Sir William Glasgow.48 This request was referred back to the DNR, Bracegirdle, who sustained the competitive aspect of the recognition debate by recommending to the Naval Board that the objectives of the Navy League deserved all possible support, but the same ought to apply to the sea scouts. Regardless of this need for equity, he observed, the problem was that the department was experiencing financial stress and funds were more necessary for both the active and reserve adult forces and this was an inopportune time to consider cadet appeals of this sort. The Naval Board agreed with Bracegirdle’s views and Glasgow informed the Navy League that, due to limitations on defence expenditure, which had influenced the curtailment of universal training, no financial assistance could be given.49

Although the Navy League acknowledged that a grant of money was impracticable, it went on to ask that the issue of uniforms be considered. The Naval Board Secretary, Macandie, nevertheless, saw this as just another form of subsidy and argued that the navy budget could not accommodate the expenditure. Nevertheless, following the recommendation of stores administrators, it was agreed that approval would be given for the sale of part worn articles of uniform to Navy League and sea scout headquarters in the

48 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra. 1956, p. 2, NAA B6121/1, 295B. 49 ibid. 143 various states.50 This decision was approved by Glasgow in June 1928.51 In this way, while it was short of funds for the permanent naval forces and the RANR, and in the face of multiple requests from both the headquarters and the rank and file of the Navy League, including political lobbying, the navy managed to maintain and communicate a consistent policy on selling worn items of uniform, while declining to fund community-based units, particularly.

Despite the Naval Board’s apparent consistency in not making gifts to community- based sea cadet units at this time, exemplified by the requirement for payment for even part- worn uniforms, a serious lack of consistency was revealed by evidence that the navy had earlier, in an ad hoc and informal manner, donated stores to some units. Furthermore, one such instance involved the supply of weapons, in 1921, and, during the period 1924-32, the navy’s ability to control of the use of such weapons was brought into question. In this case, the Naval Board was required to re-consider, on 28 March 1928, the gift of obsolete carbines (rifles) to the Institute of Social Service, Brisbane.52 The weapons had been supplied on the condition that the bolts were removed, but it was reported that certain of these rifles had been fitted with replacement bolts, in the intervening seven year period, and were capable of being fired. The Naval Board decided that, when the gift of rifles had been made, it had definitely implied that the bolts should be removed from the rifles and that they should not thereafter be replaced. As these terms had not been adhered to, the Naval Board decided that, unless these terms were strictly observed in future and the arms were kept in such a state as to be incapable of use as firearms, the gift would be revoked.53 This example reveals how the navy not only donated rifles to a community-based sea cadet unit, but did so on the basis that the Naval Board would maintain a controlling interest in their use, in this case by requiring an assurance that they were used for drill purposes only, although this was not policed as vigilantly as might have been anticipated. From this example, it is understandable that confusion could arise on both sides about how the navy viewed the support, organisation and control of the community-based sea cadet branch.

50 ibid. 51 ibid., p. 3. 52 Naval Board Minutes, 28 March 1928, NAA MP124/6, 404/202/689. 53 ibid. 144

This issue of confusion about how the navy viewed the community-based sea cadets, and what it was prepared to do to assist in the areas of organisation, control, personnel and funding, became more central to the movement’s history from 1928, because this arm of the movement struggled to survive as the Depression worsened. While the Navy League remained a significant participant in the quest for support and survival, it was the role played by one of its most iconic units, the ‘Sydney Training Depot’ located on Snapper Island in Sydney Harbour, that best illustrates the Naval Board’s dilemma. An examination of the work of this unit and its founder, LE Forsythe, provides a further and fuller insight into the challenge the Naval Board faced in working with the organisers of the community-based sea cadets overall. In addition, a clearer view can be attained, by examining the development of Forsythe’s various units, of the highly variable fortunes of even the most successful community-based sea cadet organisations.

Leonard Forsythe first came to notice as a sea scout leader when the national review of sea scout organisation was conducted by the navy in 1920, just before he transferred his allegiance to the NLSCC and becoming one the Navy League’s most successful, and vocal, unit commanders and state office bearers.54 A Sydney Training Depot publication, a ‘Souvenir of Snapper Island’, describes April 1928 as being the lowest point for its forerunner, the Drummoyne Company of the NLSCC, since its formation as one of the original companies of 1921.55 In this publication, Forsythe records how the unit had by early 1928 been forced to scale down its activities due to lack of financial and material support, had a membership of only 15 cadets, no depot to parade in, and only the use of a small portion of a boatshed in which to keep what little gear they had for their three boats, which were all much the worse for the want of repairs and painting. Despite these setbacks, Forsythe reports that, by July 1928, the cadets had raised £54 in pennies to repair the boats and buy new gear, and it was decided to move to a more suitable site for training purposes. No sooner was this new unit premises at Iron Cove, Sydney, completed, in December 1928,

54 Memorandum, DNO NSW to DNRM, 2 September 1920, NAA: MP525/1, 357/1/7. 55 LE Forsythe, Souvenir of Snapper Island, Sydney Training Depot, Sydney, 1932, NAA MP151/1 422/201/67. After being published, this document was widely reproduced in a variety of publications 145 and official commissioned as the Sydney Training Depot of the NLSCC, on 20 April 1929, than the decision was made to move again due to the high cost of rent, rates and power.56

The departure from Iron Cove and the acquisition of a new facility by Forsythe, at Snapper Island in Sydney Harbour, provided the impetus for the creation of a leading community-based sea cadet unit and a Sydney Harbour landmark. Forsythe’s expression of appreciation of the assistance of Admiral Kerr, Rear Admiral Evans, the Naval Board and the unit’s best friend, the late Mr J Payne of the Commonwealth Shipping Board in arranging a lease of Snapper Island for 15 years from the Commonwealth Government’ encapsulates the entrepreneurial independence required of successful community-based units of every era.57 This spirit extended to the construction of the unit facilities with Forsythe using cadets and other volunteer labour to reshape the island by removing 1000 tons of rock and building an 85 metre sea wall, between August 1931 and January 1932. During this period a wharf, guard room and concrete retaining wall were built and, in March 1932, with the authority of the Commonwealth Weather Bureau, weather signals were displayed. The total cost of building the depot was £1325, which Forsythe declared he had ‘personally guaranteed’.58 In this way, the organisation that, arguably, would become Australia’s most prominent community-based sea cadet unit was launched. In addition, paralleling their physical prominence in Sydney Harbour, the organisers immediately progressed to take a leading role in the activities of the Navy League, particularly in gaining navy recognition and making the Sydney Training Depot part of the navy alongside the NRC.

This glimpse into the rapidly changing fortunes of a longstanding and, ultimately, successful unit such as the Sydney Training Depot partially demonstrates how the navy was often faced with an unstable and unpredictable community-based sea cadet branch. Furthermore, the extent of this uncertainty is made clearer by considering the contemporaneous circumstances of other Navy League units, in particular the Mosman Bay Navy League Sea Cadet Branch and its President, Major EIC Scott. While Forsythe was

56 ibid 57 ibid. 58 ibid. 146 struggling, Scott was reporting record financial results, which allowed the purchase of new training quarters and a cutter as a result of his ‘indefatigable and unrelenting’ demands on the advertisers in his unit magazine at the same time as he was pressing the Naval Board for free uniforms,59 Similarly, the Navy League’s reports of the activities undertaken by its ten existing units, at Balmain, North, Sydney, Lane Cove, Mosman Bay, Manly, Drummoyne, Richmond, Rose Bay-Bondi, Birchgrove and Middle Harbour, with the support of RAN personnel, gave the impression of a highly successful, well organised, appropriately controlled organisation with an abundance of volunteers and few funding problems.60 As regular readers of the The Navy League Journal, navy administrators could have arrived at the view that their funds were unlikely to make a large impact on such a successful organisation, and were far better directed to defence needs. It was against this ever present scenario of high profile public events and apparent success that the navy was again asked, by the Navy League, to provide more substantial support to the community-based sea cadet branch of the movement.

While Forsythe was busy building his new unit headquarters at Snapper Island and Scott and his colleagues were publicising their numerous successful activities, the Navy League’s efforts to secure support from the navy began to escalate, from 1929, using arguments which remained essentially unchanged until full recognition was finally achieved in 1952. These efforts by the Navy League and other organisations were so consistent and determined that the RAN compiled an official dossier, in 1956, of the history of these activities that reinforces the view that this aspect of the movement was the quintessence of its relationship with the navy.61 This dossier reveals the navy’s frustrations with the attempts by a range of community-based sea cadet groups to elicit official navy support from 1920 onward and provides numerous candid insights into the navy’s predicament in wanting to help, but having an uncertain legal and material basis for doing so.62

59 The Navy League Journal, vol. 8, no. 12, April 1928, p. 18. 60 ibid, pp. 16-17 61 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 3, NAA B6121/1, 295B. 62 ibid. 147

During the latter part of the period 1924-32, beginning with the cessation of compulsory NRC training in 1929, the Navy League worked relentlessly on as many fronts as possible to secure support and finance from the navy and, despite repeated rejections by the naval administration, its range of demands became quite comprehensive. Two things, however, always stood in the way of requests for assistance. These were the Naval Board’s primary function of ensuring that the permanent navy was able to perform its role and the lesser, but very important and relevant priority for the community-based sea cadet branch, requirement that the defence focused RANR, and its cadets, remained viable. This meant that allocating appropriate funds for full-time recruiting and the support of the NRC were always seen as more important than assisting community-based sea cadets. Hence, in the wake of the wind down of compulsory training, the navy focused on resuming full-time recruit training for boys and, on 27 March 1929, the Naval Board recommended to the Minister for Defence, Glasgow, the re-introduction of full-time training for boys at the earliest possible time.63 The Naval Board favoured a boys’ training establishment in the vicinity of Flinders Naval Depot, as it would ensure some economy in administration, although the government was considering a site in Geelong, and recommended that £12000 be included in the estimates for this purpose.64 Regardless of the location, this residential full-time training facility would be the RAN’s first priority.

As the Naval Board worked to establish its new full-time boy training scheme, the Navy League resumed its campaign for recognition when, on November 1929, the New South Wales branch of the Navy League applied directly to Glasgow for support and found themselves immediately rebuffed on the basis that lack of defence funds still made financial grants impossible.65 Illustrating the navy’s evolving view of the Navy League’s campaign for recognition and support, the wording of the internal navy analysis of what occurred at this time reveals something of a siege mentality in relation to the Navy League’s enthusiastic approaches. For example, it records that when Rear Admiral AE Evans, Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Squadron, accepted an invitation to be Honorary Patron of the Sydney Training Depot of the NLSCC, in 1930, the Navy was ‘straightaway avalanched with

63 Naval Board Minutes, 27 March 1929, NAA MP124/6, 404/202/689. 64 ibid. 65 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 3, NAA: B6121/1, 295B. 148 recommendations for forwarding to the Naval Board, by the Regional Officer-in-Charge (L.E. Forsythe)’.66 These recommendations included that sea cadets should be given preference in joining the navy, that officers of the Navy League should be given special honorary sea cadet commissions, plus a familiar range of support measures. Notwithstanding the enhanced expectations in this newest proposal, and the siege mentality it inspired at navy headquarters, Evans apparently supported the idea that recognition should be given to the Navy League, including that preference of entry to the navy should be given to Navy League cadets and that officers of the Navy League should be permitted to purchase uniforms from the Commonwealth Clothing Factory. In relation to a request for cadets to receive instruction in navy ships, however, Evans suggested that this should occur on ceremonial occasions, but he did not agree with embarkation during exercises.67 In making these recommendations, Evans was following what was becoming something of a tradition, whereby local navy administrators supported the community-based sea cadets in their attempts to sway the Naval Board.

In considering the Navy League’s proposals, the DNR, Bracegirdle, expressed the established view that available funds were needed for the active and reserve forces (a point he had made on the occasion of a similar submission in March 1928) and noted that the payment of a capitation allowance to naval cadet corps in Great Britain had ceased. Furthermore, Bracegirdle considered that the issue of honorary commissions was the first step to official recognition and would lead to other requests involving expenditure of departmental funds, where (previously) the Naval Board had ‘rigidly refrained from such a course, but had extended every reasonable facility to the Navy League’.68 For his part, the Naval Board Secretary, Macandie, observed that the RANR should have priority for any available funds and, on legislative grounds, the Naval Board could not arrange for commissions to be issued to officers of the NLSCC, as commissions under the Defence Act could be issued only to officers of the defence forces. Furthermore, he suggested that it would be unwise to accept responsibility for a requested inspection of the Sydney Training Depot of the NLSCC as the time available could be more profitably spent inspecting the RANR. Notwithstanding the

66 ibid. 67 ibid 68 ibid. 149 navy’s inability to assist in other areas, Macandie re-iterated that uniforms could be purchased by the Navy League and that the First Naval Member, Rear Admiral Munro-Kerr, intended to make an unofficial visit to the Sydney Training Depot the next time he was in Sydney.69 As planned, Munro-Kerr visited the Sydney Training Depot on 21 April 1931.70 While such an unofficial visit did not constitute an inspection in the sense of exercising control over the unit, the difference would have been moot to Forsythe and his supporters. In their eyes, they had succeeded in involving the most senior member of the navy in the activities of their unit, and had already received navy endorsement of their activities through an ‘inspection’ by Evans in July the previous year.71

During this period, as the pace of requests for support in resourcing the community- based sea cadets quickened, concerns began to be raised by navy administrators regarding the legality of selling uniforms to these organisations. Specifically, senior naval staff realised the potential danger of supplying naval uniforms, paid for or gifted, to individuals who were not members of the defence forces. Hence, on 29 May 1928, the head of naval administration, Commander CH Spurgeon, advised the Naval Board that it had no authority to incur any expenditure in this area.72 Moreover, on 2 June 1928, he declared that he was in no doubt that, under the provisions of Section 83 of the Defence Act, ‘every one of these lads who appears in public in Naval Uniform is liable to a penalty of £10, and a further penalty of £20 if he wears it in such a way as to bring contempt on the uniform’.73 Specifically, Spurgeon explained, ‘the Statute was designed to meet the case of a person who, for any illegal purpose, wears the uniform (e.g. to facilitate imposition)’, but did not, he considered, apply to the sea scouts as they were a bona fide ‘Military representation’ which was ‘excepted’ by the relevant Section of the Act.74 Demonstrating the wider, and not illegally motivated, aspects of this issue, the navy had been investigating breaches of Section 83, by state harbour masters for example, since 1914.75 Hence, this was not an issue peculiar to the Australian naval and

69 ibid. 70 ibid. 71 The Navy League Journal, vol. 11, no. 3, July 1930, pp. 6, 10. 72 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, c. 1956, p. 2., Canberra. NAA: B6121/1 295B, The Navy League of Australia. 73 ibid. 74 ibid. 75 Letter, Naval Secretary to Secretary, Department of Defence, 29 June 1914, NAA MP472, 13/15/8961. 150 sea cadet movement, but it was to have more longevity in this area and would assume more damaging proportions than it did in relation to officers in the maritime industry who wore navy-like uniforms.

Notwithstanding Spurgeon’s ‘exception’ advice, the Naval Board decided, on 7 June 1928, that it would improper be improper to supply naval uniforms from serviceable stocks for use by any of the various community-based sea cadet organisations, including the NLSCC and the sea scouts.76 Instead, the Naval Board recommended for the minister’s approval that authority be given for the sale of worn articles of naval uniform, which would otherwise be disposed of at the periodical departmental auction sales.77 As a result of this decision, on 14 June 1928, arrangements were made for sale to Navy League and sea scout headquarters of part-worn articles of uniform only.78 Thus, the community-based sea cadets were denied access to new uniforms, but were given preferential access to uniforms that would otherwise go to public auction, and a small formal privilege had been delivered at the instigation of navy administrators, rather than in response to a specific Navy League or sea scout request.

While the community-based sea cadets were trying unsuccessfully to garner greater support from the navy during this period, the defence-based NRC were still fully supported under the compulsory cadet scheme, although accurate data with respect to the state of the scheme, the level of support and the associated supply process is only sporadically available for the adult RANR and the NRC. This uncertainty in providing reliable figures for the supply of NRC uniforms provides some insight into RANR administration and its standing during this period, when a reduced scheme had been in place between 1 July 1922 and 30 June 1925.79 It was only on 1 July 1925 that the DNR, Bracegirdle, arranged to provide the necessary information to stores personnel on a half yearly basis with respect to RANR uniform requirements and arranged, on 9 October 1925, to send a request to all DNOs for reports on its membership.80 Membership details were to be provided for the active RANR

76 Extract, Naval Board Minutes, 7 June, 1928, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 77 ibid. 78 Minute, Macandie to Cayley, 14 June 1928, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 79 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 20, 1927, p. 558. 80 Minute, Victualling Stores Officer to Director of Victualling, 23 March 1925, NAA MP124/6, 434/211/266. 151

(defined as the adult division undergoing training), continuing volunteers and the cadets.81 Initially, it was found to be too late to prepare returns for 1 July 1925, but it was decided that returns would be provided half yearly thereafter.82

The trickle of reports that resulted from this process merits examination as much for the evidence of inconsistency in the organisation of NRC as for the final summary of NRC membership (which was incomplete). The first return, for the period ending 31 December 1925, reported 190 NRC members in Western Australia, 211 in Tasmania, 517 in Victoria, 188 in Queensland and 438 in New South Wales.83 A report from South Australia was not included for the half year ending 31 December 1925, but, on 28 June 1926, it was reported that there were 220 NRC members classified as entitled to receipt of clothing in that state.84 Without the South Australian figures, the total membership of the NRC at 31 December 1925 was 1544. Adding the subsequent figure provided from South Australia to the earlier half- yearly totals, provides an approximate national total of 1764, and reveals that NRC membership at the end of 1925 was around half the membership at the height of the compulsory cadet training era.85 As a comparison to these internal reports, it is noteworthy that the Commonwealth Statistician reported the total membership of the RANR on 16 May 1925 as 5,804 and on 15 February 1926 as 6,593, although cadet numbers were not reported separately.86 Nevertheless, while the compulsory scheme was in decline, its impact was evident in the retention of the overall RANR complement, which would continue to provide an administrative base for the organisation and control of the NRC. Later internal reports however, reveal that such data was unreliable, in certain cases, with cadets reported as adult reserve members and dates of reporting periods being incorrect.87 Nevertheless, such internal

81 Circular, DNRM to DNOs, 9 October 1925, NAA MP124/6, 434/211/266. 82 Minute, Director of Victualling to Victualling Stores Officer, 15 October 1925, NAA MP124/6, 434/211/266. 83 Report on ‘Ratings classified for clothing in W.A. District’, 18 December 1925; Report on ‘Ratings classified for clothing in Tasmania District’, 7 January 1926; Reports on ‘Ratings classified for clothing in Geelong Sub- District’, 29 December 1925, ‘Ratings classified for clothing in Port Melbourne Sub-District’, 1 January 1926, ‘Ratings classified for clothing in Williamstown Sub-District’, 1 January 1926. Reports on ‘Ratings classified for clothing in Queensland District’, 8 January 1926, ‘Ratings classified for clothing in N.S.W. District’, 6 January 1926. NAA MP124/6, 434/211/266. 84 Report on ‘Ratings classified for clothing in South Australia’, 28 June 1926, NAA MP124/6, 434/211/266. 85 Naval Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia, Strength on 31st December 1911, NAA MP472/1, 5/12/2825. 86 Commonwealth Year Books, no. 18, 1925, p. 609, no. 19, 1926, p. 554, 87 Corrigendum Slip to RANR 22a, DNO Tasmania to DNRM, 10 March 1930, MP124/6, 432/205/2771. 152 reports confirm that, between 1931 and 1935, overall RANR membership remained over of 5000.88

From mid-1926, DNOs continued to provide details of NRC numbers as part of the stores estimates process. At this point, in addition to the 220 NRC members reported in South Australia, there were 210 reported in Western Australia, 588 in Victoria, 236 in Tasmania, and 210 in Queensland.89 For this half year, no report from New South Wales is available and makes the tracking of changes in membership levels a notional exercise at best. The importance of the available figures, nonetheless, is not reduced by their being incomplete, as subsequent reports confirm the overall decrease in NRC numbers.90 Notwithstanding the continuing decline of the compulsory scheme and associated budget cuts, new entrants still received almost a full set of uniforms. As late as 15 December 1928, instructions were issued to all DNOs for the issue of uniforms to the NRC commencing training on 1 July 1929.91 In one concession to the need for economy, however, DNOs were directed to make allowances for the items already in stock and for serviceable items which would be returned by the division ceasing training on 30 June 1929.92 Moreover, approval for issue did not mean that the items would be available, although items that were not available for cadets, such as hat ribbons and badges, were still fully funded and remained on order for supply when available from the central navy store.93 Ultimately, before training of the new batch of NRC could commence on 1 July 1929, the original supply order was cancelled as the result of the ‘reduction in R.A.N.R. Draft Estimates for 1929/30’ and DNOs were advised of further, although relatively minor, reductions in uniform items to be issued to adults and cadets.94

88 Minute, DNRM to DNA, 22 November 1935, MP124/6, 432/205/2857. 89 Reports on ‘Ratings classified for clothing’ in South Australia, Western Australia, Victoria, Tasmania and Queensland, June/July 1926, NAA: MP124/6, 434/211/266. 90 Report on ‘Ratings classified for clothing in South Australia District’, 6 January 1927. Report on ‘Ratings classified for clothing in N.S.W. District’, 13 January 1927. Reports on ‘Ratings classified for clothing’ in Queensland, Victoria, and Tasmania, January 1927. NAA MP124/6, 434/211/266, RANR. 91 Circular, DNRM to DNOs, 15 December 1928, NAA MP124/6, 434/211/323. 92 ibid. 93 Minute, DNO, NSW, to DNRM, 9 May, 1929; Minute, DNO, Tasmania, to DNRM, 7 May 1929. NAA MP124/6, 434/211/342 94 Circular, DNRM to DNOs, 11 July 1929, NAA MP124/6, 434/211/352. 153

From 1930, with the compulsory scheme discontinued on 1 November 1929 and no longer providing a large influx of recruits, the NRC branch returned to its roots as a small voluntary component of the RANR, as the army implemented similar reductions in the size of its cadet force.95 By July 1930, the decision had been made to limit the number of NRC members at each naval reserve depot to 50 and the days of thousands of NRC overshadowing the NLSCC were over.96 Notwithstanding the change to voluntary status, official statistics confirm membership of the RANR peaking at 6919, on 15 February 1929, and remaining over 3000 for the next ten years. 97 Although active RANR and NRC numbers were now dramatically reduced, this residual pool of naval reservists from the compulsory era would have provided a constant reminder to the Naval Board of its investment in both the adult RANR and the cadet system that had contributed to its growth. Nevertheless, with much of the world, including Australia, experiencing the bite of the Depression, the national defence budget was under pressure and, on 11 April 1930, the DNR, Bracegirdle, advised DNOs that, due to ‘very drastic cuts having to be made in next year’s Estimates’, it was anticipated that there would be very little money available for uniforms for members of the RANR for the 1930/31 financial year.98 Thus, although still part of the defence force, the now volunteer NRC branch was not immune to budget cuts. Action was taken, however, to ensure that demands for the next financial year were notified urgently so that the next year’s needs could be met from the current year’s budget.99

In this way, while the available funds may have been cut, the NRC branch retained its place in the navy organisation and was given resource priority accordingly. With the demand for new uniforms no longer large, with only 100 kits required for new naval cadet entrants to the Sydney Port Division in New South Wales, for example, uniforms were supplied when required.100 The greatest inconvenience NRC members suffered, it seemed, was being restricted to one set of new uniforms where, prior to November 1929, they had been issued

95 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 23, 1930, p. 408. 96 Manuscript, ‘The Citizen Naval Forces’. SPC-A) 23B. 97 Commonwealth Year Books; no. 20, 1927, p. 564; no. 21, 1928, p. 590; no. 22, 1929, p. 582; no. 23, 1930, p. 416; no. 24, 1931, p.416, no. 25, 1932, p. 430, no. 26, 1933, p. 328; no. 27, 1934, p.337; no. 28, 1935, p. 344; no. 29, 1936, p. 347; no. 30, 1937, p. 262; no. 31, 1938, p. 265; no. 32, 1939, p. 239. 98 Circular, DNRM to DNOs, 11 April 1930, NAA MP124/6, 434/211/409, 99 ibid. 100 Minute, DNO, NSW, to DNRM, 22 August, 1930, NAA MP124/6, 434/211/431. 154 with two.101 In contrast, the community-based sea cadets still relied on the purchase of second hand uniforms. Moreover, they were about to experience direct competition for access to even these uniforms from government programs aimed at securing surplus military clothing for the many men now unemployed as a result of the Depression.

Despite the difficult economic times, the NLSCC was one community-based cadet group that seemed to thrive, overall, as illustrated by attendance reported at various competitions they conducted and the public events they supported. The 1930 competition for the Miss Charles-Fairfax Flag, for example, involved some 300 NLSCC members and was witnessed by about 2000 spectators.102 NLSCC companies from Birchgrove (the defending holders of the flag), Mosman, Woolwich, Drummoyne, Balgowlah, Cook’s River and Leichhardt competed, with the flag being won by Mosman. Nevertheless, unit organisers continued to report their progress in mixed terms. For example, the Woolwich Company reported an increase to 36 sea cadets and successful fund raising ventures leading to plans for a new depot in the Woolwich/Hunters Hill area. The Manly company, on the other hand, reported on the need to raise funds in the face of difficult economic times impacting the district.103 Notwithstanding economic pressure, new NLSCC units kept springing up, at Vaucluse and Elizabeth Bay for example, with support from members of the local community and ex-naval officers.104 At the same time as these new companies were being formed, it was reported that some existing units were struggling, such as the North Sydney Company, which was ‘working with a will to bring’ itself ‘back to a semblance of its former strength’ so that it would be in a position to compete with other units in the league.105

In general terms, the community-based sea cadet branch of the movement continued to be a fragmented affair and, despite continuing efforts by the navy to encourage a single point of contact, the Department of Defence and the navy continued to receive random requests to supervise or endorse community-based sea cadet training. As an example, on 17

101 Minute, DNO, QLD, to DNRM, 19 August 1932, NAA MP124/6, 434/211/495. 102 The Navy League Journal, vol. 11, no. 2, June 1930, pp. 8-9. 103 ibid., p. 9. 104 ibid., vol. 11, no. 3, July 1930, p. 11. 105 ibid., p. 12. 155

October 1931, F. Walling, on behalf of Burns Philp & Co, wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Defence, M Maguire, regarding the formation of a company of the NLSCC in Newcastle and the associated provision of sea training on board the steamer Morinda. The submission was made primarily because a special permit would be needed to carry sea cadets on board the vessel, but the organisers also sought the navy department’s suggestions and general co-operation.106 The Walling enquiry illustrates how even a single request could prompt a quite comprehensive ‘defence’ of the navy’s stance on its (lack of) support for the community-based sea cadets.

On 8 December 1931, Maguire advised the Prime Minister’s Department that the movement had the good will of the Naval Board, but that it was impossible for the navy to accept responsibility in connection with these corps. Principally, it was observed, this was because all resources at the disposal of the Naval Board were required for the organisation and training of the RANR and the NRC, as raised under the Defence Act. For this reason, and because the enquiry under consideration clearly related to an application to establishing a sea cadet corps in Newcastle, Maguire suggested that assistance for the application should be directed to the Navy League. Although the sea training issue could be referred to the navy’s navigation branch, that branch should clearly understand that ‘the Corps is not organised or controlled by this Department’.107 It was evident then at this point that the navy could not, and did not want to, assume any additional responsibility for the community-based sea cadets. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by earlier events, particularly in relation to the use of uniforms and rifles and boats, it was clear that the navy still wanted some form of control in certain areas. This remained a fundamental and essential part of the friction between the navy and community-based sea cadet organisers.

Up to the end of 1931, insofar as community-based units were concerned, the Naval Board had been focused on sea scout units around Australia, the NLSCC in New South Wales and several independent units. From 1932, the potential for a deepening of the complexity of

106 Letter, Walling to Maguire, 17 October 1931, NAA A518, P112/5. 107 Letter, Secretary, Department of Defence, to the Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 8 December 1931, NAA A518, P112/5. 156 the navy’s relationship with the community-based sea cadets arose when an independent NLSCC was established in Victoria. This occurred on 26 February 1932 when the Victorian Navy League advised the Naval Board Secretary, Macandie, that they were in the process of forming a sea cadet corps and requested the same facilities with regard to purchase of stores, clothing and so on as was provided to the equivalent corps in New South Wales.108 The Victorians had ambitious plans for their new corps and, on 29 February 1932, the Age reported plans by the Victorian Navy League to establish a ‘sea cadet corps in every possible district in Victoria’ and that a uniform was to be worn very similar to that of the navy.109 Thus, the potential for friction with the navy was evident from the beginning, as the Victorian NLSCC had been announced as being entirely under the auspices of the Navy League and not ‘in any way connected with the Royal Australian Naval Reserve or the naval department’, yet the uniform was to be virtually identical.110 The local press gave the new venture extensive coverage and, on 11 March 1932, the Argus reported that a depot and headquarters would be established in Melbourne and arrangements were already proceeding for the establishment of branches at Sandringham, Williamstown, Geelong and elsewhere, with companies to vary from 20 to 100 boys. As a comparison, it was reported that there were 18 sea cadet companies in New South Wales, of which eight had been formed in the previous six months, and that the largest of these had nine boats.111 Thus, an important step had been taken in spreading the Navy League version of the community-based sea cadets into a new state, but the navy would be required to deal with a second Navy League controlling body, in addition to the Boy Scouts’ Association, which was still advocating on behalf of the sea scouts.

The new Victorian NLSCC received immediate moral support from high profile members of the community and developed quite quickly. At the annual meeting of the Victorian Branch of the Navy League¸ on 12 March 1932, the President, Captain SA Pidgeon, reported that 50 cadets had been recruited in Geelong and that within a few days time it was hoped to make that up to 100 with the aim that the total enrolment for the new

108 Letter, Hon Secretary Navy League (Victorian Branch) to Navy Office, 26 February 1932, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 109Extract from the Melbourne Age, 29 February 1932, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 110 ibid. 111 Extract from the Melbourne Argus, 11 March 1932, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 157 corps might reach 500.112 In England, Pidgeon observed, there were 21,000 NLSCC members and in Sydney there were 800. Significantly, Pidgeon expressly commented on the citizenship aims of the sea cadet scheme and how it did not teach militarism, but discipline and national service.113 Developing this theme, the newly elected vice-president of the Victorian Navy League, The Lord Mayor of Melbourne, Councillor H. Gengoult-Smith, expressed the view that the teaching of discipline was a necessary part of every young man’s education and that young Australians had abundant initiative, but generally appeared intolerant of discipline.114 It was only by ‘getting them young’ and teaching them discipline, he commented, that they were going to be made into better citizens.115 Further demonstrating the close relationship, particularly at a local level, between the navy and the Navy League, the Victorian DNO, Commander AL Loudon-Shand, was reported as advising the meeting that the Navy League in New South Wales had doubled its numbers from 400 to 800 between 1924 and 1932 and that the combined membership goal, including new Victorian units, was 1300.116 Thus, as in Victoria, this new branch of the NLSCC had already enlisted the support of the local navy administrator, as well as having prominent local politicians appointed to its board.

When the Victorian Navy League commenced its sea cadet scheme, the navy and Defence Department policy on the need for available funds to be directed to the RANR and its defence-related cadets was already firmly in place and had been clearly communicated to the Navy League in New South Wales.117 Nevertheless, the Victorians first request for support, on 26 February 1932, ignored this policy by requesting ‘favourable consideration’ for the erection of a ‘Head-Quarters Hall’ on defence land.118 On 8 March 1932, indicating no signs of any frustration at this escalation of Navy League lobbying, Macandie submitted the Victorian Navy League submission to the Naval Board. In doing so, he recommended confirming the stance taken with the Navy League in New South Wales on financial priority

112 ibid. 113 ibid. 114 ibid. 115 ibid. 116 ibid. 117 Letter, Secretary, Department of Defence, to the Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 8 December 1931, NAA A518, P112/5. 118 Letter, Hon Secretary Navy League (Victorian Branch) to Secretary, Navy Office, undated (received 26 February 1932), NAA MP151/1 422/201/67. 158 being given to the RANR, but that similar facilities for the purchase of stores, clothing, and so on, would be provided. The matter of acquisition of land for the corps, however, was to be referred to the Military (Army) Board, who had control over the site.119 Thus, with the support of Macandie, members of the new Victorian NLSCC appeared likely to gain immediate access to the same benefits received by their New South Wales counterparts, plus further consideration of their request for use of defence land. In this way, while conceding nothing new, the Naval Board and the Victorian DNO, Shand, were encouraging the development of the NLSCC, beyond its long standing base in New South Wales. Although such support had not been evident in the Naval Board’s dealings with the sea scouting branch of the Boy Scouts’ Association, both organisations were still being given official preference, over life saving clubs for example, in the purchase of naval stores available for disposal.120 It appeared that these two organisations would continue to be the leaders of the community- based sea cadet branch, regardless of their overall limited success in garnering the level of navy support that they felt was appropriate.

In the process of finalising their decision on support of the new Victorian NLSCC, the Naval Board considered the broader implications of supporting the wider community-based sea cadet branch, based on a review of Navy League sea cadet activities in New South Wales, completed on 11 March 1932, by the new DNR, Commander HL Quick.121 Quick expressed the view that, since 1920, the sea cadets had ‘undoubtedly made great strides in expansion, popularity and efficiency’, that the movement was undoubtedly popular and ‘served a great purpose in teaching loyalty, discipline, sea history, and cleanliness to a number of youngsters’.122 Notwithstanding there being 18 depots in New South Wales, and somewhere in the vicinity of 900 boys in uniform, however, few community-based sea cadets adopted the sea as a profession and very few joined the RAN or the RANR.123 Furthermore, Quick observed, there was a distinct disadvantage from a navy point of view in having such an organisation, because the boys in uniform were frequently mistaken for RAN or RANR

119 File Minute, Naval Board Secretary regarding Navy League (Victoria), 8 March 193, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 120 Minute, Naval Secretary to Captain Superintendent, Sydney, 10 September 1932, MP151/1, 612/201/2395. 121 Minute, DNRM to First and Second Naval Member, 11 March 1932, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 122 ibid. 123 ibid. 159 sailors, often when engaged in non-naval activities such as harbour picnics.124 Notwithstanding Quick’s comments, Macandie’s recommendation to provide the Victorians with support was approved by the Naval Board and by the Minister for Navy, Pearce, on 21 March 1932, with the proviso that NLSCC uniforms were not to be an exact replica of naval uniforms.125 Thus, although they would receive some support, it was made clear to the Victorian Navy League, on 22 March 1932, that wearing of RAN uniforms was not permitted.126 Moreover, Quick’s serious doubts about the value of the community-based sea cadets as a source of recruits for both the RAN and RANR, and his concerns about the possible negative effects of cadets being mistaken for naval personnel, had introduced a view that the overall value to the navy of the community-based branch of the movement was very limited.

Notwithstanding the still quite limited navy support for the community-based branch of the movement, from 1932 the Navy League organisation started to expand, although the details are unclear, particularly as The Navy League Journal did not appear between 1932 and 1937, although regular press reports confirm plans for state, metropolitan and regional expansion.127 As well as Victoria establishing a cadet corps in 1932, there is evidence that the South Australian Branch of the Navy League was revitalised in the same year and that, in 1934, efforts were made to form a branch in Western Australia, although there was not enough support for this last organisation to function successfully.128 Similarly, a reported expansion to Queensland, through an affiliation with the Merchant Navy Training Sea Cadet Corps, Brisbane, did not go ahead and this unit was later identified by the navy, as part of a wider review, as an organisation of ‘doubtful virtue’.129

These various uncertain moves to expand demonstrate the direct dependence of the success of the Navy League (not just its cadet corps), on the RAN, and the navy’s internal

124 ibid. 125 ibid. 126 Letter, Macandie to Secretary, Victorian Navy League, 22 March 1932, NAA SP339/1, 10/2/54. 127 Courier Mail, 4 June 1934, p. 19; Gippsland Times, 2 March 1933, p.3; Williamstown Chronicle, 28 January 1933, p. 3. 128 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 1, NAA B6121/1, 295B. 129 Minute, DRRF to the Second Naval Member, 25 March 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/155. 160 report of Navy League’s difficulties in Western Australia considered that this may have been due, specifically, to the Naval Board’s decision that permanent naval officers were not to hold office in the Navy League.130 Similarly, with regard to the NLSCC, this review described the Naval Board as ‘always considerate’ towards requests for purchase of equipment, but remaining adamant that the equipment had to be bought through recognised disposal channels.131 As noted earlier, from 1930, economic conditions meant that, even for this concession, the community-based sea cadets had to compete for access to worn uniforms with government programs for providing discarded uniforms to the many unemployed.132 Thus, while encouraging the Navy League and other community-based sea cadet organisations, the Naval Board took specific action to ensure that any support provided did not adversely affect the defence-based NRC or RANR. RANR attendance had been so poor due to the Depression, it was reported, that major temporary cuts had been made in the strength of large establishments, such as those in New South Wales.133

Although the Naval Board and the Minister of Defence had stipulated that community-based sea cadet uniforms could not be an exact replica of a naval uniform, an attempt to obtain new navy-like uniforms was soon made, with the role played by senior navy administrators in supporting these requests further illustrating the complexity of the situation facing the Naval Board. On 12 July 1932, Forsythe, as Assistant Commandant and Equipment Officer of the New South Wales NLSCC, asked to purchase new clothing, as ‘quite a number of Senior Cadets would prefer to purchase new uniforms in preference to the second-hand ones’ and that the corps’ requirements could not be met from second hand stocks.134 In recommending Naval Board approval of this request, on 29 July 1932, the Captain Superintendent, Sydney, HJ Feakes, explained that the quantity of uniforms was comparatively small and, as large quantities of second hand uniforms were being distributed to the unemployed, that source of supply had more or less closed to the Navy League.135 For their part, navy stores administrators were quick to identify, yet again, the dilemma created

130 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 1, NAA B6121/1, 295B. 131 ibid. 132Memorandum, Captain Superintendent, Sydney to Naval Board Secretary Melbourne, 29 July 1932, NAA: MP151/1, 612/235/534. 133 Minute, DNRM to DNO NSW, 2 June 1932, NAA MP124/6, 432/205/2649. 134 Letter, Forsythe to Victualling Stores Officer, 12 July 1932, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 135Memorandum, Feakes to Macandie, 29 July 1932, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 161 by the NLSCC wearing RAN arm and collar badges, cap badges and buttons for both officers and ratings.136 In Britain, it was observed, the wearing of these ‘strictly uniform’ articles was guarded against by the ‘Regulations Governing the Formation, Organisation, and Administration of Units of the Sea Cadet Corps in the British Isles (1925)’.137 As no equivalent Australian Regulations existed to address this issue in Australia, it was proposed that the Navy League sea cadet executive in each state should be provided with a list of strictly uniform articles that should not be worn. 138

After considering the stores administrators’ submissions on the uniform issue, the Naval Board Secretary, Macandie, advised Feakes that the Naval Board could not give general approval for the supply of these articles to the NLSCC, or any other similar organisation, from navy stocks.139 Nevertheless, the Naval Board had no objection to new uniforms being obtained directly from the Commonwealth Clothing Factory. Furthermore, Macandie observed, the factory manager was prepared to use materials similar to those used in naval uniforms, at a cost approximating that charged to the naval service, noting that a similar arrangement already applied to the Victorian Branch of the Navy League. In contrast, the naval badges that had been requested were strictly uniform articles that could not be worn by any non-service organisation and action was being taken to bring to the notice of the Navy League executive in each state a list of articles ‘which cannot be worn without infringing Section 83 of the Defence Act of the Commonwealth’.140 In the absence of official recognition (and therefore control) of community-based sea cadet organisations by the department, however, it was not practicable for the Naval Board to lay down what badges, buttons, and so on should be worn, Macandie observed. On the other hand, the Naval Board could direct what essentially naval articles should not be used and, in this regard, there would be no objection if the equivalent British Regulations were closely observed.141

136 Minute, Director of Victualling to DNRM, Head of ‘N’ Branch and the First Naval Member, 27 September 1932, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 137 ibid. 138 ibid. 139 Minute, Macandie to Feakes, 5 October 1932, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 140 ibid. 141 ibid. 162

Further demonstrating the caution the RAN was exercising in its arrangements with the Navy League, Macandie subsequently specified, on 12 October 1932, exactly which articles of naval uniform were to be regarded as ‘strictly uniform’ and not to be worn by members of the NLSCC.142 In particular, he made it clear that these items were not to be worn in future by any member of the NLSCC as the Defence Act provided that any person, not being a member of the defence force, who wore any uniform of the defence force, or any tolerable image thereof, was liable to a prescribed penalty.143 For their part, the Navy League declared their willingness to comply with navy requirements, with the exception of slight alterations to suit local conditions, none of which it was considered would infringe upon the naval uniform Regulations and Instructions.144 Notwithstanding this stated willingness to comply with the Naval Board’s direction, the Navy League advised, on 18 October 1932, that they had written to their headquarters in England for advice on the correct uniform to be worn.145 Their members had worn the same uniform in Australia since 1921, it was observed, and it was only for the last three months that officers in charge had been wearing naval officers’ cap badges purchased from naval stores. Furthermore, this change had only been made because the Navy League was under the impression that they were allowed to wear naval uniforms as was done in England and Canada (as shown in photos received from those two countries). Nevertheless, with this new advice, instructions had been issued, that all officers were to revert to merchant navy cap badges immediately.146 From this convoluted discussion over the enforcing of the Defence Act, it appeared that the Navy League, and some supportive naval officers, would continue to test the Naval Board’s authority, and patience, with regard to wearing exact replicas of navy uniform.

