/J.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXI • No. 1852 • December 23, 1974

PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND THE SOVIET UNION

Remarks by President Ford, Joint Communiques, and U.S.-U.S.S.R. Statement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 866

President Ford's Neivs Conference at Washington December 2 861

Secretary Kissinger's Neivs Conferences at Tokyo and Vladivostok 883

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol, LXXI, No. 1852 December 23, 1974

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and tlie Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Depart- ment, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other For sale by the Superintendent of Documents officers of tlie Department, as well as U.S. Government Printing Office WashinKton, D.C. 20402 special articles on various phases of PRICE: international affairs and the functions

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President Ford's News Conference of December 2

Following are excerpts relating to foreign through 1985. We agreed it is realistic to policy from the transcript of a news confer- aim at completing this agreement next year. ence held by President Ford in the audito- This is possible because we made major rium of the Executive Office Building on De- breakthroughs on two critical issues cember 2.^ —Number one, we agreed to put a ceiling President Ford: Good evening. Perhaps I of 2,400 each on the total number of inter- can anticipate some of your questions by continental ballistic missiles, submarine- summarizing my recent visits to Japan, the launched missiles, and heavy bombers. Republic of Korea, and the Soviet Union. —Two, we agreed to limit the number of In Japan, we succeeded in establi.shing a missiles that can be armed with multiple war- new era of relations between our two coun- heads, MIRV's. Of each side's total of 2,400, tries. We demonstrated our continuing com- 1,320 can be so armed. mitment to the independence and to the se- These ceilings are well below the force curity of South Korea. At Vladivostok we levels which would otherwise have been ex- put a firm ceiling on the strategic arms race, pected over the next 10 years and very sub- which heretofore has eluded us since the nu- stantially below the forces which would re- clear age began. I believe this is something sult from an all-out arms race over that for which future generations will thank us. same period. Finally, Secretary Kissinger's mission What we have done is to set firm and equal maintained the momentum in China with the limits on the strategic forces of each side, People's Republic of China. thus preventing an arms race with all its My meetings at Vladivostok with General terror, instability, war-breeding tension, and Secretary Brezhnev were a valuable oppor- economic waste. tunity to review Soviet-American relations We have, in addition, created the solid ba- and chart their future course. Although this sis from which future arms reductions can was our original purpose. Secretary Brezhnev be made and, hopefully, will be negotiated. and I found it possible to go beyond this get- It will take more detailed negotiations to acquainted stage. convert this agreed framework into a com- Building on the achievements of the past prehensive accord, but we have made a long three years, we agreed that the prospects step toward peace on a basis of equality, the were favorable for more substantial and, only basis on which an agreement was possi- may I say, very intensive negotiations on the ble. primary issue of a limitation of strategic Beyond this, our improved relations with arms. the other nations of Asia developed on this In the end, we agreed on the general frame- journey will continue to serve the interests work for a new agreement that will last of the United States and the cause of peace for months to come. Economy, energy, secu- rity, and trade ' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- relations were discussed, tion of Presidential Documents dated Dec. 9, 1974. which will be of mutual benefit to us all.

December 23, 1974 861 .

I would like to repeat publicly my thanks President Foid: Mr. Cormier, Mr. Brezh- and gratitude for the hospitality extended to nev and I did discuss at some length our dif- me by all of my hosts and, through me, to the ferent views on the settlement of the Middle American people. East. There are some differences, but they Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press are not as major as it would appear.

International], I am glad to respond to your We indicated that, in our judgment, it was question. important for continuous progress to be made, perhaps with negotiations between Is- Q. Mr. Presidoit, this pact permits the rael and one or more of the other Arab na- miclear buildup to go ahead. Since you ivant tions. to cut government spending, hoiv many bil- We also agreed that at a certain point a lions of dollars will this cost the American Geneva Conference might be the final an- people over the years, and also, do you think swer. So, as we discussed our what appeared that the Russians stalled last Jidy because to be different views at the outset, I think they kneiv that Mr. Nixon was doomed in the we came to an agreement that it was in the Presidency and preferred to deal with his interest of the nations in the Middle East, successor? the interest of the world at large, that both

President Ford: I would like to correct, if parties make a maximum eft'ort to keep ne-

I might, one impression. This does not per- gotiations going. mit an agreed buildup. It puts a cap on fu- We think our step-by-step approach is the ture buildups, and it actually reduces a part right one for the time being, but we don't of the buildup at the present time. preclude the possibility of a Geneva Confer-

It is important, I should say, however, in ence. order for us to maintain equality, which is a Yes, sir. keystone of this program, to have an ade- Q. You say that this is going to reduce a quate amount of military expenditures. But I part of the buildup. Does that mean, then, can say this without hesitation or qualifica- that we are going to spoid less on defense tion: If we had not had this agreement, it )u'xt year tJia)i we are spending this year? would have required the United States to sub- stantially increase its military expenditures President Ford: It does not mean that, be- in the strategic areas. cause only a part of our total defense pro- So, we put a cap on the arms race. We ac- gram is related to strategic arms research, tually made some reductions below present development, deployment, and operations and programs. It is a good agreement, and I maintenance. We do have an obligation with- think that the American people will buy it, in the limits of 2,400 on delivery systems and because it provides for equality and it pro- 1,320 on MIRV's to keep our forces up to vides for a negotiated reduction in several that level. years ahead. And I think we can, with about the same Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated expenditure level for the next fiscal year as Press] at the present. But in the other programs, in our tactical Q. Mr. President, there are reports that forces and other military programs, there is you and Mr. Brezhnev made some progress an inflationary cost. The military has that in- in maybe fashioning a complementary ap- flation just like you and I do, so we will prob- proach to negotiations in the Middle East. ably have to increase our military budget More specifically, perhaps the Soviets uwuld next year just to take care of the costs of in- agree to try to persuade the PLO [Palestine flation. Liberation Organization] to acknoivledge Yes. that Israel has a right to exist, and we then might try to persuade Israel to talk to the Q. Just to follow up, ive are not quite to PLO. Is there any truth to this? that ceiling yet, are we? Do you intend to

862 Department of State Bulletin stay below that ceiling, or are yon going to of view some years ago. The Soviet Union try to reach tliat ceiling? is limited as to delivery systems and as to MIRV's within the delivery systems. They President Ford: I intend to stay below the cannot go beyond those. ceiling. That is the agreement, but we do have The agreement gives us the flexibility to an obligation to stay up to that ceiling, and move up in throw weight if we want to. It the budget that I will recommend will keep does not preclude the Soviets from increasing our strategic forces either up to or aimed at throw weight, but I think for that objective. good reasons they have no justification for doing so. Q. Mr. President, since it is widely be- Yes, Mr. Sperling [Godfrey Sperling, lieved the Soviet Union has larger rockets Christian Science Monitor]. capable of carrying heavier payloads and be- Q. Wouldn't your stated accomplishments ing MIRV'ed to a larger extent, carrying in Russia have carried more long-rayige more warheads, can you tell us what the rel- credibility if they had been put initially and ative position would be between the United then described later on in less sanguine and States and the Soviet Unioyi in terms of war- more modest terms? heads if each side goes to the maxinuim

number of 1,320 on the MIRV'ed limit? President Ford: Well, if I understand the question, when I came back a week ago yes- President Ford: On delivery systems, we terday, we did not have in writing what is are equal. On the MIRV'ing, we are equal. I called an aide memoire, which was the spe- think the question you are asking is throw cific agreement in writing that General Sec- weight. It is recognized that the Soviet Un- retary Brezhnev and I had agreed to ver- ion has a heavier throw weight, but the bally. That has now been received. agreement does not preclude the United Until that had been received and we had States from increasing its throw-weight ca- checked it out, we felt it was wise to pability. speak in generalities. I am giving to you and to the A number of years ago, our military de- American people tonight the specific figures. cided that we wanted smaller missiles that They are, I think, constructive. It is a good were more accurate. That has been the deci- agreement. It is an agreement sion of our military. —if I might repeat—that puts a cap on the arms race, it Now, if the military decides at the present makes some reductions, and it gives us an op- time that they want to increase the throw portunity to negotiate. weight, we have that right under the agree- So, I don't think a week's delay in the spe- ment, and I can tell you that we have the ca- cifics has handicapped our presentation. pability to do so. So, if there is an inequality in throw Q. More specifically, tvhat percentage of weight, it can be remedied if our military the state of progress in Russia was yours, recommended and the Congress appropriates and how much was Mr. Nixon's? the money. President Ford: Well, I don't really think Q. Mr. President, if you find the Soviet I ought to get into an evaluation of that. The Union leaning, then, toivard getting the max- United States has been working on a stra- imum throiv iveight or the maximum number tegic arms limitation agreement for three or of loarheads on their MIRV missiles, would four years. I think we made headway in you then recommend that the United States SALT One. I think we have made a real accelerate and move from smaller missiles breakthrough in SALT Two. to larger ones? Q. Mr. President, I ivould like to get back President Ford: The Soviet military guide- to the cost of missiles for one moment, if we lines were for heavier missiles, heavier throw may. I understand ive are now spending weight. Our military took a different point about $15 billion a year in strategic arms,

December 23, 1974 863 —

and there is an ei/onnoiis amount of missile President Ford: We know of no violations, building to be done under this agreemeyit either on the part of the Soviet Union or by over the next 10 years, both in MIRV's and ourselves. There have been some allegations in throw iveight. Will our costs continue at that the Soviet Union has violated the SALT about the level they are now for the next 10 One agreement. We don't think thej' have. years, or will it be more? There are, however, some ambiguities. When the SALT One agreement was agreed President Ford: My best judgment is that to, there was established a Standing Consul- our strategic arms cost will hold relatively tative Commission made up of the Soviet Un- the same. It will not be substantially ex- ion and the United States. That Commission panded other than for any increase resulting can meet twice a year to analyze any allega- from inflation. tions as to violations of SALT One. It is our Yes. intention to call for a meeting of that group Q. Mr. President, under the agreement the I think in January of next year—to analyze U.S. tactical nuclear iveapons at the forward any of the ambiguities that have been al- bases in Europe were not i)icluded. Do you leged. We don't think there have been any expect that they will be reduced or elim- violations, but I have a responsibility to find inated tinder some future mutual balanced out, and we intend to follow through under force reduction agreement with the Soviet the agreed procedure of the 1972 agreements. Union? Q. Mr. President, since there is no limit President Ford: One of the very significant in this agreement on throw iveight, and since benefits of the agreement from Vladivostok there is no limit on multiple warheads, and was the fact we didn't have to include in the since additio)ial multiple warheads could be 2,400 or the 1,320—either the delivery sys- put on the bigger missiles, more or less ad tems or the MIRV's—as far as the forward- infinitum, how can you say that this is a lid base systems were concerned. or cap 0)1 the arms race?

I am sure you know we are involved in mu- President Ford: Well, it certainly, number tual balanced force reductions in Western one, puts a limit on the delivery systems Europe. When we get closer to an agreement 2,400—and as I indicated at the outset, this there—and I hope we will ; we are presently does result in a cutback as far as the Soviet negotiating in Vienna in this area—it is Union is concerned. hopeful that we can make some reductions The 1,320 limitation on MIRV's does put a both in numbers of military personnel be- lid on the planned or programed program for tween ourselves and the allies on the one ourselves as well as the Soviet Union. side and the Warsaw Pact nations and the Now, the throw-weight problem is one that Soviet Union on the other, as well as any we can remedy if we want to. Our military arms reductions. took a dift'erent point of view some years Q. Beyond your hope, is that a commitment ago when they designed our ballistic missiles, that you made to the Soviet leaders in Vladi- but we have that flexibility. vostok? Now, if we decide to go to a heavier throw weight, we can add on a MIRV'ed missile a President Ford: No, we made no agree- greater number of individual warheads. That ment concerning the mutual balanced force is a choice of flexibility that we have, and I reductions. We did agree to continue nego- think it is one of the benefits of this agree- tiations. ment. Q. Mr. President, are you satisfied that Q. You woiddn't describe that as an arms the Soviets are carrying out the spirit and race ? the letter of the 1972 arms limitation agree- ments ? President Ford: Well, it is an attempt, if

864 Department of State Bulletin ?

our military wanted to achieve an equality myself, as far as the Middle East was con- in this particular area. We have equality on cerned, was to state our position and their delivery systems and the right to MIRV position; and as we discussed it, I think we from those delivery systems. In the other, if came to a higher degree of agreement in it is our choice, we can go up in throw weight. that our position was understood by them Yes, Sarah [Sarah McLendon, McLendon and the prospect of a Geneva agreement was News Service]. understood by us.

