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Home , Aenesidemus, Anaxarchus, Pyrrho

CHAPTER TWO

PYRRHONIAN AND ACADEMIC POLITICS

Why did live as a recluse? Why did Sextus think that skeptics would suffer less at the hands of tyrants? Why did argue pro and contra on the question of justice? An ans• wer to these and similar questions about ancient and pol• itics requires an inventory of the alternative readings of the work of each of the major figures in the tradition. This chapter provides such an inventory. Concepts and methods do not exist without the thinkers who use them. There was no agreement among the ancient thinkers concern• ing how to use the concepts and methods of skepticism, and each one used them in different (albeit often overlapping) ways. There• fore, this chapter works out from each of the main thinkers in• volved, examining their different approaches and the implications for political thought and action. The political issues that are discussed are the issues that come up in the ancient sources: discrete issues such as slavery; matters of authority and obligation such as paying court to kings and obed• ience to tyrants; general theories such as the source and status of justice; and the parameters of political argumentation. We shall be concerned throughout with the common charge that skepticism must lead to political quietism, where quietism means withdrawal from or indifference to politics.

PART ONE: PYRRHONIAN POLITICS

1. Pyrrho and Timon: epoche, , eschewing , and living with appearances Laertius reported that Pyrrho set an example of sus• pension of judgment, maintaining that "each thing is no more this than this"; and that he was credited with living by his philosophy.1

1 DL IX 61-2 (Long and Sedley, 1:13). 34 PYRRHONIAN AND ACADEMIC POLITICS

The first element of Pyrrho's way, also described as suspension of belief, was called epoche by the later Greeks.2 As re• ports, "the outcome for those who adopt this attitude, says Timon, will be first speechlessness, and then freedom from disturbance".3 "Freedom from disturbance" is a translation of the Greek ata- raxia, also translated as "tranquillity". It is a negative concept: tarachê meant nuisance, trouble, disturbance, or anxiety, and the prefix "a-" meant freedom from those states. As we have seen in the previous chapter, other schools such as the Epicureans claimed to seek ataraxia as a goal. Pyrrho was much admired for his tran• quillity and equanimity in the face of pain, and of difficult questions. Even in ancient times there was disagreement about the meaning of the claim that Pyrrho lived by his skepticism. According to Diogenes Laertius, it was reported that "when fell into a slough, he passed by without giving him any help",4 presumably because he could not be sure that Anaxarchus had really fallen into the slough, or that he could really help him, or because it did not disturb his tranquility. Living by his principles reportedly meant "avoiding nothing and taking no precautions, facing everything as it came, wagons, precipices, dogs, and entrusting nothing whatever to his sensations. But he was looked after... by his disciples".5 Diogenes also reported that defended Pyrrho against this charge, asserting that "although he practiced philosophy on the principles of , he did not act carelessly in the details of daily life".6 Diogenes's source for the first stories may have been hostile, and Aenesidemus may be polishing Pyrrho's image for his own purposes, but in any case the two versions have

2 Hallie, Scepticism, Man, & God, observes that the fragments we have from Pyrrho do not use the word epoche, but asserts that Pyrrho clearly uses the concept (p. 14). See Couissin, "L'origine et revolution de Y epoche", pp. 373-397. Diogenes Laertius read the word back into the earliest Pyrrhonists: the skeptics strive for epoche, "so Timon and Aenesidemus declare" (DL IX 107; see also DL IX 61). 3 Eusebius, 14.18 (Long and Sedley, 1:15). 4 DL IX 63 (Bury, 2:477). 5 DL IX 62 (Long and Sedley, 1:13). 6 Ibid.