As it was such a central, and intractable, point of friction, it is important to reveal that the issue of control of the community-based sea cadets, particularly with respect to uniforms, was not restricted to the Navy League. In a further example, the well-established Brisbane Institute of Social Service made a submission, on 6 October 1932, to Captain J Francis, Assistant Minister for Defence, for a ‘Commonwealth money grant’ or ‘uniforms free of cost’

142 Letter, Macandie to Navy League, NSW and VIC Branches, 12 October 1932, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 143 ibid. 144 Letter, Navy League (Victorian Branch) to Macandie, 14 October 1932, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 145 Letter, New South Wales Navy League to Macandie, 18 October 1932, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 146 ibid. 163 in which it was stated that institute sea cadets were approved to wear official naval uniform.147 Specifically, the institute president, one Mr Campbell of Campbell Brothers, Soap Makers, advised Francis that ‘our Naval Cadets, I believe, are the only body in Australia allowed to use the Navy’s uniform outside the regular and Cadet Forces which is a great compliment to our boys’ training and conduct’.148 In support of his bid for support, Campbell informed Francis that the institute had a new board with many prominent citizens, 372 boys in naval training plus scores of boys anxious to join that it seemed a great pity to turn them away.149 For his part, on 21 October 1932, Macandie informed Campbell of the navy policy on ‘strictly uniform’ items and requested that, if such ‘prohibited’ uniform items had been worn, action should be taken to ensure naval regulations in this respect would not be infringed in future.150 In their response, on 27 October 1932, the institute advised that, acting on new advice provided by the Queensland DNO, the institute had taken action to prevent any officers or boys wearing anything that might from this point be considered an infringement of the naval regulations and was still adhering to that policy.151 Notwithstanding these assurances, such comments by community-based sea cadet organisers in both Queensland and New South Wales regarding their right to wear navy uniforms must have given the Naval Board cause to consider that greater control of the community branch of the movement might be required.

As the Brisbane Social Service Institute was seeking support in Queensland, the Navy League renewed its joint campaign for official recognition and support of its cadet units when the Victorian Secretary, Commander AE Creal, and the New South Wales Assistant Commandant, LE Forsythe, presented Second Naval Member, Captain GAM Sarel, with an extensive list of demands on 25 October 1932. 152 These enhanced privileges included confirmation by the RAN of the status of local sea cadets as identical to sea cadets affiliated with the Navy League in England, plus acceptance that the NLSCC was military in character and therefore should be seen by the authorities as similar to the army cadet corps in public

147 Letter, Campbell to Francis, 6 October 1932, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 148 Letter, Campbell to Francis, 9 October 1932, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 149 ibid. 150 Letter, Macandie to Campbell, 21 October 1932, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 151 Letter, Secretary, Brisbane Institute of Social Service, to Macandie, 27 October 1932, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 152 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 6., NAA B6121/1, 295B. 164 schools. In terms of support, the NLSCC was to be loaned guns, rifles, boats and other stores on condition that they would be maintained, returned when called for, and any damages, breakages, or losses were made good. Under this new proposal, DNOs were to inspect sea cadet depots half yearly and conduct examinations for sea cadet promotions, as in England. In addition, there was to be formed a section of the Royal Australian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RANVR) at Snapper Island (for the enrolment of sea cadets over 18) and the award of RANVR commissions to officers of the NLSCC.153 With this new list of demands, the Navy League was seeking an immediate change from a position of limited recognition and support to, essentially, a position whereby the RAN would be forced to exercise a considerable degree of influence over the NLSCC, through its officers status as members of the RANVR, and recognise community-based sea cadets as the equivalent of army cadets and, thus, the equivalent of the NRC. The essential duality of the movement as a whole would be altered significantly under these arrangements, if the Naval Board agreed, but the requested changes were completely contrary to traditional and extant navy policy.

In considering the Navy League demands, the DNR, Quick, noted that the supply of cadet rifles and field guns had previously been refused by the Naval Board as the NLSCC was considered to be a non-military organisation.154 Further, generous facilities were already being provided and it appeared that the main object of the new approach was to secure instructional equipment on loan and acquire arms which had already been refused.155 Moreover, Quick expressed his ‘very grave objection to any closer Naval association with this organisation’, pointing out that the NLSCC boys had been seen skylarking and parading in the streets in a uniform which was essentially naval but frequently worn in a fashion which was decidedly unorthodox. Furthermore, where this had occurred in the vicinity of RANR centres, reservists had complained because these sea cadets might have been mistaken as members of the RANR and, Quick noted, this might have the effect of making the RANR, which was now a volunteer organisation, to some extent unpopular.156 In addition to these issues of behaviour by the community-based sea cadets, Quick’s stance is made more

153 ibid. 154 Minute, DNRM to Director of Naval Stores, Naval Board Secretary and the Director of Ordnance, Torpedoes and Mines, 31 January 1933, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 155 ibid. 156 ibid. 165 understandable by his request, on 1 August 1932, that DNOs, in estimating amounts required for the provision of uniforms, make every possible allowance for stocks on hand, as provision for uniforms had been curtailed by approximately 50 per cent.157 For this reason, the ‘most drastic economy’ would be necessary, he observed, in providing funds for uniforms for RANR officers, ratings and cadets and Quick sought the ‘earnest cooperation’ of DNOs in exercising ‘every possible economy’ in calculating quantities required, in order that the very limited funding could be used to the best possible advantage.158 Thus, in Quick’s view, the community-based sea cadets were a threat to the defence-based NRC on two fronts - the need for control over their behaviour to prevent an unfavourable impact on the RANR, and its cadets, and the potential for competition for scarce defence funds. On this basis, he recommended against official recognition or enhanced support.

It was somewhat unexpected, given its request for increased naval support, especially while the defence-based NRC branch was struggling under cost constraints, that the community-based NLSCC appeared to be progressing well in these very difficult economic times, although reporting on this progress was not entirely consistent. The Navy League Journal of July 1930 included extensive coverage of the visit to the Sydney Training Depot by Rear-Admiral ERGR Evans, including details of his ‘complete inspection’ of the depot.159 In addition, the journal continued to report very positively the activities of the now six NLSCC (previously ten) companies at Drummoyne, Woolwich, Mosman, Cook’s River, North Sydney and Manly.160 Similarly, from Victoria, on 3 October 1932, the Argus reported that, since the inauguration of the movement in April, six companies of more than 300 boys had been formed.161 In contrast, a further article on the attendance of these six companies at the presentation of their colours reported that only 150 cadets were on parade.162 Further press coverage of the same event reported that troops from Black Rock, Sandringham, Williamstown, Port Melbourne, Geelong and the Flinders Naval Base paraded at the consecration of colours of the NLSCC with 300 people in attendance at the event.163

157 Minute, DNRM to DNOs, 1 August 1932, NAA MP124/6, 434/211/495. 158 ibid. 159 The Navy League Journal, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 6, 10. 160 ibid., vols. 11, 12, 13, 1930-1932. 161 Argus, 3 October 1932, p. 8. 162 Sydney Morning Herald, 24 October 1932, p. 10. 163 Argus, 21 November 1932, p. 8. 166

Regardless of the true extent of the progress thus far, some sections of the community were quite opposed to establishing community-based sea cadet units, such as one local Councillor, GBA Beardsworth, who objected to the formation of a unit at the harbour suburb of Chelsea, slightly farther south of existing units, on the grounds that it trained boys for warfare without showing them its horrors.164 Notwithstanding such opposition, new companies were being formed at more remote centres such as Sale, 200 kilometres East of Melbourne.165 Thus, in New South Wales and Victoria at least, the NLSCC appeared to have achieved a degree of stability and now seemed to be anticipating growth.

Thus, at the end of this nine year period, the community-based sea cadet branch of the movement, dominated by the NLSCC, was really no closer to establishing a viable single identity or administration than at any other time in its history. In addition, while there appeared to be growth in membership in both the Victoria and New South Wales units of the Navy League, this is impossible to confirm in the light of so many unreliable reports. For its part, the navy continued its policy of trying to be helpful in providing assistance with priority access to equipment and uniforms at reduced cost, but remained wary of the many requests for financial assistance that the community-based sea cadets could generate through the Navy League, sea scouts and independent units. Overall, the community-based sea cadet branch of the movement still lacked any true organisation, had no centralised control over the many and varied units and their personnel, who were mostly unqualified, and some units remained chronically short of funds. From this position, there was no basis for assuring the navy that community-based sea cadets were in any way ready to work alongside the defence-based NRC in a combined scheme. In any event, the Naval Board remained of the view that it had insufficient funding for the RANR and its cadets and, consequently, any further funding of the community-based sea cadet branch was completely inappropriate. Specifically, there was a need for significant further structural development before the community-based branch of the naval and sea cadet movement could be regarded as a serious candidate for navy support and any real commitment in facilitating the type of organisation, control, personnel and funding that was provided to the defence-based NRC.

164 Argus, 14 October 1932, p.7 165 Gippsland Times, 28 November 1932, p. 5. 167

CHAPTER SIX

Seeking unity 1933-1934

Despite its continuing inherent lack of unity, forlorn struggle for funding and overall minor place in the defence landscape, the Australian naval and sea cadet movement of the early 1930s had a popular profile that belied its humble material circumstances. This was well illustrated when naval historian, Arthur Jose, made front page news by reporting that a Ballarat Catholic college, which had trained some of its pupils as naval cadets, had been accused by the Australian Labor Party of plotting with Irish home rulers to break up the empire.1 Less controversially, although The Navy League Journal had temporarily ceased publication, the community-based sea cadet branch continued to be well supported by the press by way of publicising its activities, seeking donations and advertising for new members.2 In this way it was evident that, while the defence-based NRC still had the benefit of being officially supported by the navy, it was the community-based sea cadet branch that had greater success in garnering public support. Furthermore, the community-based sea cadet organisers seemed determined to use this point of strength to sway the long running argument in favour of official recognition by the navy. Thus, the period 1933-34 was dominated by a major surge in the efforts of the organisers of the community-based sea cadets to become an official part of the RAN. This concerted push was led by a confident and forthright Navy League, ostensibly seeking the betterment of both arms of the naval and sea cadet movement. For their part, in response to these Navy League efforts to improve their relationship with the navy, navy administrators candidly expressed their significant lingering concerns regarding the poor state of the organisation, control, personnel and funding of the community-based sea cadet branch as serious impediments to recognition.

This chapter begins with the consideration of yet another intense phase in the community-based sea cadet official recognition campaign, with particular attention directed to the navy’s implementation of defence policy with respect to managing its commitments to both the defence-based and community-based branches of the movement. During this period,

1 A Jose, ‘Early Federal Memories’, Brisbane Courier Mail, 30 December 1933, p. 9. 2 Williamstown Chronicle, 25 February 1933, p. 2; Sydney Morning Herald, 28 March 1933, p. 6; Gippsland Times, 27 April 1933, p.3. 168 the focus remains with the Navy League’s efforts to form a national body to represent the community-based sea cadets, mostly through the efforts of its separate branches in New South Wales and Victoria, although Queensland and South Australian Navy League units started to make an appearance for the first time. In what looked like a promising development, the New South Wales and Victorian Navy League continued to work together to present a united front to the navy. The fragility of the Navy League’s control of the NLSCC, however, is dramatically exposed as the chapter moves to an examination of how the New South Wales Navy League expelled the Sydney Training Depot, after its founder, Leonard Forsythe, continued to assert his unit’s independence from the Navy League. More dramatically, a clear failure in Navy League control is revealed as an established Navy League officer is convicted on child offence charges relating to acts committed as a member of the NLSCC. The final stages of this chapter consider the impact of another failed attempt at official recognition, and the associated unsettling events, on the status of both branches of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement in the eyes of navy administrators. The chapter concludes with a specific examination of the unchanged duality of the movement, as demonstrated by the navy’s policy on the supply of uniforms to the two different branches of the movement, and the implications of the RAN’s perpetual unwillingness to become involved in the affairs of the community-based sea cadets.

Between 1933 and 1937, unemployment in Australia fell to 10 percent as post Depression prosperity returned.3 Behind this economic recovery, however, there was a national leadership problem, not in continuity but action, as the Prime Minister, Joseph Lyons, struggled to unite the conservatives he had resigned from the Labor Party to lead.4 Lyons endured, but was plagued by a series of ministerial resignations, mostly over policy issues.5 Notwithstanding many criticisms of his mild nature and unsuitability to political leadership, Robert Menzies credited Lyons with restoring confidence in the future, increasing employment and improving business investment.6 Starting in 1932, increasing government revenue allowed Lyons to reduce some of the emergency Depression taxes and, in 1933-34,

3 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, p. 175. 4 ibid, p. 176; 5 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, pp. 182-183. 6 A Henderson, ‘Joseph Aloysius Lyons 6 January – 7 April 1939’ in M Grattan (ed.), Australian Prime Ministers, New Holland, Sydney, 2000, pp. 156-157. 169 his ‘restoration’ budget saw a return to an increase in government expenditure.7 Socially and politically, this was a time when many new organisations were formed.8 The Communist party contested elections in 1931, 1934 and 1937 and organisations such as the Sane Democracy League, Soldiers and Citizens Party, the Empire Party, the All for Australia League and the New Guard represented a variety of conservative points of view.9 For sports mad Australians, this was the era of the ‘bodyline’ controversy that arose when the touring English cricket team of 1932/33 were accused of intentionally bowling to intimidate or injure Australian players.10

At a time, when so many organisations, including the Navy League and its sea cadet corps, still existed to further British ideals, the ‘bodyline’ cricket series made a strong impression on many Australians, suggesting an Australia that might somehow be distinctly different from Britain.11 Notwithstanding such sentiment, the Navy League remained committed to the British model as the best guide for achieving recognition for the community-based sea cadet branch. The challenge was how to achieve a unified national organisation or Board of Control that could implement a consistent standard in the areas of organisation, control, personnel and funding, that would satisfy the Naval Board. For its part, the Naval Board was focused on rejuvenating the RAN after the Depression and participating in international defence strategy, with Britain and the United States, focused on Japan and .12 Perhaps fortuitously for the Navy League, the RAN build-up focused on ship acquisition, by loan and purchase, from Britain, so that links to the RN would be as strong as ever, although there was political pressure to pursue local shipbuilding to assist the many thousands still unemployed.13 Whatever strategy was adopted, the Naval Board would be fully engaged in mainstream defence planning on a range of fronts upon which the naval and sea cadet movement could have no impact.

7 JR Robertson, ‘1930 – 1939’, in FK Crowley (ed.), A New History of Australia, William Heinemann Australia, Melbourne, 1974, p. 436. 8 ibid., pp. 430-431. 9 ibid., p. 431. 10 Knightley, Australia: A Biography of a Nation, pp. 152-168. 11 ibid., pp.152, 159-160. 12 Frame, No Pleasure Cruise, p. 143. 13 ibid., pp. 143-44. 170

In many ways, the same pioneering spirit that had created the community-based sea cadet branch now appeared to stand in the way of its achieving a centralised organisation that might curb the independent actions of its members, particularly in its relationship with the navy. As part of the Navy League official recognition submission of 1932, a case had been made, by Leonard Forsythe, the NLSCC Assistant Commandant for New South Wales and head of the Sydney Training Depot, for merging his unit with the defence-based NRC and establishing a system of joint RAN and the Navy League control. Subsequently, on 6 January 1933, acting independently, Forsythe formally proposed that his unit should be affiliated with the Commonwealth defence forces, after the style of the school-based military cadets.14 Forsythe explained his motive as the need to cater for cadets turning 18, who had to leave the movement as they were then over the Navy League age limit. To address this issue, he wanted the Naval Board to grant him the authority to form a division of the RANVR at the Sydney Training Depot, to be conducted in addition to the NLSCC for junior boys. Under this arrangement, Forsythe contended, a ‘continued system’ of training would be provided from the age of twelve for as long as the boys wished to serve.15

In addition, Forsythe argued, the formation of a sub-section of the RANVR would also cater for those cadets who were over eighteen years of age and were unable to travel to the RANR depot at Rushcutters Bay. From an organisation and control point of view, Forsythe proposed that the administration and finance of these new ‘combined’ naval and sea cadet sections could be done by the Navy League officers, who would be responsible for equipment or stores on loan for instructional purposes. Training, on the other hand, would be carried out under instruction from the DNO.16 Effectively, if Forsythe’s proposal was sanctioned, a combined unit, incorporating both branches of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, defence and community, would be formed, and the Navy League and the navy would share responsibility for organisation, control, personnel and funding. The proposal, however, was being made by what was essentially a splinter group and was totally contrary to the Naval Board’s stance on the need to see evidence of possible overall unity and control within the community-based branch.

14 Letter, Forsythe to Captain Superintendent, Sydney, 6 January 1933, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/143. 15 ibid. 16 ibid. 171

While Forsythe pursued his independent scheme, his Navy League colleagues in New South Wales and Victoria resumed their combined efforts, still involving Forsythe, aimed at gaining wider navy support, and official recognition, although it is likely they were aware of Forsythe’s independent proposal. Furthermore, they appeared undaunted by navy concerns, raised during their most recent recognition bid, about the minimal tangible defence value of the community-based sea cadets, particularly when compared to the NRC branch.17 Thus, in the face of the navy’s firm stance on the lack of viability of recent and similar proposals, the Navy League once again commenced what was to be a series of requests for navy assistance that would continue throughout 1933.18 Virtually immediately, as part of this new campaign, and with his specific and separate request for a new type of naval cadet unit at the Sydney Training Depot only days old, Forsythe decided to make a direct appeal to the Naval Board, on 12 January 1933, for general recognition of the NLSCC. Using the now familiar appeal to the local relevance of the British model, he requested official recognition of the corps in New South Wales, on the same basis as had been approved in Britain.19

Adding significant local flavour, Forsythe explained that boys who wanted to enter either the navy or mercantile marine were given every encouragement and possible assistance, but lack of equipment meant that they had to train with rifles and cutlasses made from timber and pipe. On the few occasions that equipment had been provided, Forsythe observed, the boys had performed the drills involved very well and he thought that it would be a great asset to be able to obtain proper training equipment.20 Thus, Forsythe was simultaneously representing the New South Wales Navy League in a bid for overall official recognition and pursuing the independent goal of establishing a section of the RANR on Snapper Island in conjunction with the Navy League affiliated Sydney Training Depot, of which he was the commanding officer.

17 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 7, NAA: B6121/1, 295B. 18 ibid. 19 Letter, Forsythe to the Naval Board, 12 January 1933, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. Forsythe wrote lengthy correspondence, but his spelling, punctuation and grammar were poor and this may well have contributed to the views expressed by naval staff officers that Navy League officers were not of the same quality as naval officers and, hence, it would be inappropriate to grant them a commission. 20 ibid. 172

Using a lobbying model that was becoming a standard for the Navy League in approaching the Naval Board, Forsythe garnered local support from the Captain Superintendent, Sydney, HJ Feakes, who submitted a proposal of his own for the consideration of the Naval Board, on 30 January 1933, in support of Forsythe, emphasising the non-Navy League option of having an NRC unit at the Sydney Training Depot,21 Spanning 12 years of submissions, the new proposal for overall official recognition of the NLSCC also included remarks by the New South Wales DNO, Commander CW Stevens, that a similar proposal had been made in 1921, without success, but that there had been considerable advancement in the movement and an improvement in the administration of the NLSCC since the earlier application. 22 Specifically addressing the independent Forsythe submission of a new NRC component at the Sydney Training Depot, Stevens considered that there was scope for further advancement of this concept if the initial proposals for support were approved. For some time, he observed, recruiting for the RANR from the Drummoyne and up-river districts of Sydney had been handicapped by their distance from the navy depot at Rushcutters Bay and forming a section of the RANR at the Sydney Training Depot at Snapper Island would remedy this problem. Noting that an officer and instructors could be made available on evenings or afternoons as arranged with the Navy League, Stevens recommended that a half company with 50 NRC members should be formed. In addition, petty officers and chief petty officers selected from the Navy League, but qualified under RANR Regulations, could carry out a similar syllabus of training to that provided at the RANR depot under the supervision of the depot instructional staff.23

Notwithstanding these proposed arrangements, Stevens made it clear that this would in no way alter the administration of the Sydney Training Depot and would apply only to those Navy League cadets reaching 18, who volunteered for enlistment in the RANR. Summing up these proposals, Feakes commended the NLSCC members of the Sydney Training Depot and strongly recommended the proposal as outlined by Stevens and hatched

21 Minute, Feakes to Naval Board, 30 January 1933, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/143. 22 ibid 23 ibid. 173 by Forsythe.24 Thus, although the Naval Board had only recently rejected the Navy League’s submission for official recognition, there now appeared to be considerable support from navy administrators at a local level for the first joint venture between the community-based sea cadet branch and the navy. Although (unlike Forsythe’s original scheme) Stevens’ proposal was now limited to the creation of an adult RANR unit at Snapper Island, alongside the Sydney Training Depot NLSCC, it did provide for sharing of many important aspects of organisation, control, personnel and funding, and could be the first step to full joint responsibility for a combined unit of defence and community-based naval and sea cadets.

In considering the Forsythe proposals, on 31 January 1933, the DNR, Quick, further reviewed the relationship of the navy and the NLSCC and the merits of this new claim for official recognition. In a thorough recapitulation of his previous arguments, he made it clear that requests for guns and rifles had been refused previously and that resources requested were still more urgently needed for the RANR. On the issue of RANVR commissions for officers of the NLSCC, Quick noted that anyone could apply for a commission in the volunteer RANR and consideration was given to all applicants qualified according to the Regulations. In this regard, however, he observed that the officers of the Navy League were ex-sailors and others not generally of officer class and granting of commissions under these circumstances would tend to reduce the status of this section of the navy and was ‘definitely not recommended’. 25 Furthermore, all RANVR officers were fully occupied in their spare time learning their naval duties and had no time for instructing sea cadets, plus there were fewer navy staff available than ever, for inspection and examination duties. Moreover, Quick observed, those available were fully occupied training naval reserves six days a week and they could not undertake further duties in connection with an organisation over which they could have little actual control. In addition, with some 18 sea cadet depots in New South Wales, some many miles from the city, and one in Victoria as distant as Sale, even an annual official visit, with its associated expenditure, was unlikely. On the specific issue of training naval reservists at sea cadet depots, Quick expressed the view that he could not see how a similar syllabus to that used at a RANR depot could be delivered, other than at such a depot,

24 ibid. 25 Minute, DNRM to Director of Naval Stores, Naval Board Secretary and the Director of Ordnance, Torpedoes and Mines, 31 January 1933, NAA: MP151/1 422/201/67. 174 and that the training of naval reservists at a place other than a recognised RANR depot was ‘entirely out of the question’.26 While Feakes and Stevens were supportive, Quick was adamant the Forsythe proposals should not be approved by the Naval Board.

Whether the Navy League knew of Quick’s stance is uncertain, but it was likely given its close working relationship with Feakes and Stevens. Whatever the reason, on this occasion, there was a more formal show of solidarity by the Navy League when, on 6 February 1933, the Victorian branch formally advised their support for the New South Wales proposals, authored by Forsythe.27 In a move intended to address some of the navy’s organisational objections to previous submissions, the Victorians formally aligned their application for official recognition, as given by the British Admiralty to the corps in the British Isles, with that of New South Wales. As in their previous application, the Victorians made it clear that ‘the per Capita Grant given by the Admiralty to efficient Corps in the British Isles’ was not expected to apply in Australia.28 The general focus was on their application being considered conjointly with that of New South Wales, noting that the two branches were affiliates of Navy League headquarters in London, and emphasised that the detailed aims in the New South Wales application were generally supported by the Victorians. The more specific aim was to support the formal suggestion that the NLSCC ‘could really occupy the same relative position to the Naval Forces as the School Cadet Corps do the Military’, and assist in providing recruits for the RANR, if periodical inspections were conducted to ensure that the movement was suitably organised to do so.29 With this combined proposal, the New South Wales and Victorian Navy League branches appeared to be moving closer to a combined organisation of the type that the Naval Board had identified as an essential requirement for recognition. Furthermore, they also appeared willing to model the organisation to meet the RAN’s requirements and accept control (by inspection) of the sea cadets after the long and well established army school cadet scheme.

26 File note on Minute, Captain Superintendent, Sydney submitted for the consideration of the Naval Board, on the subject ‘Navy League – Snapper Island’, 30 January 1933, undated and unsigned, but most likely written by Quick, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/143. 27 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 7, NAA: B6121/1, 295B. 28 Letter, Secretary of the Navy League (Victorian Branch) to Naval Board Secretary 6 February 1933, NAA MP151/1 422/201/67. 29 ibid. 175

In terms of gaining greater support and possible recognition from the Naval Board, things appeared to be moving in the desired direction for the community-based sea cadet branch, especially with a specific New South Wales and Victorian Navy League attempt at addressing the navy’s concerns about the need for a single point of control. Nevertheless, the Naval Board again ‘decided that the time was not opportune for extending recognition similar to that afforded by the Admiralty to the corps in Britain’30. On 4 May 1933, Macandie advised Forsythe, who had submitted the original proposal for overall recognition to Feakes, that conditions in the were different from those in Australia as the British Admiralty dealt only with an approved central administration and in Australia no such administration existed. Furthermore, it was observed, the granting of a capitation grant by the British Admiralty was subject to certain conditions, such as supervising the appointment of all sea cadet officers in the United Kingdom. In Australia, the Naval Board had not been consulted on the appointment of Navy League officers and nor were they prepared to undertake the duty. On the matter of approval for issue of arms, such as field guns and rifles, this had already been refused by the Australian government as the community-based sea cadet corps were non-military bodies and were not authorised under the Defence Act to be in possession of such arms.31 Thus, even with this first attempt at presenting a united organisation, the Navy League made no progress as the Naval Board considered that the situation in Australia differed in significant ways from that in Britain. In particular, the Naval Board was not prepared to become involved in resolving these issues and play an active role in helping the Navy League become a properly constituted federal organisation that was suitable for coordinating the activities of the community-based branch of the movement.

Although he was the most long-standing example, Forsythe was not the only Navy League member with a strong independent approach to his sea cadet activities and, even as they made their combined proposals, both state organisations were unable to stem the flow of independent submissions from prominent supporters of the community-based sea cadets. The nature of such independent submissions, in this case from a Victorian Navy League member,

30 Letter, Macandie to Forsythe, 4 May 1933, NAA MP151/1 422/201/67. 31 ibid. 176 gives further insight into the context in which the Naval Board’s decision to refuse recognition was made. In this example, on 9 January 1933, a World War I veteran and keen Navy League supporter, Dr RW Hornabrook, wrote to the Minister for Defence, Pearce, that he was ‘very keen indeed on the movement for I know what it will mean to the future of this country’.32 Hornabrook pointed out that at home (in Britain), a capitation grant was given by the government towards the NLSCC but that it was not necessary in Australia as ‘a little sacrifice on the part of the lads and others’ was all to the good.33 Although not seeking a grant, Hornabrook wanted Pearce to provide the NLSCC the same help that was being given to sea scouts by the loan of equipment on the basis of the recruiting benefit the community- based sea cadets provided.34 For his part, on 3 February 1933, Pearce reiterated the general advice previously provided to the Victorian Navy League on what support could be provided, noted that a new bid for official recognition was being considered and made it clear to Hornabrook that lack of funds for the RANR made the liability of loaning naval equipment unacceptable.35 Thus, while the Naval Board was considering a high-level Navy League submission based on its ability to organise and control its members, and the wider community-sea cadet branch, the minister was receiving essentially identical requests from individual members and units.

In addition to Navy League members, such as Hornabrook, independently expressing their dissatisfaction with the navy’s stance on recognition, the Naval Board was faced with other quite blatant examples of lack of organisation and control in the form of NLSCC officers making independent requests for specific types of support, in some cases based on ‘inside’ knowledge of defence stores processes. As an example, members of the expanding Victorian branch, DP McLachlan and FW Salmon, applied independently for the use of rifles for sea cadet drill, on the basis that they were aware that the weapons were of no further use to the Government, although decent in appearance, as they had been condemned for firing purposes. McLachlan, a paymaster with the Port Melbourne Branch of the Navy League, wrote directly to the Minister, Pearce, who referred the letter to the Naval Board Secretary,

32 Letter, Hornabrook to Pearce, 9 January 1933, NAA MP151/1 422/201/67. 33 ibid. 34 ibid. 35 Letter, Pearce to Hornabrook, 3 February 1933, NAA MP151/1 422/201/67. 177

Macandie.36 Macandie advised McLachlan that approval could not given for the rifles to be issued to a non-military organisation and the matter appeared to be settled.37 Salmon, however, as the Officer-in-Charge of Port Melbourne, not only appealed the decision but went on to pursue issues of official British recognition, including the right to wear British naval uniform, British Admiralty subsidies provided to the Navy League and his view that similar official recognition and funding in Australia was not far off.38 Unfortunately, Salmon’s proud assertion of having ‘over a Hundred Cadets, trained to be loyal to their King and Country and trained in the rudiments of a sailors profession’ was somewhat deflated by his equally proud claim that ‘Officers are ex Navel officers’ with the misspelled word ‘navel’ being underlined by what must have been a somewhat amused staff member in navy office.39 Reinforcing Quick’s concerns about the quality of Navy League personnel, here was more evidence to support his contention that Navy League cadet staff were not officer material. More broadly, a Navy League that could not control its own units was a poor prospect as a national organisation to be given responsibility for the organisation, control, personnel and funding of all current and future community-based sea cadet units in Australia.

In addition to the need for a central organisation and the Navy League’s lack of control over its members and officers, these independent submissions raised again the more quintessential issue of the value of community-based sea cadets as a source of recruits for the navy. For his part, Quick remained unconvinced of the recruiting value of the community- based sea cadets and took this opportunity to reinforce the importance of the NRC by pointing out that the overall fine work done by the Navy League was of no value as a stepping stone to either the RANR or recruiting for the full-time navy.40 Very few boys who trained in the NLSCC had joined the RANR, Quick reiterated, and now he also made it clear that not only did the RANR have no vacancies, it filled any that did arise generally from its own cadet force. As regards recruiting for the RAN, Quick declared that even in the days when large numbers of boys were needed for the navy’s full-time recruit training ship, Tingira, it was a rarity to find one applicant from the NLSCC and only about three percent of

36 Letter, McLachlan to Pearce, 12 March 1933, NAA MP151/1 422/201/67. 37 Letter, Macandie to McLachan, 3 May 1933, NAA MP151/1 422/201/67. 38 Letter, Salmon to Macandie, 15 May 1933, NAA MP151/1 422/201/67. 39 ibid. 40 Minute, DNRM to Director of Naval Stores & Secretary, Naval Board (and the Director of Ordnance Torpedoes and Mines), 31 January 1933, NAA MP151/1 422/201/67. 178

NLSCC members chose the sea as a profession. For these reasons, he urged the Naval Board, before considering official recognition, to satisfy itself that such approval would not result in a series of further requests which might cause embarrassment to the navy in the future.41 In a few short sentences, Quick had summarised and rejected what he regarded as the very limited value of the community-based sea cadet branch, an opinion based almost entirely on its non- defence purpose as a series of disconnected, community-sponsored citizenship training organisations,

Not all navy opinion was as negative as Quick’s, but even those navy administrators who supported the work of the community-based sea cadets acknowledged the limitations of organisations such as the NLSCC, because of its non-defence status.42 As an example, naval ordnance administrators expressed the view, on 10 February 1933, that the Navy League warranted a degree of support that could not be provided under the prevailing organisational arrangements, but that these deficiencies might be addressed by the navy taking control of the community-based sea cadet branch. This was regarded as an option that merited consideration, it was observed, because the decision to withhold stores from such organisations was not due to either stores being unavailable or supply being against the interests of the navy, but because the Navy League, in this case, was regarded as a non- defence organisation.43 As the Navy League and its sea cadet corps existed mainly to help the navy, ordnance branch personnel regarded it as desirable for the navy to provide some assistance and, in view of the additional concerns raised by Quick, particularly about the behaviour of cadets, it was suggested that some measure of control by the Naval Board was not only desirable, but essential.44 Without this control, on the other hand, it was considered that the list of facilities available to the sea cadet corps should not be added to, and that the loan of naval stores at any time was certainly not recommended.45 Thus, while there was positive naval sentiment about the Navy League’s support of the navy, the status of the community-based sea cadets as a series of non-defence organisations remained a major

41 ibid. 42 Minute, Director of Ordnance Torpedoes and Mines to Naval Board Secretary NLSCC, 10 February 1933, NAA MP151/1 422/201/67. 43 ibid. 44 ibid. 45 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 7, NAA: B6121/1, 295B. 179 impediment to the supply of a variety of stores and added to the already complicated issue of control of the behaviour of cadets and their officers.

Some months after the Navy League had been refused recognition and his independent attempt to establish a section of the adult RANR at the Sydney Training Depot had failed, Leonard Forsythe decided to make a new, and this time completely separate, bid to get official RAN recognition for his unit. Referring to a series of previously unsuccessful bids, he wrote to the Minister for Defence, Pearce, on 8 September 1933, and emphasised the independence of the Sydney Training Depot.46 Apologising for corresponding directly with the minister, Forsythe explained that he had tried to get some form of official recognition for his training depot through various channels over the years but had met with no success. After reiterating previous arguments for official recognition, he now canvassed the idea that if recognition could not be given under the Naval Defence Act, then some form of recognition might be possible in the style of the school military (army) cadets. This could be as an auxiliary unit of the defence forces of the Commonwealth, he suggested, which would be ready to take its place in the defence forces when needed. Emphasising the extent of this new independent approach, Forsythe now explained that, although in the past he had been associated with the Navy League, the Sydney Training Depot had been solely financed by him and remained under his personal administration.47 In this way, while still a Navy League office bearer, Forsythe was declaring his independence to Pearce, seeking a unique status for his unit compared to other community-based sea cadet units, and adding yet another complication to the already confused view the Navy League presented to the Naval Board. Thus, it became clear that while moves to engage the navy in these few years after the depression were intense, they were not characterised by full cooperation and organisation on the part of the members of the Navy League in New South Wales and Victoria.

Although mostly engaged by the Navy League in New South Wales and Victoria, the Naval Board also remained the focus for independent requests from other community-based sea cadet units, but its policies were consistent and provide some insight into how much the

46 Letter, Forsythe to Pearce, 8 September 1933, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 47 ibid. 180 need to maintain funding for the RANR influenced the rejection of these bids. As an example, the Assistant Minister for Defence, J Francis, had to again advise the President of the Brisbane Institute of Social Service, Campbell, on 20 November 1933, that no navy funds were available to provide a subsidy for the work of the institute. In doing so, Francis explained to Campbell that ‘social and philanthropic work cannot fail to be of distinct advantage to the Community, but the Naval Authorities regret that a grant cannot be made from the limited funds voted for the maintenance of the Naval Forces’.48 As part of this process, Quick had provided a national perspective, advising Francis that the Brisbane Institute of Social Service was able to buy uniforms on the same basis as the ‘Navy League and Sea Scout Corps’ and ‘departure from this procedure is not recommended’.49 Funds were still tight for the navy and little was left over to offer community-based sea cadets in Queensland, or anywhere else for that matter. Additionally, no extra adult enlistments were planned at this time, for example, although 200 men had been re-engaged from the RANR to crew new ships coming from England.50 It was at this time, furthermore, that that the Naval Board approved Quick’s recommendation that, within the limit of funds available, Senior Naval Cadets could be recruited by DNO’s to fill adult reserve vacancies.51 Thus, underlying the many issues of organisation, control and personnel management, lack of funds ensured that the community-based sea cadets were placed well behind the needs of the full-time navy, and the RANR, in the Naval Board’s deliberations.

The community-based sea cadet branch’s ability to survive in difficult economic times, and in general, owed much to its sponsors and their business acumen. In particular, and unlike the full-time navy, or the defence-based NRC, the community-based sea cadets had the option of pursuing ‘outside’ funds based on the value of their citizenship training. This flexibility is well illustrated by how Campbell of the Brisbane Institute of Social Service subsequently approached Francis, the local member for the seat of Moreton in Brisbane, as well as the Assistant Defence Minister, on 5 December 1933, regarding the prospect of obtaining naval cadet funding directly from the Treasury, as distinct from the sum allocated

48Letter, Francis, to Campbell, 20 November 1933, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 49 ibid. 50 Sydney Morning Herald, 6 October 1933, p. 7. 51 Naval Board Minutes, 1 June 1933, NAA MP124/6, 404/202/689. 181 to the Defence Department. 52 This submission emphasised how the institute, by training young men and boys (in citizenship), was doing work of national importance which merited financial assistance from the Commonwealth government.53 For his part, on 22 January 1934, Francis advised that a grant directly from the Treasury Department, as opposed to a grant from the defence budget, had been considered by the Assistant Treasurer who had advised that he was unable to approve a grant for the purpose mentioned.54 Nevertheless, here was clear evidence that, for some community-based sea cadet organisations, the aim was to subsidise their community work with funds from any government source, not just defence. Nevertheless, on this occasion, neither source had proved fruitful, no doubt increasing the frustration of the organisers, who had made it clear that they thought their work benefitted both the defence force and the country.

The pressure on navy finances in the period 1933-34 that was influencing decisions affecting the community-based sea cadets had a direct impact on the NRC as well, with even some members of the adult RANR having to attend parades in plain clothes.55 At this point, furthermore, although they were members of the wider RANR, the NRC could not automatically continue to serve as adult members of the RAN, or the RANR, when they reached the appropriate age.56 Except for cadets undergoing training in specialist branches, such as wireless telegraphy, NRC members who attained the age of 18 years and applied to join the RANR, were treated no differently than new civilian recruits, particularly with regard to promotion, if they were accepted.57 In an attempt to redress this situation, on 27 March 1934 the Victorian DNO, Commander AL Loudon-Shand, recommended to the DNR, Quick, that seaman cadets should be allowed to qualify as able seaman during their service as cadets and gain accelerated promotion in the adult RANR based on their examination results. Under the prevailing system, Shand observed, it was possible for cadets to join at age 16 and qualify as a cadet petty officer but, on attaining the age of 18 years, and joining the adult force as an ordinary seaman, they had the same status as someone joining the RANR for the first time

52Letter, Campbell to Francis, 5 December 1933, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 53 ibid. 54 Letter, Francis to Campbell, 22 January 1934, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 55 Minute, Captain Superintendent, Sydney, to Naval Board Secretary 14 March 1934, NAA MP124/6, 434/211/553. 56 Minute, Shand to Quick, 27 March 1934, NAA MP124/6, 432/205/2765. 57 ibid. 182 without any previous training. Under this system, Shand observed, the trainee who had served as a cadet gained nothing from his service in the NRC and he strongly recommended that consideration be given to accelerated promotion for such NRC members.58

Demonstrating the focused use of the NRC system for attracting technical sailors to the full-time navy or RANR, Quick pointed out to Shand, on 11 April 1934, that the approach Shand was recommending had been implemented for specialist cadet categories, but not seaman cadets. This was to induce cadets to take up specialist training, which had more difficult examinations, and give up more voluntary time for it. It was not intended, Quick observed, to extend this advantage in a general way to seaman cadets but, in cases where cadets displayed keenness, such as that noted by Shand, accelerated promotion was approved. Quick requested, however, that discretion be used when approving this form of accelerated promotion for seaman cadets, as it was desired that only those with strong claims be considered.59 Thus, while it had limited options at this time, particularly financially, the navy did its best to introduce some flexibility into the management of its NRC to keep the volunteer scheme attractive by encouraging extra commitment to specialist categories that would be more in demand by the full-time navy and RANR.

Notwithstanding its lack of success in obtaining official recognition and support for the navy, throughout 1934 the community-based sea cadet branch, again principally through the efforts of the Navy League, began to expand outside New South Wales and Victoria, but the league did not always take action when an opportunity arose to promote a true federal organisation. As an example, an opportunity for Navy League sea cadet expansion in South Australia arose when, on 13 June 1934, Acting Lieutenant LC Gooley of ‘No 1 Company, South Australian Naval Sea Cadets’ requested uniforms from Macandie, on the specific recommendation of the South Australian Navy League..60 This was a new company forming around a nucleus of former sea rover scouts, Gooley observed, and the South Australian DNO, Commander SR Symonds, had given his full approval, plus the assistance of the South

58 ibid. 59 Minute, Quick to Shand, 11 April 1934, NAA MP124/6, 432/205/2765. 60 Letter, Gooley to Macandie, 13 June 1934, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 183

Australian Navy League was assured.61 Macandie provided all the requested information to Gooley, on 24 July 1934, with the proviso that the process would need to be formalised (through the Navy League).62

At this point, on 31 July 1934, Gooley advised Macandie that the South Australian Branch of the Navy League had not yet given its approval and had actually resolved that his unit should not use the name of the Navy League until he was interviewed by Symonds and a representative of the Navy League. Notwithstanding this situation, Gooley advised that he had been told to carry on ‘quietly’ until the whole matter was resolved.63 As a result of these revelations, Macandie advised Gooley, on 22 August 1934, that no action could be taken on his request for assistance because it appeared that his sea cadet corps at Brighton was still an independent unit that had not been absorbed by any established organisation.64 Nothing more is known of this unit or the details of its relationship with the Navy League, but this episode illustrates how an opportunity for the League to expand the community-based sea cadet branch in South Australia, with the cooperation of the DNO, was missed. While the case is of inherent interest because of the location and the timing, just after a further more substantial bid for official national recognition by the Navy League, it is also of symbolic interest because it demonstrates how difficult it was for the navy to influence the alignment of units of the community-based sea cadet branch without a proper set of national guidelines.

Lack of funds and the absence of an effective national organisation to represent their interests at this time resulted in some community-based sea cadet organisations adopting inventive strategies in an effort to gain support for their, predominantly, citizenship training activities. Always innovative, the Brisbane Institute of Social Service decided to approach the British Admiralty, on 15 November 1934, for the supply of ‘free of cost’ uniforms for their naval cadets.65 This attempt to fund its activities from outside Australia showed the institute’s strong commitment to the ‘building of character in youth’, that resulted from

61 ibid. 62 Letter, Macandie to Gooley, 24 July 1934, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 63Letter, Gooley to Macandie, 31 July 1934, NAA: MP151/1, 422/201/67. 64 Letter, Macandie to Gooley, 22 August 1934, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 65 Letter, Secretary, Brisbane Institute of Social Service to the Admiralty, 15 November 1934, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 184

‘companions, associations, surroundings and hobbies’, and its aim to ‘build ideals, awaken ambition and stimulate the desire for achievement’.66 In addition to these, and many other, citizenship training goals the submission emphasised themes of naval tradition, duty to King and country, and development of good citizenship. Illustrating the success of this organisation not long after a severe economic downturn, the ‘Junior Cadet Corps (the Loyal Wirts)’ was described as attracting an increasing number of new boys and averaging an attendance of 120 to 130 each drill night.67 Notwithstanding the prominence of citizenship education in the reported activities and training, it was made clear that the methods adopted by the institute were on the ‘high and age-old traditions of the British Navy’.68 For its part, and predictably, on 2 February 1935, the British Admiralty expressed it regret at being unable to assist.69 Whatever might be thought of the limited likelihood of such a request succeeding, this further effort, after failed requests to the navy and treasury, illustrates how community- based sea cadet organisers sought to subsidise their activities, when local resources were very limited, and were quite open about their prime focus being citizenship training, even when pursuing support from the RN.