Q. Mr. President, I tvant to ask you, ivhat Q. / understand you tvould like to devote about conventional weapons? We have heard about half of the news confereyice to domes- from Senator {Barry'] Goldivater, and we tic affairs, and I think we are about at the have heard from Admiral Zumwalt \_Adm. halfway point. Elmo R. Zumivalt, Jr., former Chief of Na- val Operations] that ive are very iveak on Q. Mr. President, this question perhaps conventional iveapons and ive need more of goes back to the earlier part of the neivs those, rather than the kind that you have in conference, but it has an economic impact— your agreement. and that is how much it ivill cost to reach the President Ford: Well, of course, this agree- ceiling ivhich you negotiated tvith Mr. Brezh- nev, ment, Sarah, was limited to strategic arms. and ivhen do you expect that the United States ivill We hope, as I indicated a moment ago, to reach this ceiling? continue our negotiations for the mutual bal- President Ford: As I indicated in answer anced force reductions in Europe. That, of to an earlier question, I think we must con- course, would have a limit on the conven- tinue our present strategic research develop- tional weapons. ment, deployment, maintenance programs. In the meantime, I think it is of manda- And we are going to move into the present tory importance for the United States to program some additional new weapons sys- maintain its conventional capability the — tems—the B-1 aircraft, the Trident sub- Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Ma- marine. The net result is that costs will rines because the United States, through a — probably go up as we phase out some and responsible military program, can maintain phase in some and phase out others. Now, the peace. If we cut back our defense in con- the total annual cost will be relatively the ventional weapons, I think we will have same plus the co.st of inflation. weakened our position for the maintenance of peace. I don't intend to propose a budget Q. Is it $18 billion? in that regard. President Ford: It is in that ball park. Q. Mr. President, do you think that we can Q. And for hotv many years do you ex- do both these, then of pect this to continue, Mr. President?

President Ford: I think so. President Ford: Until we are able to ne- Q. To follotv up on Frank Cormier's ques- gotiate a reduction below the 2,400 delivei-y tion, did you and Mr. Brezhnev discuss some systems and the 1,320 MIRV systems. kind of a trade-off ivhereby Israel woidd deal the with PLO and the PLO woidd recognize Q. To follow up the qtiestion that is reach- Israel's right to exist as a state? ing but is still in the economic ball park, if the ceiling works, will there ever be a President Ford: We didn't get into that saving, an actual saving, in expenditures detail. Israel has indicated that it would not for strategic iveapons? negotiate with the PLO. We have no way of forcing them to do so. President Ford: Very, very definitely, and The discussion between Mr. Brezhnev and that is the fundamental question that we

December 23, 1974 865 ;

have answered. If there had been no ceiling first had to cap the arms race, both in of 2,400 on launchers and 1.320 on MIRV's, launchers and in MIRV's. We have done we would have had an arms race. The that, and I wish to compliment Mr. Brezhnev Soviet Union had plans and programs, we because his opening statement, if I can para- believe, to substantiallj' increase the number phrase it, was that he and I, his country and of launchers and to substantially go beyond ours, had an obligation to not indulge in 1,320 on the MIRV's. an arms race, to put a cap on the proposed expenditures in both And we have the capability. And, I think, categories. It a statesmanlike at if there had been an arms race with the was approach the out- Soviet Union going higher and higher and set, and because he believed that and be- higher, we as a nation, for our own security, cause I believe it, I think we made substan- would have been forced to do precisely the tial progress, and I strongly defend what same. we did.

So, Mr. Brezhnev and I agreed that w'e Tlie press: Thank you, Mr. President.

President Ford Visits Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Soviet Union

President Ford made a state visit to Japan This, I think, can be defined as a quest November 18-22, visited Korea November for peace, to broaden it, to strengthen it 22-23, and met with Leonid I. Brezhnev, and as I said in Arizona earlier this week, I General Secretary of the Commuttist Party would rather travel 1,000 miles for peace of the Soviet Union, at Vladivostok Novem- than take a single step for war. ber 23-2U. Folloiving are remarks and toasts We are visiting three great countries. The by President Ford during the trip and the first is Japan, the first visit of an American texts of joint communiques issued at Tokyo President, a state visit, to that great coun- and Seoid, a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on try. We have a special relationship with limitation of strategic offensive arms issued, Japan, and although we are separated by the at Vladivostok, and a joint U.S.-Soviet com- broadest of oceans, we have the closest of munique signed at Vladivostok. friendships. We also will be stopping in the Republic of Korea, a courageous and brave ally, an ally that joins with us in preserving DEPARTURE REMARKS, THE WHITE HOUSE, peace in that part of the world. NOVEMBER 17 The trip to the Soviet Union has special significance. There has been a tremendous white House press release dated November 17 efl'oi't over the years to broaden an effort of Let me just say a word or two, and at peace throughout the world, and I look for- the outset thank all of my friends for coming ward to participating in the ever-increasing out to see us off. strengthening of our ties with the Soviet

I think this trip has great significance, Union. both as to timing and as to substance. We I go with optimism. I think we, as Ameri- all live in an interrelated world; no longer cans, can be optimistic about the progress can we, in the United States, think in the that has been made and will be made. I go terms of isolationism. What we do overseas with a dedication of service to my fellow has great significance for some of the prob- Americans and a pride in our great country. lems that we have here at home. Thank you very, very much.

866 Department of State Bulletin — ;

THE VISIT TO JAPAN contributions they have made to our culture, to our indu.stry, to our trade, to our educa- tion, and to our government. Toast at Luncheon Given by Kakuel Tanaka, Mr. Prime Minister, the dialogue that Prime Minister of Japan, Tokyo, November 19 we began in Washington and which we have White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 19 continued here in Tokyo indicates that we Mr. Prime Minister, Excellencies, gentle- have many, many basic ties and many areas

men : The reception that I received upon of common purpose. We have many prob- arriving in Japan and the warm reception lems, but the frank and open discus-sions received during the day today is further proof that we have had and will continue to have of the great hospitality that the Japanese involving areas of prosperity on a world- people have for the Americans. wide basis and peace on a global basis are This very kind and gracious hospitality beneficial to your country and to ours and the warm reception— is typical of the attitude to the world as a whole. of the Japanese Government and the Japa- Our two countries, by working together,

nese people. When I stopped in Anchorage can significantly contribute to world peace, on the way to Japan, the last words I said and we will. Our two nations, cooperating to my fellow Americans were that although with one another, can make a significant Japan and the United States were separated contribution to prosperity in both of our by the broadest of oceans, they were on the countries and to the world at large. other hand the warmest of friends. Mr. Prime Minister, we must discuss and Mr. Prime Minister, you spent many years coordinate our economic policies in an era in your Parliament, and I spent better than of energy shortages and some international 25 years in the Congress of the United monetary crises. We must work together States. I have a great liking for the Con- in order to produce and distribute, make gress. I called it my home outside home. available the need of mankind for food

I can't speak with any personal relation- throughout the world. ship to the Congress a hundred-plus years Mr. Prime Minister, we must join to- ago when they were alleged to be lacking gether in helping those nations throughout in civilization, but I would have to say in the world that are less fortunate than we. defense of the Congress today—whether I We have in the past, and we will expand agree with what they do or not, they are those eff'orts in the future. better behaved. [Laughter.] In contemplating these problems, the ex- Let me assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, pansion of peace and the betterment of the Mrs. Ford deeply regrets she is not with me world economically, it is good to know that on this trip. She had long looked forward we can discuss the issues and problems in an to visiting Japan, meeting the Japanese attitude and an atmosphere of mutual under- people, and she is terribly disappointed that standing in a spirit of good will.

it is impossible for her to be here on this Mr. Prime Minister, let us join in a toast

occasion. I spoke with her on the telephone which honors the friendship and the collab- this morning. That didn't help any, because oration between our people and our nations of her desire to be here. But I can say that this is a characterization of what is good for she is here in spirit, if not in person, and all and in the best interests of each. To she will come on some other occasions. Japan. Mr. Prime Minister, the United States is nation of citizens with many backgrounds, a Toast at Banquet Given by the Emperor, ancestors. of our very finest many Some The Imperial Palace, Tokyo, November 19 citizens have a Japanese ancestry. We are white House press release (Toyko) dated November 19 proud of the tremendous contributions that they make to a better America. We are Your Majesty: I am honored to be the proud of them because of the significant guest of Your Imperial Majesties, and it is

December 23, 1974 867 with a very deep sense of this special moment the opportunity to speak directly to the that I speak this evening. people of Japan. The first state visit of an American Presi- I deeply appreciate the excellent coverage dent to Japan is an occasion of very great of my visit by the exceptional news media importance to all of us. Your gracious of Japan. I have always sought a good work- hospitality symbolically honors the 213 mil- ing relationship with the American journal- lion Americans that I have the honor to ists and have the same feeling toward their represent. I can reassure Japan that the Japanese colleagues. It has been my objec- United States is determined to perpetuate the tive at all times to treat journalists and all unique ties that link our two nations for other people in the same manner that I would the common good. like to be treated. Though separated by the broadest of I bring the warmest greetings of the oceans, Your Majesty, we have achieved be- American people. Our bipartisan political tween our two nations the closest of friend- leadership in the American Congress sends ships. Our relationship transcends that of its very best wishes. The distinguished lead- governments and heads of states. Each year ers of both of America's national political the ties binding Americans with Japanese parties have asked me to tell you of the very increase: trade, science, culture, spoi'ts, and high value that all Americans attach to our many other areas, including cherished per- partnership with Japan. sonal contact between individuals. It is the American custom for the Presi- We share a common devotion to moral dent to make a report every year to the and to spiritual strength. Our paths are not Congress on our state of the Union. In the always identical, but they all lead in the same spirit, I thought the people of Japan same direction—that of world peace and might welcome a report on the state of an- harmonious relations among mankind. other union—the unity of American and Jap- Let us continue to seek understanding anese mutual aspirations for friendship as with each other and among all peoples, Your Americans see that relationship. Majesty. Let us trade. Let us share and In my hometown of Grand Rapids, Michi- perpetuate the prosperity of both nations. gan, a Japanese company is now assembling Let us work together to solve common prob- musical instruments. Not only are the in- lems, recognizing the interdependence of the struments harmonious in the melodies they modern world in which we all live. produce, but the labor-management relation- America, I can assure you. Your Majesty, ship followed by the Japanese created a model

is determined to do its part. It is in a of harmony between workers and business. spirit of respect, the spirit of admiration for In a nearby community, Edmore, another the Japanese nation, in dedication of our Japanese firm is manufacturing small elec- continuing collaboration, and with sincere trical motors. This is yet another Japanese and deep-felt confidence in the future, that enterprise that has injected new energy, new

I offer a toast to the health and to the well- good will, in our industrial life. There are being of Your Imperial Majesties. similar examples throughout America, and we welcome them. The time has long passed when Americans Address Before the Japan Press Club, speak only of what we contributed to your Imperial Hotel, Tokyo, November 20 society. Today traffic flows in both directions. White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 20 We are both learning from each other. As the first American President to visit To signify the value the United States at- Japan while in office, I greet you on this taches to partnership with Japan, I chose this unprecedented occasion. I thank the Japa- to make my first overseas trip. I also met with nese Press Club for inviting me and the your Ambassador to the United States on the National Television Network of Japan for first day that I assumed office, August 9.

