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6 X 10.5 Long Title.P65 Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-15285-3 - Australian Constitutional Landmarks Edited by H. P. Lee and George Winterton Index More information Index Note: page numbers in bold indcate a substantial treatment of a topic. A aliens, 181–4, 186, 196, 201 Abadee, A. R., 395 Allen, Allen & Hemsley (solicitors), 92 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Protection Act 1984 (Cth), 199–200 Steamship Co Ltd. see Engineers case Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders Anderson, John (Colonial Office), 21 heritage protection, 181, 195–6, Anderson, John (Prof.), 120 199–200, 202, 266, 273 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) v native title, 181, 196–9, 202 Commonwealth, 393 race power, xxxiii, 180–3, 185–90, Antill Ranger case, 325–6 192–208 appropriation. see Supply absolute freedom of interstate trade. see Arbitration Commission, xxxiii, 170–1, freedom of interstate trade 188, 372, 383 Ackland, Richard, 400 Australian Social Welfare Union case, xxxv, acquisition power 356, 359–62, 363 Bank Nationalisation cases, 87, 89, 91–2, Arbitration Court, xxxiii, 38–9, 42 94–8 Boilermakers case, 160, 162–6, 168–71 Communist Party case, 116, 124 arbitration power. see industrial race power and, 193, 198 arbitration; labour relations power States, 321–2 Archives Act 1983 (Cth), 157 Tasmanian Dam case, 274 Asquith, H. H., 245 Act of Settlement 1701 (Eng), Article III, s. 7, Association of Australian University Staff, Re 290 Application for Registration of, 369 Actors and Announcers Equity Association v Attainder, Acts of, 118, 127, 131–2, 134, Fontana Films Pty Ltd, 272 172 Acts of Attainder, 118, 127, 131–2, 134, Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v 172 Commonwealth, 397 ACTV case, xxxi, xxxv, 134, 383, 384–9, Attorney-General (Cth) v Colonial Sugar 391–5, 397–8, 406 Refining Co Pty Ltd, 316–17, 320, administrative law, 206, 290, 296, 298, 300, 330 327 Attorney-General for Ontario v Attorney- Aickin, Sir Keith, 269 General for Canada, 320 Air Navigation Convention, 268 Austin v Commonwealth, 49–50 Airlines of New South Wales v New South Australia Act 1986 (Cth), 329 Wales (No. 2), 50–1 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Alexander’s case, 162–3 Game Meats Pty Ltd, 401 412 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-15285-3 - Australian Constitutional Landmarks Edited by H. P. Lee and George Winterton Index More information INDEX 413 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth), 163 Commonwealth. see ACTV case Banks and Insurance cases, 361, 365–6 Australian Communist Party. see Barley Marketing Board (NSW) v Norman, Communist Party case 338, 347–8, 352 Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Barton, Sir Edmund Commission. see Arbitration Federation and constitutional drafting, Commission 1, 4, 12, 17, 20, 23–4 Australian Constitutional Convention implied rights, 394 (1980s), 275, 277 judicial advice to Governor-General, 249 Australian Education Union, Re; Ex parte Privy Council, 313–15 Victoria, 49, 375–6, 378 race power, 183–4, 186 Australian Industrial Relations reserved State powers, 38, 42, 46 Commission, 170, 172, 355, 357, 376, Barton, Wilfred, 42 384 Barwick, Sir Garfield Australian Insurance Staffs’ Federation v Bank Nationalisation cases, 87, 92–9, 130 Accident Underwriters Association, 361, Communist Party case, 126, 130 365–6 double dissolutions, 220–4 Australian Labor Party. see also Bank freedom of interstate trade, xxxv, Nationalisation cases; dismissal of 335–6, 345 Whitlam government implied freedom of political Communist Party case, 110, 112–19, communication, 383 123–5, 129–30, 132 Joske, 172–3 early history, 1, 7, 19, 216 reserved State powers, 50 Fitzpatrick and Browne, 147 Uniform Income Tax cases, 74 freedom of interstate trade, 337 Whitlam dismissal, 237–8, 244–51 implied freedom of political Bath v Alston Holdings Pty Ltd, 339–40, 342, communication, 385 348, 352 labour relations power, 362–3, 372 Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW), Murphy Affair, 284, 288, 298 37–8, 316–17, 319 race power, 188–9 Beasley, Frank, 97 Split (1950s), 229 Beazley, Kim C. (b. 1948), 385 Tasmanian Dam case, 262–5 Beazley, Kim E. (b. 1917), 188 Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Berry, Sir Graham, 19 Commonwealth, 90, 139 Bienstein case, 290, 294, 297 Australian Social Welfare Union case, xxxv, Bill of Rights, 4, 22, 24–7, 133, 297–8, 356–7, 358–9, 360–1, 365–8, 372–8 386–7, 390–1, 393, 405 in the High Court, 362–3 Bills of Attainder, 118, 127, 131–2, 134, Australian Workplace Agreements, 376–7 172 awards. see federal industrial awards Birkenhead, Lord, 327–8 Birrell, Bob, 185 B Black, Michael, 267 Bailey, Kenneth H., 65, 69, 94, 187, 222 Black’s case, 79 Baker, Richard Chaffey, 5, 14 Blackshield, Tony, 36, 282–4, 289, 297, balance of power. see