While the Naval Board remained challenged by the activities of the community-based sea cadet branch’s enthusiastic and flexible approach to funding its activities during this brief but intense period of struggle, it was a dramatic misuse of sea cadet uniform and rank that best illustrated why the Naval Board had reason to be concerned about the non-defence branch of the movement. On 1 July 1934, the New South Wales DNO, Stevens, forwarded a newspaper article to the Captain Superintendent, Sydney, CJ Pope, in relation to the jailing of a sea cadet officer. Specifically, Stevens was concerned because of the ‘generally published statement that the person concerned was a Lieutenant-Commander and more particularly as ‘my 1st Lieutenant has been questioned on more than one occasion by civilians as to what ship this person is serving in’.70 Stevens advised that the convicted man had only been associated with the NLSCC for a period of three years, but had been given the rank of ‘Lieutenant-Commander (S.C.)’ without fully complying with the sea cadet regulations

66 ibid. 67 ibid. 68 ibid. 69 Letter, Admiralty to the Secretary, Brisbane Institute of Social Service, 2 February 1935, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 70 Minute Stevens to Pope, 10 July 1934, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 185 governing promotion.71 Although he realised that any interference with the sea cadet movement was not desirable, Stevens believed that Pope needed to be informed about the article entitled ‘Vaucluse Man Gaoled Protect Children from Corruption’.72 In the press report, Judge Curlewis at the Sydney Quarter Sessions was quoted as saying that ‘I have to protect parents from having their children corrupted’ when gaoling Richard Morton McDougall for three years. McDougall was reported as pleading guilty to behaviour concerning three youths aged 9, 10 and 11. 73

Curlewis’ comments in sentencing McDougal illustrate the extent of the navy’s dilemma in assisting organisations where it had no control over the personnel and the resources, such as uniforms, and how they might be (ab)used. He noted that McDougall, who was 25 years of age, had for about five years organised the Rose Bay-Vaucluse branch of the sea cadets and held the rank of lieutenant-commander of the troop until his arrest. He had never had a permanent job, but had held casual positions and devoted practically the whole of his time to the organisation of the troop. A Dr Martin, Assistant Professor in Psychology at Sydney University, told Judge Curlewis that McDougall had a mental age of 12½ years, which was equivalent to that of an ordinary youth leaving school. The judge said he had the greatest respect for Dr Martin’s opinions, but that the accused had taken advantage of his position in the sea cadet movement and ‘(n)othing could be more ruinous than if offences of this nature were passed over lightly’.74 The navy’s dilemma in this case is more fully illustrated by McDougall’s regular contributions to The Navy League Journal as Officer Commanding the Vaucluse Company of the NLSSC where he described a range of interesting monthly training activities and excursions undertaken by the cadets and, overall, appeared to have been conducting a very successful community-based sea cadet unit.75

Although it had a policy of non-intervention in community-based sea cadet affairs, the navy was under considerable pressure to act on the McDougall conviction, but there were no

71 ibid. 72 ibid. 73 ibid. 74 ibid. 75 The Navy League Journal, vol. 11, no. 5, September 1930, p. 10; no. 6. October 1930, p. 10. 186 precedent to indicate how they should, or would, react. It was Pope who took the initiative, on 17 August 1934, when provided the Naval Board with details of just how a sea cadet officer could come to be convicted and gaoled for three years for offences involving three children while on a sea cadet activity.76 As part of this submission, he addressed the implications for the navy. It was believed, Pope reported, that the sea cadet officer, McDougall, had used the title lieutenant-commander, without the addition of the words sea cadet, and permitted, or not encouraged others, to do so when addressing him, as well as generally conveying the impression in his district that he was a naval officer. Putting the event into the context of attempts by the Navy League to achieve official recognition, Pope advised that in 1922, and again in 1933, the Naval Board had refused the Navy League’s (New South Wales Branch) request for official recognition of the institution known as the ‘NLSCC’ and the reasons for this refusal were well understood.77 On both occasions, he observed, certain concessions were made by the Naval Board but they were of a nature which did not affect the principle of recognition nor empower DNOs, or any naval officer, to interfere with the corps. Specifically, the concessions allowed the NLSCC officers to purchase items from the Australian Government Clothing Factory, but only on the basis that the worn uniforms were not to be an exact replica of a naval uniform. The differences between an exact replica and near replica, however, were likely to be so small that they were unnoticeable to the general public, Pope observed.78

It was as a consequence of these previous uniform concessions, Pope explained, that civilians, including newspaper reporters, sometimes believed sea cadet officers to be naval officers. Examples where this had occurred were common, sometimes with damage to the prestige or reputation of the navy. To address his concerns, Pope raised the possibility that the attention of the Navy League might be drawn to the necessity of impressing on each of its officers that the omission of the words ‘Sea Cadet’ before his title, or failure to correct anyone addressing him by a naval officer’s rank was a serious matter.79 Indeed, Pope suggested, it might be better still to make a drastic change in the title and uniforms of the sea

76 Minute, Pope to Macandie, 17 August 1934, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 77 ibid. 78 ibid. 79 ibid. 187 cadets if such a course were considered possible.80 While Pope’s stance was clear, the Naval Board’s capacity to exercise more direct control over the Navy League and the community- based sea cadets was constrained by defence legislation that extended no further than preventing inappropriate use of naval uniform.

Notwithstanding these limitations on what the navy could do legally, some action needed to be taken, noting that the Naval Board had already advised the Navy League, on 21 July 1933, that the correct designation for their officers, as approved by the RN, was ‘Sea Cadet Lieutenant Commander’, and that RN or RAN ranks were not to be used under any circumstances.81 Although there is no record of formal intervention by the navy after the McDougall sentencing, the Secretary of the New South Wales Navy League, WW Beale, advised, on 18 September 1934, that in view of ‘certain recent happenings’, the league committee had decided to withdraw from sea cadet officers such ranks as ‘S.C. Commander’.82 Officer ranks would revert to the original designations of Senior Officer, Officer-in-Charge and so on, Beale observed, and alterations had also been made to sea cadet officer uniforms to distinguish them from navy uniforms, such as replacing gold lace with gold buttons.83 Subsequently, Macandie, on 3 October 1934, advised navy staff of these changes and observed that this strategy by the Navy League had lessened, if not removed, the chance of ‘undesirable officers of the sea cadet corps bringing discredit on the Navy’.84 While some action had been taken, future still more dramatic misuse of naval uniform would be needed to bring the Naval Board to the realisation that wearing and misuse of any form of naval, or naval-like, uniform, would always be a risk while the community-based sea cadet branch was not under its control.

As the community-based sea cadet organisers continued to press the navy for, at least, favourable access to uniforms and equipment, these dramatic events involving the misuse of naval uniforms, and assumed rank, provide an important insight into the developing

80 ibid. 81 Letter, Naval Board Secretary to Secretary, Navy League, New South Wales, 21 July 1933, NAA MP124/6, 422/201/18. 82 Letter, Beale to Pope, 18 September 1934, NAA MP151/1 422/201/67. 83 ibid. 84 Minute, Macandie to all naval staff, 3 October 1934, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 188 relationship between the navy and the, now reasonably well established, NLSCC. In this regard, the difficulties faced by both sides illustrate the challenges of what was a complex relationship, particularly in the light of the comment made by the New South Wales DNO, Stevens, that any interference with the sea cadet movement was not desirable and Macandie’s somewhat tentative approach to the policing of changes to the Navy League uniforms.85 With this ‘hands off’ approach in mind, it is evident that such dramatic examples of a lack of organisation and control, focusing on personnel, rank structure and uniforms, conspired to reduce the credibility of the Navy League as a suitable partner for the navy in managing the two branches of the naval and sea cadet movement. Nevertheless, the Naval Board seemed intent on working in a limited way with the Navy League in an attempt to help shape it as a future national coordinator of all community-based sea cadet units. With regard to the sea scouts, on the other hand, an unequivocal stance had been adopted that ‘so far as the Sea Scout Organisation is concerned, no assistance is granted’.86

Thus, at the end of this two year period, with the economy still putting financial pressure on both arms of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, the navy found itself struggling to support its own defence-based NRC, while dealing with continuing requests for assistance from the Navy League and other community-based sea cadet organisations. In addition, the lack of organisation and control in the community-based sea cadet branch, particularly in relation to personnel and uniform issues, meant that no progress was made on official recognition for these non-defence sea cadet groups. Nevertheless, despite their lack of success in this period, the organisers of the community-based sea cadets remained energetic and focused in their efforts to keep the navy aware of their activities and to further garner support. For its part, the navy remained faithful to the defence based NRC as an integral part of the navy by increasing their quota in the volunteer RANR. Most dramatically, however, it was lack of control over NLSCC officers that overshadowed attempts by the Navy League to work more closely with the RAN.

85 Minute, Stevens to Pope, 10 July 1934, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 86 Letter, Naval Board Secretary to DNO, Western Australia, 23 November 1934, NAA MP124/6, 422/201/30. 189

CHAPTER SEVEN

At Loggerheads 1935-1938

In the period 1935-38, the Navy League’s grip on its own organisation, and its credentials as a potential future national representative of the community-based sea cadets, were severely tested. The lack of a central organisation and limited control over community- based sea cadet units remained key issues for the navy and the initial part of this chapter examines the next phase in the Navy League’s claim for official recognition and support and the Naval Board’s continuing concerns regarding the league’s credentials. The overall recruitment value of the community-based sea cadets, focusing on the need for the navy to give financial priority to the much reduced NRC force, is then further examined. Developing this theme, a strategy for boosting defence-based NRC numbers to improve recruitment to the adult RANR is considered for its importance in demonstrating the navy’s commitment to its ‘official’ branch of the cadet organisation. The development of a navy policy designed to limit further support to the community-based sea cadets is then considered, and aspects of the relentless community-based sea cadet campaign are examined in detail to reveal the continuing philosophical division between the Navy League, still a principal organiser of community-based sea cadet units at this time, and the navy. In addition, management control within the Navy League becomes a prominent issue, with significant internal organisational turmoil resulting in the dramatic expulsion of Leonard Forsythe and his Sydney Training Depot. The enduring themes of lack of organisation and control in the wider, community- based sea cadet branch are considered still further in an examination of a proposal for a major new community-based sea cadet organisation directed at recruitment to the merchant navy. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the navy’s administration of its defence- based NRC was regarded as exemplifying the type of organisation and control appropriate for part-time naval and sea cadets in general.

In the period immediately before World War II, the Australian government, led by Prime Minister Joseph Lyons, was not keen to fight another war in Europe and, in 1938, warned the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, that ‘almost any alternative’ would

190 be preferable to a war with Germany.1 There had already been an increase in applications for migration from Europe, particularly from Austrian and German Jews, but the Australian government continued to favour British migrants.2 The Lyons’ government supported appeasement in Europe and the Labor opposition was committed to isolationism and pacifism.3 Thus, influenced by a public dislike of defence spending that would bring higher taxes and fewer social services, Australia arrived at the brink of World War II with less naval investment, and naval power, in international terms, than it had in 1914.4 Although £43,000,000 had been allocated for defence in April 1938, including the acquisition of two more cruisers to arrive by 1939, the navy lacked the capacity to service its own vessels and most naval armaments were still imported from Britain.5

Despite continuing organisation, control, personnel and funding problems, including the jailing of one of its officers, the Navy League continued to press the navy in this period for official recognition and support. The organisers and supporters of the Sydney Training Depot, led by its founder Leonard Forsythe, continued to champion this campaign by lobbying the Minister for Defence, Archdale Parkhill. As a result, Parkhill agreed to visit the depot and the Naval Board Secretary, Macandie, provided the minister with a brief, on 19 July 1935, in which he immediately addressed the, now familiar, themes of the community- based sea cadet branch’s lack of a central organising body and the need to direct available funds to the RANR.6 While conceding that, since being formed some 15 years earlier, the NLSCC had ‘undoubtedly made great strides in expansion, popularity and efficiency’, Macandie pointed out that this new request for official recognition was again based on a system in the United Kingdom where there was an approved central association, which had not yet been formed in Australia.7 More specifically, funds could not be provided to the Sydney Training Depot, Macandie advised Parkhill, as all available funds had to be devoted to the maintenance of the defence-based NRC, although the Naval Board did grant the Navy

1 Knightley, Australia: A Biography of a Nation, p. 165. 2 ibid., p. 160. 3 ibid., p. 165. 4 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, p. 180. 5 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 131. 6 Minute, Secretary, Naval Board to Secretary, Department of Defence, 19 July 1935, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 7 ibid. 191

League facilities to purchase articles of clothing, mess utensils, hammocks and other items of naval stores.8

Notwithstanding Macandie’s advice, and after visiting the Sydney Training Depot on 23 July 1935, Parkhill suggested that the Captain Superintendent, Sydney, CJ Pope, should provide his views on the usefulness of the depot’s activities. This prompted an immediate further response from Macandie, on 6 August 1935, in which he presented a more pointed summary of the navy’s long-term policy on the Australian naval and sea cadet movement.9 Emphasising the forced closure of RANR depots, due to financial cuts, and the negligible recruitment benefit to the navy from the community-based sea cadet branch, Macandie advised Parkhill that the Naval Board was fully aware of the details of the work being done by the Sydney Training Depot and had provided support to the depot in the previous five years. Highlighting the disbandment of efficient RANR corps at Newcastle, Geelong and Launceston, he argued more forcefully that it was out of the question to assist the NLSCC further, which was not part of the defence forces.10

Putting the submission by Forsythe in the wider context of the community-based sea cadet branch, Macandie informed Parkhill that there were Navy League sea cadet units in Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide, a sea cadet brigade in or near Sydney that was not under the control of the Navy League and sea scouts in various states. With this in mind, he argued, there was no justification for giving assistance to Forsythe unless similar treatment was accorded to the numerous other corps mentioned. Furthermore, the Military Board (army) did not assist boy scouts and, in any event, if the government could make more funds available, the Naval Board would, before assisting the NLSCC, prefer to re-open one of the RANR depots or increase the strength of the NRC corps, which were attached to every port division of the RANR.11 In reiterating these well established points, Macandie focused Parkhill on the lack of organisation in the community-based sea cadet branch, the impact of limited navy funding on the defence-based NRC branch, and the negligible recruiting value

8 ibid. 9 Minute, Macandie to Parkhill, 6 August 1935, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 10 ibid. 11 ibid. 192 of the community-based sea cadets, as the basis for the Naval Board history of rejecting these bids for assistance. It is germane to considering Macandie’s forthrightness on this occasion that Parkhill’s Private Secretary had telephoned him on 1 August, in preparation for the Minister receiving a deputation from the Air League, to ascertain, what assistance was given, or contemplated to be given, to the Navy League.12 In his reply, the next day, to the Secretary of the Defence Department, Macandie was unequivocal in conveying that the Navy League was an independent society to which ‘no assistance is given from Commonwealth funds, nor is any contemplated.’13

At this point it is appropriate to gain further insight into the events surrounding these many submissions by the Navy League, and representatives such as Leonard Forsythe, during this period by considering pertinent comments in the 1956 RAN report on the history of the Navy League, the community-based sea cadets, and their relationship to the RAN.14 In particular, the report reveals that, in 1935, ‘possibly with the Naval Board’s continued refusals to deal with anything but a central organisation in mind’, the Navy League formed the Australian Navy League Council, a body that ‘loosely connected’ their branches in Victoria, New South Wales, and South Australia, but with no executive control.15 At the same time, the report reveals, a Sea Training Committee was formed with the aim of advocating the sea training of youths for service in the merchant marine, with the Navy League as one of the members. Proposals put forward by this committee included use of the naval auxiliary vessel Kurumba as a training ship and that the Commonwealth government should take over Snapper Island and reimburse Forsythe for the cost of improvements.16

In relation to this venture, the Naval Board declined to approve either proposal on the basis that the Kurumba was the only fuel tanker the navy possessed and that it was inappropriate to expend Commonwealth funds taking over Snapper Island or reimbursing

12 Transcript of telephone message, Private Secretary, Minister for Defence, to Macandie, 1 August 1935, NAA MP124/6, 422/201/36. 13 Minute, Macandie to Secretary, Department of Defence, 2 August 1935, NAA MP124/6, 422/201/36. 14 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra c. 1956, p. 7, NAA: B6121/1, 295B. 15 ibid., p. 8. 16 ibid. 193

Forsythe.17 Specifically, the report confirms that the efforts, which focused on support for Forsythe’s Sydney Training Depot, failed when the minister supported the Naval Board’s position of refusing to provide additional support to the community-based sea cadets at the expense of its own NRC. A subsequent Naval Board decision, of 19 October 1935, publicly confirmed this policy as part of a decision declining to provide support to the Navy League, Mosman Bay Sub-Branch.18 Thus, despite efforts by the Navy League, in conjunction with others, to form a new cadet-related organisation with a federal character, the navy established a firm and unambiguous policy on denying financial support to community-based sea cadet units due to their lack of a true controlling body, and overall navy funding constraints. It seemed unlikely that the navy was going to change its long-standing position on limiting its involvement with the community-based sea cadet branch.

Although the Naval Board’s position on providing recognition and direct financial support to the community-based sea cadet branch remained unchanged, the navy continued to provide considerable non-financial assistance, particularly in support of sea cadet training. As an example, navy personnel assisted at sea cadet drill competitions and, importantly, although he had the opportunity, Macandie, did not intervene to prevent this informal support being provided.19 In this way, the navy maintained an informal involvement in the organisation of community-based sea cadet activities, despite repeatedly rejecting bids for official recognition and funding. In this regard, it is important to note that, at a more formal level, even the smallest cash sales to community-based sea cadet units were closely scrutinised, even if this resulted in the sales process becoming quite convoluted. In a further example, which also reveals the continuing involvement of the sea scouts, a Victorian RANR member and scoutmaster, M Nicholas, approached his local navy store for the purchase, or donation, of uniforms designated to be donated to the unemployed. As Scoutmaster of the 4th Williamstown Holy Trinity Sea Scouts, Nicholas advised naval stores personnel in Melbourne, on 11 April 1936, that he was aware that disused uniforms were being distributed among the unemployed and, on behalf of his troop, he wanted to purchase or ‘otherwise

17 ibid. 18 Letter, Parkhill to Hamilton, 19 October 1935, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 19 Letter, Hon Secretary, Navy League (Victorian Branch) to Naval Board Secretary, 4 March 1936, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/42. 194 receive’ three dozen caps.20 The sale, on 5 June 1936, for items valued at one shilling each, had to be approved by both the Victoria DNO, and the Director of Victualling.21 Thus, at a very practical level the navy was going to keep a tight rein on aspects of even limited support to the community-based sea cadets that had a cash value.

As a further example of the meticulous scrutiny that was applied to even the smallest transaction involving community-based sea cadet units, a similar level of formality was applied, on 30 April 1936, to the sale of two out of date library books for 2/6d each to the NLSCC.22 Thus, while it was possible to provide informal support in assisting at community-based sea cadet activities, navy due diligence was applied to even well worn items valued at five shillings and such transactions were processed and approved with the specific aim of not approving anything out of the ordinary.23 While such transaction might be considered merely an unimportant example of routine due diligence for disposal of public property, later correspondence, on 6 May 1936, reveals that this was not the case with navy administrators directed to be specifically on the alert to ensure that the Navy League was supplied only with articles for ‘which specific approval has already been given’.24 Thus, with clear and specific policies, painstakingly developed and approved by the Naval Board, the navy remained vigilant to prevent any inadvertent funding of the community-based sea cadet branch by inappropriate sale or gift of equipment or supplies.

During this period the defence-based NRC settled into being an integral part of the navy and it was proposed to increase their ‘value’ by making their training more flexible, interesting and rewarding. In contrast to the community-based sea cadets, the NRC organisation was regarded by the navy as a real source of adult recruits. For this reason, on 7 April 1936, the Tasmanian DNO, Lieutenant-Commander VAT Ramage, proposed securing the required numbers of adult ratings, which was proving difficult, by recruiting more NRC

20Letter, Nicholas to ‘The Victualling Officer’, 11 April 1936, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 21 Memorandum, DNO VIC, to Director of Victualling, 5 June 1936, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 22 Memorandum, Victualling Stores Officer to Director of Victualling, 30 April 1936, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 23 ibid. 24 Memorandum, Director of Victualling to Victualling Stores Officer, 14 May 1936, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534. 195 members through the introduction of greater flexibility in managing the ratio of adults to cadets, and by remunerating NRC members.25 Ramage asserted that the ideal source of recruits for the adult force was without a doubt the NRC force and, if he could make this branch attractive and interesting enough to secure more recruits, there would be little difficulty in getting the majority of the cadets to transfer to the adult force on reaching 18 year of age.

Furthermore, wastage from the adult force was heavy, Ramage argued, and although he had recruited up to the maximum of 50 NRC members allowed in Hobart, this was not sufficient to ensure enough transfers from the cadets to build up the required numbers in the adult force. To address this problem, Ramage recommended that DNOs should be given approval to recruit cadets to a maximum number determined by local requirements. In Hobart, for example, Ramage suggested, up to 200 cadets could be enrolled without additional cost as there were approximately 180 adult naval reservists on his books for whom money was provided but not expended. Furthermore, if it was not practicable to pay cadets, Ramage considered that some form of allowance should be paid every half year to those who carried out their obligatory training at a reasonable standard of efficiency. He suggested two pounds per year per cadet, payable at the rate of one pound every half year, as an added inducement for them to maintain their interest and increase their efficiency generally.26 If Ramage’s suggestions were implemented, the NRC would become a still more integral and important part of, at least, the RANR system and might also provide more recruits for the full-time navy. From another angle, Ramage’s comments illustrate that the limit on NRC membership, in Tasmania at least, was driven by funding constraints, not its lack of popularity.

The DNR, Quick, considered that Ramage’s observations about the value of recruiting from the cadets applied in some areas but not in others.27 Nevertheless, on 6 May 1936, he approved an increase in Tasmanian cadet numbers to 100, with 30 to be added to the seaman

25 Minute, Ramage to Naval Board Secretary, 7 April 1936, NAA MP124/6, 432/205/2884. 26 ibid. 27 Minute, Quick, to Ramage, 6 May 1936, NAA MP124/6, 432/205/2884. 196 branch and 70 to the signal branch, but he expressed his regret that consideration could not be given to payment of drill pay or efficiency allowance for cadets. With regard to suggestions Ramage had made for making service more attractive, such as more interesting training and social events, Quick pointed out that DNOs were fully in command and had a free hand to make such arrangements as they considered appropriate.28 In this interesting twist, Quick, as navy’s policy advisor on RANR and community-based sea cadet issues, had declined to act on an opportunity to progress a national policy on NRC organisation. The organisation of the NRC was therefore left in the hands of the DNO, as the local naval commander. In this way, the navy showed that its national policy for the organisation and control of the NRC had a significant degree of local management discretion, including a state by state variation in organisation, which the community-based sea cadet organisers might have considered to be no different to the variations they sought to have approved for their branch of the movement. On the other hand, along with the implementation of strict policies on disposal of uniforms and equipment, this is another example of how the organisation and control of NRC occurred within the same command structure applied throughout the navy and set them well apart from their community-based sea cadet counterparts.

Meanwhile, undaunted by Parkhill’s advice that no funds could be made available to assist community-based sea cadet units, particularly at the expense of the NRC, the Navy League continued its campaign for navy recognition and support. Initiating a further phase that was virtually indistinguishable from the last, Forsythe approached Parkhill, on 16 July 1936, after hearing him make a speech appealing for recruits for the militia.29 Forsythe now wanted support for community-based sea cadets because, not in spite of, their position outside the defence forces. He argued that he was fully aware that there was no authority under the Defence Act to support community-based sea cadet units, because if there were, there would be no need for such sea cadet units to exist. While his logic was questionable, it presumably rested on the next part of his submission explaining that community-based sea cadet units were independent and funded by the community. In this regard, Forsythe emphasised that he did not need any financial assistance as he had personally funded the Sydney Training Depot, but then went on to make a lengthy, but not new, case for the loan of

28 ibid. 29 Letter, Forsythe to Parkhill, 16 July 1936, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 197 equipment, including rifles and bayonets.30

In refusing all of Forsythe’s requests, on 17 August 1936, Parkhill again made it clear that the NLSCC was not raised under the Naval Defence Act, that its officers and instructors were not trained by the naval authorities and that they were not subject to naval discipline. As such, the corps was not entitled to be in possession of arms.31 With this ruling, Parkhill again underlined the now well-established Naval Board stance that support would not be provided for any activity deemed inappropriate for a non-defence organisation. Forsythe, on the other hand, had hoped to argue the value of the community-based sea cadets as an economical adjunct to the navy, particularly compared to the NRC. By moving, somewhat quickly, to his need for the loan of items prohibited for community-based sea cadets, and letting his special case argument fall by the wayside, Forsythe ended up completely undermining any argument for official recognition on economy grounds. At the same time, it would not have helped that one of Forsythe’s colleague’s was independently questioning Parkhill about the Naval Board’s policy on removing gold lace from Navy League uniforms, on the basis that he had been advised by two RN admirals that they would not object to Navy League officers wearing gold lace.32 Although unsuccessful, these constant attempts by organisers of the more demanding units, and their many supporters, to elicit any form of additional material support, particularly weapons, and to press for policy changes, contrary to what had been agreed between the Naval Board and Navy League headquarters, continued to shape the navy’s view of the overall movement.

While Forsythe, and the Navy League, single-mindedly pursued navy support, there were successful independent units of community-based sea cadets, without any form of national affiliation, which inevitably complicated the picture for the navy as it struggled with the demands of more needy units.33 One such unit, known to the navy, was the Australian Sea Cadet Brigade, based in Sydney, which was able to fund and organise regular interstate training trips for its members without navy assistance. As illustrated by press reports of the period, but only occasionally reflected in navy deliberations, these independent units were

30 ibid. 31 Letter, Parkhill to Forsythe, 17 August 1936, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 32 Letter, Hamilton to Parkhill, 10 August 1936, NAA MP124/6, 422/201/51. 33 Naval Board Secretary Internal Navy Office Minute, 31 August 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/79. 198 able to provide personal development experiences in a nautical setting that paralleled those provided by the Navy League, and the sea scouts, by focusing totally on recreational and citizenship activities. Moreover, these activities were not limited to minor outings in the Sydney area. As an example, the Mercury of 8 January 1937 reported that thirty members of the Australian Sea Cadet Brigade, New South Wales Division, would reach Hobart by the Zealandia that morning.34 They were to be billeted on the Royal Agricultural Society's show ground at Glenorchy for about ten days with Commander V. Nudsen, Chief Executive Officer of the Brigade, in charge.35

The members of the Australian Sea Cadet Brigade were reported as ranging in age from 12 to 16 years and the purpose of their, mainly educational, tour was to visit the main tourist attractions of the state and its chief industrial undertakings. Furthermore, it was reported that members of the brigade visited one of the Australian States each year, but this was the first time they had visited Tasmania, where their tour included two days in Launceston after which they would return to Hobart and set sail for Sydney, again on the Zealandia.36 In a letter of appreciation, published in the Hobart Mercury on 22 January 1937, Nudsen thanked those who had helped to make the visit such a pleasant one, especially the Lord Mayor, Rotary Clubs, the Royal Agricultural Society and the YMCA. The brigade planned to call in to Tasmania en route to Adelaide the following year and he asked the organisers of the visit to ‘please tell the lads in Tasmania who approached me to form a branch in Hobart and Launceston that I am hopeful of doing so and am waiting for some patriotic citizens to come forward and help me and them’.37 Subsequently, on 1 January 1938, the Adelaide Advertiser reported that ten boys of the Australian Sea Cadet Brigade in the charge of Captain V Nudsen had arrived in Adelaide on board the Westralia from Sydney and were staying at the YMCA. They visited beaches and went boating on the Torrens River.38 In considering the significance of Nudsen independently organising this type of sea experience for his community-based sea cadets, it is significant that the Naval Board would not allow NRC members, under 18, to embark on HMA Ships at this time, as the Regulations

34 Hobart Mercury, 8 January 1937, p. 10. 35 ibid. 36 Mercury, 11 January 1937, p. 3. 37 Mercury, 22 January 1937, p. 12. 38 Adelaide Advertiser, 1 January 1938, p. 6. 199 did not provide coverage in the event of accident or sickness.39 Hence, Nudsen was providing seamanship experiences to his community-based sea cadets, as part of his citizenship training program, that were not even available to equivalent NRC members, let alone the wider community branch.

Although such independent units did not survive, what little is known of them is an important part of the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement. This is mainly because their achievements illustrate an important alternative to the centralised model pursued by the navy and exemplified by the NLSCC and the NRC. These units were fully independent in terms of their organisation, control, personnel and funding and did not turn to the navy for assistance. In addition, although the evidence is limited, it appears that there was no obvious place for such nautical based programs under the umbrella of the Australian Council of Youth, which included religious groups such as state councils of religious education and the Young Women’s Christian Association, along with political youth groups such as the League of Nations Youth Group, Young Communists League and Young Zionist Club.40 Neither would they have been eligible to be affiliated with other youth groups such as those sponsored by the Returned Soldiers’ League, nor philosophically compatible with religious organisations such as the Brotherhood of St Laurence, and other religious groups of this period with a combined membership of 10,000.41 Nevertheless, as will be revealed in later chapters, a number of these independent units thrived, although some were not held in high regard by the navy. Successful or otherwise, all of these organisations contributed in some way to the complex nature of the community-based sea cadet branch and the resultant unbalanced dual identity of the overall movement. As a result, the navy struggled more than ever in this period to find a consistent pattern of organisation and control in the structure of the community-based sea cadet branch that could satisfy its concerns about how, and if, these units should be assisted effectively alongside the NRC.42

39 Minute, DNRM to DNO NSW, 24 June 1937, NAA MP124/6, 432/205/2973. 40 Courier Mail, 5 May 1937, p. 18. 41 West Australian, 3 November 1938, p. 9; Argus, Melbourne, 15 July 1938. 42 Naval Board Secretary Internal Navy Office Minute, 31 August 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/79. 200

The next phase of the history of the movement revealed a more structured approach by the Navy League, displaying some grasp of the navy’s concerns, and featured submissions from both Victoria and New South Wales that attempted to address the navy’s objections about the overall lack of control in the community-based sea cadet branch. In addition, the creation of the Navy League Council as a coordinating body was used to add strength to the new submissions and may have influenced the Naval Board’s thinking.43 This further effort at eliciting support began routinely when, on 8 June 1937, the Secretary of the Navy League in New South Wales, WW Beale, presented the Acting Minister for Defence, HVC Thorby, with many of the standard philosophical arguments used by the Navy League since 1920.44 In subsequent and more detailed submissions to the Naval Board, however, the Navy League started to show more willingness to replace rhetoric with rigour.45 First, the Victorian Navy League explained that it had four companies of sea cadets with 15 officers and 178 cadets and provided a comprehensive summary of its facilities and training resources. Second, this submission addressed the quality of the personnel involved and their achievements by explaining that all company commanders had naval experience and that 500 cadets had been trained over the past five years. Finally, the organisation of the NLSCC was presented in a formal ‘Organisation and Regulations of the Navy League, Victorian Branch Governing the NLSCC of Victoria’, which included its aims, executive organisation, appointments, powers and duties, local committee structure, property and finance.46 This was the first time that the Navy League had addressed the navy’s concerns in a way that emphasised a structured approach to organisation, control and personnel, although funding was not considered.

The New South Wales Navy League made a separate submission, on 21 July 1937, to complement that of the Victorian branch, and provided further historical information.47 In New South Wales, it was explained, resources had always been an issue but, up until 1931, the numerical strength of the corps had been in excess of 600 cadets in uniform, with a subsequent reduction in numbers mainly due to financial considerations and difficultly in providing and maintaining suitable equipment and training quarters. For the organisation of

43 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra c. 1956, NAA: B6121/1, 295B. 44 Letter, Beale to Thorby, 8 June 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/79. 45 Letter, Victorian Navy League to Macandie, 16 July 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/79. 46 ibid. 47 Letter, Beale to Macandie, 21 July 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/79. 201 the New South Wales units, the NLSCC rules and regulations provided for control through an inspecting officer who was responsible for the inspection of depots, boats, and company equipment generally and was required to advise when necessary on their care, safety and maintenance. Organisation in New South Wales did not quite accord with that in Victoria, but was sufficiently similar, particularly in the area of control, personnel and financial management, to give the impression of the two organisations working under similar rules.48 With regard to RAN support, the rules and regulations provided that only corps equipment officers were authorised by the executive to approach the Defence Department in connection with equipment. In addition, unlike the Victorians who still used a navy-like rank structure, the rank structure in New South Wales was Senior Officer, Inspecting Officer, Officer-in- Charge of a Company, and so on, and merchant navy uniforms were worn. The New South Wales submission described the company at Snapper Island and sub-depots at North Sydney, Woolwich, East Sydney, and Balmain, and two companies in the process of being formed at Manly and Gosford. The membership of these companies was reported as 11 Officers and 249 cadets, with an additional 2 officers and 50 cadets forming at the Manly and Gosford sub-depots.49

With these detailed Victorian and New South Wales submissions the Navy League started to address the navy’s concerns about organisation, control, personnel, funding, constitution, purpose and uniforms. Seemingly, there was little for the navy to do but decide a policy on community-based sea cadets, using the NLSCC as the best available standard. The problem was that the two submissions did not fully align and there had been no attempt by the Navy League to provide a single national submission. Notwithstanding the creation of the Navy League Council, these submissions still demonstrated that the navy was not dealing with one organisation and, furthermore, the Navy League in Queensland and South Australia were not represented, let alone the sea scouts or the remainder of the diverse community- based sea cadet units scattered across the country.

48 ibid. 49 ibid. 202

The Naval Board Secretary, Macandie, submitted the Victorian and New South Wales Navy League material to the Naval Board, on 31 August 1937, noting that the Secretary, New South Wales Navy League, Beale, was also the Honorary Secretary of the Australian Navy League Council. 50 In addition to the NLSCC in New South Wales and Victoria, and its membership of 26 officers and 427 sea cadets, Macandie observed that there was a ‘body at Sydney styling itself the ‘Australian Sea Cadet Brigade’ quite apart from the Navy League, but no particulars as to strength have been supplied’.51 He also summarised the history of Navy League submissions to the Naval Board since 1933 and the reasons for refusing further recognition and support on each occasion. This summary focused on the disbandment of various RANR units owing to lack of money, the availability of a defence-based NRC corps at each navy port, the status of the community-based sea cadet branch as non-defence and that the British admiralty only assisted the sea cadet corps in the United Kingdom because it did not have the equivalent of Australia’s RANR organisation with its attached cadet corps.52

With respect to these latest submissions, Macandie then made a number of personal observations, beginning with his view that the NLSCC had been raised by the Navy League simply because it was done in Great Britain. Furthermore, this was done without any regard to the differing conditions in Australia, namely compulsory training in the RANR which had now been replaced by voluntary training. Turning to the merits of the submissions, Macandie questioned whether funds should be spent on what was ‘practically negligible as a defence proposition’, when the Naval Board had closed down RANR units at Newcastle, Geelong and Launceston due to lack of funds.53 Moreover, he observed, any type of capitation grant would entail periodical inspections by DNOs and require the DNR becoming responsible for the oversight of the administration of these corps, appointments of officers, and so on, just as the Admiral Commanding Reserves did in England. The impact of Macandie’s recommendations were reflected in the notation by the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff who remarked that the ‘difficulties involved in making this Naval Board in any way responsible for this organisation are such that I do not consider them worth while taking on for the sake

50 Minute, Macandie to Naval Board, 31 August 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/79. 51 ibid. 52 ibid. 53 ibid. 203 of the very problematical, and in many cases small, benefits the Service is likely to receive’.54 Thus, even as the navy was preparing for a possible war in Europe, the Naval Board considered the community-based sea cadet branch as having little, if any, value as a pre-entry training and recruiting organisation and, on this basis, rejected the Navy League’s submissions.

As part of this latest review of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, it is noteworthy that Macandie also recorded the defence-based NRC branch as having a total membership of 412, located in Brisbane (50), Sydney (50), Port Melbourne (81), Williamstown (51), Port Adelaide (50), Fremantle (52), and Hobart (78).55 In this way, the NRC branch and its organisation, control, personnel, funding, constitution and purpose was used to highlight that there was no alignment between the goals of the navy and the purpose of the community-based sea cadet branch. Using this comparative approach, the Naval Board remained of the view that that there were entirely logical reasons for not supporting the community-based sea cadets and, on 9 September 1937, the Minister for Defence, Parkhill, advised the New South Wales Navy League that the RANR was training more than 3000 men, of 18 years and over, and 412 boys in attached cadet corps.56 Furthermore, if more money could be allotted to the RANR, he observed, these numbers would be increased – it would not go to the community-based sea cadets. Hence, the Naval Board could not recommend any grant for the NLSCC, which was not part of the defence forces.57 Thus, a decision had been made which emphatically communicated to the Navy League that community-based sea cadet organisations would not be recognised or more formally supported alongside the NRC.

At this point, when the Navy League’s sea cadet training activities had been comprehensively rejected as a contributor to navy training and recruiting, it suffered a further blow to its credibility when it expelled one of its most influential members, Leonard Forsythe. The official history of the Sydney Training Depot, published in 2002, describes

54 ibid. 55 ibid. 56 Letter, Parkhill to Secretary, Navy League NSW, 9 September 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/79. 57 ibid. 204 how, in 1937, ‘upon request by the Navy League NSW Branch, the Sydney Training Depot became responsible for the management and financing of the Sea Cadet Unit’.58 Other sources describe quite differently how a dispute arose, in December 1937, and that Forsythe was dismissed from the Navy League. Notwithstanding his departure from the Navy League, Forsythe was independent and able to carry on a self supporting organisation under the title ‘Sydney Training Depot, Snapper Island (Voluntary Sea Training Establishment, Sea Cadet Corps, N.S.W.)’ because he held a personal lease over Snapper Island.59 The Naval Board would have been aware of the rancour associated with this separation as, in addition to local naval administrators paying close attention, the Age of 13 December 1937 reported a very public confrontation between Forsythe and the Navy League with the headline ‘70 SEA CADETS RESIGN’.60 Further eroding the public image of the Navy League as a potential formal coordinating body of the community-based sea cadet branch, the Age reported that as he was ‘dismissed from his position of honorary sea cadet commander without being given a reason, Mr. L. Forsythe asked seventy cadets on Saturday of the Navy League to choose between him and the league’. 61 The rift was completed when, in response to this ultimatum, ‘the cadets stood by Mr. Forsythe, and resigned from the league in the presence of Captain W. Beale, O.B.E. representing the league. Forsythe said later that he would continue his work at Snapper Island’.62

Forsythe declared himself formally independent of the Navy League, on 4 December 1937, when he advised the Naval Board Secretary, Macandie, that, in future, the Sydney Training Depot would function as a separate organisation.63 At the same time, he thanked the Naval Board for its support to him as Navy League Equipment Officer, a position he was relinquishing after ten years of service.64 After such a lengthy period as both an office bearer and a spokesman with the Navy League, Forsythe’s departure was a significant event for the navy. Furthermore, his management of the situation surrounding his departure illustrated the

58 Sydney Training Depot Snapper Island: Maritime Museum Catalogue 2002, Sydney Training Depot (Snapper Island), Drummoyne, 2002. 59 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra c. 1956, p. 10, NAA: B6121/1, 295B. 60 Memorandum, Captain Superintendent Sydney to the Naval Board Secretary, 15 December 1937. NAA MP151/1 422/201/112. 61 ibid. 62 ibid. 63Letter, Forsythe to Macandie, 4 December 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/112. 64 ibid. 205 vulnerability of the community-based sea cadet structure to the independent instincts of its many founders and emphasised the potential futility of the navy’s aim of working with a single national community-based sea cadet organisation. Perhaps because only token support was provided, the Naval Board decided to continue supporting Forsythe and, on 22 December 1937, Macandie directed Captain Superintendent Sydney, CJ Pope, that facilities should continue to be made available to the Sydney Training Depot.65 Regardless of its recent rejection of official recognition bids by the Navy League, by supporting Forsythe the Naval Board brought into question the integrity of its policy preference of doing business with one national organisation in relation to community-based sea cadets.66

After his very public departure, the Navy League advised Macandie, on 28 December 1937, that Forsythe no longer occupied the position of honorary officer in charge of the League’s subsidiary, the ‘Sea Cadet Corps’, nor was he ‘now associated with the League in any way whatsoever’.67 In addition, it was observed that Forsythe proposed to continue a private voluntary training establishment at Snapper Island and ‘for the present’ the Navy League would carry on its own sea cadet corps with units at North Sydney, Birchgrove (Balmain), Woolwich and Manly.68 For his part, Forsythe, who had modelled the Sydney Training Depot on the sea cadet corps in Britain, was quick to assure the navy that he would continue in this vein and, on 3 January 1938, he thanked Macandie for the continued support the navy would be giving to the depot after its separation from the Navy League. He assured Macandie that activities at the depot would be conducted in accordance with the ‘Regulations Governing the Formation and Administration of Units of the Sea Cadet Corps in the British Isles’ and invited any members of the Naval Board to inspect the depot should they be in Sydney.69 The Navy League’s goal of being recognised by the Naval Board as comfortably in control of its own sea cadet corps and, thus, the pre-eminent contender to be the national coordinator of the community-based sea cadet branch, had suffered a major blow.