868 Department of State Bulletin I have long admired the richness and the each other what we regard as the central diversity of Japan's culture, the products of needs of our times. your industry, the ingenuity, creativity, and First, of course, is peace. Americans and the energy of your people, your courage as Japanese know the value of peace. We want a fountain of resourcefulness in a troubled to devote our resources and ourselves to world. building things, not tearing them down. We My only regret is that Mrs. Ford could do not want to send our sons into battle not join me on this visit in respon.se to your again. very kind invitation. We both hope that she The alliance between Japan and the United can come at some later date. States has helped to secure peace and can Americans are very proud of the way that continue to help secure it. That alliance is we and the Japanese have worked together not directed against any other country. It during the postwar period. We have had does not prevent us from improving our some disagreements. But we have remained relations with other countries. friends and we have remained partners. To- Our alliance does not signify that both gether we created conditions under which nations subscribe fully to identical attitudes both nations could prosper. Together we ex- or identical styles. It does signify, however, panded our relations in trade and travel. that we clearly share a common resolve to The reality of America's economic, politi- maintain stability in East Asia, to help in cal, and strategic interdependence with Japan the development of other countries that need is very obvious. our help, and to work together to encourage America is Japan's greatest customer and diplomatic and political rather than military supplier. Japan is America's greatest over- solutions to world problems. seas trading partner. Japan is the best for- Our alliance was forged by peoples who eign customer for America's agricultural saw their national interest in friendship and products. in cooperation. I am confident that our re- The total trade between our two nations lations will remain solid and very substantial. has doubled since 1970. It will surpass $20 I pledge that we shall work to make it so. billion in 1974. American investments in Peace, however, cannot be our sole con- Japan are the largest of any foreign state. cern. We have learned that there are many Japan's investment in America is growing international threats and dangers that can rapidly and accounts for one-fifth of all aff'ect the lives of our citizens. We face Japanese investment abroad. dwindling supplies of raw materials and The flow of Japanese visitors to the United food. We face international economic prob- States has grown from some 50,000 in 1966 lems of great complexity. We must be more to over 700,000 in 1974. This is also a two- stringent in conservation than ever before. way street. Over 350,000 Americans visited We have worked together to solve the Japan last year, accounting for nearly one- problems of the cold war. We succeeded half of all foreign visitors. because we worked together. Now we con- Together we removed the legacies of World front these new and even more complicated War II. The reversion of Okinawa eliminated problems. the last vestige of that war from our agenda. The Japanese reformer Sakuma Shozan We have made independent but mutually wrote some lines in 1854 that provide an compatible efforts to improve our relations insight for 1974. Sakuma said, and I quote: with the Soviet Union and the People's Re- When I was 20, I knew that men were linked to- public of better China. We have devised gether in one province; when I was 30, I knew that channels for open consultation. I particular- they were linked together in one nation; when I was ly want you to know that I understand the 40, I knew they were linked together in one world of dangers of taking each other for granted. five continents. As we talk to each other, we must ask Now, 120 years later, the links between

December 23, 1974 869 nations are closer than ever. Modern tech- baseball, two teams compete. But neither can nology has made the world one. What each- play without the other nor without common man or each nation does, or fails to do, affects respect for each other and for the rules of every other. the game. Some Americans wondered why I decided I have taken the liberty of giving you my to accept your invitation to come to Japan views on the world we live in. Now let me at a time when we have unsolved problems tell you, the Japanese people, a little bit at home. I replied to those Americans that about the American people. The American many of the problems we have at home are people have faced some difficult times in our not just American problems but the problems history. They know they will face others in of the world as a whole. Like others, we the future. Their burdens are enormous, suffer from inflation. Like others, we face both at home and abroad. Some observers, recession. Like others, we have to deal with including American observers, say that rising prices and potential shortages of fuels Americans have lost their confidence, their and raw materials. America cannot solve sense of responsibility, and their creativity. those problems alone. Nations can only solve It is not true. those problems by working together. I have traveled over much of my country Just as we worked together to maintain during the past year. Each time, I return peace, we can work together to solve to- to Washington refreshed. Our people are morrow's problems. determined and realistic. Our people ai"e Our two nations provide the world with vigorous. They are solving their problems a model of what can be achieved by inter- in countless towns and cities across the national cooperation. We can also provide country. They continue to understand that a model for dealing with the new difficulties. history has placed great responsibilities on We both have great technological skills and American shoulders. Americans are ready human resources, great energy, and great and willing to play their part with the same imagination. strength and the same will that they have We both acknowledge the responsibility to always shown in the past. developing states. We envisage the orderly Americans also know that no nation, how- and peaceful sharing of essential national ever strong, can hope to dictate the course resources. We can work together to meet the of history by it.self . But the ability to under- global economic issues. stand the basic issue, to define our national We believe that we are not just temporary interest, and to make common cause with allies. We are permanent friends. others to achieve common purposes makes it We share the same goals—peace, develop- possible to influence events. And Americans ment, stability, and prosperity. These are are determined to do that for constructive not only praiseworthy and essential goals purposes and in the true spirit of inter- but common goals. dependence. The problems of peace and economic well- In that spirit, let me make a pledge to being are inextricably linked. We believe you today. As we face the problems of the peace cannot exist without prosperity, pros- future, the United States will remain faith- perity cannot exist without peace, and neither ful in our commitments and firm in the can exist if the great states of the world do pursuit of our common goals. We intend not work together to achieve it. We owe not only to remain a trustworthy ally but a this to ourselves, to each other, and to all reliable trading partner. of the Japanese and the American peoples. We will continue to be suppliers of goods America and Japan share the same na- you need. If shortages occur, we will take tional pastime—baseball. In the game of special account of the needs of our traditional

870 Department of State Bulletin trading partners. We will not compete with promise, and cooperation. This concept also our friends for their markets or for their guides my view of American policy toward resources. Japan. We want to work with them. We both have much work to do. Let us do The basic concepts of our foreign policy it together. Let us also continue the quest remain unchanged. Those concepts have a for peace. I would rather walk a thousand solid bipartisan and popular support. The miles for peace than take a single step American people remain strong, confident, toward war. and faithful. We may sometimes falter, but we will not fail. Toast at Reception Given by Japanese Diet, Let me, if I might, end on a personal note. Hotel Okura, Tokyo, November 20 It is a privilege to be the first American White House press release (Tokyo) dated November President to visit Japan while in office. It 20

is also a very great pleasure. I look forward Mr. Speaker: I am deeply grateful for to seeing Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan. the very kind remarks and the toast given Japan has preserved her cultural integrity to me and to my country. It is very signifi- in the face of rapid modernization. I have cant that I have an opportunity of joining never believed all change is neces.sarily good. with the members of your Diet. We must try to apply the enduring values I am sure all of you have recognized that of the past to the challenges and to the I spent a quarter of a century of my political pressures of our times. Americans can learn life as a member of our legislative body, the from Japan to respect traditions even as wo, House of Representatives—or your Parlia- like you, plunge ahead in the last quarter ment.

of the 20th century. This was a great experience for me. I I also look forward to another deep priv- think it is quite significant in addition that ilege. Yesterday during my call upon His the first American President who visited Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan, I your great country was an individual who renewed our invitation for the Emperor to had spent some time in the Parliament or visit the United States. It would be a great the Legislature, the House of Representa- pleasure to be the first American President tives, and the United States Senate, as Vice to welcome the Emperor of Japan to Wash- President. ington and to show His Imperial Majesty This, in my judgment, gives a President our national shrines and treasures, including a broader perspective of the problems, of the graceful Japanese cherry trees whose the solutions. It has always been my feeling blossoms provide a setting for the monu- that a person who has served in a Parliament ments to the great heroes of our own past. or in a legislative body is extremely well I hope that my visit shall be the first of qualified to understand the views of the many by American Presidents. I hope that people of a country, a person who is well the leaders of our two countries will follow qualified to seek a consensus or a solution to the example that our peoples have already the problems, whether they be at home or set, to visit each other frequently and freely abroad. as our nations move together to deal with One of my very top staff members, a the many common problems and concerns number of years ago, Mr. [Donald] Rums- that will affect the lives of all our citizens feld, initiated with members from your and all humanity. Parliament an exchange between Japanese I said in my first Presidential address to parliamentarians and legislators from our the Congress that my administration was Congress. It is my judgment that this ex- based on communication, conciliation, com- change is a very, very important way of

December 23, 1974 871 —

it is therefore my privilege and honor to building a constructive relationship between your government and to and our country. offer a toast to your country and participate in your people on behalf of my government I was never privileged to the American people. the Japanese-American interparliamentary group, or exchange group, as I understand opportunity as a Nongovernmental it is called. I did have an Toast at Reception by Member of the House of Representatives Organizations ' Hotel Okura, November 20 Inter- 20 our Congress—to be a member of the White House iness release (Tokyo) dated November delegation on three or parliamentary Union It is a very high honor and a very rare this exchange four occasions. And I found privilege for me to have the opportunity of of great benefit, between parliamentarians joining with all of you on this occasion. I hope and trust a tremendous asset, and The trip by me as the first American this exchange be- that in the years ahead President in office coming to Japan has been groups will tween members of parliamentary a memorable one, one that I shall never for- extensive—it will be broaden, will be more get. The opportunity to meet with Their countries. very helpful to each country, to all Majesties, the opportunity to meet with your that I am Let me conclude by saying high government officials, the opportunity to that I grew honored to be among a group share some thoughts with the members of the country. I under- up with in politics in my Diet, the opportunity to have a governmental each and stand your problems ; I understand exchange at the highest level is of course always in the every one of you. I was of great significance. always were minority in our Congress. We It has been my experience in 25 years of majority. We had trying to challenge the political life, when I served in the House found that in many dift'erences, but I have of Representatives, to work hand-in-glove group in the differences in a parliamentary with other members of the legislative branch yours—that our country—and I believe in and of course, in later years as a member disagreeable, you can disagree without being of the leadership, to work with the legisla- test of the which in my opinion is a true tive and executive branch. parliamen- strength and the character of a And, of course, in the last 13 or so months, in tary body. I have had the opportunity of serving two had with your The discussions that I have offices in the executive branch. constructive in seek- government have been I have learned, over a period of 26 years interna- ing to solve problems—domestic, serving in the Federal Government, that all tional. wisdom, all support for policies, doesn't nec- I had to meet The great opportunity that essarily come from government, but primar- Empress, His Maj- with your Emperor and ily from people in nongovernmental organi- been a great esty and Her Majesty—it has zations and individuals who are not directly them and experience for me, and I thank connected with government itself. being so warm in the people of Japan for And as I understand it, this group here report to my people their welcome. I will on this occasion is a nongovernmental group have great in the United States that they of Japanese and Americans who have spent governments are friends in Japan, that our a great deal of your time working together solutions to the working together to seek in a nongovernmental capacity to support and between problems on a worldwide basis a greater unity between our country, the us, as two governments. United States, and your country, Japan. We are friends, we will work together, United ' .\merica-Japan Society, Inc., and and we have a great future—the Given by the Japan. And the Japan-U.S. Economic Council. States with the Government of

Department of State Bulletin 872 —

I compliment you, and I thank you. Your permits me to, in a small way, in a symbolic contribution is of tremendous significance. gesture, to reciprocate the wonderful hos- Governments themselves can't do it. pitality so graciously extended to me this Decisions can be made at the government week. level, and in our society that is essential. It has been a period of enlightenment for