federal–State balance 299, 303 Bank Nationalisation cases, xxx, xxxii, xxxv, Boilermakers case, xxxiii, 160–79, 318–19, 85–107, 130, 319, 323–5, 337 326–7 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth. High Court decision, 166–9 see Bank Nationalisation cases impact, 170–3 Bank Officials’ Association v Bank of political background, 164–6 Australasia, 361, 365–6 Bolte, Sir Henry, 70 Banking Act 1945 (Cth), 48, 88–9 Bongiorno, B. D., 403–4 Banking Act 1947 (Cth), 85, 87, 89–90, 91, Booker, Keven, xxiii 92, 95–6 on Engineers case, xxxii, 34–61 banking power, 87, 92, 94, 96–7 Bowen, Lionel, 299 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-15285-3 - Australian Constitutional Landmarks Edited by H. P. Lee and George Winterton Index More information 414 INDEX Braddon, Sir Edward, 18 Chifley, Ben, 85, 87–91, 93, 97–100, Brandy v Human Rights and Equal 113–14, 117–18, 123, 125 Opportunity Commission, 173 Cigamatic case, xxx, 48–50 Brennan, Sir Gerard, xxiii citizenship, 26–7, 184, 202 Australian Social Welfare Union case, 363 civil liberties (Communist Party case), 108, freedom of interstate intercourse, 350 114, 117–21, 123, 128–9, 132–3 implied freedom of political Clark, Andrew Inglis, 12, 14–15, 20, 23, communication, xxxv, 384, 386–8, 25–8, 167, 182, 312 391, 397–8 Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Privy Council, xxxiv, 312–34 Board, 336 race power, 194–5, 197, 199–201 Clayton v Heffron, 223 Tasmanian Dam case, 268–72, 274, 277 Cockburn, John A., 19, 25 Whitlam dismissal, 250 Cohen J (ACAC), 362 Brennan, T. C., 45 Cold War, 112, 131 Briese, Clarrie, 282, 285–7, 303 Coldham, P. A., 361 British North America Act 1867 (UK), 14–15, Cole v Whitfield 320 Bank Nationalisation cases and, xxx, Broadcasting Act 1942 (Cth), Part IIID, xxxii, 87, 96, 98–9 384–6 constitutional drafting, 28 Brown v Members of the Classification Review exporting States, 338, 342, 347–9, 352 Board, 404 freedom of interstate intercourse, 335, Browne, Frank, 146–9, 151–2 349–51, 352 Bryce, James, 5, 14, 24–5 freedom of interstate trade, xxxiv–xxxv, Builders’ Labourers case, 316–18 335, 337–9, 351–2 Bunton, Cleaver, 234–5 importing States, 339–47, 348, 352 Burger, Warren, 146–7 Privy Council decisions, 321, 325–6 Burgess case, 268, 275, 277 Collector v Day, 37 Burke, Brian, 79, 124 Collins, A. E., 21 Burke, Tom, 124 Colonial Sugar Refining Co case, 316–17, Burns v Ransley, 133 320, 330 Business Franchise (Tobacco) Act 1974 (Vic), Comans, C. K., 226 339–40 Commissioner for Motor Transport v Antill Butlin, S. J., 120 Ranger & Co Pty Ltd, 325–6 Byers, Sir Maurice, 234, 237, 240, 242–3, common law, 319–20, 329–30, 388, 390–2, 387 395–6, 399–400, 403, 405 Commonwealth Bank, 85, 87–9, 91, 94, 96, C 100 Cahill, J. J., 70 Commonwealth Bank Bill 1951, 222 Cairns, James, 233–4 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Callinan, Ian, 284, 288–9, 299, 304–5, 401 Act. see Conciliation and Arbitration Act Calwell, Arthur, 188 Commonwealth Conciliation and Cameron, Archie, 111 Arbitration Commission. see Cameron, D. J., 68 Arbitration Commission Campbell, E., 295–8 Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Canada, xxix, 11, 14–15, 72, 74–5, 77, 114, Arbitration. see Arbitration Court 185, 320, 391 Commonwealth Electoral Act (No. 2) 1973 Carrington, Lord, 11–12 (Cth), 218–19 Carson, Lord, 42 Commonwealth Grants Commission, 64, 67 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia, Commonwealth Industrial Court, xxxiii, 338–41, 343–6, 352 170–1 Cave, Viscount, 42 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales. Chamberlain, Joseph, 20–2, 312–14 see Bank Nationalisation cases characterisation, 47, 71, 387 Commonwealth v Cigamatic, xxx, 48–50 checks and balances, 135, 252 Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd, 395 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-15285-3 - Australian Constitutional Landmarks Edited by H. P. Lee and George Winterton Index More information INDEX 415 Commonwealth v Queensland (1975), 317 freedom of interstate trade, 345 Commonwealth v Tasmania. see Tasmanian omissions, 22–7, 386–7, 390 Dam case Privy Council, 5–7, 15, 20–2, 312–14, communication. see implied freedom of 330 political communication resolution of parliamentary deadlocks, communism, 89–90, 108–15 214–16 Communist Party case, xxxii, xxxv, 108–44, separation of powers, 161–2 286, 300 constitutional history, xxix–xxxvi significance, 129–33 constitutional interpretation. see also Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950 (Cth), literalism 108–9, 113, 115–24, 126–7, 129–34 Bank Nationalisation cases, 94 compensation. see acquisition power extra-legal considerations, 43, 53–4 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904–1952 High Court, xxxii (Cth), 38, 164, 319, 355, 357, 359–60, implied freedom of political 364, 369, 371–3, 375 communication, 390, 398, 405 s.
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