65Memorandum, Macandie to Pope, 22 December 1937, NAA: MP151/1, 422/201/112. 66 Letter, Macandie to Forsythe, 22 December 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/112. 67 Letter, Beale to Macandie, 28 December 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/112. 68 ibid. 69 Letter, Forsythe to Macandie, 3 January 1938, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/112. 206

Although the Naval Board was able to clarify its position with the more significant existing community-based sea cadet organisations, which were regularly reviewed as the result of their submissions to the Naval Board, there still always seemed to be new independent units being created. Most were small and little was heard of them, but some, like the Australian Sea Cadet Brigade, were more substantial, or contrived to be so, and it was the potential lack of control of the activities of these units that attracted the attention of the navy. Consideration of one of these ventures, in particular, provides important further evidence of the seemingly inexhaustible capacity of the community-based sea cadet organisation to remain immune to any sort of control how it this could ensnare the Naval Board. Along with a range of other issues, this control dilemma is well exemplified by the grandiose aims of the Captain Cook Training Depot, Melbourne and its founder, JW Ward.70 Ward, who was also Chairman of the Nautical Societies of Australia, first wrote to the ‘Admiral Commanding Coastguard and Reserves at the British Admiralty, on 5 May 1937, requesting permission to form a sea cadet corps under the ‘Admiralty Memorandum governing the formation, organisation and administration of units of Sea Cadet Corps in the British Isles, 1918’.71 In his submission, he presented elaborate plans for establishing training facilities to prepare boys for sea service and give them a sound general education, as well as providing training for future yachtsmen. 72 Ward’s scheme epitomised how anyone with a plan, with no real substance behind it, could absorb navy resources and put the reputation of the community-based sea cadet branch at risk.

First, the grandiose nature of the Ward scheme is important for understanding what faced the British Admiralty and the Australian Naval Board when enthusiastic members of the public decided to participate in the virtually unregulated world of the community-based sea cadets. Although Ward’s scheme was primarily aimed at full-time and part-time training for the merchant navy, he planned a cadet corps for boys who would train only on week nights. At a time when the Navy League was telling the navy that they could not get support by subscription, Ward declared that this method of financial aid could be as successful in

70 Letter, Ward to the Admiralty, 5 May 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/101; JW Ward (Ed) Our Australian Navy it’s story in word and picture for the people of Australia and New Zealand, Nautical Societies Council of Australia, 1938? This publication is undated and the place of publication is not provided, but the State Library of New South Wales has estimated its publication date to be 1938. 71 ibid. 72 ibid. 207

Australia as it had been in Great Britain and referred to the success of Forsythe’s Sydney Training Depot and the Australian Sea Cadet Brigade at Darling Point. Although Ward had not advised the Australian government or the navy about his scheme, they were made aware when, on 14 June 1937, the Admiralty referred the submission, with a copy of the ‘Regulations Governing the Formation, Organisation and Administration of Units of the Sea Cadet Corps in the British Isles 1934’, to the High Commissioner for Australia for ‘such action by the Commonwealth Naval Board as may be considered desirable’.73

Second, Ward’s membership of the Navy League illustrates how that organisation was no closer to containing the independent ventures of its members, even though they cut directly across its goal of regulating the community side of the movement. When the proposal for the Captain Cook Training Depot was forwarded to the Naval Board, Macandie advised Ward, on 7 September 1937, that the proposal was essentially for the establishment of a nautical boarding school and that the Naval Board considered it outside its province to offer an opinion.74 On the matter of formation of a sea cadet corps, he suggested that Ward confer with the Navy League, which had already raised several such corps. For his part, Ward advised, on 8 October 1937, that he was a member of the Navy League and had been on the executive committee for three years.75 In addition, as he held the rank of Sea Cadet Paymaster for the Melbourne district, he felt he was in a good position to ascertain the success of the sea cadet corps in Victoria, and he regarded himself as familiar with the sea cadet corps in New South Wales. Furthermore, Ward explained, the proposal under discussion had been presented to the President of the Victorian Branch of the Navy League, who had advised that it was impossible for the Navy League to run the scheme due to it being organised as a commercial venture. Ward explained that it had been organised on this basis as the ultimate objective was to make it a large undertaking and making it a public company would limit the liability of any people connected with it ‘should the scheme fall on lean times’.76

73 Letter, Macandie to Ward, 7 September 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/101. 74 ibid. 75 Ward to Macandie, 8 October 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/101. 76 ibid. 208

Finally, this proposed venture serves to demonstrate how the issue of uniforms, and rank, underpinned the actions of so many of these entrepreneurs. Addressing his initial approach to the British Admiralty, Ward advised that he understood that it was impossible for the navy to support such a movement officially, but unofficial advice would be helpful. In addition, it was not the intention of the organisers to pester the government for a grant with all funds being sought by public subscription and from the cadets. The main point in writing to the British admiralty had been ‘to ascertain how we stand for wearing the King’s uniform, and what rankings could be carried by our officers?’77 This was a somewhat complex attempt by an officer of the Navy League to start a commercial full-time nautical training school, and part-time sea cadet corps, where officers would wear an RN (and thereby RAN) uniform. Although Macandie had attempted to deflect the sea cadet corps issue away from the navy towards the Navy League, the uniform issue could not be avoided, if the venture succeeded.

A closer examination of Macandie’s reply to Ward, on 25 November 1937, provides a useful insight into the manner in which the Naval Board was developing its thinking on management of the community-based sea cadet branch of the movement.78 Macandie divided the Ward scheme into two parts. First the establishment of a sea cadet corps for which he stated that the Victorian Branch of the Navy League was the ‘central authority controlling Sea Cadet Corps in Victoria, and its authorisation would be sufficient’.79 Second, the establishment of a training depot, which would be a nautical training school, where boys could live while undergoing the course, was outside the purview of the Naval Board as the boys would be trained for the merchant navy. In this regard, the Naval Board was concerned only with the training of personnel for the navy and had established its own training schools and he understood that the shipping companies already trained officers and seamen in the Australian coastal fleet. Regarding the wearing of uniform and rank, Macandie advised Ward that there would be no objection to the wearing of ‘something on the lines approved by the Admiralty for the Sea Cadet Corps uniforms’ and he set out in detail what had been approved for the Navy League.80 In yet another variation of the many navy communications on

77 ibid. 78 Letter, Macandie to Ward, 25 November 1937, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/101. 79 ibid. 80 ibid. 209 permissible uniforms, Macandie declared that ‘(a)ny inscription is, however, admissible at the discretion of the Unit concerned, provided that the words “Royal,” “Reserve,” or “Naval” are not introduced’.81 In this way, while not recognising the Navy League for official navy support, the Macandie now acknowledged it as a suitable state authority over new community-based sea cadet units. In addition, the use of navy-like uniforms, based on a British or local design, was approved with very few restrictions, with the likelihood that the personnel of the Captain Cook Training Depot would be mistakenly identified as naval officers.

In understanding the navy’s benevolent tolerance of proposals such as the Captain Cook scheme, it is useful to examine the administration and control exercised over its force of approximately 400 defence-based NRC, and consider that the success of such an undertaking may have been seen as highly unlikely when considered in the light of the resources the navy allocated to the administration of the NRC system. In this regard, a snapshot of the very formal, and somewhat elaborate, administration system of the NRC is provided by a typical case file, one of many surviving from this era, recording the service of one Walter William Ernest Derbyshire of 6 Newell Street Footscray, who served from 1936 to 1938, although ‘often absent’.82 Enrolling at the Williamstown Port Division, he undertook to attend drills regularly, fulfil the requirements for efficiency during each year of training and be willing to enlist in the RANR on reaching the age of 18 years. Importantly, the declaration regarding the obligation to enlist in the adult RANR was footnoted with the added proviso that ‘it should be explained to the applicant that the obligation to enlist in the R.A.N.R. constitutes an honourable undertaking to do so and does not involve any legal obligations’.83 Additionally, permission to enlist in the adult RANR was subject to medical fitness, the existence of a vacancy and general suitability. Furthermore, candidates were required to produce two character references, one of which needed to be provided by a person holding an official or other responsible position, such as a police official, clergyman, schoolmaster or employer. So too, Walter had to provide the name and address of his

81 ibid. 82 Enrolment forms of senior naval cadets (form RANR.5), Williamstown Division of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve, NAA B5749, WHOLE SERIES. 83 Enrolment Form, Senior Naval Cadets Attached to the Royal Australian RANR, Walter William Ernest Derbyshire, 4 Sep 1935, NAA B5749, WHOLE SERIES. 210 employer, before being able to sign and submit the application. The administrative component of the application form included a medical certificate that declared the candidate physically fit for enrolment and, in Walter’s case, it was signed by an RANR surgeon. This certificate included details of height, weight and minimum and maximum chest measurement.84

Ultimately, the enrolment of a defence-based NRC was approved by the local RANR commanding officer, a full-time lieutenant commander. In Walters’s case the whole process was concluded in one day on 4 September 1935. In a similar way, his discharge (due to unsatisfactory attendance) was accomplished using the reverse side of his application form on which particulars of drills attended and efficiency were recorded for the years 1936-38 and examinations, promotions, transfers recorded. Importantly, the process required that a ‘true copy’ of the enrolment/discharge form was to be handed to the cadet on discharge with the original being retained by the RANR depot and attached to the engagement form should the cadet join the adult RANR. As part of the process each cadet received a ‘Record of Service’.85 Thus, the RAN processed recruitment, selection, service and discharge of NRC members in a manner that they would not have considered possible for the community-sea cadet branch to implement, although, as the case of Walter Derbyshire demonstrates, this process did not guarantee effective service.

Pursuing this theme of organisation and control systems, the volunteer NRC may have been properly resourced, but the navy managed these scarce resources, particularly uniforms, very strictly. Thus, in contrast to what was now a voluntary attendance system with none of the penalties that were a feature of the compulsory cadet era, including no obligation to join the adult RANR upon turning 18, the requirement to return a long list of issued clothing was definitely obligatory, as it was for an adult RANR member.86 This is illustrated by the case of Cadet JD Curry, who was discharged for poor attendance on 13 March 1936.87 As part of

84 ibid. 85 ibid. 86 Form RANR 41, Recovery Of Uniform From RANR Personnel Discharged, JD Curry, 13 March 1936, NAA B5749, WHOLE SERIES. 87 ibid. 211 effecting Curry’s discharge, the uniform recovery process was initiated on 24 July 1935, but did not conclude until the date of discharge, when he returned his uniform after being advised that failure to return loan items would make him liable to prosecution under the Defence Act.88 From just these two examples, it is clear that, although fully under the navy’s control and comprehensively supported and administered, defence NRC members did not always fulfil their commitments and, for their part, the navy was not committed to providing membership in the adult force. Nevertheless, the administrative systems that pertained to the defence-based NRC branch were fully aligned with those of the RAN and were not in any way similar to those of the various community-based sea cadet organisations. This difference continued to clearly underscore the duality of the defence and community-based branches of the movement and set the standard of administration that the Naval Board would have considered appropriate to expect from the Navy League in relation to its organisation and control of an officially recognised NLSCC.

After a hiatus of five years, The Navy League Journal was relaunched as a new series in April 1938.89 This resurgence of the journal is significant, as its first editorial acknowledged the financial hardship experienced by the league in the period, 1932-37, but also because it confirmed the league’s 17 year commitment to training boys in the NLSCC along naval lines in order to instil ‘ideals of good and decent citizenship’.90 The journal’s familiar unit reports resumed and acknowledged the years of struggle, with the North Sydney company reporting a low point of two officers and ten ratings in July 1936, when it was thought the unit would not survive, before additional members joined from the disbanded Fairlight company, in August 1937, and the unit rebuilt to a strength approaching 50 early in 1938.91 Thus, while its finances and membership may have suffered as a result of the economic turmoil of the early 1930s, the Navy League had survived and its focus on rebuilding was reflected in its next attempt to gain official navy recognition and support for its cadets. An important part of this process was the close relationship the editor of The Navy League Journal established with the Naval Board in gaining agreement to publish copies of

88 Letter to Cadet JD Curry from Warrant Instructor RAN, for Commanding Officer, dated 24 July 1935, NAA B5749, WHOLE SERIES. 89 The Navy League Journal, vol. 1, no. 1 (new series), April 1938, p.1 90 ibid. 91 ibid., p. 11-12 212

RAN appointments, projected movements of HMA Ships and other official navy information.92 As in the past, and with its renewed enthusiasm for working closely with the navy, the Navy League did not accept the most recent decision, by the Naval Board and Parkhill, as final and, no sooner did Harold Thorby resume the role of Acting Defence Minister, than yet another request for official recognition and financial assistance was submitted.

This new submission did not have the voluminous detail of its predecessors, but suggested a more focused approach, in many ways similar to previous submissions by Forsythe, to how the NLSCC might assist the navy.93 Observing that the Navy League’s sea cadet membership was now less than it had been in 1932, it was proposed to remedy this situation by training boys that were too young to join the defence-based NRC. By using this approach, the Navy League proposed that it would not be in competition with the NRC but would support the navy by pre-training boys before they joined the RAN, the RANR and its attached NRC scheme. Of course to provide this support in training more junior boys, money would be required as it was through shortage of funds that NLSCC membership had fallen to such a low level. As part of this new approach, the Navy League organisers specifically acknowledged the RANR as a government organisation that trained boys for sea service, but argued that the NLSCC enlisted boys from the age of 10, provided them with an incentive to join the navy and that this type of training had to be accepted as a ‘distinct adjunct’ to the RANR.94 If the Navy League was hoping that Thorby, as the new minister, would be more sympathetic than Parkhill, they were to be disappointed. He was unmoved by their argument and, on 8 June 1938, declined to provide funding, presenting the same arguments that had been used to reject previous submissions.95

In a somewhat uncharacteristic manner, and openly expressing their frustration, the Navy League suggested to Thorby, on 4 July 1938, that ‘apparently you have been misinformed with regard to the variety of difference of conditions with respect to the Sea

92 Letter Naval Board Secretary to Secretary, NSW Navy League, 24 August 1937, NAA MP124/6, 422/201/66. 93 Letter, Forsythe to Thorby, 16 July 1936, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 94 ibid. 95Letter, Thorby to NSW Navy League, 8 June 1938, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/79. 213

Cadet Corps’.96 Abandoning its argument on the merits of the community-based sea cadets as a junior pre-entry organisation, the Navy League presented a series of circuitous arguments based on parallels with the British experience, which culminated in an admission that it was hardly worth persevering without adequate support. In addition, unwittingly it would seem, the Navy League acknowledged the merit of the Naval Board’s argument on the differing circumstances in Britain and Australia by drawing attention to the similarity in the purpose and organisation of the NLSCC in the United Kingdom and the defence-based NRC in Australia.97 It seemed that the intention was to press for the right to expand the community- based sea cadet branch dramatically as the equivalent of its British parent, but the argument actually supported the navy position that the NRC provided all that was needed in the way of a cadet system in Australia. The Navy League seemed to be losing its way after years of struggling to stay viable.

Furthermore, in advising Thorby, Macandie now observed that, while the NLSCC in the United Kingdom might serve the same function as the defence–based NRC did in Australia, the relationship between the Navy League in the United Kingdom and the RN was quite different to the relationship that existed between the League in Australia and the RAN. In this way, the Navy League found itself, unintentionally and unexpectedly, in accord with Macandie’s view that there were flaws in the argument about the local relevance of the British experience. For his part, Thorby was of a similar view and, on 16 August 1938, he summarised Macandie’s arguments, encouraged the Navy League in its ‘social welfare’ work and rejected their submissions.98 As the organisational spearhead for the community-based sea cadet branch, the Navy League had relied again on the British precedents it perceived as applying in Australia and failed again in its bid to secure financial support. In addition, as well as re-emphasising the irrelevance of the British model of organisation in Australia, Thorby had rejected the Navy League’s argument of having a recruitment and pre-entry training role by describing the NLSCC, and by default the community-based sea cadet branch, as mainly a social welfare organisation. From its side, the Navy League further complicated any claim to a central role in navy pre-entry training by having its revamped

96 Letter, NSW Navy League to Thorby, 4 July 1938, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/79. 97 ibid. 98 Letter, Thorby to NSW Navy League, 16 August 1938, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/79. 214 journal provide specific coverage of the recovering units of the NLSCC as focused on social, sporting and citizenship activities.99

At the end of the period 1935-38, the community-based sea cadet branch was no further advanced in its quest for official recognition and more formal support from the navy and, particularly in the case of the Navy League, was focused on rebuilding.100 The navy maintained its stance on the need to protect the reduced NRC branch ahead of funding the community-based sea cadets and, regardless of its citizenship training merits, did not concede that the community-based sea cadet branch provided any recruiting benefit to the navy. Moreover, the organisation and control of the community-based sea cadets, within individual units and by the Navy League, was not improving. This left the navy with no option but to wait until the Navy League, or some other organisation, took action to make itself a credible national representative of the community-based sea cadet branch. In this regard, the Navy League remained focused on using the merits of its United Kingdom parent’s success with the British admiralty, rather than its own achievements, in order to sway the Naval Board’s view – not an approach that had thus far paid any dividends. For its part, the Naval Board remained of the view that the situation in the two countries was very different and, thus, the dual system continued unaltered.

99 The Navy League Journal, vol. 1, no. 2 (New Series), May 1938, pp. 13-16. 100 DJ Mort, ‘An Outline of the Work of the NLSCC’, The Navy League Journal, vol. 1 no. 9 (New Series), December 1938, p12. 215

CHAPTER EIGHT

War and Policy Changes 1939-1945

As part of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement during World War II, community-based sea cadets were subject to some unexpected and unusual ordeals. For example, on 15 January 1940, the Honorary Commanding Officer, Sydney Training Depot, Leonard Forsythe, reported to the New South Wales police that sea cadets from his unit had been attacked by ‘irresponsible youths’.1 Apparently, the sea cadets were only attacked when in uniform and Forsythe suggested that the assaults were being ‘made on the uniform’ rather than on the wearer.2 Despite this reported lack of support from some minor sections of the community, both branches of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement made direct contributions to the war effort. The defence-based NRC served in various local defence roles as part of the navy, particularly as members of the Naval Auxiliary Patrol (NAP), while the community-based sea cadets assisted with the manufacture of ammunition. In addition to considering the importance of these direct contributions to the war effort, this chapter focuses on renewed attempts by leading community-based sea cadet organisations to elicit further navy support. The chapter concludes with an examination of how positive changes in the Naval Board’s view of the community-based sea cadets, with significant implications for future formal recognition, come about, despite further inappropriate use of naval uniforms, which again resulted in criminal charges.

On 26 April 1939, Robert Menzies had become Prime Minister, after the death of Joseph Lyons. On 3 September, Britain and France declared war on Germany as a consequence of the Nazi invasion of Poland two days earlier. Menzies responded immediately by declaring Australia to also be at war with Germany. Menzies sought to rally the nation but the loss of three of his cabinet ministers in an aircraft crash and his unpopular war time policies, such as petrol rationing, left his government, after an election of 21 September, dependent on the support of two independents, Arthur Coles and Alex Wilson. A year later these independents changed their allegiance and John Curtin took over as Prime

1 Letter, Forsythe to the Commissioner of Police, NSW, 15 January 1940, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/112. 2 ibid. 216

Minister of a Labor government.3 According to the dominant military theories of the era, air power was now challenging sea power, and the government-supported aircraft factory, established by a private syndicate in 1936, produced its first local product, a Wirraway training aircraft, in March 1939.4

At the beginning of the war, Australia sent airmen to Britain, warships to the northern hemisphere and an army to the eastern Mediterranean, but when, between December 1941 and January 1942, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, invaded the Malay peninsula, overran and bombed Darwin, the focus shifted to local defence.5 While British cargo and the protection provided by naval ships remained important, it was the newly arrived American forces that were seen as critical to the defence of Australia.6 The loss of HMAS Sydney and its crew off the coast of Western Australia in November 1941 had already brought the tragedy of war close to home and a midget submarine attack on Sydney Harbour, in June 1942, and the 14 May 1943 sinking of the hospital ship Centaur off the Australian east coast, emphasised the importance of naval defence.7 On mobilisation, in September 1939, 4800 naval reservists had been called up to boost the navy to a total strength of 10250 and small vessels had been requisitioned locally to act as minesweepers.8 This was an area, harbour defence, where the naval and sea cadet movement had the potential to assist the navy at a local level.

For the organisers of the community-based sea cadet branch, the period 1939-1945, perhaps surprisingly given the advent of World War II, remained focused on continuing their efforts at convincing the Australian Government and the Naval Board that they merited substantial financial support. As the members of the British Navy League focused on the war in Europe, the lead role in the quest for local naval recognition and support for community- based seas cadets was again assumed by the various branches of the Australian Navy League and Leonard Forsythe of the Sydney Training Depot. It had been 18 months since Forsythe

3 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, p. 182. 4 ibid, p. 181. 5 ibid, p. 184. 6 ibid, p. 184-185. 7 ibid, p. 187-188; Canberra Times, 5 June 1942, p 2. 8 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 148. 217 had applied for navy funding, but throughout 1938 he kept the depot in the defence spotlight by publicising its history and activities in defence oriented publications wherever the opportunity arose.9 With war imminent, on 7 June 1939, the Sydney Training Depot made another formal bid for support by approaching the Prime Minister, Menzies, for an annual subsidy in order to ensure that the depot’s activities could continue without being a ‘constant strain on the time and financial resources of the Hon Commanding Officer and Founder’ (Forsythe).10 Emphasising their citizenship training aims, the depot organisers invited Menzies to visit the establishment where the ‘new aim’ was to ‘remedy the evil effects of street-loafing’ and give boys practical knowledge, useful in time of peace and war, and educate them to ‘believe in the British Empire and the British Navy’.11 It was clear that the war was not going to deflect the more enthusiastic units of the community-based sea cadet branch from their ultimate goal of official navy recognition and support.

Contradicting the broader goals outlined by Forsythe’s supporters, the Naval Board Secretary, Macandie, advised Menzies, on 3 July 1939 that the training of boys conducted by Forsythe was for either naval service or the merchant navy. On both counts, Macandie maintained the official line, that the government had naval depots for training RAN personnel and, as it maintained no merchant navy, had no need to train officers or men for such careers. With regard to the invitation to visit the Sydney Training Depot, Macandie suggested that it would be much appreciated if Menzies, in preference, visited navy establishments in Sydney, including the RANR depot at Rushcutters Bay.12 The thrust of the arguments on both sides had not changed in the 18 months, since the last formal bid was refused, although this was more a personal bid by Forsythe’s followers than a submission representative of the wider community-based sea cadet branch.

9 ‘The Romance of Snapper Island, Sydney, Training Australia’s Embryo Seafarers’, Navy, Army, Air and Munitions Journal, vol. 7, no. 7, 14 July 1938, pp. 17-18; ‘“Sinbad”, The Romance of Snapper Island, Australia’s only voluntary sea training establishment’, Navy, Army, Air and Munitions Journal, vol. 7, no 11, , 13 November 1938, pp. 18-20. 10 Letter, Forsythe to Menzies, 7 June 1939, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/112. 11 ibid. 12Letter, Macandie to Menzies, 3 July 1939, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/112. 218

While Forsythe was intent on involving the navy formally in his unit’s activities, the New South Wales NLSCC concentrated on increasing its membership, maintaining a recreational focus and encouraging extensive boat racing and other activities among its various units, although some defence-related activities were included.13 Although a group of cadets experienced some ‘operational’ training by attending a ‘Voluntary Coastal Patrol Camp’ in November 1939, it was the adult organisers of the various NLSCC units who were quickly called up for full-time service in the navy, army and air force.14 This often resulted in their performing dual defence and community roles, as NLSCC staff tended to continue their volunteer work whenever possible. This duality highlighted the enduring difference between service in the RAN and NLSCC, as illustrated by the work of NLSCC Senior Training Officer, DJ Mort, who served as a Yeoman of Signals at the Flinders Naval Depot and used his dual role to appeal to the community-based sea cadets to aspire to naval training standards.15 In Victoria, fewer press reports of NLSCC activities appeared, but social events, involving as many as 150 cadets, were still regarded as newsworthy.16 This was also a time when newer independent units became more prominent, such as the Queensland Merchant Navy Sea Cadet Corps, which grew rapidly into a large community-based sea cadet organisation with hundreds of members.17 The growth of these new units, fuelled by wartime recruitment needs, added still more complexity to what was already a fragmented, diverse and uneven assortment of nautically-oriented youth groups in the eyes of the Naval Board. Although it would eventually be drawn into examining the credentials of many of these organisations, for the time being, the navy’s focus remained on those community-based units closest to its main centres of activity in Sydney and Melbourne.

Although refused funding in 1939, and not part of the defence force, Forsythe’s Sydney Training Depot remained active during the war in the training of 200 sea cadets, providing support facilities for Australian, British and American armed servicemen and women, and continuing as the main advocate for navy recognition of the community-based

13 The Navy League Journal, vol. 2, no. 11 (New Series), November 1939, pp. 8-10, 16; Argus, 16 December 1940, p. 16. 14 ibid., vol. 3, no. 1 (New Series), January 1940, pp. 8-11. 15 DJ Mort, ‘Flinders Naval Depot’, The Navy League Journal, vol. 3, no. 1 (New Series), January 1940, pp.12 - 13. 16 Argus, 24 May 1940, p. 7 & 16 December 1940, p. 16. 17 Courier Mail, 6 February 1940, p. 16. 219 sea cadet branch.18 In a further bid to Menzies, on 19 May 1940, this time for funding of a training ship, retired Rear-Admiral HJ Feakes recommended that the Sydney Training Depot should be expanded from a ‘one man show’ into an organisation controlled by a committee of management, representative of Australian shipping interests.19 Although Feakes was unsuccessful with this first attempt, he persisted and even broadened his goals for the Sydney Training Depot.20 In a direct submission to the Minister for the Navy, WM Hughes, on 5 December 1940, Feakes explained how the depot could assist the navy by training community-based sea cadets in a manner identical to the navy’s own defunct boys’ entry scheme conducted on board HMAS Tingira some 30 years before.21 To meet current war needs, Feakes suggested, the Sydney Training Depot was capable of immediate expansion and some 300 boys were already under training.22 Furthermore, another 300 boys had already been accepted into the navy from Forsythe’s unit, although no financial grants had been received. If British Admiralty practice had been in place, Feakes observed, the depot would have received a subsidy of £7000. On this basis, the Sydney Training Depot committee of management was seeking a capitation grant of up to 50 percent of the cost of training which, Feakes argued, had additional youth welfare benefits that compared favourably to existing youth employment schemes.23 The issue was decided on a navy-wide basis when Hughes advised Feakes, on 24 December 1940, that his proposal was not necessary as the needs of the navy were satisfied by recruits trained at the Flinders Naval Depot (in Victoria) and there was no justification for another training establishment in Sydney.24 In essence, the war had focused the navy on its primary need for full-time recruiting and adult training, where it had full control.25

18 Sydney Training Depot Snapper Island: Maritime Museum Catalogue 2002, Sydney Training Depot (Snapper Island), Drummoyne, 2002. 19 Letter, Feakes to Menzies, 19 May 1940, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/112. 20 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 10, NAA: B6121/1, 295B. 21 Letter, Feakes to Hughes, 5 December 1940, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/112. 22 ibid. It is typical of accounts of the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement that Feakes estimate of 300 is so different from the figure of 200 boys claimed by the depot’s official history and the 100 – 125 boys that rival unit organisers thought to be the more accurate figure. 23 ibid. 24 Letter, Hughes to Feakes, 24 December 1940, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/112. 25 ‘The Citizen Naval Forces’, Outline of Australian naval history, RAN Education Service, Canberra, 1962, pp. 2-3. During the war, part-time reserve training was suspended and the RANR became an integral component of the RAN. By the end of the war, the 2863 officers and 26, 956 sailors in the naval reserve represented 80% of the personnel serving in the navy. Conventional naval reserve training did not resume until January 1950. 220

In contrast to the community-based sea cadet branch, the defence-based NRC branch was an integral part of the navy’s war effort from the very beginning, alongside the full-time forces, although its members sometimes required special consideration because of their age. As an example, on 1 April 1941, the Naval Board Secretary, Macandie, sought an opinion from the Attorney General regarding the legal necessity for the consent of a parent or guardian in the case of a minor seeking entry to the RANR.26 The Attorney General advised the navy that, under Regulation 29 of the RANR Regulations, candidates for enrolment in the RANR had to be aged between 18 and 40 years of age, except in time of war or emergency when any person of any age could be engaged, and there were no restrictions with regard to the age of entry for the RANVR.27 At the other end of the cadet age spectrum, the case of a 21 year old cadet mobilised in the Naval Auxiliary Patrol (NAP), a part of the RANVR engaged in local patrol duties, illustrates how the term cadet was applied widely in many areas of the navy as late as 1943.28 At this time, by convention, NRC members could volunteer for active service from the age of 16, but some younger cadets ‘snuck through’. As an example, on 23 December 1943, the squadron skipper of the New South Wales NAP Squadron, advised the Staff Officer (Reserves) in Sydney that a cadet, FF Davis, whose date of birth had been inadvertently incorrectly entered in the records, was not eligible for membership as an attested volunteer as he would not attain the age of 16 years until August 1944 and, accordingly, steps were being taken to effect his discharge.29 Thus, NRC members were serving, locally, during World War II from the age of 16 years, and younger occasionally, as part of a force of over 700 strong, mostly volunteer, NAP members, and reinforcing their identity as members of the RANR.30

Although the community-based sea cadets were not directly involved in the war effort as members of the navy, like their NRC counterparts, it was not from want of effort. On 3 January 1941, for example, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that 28 Brisbane boys from

26 Letter, Macandie to Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department, 1 April 1941, NAA A472, W3079. 27 Attorney General’ Department, Opinion, No 28 of 1941, Entry of Minors to the RANR Forces, 14 May, 1941, NAA A472, W3079. 28 X-ray treatment of Naval Auxiliary Patrol Cadet Hedley W Alfred Harris H/P130, NAA MP150/1, 554/201/214,. 29 Minute, Squadron Skipper of the Naval Auxiliary Patrol, NSW, to Staff Officer (Reserves), 23 December 1943, NAA MP150/1 554/201/390. 30 HM Cooper, A naval history of South Australia and other historical notes, Hassell Press, Adelaide, 1950, p. 118. 221 the Brisbane Merchant Navy Training Sea Cadet Corps were training for the merchant navy at the Sydney Training Depot. Training was reported as being far removed from a lecture- room atmosphere, with instruction on a fully equipped signalling bridge, plus musketry, boat work and signalling. After training, the boys travelled to the Newcastle steelworks workshops and viewed a seaplane being constructed by the Sydney Training Depot sea cadets as part of their training activities.31 Thus, for some community-based sea cadets at least, the focus had become much more practical and relevant to both the merchant service and, potentially, the needs of the RAN.32

Expansionary efforts by some community-based sea cadet organisations to assist with war time recruitment presented problems for the navy in as much as it was forced once again to police the desire by organisers to wear naval uniforms, without joining the RAN or RANR. On 28 March 1941, for example, JW Ward decided to rejuvenate his previously considered, and unsuccessful, merchant navy and sea cadet training scheme.33 Ward’s newly styled Captain Cook Training Depot aimed, initially, to involve boys serving apprenticeships and he sought navy comment so that there would not be a ‘clash with regulations’.34 Expressing signs of exasperation at this local proposal, on 21 April 1941, Victorian DNO, Commander JC McFarlane, reported to the Naval Board Secretary, Macandie, on ‘the activities of one J.W. Ward who is apparently determined to establish some kind of quasi-Naval Training establishment’.35 Continuing this theme, McFarlane observed that the members of the establishment would wear uniform that could be considered ‘a colourful imitation’ of a naval uniform under the National Security Regulations’.36 Furthermore, McFarlane observed, Ward signed himself ‘S.C. Lieutenant’ which was believed to be Sea Cadet Lieutenant, but that there was some doubt as to his still being entitled to claim any connection with the NLSCC.37 McFarlane recommended to the Naval Board that no further units of this type should be encouraged, as the NLSCC and sea scouts adequately fulfilled the purposes of such

31 Sydney Morning Herald, 3 January 1941, p. 3. 32 Sydney Training Depot Air Unit, Snapper Island, 1938, NAA SP339/1, 10/2/54. 33 Letter, Ward to Macandie, 28 March 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/101. 34 ibid. 35 Letter, McFarlane to Macandie, 21 April 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/101. 36 ibid. 37 ibid. 222 organisations.38 On 28 April 1941, the Naval Board advised Ward that in view of the war situation, and as urgent steps were being taken to enlist adults in the fighting services, the time was not opportune for the organisation he described and, furthermore, approval could not be given for members to wear the naval uniform or ‘any colourful imitation thereof’.39

Ward, not surprisingly, further tested the navy’s stance, and its patience, with respect to the organisation and control of the activities of new community-based sea cadet units, when he advised Macandie that the Naval Board had misunderstood his scheme and how it would be conducted.40 Notwithstanding this situation, he did not intend to re-open the idea but, instead, he now intended to conduct a sea cadet scheme meeting for two hours each week at the Hawthorn Rowing Club, where he already had six divisional officers and 18 cadets on the roll, with eight in uniforms that adhered to the Naval Board’s direction.41 Despite Ward’s assurances, Macandie advised him again that the wearing of naval uniform or 'any colourable imitation thereof’ by persons not members of the naval forces could not be approved.42 This independent and sustained effort by Ward to start his own scheme, in competition with the Navy League, of which he was a (past) member, gives a further insight into the continuing and almost uncontrollable nature of the community-based branch of the naval and sea cadet movement. For its part, the navy had a war to fight but could not just ignore these unpredictable and persistent efforts to launch schemes that might impact on its reputation at home. From a longer-term point of view, it is significant that this exchange demonstrates how the navy had come to the view that all such community-based schemes were at least similar, if not identical, and, furthermore, that the existing structures provided by the Navy League and the sea scouts could cater sufficiently to any existing need for nautically-based citizenship training.

At this point, it is important to highlight that, in contrast to problems encountered with more grand schemes, such as the Captain Cook Training Depot, the navy was able to work

38 ibid. 39 Letter, Macandie to Ward, 28 April 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/101. 40 Letter, Ward to Macandie, 15 May 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/101. 41 ibid. 42 Letter, Macandie to Ward, 20 May 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/101. 223 effectively, and simply, with various sea scout and sea rangers troops, which sought only token support or advice. In particular, it is significant that these minor requests for support from these distinctly non-navy groups, when they were sent, were usually about protocol, something that cost the navy very little other than administrative time. As an example, on 23 September 1941, Miss Eleanor Pearson, Guider-in-Charge, Sea Ranger Crew, Mosman, sought permission to use the name Waterhen for her new crew, which had been approved by Girl Guide headquarters.43 Pearson advised that it was usual to apply to either the British Admiralty, in the case of His Majesty’s Ships, or the shipping company in the case of the merchant navy. In this way, she advised, ‘Sea Ranger Crews are allowed the privilege of adopting the name of well-known ships’ and the ‘underlying idea is that the Sea Rangers can choose a ship whose history and traditions they will be proud to carry on, and whose honour they will delight to maintain’.44 Although a simple request, it went before the Naval Board, which granted permission on 16 October 1941.45

A similar case, on 2 January 1945, involving a Miss J Allen, Secretary, 2nd Kempsey Rangers, is also instructive as it shows not only how such relationships could benefit the navy, but also how they could sometimes involve sensitive information about ships and their movements. Allen sought permission to title her unit the Warrego crew.46 She explained that, if a crew of sea rangers were permitted to call themselves after a navy unit, they then more or less adopted the ship and it was the practice of the sea ranger crew to forward comfort packages and write to members of the crew. In this regard, she sought advice on how to contact the Commanding Officer of HMAS Warrego if permission were granted.47 On 1 February 1945, the unit’s request was approved by the Naval Board and the Director of Naval Intelligence was directed to supervise the ensuing process and ensure secure cadet communication with the ship.48 By July 1950, eight such requests had been approved by the Naval Board.49 The consideration of these more routine requests, with no real financial

43 Memorandum, Commodore-in-Charge, Sydney, to Naval Board Secretary, 23 September 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/175. 44 ibid. 45Memorandum, Naval Board Secretary to the Commodore-in-Charge, Sydney, 16 October 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/175. 46Letter, Allen to the Secretary of the Department of the Navy, 2 January 1945, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/131. 47 ibid. 48 Letter, Secretary of the Department of the Navy to Allen, 1 February 1945, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/131. 49 Letter, Hawkins to Wyatt, 31 July 1950, NAA 151/1, 427/201/203. 224 implications, would have added to the broader perspective of the Naval Board in considering more controversial proposals. In addition, such examples further confirm the diverse nature of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement and, at a much broader level, raise the question of the navy perhaps having been better served by encouraging a broader base of community-based nautical groups that aspired to support the navy, but not emulate it. A navy perspective on the potential benefit of this broader view of the value of the community-based sea cadet branch is provided by the public comments of Rear-Admiral in Charge, New South Wales, HA Showers, in acknowledging the ‘great and lasting benefit’ of the part played by the Sea Rangers and its NLSCC equivalent, the Girls’ Nautical Training Corps in fostering a love of the sea.50 Whether the RAN would have been better served directing the resources it expended on the community-based sea cadet branch towards developing a more general community appreciation of the sea, ships and the navy will never be known, but it remains an interesting question.

As the war progressed and a large proportion of fit, fighting-age men in Australia were enlisting in the adult forces, more past members of the community-based sea cadets were joining the navy and this provided the perfect platform for the renewal of the Navy League campaign for official recognition. On this occasion, on 27 November 1941, it was the New South Wales Navy League, not Leonard Forsythe, that requested a subsidy from the Minister for Navy, NJO Makin.51 The League pointed out that it had been providing training facilities at its own expense and that the value of this support of the navy was shown by the enlistment of nearly every physically fit Navy League sea cadet in New South Wales and Victoria of the right age into the training depots of the RAN. In this regard, the Navy League declared, 300 cadets had joined the navy since the outbreak of the war and there were now 600 more cadets training at Navy League depots in New South Wales and Victoria. For this reason, it was suggested, that the NLSCC was a ‘feeder’ to the navy and merchant navy.52 In view of this obviously good work and the precedents set in England, , New

50 Souvenir Programme of the Royal Australian Naval Display HMA Dockyard Sydney, 27 October 1951, Navy League of Australia, Sydney, 1951, p.13. 51 Letter, NSW Navy League to Makin, 27 November 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 52 ibid. 225

Zealand and Canada, the league was seeking financial aid in the sum of £1000 each for the Navy League in both New South Wales and Victoria.53

On this occasion, on 9 December 1941, Makin, agreed to consult the Naval Board on the question of a subsidy for training facilities for NLSCC members between 10 and 17 years of age.54 While it was possible that war time conditions had opened the way for the community-based sea cadets to press their claims, press reports in the month prior to the Navy League’s submission indicated that the navy already had a good flow of general recruits and their real need was for specialists, like fitters.55 Moreover, the community-based sea cadets were not the only group contributing to this recruiting success, with the surf live saving movement providing five surf champions to just one recruiting intake of forty sailors in Brisbane.56 Furthermore, in Melbourne, navy recruits from the Australian Football League were given special publicity on game day when their new duties allowed them to play.57 Many organisations could, it seems, make claims about their contribution to the navy recruiting effort. In addition, in a direct reference to comments by the Navy League President, Captain SA Pidgeon, that the navy was having difficulty obtaining recruits, the Minister for Defence, Thorby, was reported as specifically pointing out that more applications were being received for enlistment in the navy than were needed,58 Thus, although claiming a special place in the navy recruiting process, the community-based sea cadet branch was just one of many volunteer organisations supporting the navy, with the RAN clearly aware of the benefit of this widespread support.

In Sydney and Melbourne, war time conditions precipitated a range of unusual initiatives by various prominent community-based sea cadet groups. While the Navy League was still seeking a cash subsidy, organisers at the Sydney Training Depot made a concerted effort to join the navy to serve in positions directly related to their sea cadet duties. For example, on 11 December 1941, the ‘Executive Committee of Control’ of Sydney Training

53 ibid. 54 Letter, Makin to Chairman, The Navy League, 9 December 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 55 Sydney Morning Herald, 4 September 1941, p. 5. 56 Courier Mail, Brisbane, 14 October 1941, p. 4. 57 Argus, Melbourne, 18 July 1941, p. 8. 58 Sunday Mail, 1 May 1938, p. 5. 226

Depot requested the commissioning into the navy of the harbour service tender Captain Phillips, RANVR commissions for Forsythe and three junior officers, plus the authority to call up for naval duty selected personnel, not exceeding one hundred, ‘as a preparatory measure’.59 Both the Sydney Training Depot and the Captain Phillips were to be prepared, under this latest submission, as anti-air defence units and Rear Admiral Feakes was to be appointed as ‘Captain Temporary’ for anti-air defence duties in Port Jackson.60 Such proposals by ex-naval men, while normally more limited in their scope, were not unusual, but the Naval Board generally regarded them as an added burden for navy administrative and instruction staff, who were preparing personnel for active service.61

As this rather ambitious role was being proposed for the Sydney Training Depot and its personnel, an immediate and very practical contribution to the war effort was being made by the Victorian NLSCC. On 8 August 1941, the Naval Board approved that sufficient cordage and spun yarn to make 200 projectile grummets (electrical insulation rings) would be issued without financial adjustment to the Victorian Navy League.62 It was intended that the grummets would be made by the NLSCC as an instructional activity but, at the same time, it would be saving departmental labour. If the first batch proved satisfactory, consideration would be given to extending the arrangement.63 By 10 November, the NLSCC at Port Melbourne had manufactured 200 grummets.64 The grummets were duly delivered and, although the Naval Board was keen to continue the arrangement, commenting that the cadets could ‘keep this going as long as they wish’, the Navy League advised they had moved to smaller premises and did not consider they would be able to manufacture any further grummets.65 Although of limited defence value, in the full context of naval capability in World War II, this example still illustrates the conflicting commitments, in providing an interesting citizenship experience and being seen to assist the navy, of the community-based sea cadet branch, plus the impossibility of the navy relying on such involvement.

59 RAN Message (this document is torn and missing parts of the page including the originator), 12 December 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/67. 60 ibid. 61 Minute, Naval Board Secretary to DNRM, 14 August 1940, NAA MP151/1, 629/201/152. 62 Referred to here as a grummet, but also referred to as a grommet. 63 Minute, Naval Secretary to Commodore-in-Charge, Sydney, 8 August 1941, NAA MP151/1, 408/204/1820. 64 Minute, Director of Ordnance Torpedoes and Mines to First Naval Member, 10 November 1941, NAA MP151/1, 408/204/1820. 65 File note, Manufacture of grummets by Navy League, 1 October 1943, NAA MP151/1, 408/204/1820. 227

Nevertheless, no matter how minor the work involved and how uncertain their involvement, the community-based sea cadets had made a contribution to the war effort as unpaid defence volunteers.