But if those decisions are not supported, if me, and I will take home an inspiring im- those decisions are not explained by people pression of the possibilities available for an in positions of responsibility in nongovern- even greater friendship, greater cooperation mental areas, it is impossible for those deci- and interdependence of our two nations. sions to be successful. America is now approaching its national I early in career in poli- learned that my bicentennial. Tonight I would like to recall tics. I always could be more successful in another meaningful event 114 years ago, working to find a solution if I had the sup- on May 14, 1860. That was the day when port not only among politicians but by those the first diplomatic mission ever sent by people, whether they were in management, Japan to another nation arrived in Washing- in labor, in education, in local government. ton, D.C., our national capital. So I am deeply grateful for what you have I am very pleased. Your Majesties, to pre- done in the past, and I strongly urge that sent on this evening to all of our distin- you continue these efforts in the future, guished guests a token of the durability of because the Japanese Government and the American-Japanese friendship. It is a medal United States Government, after the two bearing the likeness of President Buchanan, days of talks we have had, yesterday and who had the honor of welcoming the Japa- today, are embarking on a stronger unity, nese delegation to the historic East Room a stronger program of helping both in the of the White House. Since that occasion, the maintenance of peace and the stimulation of American Government has never ceased to prosperity. And this is what we want in look to the East as well as to the West. Japan and in America and what we want for Our visitors then regarded us as Ameri- the rest of the world. cans, as strange creatures and observed us And so what you do is of tremendous sig- in every detail. It was with equal fascina- nificance. What you do in explaining to the tion that we viewed our Japanese visitors. thousands of Americans who are here in We learned from each other then, and I and Japan, what the Japanese who are here can we are continuing to learn today. do to explain to the millions of Japanese, The most important lesson that I will not only be better for Japan and the have learned during this visit corresponds United States but will be better for the with a brilliant insight world. of one of the Japanese envoys on the first mission to the United And I congratulate you, I thank you, and States. The occasion was a visit to the New I wish you well. And may I offer a toast at York home of the widow of this point to the Government of Japan and Commodore Perry. The Japanese envoy expressed the millions and millions of Japanese. a very deep emotion at the realization that he was in the home of Commodore Perry and said Toast at Dinner in Honor of the Emperor, and I quote : "The time has come when no na- State Guest House, Tokyo, November 20 tion may remain isolated and refuse to take white House press release (Tokyo) dated November 20 part in the affairs of the rest of the world."

Your Majesties : I am honored to have That concept is even more compelling to- the privilege of welcoming Your Imperial day. The links between our two nations can Majesties to this dinner this evening. It serve as a model for a world increasingly

December 23, 1974 873 aware of the need for greater international ships among countries in the area. Each country will cooperation. contribute to this task in the light of its own respon- sibilities and capabilities. Both countries recognize Accordingly, in recalling that first Japa- that cooperative relations between the United States to Washington, I pledge that nese delegation and Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation my government will not isolate itself from and Security constitute an important and durable the world or from Japan. element in the evolution of the international situa- tion in Asia and will On behalf of the nation that I am privi- continue to plan an effective and meaningful role in promoting peace and stabil- leged to represent, to lead, I reaffirm the ity in that area. spirit of friendship that endures between us. .3. The United States and Japan recognize the to see that warm I reaffirm my determination need for dedicated efforts by all countries to pursue relationship continues and grows. additional arms limitation and arms reduction meas- Your Majesties, in that spirit and with a ures, in particular controls over nuclear armaments, and to prevent the further spread of nuclear weap- heart filled with faith in the future and ap- ons or other nuclear explosive devices while facili- preciation for our guests, I off"er a toast to tating the expanded use of nuclear energy for peace- health to the well-being of Your the and ful purposes. Both countries underline the high Imperial Majesties. responsibility of all nuclear-weapon states in such efforts, and note the importance of protecting non- nuclear-weapon states against nuclear threats. Joint Communique Issued at Tokyo November 20 4. The United States and Japan recognize the re- Joint Communique Between President Gerald R. markable range of their interdependence and the Ford and Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka need for coordinated responses to new problems con- fronting the international community. They will in- I tensify efforts to promote close cooperation among President Ford of the United States of America industrialized democracies while striving steadily to paid an official visit to Japan between November 18 encourage a further relaxation of tensions in the and 22 at the invitation of the Government of Japan. world through dialogue and exchanges with coun- President Ford met Their Majesties the Emperor tries of different social systems.

and Empress of Japan at the Imperial Palace on No- 5. In view of the growing interdependence of all vember 19. countries and present global economic difficulties, it is increasingly strengthen in- II becoming important to ternational economic cooperation. The United States In discussions held on November 19 and 20, Presi- and Japan recognize the necessity of the construc- dent Ford and Prime Minister Tanaka agreed on the tive use of their human and material resources to following common purposes underlying future rela- bring about solutions to major economic problems. tions between the United States and Japan. The establishment of an open and harmonious world

1. The United States and Japan, Pacific nations economic system is indispensable for international sharing many political and economic interests, have peace and prosperity and a primary goal of both na- developed a close and mutually beneficial relation- tions. The United States and Japan will, to this end, ship based on the principle of equality. Their friend- continue to promote close economic and trade rela- ship and cooperation are founded upon a common de- tions between the two countries and participate con- termination to maintain political systems respecting structively in international efforts to ensure a con- individual freedom and fundamental human rights tinuing expansion of world trade through negotia- as well as market economies which enhance the scope tions to reduce tariff and other trade distortions and for creativity and the prospect of assuring the well- to create a stable and balanced international mone- being of their peoples. tary order. Both countries will remain committed to

2. Dedicated to the maintenance of peace and the their international pledges to avoid actions which ad- evolution of a stable international order reflecting versely affect the economies of other nations. the high purposes and principles of the Charter of 6. The United States and Japan recognize the need the United Nations, the United States and Japan for a more efficient and rational utilization and dis- will continue to encourage the development of con- tribution of world resources. Realizing the impor- ditions in the Asia-Pacific area which will facilitate tance of stable supplies of energy at reasonable peaceful settlement of outstanding issues by the par- prices they will seek, in a manner suitable to their ties most concerned, reduce international tensions, economies, to expand and diversify energy supplies, promote the sustained and orderly growth of devel- develop new energy sources, and conserve on the use oping countries, and encourage constructive relation- of scarce fuels. They both attach great importance

874 Department of State Bulletin to enhancing cooperation among consuming coun- tion stones on which the two countries base their re- tries and they intend, in concert with other nations, spective foreign policies and form an indispensable to pursue harmonious relations with producing na- element supporting stable international political and tions. Doth countries agree that further interna- economic relations. tional cooperative efforts are necessary to forestall Ill an economic and financial crisis and to lead to a new era of creativity and common progress. Recognizing This first visit to Japan by an incumbent Presi- the urgency of the world food problem and the need dent of the United States of America will add a new for an international framework to ensure stable food page to the history of amity between the two coun- supplies, the United States and Japan will partici- tries. pate constructively in multilateral efforts to seek ways to strengthen assistance to developing coun- tries in the field of agriculture, to improve the sup- THE VISIT TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ply situation of agricultural products, and to assure an adequate level of food reserves. They recognize the need for cooperation among food producers and Arrival, KImpo International Airport, consumers to deal with shortage situations. Seoul, November 22 7. For the well-being of the peoples of the world, White House press release (Seoul) dated November a steady improvement in the technological and eco- 22 nomic capabilities of developing countries must be a Mr. President, Excellencies, ladies and matter of common concern to all nations. In recogni- gentlemen : I am very pleased to return to tion of the importance of assisting developing coun- the Republic of tries, particularly those without significant natural Korea, our faithful ally, on resources, the United States and Japan will, individu- a mission of peace. Twenty-one years have ally and with the participation and support of other elap.sed since I was last here in Korea. I was traditional aid-donors and those newly able to as- then a Congressman, a Member of our sist, maintain and expand programs cooperation of House of Representatives. through assistance and trade as those nations seek Now I return as the third American Presi- to achieve sound and orderly growth. dent to visit 8. The United States and Japan face many new you while in office. President challenges common to mankind as they endeavor to Eisenhower came here in 1952 and again in preserve the natural environment and to open new 1960. President Johnson came in 1966. Those areas for exploration such as space and the oceans. visits as well as mine demonstrate a close In broad cooperation with other countries, they will involvement of different American adminis- promote research and facilitate the exchange of in- trations over a quarter of a century. formation in such fields as science, technology and They environmental protection, in an effort to meet the reflect the same reality—our long and friend- needs of modern society, improve the quality of life ly ties to the Korean people. and attain more balanced economic growth. When I came to Korea in 1953, I saw a 9. The United States and Japan recognize that heartrending scene. The Republic of Korea their durable friendship has been based upon the con- had been ravaged by war. You had made tinued development of mutual understanding and enhanced communication between their peoples, at great sacrifices to repel aggression. Your many levels and in many aspects of their lives. They economy was in ruins. I was deeply saddened will seek therefore to expand further- cultural and by what I saw, but I was inspired by the educational interchange which fosters and serves to determination of the Korean people to re- increase such understanding. build. 10. In the spirit of friendship and mutual trust, Today I very happy to return. I the United States and Japan are determined to keep am want each other fully informed and to strengthen the to see the great progress that so many have practice of frank and timely consultations on poten- described so very vividly. I want to see for tial bilateral issues and pressing global problems of myself what you have built upon the ashes common concern. of war. 11. Friendly and cooperative relations between the I am here, Mr. President, to reaffirm our United States and Japan have grown and deepened over the years in many diverse fields of human en- friendship and to give it new life and mean- deavor. Both countries reaffirm that, in their totality, ing. Nothing binds nations together closer these varied relationships constitute major founda- than to have fought side by side for the

December 23, 1974 875 same cause. Two times we have stood to- am pleased to see the Speaker, and the other gether, here as well as in Viet-Nam, to pre- members of the National Assembly, includ- serve the peace, to preserve the stability ing representatives of the various major of Asia and the world. We can never forget political parties. this. Having spent, Mr. President, a quarter of Though we have been together with you a century of my life in parliament, or our in war, America's deepest hope is for a Congress, I place a great value in the legis- world of peace. Let us now join to preserve lative process of a representative govern- peace and to prevent any recurrence of ment. hostilities. That is our continuing commit- I came to your country, Mr. President, to I ment, which I today reaffirm. demonstrate America's continued determina- "

I thank you very much, Mr. President, for tion to preserve peace in Korea, in Asia, and this heartwarming welcome. My only re- throughout the world. Koreans and Ameri- gret is that my wife, Mrs. Ford, is not here cans were friends in war. We will remain at my side. She sends her greetings to the friends in peace. great Korean people. She looks forward to America seeks world peace for the good hearing in detail from me personally about of all and at the expense of none. this visit. Today, Mr. President, I enjoyed a reward- You were most gracious, Mr. President, ing and a very inspiring visit with your peo- to invite me. I am proud to come here on ple. I also drew great encouragement by this my first overseas journey as President meeting with the armed forces of our Amer- of the United States. ican troops in which all of us take such great pride.