As enduring themes, the organisation, control, personnel and funding of the community-based sea cadet groups were central to Naval Board’s consideration of official recognition proposals during the war, but it was more dramatic episodes, unrelated to such wider policy considerations, that had the potential to most influence these deliberations. In one such case during the war, a seemingly innocuous clash between the ubiquitous Forsythe and one Alan Ward-Hunt caused the Naval Board significant concern - more so because it came to involve the Minister for the Navy, WM Hughes. On 9 August 1941, Forsythe wrote to Hughes to complain that members of the ‘Auxiliary Force Patrol Squadron, Pendennis’, a rival community-based sea cadet unit to Forsythe’s and organised by a ‘Commander’ Alan Ward-Hunt, had accosted members of Forsythe’s Sydney Training Depot to check their right to wear naval uniform.66 Furthermore, at a subsequent meeting between the two parties to discuss this issue, Ward-Hunt had reportedly stated that he was able to gain direct entry to the navy for his members through the support of the minister.67 Hughes expressed his surprise, on 14 August 1941, that ‘Commander A.J. Ward-Hunt’ would have acted as had been described and advised Forsythe that he would discuss the matter with the Naval Board Secretary, Macandie.68 Subsequently, Forsythe’s letter was forwarded to Macandie who, at the direction of the Naval Board, sent it to the Commodore-in-Charge, Sydney, GC Muirhead-Gould for such action as he considered necessary. Gould, however, with no formal control over either of the two units involved, had to intervene on whatever basis was found appropriate in the circumstances, and nothing, as yet, had occurred that was in breach of defence or navy Regulations. In the meantime, on 20 August 1941, Hughes sent a letter of appreciation, to ‘AJ Ward-Hunt Esq’ for volunteering the services of the members of the Australian Fleet Patrol Squadron Pendennis to serve in the NAP. 69 Furthermore, Hughes expressed his appreciation at the news that many members of Pendennis had volunteered for entry to the RANR and advised Ward-Hunt to keep in touch with his local recruiting officer

66 Letter, Forsythe to Hughes, 9 August 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/123. 67 ibid. 68 Letter, Hughes, to Forsythe, 14 August 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/123. 69 Letter, Hughes to Ward-Hunt, 20 August 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/123. 228 so that he could be advised as to ‘the best means to afford assistance to the Naval Auxiliary Patrol’.70 Thus, Hughes was encouraging Ward-Hunt to work with the navy, while Gould was investigating a complaint against him at the direction of the Naval Board, although this appeared to be little more than inter-unit rivalry.

If the Ward-Hunt matter had involved no more than idle boasting and had ended there, the navy may have moved on from yet another community-based sea cadet internal squabble with its views on official recognition for this branch of the wider naval and sea cadet movement relatively unchanged. As it transpired, on 7 January 1942, the Sydney Morning Herald reported the sentencing of one Alan Ian Ward-Hunt, 40, engineer, to 12 months imprisonment on four charges of having worn a naval uniform without lawful authority. It was reported that Ward-Hunt had obtained, from the New South Wales Department of Education, the use of the Milson’s Point Public School at night, where he trained boys for the navy and was paid a weekly fee by them. Also, when the boys obtained work, he suggested part of their wages should be given through him to the ‘Navy Widows’ Institute’, which did not exist. In addition, as part of his activities, Ward-Hunt was reported to have induced a 16 year old boy to pose as a midshipman from the Mediterranean fleet and say that he had been in the evacuation of Crete. The boy got work with a well known engineering firm at £7 per week and Ward-Hunt suggested that the boy pay him £2 to be passed on to the work foreman; money that Ward-Hunt kept. As part of the court proceedings, it was revealed that Ward-Hunt’s criminal record went back to 1924 and included sentences for false pretences and a false declaration.71 In this way, a self-appointed community-based sea cadet officer had simultaneously done good enough work to earn encouragement from Makin and been imprisoned for abusing his position, although the actual conviction was for misuse of a naval uniform.

Prior to the publication of the news of Ward-Hunt’s imprisonment, Gould, who had been considering how he could act on the Naval Board’s direction, recommended, on 6 January 1942, that Regulations in relation to sea cadet activities, similar to those issued by

70 ibid. 71 Sydney Morning Herald, 7 January 1942, p. 15. 229 the British Admiralty, should be introduced in Australia. 72 In this way, he suggested, some control could be exercised over community-based sea cadet organisations. In particular, he suggested, the introduction of such Regulations would prohibit the wearing of uniforms, even if only similar to naval uniforms, without the permission of a naval authority such as the Naval Board. In support of his recommendations to the Naval Board, Gould reported that the magistrate in the Ward-Hunt case had ruled that, provided that a naval uniform was altered in some way, and the wearer had the authority of his commanding officer (constituting a lawful authority within the meaning of the National Security Regulations) no offence had been committed.73 Thus, as the law stood in terms of the magistrate’s decision, Gould pointed out, any person could start an organisation and give authority for its members to wear a uniform. Furthermore, this uniform could be so similar to a naval uniform that the only difference would be that, instead of wearing a naval cap ribbon, they could wear a cap ribbon bearing the name or initials of the organisation, sometimes arranged deliberately in such a way as to suggest that the wearer has some real connection with the RAN.74

In making his recommendations for regulations to be adopted to help to control community-based sea cadet organisations, Gould made it clear that the aim was not to restrict the standing of these organisations overall, but rather enhance the status of those whose genuine object was to give boys ‘useful naval training and physical training’.75 In this regard, he observed, the NLSCC and the Sydney Training Depot were examples of organisations founded and controlled by reputable persons and organisations. According to Gould, the introduction of such regulations would give added momentum to such approved organisations, possibly attract a better class of member, prevent the naval uniform being worn by ‘persons ill-fitted for the wearing of it’ and prevent the formation of organisations whose projected objects and ideals were not in accordance with the spirit of the navy.76 Thus, once again, a local naval authority was supporting the larger of the community-based sea cadet organisations in their apparently never-ending, and so far fruitless, quest to become more

72 Minute, Gould to Naval board, 6 January 1942, NAA MP151/1 22/201/67. 73 ibid. 74 ibid. 75 ibid. 76 ibid. 230 closely involved with the navy and, thereby, attain a position of privilege in relation to organising and controlling the civilian branch of the movement.

Notwithstanding the negative publicity surrounding the Ward-Hunt conviction, Gould’s recommendation to adopt similar regulations to those governing the sea cadet corps in the United Kingdom was not accepted. Instead, the Naval Board pointed out that there were various measures under existing legislation to deal with such transgressions.77 During these deliberations it was observed that adopting the United Kingdom regulations would have necessitated the formation of central associations and control by the naval authorities, particularly as regards the appointment of cadet unit officers, and it was not desired at this stage to assume this level of control in Australia.78 In contrast to Gould’s position, the Naval Board had made it clear once again that it was not prepared to accept any responsibility for the community-based sea cadet branch. Nevertheless, the behaviour of Ward-Hunt’s wayward unit resulted in a clear delineation between the notion of ‘approved’ reputable units of the community-based sea cadets, and who they were, and units conducted by unsuitable personnel.

With the Ward-Hunt matter fresh in their minds, the Naval Board met on 23 April 1942 to discuss the Navy League’s request for a subsidy.79 Perhaps unsurprisingly, it decided, yet again, to advise the minister it could not see its way to recommending that any grant be made to the Navy League.80 Despite an apparently routine and speedy decision, confirming previous policy, however, there was considerable discussion with implications for the future of the community-based sea cadet branch. On this occasion, Macandie expressed the view that the Naval Board should actually consider supporting the Navy League and give the matter further consideration as the navy’s previous inability to fund the Navy League due to limited funding for the RANR had been the ‘result of a parsimonious Defence Policy and

77 Letter, Secretary, Department of Defence Co-ordination, to Naval Secretary, 22 September, 1941, NAA MP151/1, 434/201/3585. Gould was also investigating the application of the National Security (General) Regulations to the similarity between uniforms of various unofficially women’s auxiliaries and those of the Women’s Royal Australian Naval Service. 78 Minute, Macandie to Gould, 28 April 1942, NAA MP151/1 22/201/67. 79 Letter, President , NSW Navy League to Makin, 27 November 1941, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 80 Extracts, Naval Board Minute No. 60, 23 April 1942, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 231 is of course no longer true’.81 In Macandie’s view, previous observations that few NLSCC members joined the navy or RANR had been answered by the statement in the Navy League’s letter that 300 NLSCC members had joined the RAN or RANR since the outbreak of the war. For this reason, he considered this request for a subsidy should not be turned down on this basis, as it had been in the past. 82

At this point, Naval Board discussion on recognition of the community-based sea cadet branch took a significant turn. The new First Naval Member, Vice-Admiral Sir GCC Royle, made the comment that ‘there are other bodies (e.g. Sea Scouts) who might like to come in on this. Why not subsidise all? Suggest Bd consideration’.83 On this occasion, it seemed, despite its formal resolution, that the Naval Board was divided. Notwithstanding this division of opinion, a draft reply was prepared for the minister, advising the Navy League that no assistance could be provided. The principal reason for refusal on this occasion was to be that approval of a subsidy for the NLSCC would open up requests from bodies of a similar nature, outside the control of the League, and that no provision had been made for grants of that nature. Ultimately, this draft was not used and, on 1 May 1942, Macandie commented that the ‘Minister is apparently not happy about this’ and suggested that it was desirable to collect some statistics, if possible, on numbers enrolled at the NLSCC, the breakaway body (the Sydney Training Depot) and the sea scouts. In a, presumably, tongue in cheek comment, Macandie suggested that data collection need not be restricted to New South Wales and Victoria and could be extended to the minister’s home town in South Australia’.84 Hence, as part of an evolving analysis of the community-based sea cadets’ relationship to the navy, brought on by dramatic events leading to the gaoling of a community-based sea cadet organiser, the Naval Board had initially decided to retain its long- standing policy on non-interference. Both Royle and Macandie, however, appeared to favour a new and more benevolent approach. Furthermore, Makin was not in agreement, thus leaving the Naval Board with little option but to investigate further and reconsider its position. This was the first sign that the Naval Board might alter its stance on its strictly limited support of the community-based sea cadet branch.

81 ibid. 82 ibid. 83 ibid. 84 ibid. 232

While the Navy League was pressing its claims for a subsidy, members of the defence-based NRC continued to serve, legally, in the Naval Auxiliary Patrol (NAP). On voluntary enlistment in the NAP, cadets were subject to mobilisation, if required, as Ordinary Seamen.85 While, the age of entry for cadets of the NAP was originally 16 - 20 years, there was an understanding that cadets would not be mobilised until the age of 18 years.86 Nevertheless, mobilisation of cadets under the age of 18 occurred and this created problems in relation to their conditions of service, particularly pay.87 In addition, and further complicating such lapses, cadets under 18 enrolled in the Fremantle district of Western Australia, for example, were appointed as Ordinary Seamen Second-Class in the NAP, while all other defence-based NRC were appointed as Ordinary Seamen.88 Although these disparities involved only 38 cadets, nationally, and the majority had turned 18 by the time the problem was discovered, all naval depots were instructed, on 15 January 1943, that cadets under the age of 18 years were to be credited with pay of Ordinary Seaman 2nd Class and financial recovery of overpayments was to be effected when necessary. In Sydney and Port Melbourne, however, the Naval Officers in Charge requested reconsideration of this instruction regarding financial recovery of overpayments on the grounds that such an action would constitute a breach of faith and would be contrary to existing Regulations. The amount involved, was approximately £1000, inclusive of deferred pay, and the navy eventually accepted liability for the over payments. From this point, the Naval Volunteer Reserve Regulations were amended immediately to limit eligibility for advancement from Cadet (Ordinary Seaman) to Seaman (Able Seaman) to cadets who had attained the age of 18 years.89 Thus, from a navy perspective, while there were benefits to the NRC being within the defence force, and fully organised and controlled by the navy, there were costs associated that could not be avoided in the same manner as requests for grants from the Navy League or other community-based sea cadet organisations. The NRC had entitlements that had to be

85 Navy Office Letter (NOL), 3 June 1942, NAA MP151/1, 556/226/1786. The NOL is an official form of instructional correspondence. 86Minute, Naval Officer-in-Charge, Sydney, to the Naval Board Secretary, 9 February 1943, NAA MP151/1, 556/226/1786. 87 ibid. 88Minute, Director of Naval Accounts to the Finance Member and Second Naval Member, 14 July 1943, NAA MP151/1, 556/226/1786. 89 ibid. 233 met, unlike their community-based grummet making counterparts who had volunteered their labour.90

After some years of inactivity, the Navy League’s quest for recognition was resumed in early 1943, some 12 months after yet another NLSCC officer, Sea Cadet Lieutenant Frederick Joseph Mason, of Brighton, Victoria, was convicted of having falsely pretended to be a naval surgeon.91 This incident, however, does not appear to have been influential in the Naval Board’s deliberations or altered its view that the Navy League was the best available candidate for coordinating the community-based sea cadets. Hence, at an initial meeting, on 14 January 1943, with First Naval Member, Admiral Sir , the President of the Victorian Navy League, Captain S.A. Pidgeon, was able to request that the Naval Board should give some recognition and assistance to the NLSCC, although financial help was not needed.92 The League’s main need, Pidgeon observed, was for the navy to take a direct interest in the sea cadets by arranging for a representative to visit drill halls, advising on training and helping the Navy League find instructors, such as suitable invalided navy personnel. In addition, it was requested that preference be given to NLSCC members in joining the navy, plus further assistance in obtaining uniforms, especially caps and collars, and the loan of instructional gear for cadets.

Consistent with his earlier comments at the Naval Board meeting of April 1942, Royle was in favour of encouraging the NLSCC as much as possible and he proposed a number of initiatives in support of its activities, including that the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Port Melbourne, would be directed to detail a suitable officer to visit various NLSCC drill halls.93 This officer would give advice on the instruction that should be given and further visits would be made at intervals of not more than three months. In addition, when adult navy personnel, suitable as instructors, were invalided out of service, arrangements would be made for the Navy League to be informed, so that they could get in touch with these potential

90 File note, Manufacture of grummets by Navy League, 1 October 1943, NAA MP151/1, 408/204/1820. 91 Argus, 21 November 1941, p. 9. 92 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 12-13, NAA: B6121/1, 295B. 93 Extracts, Naval Board Minute No. 60, 23 April 1942, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 234 instructors. Outright preference for NLSCC members to join the RAN could not be granted, although the Director of Recruiting would ensure that, all things being equal, an NLSCC member would be specially considered. In addition, Royle proposed that the navy would contact the Navy League in relation to the sale of spare items of clothing and the loan of equipment. Although it was not discussed at this particular meeting, Royle considered that a Navy League proposal that community-sea cadets should train for a week at the full-time recruit training centre at the Flinders Naval Depot was not practicable. 94

This was an important development in the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement. After some forty years of vigorous resistance to attempts by the community-based sea cadets to get the navy involved in its organisation, control, personnel management and funding, the First Naval Member, Royle, had independently begun a process whereby the navy would contribute, to some degree, in all of these areas. Although he did not state his reasons for taking a new approach in his discussions with the Navy League, internal navy correspondence reveals that Royle was influenced by events in England, where the British Admiralty had taken over the NLSCC entirely.95 Royle had been a Sea Lord in the RN, from 1939 to 1941, before being appointed First Member of the Australian Naval Board, in March 1941, and would have had first-hand knowledge of the changes made by the British Admiralty in its relationships with the Navy League.96

In England, the NLSCC was formed in 1899 under the auspices of the Navy League, but only assumed its formal title in 1919 when first granted recognition by the British Admiralty.97 The level of official support provided by the RN varied considerably over the next two decades, but the relationship remained positive and the NLSCC had grown to a membership of almost ten thousand cadets in one hundred units by late 1939 when war broke out.98 The British Admiralty had declared itself well aware of the ‘immense potentialities of

94 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 12-13, NAA: B6121/1, 295B. 95 JGP Vivian, ‘Sea cadets and seamen, the Admiral Commanding Reserves explains them’, The Navy League Journal, vol. 6, no. 8 (New Series), p. 4. 96 Sydney Morning Herald, 8 January 1943, p. 4. 97 JET Harper, ‘The Navy League Sea Cadet Corps’, The Navy League Journal, vol. 6, no.3 (New Series), p. 3 98 ibid., p. 14. 235 this volunteer pre-entry naval training’ and took over the general administration of the NLSCC early in the war and ‘by means of appeals to civic authorities to support the organisation’ had expanded the strength of the Corps to about 42,000 cadets in some 440 units distributed throughout the British Isles by 1945.99 In addition, in 1941, the British Marine Society and the Navy League combined to meet the need to provide induction training for 3,435 new entrants to the RN.100 As a result of this takeover in Britain, navy liaison officers had been appointed to cadet units and a range of other changes were considered. These changes included preference for NLSCC members for vacancies in the RN, the appointment of naval officers as instructors, parties of cadets undertaking training at RN depots and the use of equipment on loan for instructional purposes.101 Moreover, the RN had been, in general, an enthusiastic participant in this process.102 In Australia, the details of these changes had been reported in detail by the Navy League.103

On 22 January 1943, the Naval Board approved Royle’s recommendations that the NLSCC be encouraged and assisted and that suitable publicity of the decision should be arranged. When the Navy League was advised, on 3 February 1943, that the navy had agreed to exercise some control over the community-based sea cadets, it recognised the watershed for what it was. 104 The issue of a central single controlling organisation still needed to be resolved and at his first meeting with Royle, Pidgeon had indicated that he was speaking for the NLSCC in Victoria and New South Wales, but not for the Sydney Training Depot. Royle, therefore, proposed that the navy should go ahead with assisting the Victorian NLSCC, but get the views regarding Sydney from the naval officer-in-charge of that area, Rear Admiral GC Muirhead-Gould. Royle made it clear, in this regard, that the navy could not deal with two separate sea cadet organisations and any arrangement for the Sydney Training Depot sea cadets would be conditional upon their re-absorption by the Navy League organisation.

99 ‘The Sea Cadet Corps’, Naval Review, vol. 36, no. 2, pp.177-179. 100 R Woodman, … of daring temper 250 years of the Marine Society, Marine Society (Seafarers’ Libraries), London, 2006, p. 96. 101 ‘The Sea Cadet Corps’, Naval Review, vol. 36, no. 2, pp.177-179. 102 JET Harper, ‘The Navy League Sea Cadet Corps’, The Navy League Journal, vol. 6, no.3 (New Series), March 1943, p. 14. 103 The Navy League Journal, vol. 5, no. 6 (New Series), June 1942, p. 10. 104 Letter, Macandie to Pidgeon, 3 February 1943, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 236

Subsequently, on 13 February 1943, Gould advised Royle, that he had conducted long interviews with both Captain Beale of the NLSCC, New South Wales and Mr (now Lieutenant in the AIF) Forsythe of the Sydney Training Depot.105 The cleavage between the two organisations was as wide as ever, he reported, and he could see no prospect of bridging the gap. For this part though, Gould did not anticipate any difficulty if the Naval Board decided to recognise both organisations, as they were performing quite different functions and could continue to do so quite happily along their present lines. Comparing the two, Gould pointed out that the NLSCC did not attempt any sort of sea training, while the Sydney Training Depot set minimum physical qualifications, believed in and practiced sea training as much as possible, and concentrated on boat work and signalling. Furthermore, the NLSCC now had only three depots with a total of about 200 boys, where a few years ago there were 1000, and he was not greatly impressed by their activities, particularly compared to the league in Victoria, which was a very different and much more alive affair. ‘Forsythe's lot’, on the other hand, Gould described as ‘very good indeed’ and, while ‘Forsythe personally was a cantankerous individual, he was ‘very active in mind and body’ and had explained that he could not stand the half hearted efforts of the Navy League and their fear of responsibility, and had also admitted that he had quarrelled with them over matters of policy.106

Regarding support for Forsythe and the Navy League in New South Wales as two separate organisations not being an option favoured by the Naval Board, Gould advised Royle that he felt sure that in England there was a precedent for recognising more than one sea cadet movement and that his recollection was that there were at least a dozen different organisations which were affiliated with the RN. Furthermore, he had no doubt that he would be able to drive both the NLSCC and the Sydney Training Depot in tandem if both were officially recognised. Elaborating on his view of Forsythe, he commented that Royle’s predecessor as First Naval Member did not like Forsythe, but that Gould felt that he was ‘a good hand’ who had done a very great deal for the navy and that the signal boatswain in the Australia was one of ‘Forsythe’s boys’.107 Gould’s arguments swayed Royle and, on 15 February 1943, he reversed his previous position with the comment that ‘I should like the NB

105 Letter, Gould to Royle, 13 February, 1943, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 106 ibid. 107 ibid. 237 to recognise both organisations. They are doing good work’.108 Thus, despite a long standing policy of only agreeing to provide support to the community-based sea cadets through a single central body, the Naval Board was being encouraged, by one of its most senior officers, to recognise at least three, and possibly more if the British precedent was followed. Forsythe’s commitment to the war effort, as a member of the AIF, and the precedent set by the British Admiralty in recognising the NLSCC in the United Kingdom would have been influential, but Gould’s remarks and Royle’s acquiescence provide evidence of the significant influence of senior naval administrators with respect to the course the recognition process took on this occasion.

With Royle having decided that some form of official recognition would be approved for the Sydney Training Depot, as well as the NLSCC in New South Wales and Victoria, on 6 May 1943 Macandie requested a formal recommendation from Gould in relation to Forsythe’s unit.109 Accordingly, on 11 May 1943, Gould formally recommended that facilities approved for the Navy League sea cadet movement should be granted to the Sydney Training Depot, adding that the depot was a good source of recruits for the navy. Furthermore, he advised, that subject to Naval Board approval and the wishes of the Sydney Training Depot, he would be glad to arrange for the provision of instructors and the loan of stores in a similar manner to that provided to the Navy League.110 Macandie endorsed Gould’s suggestions and, on 8 June 1943, observed that the Sydney Training Depot might be more worthy of encouragement than the Navy League, if a preference were to be exercised.111 Thus, on 17 June 1943, the Naval Board approved that the Sydney Training Depot should receive similar facilities to those provided to the Navy League.112

These decisions by the Naval Board were significant in themselves, but had wider implications because there was no approach to the minister and the only publicity given to the

108 Ibid. 109 Minute, Macandie to Gould, 6 May 1943, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 110 Minute, Gould to Macandie, 11 May 1943, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 111Minute, Macandie to the Finance Member, 8 June 1943, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 112Message, Naval Board to Gould, 17 June 1943, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 238 decision was in a message to Gould.113 In this way, and in a relatively informal manner, the three largest community-based sea cadet organisations, in New South Wales and Victoria, were provided with some recognition, despite not forming a national organisation or representing the many other active community-based sea cadet groups around the country. As a result of these changes, the navy was now moving down a path where, at least for three relatively long standing and well known community-based sea cadet organisations, advice and support would be provided in the areas of organisation, control, personnel and funding. Moreover, this decision had been made despite the equally long standing Naval Board view, and concern, that concessions provided to one component of the community-based sea cadets would then, correctly, be expected by all others. Moreover, on this occasion, this long standing concern had not been exhaustively discussed and, similarly, there was no consideration of the view that support provided to the community-based sea cadets would be at the expense of other naval activities, particularly the RANR and the NRC. The Naval Board appeared to have adopted a new approach to the community-based sea cadets under the guidance of a new First Naval Member, Royle, an officer of the RN on loan to Australia, with first-hand experience of the system used by the RN in administering the British community- based sea cadet organisation. In addition to encouraging further support of the NLSCC based on his experiences of the British system, Royle accepted arguments, along a similar line, from Gould regarding support of the Sydney Training Depot. The Naval Board was charting an entirely different course for its involvement with the community-based sea cadet branch than it had followed since it first considered formal recognition in 1905.

Under the new support arrangements, the Navy League finally started to expand again and make additional, and to some extent predictable, additional demands on the navy. On 9 December 1943, Pidgeon asked Macandie for 50 uniforms for a new NLSCC unit at Portland plus additional uniforms to assist with increased numbers in other units.114 Macandie’s approval of this request, on 11 January 1944, was the start of a new positive approach to supporting the community-based sea cadets, but senior navy administrators remained wary of the new arrangements and continued to seek guidance on any requests that were not clearly

113ibid. 114 Letter, Pidgeon to Macandie, 9 December 1943, NAA MP151/1 434/201/3874. 239 covered by the new Naval Board guidelines.115 As an example, on 8 February 1944, the Commanding Officer of HMAS Lonsdale in Melbourne felt sufficiently unsure about the new policy for the supply of uniforms that he consulted Macandie on what appeared to be a quite simple request.116 In this case, he sought Macandie’s assurance, on 17 February 1944, that the unit seeking support, Geelong, actually formed part of the Navy League’s metropolitan organisation, notwithstanding its remote location, before uniforms were supplied.117 Such minor examples illustrate how, after decades of being vigilant in how community-based sea cadet units were assisted, the local naval authorities proceeded carefully and adopted a generally cautious approach to providing support under the new policy, particularly throughout 1944.118

With things going well in relation to uniforms, and the loan of equipment, an attempt was soon made to extend the new supply arrangements to the issue of weapons, and the Sydney Training Depot, on 2 March 1945, asked for fifteen .303 rifles and associated, bayonets and scabbards.119 Noting that the navy policy on issue of weapons to community- based sea cadet units had not changed since 1935, the Second Naval Member, Commodore HA Showers, recommended that the Naval Board review its policy. For his part, Macandie commented that it had been considered most unwise in the past to issue serviceable rifles to community-based sea cadet units as there was always a danger that live ammunition might be obtained and that the control of the weapons may not be satisfactory. Furthermore, he observed, the navy refused arms to the members of the Sydney Training Depot, on 17 August 1936, on the basis that ‘such corps are not entitled to be in possession of arms’.120 With this in mind, the Naval Board confirmed, on 25 July 1945, their existing policy that certain stores could be made available for purchase, but not on loan, and that ‘arms should not in any circumstances be made available’.121 Thus, while some concessions had been made, there

115 Letter, Macandie to Pidgeon, 11 January 1944, NAA MP151/1, 434/201/3874. 116 Minute, Commanding Officer, HMAS Lonsdale to Macandie, 8 February 1944, NAA MP151/1, 434/201/3874. 117 Minute, Macandie to Commanding Officer, HMAS Lonsdale, 17 February 1944, NAA MP151/1, 434/201/3874. 118 Letter, Naval Officer-in-Charge, Port Melbourne to Macandie, 7 November 1944, NAA MP151/1, 434/201/3874. 119Memorandum, Gould to Macandie, 2 March 1945, NAA MP151/1, 612/260/471. 120 ibid. 121 ibid. 240 were some issues that remained not negotiable as far as official navy support of the community-based branch was concerned.

Although the navy had taken a significant step towards officially recognising community-based sea cadet units in New South Wales and Victoria, this emboldened some of the branch’s supporters to press for more. At the end of the war, a movement was initiated in the Barton electorate of the Minister for External Affairs, HV Evatt, at the end of the war, that threatened to make an election issue of having the NLSCC recognised in the same form as army cadets and air force cadets. Initially, on 14 September 1945, Macandie received a submission from a Mr R Ferguson suggesting that it was ‘exceedingly strange’ that the Air Training Corps and army school cadets were recognised by their respective services but the Naval Board did not recognise the boys of the Navy League, although the parent group was recognised by the (British) Admiralty.122 Having made its new commitment to the Navy League, the Naval Board referred Ferguson to its Victorian President, Pidgeon.123 By this time, however, Evatt was involved and on 1 December 1945, he advised the Minister for Navy, Makin, that he was concerned about inadequate navy recognition of the Navy League. As conceived by his constituent, Ferguson, Evatt submitted to Makin that if the army recognised the (army) school cadet corps, and the air force recognised the ‘Air Training League’, both of which were assisted by the parent service in every way possible, there should be no valid reason for the navy office not to recognise and assist the Navy League.124 Evatt was of the strong view that much closer co-operation could be extended to the League by the navy and he was sure that Makin recognised the value of the work being done by the boys and young men of the Navy League on whose behalf he sought sympathetic consideration of the matter.125 For some Navy League advocates, it seemed that only full parity with the NRC, and the army and air force cadets, would be satisfactory.

In responding to Evatt, on 17 December 1945, Makin provided an overview of the concessions that the navy had made as a result of its recent decision to support the Navy

122 Letter, Ferguson to Macandie, 14 September 1945, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 123 Extracts, Naval Board Minutes, 17 October 1945, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 124 Letter, Evatt to Makin, 1 December 1945, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 125 ibid. 241

League and the Sydney Training Depot, in 1943, including a comparative analysis of the community-based sea cadet branch and the army and air force cadets.126 On the subject of support, Makin explained the commitment the navy had to provide assistance in the areas of training, inspections, uniforms and equipment. With regard to Evatt’s contention that the army and air force schemes ought to be comparable to the community-based sea cadet branch, Makin noted that that the (army) school cadets were actually a formed service under the Defence Act and that the ATC was administered by the Department of Air. As such, in peacetime, as far as the navy was concerned, the equivalent to the school cadets and Air Training Corps would be the NRC, an organisation recognised under the Naval Defence Act. Notwithstanding this circumstance, Makin assured Evatt, the good work carried out by the Navy League was fully appreciated and the Department of Navy would continue to render such assistance, as was practicable.127 Thus, while the Navy League had made some progress, Makin was not supportive of the suggestion that they could become the equivalent of the defence-based NRC under the Defence Act. Nevertheless, continuing support for the NLSCC and, potentially, other community-based sea cadet units had been comprehensively endorsed by the minister.

During World War II, both branches of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement experienced different, but equally rewarding, benefits from their involvement with the RAN. Although the NLSCC in Britain had provided a much needed pre-entry training service to the RN and merchant navy, endeavours to do the same in Australia had not been based on a similar urgent requirement, of repelling an invasion, and had not succeeded. Nevertheless, the organisers of the community-based sea cadets had persisted in their efforts to elicit formal support from the navy and had benefitted from the RN’s decision to assume control of the movement in Britain, when the newly appointed First Naval Member, RN Admiral Sir Guy Royle, approved greater support. At the same time, the defence-based NRC had encountered their own challenges in being properly administered by the navy and receiving entitlements appropriate to their contribution to the war effort. At the end of the war, notwithstanding the support they were now receiving, the community-based sea cadets were still regarded as distinctly separate from the dormant NRC organisation, which was regarded as being fully

126Letter, Makin to Evatt, 17 December 1945, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 127ibid. 242 aligned with the army cadets and air force cadet organisations, particularly in how they were organised and the support they received. As a result of changes during the period 1939-45, although the community-based sea cadets were slightly better supported than they were before the war, the duality of the movement was not substantially different than it had been since the creation of the first community-based sea cadet units around the turn of the 20th century. Now, with the war at an end, defence plans, and the navy’s peacetime funding and recruiting policies, and the future structure of the RANR, would be central to the fortunes of both components of the movement.

243

CHAPTER NINE

Recognition in Principle 1946-1947

In the immediate post-war period, the community-based sea cadet organisation made efforts to gain further recognition and support from the navy, and the relationships between the various parties within the branch, for the most part, remained close. As an example, as World War II war drew to a close, the Navy League in South Australia presented a new dinghy to the sea scouts for use aboard their training ship Wongala. The presentation was attended by sea scout troops from the Adelaide metropolitan area, the Mayor of Adelaide (also President of the Navy League), members of the committee of the Navy League and a representative of the South Australian DNO.1 Similarly, members of the both the Boy Scouts’ Association and the NLSCC were prominent in welcoming Australia’s veterans on their arrival home and in working to raise funds for their welfare.2 Such activities underline the continuing diverse, but cooperative, nature of the community-based sea cadet branch’s activities under the direct gaze of the navy. Notwithstanding this general theme of cooperation and good will, rogue elements continued to plague the community-based sea cadet branch. Against this background, this majority of this chapter is dedicated to examining how further changes in the navy’s view of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, during the period 1946-47, resulted in recognition of the Navy League as the national coordinating body for all community-based sea cadets. In addition, it is considered how, at the end of this period, the Naval Board contemplated a broader approach to the development of the movement, including establishing naval cadets in schools. Meanwhile, the NRC branch continued legally unaltered as part of the navy, although the post-war future of the overall RANR, which was yet to be reactivated, remained somewhat uncertain.

Immediately after World War II, the Australian focus was on migration, not defence.3 The new Prime Minister, Ben Chifley, and Immigration Minister, , initiated a set of policies based on a basic mantra of ‘populate or perish’ and new arrivals came from across Europe, not just Britain. Nevertheless, the new migration program accommodated

1 Adelaide Advertiser, 19 June 1945, p. 3. 2 Argus, 20 May 1946, p. 2. 3 Knightley, Australia: A Biography of Nation, pp. 216-229. 244 continuing ‘white Australia’ sentiment, especially from Calwell, as it was used to provide unskilled labour for remote development projects, such as the Snowy Mountains River Scheme.4 Links with Britain remained strong, however, and Calwell hoped that there would be ten migrants from Britain for every one arriving from mainland Europe.5 Initially, in 1947, one continental European arrived for every three British migrants but, from 1948 to 1957, European migrants outnumbered the British, three to one.6 For his part, Calwell coined the term ‘New Australians’ in an endeavour to make the increasing quota of people from different cultures more welcome.7 With this influx of migrants and a government that believed that everything that could be manufactured at a reasonable cost should be made in Australia, thousands of factories were built and industry began to thrive through the production of everything from building materials to aircraft.8 Australia was about to enter somewhat of a golden age.9

The immediate post-war period was not so golden for the Australian naval and sea cadet movement with yet another unsavoury case unfolding in Sydney that underlined the Naval Board’s potential dilemma in further supporting what was still a very disparate and uncontrolled collection of community-based sea cadet units. In this case, the somewhat grandly named Sydney Naval and Mercantile Marine Cadet Training Service, which had emerged during World War II, and its founder, Dale S Martin, were the subject of a report, on 2 January 1946, by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Commander JCB McManus. 10 McManus reported that Martin was in fact an army deserter, named Seary, who had a pre-war conviction for passing valueless cheques, and that his sea experience was three weeks as a deck boy and a similar period as an assistant cook. Nevertheless, in his community-based sea cadet role, he wore a ‘colourable imitation of naval uniform’ and displayed the ‘airs of a naval officer’. In view of the information obtained, and the possibility that charges for false

4 ibid, pp. 217-218. 5 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, p. 195. 6 ibid. 7 ibid. 8 ibid., p. 196 9 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, pp. 196-235. 10 Minute, McManus to Naval Board, 2 January 1946, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/139. 245 pretences and soliciting donations without proper authority might be substantiated, all information had been handed to the New South Wales civil police.11

In relation to the potential offences, McManus commented that there had been ‘two similar instances in recent years, and it appears that the establishment of marine training schools has some attraction to frauds and charlatans’ and that action was being taken ‘for enquiries to be made into the credentials and record of the sponsors of any such organisations’.12 Even the Navy League was not immune to such scrutiny, with McManus ordering an investigation into the history of the league’s ‘Australia’ depot at Henley over a request for the sale of a boat for instructional purposes13 Although such events may have caused the Naval Board to re-consider the possible benefits of taking some control of the administration of the personnel of the community-based sea cadets, which it had specifically rejected in the past, it was evident from repeated incidents leading to criminal charges that there were risks in not doing so. Under the substantial, yet in many ways still informal, arrangements in place, the negative impact of these cases on the navy was only by association, with formal control would come some form of responsibility and the possibility of full legal liability.

The offences of independent operators like Martin did not dull the enthusiasm of mainstream community-based sea cadet organisers and they resumed their efforts at garnering new levels of support, from supply of uniforms to the donation of ships. An initial minor request, on 28 February 1946, for the supply of five chief petty officers’ uniforms, approved by the Second Naval Member, Commodore HA Showers, was followed by a further request, on 23 May 1946, for a further ten sets of uniforms.14 At the same time, the New South Wales Navy League Secretary, WW Beale, had asked the Minister for Navy, Norman Makin, for the loan of a motor launch and four whalers, which he refused on the basis that it was not navy policy to loan such items.15 An earlier, much more ambitious, proposal

11 ibid. 12 ibid. 13 Memorandum, Browne to McManus, 15 January 1946, NAA MP138/1, 603/201/2418. 14 Minute, Director of Victualling to Showers, 7 March 1946, NAA MP151/1, 434/201/3874. 15 Letter, Makin to Beale, 16 April 1946, NAA MP138/1, 603/267/1692. 246 submitted by the organisers of six of the Navy League’s depots in Sydney, on 1 January 1946, had suggested the gift of a fully operational Corvette but the Navy League Secretary, Beale, advised Makin that the league was unaware of the letter and did not support the request.16 These new requests precipitated an immediate navy review of the Naval Board decision of February 1943 with respect to the support provided to the New South Wales and Victorian Navy League and the Sydney Training Depot. 17 As had his predecessors, the Flag Officer in Charge, Sydney, Rear-Admiral GD Moore, on 6 May 1946, requested that the navy support, referred to in the Naval Board letter of 21 June 1943, might again be granted to the Sydney Training Depot. More generally, Moore expressed the view that community-based sea cadet organisations deserved every encouragement from the navy, as the organisation they strived to emulate, and they were both a valuable recruiting ground for the navy and, to some extent, of use for disseminating naval information of a non-confidential nature.18 It seemed that the community-based sea cadet branch was about to start the post-war period on a positive note. It remained to be seen if this would translate in to formal and substantial assistance from the navy.

Following Moore’s representations, a report of 21 May 1946 by the navy’s Director of Plans, provided some further information about ‘various voluntary organisations for training youths in Australia’, including a list of the various organisations, their addresses, the number of boys, the date they were founded, the patrons, the organisation's aims and the organiser.19 It was reported that the NLSCC in New South Wales, which had made various requests for naval assistance over the previous twelve months, had training depots in Sydney at Neutral Bay, Manly, Woolwich, Henley and Connells Point. There was some, but significantly less, detail about the Victorian Navy League, the Sydney Training Depot, the Merchant Navy Training Corps in Brisbane and the ‘Volunteer Coastal Patrol Sydney’ (known as NTS Vivid), all of which were reported by the navy as being part of the community-based sea cadet

16 Letter, Beale to Makin, 4 February 1946, NAA MP138/1, 603/267/1692. 17 Minute, Director of Plans to Director of Victualling, 23 May 1946, NAA MP151/1, 434/201/3874. 18 Minute, Moore to Macandie, 6 May 1946, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. On 10 May 1946, Macandie retired from the role of Naval Board Secretary and was replaced by TJ Hawkins. Macandie had been replaced in his role as Secretary of the Department of the Navy by AR Nankervis in 1941, but had continued as Secretary to the Naval Board. Macandie had served the navy in various capacities since being appointed as Secretary of the first Department of the Navy in March 1919. 19 Minute, Director of Plans to the Director of Naval Intelligence, 21 May 1946, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/144. 247 movement.20 Even this basic information on NLSCC units appears to have been out of date, as the Navy League had reported its expansion to eight units as early as February 1946.21 Perhaps naval authorities were adopting a conservative approach as one of these depots had disappeared without fanfare by April.22 Notwithstanding these rapid changes, from this review, the Naval Board had acquired a fuller picture of the state of the community-based sea cadet organisation in Australia, although limited to the eastern states, to inform its consideration of the renewed bids for support that had already been received, and the associated requests for even higher levels of formal recognition that would likely follow.

Although the Naval Board remained focused on the better known community-based sea cadet organisations in New South Wales and Victoria, requests generated by the activities of units of varying types in Western Australia, South Australia and Queensland served to remind the admirals of the potential diversity of the branch and the challenges of becoming too involved in its overall organisation and control. As an example, in Western Australia, on 20 May 1946, a Mrs MM Pamflett, Principal of the Greenstead School, Albany, Western Australia, sought navy approval to form the ‘Greenstead Nautical School’ for ‘cadet’ training using materials she had used as a coach at Dartmouth Naval College in England.23 Although this request related to a full-time school, the navy’s response provides further insight into how such requests served to maintain confusion about the nature and possible role of the community-based sea cadet branch. Pamflett’s school was described by the Naval Officer-in- Charge at Fremantle, Commodore CJ Pope, on 31 July 1946, as being of an educational standard well below that required by the District Education Inspector because of the unsuitability of the teaching methods of the Principal. Nevertheless, he observed, Mrs Pamflett had competently instructed the local NAP on theoretical navigation based on her experience at the Dartmouth Naval College 20 years earlier.24 The subsequent decision, on 13 August 1946, by Second Naval Member, Commodore JM Armstrong, approving the use of the term ‘Greenstead Nautical School’ and the word ‘cadet’, but refusing permission for

20 ibid. 21 The Navy League Journal, vol.9, no. 2, February 1946, p. 13. 22 ibid., vol.9, no. 4, April 1946, p. 8. 23Letter, Pamflett to Pope, 20 May 1946, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/146 24Minute, Pope to Hawkins, 31 July 1946, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/146. 248 cadets to wear a naval type of uniform, is not in itself overly noteworthy, but his thoughts on having to consider these issues are illuminating.25

Armstrong’s question of ‘What age is a naval type uniform forbidden?’ and his musings that ‘I seem to remember being forced to wear a sailor suit and I regret to say my own sons were forced to do likewise’ raise questions about the entire concept and identity of the community-based branch of the movement. Armstrong’s thoughts raise the interesting contention that isolated groups of boys, and girls such as the Sea Rangers, meeting part-time to study seamanship, and possibly the community-based sea cadet branch overall, was regarded by some senior naval officers as no more than children wearing sailor suits and of no great interest or importance to the navy from a recruiting point of view.26 If so, how did this relate to the continuing process of reviewing the claims for recognition by the Navy League and the sea scouts? Was the Naval Board unsure of what approach to adopt because such groups were seen as neither military, nor pre-military, and only had an identity as general educational or recreational institutions that encouraged a general interest in naval matters, but not a naval career? If this were the case, the Naval Board would correctly see involvement in the organisation, control, personnel management and funding of these schools and their units as of no relevance for the navy, particularly if the students were seen to be dressed in ‘sailor suits’, not naval uniforms. Moreover, the more part-time community-based sea cadet units resembled such nautical schools, and conducted similar non-defence activities, the more they would be regarded as distinctly different from the defence-based NRC, and the army and air force cadets, and in no way meriting further recognition or support.

Another post-war concession, that is illustrative of the navy’s developing relationship with the community-based branch of the movement unfolded in South Australia, where the DNO, Commander NR Read, accepted, on 3 June 1946, nomination as a member of the local Navy League executive committee.27 Read requested the Naval Board’s permission to accept the appointment and this was given on 21 June 1946.28 This could be dismissed as a

25 ibid. 26Minute, DPS to Armstrong, 13 August 1946, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/146. 27 Letter, Honorary Secretary, Adelaide Navy League to Read, 3 June 1946, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/161. 28 Letter, Read to Hawkins, 6 June 1946; Letter, Hawkins to Read, 21 June 1946, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/161. 249 relatively minor event, as DNOs regularly accepted many local appointments, both formally and informally, as part of their role representing the navy. It is significant, nevertheless, because the Naval Board had a long-standing policy of expressly prohibited this type of appointment.29 On this occasion, therefore, this appointment can be regarded as a further endorsement of the NLSCC, particularly as Read would now participate, officially, in formulating support requests to the Naval Board, which he would then consider in his navy role and further critique before referring to the Naval Board. Although DNOs already had an established history of supporting their local community-based sea cadet units, this appointment represented a significant potential concession in allowing formal involvement by the state’s most senior naval officer in the organisation and control of the Navy League organisation and its sea cadets.

In Queensland meanwhile, in a different way, the DNO was involved in a much more significant local move to formally recognise the community-based sea cadets, in this case represented by the Boy Scouts’ Association. Although a only a local initiative, this submission further tested the Naval Board’s developing views on the merits of a national coordinating organisation for the community-based sea cadet branch. During Scout Week, in May 1946, the Chief Scout Commissioner for Queensland, EJ Shaw, launched a membership drive and urged current scouts to assist in finding new leaders for the hundreds of boys who wanted to join.30 By November 1946, the Scout Council of Queensland reported a record membership of 8000 scouts, up 1000 from the previous year, including an unspecified number of sea scouts.31 When advised, on 20 June 1946, that the Boy Scouts’ Association, Queensland Branch, intended to extensively develop their activities and membership, the Queensland DNO, Captain EP Thomas, recommended to the Naval Board that considerable formal support should be provided to the Queensland sea scouts.32

There was no shortage of prospective recruits, Thomas observed, and there was a need for trained sea scout officers, plus new facilities and equipment for training these

29 Letter, Naval Board Secretary to DNO, Western Australia, 19 November 1934, NAA MP124/6, 422/201/29. 30 Courier Mail, 20 May 1946, p. 3. 31 Courier Mail, 19 November 1946, p. 4. 32 Minute, Thomas to Hawkins, 11 July 1946, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/150. 250 officers and the sea scouts themselves. Thomas regarded the membership goal of 1000 sea scouts, which had been put forward by the Boy Scouts’ Association, as a reasonable objective, but that facilities were needed to develop sea sense through practical seamanship activities. In addition, waterside accommodation was needed for training, administrative headquarters, storage of boats and equipment, repairs and moorings and, as such, assistance from the naval authorities by way of gift, loan, hire or purchase would enable the sea scouts’ plans to proceed.33 Thomas’ proposal, involving a potentially large and formal navy commitment, is significant as it had the potential to be in direct conflict with the Naval Board’s recognition of the New South Wales and Victorian NLSCC and the Sydney Training Depot as preferred national organisers of the community-based branch of the movement.

Of still further significance is that, in making their proposal, the Queensland sea scout organisers relied on the significant contribution sea scouts had made to the war effort in the United Kingdom, and in Australia, both as navy recruits and in civil defence organisations.34 For his part, Thomas recommended to the Naval Board, on 11 July 1946, that it was both appropriate and desirable that the navy give all possible encouragement and practical assistance to the sea scout movement, and he proposed a range of significant support measures that included substantial resources being made available. Furthermore, he observed, although various organisations claimed to train sea cadets, and so on, at different ports, it was his intention that the navy’s interest would be confined to the sea scouting branch of the original Boy Scouts’ Association which enjoyed world-wide recognition.35 This was an important recommendation by the Queensland DNO to the Naval Board as it suggested that the sea scouts, not the NLSCC and similar organisations, should be supported as the prime focus of naval support of nautically based youth organisations - in Queensland at least. At navy headquarters, however, the policy situation did not favour such support as the Naval Secretary, AR Nankervis, had decided to refuse to sell caps to the Commissioner for Sea Scouts in Tasmania, GW Rex, directing him to a commercial supplier, while approving

33Letter, Honorary Secretary, Boy Scouts Association, Queensland, to Thomas, 20 June 1946, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/150. 34 Mercury, 26 August 1939, p. 11. 35 Minute, Naval Officer-in-Charge, Queensland, to the Naval Board Secretary 11 July 1946, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/150. 251 an identical request from the Navy League.36 As both requests were received in July 1946, the next steps taken at navy headquarters in dealing with Thomas’ recommendations on the Queensland sea scouts, are less surprising, and provide an interesting insight into the Naval Board’s developing stance on future support of the NLSCC and sea scouts, nationally.37 l

In contrast to Thomas’ unequivocal support for the sea scouts, the reply from the newly appointed Naval Board Secretary, TJ Hawkins, on 29 April 1947, made it clear that the Naval Board was still deliberating over the general question of assistance to community- based sea cadet organisations and, hence, approval could not be given for Thomas’ proposals. In this regard, Hawkins advised, the Boys Scouts’ Association (sea scouts branch) was to be informed that any surplus naval stores and material were being sold through the Commonwealth Disposals Commission.38 With this prompt and unequivocal dismissal of Thomas’ proposal, Hawkins had rejected the Queensland sea scouts requests entirely on the basis that consideration was being given to the claims of all community-based sea cadet organisations. Furthermore, there was no acknowledgement of Thomas’ statement that the sea scouts were controlled by the Boy Scouts’ Association, as part of a fully developed youth training system, with fully developed and legally recognised systems that fulfilled the Naval Board’s requirement for a suitable controlling body.

Thus, the Naval Board was presented with what looked like a viable state-based recognition option, but Thomas’ plan did not appear to align, at all, with what was being done in Sydney in confirming the war-time approval of support to NLSCC and the Sydney Training Depot. Possibly, the prospect of a youth organisation with 1000 members in Queensland alone may have been much more daunting than a NLSCC and Sydney Training Depot that was still far short of 1000 members nationally. There is no evidence to support such contentions, however, and these events in Western Australia, South Australia and Queensland remain as background only to the next steps taken by the Naval Board, in Melbourne and

36 Letter, Nankervis to Rex, 7 November 1946; Memorandum, Nankervis to CO HMAS Lonsdale, 7 October, 1946. MP151/1, 434/201/3874. 37 Letter, Rex to Nankervis, 10 July 1946; Letter, CO HMAS Lonsdale to Nankervis, 18 July 1946. MP151/1, 434/201/3874. 38 Minute, Hawkins to Thomas, 29 April 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/150. 252

Sydney, in investigating what form recognition of the community-based sea cadet branch might take. In this regard, the Navy League relaunched its flagship journal, in January 1947, under a new title, The Navy, and immediately resumed advertising for boys, aged 10-17 years, to join its depots at North Sydney, Woolwich, Manly, Henley, Connell’s Point and Orange, although the vast majority of the new journal’s content was devoted to reporting on the activities of the RAN.39 The introduction of substantial RAN content, moreover, had the effect of making the revamped journal something of an informal public relations tool for the navy and the added benefit of allowing Navy League organisers to work closely with navy headquarters staff on a regular basis.

On 13 January 1947, as part of the wider continuing review of community-based sea cadets being, the new DNR, Captain AS Rosenthal, now received comprehensive advice on the British system from the Naval Liaison Officer in London, Captain JB Foley.40 In a detailed analysis of the British naval and sea cadet system, which was to prove central to the outcome of the official recognition process, Foley reported that the British Admiralty took over the NLSCC in 1942 and that the organisation was now effectively run under joint British Admiralty-Navy League control. In effect, the Admiralty looked after the training side and the Navy League managed the administration, such as drill halls, equipment, amenities, recruitment, and so on. A capitation allowance of 17/6 per cadet per annum was paid, of which 12 shillings went to the unit for unit expenses, such as equipment, two and six pence was for training and three shillings was for area expenses. There were eight sea cadet areas, with staff provided by the Admiralty for inspections, and so on, to ensure that the various units within the areas were properly maintained and trained.

Foley explained that the sea scouts were actually supported on a different basis, although ‘in answer to Parliamentary Questions on differential treatment, a case is usually made to suggest they receive equal treatment’.41 In effect, there were over 400 sea scout units in the country, Foley observed, but only about 100 were officially recognised by the

39 The Navy, vol.10, no. 1 (New Series), January 1947, p. 15. 40 Letter, Foley to Rosenthal, 13 January 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 41 ibid. 253

Admiralty. Those which were recognised (and this recognition was granted only after an Admiralty inspecting officer recommended a unit as efficient and of a high standard) received a capitation grant of three and six pence per head per annum and a certain amount of preference in the purchase of equipment. Foley commented to Rosenthal that ‘you can see it is not similar treatment’.42 Thus, the Navy League in Britain was involved in a ‘joint venture’ with the RN in managing their community-based sea cadet units, but sea scouts had limited financial support and recognition, although they were still involved in highly prized cadet activities, such as overseas trips. In Australia, the navy now had a template that pointed to full official recognition for the NLSCC, but not for the sea scouts or other independent units.

Rosenthal provided the First Naval Member, Admiral LHK Hamilton, with the Foley summary of the organisation of the British NLSCC and sea scouts, and associated Regulations and Instructions, on 14 February 1947.43 Adopting an approach that anticipated equal treatment, he recommended that a policy should be decided so that financial provision could be made in the navy budget for the administration and training of a proportionate number of NLSCC and sea scouts. Further, as Rosenthal observed, the army and air force were proceeding with their schemes of cadet training and allocating navy funds in the current budget estimates would allow a start to be made on a sea cadet scheme in the 1947/48 Financial Year. For his part, Hamilton wanted to discuss, with the Second Naval Member, Armstrong, and with Rosenthal, what was required to ‘get an organisation going’ and instructed Rosenthal, on 3 March 1947, to again get a ‘list of such organisations in Australia & go into what has been done in the past’.44 With this new review, and in the light of the candid overview of how the British system worked, an opportunity now arose for the Naval Board to fully consider the implications of supporting the community-based sea cadets formally alongside the NRC. It remained to be seen if the key issues of organisation, control, personnel and funding would be decided in such a way as to arrive at a sound sustainable policy and a united movement.

42 ibid. 43 Minute, Rosenthal to Hamilton, 14 February 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/155. 44 ibid. 254

At this point, it is pertinent to note, the option still existed for the navy to concern itself only with reforming the post-war NRC, where it was authorised by legislation to decide all aspects of administration. On the community-based sea cadet side, an important aspect of Rosenthal’s next report to the Naval Board, on 25 March 1947, was that all organisations known to the navy were to be considered, thus confirming this process as being a comprehensive assessment of the community-based sea cadet branch, in navy terms, upon which to base a decision to embrace or abandon the non-defence part of the movement. 45 Making a recommendation rather than a report, Rosenthal observed that the NLSCC (no membership details provided) was an empire wide organisation of youth and, under normal circumstances, it could be assumed that this organisation, formed under the strict supervision of the Navy League, would be a suitable organisation for official recognition and assistance. Neverthless, he observed, there had been quite a few instances in which NLSCC units had made a direct approach to the Department of Navy, usually for assistance in the way of provisional gear, apparently without the knowledge or approval of the headquarters of the Navy League. Notwithstanding this evidence of lack of control, Rosenthal affirmed, recognition should be given to the Navy League as such and then the question of individual NLSCC units could be taken up with the headquarters of the Navy League in detail.46 Just as Sir Guy Royle’s decision to support the overall community-based sea cadet branch had been a turning point, in principle, for the movement, Rosenthal’s recommendations that funds be budgeted and that the Navy League should be recognised represented a further significant step towards official recognition and the creation of a combined movement. For this reason, and because his finding revealed the variable quality of community-based sea cadet organisation, Rosenthal’s report merits more detailed consideration.

In coming to his conclusion that the Navy League should be officially recognised and supported, Rosenthal had considered a substantial number of other units, but not the many small independent groups that could be regarded as giving the Australian naval and sea cadet movement its, essentially, fragmented character. The units Rosenthal had examined were, in the main, the larger units such as the Sydney Training Depot, which was described as well- organised, well-conducted and efficient. In contrast, the Beatty Training Depot was noted as

45 Minute, Rosenthal to Armstrong, 25 March 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/155. 46 ibid 255 being organised by Messrs Armstrong and Smith, both of whom had been adversely reported upon, and was not recommended as an organisation to be accorded support by the Naval Board. Considering some less well known independent units, Rosenthal advised that the Vivid Sea Cadet Training Depot had arisen from the ‘wreckage’ of the short lived Naval and Mercantile Marine Training Depot, Creswell, and the Nelson Training Depot, which were disbanded in 1946 and late 1945 respectively. Subsequently, this unit was run by one E Evans, and a committee, consisting of two or three other people, who had leased the old Sydney Ferry Kookaburra for five pounds per annum and named it Vivid. In contrast to these part-time organisations, Rosenthal observed, the Richmond Training School was a commercial venture for merchant service instruction and was also not recommended for recognition or assistance.47

Several Queensland units were considered by Rosenthal and the Merchant Navy Training Corps Brisbane was described as an organisation of doubtful virtue run by one Hamilton-Grace, who described himself as ‘Commander Grace’, but had a police record, it was observed, mainly on the score of false pretences and stealing, and had already been thrown out of the Boy Scouts’ Association. In 1940, Grace had applied to register the Merchant Navy Training Sea Cadets Corps under the Queensland Registration of Firms Act 1901-1912, but this was turned down at the request of the State Department of Justice owing to his unsavoury record. This organisation was not recommended for recognition or assistance. In contrast, the Brisbane Institute of Social Services was an organisation run on naval lines, very similar to those of the sea cadet corps or sea scouts. Rosenthal observed that it was reported on favourably by the Naval Officer-in-Charge in Brisbane, and therefore regarded as suitable for recognition and assistance, but it would be preferable if this organisation were absorbed by one of the two large empire wide organisations, the Navy League or the sea scouts. In this regard, he noted, the sea scouts had a membership of 300 in Queensland, 450 in Western Australia, 450 in South Australia and 324 in Victoria, including rovers and cubs. Its membership in New South Wales was unknown. Overall, Rosenthal

47 ibid. 256 concluded, as a worldwide organisation that was well-organised and administered, it was worthy of support.48

While Rosenthal’s report might be considered to have provided the Naval Board with a limited view of the community-based sea cadets, particularly when the navy’s lack of real interaction with so many small independent units is considered, it did provide an effective summary of the problems arising from lack of control of various independent units. In particular, complementing the recent submission from Thomas in Queensland on the sea scouts, there was sufficient additional information in Rosenthal’s report to develop a longer- term view of the benefits to the navy of supporting the sea scouts as a legally and organisationally cohesive organisation on a national basis. Moreover, there was evidence that the sea scouting organisation could give the navy direct recruiting access to a membership of approximately 2000 (if the likely New South Wales membership was considered) compared to supporting a disparate collection of nautical groups of which so little was known. Despite the evidence of these possibilities, it seemed that Rosenthal had already committed himself primarily to supporting the Navy League, particularly after receiving Foley’s report on the British arrangements, and his report reflected this preference. Thus, if the sea scouts were to be considered for recognition and support, the key issue would be the willingness of the organisers in the Navy League and the sea scouts to join forces and arrive at a joint solution acceptable to the navy. As both the Boy Scouts’ Association and the Navy League were organised on a state by state basis, with neither organisation having a binding national council or other authority, this was going to prove difficult.

As Rosenthal was reporting on the wider community-based sea cadet branch, the Navy League was doing its best to satisfy the navy’s requirement for it to have at least a federal flavour, even if it could not guarantee national control of all community-based sea cadet units. In pursuit of this goal, its new Victorian Chairman, Commander JD Bates, a former member of the RANVR and now passenger manager of the Orient Line, advised the navy, on 2 April 1947, that there was a serious attempt being made to ‘revivify’ the Victorian

48 ibid. 257

Navy League, which had become somewhat moribund over the past few years.49 Bates observed that, before the war, the Naval Board gave semi-official recognition to the Navy League and he was very anxious for this arrangement to be ‘again brought into force’.50 In this regard, he pointed out, the Navy League might well be able to help the navy in the matter of ‘promulgating the right ideas amongst the community and in acting as a sort of nursery for recruiting’.51 Bates was keen for a naval staff member to attend the next annual general meeting of the Navy League which was due to be held at the end of the month. From the navy side, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Commander AS Storey, recommended that approval should be given for an officer to attend Navy League meetings in an advisory capacity as requested by Bates.52 This officer should be the Director of Reserves as the officer most concerned with organisations of the nature of the Navy League, he suggested, or the Director of Naval Intelligence as the officer responsible for navy public relations. The Naval Board agreed with the proposal, in that interest should be shown, but members expressed some reservations about ‘snags’ in previous efforts at working with the Navy League.53 Thus, the Navy League’s history of failing to control its organisation was still of concern to the Naval Board, but it was prepared to continue to develop the relationship by appointing a formal representative to observe at the league’s next annual general meeting. The recent approval for the DNO in South Australia to become an official member of the local Navy League committee seemed to have been overlooked and the two parties appeared to be on a path to working together more closely. Nonetheless, it remained likely that this would be a slow and cautious exercise for the navy.

As the navy considered its position in relation to the Navy League, and oblivious to decisions being made by the Naval Board, the sea scouts and many other organisations continued to seek navy support by negotiation of favourable terms for the acquisition of surplus post-war equipment. For example, on 10 March 1947, the Commissioner of the Sea Scouts in South Australia, HW Rymill, sought assistance from his local federal member of parliament, AV Thompson, to replace the sea scout training ship, Wongala, which had been

49 Minute, Bates to Rosenthal , 2 April 1947, NAA MP151/1, 413/201/404. 50 ibid. 51 ibid. 52 Minute, Storey to Naval Board, 2 April 1947, NAA MP151/1, 413/201/404. 53 ibid. 258 on loan from the Commonwealth government, but had been recalled for exploration purposes. The sea scout section of the Boy Scouts’ Association was very strong in South Australia, Rymill observed, with over 400 members (boys from the age of 11 to 16) in 14 different troops. Four of these troops were at regional ports and the others in the suburbs of Adelaide.54 At Navy Headquarters, Rosenthal incorporated Rymill’s request into the overall work being done on official recognition of community-based sea cadet units, and recommended to the Naval Board that when this process was complete, the request by the South Australian movement should receive consideration along with many other requests which had been received.55 Subsequently, as the result of advice from the Naval Board, the Minister for the Navy, WJF Riordan, advised Thompson, on 26 May 1947, that he was having the matter investigated and as soon as a general policy was decided, he would communicate again. Subsequently, a copy of Riordan’s letter was sent to the Naval Board Secretary, Hawkins, requesting that he ‘let the Minister have something in connection with this matter as a number of Members are pressing him for a reply to their representations’.56 The community-based sea cadet cause was attracting significant political attention, although such attention was not new and had not resulted in major changes on previous occasions.

Despite the urging from Riordan’s office, the Rymill matter was not addressed again by the Naval Board until 16 March 1948, by which time the navy had progressed the recognition process and Riordan advised Thompson that, as had been announced, the Naval Board had granted official recognition to the Navy League and its NLSCC.57 Furthermore, he observed, it was not possible to give consideration to the recognition of the sea scout organisation until such time as its central authority made official application. Although individual requests for assistance had been received, Riordan observed, this was only from isolated units and these could be considered only if co-ordinated by the controlling authority or, as in the case of the Navy League, by the Australian Council of that organisation.58 Thus, as no such federal scouting body with executive control existed, and notwithstanding that a previous attempt had been made by the RAN to make this happen in 1922-3, an international

54 Letter, Rymill to Thompson, 10 March 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/158. 55 Minute, Rosenthal to the Director of Plans, Second Naval Member and Naval Board Secretary, 19 March 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/158. 56 Letter, Riordan to Thompson, 26 May 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/155. 57 Letter, Riordan to Thompson, 16 March 1948, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/158. 58 ibid. 259 organisation with a history of supporting both the RN and the RAN was left unrecognised and largely without any means of seeking navy support. Although the sea scouts in Adelaide had played a key role in presenting their organisation’s case, ultimately it was events in Sydney and Melbourne that influenced the official recognition decision in favour of the Navy League. How could this have happened when the sea scouts had such strong political support and had expressed their equally strong desire to assist the navy by maintaining a national community-based sea cadet organisation of some 2000 sea scouts? The answers lie in representations made by the Navy League in both Sydney and Melbourne and the Naval Board’s disposition on the best way to take responsibility for the organisation, control, personnel and funding of the community-based sea cadets alongside the NRC.

Notwithstanding the efforts of unit organisers in the more remote states of Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia, the ‘national’ review of the larger Australian units, following the consideration of British naval and sea cadet arrangements, had resulted in the official recognition process being concluded in Sydney and Melbourne in the latter half of 1947. Throughout this period, the Navy League and Leonard Forsythe, of the Sydney Training Depot had been pressing hard for full official recognition and a comprehensive role for the navy in providing organisation, control, personnel and funding for community-based sea cadet organisations. In the earliest stage of the process, Forsythe wrote to the Prime Minister, JB Chifley, on 28 April 1947, requesting that, when the future naval defence policy and program was being drawn up, special consideration should be given to the recognition of the sea cadet corps in Australia.59 As with previous submissions, he observed that this had been done already in the United Kingdom, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand, under Regulations laid down by the Admiralty in 1934. In addition, he recapitulated the support that the Sydney Training Depot and its cadets had provided to the Commonwealth during the war and how this record of service had proven the usefulness of the sea cadet corps, in both peace and war. Finally, he informed Chifley that he had sent a copy of his letter to the Naval Board for comment, and to the Department of Defence.60

59 Letter, Forsythe to Chifley, 28 April 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/155. 60 ibid. 260

In a further submission, on 21 May 1947, Forsythe sent Chifley copies of British Admiralty pamphlets of the ‘Regulations Governing the Formation, Organisation and Administration of Open Units of the Sea Cadet Corps in Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ to show how the sea cadet corps scheme had been adopted.61 As the result of these efforts to influence the process, Forsythe was informed that a decision regarding formal recognition and full support was imminent, and he was provided with an expression of appreciation for his community-based sea cadet work, on behalf of the Prime Minister, by the Minister for the Navy, WJF Riordan, on 6 June 1947.62 On this occasion, in distinct contrast to many previous occasions, Forsythe was not rebuffed with an immediate denial of support and reiteration of the extant policy. This signalled the beginning of a process that would result in the eventual recognition of the Navy League as the central organising body for the community-based sea cadets.

While issues of recognition had essentially been dominated by the community-based organisations up to this time, the Naval Board now decided to introduce a wider defence perspective to its management of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement. On this occasion, the thrust for change came from developments in the army and air force cadet organisations and a perceived need for the navy to maintain parity with them.63 As part of this process, Rosenthal provided the Naval Board with a summary of the military (army) cadet organisation and how its organisation and training was carried out through units composed of cadet detachments in schools. It was observed that, at the end of 1945, the authorised strength of army cadet detachments was 30,000, and the enrolled strength was approximately 23,000. The Air Training Corps (ATC), Rosenthal observed, was established in 1942 with an authorised membership of approximately 3750 and had a present strength of around 2000 which was gradually increasing as the provision of instructors permitted. The ATC organisation consisted of town units and school units, in which the town units were trained to a slightly higher level compared to those conducted in schools.

61 Letter, Forsythe to Chifley, 21 May 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/155. 62 Letter, Riordan to Forsythe, 6 June 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/155. 63 Minute, Rosenthal to Naval Board, 6 June 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/155. 261

In considering these two organisations, Rosenthal regarded it as essential that some naval counterpart of the army cadets and the ATC organisation should be instituted by the navy. In this regard, there was an effective organisation in the United Kingdom to assist, encourage, train and generally control the sea cadets - the Navy League - with the essential aims of providing self discipline and self confidence, a fit and healthy body, an alert and nimble mind and a real appreciation of the value of knowledge. In addition, the training provided for the NLSCC in the United Kingdom was intended to gain cadets entry into the RN and the merchant marine, and to develop powers of leadership.64 In taking this approach, it seemed, Rosenthal was completing ignoring the possibility that the NRC, which was still in post-war abeyance, would be re-constituted and again fill this role as the navy counterpart of the army and air force cadets.

Providing a comprehensive overview that was to substantially influence the Naval Board’s approach to recognition of the community-based sea cadets in Australia, Rosenthal described how the Sea Cadet Corps in England had a membership ceiling of 50,000 spread over 427 training units and that, during the last war, well over 30,000 cadets had joined the armed forces. Further, the Sea Cadet Corps in the United Kingdom was a national organisation under the control of the Admiralty and a Sea Cadet Council that directed general policy and decided matters of major importance. The Sea Cadet Council was presided over by the Admiral Commanding Reserves, but there was a division of responsibility. The Admiralty was responsible to Parliament for the efficiency and well-being of the Corps, including training, while the Navy League, on the other hand, provided social and welfare services for the Corps including recreation and sport, the appointment of local committees and the supervision of local finance. Having thus described the British model, Rosenthal expressed the view that an organisation on similar lines to that which was in existence in the United Kingdom should be instituted in Australia with a view to enabling the navy to supervise youth training with a naval flavour and to function as the naval equivalent of the army cadet and ATC organisations. If arrangements could be put in place in Australia, he observed, the DNR could act in a similar capacity to the Admiral Commanding Reserves in the United Kingdom.65 With these further observations and recommendations, Rosenthal was

64 ibid. 65 ibid. 262 now directly contradicting previous Naval Board and ministerial policy that the defence constituted NRC was already the equivalent of the army and air force cadets.

Having considered the British model, Rosenthal next considered the issues standing in the way of official recognition in Australia. First, the Navy League should have a central, federal authority to govern its activities, he noted, but the present situation was that the Navy League had branches in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia only, and that these three branches were only loosely connected by the Australian Navy League Council, formed in 1935. In the past, the Council had met once a year and, while making efforts to coordinate arrangements and methods in each state, had no executive authority. Before a practical scheme could be instituted, Rosenthal observed, it would be necessary to form a Sea Cadet Council, and provide the related committees and staff, similar to that in existence in the United Kingdom, which would be responsible for the whole of Australia in matters concerning the NLSCC. In addition, Rosenthal noted, there was in Australia a number of individual sea training units not affiliated with each other or with the Navy League and, with this new organisation, it would be possible for these units to merge, ensure that training activities were coordinated, and enable essential training equipment to be made available.66

Furthermore, Rosenthal now argued, a numerically strong, healthy and well organised NLSCC, in addition to being of great benefit to the boys themselves in instilling the principles of comradeship and good citizenship, would be of great use to the navy as a source of recruits. Recruiting would be for both officers and ratings, Rosenthal observed, and, furthermore, the organisation would remain a most useful adjunct to the well-being and the advancement of the nation generally by producing the right type of citizen. Such an organisation would also assist in keeping the importance of sea power and the necessity for maintaining an adequate navy before the Australian public.67 With these recommendations, Rosenthal was placing an equal emphasis on seamanship and citizenship training and the benefits that could be delivered to the navy and the nation respectively. In doing so, he had essentially outlined a comprehensive recognition model that could, ultimately, govern the

66 ibid. 67 ibid. 263 long-term future of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, but the issue of the uncertain future of the NRC, as part of a post war RANR hiatus, and the duality of the movement needed to be resolved if a single organisation was to be formed.68

As the Naval Board deliberated further over Rosenthal’s recommendations, a review of conditions applicable to all Australian defence cadet organisations was initiated that overlapped the navy’s work and influenced its final decision. On 19 June 1947, the Minister for Air, AS Drakeford, suggested to the Minister for Navy, Riordan, the need for a committee to submit recommendations on a scheme of recruitment of officers and cadets for the cadet organisations in the three defence services, including their rates of pay and conditions of service.69 Acting on navy advice, Riordan expressed concern regarding Drakeford’s suggested approach as ‘the requirements of each Service are so entirely different’.70 Arguing the benefits of his recommendation, on 14 July 1947, Drakeford explained to Riordan that since the end of the war it had become apparent that the ATC movement in Australia had suffered a gradual decline in strength and support, due largely to a lack of support for it in schools.71 In particular, it was the view of his officers that an important contributing factor to the decline was that members of the teaching staff of schools were paid for their services as army cadet officers, while service as an officer in the ATC was purely voluntary. As a result, members of the teaching staff preferred to offer their services and support to the army cadet service. Consequently, the Air Board had recommended that officers carrying out part-time duty with the ATC should be paid for their services for a maximum of 21 days per annum.72

Notwithstanding this initiative, Drakeford was not satisfied that payment of the limited number of days annum recommended by the Air Board would completely overcome the difficulties, but he believed that such a scheme might attract teachers to the ATC, at the expense of the army cadet organisation, and promote some mild form of competition. As an

68 Commonwealth Year Book, no. 37, 1946-47, p.1154. On 31 December 1947, the total strength of all branches of the naval reserve was reported as 159 men and 108 sailors, of a total naval force of 847 officers and 10,189 men. 69 Letter, Drakeford to Riordan, 19 June 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/161. 70 Letter, Riordan to Drakeford, 27 June 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/161. 71 Letter, Drakeford to Riordan, 14 July 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/161. 72 ibid. 264 alternative, he suggested that there was a need for a well regulated plan of recruitment of cadets, for all three services, that would avoid unnecessary competition. For instance, he observed, at certain schools there might be only enough volunteer teachers and pupils to man the smallest army or air force formation permitted and, if both organisations were in competition, effective training would be impossible. For such situations, Drakeford was of the view that some form of zoning might be appropriate and that, in this regard, it was important to adhere to the government’s policy of ensuring the greatest degree of uniformity of rates of pay and conditions of service in the three services cadet organisations. Hence, he had suggested the formation of the inter-departmental committee.73

For his part, as Drakeford observed, the Minister for the Army, C Chambers, had advised, on 4 July 1947, that the proposals had been examined by the Military Board on 30 April 1947 and a series of recommendations had been agreed. For their part, army authorities considered that (a) all three services should have access to educational establishments for the purpose of training cadets of their respective services; (b) the allocation of cadets to services should be based on some form of equitable basis yet to be determined; (c) competition between the services for cadets should be avoided; (d) colleges and schools not large enough to provide more than one service detachment should be restricted to providing cadets for one service only; (e) conditions of service for officers and cadets in cadet corps of all services should be uniform; and (f) the whole question should be examined by an inter-departmental committee. In addition, the Military Board had expressed the view that the matter affected all services and should be referred to the Department of Defence for consideration by the Defence Committee and by the Principal Administrative Officers Committee (Personnel). Furthermore, the Defence Minister, J Dedman, had approved these recommendations on 20 May 1947.74 The navy appeared to be alone in its view that its requirements were unique and, unlike Creswell in 1905, were being encouraged to participate fully in a unified system.

With the whole tri-service cadet issue under consideration by Dedman’s department, it seemed inevitable that the navy would have to consider a co-ordinated approach,

73 ibid. 74 ibid. 265 particularly in relation to cadets in schools. Rosenthal commented that, although the navy had not subscribed to the system of school cadets, the concept had been previously considered with a view to making school boys’ more navy minded, with possible recruitment benefits.75 Furthermore, he observed, the ‘1st Naval Member has had this subject in mind for some time’ and noted that a Naval Board decision was required regarding the institution of a naval cadet organisation in schools as well as whether official recognition was to be accorded to the Navy League sea cadet and the sea scouts’.76 Any immediate commitment by the navy to a coordinated tri-service approach was quashed, however, by the Second Naval Member, Commodore JM Armstrong, who decided that no reply to the Drakeford proposals was necessary as the matter was being brought up for Naval Board consideration in due course.77 Thus, notwithstanding the broad base of support that Drakeford had elicited for his proposals, the concept of a comprehensive plan for managing all defence, and defence- related, cadet organisations under a single scheme was going to be ignored by the naval authorities, for the time being at least.

Meanwhile, as the navy’s consideration of formal recognition or even control of the community-based sea cadet branch of the movement gained momentum, naval staff started to express their views on the merits of supporting the community-based branch, particularly its likely contribution as a source of recruits and its usefulness as a potential voice for the navy in the wider community. As a local commander working closely with the community-based sea cadets, the Flag Officer in Charge, New South Wales, Rear Admiral GD Moore, made a strongly supportive submission to the Naval Board Secretary, Hawkins, on 6 July 1947, favouring implementation of the British system of full community-based cadet unit recognition and support.78 Moore requested that the Naval Board consider granting such status to the NLSCC, the Sydney Training Depot, and other similar organisations throughout Australia, on the same lines as those in force in England for such organisations.79 It was desirable, he contended, that some stricter form of naval control over these bodies should be exercised and the Navy League and Sydney Training Depot were organisations which could,

75 Minute, Rosenthal to Armstrong, 25 July 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/161. 76 ibid. 77 ibid. 78 Letter, Moore to Hawkins. 6 July 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 79 ibid. 266 under such control, produce valuable recruit material for the RAN and ‘foster the naval mind in civilian circles’.80 On the other hand, he warned, other organisations of ‘mushroom growth and less will constituted, (sometimes of suspicious birth and unsavoury reputation) do more harm than good and should be stultified’.81

Illustrating the source of his opinions regarding the varying qualities of the community-based sea cadet branch and the need to bring them under firmer naval control, Moore informed the Naval Board that the annual Navy League Service had been held at the Dockyard Church on Sunday, 29th June, and some 50 Navy League officers and sea cadets from the Navy League and a range of other smaller independent units had attended. At this event, Moore observed, Navy League officers did not know the correct uniform to wear, many of the cadets themselves were dressed in a range of divergent uniforms, and some of the younger ones had only recently ‘left the cradle’ and ‘the whole parade was a travesty of the Navy’. 82 In addition, sea cadets were often much the same age as the younger RAN ratings and, to the layman, they appeared to be members of the navy, he observed. Moore advised that he could take no strong steps to correct this situation, while such organisations owed no official allegiance to the navy.83 It is germane to this issue that the Navy League was aware of these problems from the outset of its activities and had issued meticulous instructions, on repeated occasions and over a lengthy period, to its staff and cadets regarding ‘Appearance of Ratings in Uniform’ that, if followed, would have prevented the problems Moore had raised with the Naval Board.84 It appeared that the Navy League was still attempting to maintain a high standard of dress among its members, but was still failing.

Moore made it clear, again in the context of the parade of cadets he had recently witnessed, that it was desirable that such organisations should be brought under the aegis of the RAN as soon as possible, so that training could be controlled and directed, personnel regularly inspected, and the officers subjected to some form of test. If this was not

80 ibid. 81 ibid. 82 ibid. 83 ibid. 84 Letter, New South Wales Navy League to Macandie, 18 October 1932, NAA MP151/1, 612/235/534; The Navy League Journal, vol. 5, no. 8, (New Series), August 1942, p. 12; vol. 9, no. 4, April 1946, p. 10. 267 immediately practicable, he considered that such organisations should not be allowed to wear the semblance of naval uniform, but should be confined to a ‘sea-scout’ outfit of jersey and shorts.85 With this submission to the Naval Board, Moore had effectively summarised the potential benefits of the community-based sea cadet branch, if issues of organisation, control and personnel were resolved. This was a clear statement of the situation, and an attempt to guide policy development, from a senior naval officer with direct responsibility for a naval district where a substantial number of community-based sea cadet units, albeit of varying quality, had been established for many years. Moore’s specific proposal, for either taking control of the community-based sea cadets, or, alternatively, having them all dressed distinctively as sea scouts with no prospect of them being mistaken for members of the RAN, was included in Rosenthal’s submission to the Naval Board on 28 July 1947.86 This was another opportunity for the Naval Board to take control of the community-based sea cadet branch or take action, principally by denying all access to navy-like uniforms, to distance itself from all non-defence nautical training schemes.

Before Rosenthal’s summary could go before the Naval Board, the Defence Department decided, on 7 August 1947, that funding of the cadets of all three services was a matter for ultimate determination by the Treasury, in consultation with the navy, army and air force.87 As a result, on 28 November 1947, the Secretary of the Department of Defence, F Shedden, provided the Secretary of the Department of the Navy, Nankervis, with an elaboration of the Drakeford recommendations. This comprehensive plan for the future organisation and control of the three defence-related cadet organisations indicated that the army and air force required 35,000 and 4000 cadets respectively and, while the present policy of the Naval Board did not envisage entering into the school organisation, the ultimate requirements of the navy would be 4000 cadets. In addition, the Defence Committee proposed a wide range of standard conditions for these cadet organisations, but implementation of the proposals envisaged would, as far as the navy was concerned, be

85 Letter, Moore to Hawkins. 6 July 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 86 Minute, Rosenthal to Armstrong, 28 July 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 87 Memorandum, Secretary, Department of Defence to the Secretary Department of the Army and Secretary Department of Air, with a copy to the Secretary of the Department of the Navy, 7 August 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/161. 268 subject to the approval by the Minister for the Navy.88 Thus, once again, the navy had been presented with an opportunity to consider a cadet solution that would provide uniformity in cadet administration across all three services. Furthermore, such a solution would allow the navy to address, under a defence-wide policy, an organisation model for all defence-related cadets, the duality of the navy cadet system and, possibly, resolve the associated community- based cadet issues of organisation, control, personnel and funding. At a broader level still, this tri-service solution presented another option to resolve the navy’s cadet duality dilemma, if the Naval Board chose to consider and support the Drakeford proposals.

With the release of the Defence Department recommendations on combined cadet conditions imminent, Rosenthal suggested to Hawkins, on 20 November 1947, that the army and air force should be asked to give full details of all equipment and services made available to the army cadet service and the ATC.89 Such details were to include information on supply of equipment, the cost of camps or continuous training, transport costs from home or school, authorised membership levels and the total average annual cost of supporting the respective cadet organisations. Rosenthal then considered this data alongside preparations for a new scheme in Britain aimed at creating a in schools by merging existing sea cadet corps, junior training corps, and air training corps school units. In Australia, Rosenthal observed, if the NLSCC and sea scouts in Australia were recognised, there would be a requirement for a new organisation to run these ‘open units’ (non-school units or school units that allowed non-students to enrol) as was done by the British Admiralty. Moreover, there would be a requirement to authorise payments, issue equipment, provide drill ships and undertake the docking and refitting of the ships, as occurred in England.90 When Rosenthal subsequently put these, quite expansive, ideas on paper and presented them to the Naval Board, he had, in effect, packaged up a comprehensive policy for the management of the community-based sea cadets, focusing on the Navy League and the sea scouts. What is more, his latest proposals entailed full involvement in management of all aspects of organisation, control, personnel and funding. In particular, the projected funding support went well beyond anything previously considered and, if approved, would provide

88 Memorandum, Shedden to Nankervis, 28 November 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/161. 89 Minute, Rosenthal to Hawkins, 20 November 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 90 ibid. 269 the community-based sea cadet branch with a level of support approaching that previously provided to the defence-based NRC.

Thus, after almost two years of research and deliberation and forty years of considering various types of requests for recognition, the Naval Board decided to give formal consideration to a concrete and detailed proposal for the official recognition of the NLSCC and similar organisations, on 17 September 1947. 91 In doing so, it was first observed by naval authorities that the army and air force had junior cadet systems, which had been established in various schools, but that it was inadvisable, for the present, to form similar ‘closed’ navy units in schools. Rather, it was decided that the navy would concentrate on training of boys between the ages of 14 and 18 enrolled with non-school organisations, which aimed at fostering a seafaring career. Capitation fees payable to such units would be based on levels provided to similar organisations by the army and air force. From a control point of view, it was decided that it was impracticable to deal directly with the numerous organisations requiring assistance and that conferences should be held in all states with these bodies for the purpose of appointing unified authorities, state and federal, with which the department would co-operate. If this recommendation received the minister’s approval, the DNR, Rosenthal, the architect of the plan, would undertake the organisation of such meetings.92

The Naval Board’s subsequent implementation plan for recognising the community- based sea cadets began on 9 October 1947 when Rosenthal advised Hawkins of capitation fees paid by the army and air force and commented that the funds made available for this purpose were at a ‘low-level’.93 Some details of costs were provided, but Rosenthal considered that a much more comprehensive overview of the cost of the army scheme was required. Subsequently, on 19 November 1947, the army provided a detailed costing of its total force of 226 units and 22500 Army Cadets and an estimate for maintaining 5000 cadets in initial and subsequent years.94 Now, after years of providing mostly token support, the

91 Naval Board Minutes, 17 September 1947, NAA MP 151/1, 422/201/166. 92 ibid. 93 Minute, Rosenthal to Hawkins, 9 October 1947, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 94 Letter, Secretary, Department of the Army, to Secretary, Department of the Navy, 19 November 1947, NAA: 270

Naval Board had taken the initiative to gain a fuller appreciation of what turned out to be the quite substantial, not low level as Rosenthal had initially indicated, cost of providing the kind of comprehensive support, to both the community-based sea cadets and the defence-based NRC, that was already being provided by the army to its cadet organisation. In light of these potentially very significant and unexpected costs, the immediate question that arose was - Would the potential benefits suggested by advocates such as Moore and Rosenthal, the influence of events in Britain and the cadet schemes in the army and air force be enough to convince the Naval Board to recognise either the Navy League units or the sea scouts, or both?

As the official recognition process ebbed and flowed, the Navy League executive was being kept informed, and followed the developments very closely. At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Victorian Navy League, on 26 November 1947, the Chairman, Commander JD Bates, reported on his meeting with First Naval Member, Hamilton, whose reaction he described as ‘heartening’.95 Additionally, he advised that the Naval Board Secretary, Hawkins, had apprised him of the work Rosenthal was undertaking on costs met by the army, air force and the British Admiralty regarding cadets so that the Navy League case could be presented to the Naval Board.96 From the Navy League side, Bates reported that the Sydney Training Depot had accepted membership of the Navy League Council and an effort was to be made to open branches in Queensland and Tasmania.97 It seemed that both sides were preparing to make a commitment and, although similar scenarios going back 40 years had not progressed to a solution, there was certainly at this point a much more focused approach among senior navy administrators that suggested recognition of the community- based sea cadets, and unification of the naval and sea cadet movement might be achievable, in some form.