I pledge to you, Mr. President, that the Toast at Dinner Given by President Park, United States will continue to assist and to Capitol Building, Seoul, November 22 support you. Our relationship and our dia- (Seoul) November 22 White House press release dated logue will continue. Mr. President, distinguished guests, ladies We live in a time of new international re- alities and gentlemen : I am greatly honored by this and new opportunities for peace and occasion and appreciate the gracious hospi- progress in Asia and elsewhere. President tality you have accorded us this evening. Park, your statesmanlike initiative in open- The warmth shown by the Korean people ing a dialogue with the North contributed exceeds even that which I remember from constructively to efi'orts to find a peaceful my previous visit to Korea, this very hospi- and just solution to the Korean problem. table land. With the perseverance and with the courage I am very, very much impressed by the so typical of the American [Korean] people, dynamism of the Korean society, the energy I trust you will prevail in this effort. and vitality of the Korean people, and the Let us recognize the new world in which charm and the beauty of the Korean women. we all live. Let us envisage the interdepend- Mr. President, I wish that I had time to ence of all nations, large and small. When we see not only the impressive landmarks of plan for such new international problems as the Korean miracle of material progress but energy shortages and financial crises, the also the famous historical shrines of your United States considers the interests of all great country. On another day perhaps, Mr. nations. We will continue to consult with you President, my wife and myself and our in common interests and in common prob- family can come, and certainly we would like lems. to return. America has great confidence in the people Mr. President, it was a great pleasure to of Korea, just as we have great confidence meet the leaders of many sectors of the in ourselves in America. Korean society here tonight. In particular, I Mr. President, I am here on a mission of

876 Department of State Bulletin peace. It is my deepest hope that the entire were Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, world will lift its gaze and broaden its vision. Foreign Minister Kim Dong Jo, Presidential Secretary General Kim Chung Yum, I have said before, but I repeat here tonight, Ambassador Richard L. Sneider, Ambassador Hahm I would rather walk a thousand miles for Pyong Choon and other high officials of both Govern- peace than take a single step for war. ments. President Ford also visited American forces Mr. President, the relationship between stationed in the Republic of Korea. our two peoples was first formalized as long President Ford laid a wreath at the Memorial of the Unknown Soldiers. He also visited the grave ago as May 22, 1882. The preamble to that of Madame Park Chung Hee and expressed his treaty spoke of permanent relations based deepest personal condolences to President Park on upon amity and friendship. We have proven her tragic and untimely death. that by more than diplomatic phrases. Our The two Presidents reaffirmed the strong bonds relationship has endured through war and of friendship and cooperation between their two through peace. countries. They agreed to continue the close co- operation and regular consultation on security mat- The welcome you accorded me today is ters and other subjects of mutual interest which symbolic of our very close tie.s it demon- — have characterized the relationship between the strated the great strength of the friendship Republic of Korea and the United States. between our two peoples. I was greatly The two Presidents took note of significant politi- touched, Mr. President, by the outpouring of cal and economic changes in the situation in Asia in recent years. They recognized that the allied good will from the countless thousands and countries in the area are growing stronger and thousands of people who greeted me so more prosperous and are making increasing con- cheers, I not warmly. Their am sure, were tributions to their security as well as to that of the only for me as an individual, but for the region. President Ford explained that the United United States of America and our 213 mil- States, as a Pacific power, is vitally interested in Asia and the Pacific and will continue its best lion of which I have the honor to represent. efi^ort to ensure the peace and security of the region. I wish to thank every Korean that I saw President Park expressed his understanding and today on behalf of all of the American people. full support for United States policies directed Today I visited a very beautiful cemetery toward these ends. and the monument to the brave Koreans who President Park described the efforts being made fell in battle. They fought side by side with by the Republic of Korea to maintain a dialogue with North Korea, designed to reduce tensions and Americans. And let the continued friendship establish peace on the Korean Peninsula, and to of our two nations pay tribute to the memory lead eventually to the peaceful unification of Korea. of the supreme sacrifices of your courageous President Park affirmed the intention of the Republic men and our own. of Korea to continue to pursue the dialogue despite Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to rise the failure of the North Korean authorities to re- spond with and to join me in a toast to my distinguished sincerity thus far. President Ford gave assurance that the United States will continue to host, President Park, and to the great people support these efforts by the Republic of Korea and of the Republic of Korea. expressed the hope that the constructive initiatives by the Republic of Korea would meet with positive responses by all concerned. Joint Communique Issued at Seoul November 22 The two Presidents discussed the current United Nations Joint Communique Between President Gerald R. General Assembly consideration of the Ford and President Park Chung Hee Korean question. They agreed on the importance of favorable General Assembly action on the Draft At the invitation of President Park Chung Hee Resolution introduced by the United States and of the Republic of Korea, President Gerald R. Ford other member countries. Both expressed the hope of the United States of America visited the Republic that the General Assembly would base its considera- of Korea on November 22 and 23, 1974, to exchange tion of the Korean question on a recognition of the views on the current international situation and to importance of the security arrangements which have discuss matters of mutual interest and concern to preserved peace on the Korean Peninsula for more the two nations. than two decades. During the visit the two Presidents held discus- President Park explained in detail the situation sions on two occasions. Present at these meetings on the Korean Peninsula, and described the threat

December 23, 1974 877 behalf of the members of his Party and the to peace and stability of hostile acts by North On Korea, exemplified most recently by the construc- American people, President Ford extended his deep- tion of an underground tunnel inside the southern est thanks to President Park and all the people of sector of the Demilitarized Zone. the Republic of Korea for the warmth of their recep- The two Presidents agreed that the Republic tion and the many courtesies extended to him during of Korea forces and American forces stationed in the visit. Korea must maintain a high degree of strength President Ford cordially invited President Park President and readiness in order to deter aggression. Presi- to visit the United States of America and dent Ford reaflfirmed the determination of the United Park accepted the invitation with pleasure. The States to render prompt and effective assistance two Presidents agreed that the visit would take to repel armed attack against the Republic of Korea place at a time of mutual convenience. in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 between the Republic of Korea and the United States. In this connection, President Ford assured THE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION President Park that the United States has no plan to reduce the present level of United States forces Toast at in Korea. Luncheon Given by General Secretary The two Presidents discussed the progress of the Brezhnev, Vladivostok, November 24 Modernization Program for the Republic of Korea White House press release (Vladivostok) dated November 24 armed forces and agreed that implementation of the program is of major importance to the security Let me say a few words if I might about of the Republic of Korea and peace on the Korean the very special significance of this, our first took note of the increas- Peninsula. President Ford official meeting. ing share of the defense burden which the Republic The world has been accustomed in recent of Korea is able and willing to assume and affirmed years to regular meetings between the lead- the readiness of the United States to continue to render appropriate support to the further develop- ers of the Soviet Union and the American ment of defense industries in the Republic of Korea. people. President Ford expressed his admiration for the Cooperation between our two countries has rapid and sustained economic progress of the Re- intensified both in tempo and, more impor- public of Korea, accomplished in the face of various tant, in substance during the past few years. obstacles, including the lack of sufficient indigenous natural resources and continuing tensions in the As a result, all people, Mr. General Secre- area. President Park noted with appreciation the tary, have a better chance to live in peace United States contribution to Korea's development and security today. in the economic, scientific and technological fields. The fact that these meetings have become The two Presidents examined the impact of recent more regular testifies to the significance at- international economic developments. They agreed tached to them by both countries. In these that the two countries should continue to foster close economic cooperation for their mutual benefit, meetings, we are able to conduct our discus- and that they should guide their economic policies sions in a businesslike and a constructive toward each other in the spirit of closer inter- way. We are able to make important prog- among all nations. They shared the dependence ress on the issues that concern our countries. view that coordination of their policies on new Mr. General Secretary, I look forward to problems confronting the international community continuing the close relationship de- is necessary. P>oth Presidents expressed mutual working satisfaction over the continuing growth of substan- veloped between the leaders of our two coun- tial bilateral economic relations which have been tries. In my first address to the Congress of beneficial to both countries. They agreed that con- the United States I pledged to the Soviet Un- tinued private foreign investment in Korea by the ion to continue America's commitment to the United States and other foreign countries is desir- course followed in the last three years. able. It was agreed that international efi'orts should focus on the reduction of trade distortions, estab- Mr. General Secretary, I personally reaf- lishment of a framework for ensuring stable food firm that pledge to you now. As nations with supplies, and realization of stable supplies of energy great power, we share a common responsi- at reasonable prices. bility not only to our own people but to man- President Park expressed his high expectations kind as a whole. and respect for the efforts being made by President avoid, de- Ford to establish world peace and to restore world We must of course, war and the economic order. struction that it would mean. Let us get on

878 Department of State Bulletin with the business of controlling arms, as I vant provisions of the Interim .Agreement of May think we have in the last 24 hours. Let us 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977. contribute, through our cooperation, to the 2. The new agreement will cover the period from resolution of the very great problems facing October 1977 through December 31, 1985. mankind as a whole. 3. Based on the principle of equality and equal Mr. General Secretary, the problems of security, the new agreement will include the follow- food, population, and energy are not con- ing limitations: fined to any one country or to countries at a. Doth sides will l)e entitled to have a certain an early stage of economic development. agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery They affect people everywhere. If this age vehicles; b. Both sides will be entitled to is to be remembered favorably in the history have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs books, it will be because we met our respon- [intercontinental ballistic missiles; submarine- sibilities your country and my country and — launched ballistic missiles] equipped with multiple our friends and allies throughout the world. independently targetable warheads (MIRVs). May I propose a toast to our joint search 4. The new agreement will include a provision for solutions to the problems facing mankind for further negotiations beginning no later than and a toast to you, Mr. General Secretary, 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and to those associated with you in your gov- and possible reductions of strategic arms in the ernment and to the people of the Soviet Un- period after 1985. ion and to the people of the world, who will 5. Negotiations between the delegations of the U.S. and USSR to work out the new agreement benefit from your efforts and, hopefully, incorporating the foregoing points will resume in mine. To the General Secretary. Geneva in January 1975.

November 24, 1974. Joint Statement on Strategic Offensive Arms Issued at Vladivostok November 24 Joint Communique Signed at Vladisvostok Joint U.S.-Soviet Statement November 24

During their working meeting in the area of Joint US-SoviET Communique Vladivostok on November 23-24, 1974, the President In accordance with the previously announced of the US.\ Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary agreement, a working meeting between the Presi- of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezh- dent of the United States of America Gerald R. nev discussed in detail the question of further Ford and the General Secretary of the Central limitations of strategic offensive arms. Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet They reaffirmed the great significance that both the Union L. I. Brezhnev took place in the area of Vladi- United States and the USSR attach to the limitation vostok on November 23 and 24, 1974. Taking part of strategic offensive arms. They are convinced that in the talks were the Secretary of State of the a long-term agreement on this question would be United States of America and Assistant to the a significant contribution to improving relations President for National Security Aff'airs, Henry A. between the US and the USSR, to reducing the Kissinger and Member of the Politburo of the danger of war and to enhancing world peace. Having Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of For- noted the value of previous agreements on this eign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Gromyko. question, including the Interim Agreement of May They discussed a broad range of questions deal- 26, 1972, they reaffirm the intention to conclude a ing with American-Soviet relations and the current new agreement on the limitation of strategic offen- international situation. sive arms, to last through 1985. Also taking part in the talks were: As a result of the exchange of views on the sub- On the American side Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., stance of such a new agreement, the President of Ambassador of the to the the United States of America and the General USA USSR; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State; Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State concluded that favorable prospects exist for com- for European Affairs; Lieutenant General Brent pleting the work on this agreement in 1975. Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for Agreement was reached that further negotiations National Security Affairs; and William Hyland, will be based on the following provisions. official of the Department of State. 1. The new agreement will incorporate the rele- On the Soviet side A. F. Dobrynin, Ambassador