MP742/1, 48/1/446. 95 Minutes of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Navy League (Victorian Branch), 26 November 1947. AWM 124, 4/82. 96 ibid. 97 Letter, Bates to Pixley, 23 January 1948, AWM 124, 4/82. 271

On 26 November 1947, the Naval Board decided to recommend official recognition of the Navy League to Riordan. 98 If necessary, it was observed, the question of similar recognition of the sea scouts and other similar organisations would be considered at a later date. In this regard, Rosenthal, who was instructed to prepare a covering statement for the minister, made a number of observations and recommendations, beginning with his view that granting official recognition to the Navy League would almost certainly stimulate the sea scouting organisation to make a similar request. With regard to recognition of the Navy League, and its sea cadet corps, despite his role as a prime mover in this whole process, he suggested that approval should be given ‘in principle’ only and be subject to the Department of Navy having to provide assistance only in regard to the making available of stores and equipment, under conditions to be determined, and the supervision of the training of these bodies by naval authorities.99

If Rosenthal’s caveats were agreed by the Naval Board, official recognition would actually have very limited impact on what was already in place. Nevertheless, after ministerial approval was received on 11 December 1947, the Australian Council of the Navy League was informed on 19 December 1947 that official recognition had been granted and that it should forward proposals for assistance as required.100 In this way, even after ministerial approval, the parties remained at the beginning of a process of agreeing on the practical details of what official recognition would, in fact, entail and the announcement of official recognition of the ‘Navy League in Australia and the Navy League Sea Cadets’ was tempered by the statement that assistance ‘may possibly follow’.101 This was certainly official recognition in principle only, as Rosenthal had recommended, with much yet to be discussed before any substantial action would be taken.

Thus, at the end of this two year period, the Naval Board had passed the brink of providing some form of community-based sea cadet recognition, but there was, as yet, no

98 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 21-25, NAA: B6121/1, 295B. 99 ibid. 100 ibid. 101 ‘Navy League Given Official Recognition’, Newsletter No.2, Naval Reserves Branch, Navy Office, Melbourne, 15 January 1948, p.2. 272 suggestion of legislation to formalise the suggested changes or what final form such changes might take. Similarly, alignment with the army and air force cadets has been left in abeyance, as priority was given to the first steps of official recognition of the community- based sea cadets. Nevertheless, it appeared that the navy had substantially accepted, in principle at least, that it would take greater responsibility for the community-based branch of the naval and sea cadet movement’s organisation, control, personnel and funding – and perhaps end the traditional ‘dual’ system of naval and sea cadets.

273

CHAPTER TEN

Dilemma Resolved 1948-1952

In the period 1948-52, after decades of tedious wrangling, the ‘recognition’ debate concerning the community-based sea cadet branch of the naval and sea cadet movement was at last resolved when the Navy League was officially recognised, through the creation of the Australian Sea Cadet Council, as the central governing body of the community-based sea cadet branch. Under new administrative arrangements, the DNR was placed in charge of both the defence-based NRC and community-based sea cadets. This final step, however, was, rather predictably, neither smooth nor painless. This chapter begins with an examination of the Naval Board’s continuing deliberations regarding official recognition of the community-based sea cadets and how they might be managed alongside the NRC, which was to be rejuvenated after having been in abeyance since World War II. Subsequent processes, problems and frustrations that faced the Naval Board are considered and showcase the navy’s effort to finally transform the community-based sea cadet branch into a defence administered organisation. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of plans for the future organisation and control of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, in conjunction with a restructured RANR, under the control of the DNR.

The Chifley/Calwell post-war immigration program was expanded by the new Menzies government that came to office at the end of 1949.1 Domestically, Menzies aimed to reduce bureaucracy by cutting red tape, reducing taxes, lifting restrictions on foreign investment, encouraging private investment and allowing wage increases.2 His security concerns, however, were focused on communism, which he regarded as a major threat, and he despatched Australian forces to Korea and Malaya and, confirming the enduring defence links to Britain, allowed British nuclear testing to be conducted in Australia.3 Menzies’ connections to Britain extended beyond defence and it has been written of him that if his first hate was communism, his first love was the British monarchy, to the point that he was a courtier.4 Nevertheless, the Menzies government sustained a broadly based migration policy

1 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p. 199, M Peel & C Twomey A History of Australia, pp. 210-211. 2 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p. 202. 3 Blainey, A Shorter History of Australia, p. 199-200 4 ibid., p. 200-201. 274 and, by the 1950s, Australia was producing its own iconic Holden motor car, there was a strong mining sector and the rural sector was about to be boosted by markets opened by the war in Korea.5 Throughout this period of industrial and social diversification, Menzies imperial sentiments would have given encouragement to organisations with direct links to Britain, like the Navy League and its NLSCC.6 His defence concerns also resulted in the re- introduction of conscription and the first intake of 400 ‘Naval National Servicemen’ commenced a combination of full-time and part-time training on 30 July 1951, but this did not include cadets.7

The first step in the final, but lengthy, process whereby the navy at last recognised the NLSCC, and formed a combined Australian naval and sea cadet movement, occurred when, on 22 January 1948, the President of the Council of the Navy league, JD Bates, acknowledged the navy’s formal approval of official recognition.8 Thus, after many false starts, the RAN and the Navy League had arrived at a turning point in the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement some forty years after the Director of Naval Forces, WR Creswell, had declined to follow through on a similar proposal.9 Unlike many previous tentative and in principle proposals, on this occasion the navy confirmed its decision, on 2 March 1948, with an ‘order’ confirming that the Australian Council of the Navy League would be the coordinating authority for all branches of the Navy League and NLSCC in each state.10 Specifically, under this new arrangement, if individual units of the NLSCC made requests for assistance in regard to provision of boats or other equipment, they were to be informed that all such requests should be forwarded to the Australian Council of the Navy League.11

5 ibid. p. 202-203; Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p. 203. 6 Knightley, Australia A Biography of a Nation, p. 232. 7 National Service Act 1951, G Davison, J Hirst and S Macintyre (eds), The Oxford Companion to Australian History, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2001, p. 146, NT Shields, ‘National Service Training, 1950-1959, Forward, R & Reece, RHW Conscription in Australia, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, Brisbane, 1968, pp. 66-69, &‘National Service Training’, Newsletter No.14, Naval Reserves Branch, Navy Office, Melbourne, 31 July 1951, p. 5. 8 Letter, Bates to Nankervis, 22 January 1948, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166.. 9 Minute, Naval Director to Queensland Naval Commandant, 3 March 1910, NAA MP178/2, 2129/4/16. 10 Minute, DRRF to the Second Naval Member, 2 March 1948, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 11 ibid. 275

At this point of the RAN having committed itself to the Navy League, it is appropriate to review the circumstances surrounding, and implications of, a decision that was still only the first step in the process of ending the traditional duality of the overall naval and sea cadet movement. The Naval Board’s decision to recognise the Navy League, an organisation with a limited national presence that was closely aligned with the navy, immediately narrowed the focus of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement. In addition, on 23 April 1948, the Naval Board further narrowed the scope of the new scheme when it advised the Treasury Department that it did not intend, for the time being, to train sea cadets in schools and, as such, no financial provision had been made for that purpose.12 With this decision the Naval Board rejected the Defence Department’s earlier proposal for a coordinated tri-service approach to cadets in schools. The result was that the navy had no involvement with a model of cadet training, in use by the army cadets and the ATC, where cadet officers were trained teachers who conducted cadet activities as a recognised extra-curricular activity, and where the schools provided many of the facilities. In turning its back on this opportunity, the Naval Board ignored an environment that had significant advantages over open volunteer community units, like those of the Navy League, in terms of organisation, control, personnel and funding. The navy’s choice could be described, in the fullness of time, as choosing the longer and harder course. As will be revealed later in this chapter, the Naval Board was encouraged to reconsider its decision by a number of community-based sea cadet supporters, including politicians, but chose to maintain its view that, with few exceptions, naval and sea cadet units should not be formed in schools.13

Although it had agreed to recognise the NLSCC, the Naval Board intended to retain, separately, the defence-based and legislated NRC and advised the Treasury Department that the pre-war cadet scheme in the RANR, in which ratings were enlisted between the ages of 16-18 years, would be continued in the post-war RANR.14 Under this rejuvenated scheme, NRC members were not to be paid for drills, but would be issued with uniforms and provided

12 Letter, Secretary, Department of the Navy, to the Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury, 23 April 1948, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/161. 13 As a result of this decision, very few naval cadet school units were ever formed and the few early units that were formed were abandoned. Several new school units were formed much later, but the navy never truly embraced the school system. This situation remains unchanged at the time of writing this thesis. 14 Letter, Secretary, Department of the Navy, to Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury, 23 April 1948, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/161. 276 with travel warrants or fares to and from the drill hall and their place of residence. Furthermore, personnel for the NRC would not include specific adult cadet officers, as training was to be provided by the permanent instructional staff attached to adult RANR establishments. Finally, by the time NRC training resumed, on 1 January 1950, the national complement of 400 cadets was confirmed as an integral part of the naval reserve forces (Naval Reserve Regulation 33), while statutory rules would be needed to organise and control the NLSCC.15 Although the strict legal duality of the movement thus remained, the two organisations were to be managed side by side by the DNR, Rosenthal, using a joint system of organisation, control, personnel and funding. Thus, in the next phase of the official recognition process for the community-based branch, on 26 May 1948, Rosenthal proposed new administrative arrangements for the future, and yet to be officially approved, Australian Sea Cadet Corps (ASCC), which borrowed heavily from the British Admiralty's management of the sea cadets in the United Kingdom.16

In considering the application of the British model, Rosenthal focused directly on the duality of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, particularly the funding of the future ASCC compared to the defence-based NRC. The NRC, he observed, had all the benefits that membership of the defence force provided, but now the Naval Board was considering similar benefits for the new ASCC organisation, which would be formed, essentially out of the NLSCC, but under a totally new and different arrangement. An important example, he observed, of the differences in benefits to be provided, was insurance. The British Admiralty accepted liability in respect of third-party claims against Sea Cadet Corps personnel, arising out of accidents occurring in the course of sea cadet duty, but only to the same extent as a private employer. In Australia, Rosenthal noted, the Principal Defence Personnel Committee had already recommended protection in this regard for school (army) cadets and the ATC and he suggested the same conditions should apply to the ASCC, while the defence-based NRC would continue to be protected on the same basis as adult RANR members. Thus, a potential enduring point of difference between the proposed new community-based branch

15 Minute, Naval Secretary to Second Naval Member, 16 June 1950, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/198. After RANR training resumed, in January 1950, compulsory part-time ‘national service’ training was introduced, but volunteer naval reserve training continued as a separate program. ‘The Citizen Naval Force’, Outline of Australian naval history, RAN Education Service, Canberra, 1962, p. 3. 16 Minute, Rosenthal to Naval Board, 26 May 1948, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 277 organisation, the ASCC, and the rejuvenated defence-based NRC was already identified. It seemed that aspects of the dual system would survive, particularly where there were significant potential, legal and financial, ramifications.

Even though it was not to receive defence compensation coverage, the new ASCC would require significant navy investment. In terms of staffing to control this new organisation, Rosenthal felt it was necessary to appoint young, active commanders or senior lieutenant commanders, on a full-time basis, with a genuine interest in youth training, as part of the staff of the DNR and DNOs in each state. His four year budget forecast provided for a capitation grant, efficiency grant, uniform gratuity to officers, kit for sailors (on loan), equipment and stores for instructional purposes (on loan), and boats (on loan). Over this four year period, the new ASCC was planned to increase from 650 in year one, to 950, 1200 and finally 1550 in year four.17 Thus, from the outset, Rosenthal’s overview made the Naval Board fully aware of the immediate implications of recognising the community-based sea cadet organisation and taking full responsibility for its organisation, control, personnel and funding. Perhaps, in light of the long history of the navy hesitating to assist the community- based sea cadet branch in any substantial, or permanent, way, the financial implications of Rosenthal’s four year approval plan should not have come as a surprise to the members of the Naval Board - but it did.

With Rosenthal keen to progress the ASCC plan and the Navy League impatient to recruit new cadets, it seemed that the implementation of the new scheme would be a mere formality. As agreed, the navy had supplied the Navy League with the names and addresses of ex-members of the RANR to recruit as instructors and the League was now keen to expand.18 Yet, notwithstanding the enthusiasm of both parties, long-standing problems stood in the way of progress and, on 14 June 1948, Bates, advised the navy that there was still difficulty in obtaining uniforms. Furthermore, he observed, there was still uncertainty about the Naval Board authorising the use of the same uniform worn in the United Kingdom for use by Australian officers and cadets, and this was delaying expansion to Queensland and South

17 ibid. 18 Letter, Bates to Nankervis, 15 March 1948, NAA MP151/1, 413/201/430 278

Australia.19 While the Naval Board was able to confirm, on 23 June 1948, that it had agreed in principle on the general scheme of sea cadet training to be followed, it did so with the added proviso that it was checking what had been approved in this regard in the army and air force.20. Pressure was building on the Naval Board, however, as the Minister for the Navy, Riordan was again forced to delay a reply to the Member for North Sydney, WM Hughes, whom he had advised in December 1946 that a decision on assistance to the NLSCC was expected to be made early in 1947.21

After the particulars of what the other services cadet schemes provided in terms of uniforms and training were received, on 29 June 1948, the Naval Board decided that it would proceed immediately with supplying the extant NLSCC (pending the formal creation of the ASCC) with similar articles to those issued by the RN to the British NLSCC, when possible, and that NLSCC officers could obtain uniforms from the Commonwealth Clothing Factory.22 For the conduct of training, approval was given, again in principle, that, when convenient, use could be made of the facilities available at certain naval establishments, such as the Flinders Naval Depot in Victoria and HMAS Penguin in New South Wales, and NLSCC members were to be given short passages in navy ships when the opportunity arose. In addition, compensation cover on such short trips was to be provided under an amendment to the Defence Act and free travel was approved for NLSCC officers and cadets to join and return from navy ships or establishments for training, as circumstances permitted.23 More significantly, after years of the community-based sea cadets having to buy their own boats, the Naval Board approved, again in principle, the supply of navy boats, when available on the basis of the practices associated with the provision of equipment in the army and air force cadet schemes.

Notwithstanding these funding concessions, when it came to organisation, control and personnel, the Naval Board did not agree with Rosenthal’s recommendations regarding eight

19 Letter, Bates to Nankervis, 14 June 1948, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 20 Naval Board Minute, No. 146, 23 June 1948, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 21 Letter, Riordan to Hughes, 11 December 1946; Draft letter, Riordan to Hughes, 16 June 1948, NAA MP138/1, 603/201/3041. 22 Naval Board Minute, No. 155, 29 June 1948, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 23 ibid. 279 extra full-time navy officers to be used to help run the new ASCC. Although the air force, for example, had fifty three personnel dedicated to supporting its 2300 cadets, it was considered that the existing navy officer complement was sufficient, so that, effectively, Rosenthal would not have any officers dedicated exclusively to the development of the new ASCC, when it was officially formed.24 Thus, while the Naval Board had made significant concessions, it stopped short of taking responsibility for the community-based sea cadets to the same extent that it maintained the NRC. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the community-based sea cadets were now sharing the same limited personnel and funding allocation as the rest of the navy, although at a low level of priority. Regardless of how it was presented, the divide had closed considerably, with only some aspects of personnel and funding lacking commonality between the NLSCC (and future ASCC) and what was to be rejuvenated as the post-war NRC.

Unfortunately, the time necessary to draft regulations for the ASCC proved much more than the anticipated six months. Although the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear-Admiral JA Collins, was impatient and wanted to see progress, a year passed before any real progress was evident.25 Nevertheless, the delay allowed the Naval Board to address some perceived problems with the navy’s new legal responsibility for community-based sea cadets. These problems became evident, in January 1949, when Rosenthal, who considered that the future ASCC should be incorporated in the Citizen Naval Forces, in order to maintain co-ordination with the army and air force, had drafted ‘Regulations for the Navy League Sea Cadet Corps’ to anticipate such a change.26 The preparation and approval of these draft Regulations was accounting for a large part of the delay in implementing the Naval Board decision of 29 June 1948. As a solution to the problems associated with this delay, the Naval Secretary, Nankervis, suggested that it was preferable for the Navy League to assume all responsibility for the training of future ASCC, together with amenities, buildings required for training, and so on.

24 ibid. 25 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, pp. 28-29, NAA B6121/1, 295B. 26 ibid.. 280

With this division of responsibilities, the Naval Board could confine itself to assisting with permanent loan of uniforms and instructional equipment (including boats), and the provision of opportunities for training in navy ships or at navy bases. This new approach, Nankervis observed, could be implemented by amendments and additions to existing Regulations, as opposed to approving the new Regulations that Rosenthal had proposed. The matter was given impetus by Collins, who commented that he was ‘surprised and distressed to find that, in over 14 months nothing has been achieved towards implementing Board decisions’, and he agreed with Nankervis’ recommendation, hoping to see something ‘definite achieved forthwith.’27 Collins, as the head of the navy, had made it clear that he wanted the matter of the duality of the movement and support of the community-based sea cadets resolved, and that he supported a more expedient approach that retained some aspects of the dual system through a transition period. While the divide was not widening again, with these uncertainties, it seemed there were going to be delays before it was permanently closed.

Amidst all these discussions on what form recognition and support would take, the Navy League found itself no further advanced with regards the supply of uniforms and, on 21 June 1949, Rosenthal advised the Naval Board that he was ‘very disturbed’ over this issue and that steps should be taken immediately to outfit current new NLSCC recruits before the enthusiasm of the organisers waned.28 Further, he observed, very little progress had been made on the draft Regulations which had left his branch on 23 January 1949, and it was a matter of additional concern that the considerable lift given to the Navy League organisation by formal recognition might deteriorate very rapidly, unless the Naval Board was able to implement its policy ‘at the earliest possible time’.29 In addition to the navy delays, the current delay in the Attorney General's Department in having the appropriate ASCC statute gazetted did not help matters and Rosenthal strongly recommended that a case should be put forward for the minister to obtain the interim approval of the Treasurer for the issue of the uniforms under the proposed new arrangements.30

27 ibid. 28 Minute, Rosenthal to Naval Board, 2, June 1949, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 29 ibid. 30 ibid. 281

Rosenthal’s increasingly frustrated and even desperate recommendations were approved by Collins and, on 25 June 1949, the Director of Navy Accounts co-ordinated the minister’s approval to issue uniforms to the NLSCC on the basis that the necessary funds had been provided in the draft budget for 1949/50.31 Noting the minister’s ‘full agreement’ Hawkins sought the immediate concurrence of the Treasury Department, on 1 August 1949, to the free issue to units of the NLSCC, and to officers and instructors attached to these units, of such articles of naval uniform, and in such quantities, as approved in the budget. These uniforms would of course remain the property of the Government, he observed, and would be issued under conditions of control as directed by the Naval Board. 32 With this action, the Naval Board was now pressing its case to take full responsibility for funding of uniforms and exercise control over their use. The gap between the management of the community-based sea cadets and defence-based NRC was closing with respect to an issue that had been a matter of considerable contention since the creation of the first community-based sea cadet units from 1900. Furthermore, although aspects of the navy’s organisation, control, personnel management and funding of the community-based sea cadets was being achieved with a succession of makeshift measures, in anticipation of completing the legislative process, there was as yet no sign that the navy was having second thoughts about its commitment to recognition and unification.

Another significant decision that signalled the acceptance by the navy of the community-based sea cadets existing alongside the defence-based NRC, under a naval administrative umbrella, was the granting of special leave for defence purposes to Australian public servants who served in such recognised units. In proposing this important government concession to the Australian Public Service Board, on 1 September 1949, the Secretary of the Department of Defence, PE Coleman, addressed the revised formation of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement and, particularly the rejuvenated NRC.33 A revised ‘NRC’ scheme was to commence on 1 January 1950, Coleman observed, that would be similar to the ‘Regimental Cadet Units’ recently approved for the training of boys between the ages of 14 and 18 years of age who were not provided for in the Australian (Army) Cadet Corps, which

31Minute, Director of Navy Accounts to the Finance Member, Naval Board, 25 June 1949, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 32Letter, Hawkins to Assistant Secretary, Department of Treasury, 1 August 1949, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/166. 33 Letter, Coleman to the Public Service Board,, 1 September 1949, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/184. 282 comprised school cadets only. 34 Addressing the need for leave for cadet staff, Coleman observed that, although home training only was proposed initially, it might be desired to introduce continuous cadet training in future and, for this reason, it was considered desirable that the principle of leave for such purposes should apply to the NRC, in common with other service cadet organisations. On the other hand, Coleman explained, the NLSCC, which would form the basis of the ASCC, were as yet only organised in New South Wales and Victoria, but it was planned to extend the organisation to the other states. It was considered by the Defence Committee, therefore, that the principle of leave with pay, which now applied to the citizens’ forces, should be extended to embrace service cadet organisations, including the new ASCC, as an organisation officially recognised by the Naval Board. On the other hand, it was the view of the Defence Committee that leave should not be granted to public servants for training with the remaining non-ASCC, and thus non-official, bodies, such as the sea scouts.35

With a decision made on leave for public servants, the Defence Department put in place an organisation and personnel structure that went a long way, symbolically at least, towards eliminating the duality of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement. In addition to aligning a particular section of the community-based sea cadet branch (the NLSCC/ASCC) with the NRC in providing a single navy-endorsed outcome, it further defined the sea scouts, as part of the Boy Scouts’ Association, as being outside the realm of service based organisations for which the navy could provide organisation, control, personnel and funding. This effectively confirmed the ASCC (and the NLSCC on an interim basis) as the only recognised community-based sea cadet organisation in Australia, despite its initial presence being limited to New South Wales and Victoria. In this way, the navy had created a single organisation out of two groups, each effectively very small and manageable - an NRC organisation that was in the process of reforming and a NLSCC organisation that was still in its infancy 30 years after its formation. While this new organisation lacked numerical and geographic strength, particularly compared to the army cadets, the challenges of providing organisation, control, personnel and funding would be far less daunting for the navy than

34 ibid. 35 ibid. 283 assuming responsibility for the widespread and fragmented movement that had engaged the Naval Board, in some form, since 1900.

Although the date of the official inauguration of the ASCC remained uncertain, further official endorsements of the role of the Navy League, as the national coordinator of this new single community-based sea cadet organisation, confirmed the likely prospect of the elimination of the dual status of the movement. As an example, on 28 September 1949, Riordan announced that it was ‘pleasing to be able to refer to the great interest being shown by young men of school age in the Navy League Sea Cadet Corps, and the Naval Board has given its official recognition to that organisation’.'36 Furthermore, after 30 years of seeking such recognition, the status of Navy League personnel appeared assured when, on 5 January 1950, the Treasury Department included the NLSCC in a review of officers’ home training allowance.37 Asked to comment on this proposal, Rosenthal expressed his agreement with the proposed increase in the annual allowances for officers instructors of the sea cadets, but he noted that officers and instructors who were members of the RANR would probably not be affected since the maximum payment they could receive would not exceed what they could be paid under the RANR Regulations. Notwithstanding this situation, he observed, with regard to officers who held appointments only in the ASCC, it would provide an additional incentive for the time and energy they devoted to sea cadet activities.38 With the navy preparing new official rules that applied to both the future ASCC and the existing NRC, on the same basis, formal recognition of the NLSCC, and the creation of the ASCC, as the official national community-based sea cadet body, must have seemed a formality. Certainly, the firm line of separation that had defined the dual system was being blurred quite significantly in many areas and, it seemed, that only several more formal steps needed to be taken to complete the recognition and unification process.

Although the navy had taken the initiative, thus far, to formalise its commitment to certain aspects of administering the community-based sea cadets, it was the Federal Council

36 CPD, House of Representatives Objective Speech, 28 September 1949, p. 5 37 Minute, Secretary, Department of Air, to Secretary, Department of Navy,1 January 1950, NAA MP151/1,407/201/2208. 38 Minute, Rosenthal to Nankervis, 16 January 1950, NAA MP151/1, 407/201/2208. 284 of the Navy League that asked the Naval Board, in May 1950, for co-operation in the formation of a sea cadet council. 39 To control the policy and general organisation of the future ASCC, it was suggested that a similar council should be formed to the one performing the same role in the United Kingdom. Rosenthal supported the proposal but, in terms of the statutory rules that he had drafted, did not consider that a ‘sea cadet council’ in Australia could be given similar authority to its counterpart in the United Kingdom, especially in regard to control of finance. In particular, Rosenthal considered that any sea cadet council formed in Australia must be restricted to an advisory role and decisions made would not be binding on the Naval Board, to which any matter requiring approval would be submitted in the normal (and formal) way.40

The Naval Secretary, TJ Hawkins, presented a strong case in support of taking responsibility for the NLSCC, alongside the NRC, to the Naval Board, on 16 June 1950, declaring that he ‘earnestly desired’ the Board to forward the necessary draft statutory rules to the Attorney General’s Department.41 Subsequently, the Naval Board approved the formation of an Australian Sea Cadet Council, consisting of the DNR (Chairman), Staff Officer (Training) to DNR, Deputy President of the Navy League, a representative from each state division of the Navy League (which had a sea cadet corps) and a secretary.42 Although, the proposed sea cadet council would not be able to make decisions with regard to the new ASCC that were binding on the Naval Board, it could be argued that this arrangement gave the council no less power than was enjoyed by the naval administrators in their administration of the NRC, who also had to progress all requests through the navy system to the Naval Board. The fact that these administrators were one and the same only served to blur yet another aspect of the remaining legal remnants of the dual system.

Although the necessary legislative changes had not yet been made, the Naval Board Secretary, FG Cummins, informed all DNOs, on 15 August 1950, that interim assistance

39 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 36, NAA: B6121/1, 295B. 40 ibid. 41 Minute, Naval Secretary to Naval Board, 16 June 1950, NAA MP151/1, 427/201/198. 42 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 36, NAA: B6121/1, 295B. 285 would be given to existing NLSCC units along the lines of similar support given to the Australian Army school cadets and the ATC.43 In this way, the status of the new Australian Council of the Navy League and the extent of the navy’s commitment to the new scheme were confirmed, with the planned ASCC and the existing NLSCC, essentially, being the same organisation. Cummins also confirmed that the Naval Board had approved the formation of the Australian Sea Cadet Council to act as an advisory board to the Naval Board in matters pertaining to the ASCC, such as recruiting, training, equipment, uniform, appointment of officers and instructors, formation of new sea cadet units, and so on. Nevertheless, uncertainty remained, as Cummins also advised DNOs that tentative general detailed instructions governing the administration of the sea cadets would be promulgated only when formal concurrence was received from the Defence Division of the Treasury Department, which was anticipated in the near future. In making these arrangements known throughout the navy, however, the Naval Board had taken a major step in finalising its commitment to taking substantive control of the community-based sea cadet branch of the movement.44 For its part, the Navy League announced, in its September 1950 journal, the change from the NLSCC to the ASCC, the formation of the Australian Sea Cadet Council and the commitment from the Minister for Navy, Francis, that ‘the Naval Board would ensure that everything possible was done to assist the corps in its work and development’.45

Although the navy had agreed to work with the Navy League in organising and controlling its community-based sea cadet branch, and transforming it into the ASCC, questions remained about the new arrangements, particularly in relation to sea cadets in schools and the alignment of the new ASCC units with their army and air force equivalents. As an example, a question in the Australian Senate, on 5 October 1950, from Senator Kendall to the Minister for the Navy, J Francis, probed the navy’s commitment to cadets in schools and the provision of the same assistance to sea cadets as that given by the other services.46 As a consequence, and notwithstanding previous assurances that there would be little involvement with schools, the Secretary to the Department of the Navy, TJ Hawkins, advised,

43Minute, Cummins to the Flag Officer in Charge, NSW, Naval Officers in Charge and Resident Naval Officers, 15 August 1950, NAA MP151/1, 422/201/209. 44 ibid. 45 The Navy, vol.14, no. 9, September 1950, pp. 28 46 CPD, Extract, 5 October 1950, NAA MP151/1, 551/201/597. 286 on 11 October 1950, that not only was the NLSCC the naval counterpart of the army school cadets and the ATC, but every endeavour was being made by both the navy and the Navy League of Australia to increase the number of units, including ‘Closed Units’ in larger schools.47 Notwithstanding this intention, the only existing ‘Closed Units’ were at Footscray Technical School and Geelong Grammar School as a shortage of officers and instructors made it impossible to form new school-based units.48 Furthermore, no ex-naval officers or instructors were being employed as school masters or in connection with the larger schools and, therefore, if such an expansion into schools was to become a reality, such personnel would need to be drawn from pools that were already in very short supply. Moreover, Hawkins pointed out, sea cadet units required equipment such as boathouses and boats and to be close to a waterfront, which was confounded by available equipment being needed in many cases for training full-time navy recruits and because most schools were not near waterfronts.49

Addressing the broader goals of overall recognition, Hawkins went on to advise that progress in the development of the ASCC had practically been halted while a decision was awaited from the Treasury Department regarding issues such as the granting of sea cadet officers commissions, uniforms, travelling warrants, payments of sea cadet officers and instructors, and so on. Nevertheless, he declared, ‘all possible assistance to schools for the institution of Sea Cadet Units will be afforded’.50 Although some of Hawkins’ comments had the ring of long-standing navy arguments for not supporting the community-based branch of the movement, it was the Treasury Department’s reluctance to approve the proposed legislative authority, to render assistance to the ASCC, that meant the navy could not proceed with its plans, and strong representations were made through their Minister, in November 1950, ‘to hasten action’.51 In addition, the Naval Board took direct action and informed the Treasury Department, on 4 December 1950, that ‘there was no necessity to await enactment of the new provisions of the Defence Act and Naval Defence Bills’ before taking action on

47 Minute, Dowling to Hawkins, 11 October 1950, NAA MP151/1, 551/201/597. TJ Hawkins was first appointed as Secretary to the Naval Board and then was appointed to the more senior role of Secretary to the Department of the Navy, replacing AR Nankervis. 48 ibid. 49 ibid. 50 ibid. 51 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 36 - 37, NAA B6121/1, 295B. 287 the new sea cadet initiative.52 This keenness by the navy to anticipate the legislation is given further perspective by the already heavy involvement of RANR officers in NLSCC activities such as the annual summer camp of the Victorian Division where 63 cadets were supervised on a full-time basis by three naval reserve officers and instructed by others throughout the one week activity.53 At the same time, significant community-funded events continued to occur with veteran SC Commander LE Forsythe escorting a party of sea cadets on a visit to NLSCC units in Canada.54

Due process was not going to be swayed by enthusiasm, however, and Treasury officials held discussions with the officers of the Attorney General’s Department over a four month period and advised, on 4 March 1951, that the ‘firm advice tendered is that the NLSCC does not form any part of the organisation of the Navy’.55 Furthermore, it was observed that, while the NLSCC were under the auspices of the League and provided for under the constitution of the League they could not legally be considered as part of the official naval organisation. As such, navy proposals to amend Naval Volunteer Regulations, on the lines the navy had submitted to the Treasury Department, that is, that the NLSCC (and the future ASCC) would be deemed senior cadets within the meaning of the Defence Act, would be ultra vires. Furthermore, the envisaged amendments to the Defence Act or Naval Defence Act would not affect this position. For these reasons, unless the NLSCC (in forming the ASCC) were disassociated from the Navy League and placed entirely under naval control as part of the voluntary organisation of the navy, the Treasury Department could neither concur with the draft amendments to the Naval Volunteer Reserve Regulations nor authorise any expenditure in respect to the sea cadets.56 Thus, despite the agreement made with the Navy League, and communicated throughout the wider navy community, that the community-based sea cadets would be officially recognised by the navy, the legal aspects of duality appeared insurmountable.

52 ibid. 53 The Navy, vol.15, no. 4, April 1951, p. 31. 54 ibid., vol,15, no. 5, May 1951, p. 31. 55 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 36 - 37, NAA B6121/1, 295B. 56 ibid. 288

Although it had received approval in principle from the federal cabinet, on 4 December 1950, for a Bill to amend the Naval Defence Act 1910-1949 with regard to community-based sea cadets, the Naval Board first had to resolve its basic legal dilemma regarding community-based, and controlled, sea cadets not being able to be included in the navy organisation. 57 To this end, in June 1951, the Navy recommended the insertion of a section in the proposed bill authorising the Naval Board to give facilities for naval training to approved persons or bodies of persons. Specifically, the proposed new section provided that the ‘Naval Board may provide as prescribed uniforms, equipment, stores and monetary grants to approved persons or bodies of persons who give naval training and instruction to the satisfaction of the Naval Board’.58 While this was a move in the right direction, the Treasury Department was still not happy with the draft as it did not meet the requirements for the sea cadets to be part of the naval forces and would not give legal recognition to the NLSCC/ASCC as part of the official naval organisation. Furthermore, there was no assurance of any standards of attendance or efficiency such as would be available if the cadets were subject to the Act and Regulations as part of the naval forces.

In addition, as Treasury Department officials observed, the terms of the navy’s proposed provision were not restricted to the cadets or to the Navy League, but were wide enough to cover any individual or body of persons who or which gave naval training and instruction to the satisfaction of the Naval Board and payments or equipment might be made or provided to a number of individuals or organisations.59 For its part, as this government discourse continued, the Navy League moved ahead and announced, on 2 June 1951, the formation of two new units of the ASCC in Burnie and Hobart. The following week, First Lieutenant of the Hobart Company, Mr J Hamilton-Smith, appeared on an Australian Broadcasting Commission radio program to explain the aims and function of this new organisation, the ASCC.60 For his part, the Director of Naval Reserves, Rosenthal, was also making assumptive decisions and announced in the 31 July 1951 edition of the RANR Newsletter that, as part of the changes to distinguishing lace on

57 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 37-40, NAA B6121/1, 295B. 58 ibid. 59 ibid. 60 The Navy, vol. 15, no. 8, August 1951, p. 29. 289 uniforms, the ‘Sea Cadet Corps and Combined Cadet Force’ were to wear RANR stripes without any distinguishing cloth.61 Thus, in one area that had been very controversial for many years, the officers of the NLSCC/ASCC were going to be officially recognised and, as far as the Hobart public was concerned, creation and recognition of the new ASCC had been achieved..

Meanwhile, in addition to objecting to the breadth of the proposed division, Treasury officials observed that there was already provision for youth training in the RANR regulations under which the NRC (aged 16 to 18 years) were members of the defence forces.62 These Cadets were comparable with cadets of the Australian (Army) Cadet Corps and the ATC and, in this regard, the draft agendum did not give any reason why the age could not be amended to cover boys of 14 years and why the existing NRC branch was not, by itself, all that was required. Treasury officials expressed the view that, if the community- based sea cadets were admitted for financial and other assistance on the lines proposed, it would be difficult to resist pressure for similar treatment for other somewhat comparable bodies, such as the sea scouts, boy scouts, air scouts, and so on.63 Thus, after advising DNOs of its intention to take responsibility for the community-based sea cadets by working with just one central organisation, the Navy League, the Naval Board was being told that its plans for doing so still left it open to requests for support from any of the groups that constituted the community-based sea cadet branch. Moreover, Treasury officials were using the same arguments in relation to the adequacy of the NRC to the navy’s needs, and their equivalence to the army and air force cadets, that the Naval Board had used for so many years to resist the moves for unification which it was now pursuing.

In making its case to the Treasury Department, on 21 June 1951, the Naval Board made it clear that it was not intended, nor was it desired, to make the sea cadets part of the naval forces, because the Navy League was to continue its training of sea cadets and thereby

61 ‘Change in distinguishing lace’, Newsletter No.14, Naval Reserves Branch, Navy Office, Melbourne, 31 July 1951, p.4. 62 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 37-40, NAA B6121/1 295B, The Navy League of Australia. 63 ibid. 290 relieve the navy of an unacceptable administrative and training burden. The assistance of the Navy League was essential, particularly outside of capital cities where instructors from the naval forces were not available. Simply put, the training given by instructors of the Navy League fulfilled a requirement which could not be met by naval personnel. To achieve these aims, it was observed, the proposed amendment to the Naval Defence Act was intended to permit legal recognition of an approved association giving naval training to the requirements of the Naval Board. Furthermore, the recognition of any such organisation would be subject to ministerial approval upon the recommendation of the Naval Board, as in the case of the Navy League.64

With respect to the defence-based NRC, it was noted that they were comparable only with the army’s regimental cadets, who trained with Citizen Military Force units under conditions similar to those under which NRC trained with the adult RANR force in navy establishments in the capital cities. In contrast, the community-based sea cadets were more comparable with the largely school-based Army Cadet Corps and ATC. Furthermore, training of 16-18 year old NRC members was identical to that of a new recruit in the adult force, while the sea cadet corps, on the other hand, was a pre-entry naval training scheme. The age limits could not be lowered. With these arguments, the Naval Board made it clear that the existence of the defence-based NRC branch did not have to prevent the community- based sea cadets (the NLSCC/ASCC) being organised and controlled jointly by the navy and the Navy League, for the benefit of the navy.65 By outlining the merits of expanding naval and sea cadet membership, despite limitations of geography and resources, through the existing community-based sea cadet system, the navy was now actually putting the same argument forward, to Defence and Treasury, that had been presented so many times, over decades, by community-based sea cadet organisers and supporters.

Although the various government departments involved in the knotty process of making the navy’s plans work continued the debate, the focus now seemed more on arriving at a solution than denying the Naval Board what it wanted. Treasury, although considering

64 ibid 65 ibid. 291 that the proposed amendment was still too wide to be included in the current Naval Defence Act, proposed a new section ‘(39A)’ under which the ‘Naval Board may provide for the training of NLSCC under such conditions as are prescribed’.66 In this way, the actual financial assistance to be provided could then be included in the financial regulations. Consequently, on 10 July 1951, a copy of a new cabinet agendum to this end was prepared and forwarded. Now, however, the Parliamentary Draftsman commented that, under the Naval Defence Act 1910-1949, as proposed to be amended by the draft bill, the NLSCC were not, and could not be deemed to be members of the naval forces of the Commonwealth. In this regard, it was observed that the Naval Board’s intent was that the new ASCC would be a body of cadets raised by the Navy League of Australia. This process would be subject to any overriding directions of the Naval Board, based on statutory authority that empowered the Naval Board to approve or to enable regulations for this purpose. With this in mind, the Parliamentary Draftsman suggested that the approval of cabinet should be sought in more general terms, with a provision in the Bill that empowered the Naval Board to issue directions or regulations in relation to the training and organisation of a sea cadet corps, and for the grant of financial and other assistance. The Parliamentary Draftsman contended that the quoted recommendations, in his opinion, could properly be regarded as an authority for any necessary amendment of the Act.67 Although very convoluted, there now appeared to be a way to complete the recognition process.

In light of the opinions offered by the Treasury Department and the Parliamentary Draftsman, Rosenthal, submitted, on 15 August 1951, a redrafted and separate set of Regulations to be created under the Naval Defence Act 1910-1952 as the ‘Australian Sea Cadet Corps Regulations’.68 Another draft cabinet agendum was prepared and submitted to the Treasury Department for comment on 18 September 1951.69 This submission summarised the history of the NLSCC and more recent efforts to achieve an organisation similar to that of the army and air force cadets and why this was being done, particularly the recruiting benefits of supporting the community-based sea cadets. It was recommended that,

66 ibid. 67 ibid. 68 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 43, NAA B6121/1, 295B. 69 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 43-48, NAA B6121/1, 295B. 292 pending authorization in an appropriate bill, cabinet should authorise the Naval Board to issue directions, or approve Regulations to be made, in relation to the training and organisation of the NLSCC/ASCC and for the Department of the Treasury to approve such regulations for the granting of financial or other assistance. This time the Naval Board submission was supported by the Treasury Department, subject to the adoption of a standard nomenclature for the sea cadets’ organisation under consideration, which it was noted had variously been described as the Navy League Sea Cadet Corps, Australian Sea Cadet Corps and Australian Navy League sea cadets. Treasury recommended cabinet approval to bring down a bill authorising the training of the NLSCC/ASCC and the provision of assistance as set out by the Naval Board.70 Moreover, in order that the scheme might be put into operation immediately, it was recommended that approval be given to anticipate the passing of the legislation.71

The revised cabinet agendum was forwarded to the Prime Minister’s Department and received cabinet approval on 25 September 1951.72 The only issue that presented some remaining concern was the name of the new entity on the basis that the term ‘NLSCC’ had caused trouble in the framing of the legislation. To address this, the Second Naval Member, RR Dowling, had, on 14 June 1951, stated that he was quite prepared to drop the title ‘NLSCC’ entirely, and use only ‘Australian Sea Cadet Corps’ if it would help solve the difficulties.73 Dowling confirmed that this would be acceptable to the Navy League and, as the Treasury Department had agreed on condition of the adoption of a standard title, the ‘Australian Sea Cadet Corps of the Navy League of Australia’ was used and later shortened to the ‘Australian Sea Cadet Corps’.74 All the parties seemed to be getting closer to an agreement that would allow the official recognition process to be formalised, and the legislative process finally began on 21 September 1951, when the Secretary of the Department of Defence, Shedden, referred the matter for cabinet consideration.75

70 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p.48-51, NAA B6121/1, 295B. 71 ibid. 72 ibid. 73 Naval Archives Branch, History Statement and background of the Navy League of Australia, and its relationships with the Naval Board, Canberra, c. 1956, p. 51, NAA B6121/1, 295B. 74 ibid. 75 ibid. 293

Even in the new cabinet submission, terminology remained a problem and the matter was considered as the ‘The Australian Navy League Sea Cadet Corps’ and the arranging of a Bill authorising the Naval Board to regulate the organisation and training of the ‘Australian Navy League Cadet Corps’.76 The issues seemed to be new to the most significant of the decision makers, as well, with the new Minister for Navy, William McMahon, when visiting a community-based sea cadet unit on 24 November 1951, publicly acknowledged his ignorance of the branch’s activities.77 Similarly, the cabinet submission contained a miscellany of community-based sea cadet issues of 50 years standing, but the most immediate issue was identified as the need to anticipate the passing of the legislation in order to provide the Navy League with financial and other assistance towards the training of its sea cadets.78 In addition to a practical focus on funding, defence’s decision to place the cadet organisations of the three services on a uniform footing was considered as central to taking the first step towards building up a navy cadet organisation comparable to that of the army and air force.79

The second step in the process of ASCC establishment and development was to be the official formation of the Australian Sea Cadet Council, the structure of which had already been approved by the Naval Board, as the governing body of all Australian sea cadet organisations.80 Interestingly, in a section of the submission, ‘The Advantages of the Planned Pattern of Organisation’, the Naval Board’s argument for officially recognising the community-based sea cadet branch focused on savings in resources and personnel by using an existing organisation (the Navy League) that already provided pre-entry training and recruiting benefits and could expand to areas outside capital cities, where there was no navy presence.81 In response to the submission, presented by the Minister for the Navy, W McMahon, the Cabinet decided that action should be taken to bring down a bill authorizing the training of the NLSCC, the provision of assistance as recommended and that, in order that the scheme could be put into operation forthwith, approval be given to anticipate the passing

76 ibid. 77 The Navy, vol. 16, no.1, January 1952, p. 31. 78 Letter, Secretary, Department of Defence, to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 21 September 1951, NAA A5954, 1504/8. 79 ibid. 80 ibid. 81 ibid. 294 of the legislation.82 In this way, on 25 September 1951, the navy was authorised to take responsibility for many aspects of the administration, control, personnel and funding of the community-based sea cadet branch, in the form of the newly, and now officially, christened ASCC, although not as completely as the NRC. All that remained was the formal enactment of the Regulations.

The process conducted by the parliament and defence organisations in formalising what had been agreed by the Cabinet was the final phase in bringing the two arms of the naval and sea cadet movement together. For his part, as Minster for Navy and Air, McMahon was already approving enhanced support measures for the NLSCC, such as a £2200 grant to send a group of cadets to an Empire sea cadet camp in England, and it appeared that only the legislative process to introduce the necessary organisation and control, to accompany this type of enhanced funding, remained incomplete.83 In his speech in the Senate on the Naval Defence Bill 1952 (Second Reading), on 6 May 1952, McMahon, moved the second reading of a Bill to bring the Naval Defence Act into conformity with the National Service Act and the Defence Act, thus providing authority for the constitution of the NRC and the ASCC.84 Under Part V of the Bill, provision was made for the training and conditions of service of the NRC and the ASCC to be prescribed by Regulations. Confirming existing practices, the NRC members were to be enrolled between the ages of 16 and 18 years and the ASCC boys between 14 and 18 years. Nevertheless, the intent of the policy generally was to prevent any competition between the ASCC and the NRC, essentially by restricting entry to the ASCC to boys between 14 and 16 years of age in those areas where RANR training establishments were located and the NRC were established.85

Finally, on 1 October 1952, the ‘Naval Instructions for the Australian Sea Cadet Corps of the Navy League of Australia 1952’ were published and, thus, the Navy League component of the community-based sea cadets came under the legal control of the navy for

82 Cabinet Agendum, The Australian NLSCC, Cabinet Minute, Decision No.175, 25 September 1951, NAA, A4905, 130. 83 The Navy, vol.16, no. 5, May 1952, p. 25. 84 CPD, 6 May 1952, Naval Defence Bill 1952, Second Reading, p. 25. 85 ibid. 295 the first time.86 On 25 October 1952, at HMAS Rushcutter, a new ‘Colour’ was presented to the New South Wales Division of the ASCC at a full ceremonial parade supported by the RANR Band.87 On the same day, the Burnie unit of the ASCC completed gunnery training on board HMAS Latrobe and it was announced that HMAS Huon would be made available to the unit on permanent loan.88 With the formation of the ASCC, the community sea cadet branch was immediately receiving the type of navy support it had been seeking for some fifty years.

In a significant change to the balance between learning seamanship and citizenship, the purpose of the Navy League component of the naval and sea cadet movement was now irrevocably altered. Where the aim had been to promote citizenship as a primary outcome of membership of the sea cadets, the primary aim stated by the new instructions was technical sea training and entry to the RAN or the RANR.89 There was provision for the spiritual, social and educational welfare of cadets and the development of character and good citizenship, but this was secondary to the need to prepare sea-minded boys for entry to the navy. The one unchanged aspect of the ASCC was their constitution and military status. In the instructions, it was made clear that the ASCC did not form part of the Commonwealth Defence Forces and its members, as such, were not liable for service in time of war, except as required under the Defence Act in regard to all male inhabitants of Australia. Similarly, it was stipulated that the instructions, although entitled ‘Naval Instructions’, were neither naval nor Instructions, from a legal point of view, but simply a set of rules. Nonetheless, at a more routine level, these very comprehensive instructions provided for the organisation of the ASCC, including recognition and withdrawal of recognition, appointment and enrolment of members, promotion and advancement, uniforms, annual inspections, insurance of members, finance and so on.90

86 Naval Instructions for the Australian Sea Cadet Corps of the Navy League, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1952. 87 The Navy, vol.16, no.12, December 1952, pp. 28-29. 88ibid. 89 Naval Instructions for the Australian Sea Cadet Corps of the Navy League, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1952. 90 ibid. 296

Additionally, from a control point of view, a range of rules prescribed the duties of naval liaison officers, reserve officer secondment, units in schools, education, naming of units, and so on. In addition, a series of appendices contained information on schemes of complement, certificates of appointment, medical standards, and much more besides. Thus, the conditions for the organisation, control, personnel and funding of the Navy League were now determined under a Naval Instruction, albeit a notional one. In addition, the long standing, and often contentious, issue of uniforms was at last resolved with an ASCC uniform for officers that had a distinctive waved stripe, the letters ‘SC’ and ASCC and buttons.91 Furthermore, to adorn this new uniform, the Defence Committee endorsed, on 2 October 1952, the navy’s recommendation that officers, chief petty officers and adult warrant officers of the ASCC were to be eligible for the award of the Cadet Forces Medal,92

The navy’s control of both branches of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement was confirmed when the Australian Sea Cadet Corps Regulations, under the Naval Defence Act 1910-1952, were approved by the Governor General under Statutory Rule No.89 of 1954 on 25 July 1954.93 Thus, officially, the Naval Board was responsible, with respect to both the NRC and the ASCC, for organisation by appointment of members of the Australian Sea Cadet Council, control by inspection and recognition of units, personnel by authority over appointment of officers and instructors, and funding by its control of financial systems.94 In this way, the defence-based NRC and community-based sea cadets had become part of the same organisation some 90 years after the first naval brigade cadets were recorded as appearing in New South Wales and more than 50 years after the first community-based sea cadet unit was established.

There remained significantly more work to do in building the joint organisation, but the most significant step, of recognising the community-based sea cadets alongside the NRC, had been taken. In addition to the significant legal changes that had been made, the DNR,

91 ibid 92 Defence Committee Minutes, 2 October 1952, NAA A2031, 284/1952. 93 Statutory Rules. 1954. No. 89. Regulations under the Naval Defence Act 1910-1952, Commonwealth Gazette, 29 July, 1954. 94 ibid. 297

Rosenthal, announced to the navy, on 10 November 1952, that the ‘Sea Cadet Corps has now been re-organised, consequent upon its adoption as the Navy’s Youth Training Section’.95 The future of the naval and sea cadet movement was from this point in the hands of the RAN, but whatever course was chartered it would be negotiated by a coherent and formally structured organisation under a single authority for the administration of its organisation, control, personnel and funding.96 In this way, the first phase of the history of the movement had come to a close, after some 89 years, and the next had begun.

95 ‘Navy League Sea Cadets’, Newsletter No. 16, Naval Reserves Branch, Navy Office Melbourne, 10 November 1952, 96 Minute, DRRF to Head of ‘N’, 16 August 1954, NAA MP691/1, 3712/5/36. 298

Conclusion

The Australian naval and sea cadet movement started out on the periphery of the New South Wales and Victorian naval brigades in the early 1860s. For forty years, only part-time defence-based naval brigade cadets existed, before the first community-based sea cadet unit was created in Sydney. After Australian Federation, in 1901, the community-based sea cadet branch of the movement flourished and its organisers and supporters tried to have their units formally recognised by the navy in order to have naval authorities provide them with the same levels of organisation, control, personnel and funding support that was being provided to the defence-based NRC. This dissertation has examined how these events unfolded and created a dilemma for the navy in having two part-time cadet organisations competing for its attention, and its support, in a way that engaged a succession of Naval Boards for half a century.

The emergence of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement also occurred alongside a range of nautically based reformatory schemes and various full-time naval cadet recruiting initiatives. While these colonial beginnings were highly fragmented and poorly recorded, the naval brigade cadets in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland were unquestionably part of the colonial defence organisations to which they were attached. In contrast, from 1866, the part-time army cadet system was based in schools and quickly became numerically dominant and widely recognised. After Federation, however, community-based sea cadet units grew rapidly, and enjoyed considerable support and recognition from the navy, but were defined by their status as youth community welfare organisations, while the defence-based NRC units, which grew out of the colonial naval brigades, were confirmed as part of the naval forces. From this point, a circular argument commenced that was to continue virtually unchanged for fifty years. Community-based sea cadet organisers argued that the branch was a contributor to the navy by preparing boys for a naval career, while the navy was adamant that the NRC branch adequately filled this role and that there was no need for additional organisations which would consume resources needed by the RANR and NRC.

299

As its central theme, this thesis has investigated how the ‘duality dilemma’ of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement, of the simultaneous existence of a defence-based NRC organisation and a community-based sea cadet organisation, developed and how its associated problems remained unresolved for fifty years. In this regard, it is argued that the circumstances underlying this situation are surprising simple. The navy had created a part- time naval cadet corps (the naval brigade cadets which became the NRC) and provided organisation, control, personnel and funding for this scheme in the same manner as it did for the RANR. The many arguments presented to a succession of Naval Boards could all be reduced to the simple proposition that the community-based sea cadets needed the navy because they were a poorly organised group of heterogeneous units, lacked any form of consistent control systems, engaged personnel without any form of selection standard and were chronically short of funds. While the navy varied in its level of benevolence, it was generally tolerant of the community-based sea cadets. Nevertheless, naval authorities remained concerned about the continuing potential for damage to the navy’s reputation through community-based sea cadets, and their adult officers, being mistaken for navy officers or sailors. This was especially the case when lack of organisation and control resulted in negative reporting in the media, unfavourable comments by the general public and, in some extreme situations, criminal convictions. This is the essence of the duality dilemma that had its origins in the creation of the part-time colonial cadets.

Although, secondary sources concerning the colonial naval brigade cadets are almost non-existent, the primary sources confirm that they were embedded in the part-time colonial navies. Confusion with full-time recruitment schemes and nautical reformatory programs, although an influence on some colonial naval administrators, did not prevent the emergence of the defence-based NRC and its inclusion, after Federation, as a legislated part of the new Australian naval forces. In contrast, the earliest community-based sea cadet groups in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland were unrelated, fragmented and always unsure of their longevity. Nevertheless, the earliest official publications recording Australia’s defence structure recognised both the defence-based NRC and the community-based sea cadets. During the period 1900-10, there was a significant input from the Boys’ Naval Brigade to planning undertaken by the Director of Naval Forces, Captain WR Creswell, with respect to the most appropriate structure for the part-time naval cadets, but this ended in the confirmation of a dual system. The enactment of the Universal Training Scheme of

300 compulsory cadet training meant that the period from 1910 to 1920 was dominated by the NRC, with a membership of over 3000, while the community-based sea cadets struggled to survive without navy recognition. Nevertheless, some units, particularly the sea scouting arm of the Boy Scouts’ association, remained viable and, from 1920, the community-based branch of the movement was bolstered by the creation of the NLSCC. While individual units came and went, the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement from this point was dominated by the NRC, the sea scouts and the NLSCC.

As part of the wider policy debate on universal naval and military service, the compulsory cadet scheme progressively became financially and politically unviable and was abandoned in 1929. Thereafter, the NRC continued as a small voluntary organisation, while the community-based sea cadets became a strong competitor for the attention of the Naval Board and for navy resources, in any form. With the advent of the Depression, from 1930, both arms of the naval and sea cadet movement struggled, but the community-based sea cadets showed great tenacity in garnering support from the navy and continuing to plead their case as an economical junior naval pre-entry training scheme. As it was pressed more consistently for recognition and support, the Naval Board began to articulate more clearly that it was unmoved by the rhetoric of the community-based sea cadet organisers and needed to see significant development in their organisation and control systems, before it would consider any further financial or official support. In particular, the Naval Board specified the need for a national organisation representing all community-based sea cadet organisations, as existed in the United Kingdom. Despite efforts by the Navy League, organisation and control of the community-based sea cadets remained uncertain and criminal behaviour by some of its personnel further exacerbated the Naval Board’s concerns. Nevertheless, against the background of such occasional and unfortunate events, the Navy League and sea scouts continued to campaign for recognition by the navy, focusing more consistently on the recruiting value of their activities, but the Naval Board remained unconvinced.

With the advent of World War II, the recognition debate quietened, momentarily, as both NRC and community-based sea cadets focused on assisting in the war effort, but towards the end of the war, and immediately after, the quest for recognition by the community-based branch began once again in earnest. It was at this point that the wartime

301 official recognition of the British NLSCC played a key role in shifting the Naval Board towards a similar position. Senior navy administrators, particularly the Chief of Naval Staff, the Rear-Admiral in Charge, Sydney, and the DNR championed the community-based sea cadet cause and chaperoned their post-war bids for official recognition through the various government processes. This resulted in recognition, in principle, of the Navy League as the national coordinating body of the community-based sea cadet organisation, and the creation of an Australian Sea Cadet Council and ASCC. The decision by the Naval Board to adopt the British model and assume responsibility for the organisation, control, personnel and funding of the community-based sea cadets, alongside the NRC, with both groups administered by the DNR, essentially ended the movement’s duality. Although the legislative recognition of the community-based sea cadets, which took a further five years to effect, was not the equivalent of that governing the NRC, the two organisations were no longer in direct competition and would be organised and controlled in the same manner from 1952.

In this way, after some 50 years of resisting attempts by community-based sea cadet organisations to be accepted as part of the navy, alongside the NRC, the Naval Board created a new organisation that was generally regarded as the equivalent of the army cadets and the ATC. In the future, while the two organisations would eventually be joined under one name, their heritage would follow the ASCC, as Navy League sponsored units retained characteristics of organisation, control, personnel and funding that placed them apart from the original NRC units and the many new units created in the modern era. Many of the defining and essential characteristics of the dual system may have been eliminated by the implementation of identical systems for administration, control, personnel and funding, but the spirit of reliance on the community remained within the ASCC. Moreover, in practical and financial terms, the involvement of the Navy League in supporting a diminishing number of naval and sea cadet units into the modern era was a further lingering aspect of the dual system, but this is just one of many more aspects of the history of the Australian naval and sea cadet movement that is yet to be told. Let this dissertation, therefore, serve as a start point for future research into an aspect of Australian naval history that has never received the degree of scholarly attention it deserves.

302

BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNPUBLISHED OFFICIAL RECORDS

A range of items were examined in the following archival locations.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA

A1 Correspondence files, annual single number series.

A2 Correspondence files, annual single number series.

A100 Correspondence files, annual single number series with 'A' prefix (General, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia matters).

A432 Correspondence files, annual single number series.

A457 Correspondence files, multiple number series, first system.

A461 Correspondence files, multiple number series (third system).

A463 Correspondence files, annual single number series with occasional 'G' [General Representations] infix.

A472 Correspondence files, single number series with 'W' [War] prefix.

A518 Correspondence files, multiple number series with alphabetical prefix.

A816 Correspondence files, multiple number series [Classified 301].

A989 Correspondence files, multiple number series with year prefix.

A1194 Library Material, Single Accession Number Series with Decimal Classification.

A1200 Photographic negatives and prints, single number series with 'L' [Library] prefix.

303

A1608 Correspondence files, multiple number series with variable alphabetical prefix and general prefix 'SC' (fourth system).

A1813 Correspondence files, multiple number series.

A1831 Correspondence files, annual single number series.

A1861 Applications for Artistic Copyright (with exhibits).

A2023 Correspondence files, multiple number series with 'A', 'B', 'D' or 'E' prefix.

A2031 Defence Committee minutes.

A2487 Correspondence files, annual single number series.

A2585 Naval Board minute books (with index books attached 1914-1921, with numerical lists enclosed 1939-1949).

A2703 Curtin, Forde and Chifley Ministries - folders of Cabinet Minutes (with Indexes).

A2880 Correspondence files, multiple number series.

A3932 Correspondence files, SC (Secret and Confidential) series - second system.

A4719 Volumes of microfilm printout of the personal papers of Sir George Pearce (compiled by DR. J.S. Cumpston).

A4905 Fifth Menzies Ministry - folders of Cabinet Submissions (first system).

A4940 Menzies and Holt Ministries - Cabinet files 'C' single number series.

A5799 Defence Committee agenda, annual single number series.

A5954 'The Shedden Collection' [Records collected by Sir Frederick Shedden during his career with the Department of Defence and in researching the history of Australian Defence Policy], two number series.

A6074 Correspondence files, single number series with 'PO' Property prefix.

A6662 Miscellaneous correspondence relating mainly to local (non-Imperial) matters.

A6766 Naval records of historical significance.

304

A6767 Naval manuals and publications of historical significance.

A6826 Subject registration booklets (L14's) for CRS A1813, correspondence files, multiple number series.

A6988 Photograph albums and miscellaneous photographic prints.

A7450 Recommendations of Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson on the report 'The Naval Forces of the Commonwealth.

A8139 Photograph albums of prints in 'L' series and 'CU' series.

A9787 Council of Defence minutes and agenda papers, single number series.

A9887 Registers relating to NSW District of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve.

A9991 South Australian Naval Reserve Progress Book.

A11804 General Correspondence of Governor-General (excluding War files).

A12101 Naval Cadet training and RANR draft registers, Queensland.

A12112 Registers of Official Royal Australian Naval Reserve numbers, Queensland.

A12195 Training course progress ledgers.

B168 Correspondence files, annual single number series.

B414 Registration booklets for correspondence files, multiple number series.

B536 Registration booklets for correspondence files, multiple number series with A, B, D or E prefix.

B1120 Registration books (L14s) for correspondence files, multiple number series

B1127 Name index cards (general) for correspondence files, multiple number series ('201'series).

B1128 Name index cards [establishments] for correspondence files, multiple number series ('201'series).

B2882 Correspondence files, annual single number series.

305

B3756 Correspondence files, annual single number series.

B4081 Subject index cards (Naval personnel), for correspondence files, multiple number series ('201' series).

B5538 Record of Service Book for the Royal Australian Naval Reserve and Royal Australian Naval Brigade, alphabetical series.

B5395 Volumes of records of service for the Victorian Volunteer Force.

B5487 Attendance roll of Naval Cadets.

B5493 Registers of Trainees, Victorian Naval Reserve.

B5749 Enrolment forms of senior naval cadets (form RANR.5), Williamstown Division of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve.

B6418 General correspondence files, multiple number series.

B6121 Naval historical files, single number series with alphabetical suffixes.

BP374/1 Plans.

CT190/1 Forms RANR 2(c) Record of Service - Citizen Naval Forces.

CT190/5 Forms RANR 2 - Record of Service Citizen Naval Forces.

CT190/14 Forms RANR 2 and 2(A) - Record of Service, Cadets and Citizens Naval Forces (Medically Unfit, All Divisions.

Ct190/20 Forms ANR 2 and ANB 2 - Record of Service, Universal Trainees

CT190/21 Forms ANR 2 and ANB 2 - Record of Service, Universal Trainees.

CT190/24 Forms AND 2 - Record of Service.

D293 Correspondence files, multiple number series.

D4441 General correspondence files, multiple number series.

306

E202 Correspondence files, multiple number series, unit and formation system.

J344 Architectural plans, annual single number series with 'QA' (Queensland Architectural) followed by either 'C' (Civil), 'D' (Defence), 'G' (General Works) or 'P' (Postal/Telecom) prefix.

J655 Correspondence files relating to the administration and functioning of the Naval Staff Office, Brisbane, multiple number series with 'B' (denoting Brisbane) prefix.

J1018 Survey plans, single number series with 'L & S' (Lands and Survey) prefix.

M1274 Electorate correspondence, lexicographical series [Partially transferred to University of Melbourne Archives custody 2005 and 2006].

MP84/1 Correspondence files, multiple number series.

MP124/6 Correspondence files, multiple number series ('201' series).

MP138/1 Correspondence files, multiple number series ('201' series).

MP150/1 Correspondence files, multiple number series ('201' series).

MP151/1 Correspondence files, multiple number series ('201' series).

MP153/21 Report of Conference on Service Estimates.

MP178/2 Correspondence files, multiple number series.

MP326/1 Property Acquisition files relating to Victoria, transferred from Head Office.

MP421/4 General correspondence relating to munitions production.

MP472/1 Correspondence files, annual single number series.

MP494/2 The Naval forces of the Commonwealth recommendations by Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson.

MP494/8 Regulations and instructions for H.M.A. Training ship "Tingira".

MP525/1 Correspondence files, multiple number series.

307

MP574/1 General correspondence of the Secretariat, and Administrative and Industrial Relations Divisions.

MP691/1 Policy files relating to all aspects of the Departments activities.

MP692/1 Correspondence files, multiple number series ('201' series).

MP741/1 Requisition files.

MP742/1 General and civil staff correspondence files and Army personnel files, multiple number series.

MP981/1 Correspondence files, multiple number series ('201' series).

MP1049/4 Correspondence files (general).

MP1049/5 Correspondence files (general).

MP1185/6 Correspondence files, annual single number series.

MT574/1 Navy correspondence files relating to personnel matters.

P1557 Files containing Antarctic Voyage Reports with Voyage Leader Log Books interspersed, chronological series.

SP339/1 Navy League Sea Cadets - Efforts to procure Naval Board recognition, etc. [Box 5].

SP459/1 Correspondence.

SP551/1 Log books of HMC [Her Majesty's Colonial], HM [His/Her Majesty's] and HMA [Her Majesty's Australian] Ships.

SP1008/1 General Correspondence files, multiple number series.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

AWM1 Pre-Federation and Commonwealth records.

308

AWM3 Records of the Department of Defence, central registry - Records of Major General E. T. H. Hutton, General Officer Commanding the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia.

AWM25 Written records, 1914-18 War.

AWM27 Records arranged according to AWM Library subject classification.

AWM34 2nd Military District records.

AWM38 Official History, 1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean, Official Historian.

AWM44 Official History, 1914-18 War, manuscripts.

AWM50 Records of HMA Naval Establishments, Sydney.

AWM54 Written records, 1939-45 War.

AWM60 Northern Command registry files.

AWM61 Eastern Command registry files.

AWM93 Australian War Memorial registry files - First series.

AWM124 Naval historical collection.

AWM255 Written records, 1914-18 War, second series.

PO2790.002 Group portrait of members of a Boys Naval Brigade group posing with a flag and drum

POO444.129 Queensland. 1898. The Crew Of Her Majesty's Queensland Ship Gayundah At The Ship's Recommissioning

REL23054 Martini-Enfield Mk II Artillery Carbine: Queensland Naval Cadets

REL28316 Sennet Hat: Boys’ Naval Brigade, Victorian Navy.

STATE RECORDS NEW SOUTH WALES

NRS906 Special Bundles

309

NRS12061 Premier’s Department Special Bundles, 1895-1876 (List B)

NRS4529 Copies of letters to officials and private individuals

NRS13100 Government Transport Correspondence file, 1902-1938

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE VICTORIA

VPRS 1095 Special Files

VPRS 1189 Inward Registered Correspondence I

VPRS 1226 Supplementary Inward Registered Correspondence

VPRS 8291 General Correspondence Files

VPRS 10308 Central Correspondence Files-Scholarships

VPRS 14558 Victorian Naval Logs

QUEENSLAND STATE ARCHIVES

QSA5176 Religious and Charitable Files

QSA5253 Inwards correspondence

QSA5384 Batch and Miscellaneous Subject Files

QSA6175 Bench Record and Summons Books-Children’s Court

QSA6389 Batch and Subject Files

QSA 6477 General Correspondence, 1911-1915

QSA8400 Special Batches

310

QSA12799 Duplicate Despatches from the Secretary of State for the Colonies

QSA12781 Correspondence and Reports on Defence

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL MARITIME MUSEUM

ANMM 3 0001 00015995 5–The Origin of Some Sydney Harbour Place Names.

SEA POWER CENTRE – AUSTRALIA

23B The RAN Reserves.

QUEENSLAND MARITIME MUSEUM

Pixley Papers (no file designator).

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PUBLISHED BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS

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______, The Europeans in Australia a History, volume two, Democracy, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2004.

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314

Bolton, GC, Edmund Barton, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000.

Brassey, TB, Problems of empire: the faith of a federalist, with a foreword by Earl Gray, Longmans, Green and Co, London, 1904.

Brassey, TB & Hutchinson, HG Warriors and statesmen from the "gleanings" of the late Earl Brassey, Murray, London, 1918.

Brassey's Annual: The Armed Forces Year-Book, William Clowes and Sons, London, 1966.

Brassey's Annual: The Armed Forces Year-Book, William Clowes and Sons, London, 1967.

Brock, P, Against the draft: essays on conscientious objection from the Radical Reformation to the Second World War, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006.

Broeze, F, Western Australians and the sea: out maritime heritage, Western Australian Museum, Perth, 1986.

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______A history of Australia VI ‘the old dead tree and the young tree green’ 1916- 1935, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1987.

Clark, MS & J Clark, The Islands of Sydney Harbour, Simon & Shuster, East Roseville, 2000.

Clarke, FG, Australia in a Nutshell: A narrative History, Rosenberg Publishing, Dural, NSW, 2003.

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Creswell, W & P Thompson, Close to the wind: the early memoirs (1866-1879) of Admiral Sir William Creswell, K.C.M.G., K.B.E, Heinemann, London, 1965.

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Cryle, D, The Press in Colonial Queensland: A Social and Political History, 1845 – 1875, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1989.

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315

University Press, South Melbourne, 2001.

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Evans, A, and Australian Broadcasting Corporation, A navy for Australia, ABC Enterprises for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney, 1986,

Evans, WP, Deeds not words, Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1971.

Feakes, HJ, White ensign, Southern Cross: a story of the king's ships of Australia's Navy, Ure Smith, Sydney, 1951.

Fenton, A, Cadets of the Dolphin, Amalgamated Press, London, 1926.

Ferguson, N, Civilisation: The West and the Rest, Penguin, London, 2011.

Festberg, AN, The lineage of the Australian Army, Allara Publishing, Melbourne, 1972.

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Fleming, WM, Australia in Peace & War, Lothian Book Publishing, Melbourne, 1917.

Fones, R, In the light of all the years (a history of scouting in Queensland), The Scout Association of Australia, Queensland Branch, Brisbane, 1992.

Forward, R & RHW Reece (eds), Conscription in Australia, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1968.

Frame, T, No pleasure cruise: the story of the Royal Australian Navy, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2005.

Frame, TR, JVP Goldrick & PD Jones (eds), Reflections on the RAN, Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, 1991.

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Gatacre, GGO, A Naval career: reports of proceedings 1921 [to] 1964, Nautical Press &

316

Publications Manly, NSW, 1982.

Gillett, R, Australia’s Colonial Navies, Naval Historical Society of Australia, Garden Island, New South Wales, 1982.

Gillett, R (ed), Australia’s Navy: Past, Present & Future, Child & Henry, Brookvale, 1986.

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Hoare, ME, Boys, Urchins, Men: A History of The Boys’ Brigade in Australia and Papua- New Guinea 1882-1976, AH & AW Reed, Sydney, 1980.

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Hughes-Onslow, CH, The Australian Naval Board Scandal, Page &Bird, Melbourne, 1914.

Hyslop, R, Australian naval administration: 1900 - 1939, Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1973.

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Lind, LJ, Historic naval events of Australia day-by-day: ships, men, battles and great moments, Reed, Sydney, 1982.

______The Navy day by day: historic naval events in Australia and abroad, Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, NSW, 1996.

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317

McGuire, FM, The Royal Australian Navy: its origin, development and organisation, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1948.

McGuire, P & FM McGuire, The Price of Admiralty, Oxford University Press, London, 1944.

McKernan, M & M Browne (eds), Australia: Two centuries of war & peace, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1988.

McLean, D, Education and Empire: naval tradition and England’s elite schooling, British Academic Press, London, 1999.

McQuilton, J, Rural Australia and the Great War: From Tarrawingee to Tangambalanga. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2001.

Millis, W, The Future of Sea Power in the Pacific, Foreign Policy Association, New York, and the World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1935.

Millar, TB, Australia in Peace & War, ANU Press, Canberra, 1978.

Moorhouse, G, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1999.

Nicholls, B, Bluejackets and boxers: Australia’s naval expedition to the Boxer uprising, Allen and Unwin, North Sydney, 1986.

______, Handy men up top: the New South Wales navy in China 1900-1901, Ditty Press, Balmain, 1990.

______, Statesmen & Sailors: A History of Australian Maritime Defence 1870-1920, B Nicholls, Balmain, 1995.

______, The colonial volunteers: the defence forces of the Australian colonies, 1836- 1901, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988.

Norris, R, The Emergent Commonwealth Australian Federation: Expectations and Fulfillment 1889-1910, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1975.

Parsons, R, Steamers in the south, Rigby, Adelaide, 1979.

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Ranft, B & JR Hill (eds), The Oxford illustrated history of the Royal Navy, Oxford University Press Oxford, Oxford, 1995.

318

Rickard, DR, Australia’s Navy-the first 100 years: a 365 Day Almanac of Notable Events, DR Rickard, Brighton, 2005.

Roberts, RG, Birth of a navy, Patersons Printing Press, Perth, 1944.

Robinson, JS, Arms in the Service of Queensland 1859-1901, JS Robinson, Kedron, 1997.

Rough, BG, Lines of defence: a lineage of Queensland’s naval and military forces 1860- 1903, Victoria Barracks Historical Society, Brisbane, 1998.

Ruhen, O, Port of Melbourne, 1835 - 1976, Cassell Australia, Stanmore, 1976.

Scott, J, The engine room of government, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 2001.

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Shaw, J, Collins Australian Encyclopedia, Collins, Sydney, 1984.

Silburn, PAB, The Colonies and Imperial Defence, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1909.

Simpson, JA & ESC Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.

Springhall, J, B Fraser & M Hoare, Sure and Steadfast: A History of The Boys’ Brigade 1883 to 1983, Collins, London, 1983.

Staples, G & W Rainey, The naval cadet: a story of adventure on land and sea, Blackie, London, 1898.

Statham, P (ed), The Origins of Australia’s Capital Cities, Cambridge University Press, Sydney, 1989.

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Stevens, D & J Reeve (eds), The navy and the nation : the influence of the Navy on modern Australia, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2005.

______, Southern trident: strategy, history and the rise of Australian naval power, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2001.

Stockings, CAJ, The Torch and the Sword, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2008.

Stupart, R (ed), Rifle Exercises and Musketry Instruction for Cadets: for Officers and Non- Commissioned Officers in the Commonwealth Cadet Corps, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1914.

Sundercombe, JCR, One hundred years of merchant ships on the Australian coast, Royal

319

Institution of Naval Architects, Australian Section, Sydney, 1960.

Tanner, TW, Compulsory citizen soldiers, Maxwell Printing, Waterloo, 1980.

The Encyclopaedia Britannica, A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature and General Information, Eleventh Edition, vol. 4, University Press, Cambridge, 1910.

The story of the Navy League Sea Cadets: told mainly in pictures, Navy League, London, c. 1920.

Thomas, R, & J Herran, Navy, Macmillan, South Yarra, 1999.

Taylor, JS, Jonas Hanway: Founder of the Marine Society: Charity and Policy in Eighteenth- Century Britain, Scholar Press, London, 1985.

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Videon, BJ, Air Training Corps: the first fifty years, Air Training Corps, East Bentleigh, 1991.

Ward, JW (ed), Our Australian Navy: it’s story in word and picture for the people of Australia and New Zealand, Nautical Societies Council of Australia, Melbourne, 1938.

Ward, R, A nation for a continent: the history of Australia, 1901-1975, Heinemann Educational Australia, Richmond, 1988.

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Westerman, PF, A cadet of the mercantile marine, Blackie, London, 1923.

Wilkins, JM, Australian Naval reserves: a brief history: 1859-2002, John M. Wilkins, East Doncaster, 2003.

ARTICLES

Bach, J, ‘The Royal Navy in the South West Pacific: the Australian Station 1859 - 1913’. The Great Circle, vol. 5, no. 2, October 1983, pp. 116 - 132.

Berney, C, ‘The boys manual of seamanship and gunnery’, Naval Historical Review, vol. 24, no. 2, 2003, pp. 26 - 27.

Berry, HW, ‘The Cost of the Naval Defence of the Empire, Life, 1 November 1909, pp. 492 - 493.

Broeze, F, ‘From the periphery to the mainstream: the challenge of Australia's maritime history’, The Great Circle, vol. 11, no. 1, 1988, pp. 1 - 13.

Candy, PC, ‘Prodeo et patria’: the story of the Victorian cadet movement, Journal of the

320

Royal Australian Historical Society, vol. 64, no.1, 1978, pp. 40 - 54.

Cooper, A, ‘Review: [untitled]’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 65, no. 4, 2001, pp. 1164 - 1165.

Dale, P, ‘The Early Defences of Melbourne’, Victorian Historical Magazine, vol. 22, no. 1, 1947, pp. 10 - 22.

Evans, G, ‘The Navy League in Australia–100 years on’, The Navy, vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 4 - 6.

Fielding, JP, 'Creer, Herbert Victor (1881 - 1969)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 8, Melbourne University Press, 1981, pp 143 - 144.

Frame, T, ‘75 years of what: an historiographical survey of Australian Naval History’, Sabretache, vol. 28 no.4, 1987, pp. 32 - 33.

Frame, T,‘Australian Naval History After 75 years’, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, May 1987, pp. 39 - 50.

Gibson, DA, ‘The White Ensign’, Queensland Heritage, vol. 3, no. 7, 1977, pp. 3 - 15.

Goldrick, J, ‘The Problems of Modern Naval History, The Great Circle, vol. 18, no. 1, 1996, pp. 48 - 58.

Gordon, DC, ‘The Admiralty and Dominion Navies, 1902-1914’, The Journal of Modern History’, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 407 - 422.

Hamilton, WM, ‘The ‘new navalism’ and the British Navy League, 1895-1914’, Mariners Mirror, vol. 64, no. 1, 1978, pp 37 - 44.

Harper, JET, ‘The Navy League Sea Cadet Corps’, The Navy League Journal, vol. 6, no. 3 (New Series), pp. 3, 14 & 16.

Harrington, HE ‘The Harrington Papers’, Naval historical Review, vol. 17, no. 4, 1996, pp. 19 – 28.

Jones, S, ‘Blood red roses: the supply of merchant seamen in the 19th-century’, Mariners’ Mirror, vol. 58, no. 4, 1972, pp 429 - 442.

Jones, WH, ‘Measuring the value of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme, Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 140, Jan-Feb 2000, pp. 37 - 40.

Kirk, D & K Twigg, ‘The militarisation of school physical training in Australia: the rise and demise of the Junior Cadet Training Scheme, 1911 ‐ 31’, Journal of the History of Education Society, vol. 22, no. 4, 1993, pp. 391 - 414.

Kitney, P, ‘The History of the Australian School Cadet Movement to 1893’, Defence Force Journal, no. 12, September-October, 1978, pp. 53 - 60.

Lack, C, ‘Australia’s Merchant Navy’, Journal of the Royal Historical Society of

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Queensland, vol. 5, no. 5, pp. 1327 - 1344.

Lloyd, C, ‘The Royal Naval Colleges at Portsmouth and Greenwich’, Mariners Mirror, vol. 52, no. 2, May 1966, pp. 145 - 156.

Martin, T, ‘HMAS Tingira’, Naval Historical Review, vol. 19, no. 4, 1998, p. 9.

McAllister, I, ‘Schools, Enlistment, and Military Values: The Australian Services Cadet Scheme’, Armed Forces & Society, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 83 - 102.

Oppenheimer, PT, ‘The paper fleet or the ships that never were, Part One: 1870 to 1900’, The Great Circle, vol. 11, no. 1, 1989, pp. 52 - 61.

______, ‘The paper fleet or the ships that never were, Part Two: 1853 to 1870’, The Great Circle, vol. 12, no. 2, 1990, pp. 15 - 25.

Palmer, JM, ‘The Navy League’, Brassey's Annual, The Armed Forces Year-Book, William Clowes and Sons, London, 1966, pp 262-263.

Pietsch, R, ‘Urchins for the sea: The story of the Marine Society in the Seven Years War’, Journal of Maritime History, vol. 2, no. 1, 2000, pp.64 - 83.

Pixley, NS, ‘Military Defence of Queensland’ Royal Historical Society of Queensland Journal, vol. 4, no. 2, December 1949, pp. 253 - 270.

______, ‘Queensland: One Hundred Years of Defence’, Royal Historical Society of Queensland Journal, vol. 6, no. 4, September 1959, pp 94 - 121.

______, ‘The Queensland Marine Defence Force’ Royal Historical Society of Queensland Journal, vol. 6, no. 3, 1960-61, pp. 669 - 724.

______, ‘William Rooke Creswell’ Royal Historical Society of Queensland Journal , vol. 11, no. 1, 1979-80, pp.28 - 48.

Primrose, BN, 'Equipment and Naval Policy 1919-42', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 23, no. 2, 1977, pp. 163 - 168.

Ramsland, J, ‘Life aboard the nautical ship Sobraon, 1891 - 1911’, The Great Circle, vol. 3, no. 1, April 1981, pp 30 - 45.

Reid, G, ‘To Be or Not to Be? The 1901-1910 Parliamentary Debates on the Financing of Australia's First Navy’, Naval Historical Review, vol. 18, no. 2, 1997, p. 19.

Richards, N, & SK May, ‘South Australia's floating coffin: the diseased, the destitute, and derelict FitzJames (1852 - c1900)’, The Great Circle, vol. 25, no. 1, 2003, pp 19 - 39.

Ritter, L, ‘A comparison of the NSS ‘Vernon’ in New South Wales and the NSS ‘FitzJames’ in South Australia’, Australian and New Zealand History of Education Journal, vol. 7, no. 2, 1978, pp. 35 - 42.

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Savige, A, ‘' Naughty ' Boys: the education of reformatory schoolboys at Lytton 1881 - 1889’, Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, vol. 15, no. 1, 1993, pp 33 - 48.

Shorten, AR, ‘Nautical School Ships in Australia 1850 - 1920’, Journal of Australia New Zealand History of Education Society, vol. 5, no. 2, 1976, pp. 19 - 32.

Stockings, CAJ, ‘A Survey of Military, Educational and Community Expectations of the Cadet Movement in Australia, 1866-2006’, Australian Journal of Politics & History, vol. 53, no. 2, 2007, pp. 1 - 26.

Sullivan, JB, ‘The Naval Schoolmaster during the 18th and Early 19th Centuries’, Mariners Mirror, vol. 62, No. 3, 1976, pp. 311 - 326.

Sumida, J, ‘British Naval Administration and Policy in the Age of Fisher’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 54, no. 1, 1990, pp. 1 – 26.

Taylor, R, ‘Manning the RN: the reform of the recruiting system, 1852-1862, first part’, Mariners Mirror, vol. 44, no. 4, 1958, pp 303 - 313.

Vivian, JGP, ‘Sea cadets and seamen, the Admiral Commanding Reserves explains them’, The Navy League Journal, vol. 6, no. 8 (New Series), pp. 4 - 7.

Ward, S, ‘Cockatoo Island: an historical account’, Naval Historical Review, vol. 24, no. 2, June 2003, pp 10 - 14.

Wilde, RH, ‘The Boxer affair and Australian responsibility for Imperial defence’, The Pacific Historical Review, vol. 26, no. 1, 1957, pp 51 - 65.

Zwillenberg, HJ, ‘The Defence of South Australia 1836-1901, Sabre, vol. 26, no. 2, 1987, pp. 14 - 18.

PERIODICALS – Magazines

The following magazines and magazine articles were examined

Cadets and Scouts of Australia, vol. 1, nos. 1 (18 December 1909) & 2 (8 January 1910).

Navy and Army Illustrated, vols. 1-3, 5, 6, 10, 12, 14, 1895-1914. The Navy, 1946-1952.

The Navy League Journal, 1920-1932, 1938-1945.

UNIT PUBLICATIONS

The following cadet unit publications were examined:

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Rules and Regulations Governing the Navy League Sea Cadet Corps New South Wales 1934 The Navy League of Australia, Sydney, 1934.

Souvenir Programme of the Royal Australian Naval Display HMA Dockyard Sydney, 27 October 1951, Navy League of Australia, Sydney, 1951.

Sydney Training Depot Snapper Island: Maritime Museum Catalogue 2002, Sydney Training Depot (Snapper Island), Drummoyne, 2002.

NEWSPAPERS

A range of non-author accredited articles from the following newspapers were examined:

Adelaide Advertiser, 1903-1945. Argus, 1860-1946. Bendigo Advertiser, 1907. Brisbane Courier, 1885-1903. Capricornian, 1901. Chronicle, 1908. Coburg Leader, 1911. Colonial Times, 1839. Courier Mail, 1934-1946. Courier, (Hobart), 1850. Daily News, Perth, 1909. Gippsland Times, 1933. Hawkesbury Herald, 1924. Hobart Town Mercury, 1860. Launceston Examiner, 1860-1903. Maitland Mercury and Hunter River Advertiser, 1863. Mercury, 1860-1951. Moreton Bay Courier, 1859. Morning Bulletin, (Rockhampton), 1907-1912. Portland Guardian, 1907. Register, Adelaide, 1905.

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South Australian Advertiser, 1860. Sunday Mail, 1938. Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser, 1803. Sydney Morning Herald, 1861-1943. The Times, 1920. West Australian, 1938. Williamstown Chronicle, 1907-1933.

UNPUBLISHED THESES & MANUSCRIPTS The following theses and manuscripts were examined:

Davies, HJ, ‘The Hume family of Toowoomba and Brisbane: a case study of middle-class social mobility in colonial Queensland’, Thesis (PhD), University of Queensland, 2004.

Millar, TB, ‘The History of the defence forces of the Port Phillip District and colony of Victoria 1836-1900’, Thesis (MA), University of Melbourne, 1957.

Murnin, CE, The diary of midshipman C.E. Murnin, N.S.W. naval brigade, on service in China from 7th August 1900 to 2nd May 1901 (manuscript), 1900.

Quinn, PE, ‘Unenlightened efficiency: the administration of the juvenile correction system in New South Wales 1905-1988’, Thesis (PhD), University of Sydney, 2006.

Spurling, KL, ‘Life in the lower deck of the Royal Australian Navy 1911-1952’, Thesis (PhD), University of New South Wales, 1999.

Whitworth, C, ‘The struggle against isolationism: A history of the Queensland Marine Defence Force’, Thesis (BA Hons), University of Queensland, 1998.

WEBSITES

The following websites were examined:

Navy League of Australia, , accessed 23 October 2009.

The AIF Project , accessed 30 August 2009.

The Marine Society and Sea Cadets , accessed 30 August 2009.

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