December 23, 1974 879 of the USSR to the USA; A. M. Aleksandrov, ing the dangers connected with the spread of nuclear Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central weapons in the world. In this connection they Committee of the CPSU; and G. M. Korniyenko, stressed the importance of increasing the effective- Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign ness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Affairs of the USSR. Nuclear Weapons. It was noted that, in accordance with previous I agreements, initial contacts were established be- The United States of America and the Soviet tween representatives of the US and of the USSR Union reaffirmed their determination to develop on questions related to underground nuclear ex- further their relations in the direction defined by plosions for peaceful purposes, to measures to the fundamental joint decisions and basic treaties overcome the dangers of the use of environmental and agreements concluded between the two States in modification techniques for military purposes, as recent years. well as measures dealing with the most dangerous They are convinced that the course of American- lethal means of chemical warfare. It was agreed to Soviet relations, directed towards strengthening continue an active search for mutually acceptable world peace, deepening the relaxation of interna- solutions of these questions. tional tensions and expanding mutually beneficial Ill cooperation of states with different social systems meets the vital interests of the peoples of both In the course of the meeting an exchange of views States and other peoples. was held on a number of international issues: Both Sides consider that based on the agreements special attention was given to negotiations already reached between them important results have been in progress in which the two Sides are participants achieved in fundamentally reshaping American- and which are designed to remove existing sources Soviet relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence of tension and to bring about the strengthening of and equal security. These results are a solid founda- international security and world peace. tion for progress in reshaping Soviet-American Having reviewed the situation at the Conference relations. on Security and Cooperation in Europe, both Sides Accordingly, they intend to continue, without a concluded that there is a possibility for its early loss in momentum, to expand the scale and intensity successful conclusion. They proceed from the assump- of their cooperative efforts in all spheres as set tion that the results achieved in the course of the forth in the agreements they have signed so that Conference will permit its conclusion at the highest the process of improving relations between the US level and thus be commensurate with its importance and the USSR will continue without interruption in ensuring the peaceful future of Europe. and will become irreversible. The USA and the USSR also attach high impor- Mutual determination was expressed to carry out tance to the negotiations on mutual reduction of strictly and fully the mutual obligations undertaken forces and armaments and associated measures in by the US and the USSR in accordance with the Central Europe. They agree to contribute actively treaties and agreements concluded between them. to the search for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of principle of undiminished security for II any of the parties and the prevention of unilateral Special consideration was given in the course of military advantages. the talks to a pivotal aspect of Soviet-American Having discussed the situation existing in the relations: measures to eliminate the threat of war Eastern Mediterranean, both Sides state their firm and to halt the aiins race. support for the independence, sovereignty and terri- Both sides reaffirm that the Agreements reached torial integrity of Cyprus and will make every efl'ort between the US and the USSR on the prevention in this direction. They consider that a just settle- of nuclear war and the limitation of strategic arms ment of the Cyprus question must be based on the are a good beginning in the process of creating strict implementation of the resolutions adopted by guarantees against the outbreak of nuclear conflict the Security Council and the General Assembly of and war in general. They expressed their deep be- the United Nations regarding Cyprus. lief in the necessity of promoting this process and In the course of the exchange of views on the expressed their hope that other states would con- Middle East both Sides expressed their concern tribute to it as well. For their part the US and the with regard to the dangerous situation in that USSR will continue to exert vigorous efforts to region. They reaffirmed their intention to make achieve this historic task. every effort to promote a solution of the key issues A joint statement on the question of limiting of a just and lasting peace in that area on the strategic offensive arms is being released separately. basis of the United Nations resolution 338, taking Both sides stressed once again the importance into account the legitimate interests of all the peo- and necessity of a serious effort aimed at prevent- ples of the area, including the Palestinian people,

880 Department of State Bulletin ;

and respect for the right to independent existence of ARRIVAL REMARKS, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, all States in the area. NOVEMBER 24 The Sides believe that the Geneva Conference should play an important part in the establishment White House press lelease dated Novembei- 24 of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and should resume its work as soon as possible. Mr. Speaker, my very dear friends in the IV Congress, members of the Cabinet, distin-

The state of relations was reviewed in the field guished guests, my fellow Americans: I of commercial, economic, scientific and technical thank you all very, very much for coming ties between the and the USSR. Both Sides USA out this evening and welcoming us so very confirmed the great importance which further prog- warmly. ress in these fields would have for Soviet-American Since I left Washington eight relations, and expressed their firm intention to con- days ago, I tinue the broadening and deepening of mutually have traveled some 17,000 miles for the pur- advantageous cooperation. pose of peace and not a single step toward The two Sides emphasized the special impor- war. And every one of those miles, in my tance accorded by them to the development on a opinion, was most worthwhile. But as al- long term basis of commercial and economic co- ways when we return to our homeland, my operation, including mutually beneficial large-scale companions and projects. They believe that such commercial and myself are very, very happy economic cooperation will ser\-e the cause of in- to be here. creasing the stability of Soviet-American relations. Secretary Kissinger has a few more miles Both Sides noted with satisfaction the progress to go on this trip, but I will assure him that in the implementation of agreements and in the this warm welcome includes him as well. development of ties and cooperation between the US Thursday is Thanksgiving. I cannot help and the USSR in the fields of science, technology and culture. They are convinced that the continued but reflect on the many, many blessings that expansion of such cooperation will benefit the we Americans have. We do have some very peoples of both countries and will be an important serious problems, but we have much, much contribution to the solution of world-wide scientific more to be thankful for. America is a strong and technical problems. country; Americans are very strong people. The talks were held in an atmosphere of frankness We are free, and we are blessed with good and mutual understanding, reflecting the construc- friends and allies. tive desire of both Sides to strengthen and develop On my trip I talked with the leaders of further the peaceful cooperative relationship between two of our allies, Japan and Korea. In both the USA and the USSR, and to ensure progress in the solution of outstanding international problems nations, I saw how much they value their in the interests of preserving and strengthening relationship with us. We will continue to peace. work together to strengthen our ties. The results of the talks provided a convincing The visit to Japan marked my first trip demonstration of the practical value of Soviet- outside North America since becoming Pres- American summit meetings and their exceptional ident, and it was the first importance in the shaping of a new relationship time that a Presi- between the United States of America and the dent of the United States has visited that Soviet Union. energetic and productive island nation. President Ford reaffirmed the invitation to L. I. Our trip was historic for another reason Brezhnev to pay an official visit to the United States for it marked a change in our relationship. in 1975. The exact date of the visit will be agreed In the past the central concern of our alli- upon later. ance was military security. This security re- For the United States For the Union of Soviet lationship has now been broadened to in- of America: Socialist Republics: clude energy and food. I am particularly Gerald R. Ford L. I. Brezhnev hopeful that by working together with Ja- President of the United General Secretary pan, one of the world's most technically ad- States of America of the Central Committee vanced societies, we will be able to make a of the CPSU substantial joint contribution to resolving November 24, 1974 the energy crisis.

December 23, 1974 881 .

Japan emerged from the destruction of petition over the next decade. The under- war with a deep commitment to peace. In standing we reached resulted from an inten- Korea, a sturdy people rebuilt a nation from sive round of give-and-take, the kind of give- the ashes of another conflict. Only a little and-take negotiations that recognized the over 20 years ago, Korea was a battleground. legitimate security of both sides. Today it is a showcase of economic develop- Many details remain to be worked out by ment. our negotiators, but ceilings on the strategic Just over tw'o decades ago, American fight- forces of both nations have been accepted. A ing men were battling over the rugged moun- good agreement that will serve the interests tains of Korea. Today the major burden of of the United States and the Soviet Union is Korea's defense is borne by the Koreans now within our grasp. Vladivostok was an themselves. American servicemen are sta- appropriate ending to a journey designed to tioned there, but like their comrades in Eu- strengthen ties with old friends and expand rope and elsewhere, they are there to help an areas of agreement with old adversaries. ally maintain the peace, not to do the job I believe we accomplished what we set out alone. to achieve and perhaps more. And in that A highlight of the trip for me was the op- process I pray that we have done all we could portunity to meet with our soldiers in Korea to advance the cause of peace for all Ameri- and to have lunch with them in one of their cans and for all mankind. camps. They are outstanding fighting men and women doing a fine job. We can all be very proud of them. The final stop on our trip was the Soviet Death of U Thant, Former Union. The meetings with General Secretary U.N. Secretary General Brezhnev, I am pleased, went very, very well. They represent both a beginning and a con- Statement by Pi-esidoit Ford ' tinuation. They were the beginning of what

I hope will be a productive personal relation- ship between Mr. Brezhnev and myself. We I have learned with great sorrow of the both, I believe, came away from Vladivostok death of former United Nations Secretary with mutual respect and a common deter- General U Thant. Above all, he was a man mination to continue the search for peace. of peace. His distinguished leadership in the They were a continuation because we main- world community for a decade won him wide tained the steady improvement of our rela- respect and the gratitude of all who cherish tions begun three years ago. We talked, as world peace. He gave unselfishly of himself American and Soviet leaders have in the in the highest tradition of service to man- past, about the Middle East, European secu- kind, and the world is better for the example rity, and other bilateral relations. We often he set. agreed, but not always. When we did not, we U Thant's loyalty was not to any one stated our difl'erences quite frankly. power or ethnic bloc, but to humanity; and But on perhaps the most important issue it is in this same universal spirit that all men facing the Soviet and American peoples, the will mourn his passing. On behalf of the further limitation of strategic arms, we people of the United States, I extend con- found a large measure of agreement. We dolences to his family. discussed the issue fully, and in the end we established a sound basis for a new agree- 'Issued on Nov. 25 (text from White House press ment that will constrain our military com- release)

882 Department of State Bulletin Secretary Kissinger's News Conferences at Tokyo and Vladivostok

Following are transcripts of news confer- darity among the consumers. He made very ences held by Secretary Kissinger at Tokyo clear that this is not intended in any sense to on November 19 and 20, at Vladivostok on lead to any confrontation with the producers November 2i at 1:35 a.m. and 1^:18 p.m., and but, rather, to pave the way for a construc- at Tokyo on November 25. tive dialogue between consumers and pro- ducers for the common benefit of both. The Japanese side explained the special TOKYO, NOVEMBER 19 problems of Japan in terms of its heavy de- pendence on imported oil and the difference

Press release 503 dated November 19 in the proportion of the consumption of en- ergy between the United States and Japan, Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- in that Japan consumes about 70 percent of men, I will confine myself to the meeting be- its oil for industrial consumption and only tween the President and the Prime Minister 30 percent for personal use while in the this morning, which was attended by the two United States the opposite percentage ob- Foreign Ministers and two other individuals tains, so that the margin for reductions in on each side. consumption in Japan is more limited than We concentrated in this initial meeting in the United States. But within that frame- first on stressing the great importance that work the Japanese point of view was one that the United States attaches to its relationship seemed to us sympathetic to our general ap- with Japan for peace in the Pacific, peace in proach, and we pointed out that we would the world, and for the economic progress of put more emphasis on the development of al- our two countries as well as of all other ternative sources and that we would share countries. the results of research and development and This led to a discussion of two related technological innovation with Japan with re- questions, the problem of food and the prob- spect to the new sources of energy. lem of energy. With respect to the problem There was a general recognition that Ja- of food, the President pointed out the in- pan and the United States should cooperate terest that the United States has in an or- on the usual matters of bilateral relations derly long-term evolution of world agricul- but also on the whole area of stability of in- tural policy as we have presented it at the ternational aff'airs and progress toward World Food Conference, and in this context peace. he assured the Prime Minister that Japan The discussions on all of these items as could count on a stable level of supplies of well as others will be continued tomorrow agricultural supplies from the United States. morning when the President, the Prime Min- There were further discussions on agricul- ister, and their advisers will meet again. tural issues, and it was agreed that they I will be glad to take questions. would be continued tomorrow when the Pres- ident and the Prime Minister met again. Q. Mr. Secretary, ivere the Japanese sym- pathetic With respect to the problem of energy, the to your specific proposal in Chicago about President stressed to the Prime Minister the the reduction of importing oil, or did their situation preclude that? importance the United States attaches to the program that we outlined last week of soli- Secretary Kissinger: Well, we did not have

December 23, 1974 883 ;

a chance this morning to go into every as- voice in it—will see to it that Japan can pect of my proposal. I think that, first of all, count on a stable level of imports. my specific proposal was that the importa- Q. Dr. Kissinger, ivill the Japanese agree tion of oil should be kept level through a to import America)i beef—or was that dis- combination of measures of conservation and cussed? the development of new sources of energy. It may be that the mix in Japan between Secretary Kissinger: That question was conservation and development of new sources discussed, yes. has to be different than in the United States Q. What was the conclusion? Were there and as far as the United States is concerned, iniy indications they anight agree to let Amer- we do not feel that exactly the same formula ican meat enter their country? or exactly the same percentage has to be ap- plied to every country, but that rather there Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want to must be understanding for the particular speak for the Japanese Government, but my situation of each country. impression was that the President's point

I would say that there was sympathy to will be taken very seriously. the general approach and that we will have Q. Dr. Kissinger, does not the promise of to work out in subsequent discussions the a stable supply of U.S. agricultural products particular manner in which it can be imple- mean that ive ivill not resort to putting off mented for each country. imports in order to curb rising food prices Q. Mr. Secretarii, did your statement to as we did tvith soybeans in 1973 and wheat? the Japanese indicating they could count on Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, a stable level of agricultural products indi- we have asked major importers from the cate that Japan is going to have a special United States to give us some indication of position in America's agricultural export their requirements over a period toward market ? which we can plan. It does mean that under Secretary Kissinger: As we attempted to foreseeable circumstances we will not impose make clear at the World Food Conference, export control. we believe that the whole problem of world But we would like to have an informal ar- agriculture has to be approached on a more rangement with the key importers in which systematic and planned basis. And the vari- we can have some idea of their requirements ous proposals we made there, some of which over a period of time. This is not a major got lost in the debate about food aid—the problem with Japan, with which we have a various proposals that we made there were very satisfactory relationship in this respect. all designed to assure a stable level of ex- Q. Was Korea [inaudible] pectations and a more careful, systematic approach on an overall basis. Secretary Kissinger: We have not yet had Now, on the one hand, we of course have a a chance to discuss the problem of Korea free market for agricultural products. On except in the context of our general desire the other hand, we have set up a system to maintain peace and stability in the area. which amounts to some voluntary alloca- This is a subject which, if it comes up, will tions by the contacts between our major be discussed in greater detail tomorrow. companies and the Department of Agricul- Q. Mr. Secretary, have you had a chance ture. to discuss China and/or the Soviet Union? So, without using the word "preferred," I think one can say that the President indi- Secretary Kissinger: There has been a cated that the United States, insofar as it is discussion by the President of his meeting within our power of the government—and with the General Secretary in Vladivostok, the government will have a considerable and his general approach toward detente.

884 Department of State Bulletin and also the connection between our friend- Q. Mr. Secretary, tvas there any discus- ship with Japan and the general approach sion of the nuclear controversy or security to the Soviet Union. treaty in general? There has only been a general reference Secretary Kissinger: There was a dis- to the relationships with the People's Repub- cussion of the nuclear problem. The Presi- lic of China. It was agreed, however, that dent expressed his understanding for the I would stop in Tokyo on my return from special sensitivities of Japan with regard Peking to brief the Japanese Government to this matter. It was agreed that the nu- about my meetings in Peking. clear issue would be handled as it has been Q. Can you tell us what is on your agenda handled throughout within the framework with your meeting tonight with the Finance of the Mutual Security Treaty and that any Minister [Masayoshi Ohira] ? special problems in connection with it would be handled on the basis of bilateral discus- Secretary Kissinger: The Finance Min- sions between Foreign Minister Kimura and ister was an old friend with whom I worked myself and within the framework of Ameri- closely in his previous portfolio. He re- can understanding for the special sensitivi- quested the meeting, and it does not have ties of Japan with respect to this issue. any fixed agenda, but I would assume that we will discuss some of the problems of Q. Mr. Secretary, did you disctiss resumed energy and food and any other subject that fighting in the Middle East, and did you he may wish to raise, but I would expect discuss with the Japanese your plan for a those two to be the principal items. step-by-step negotiation ?

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the matter of the Secretary Kissiriger: We have not—first ratio of consumption for industrial versus of all, as I pointed out in Washington before private use of fuel, did Prime Minister we left, we do not expect renewed fighting Tanaka make any suggestions to President in the Middle East in the immediate future. Ford of the possibility of reducing U.S. con- We did not yet have an opportunity to go sumption in its proportion or ratio? into detail on the evolution of the negotia- tions in the Middle East. There will be a Secretary Kissinger: Well, the goals of meeting, of course, again between the Prime consumption restraint in the United States Minister and the President tomorrow morn- were publicly stated by the President in ing, and my associates and I will be meeting October. They were reaffirmed by me at the with the Foreign Minister for several hours request of the President in my speech last in the afternoon; and I am cei'tain that by Thursday. They state both the restraint on the end of the day these issues will have consumption for the next year and the over- been discussed. all restraints on imports and the develop- ment of new sources of energy over the next Q. Mr. Secretary, even tho7igh you did not 10 years. go into detail, has Japan begun to make any The President has made clear that these form of a request for the way that the diplo- consumption restraints will be met either by macy in the Middle East is to be conducted? voluntary action or by other action. There Secretary Kissinger: I am having trouble was no discussion of how this relates at this hearing you, Barry [Barry Schweid, Asso- time to any measures that other countries ciated Press]. would take. We will, however, have technical discus- Q. I am sorry. With regard to Japan's sions with Japan within the next month to need for oil and their interest in the Middle go into the details of the implications of our East, have they begun to lodge a special proposal and how it could be put on a multi- appeal with you as to how that diplomacy lateral basis. should be conducted?

December 23, 1974 885 Secretary Kissmger: No. I said that our overall program of consump- tion restraints, of import restraints, in- Q. Mr. Secretary, did the President in- volved both restraint on consumption as well vite the Emperor to the United States in the as the development of new sources, that with near future? respect to that, the American goal for con- Secretary Kissinger: The President ex- sumption restraint had been publicly stated. tended an invitation to His Majesty to visit It was not, as a matter of fact, repeated the United States for 1975, and we are to the Prime Minister, because it is well pleased to report that this invitation has known ; and I pointed out that the President been accepted. We look forward to this visit. is committed to achieving these restraints on consumption for next year, and on im- Q. Mr. Secretary, I did not quite under- ports over a 10-year period through a com- stand. On the nuclear issue, you mean it bination of consumption restraints and new has been brotight up by the Japanese as a sources, and that he will achieve it either problem ? through voluntary restraints or through

Secretary Kissinger: I think I made clear other measures that have not yet been de- that the issue has been, as I explained, the cided upon. special sensitivities of Japan with respect I am afraid I can take only one more to nuclear weapons, and then I have ex- question because I have to meet ex-Prime plained our reaction. Minister Sato.

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhut did the President Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question. say about Vladivostok and China? Secretary Kissinger: Well, I will take two Secretary Kissinger: The President and then. This gentleman and you. the Prime Minister discussed the role of Q. Dr. Kissinger, in connection ivith the detente in current diplomacy and how we sources of energy for Japan and the Uyiited believe that our relations with the Soviet States, ivas there any disciissioyi of the Union, as well as the People's Republic of Siberiayi oilfields and possible development? China, can contribute to stability in the Was that reviewed in any ivay? Pacific area. We also stressed, however, that the close friendship between Japan and the Secretary Kissinger: This is one of the United States was one of the prerequisites issues which we expect to discuss before we for the effectiveness of this policy, and he leave here. It has not as yet come out, but gave the Prime Minister a brief preview of we are prepared to discuss it. the subjects likely to be discussed in Vladi- Q. What are ive prepared to say? vostok. Secretary Kissinger: We will discuss it Secretary, you said that the Presi- Q. Mr. at the briefing after our meeting. dent had told the Prime Minister about our oivn program for restricting our own oil Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection ivith the consumption through voluntary and other nuclear question, and your sensitivity to the means. Did the President indicate that Japanese sensitivity since their introduction 7ve would be going to involuntary means of nuclear weapons, did you assure the Japa- shortly? nese that we have never, and ivould never, introduce nuclear weapons even in a transit Mr. Elfin Secretary Kissinger: Excuse me, situation? [Mel Elfin, Newsweek], I did not say that the President explained our program. The Secretary Kissinger: Well, I will not go

question to which I replied was whether beyond what I have said. The question of we would allocate consumption restraints on nuclear weapons will be discussed within the basis of the relative personal users ; and the context of the Mutual Security Treaty,

886 Department of State Bulletin —

and it will be handled as it has been handled pects of peace in the Middle East. And we within that framework. believe that there are possibilities for hope- I am afraid I must turn it over to Ron ful negotiations. Nessen [Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary But there was a general understanding to President Ford]. Thank you very much. that security in the present age cannot be confined to military matters but that the co- operation between Japan and the United TOKYO, NOVEMBER 20 States in the field of energy, in the field of food, represents a new and positive dimen- Press release 508 dated November 20 sion of the security which must be added to Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- this already established military security men, let me sum up the communique, the traditional security—relationship. meeting of the President with the Prime There was, as I have pointed out, an ex- Minister this morning, and the meeting be- change of views in which the Japanese told tween the Foreign Minister and myself this us about developments in the latest ex- afternoon, because they all cover similar changes in September on the occasion of the topics. U.N. General Assembly and Japanese and First of all, let me take this occasion on Chinese relationships, and we did the same behalf of everybody on the American delega- with respect to U.S.-Chinese relationships. tion to thank the Japanese Government for Of course, as you know, at the request of the excellence of the arrangements, cordial- the President, I am returning here after the ity, the hospitality with which we have been trip to Vladivostok and after my visit to received, and for the meticulousness of the Peking to brief the Japanese leaders about planning. those developments.

Secondly, before I get into any of the spe- We consider the exchanges here to have cifics, I would like to say that perhaps the been of an extraordinarily useful and impor- most important result of the visit—beyond tant character, and they lay the basis for a any of the specifics that were discussed—has new era of partnership between Japan and been the frankness, cordiality, and complete- the United States. ness of our exchanges. And the reference in Now I will be glad to answer your ques- the communique to the fact that this first tions. visit by the incumbent President will add a Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the new page to the history of amity between results of the visit exceeded the expectations the two countries was put into practice in of the President, and if so, in ivhat specific the discussions. ways ? The discussions today concentrated pri- marily in the morning on an elaboration of Secretary Kissinger: I would say that the the review of the international situation that results of the visit achieved perhaps the opti- was begun yesterday which is based on the mum of what one had hoped for. We have premise that Japan and the United States always attached the greatest importance to must understand each other's purposes and the friendship between Japan and the United harmonize them in the common interest of States. the two countries and of world peace. One can never, in advance of any visit or There was a review of Chinese relation- any exchange of views, predict how intense ships, Soviet relationships, and indeed, a re- and how far-ranging the exchange will ac- view of the whole world situation. There tually be. But I would say this exchange has were discussions of the Middle East. For- been as candid, as frank, and as constructive eign Minister Kimura told us about his meet- as any I have attended since I have been in ings with the Egyptian leaders on his recent Washington and has had the most positive trip, and we exchanged views as to the pros- results.

December 23, 1974 887 Q. Are there any specific results yov can that the situation in the Middle East is ex- cite? tremely complicated and that there are many issues involved. Secretary Kissinger: I think that the ap- I do believe, however, that with the de- proach that was taken to the question of en- termination and the good will, there are pos- ergy, the question of food, to the realization sibilities for progress in the Middle East, and of the interdependence of the present world I think the Japane.se Foreign Minister should economy and world political structure, was speak for himself, though I did not have the very considerable scope. i)f impression that he disagreed with my views.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were your meetings Q. Mr. Secretary, did you seek a specific with officials other than the Prime Minister commitment from the Japanese Government and the Foreign Minister—specifically the to participate in the financial safety net, and Na- International Trade Minister [Yasnhiro if so, what was the government's reaction? kasone] and Mr. [Masayoshi] Ohira—de- Secretary Kissinger: We did not go into signed to deterynine in any tvay ivhether Jap- the detail of every individual measure that anese policy ivoidd continue as it is regardless I have proposed. We discussed in general of what happened? terms the importance of consumer coopera- Secretary Kissinger: The meeting with Fi- tion along the lines of my speech and of a nance Minister Ohira and Minister Nakasone dialogue that would grow out of this with were at the request of those two Ministers, the producers. We will have further dis- and they were not initiated by us. They were, cussions on the individual measures and on however, natural requests. the implementation of the program, but I The Finance Minister, as you know, was had the impression that there was a general Foreign Minister until August, and I worked sympathy to the approach. closely with him until that time. We estab- Q. Mr. Secretary, ivas there anything in lished a very close working relationship and, section 3 of the communique dealing ivith of course, the problem of energy and food nuclear weapons control that shoidd he in- has implications also for finance. terpreted as referring to the question of Minister Nakasone was a student of mine transit of nuclear weapons in Japan? at Harvard, and I have never been in Japan without having seen him, and it would have Secretary Kissinger: I discussed that sub- been unnatural for me to refuse to see him ject yesterday. when he suggested a meeting. Q. I understand, b2tt the communique did In other words, the meetings were in no not refer to that. way designed to deal with the Japanese do- mestic situation or to gain any particular Secretary Kissinger: Not beyond anything reassurances. We believe the Japanese policy I have said since yesterday. is likely to remain stable. Q. As specifically as you can, were any

Q. Was the Japanese Foreign Minister assurances given Japan about pooling of sanguine about the prospects of a peaceful energy resources by the United States shoidd negotiation in the Middle East? there be another oil squeeze? begin- Secretary Kissinger: I think the Japanese Secretary Kissinger: I must say, Foreign Minister ought to speak for him- ning a question as specifically as you have It is also against self, and he of course visited in the Middle wounds me deeply. my East only Cairo. professorial training. As far as I am concerned, I don't know if Q. As generally as you would like. "sanguine" is exactly the right word. I have

indicated that I believe there are possibili- Secretary Kissinger: The sharing of oil ties for a step-by-step approach. I recognize supplies is part of the emergency program

888 Department of State Bulletin —

that was ratified last week and that will be in those countries, more food supplies will formally adopted this week. There were no also become available in the United States. additional commitments made. To answer your question specifically, we will However, the United States has made it give special attention to the needs of Japan. clear that it believes that consumer solidar- We will, in planning our own export, also ity is an important element in overcoming try to do this on a more long-term basis the difficulties produced by the energy crisis than has been the case in the past, and we and that it will work closely with the Japa- will have intense consultations with Japan nese Government and other interested gov- on what can be done to assure their needs. ernments in dealing with this issue on the Q. Mr. Secretary, Japanese officials were basis of consumer solidarity. And I repeat, basically sympathetic to your oil proposal. I believe we had very fruitful and construc- Wliat have they learned since last Friday, tive exchanges on that range of issues. when they were basically unsympathetic? Q. Were there any additional agreements? Secretary Kissinger: I was not here last Secretary Kissinger: There was no dis- Friday, so I don't know what they said last cussion on going beyond the emergency pro- Friday. I can only say what they said this gram that has just been adopted three or week. four days ago, so there was no reason to Q. Mr. Secretary, have you had any re- reach any additional agreements. quests for a meeting by either Mr. [Takeo]

Q. You said the United States is prepared Fukuda or Mr. [Takeo] Miki, and in par- to maintain a stable food supply to Japan. ticular, Mr. [Erusaburo] Shina? If so, have Do you contemplate being able to increase yon met them or have you talked ivith them the level of supply to meet the increasing any other way? demand in Japan? Secretary Kissinger: I have not had a Secretary Kissinger: Let me explain the request for a meeting. I have run into Mr. U.S. basic approach to the food problem, Fukuda at social functions as I have also which we reviewed again today in some de- with Mr. Miki, but just to exchange a few tail in my meeting with the Foreign Minis- words, and neither of them requested a ter and on which I believe there is a general meeting. agreement. And it is an appi'oach that got Q. Were there any discussions on Korea? overshadowed by the debate on food aid. The United States believes that the basic Secretary Kissinger: There was just a problem of world food supply requires some very brief discussion about the relationship structural adjustment. There is now in the between Korean security and the security of underdeveloped countries a food shortage of Japan. But there was no detailed further about 25 million tons which will increase discussions. may increase—to as much as 85 million tons Q. Do you have any plans to see Le Due over a decade. We therefore believe that it Tho in Peking? is important to increase agricultural produc- tion in the underdeveloped countries and to Secretary Kissinger: No. provide food reserves to cushion against emergencies. Q. When you are traveling there? In both of these efforts, we believe that Secretary Kissinger: No. the Japanese Government will cooperate with us, especially with respect to the under- Q. In Moscow? developed countries, which is a problem of Secretary Kissinger: I have no plans to technology. And we will have some ex- see Le Due Tho anywhere. changes on that subject. To the degree that food production rises Q. Never?

December 23, 1974 889 will take into account the very special sen- Secretary Kissinger: "Never" is a very Due sitivities of the Japanese people with respect : long time, but I have no plans to see Le to nuclear weapons. Tho on his current trip, which I understand that in the news- is to last two weeks. I read Q. Mr. Secretary, did you talk about U.S. plans to meet Le papers. But 1 have no aud .Japan's general approach to Siberian Due Tho. development planning? seems to Q. Mr. Secretary, the President Secretary Kissinger: The Japanese side ceremonial activi- spend a lot of his time in explained to us the general approach to Si- sort pro- ties here. Wasn't it an nnusnal of berian development planning. We are in no gram ? position to make any judgments until the trade bill and the Export-Import Bank bill Secretary Kissinger: I think the President have been passed by our Congress. And spent a considerable amount of time on the some therefore we will have to defer any decision bilateral talks. In addition, he spent until that I and consideration of these issues time on ceremonial activities, which, as time. explained before we came here, constitute the symbolism of an important element in Q. Dr. Kissinger, in your discussions with the mood, which is the relationship and in Japanese officials and former officials, have which deci- such an important attribute in you made any inquiries into the state of Jap- country. sions tend to be made in this anese domestic politics?

you tell vs whif Q. Mr. Secretary, can Secretary Kissinger: I haven't made any Rumsfeld, Assistant Mr. Rumsfeld [Donald inquiries into the state of Japanese domestic is accompanying you to with to the President] polities. It is impossible to have lunch China? press people without being told certain but you must be as familiar with Secretary Kissinger: When we were fly- things, sug- those as I am. ing across the Pacific, Mr. Rumsfeld maybe on my next trip to China gested that Q. Mr. Secretary, the answer that the along. I then said, "Well, I would take him President gave in Phoenix on the siibject of are here this time, why don't as long as you the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] we can still arrange it?" we see whether was a bit confusing. At one point he referred the President what he thought I asked to the desirability of Israel negotiating with the President thought it would about it, and the parties, and another time he was saying chief of staff had some be a good idea if his negotiations among nations. Could you say China. The explanation is as exposure to whether the United States favors negotia- It was an off-the-cuff idea simple as this. tions with Israel arid the PLO? crossing the that occurred to us as we were helpful to have Kissinger: I think I went into Pacific. I believe it will be Secretary have some ex- press conference on the President's chief of staff that issue in detail at my profound Washington. I made posure to China, but it has no Friday before we left States is not urg- significance beyond this. clear "then that the United negotiate with anybody else kind ing anybody to On the nuclear issue, ivhat of Q. and any negotiation is of course up to the understandings came out between further is our understand- Japanese parties concerned. And it you and the President and the ing that Israel has refused to negotiate with leaders ? the PLO. Kissinger: I mentioned yester- Secretary ivhen the President there are Q. What was meant day the discussions, and of course said today at the press club, "We will not always discussions within the framework— compete with our friends for their markets Mutual Security Treaty that permits is- the Is there a carving said, we or for their resources." sues to be raised—and as I have

Deparfment of State Bulletin 890 up of sectio)is of the world into Japa7iese Friday—but there has been renewed specu- markets and into American markets? lation that the fact that you and the Presi- dent are meeting Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivos- Secretary Kissinger: I think what the tok has been a source of irritation in Peking. President had in mind is we do not look at Is there any substance to that? our relationship with Japan in terms of com- petition but that the relationship between Secretary Kissiyiger: We have had no indi- the industrial nations and especially between cation whatever from Peking directly or in- Japan and the United States in the Pacific directly through any sources that have area should be on the basis of cooperation reached us that it is a source of irritation to and that in an expanding world economy Peking. I repeat, we have had opportunity to there is sufficient place for both of us. There obtain Peking's views. is no carving up of markets that was dis- Q. Mr. Secretary, on your Chicago speech, cussed or is contemplated. you said you had the i?npression. the Japanese Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think the next Government was sympathetic to the ap- time an American President visits Japan, proach spelled out in that speech. When do visits Tokyo, he could do it without having you anticipate seeing some concrete evidence 25,000 police mobilized for his visit? of that? Secretary Kissinger: Well, the security ar- Secretary Kissinger: I believe that over rangements for the visit of any President the next month concrete exchanges will be- are of course up to the host government, and gin on the implementation of these ideas it is natural that they would tend to over- with various consuming countries, and I insure his safety. think that my statement will then be proved Q. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to say fur- correct. ther, your statement yesterday about the Q. Dr. Kissinger, in view of the Japanese U.S. position on industrial oil cotisumers and expression yesterday of their difficulty with their cooperation seems milder than the tone reducing their energy consumption by the of your speech in Chicago just before yon standards you outlined in Chicago, did you left. Is that a correct interpretation, and if give them any refinement, especially for Ja- so, has the position softened as a residt of pan to think about over the next month or so? talks with the Japanese?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is very im- Secretary Kissinger: Our position is un- portant to separate two things—the basic changed. Our position is that the industrial approach and individual technical applica- oil consumers have to cooperate and estab- tions of it on a Presidential trip with the lish some basic principles before there can relatively limited amount of time that is be a productive dialogue with the producers. available. The conversations have to concen- This position has not softened. It is not a trate on the basic approach. They cannot go position of confrontation either, because we into the details of all the technical matters. believe that the ultimate solution must be Secondly, as I pointed out yesterday, we found on a cooperative basis. did not say consumption had to be reduced In developing cooperation among the con- by 10 percent in every country. We said that sumers, obviously consideration has to be over a period of 10 years, imports should be given to the special circumstances of indi- kept level by the whole group on the basis of vidual countries in applying these various consumption restraints and the development measures that were proposed. This is what I of new sources of energy. The precise appor- intended to point out yesterday. But the po- tionment within the group of either consump- sition remains as I outlined it on Thursday. tion restraints or the bringing into being of Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been renewed new sources of energy has to be discussed. specidation—/ know you answered this last I would like to remind you the same prob-

December 23, 1974 891 lems existed when the emergency sharing it would have created all the wrong impres- program was first proposed last February, sions for the President to be in Japan and and it took about three or four months to not pay the visit over such a short distance work out all the details. This is a technically to Korea. highly complex issue, but we are on the Q. Mr. Secretary, did the President and whole encouraged by the talks that took Tanaka discuss the implications of the In- place here. dian nuclear explosion? Q. Mr. Secretary, how does the President Secretary Kissinger: Not in my presence, feel about his first big foreign trip? and I was present at all the meetings.

Secretary Kissinger: I think he feels ex- Q. Dr. Kissinger, I believe you did not tremely good about it. answer the last question, which was: Are we Q. Did he talk to you about it and say going to reduce the troops in South Korea? why? Your answer ivas, We are not going to dis- cuss, much less announce, it. But are we Secretary Kissinger: He talked to me going to reduce? about it in the two minutes from the south wing of the [Hotel] Okura to the main build- Secretary Kissinger: I know of no plans. ing, and therefore I don't think he could There are no plans to reduce troops in give me all the refinements of his judgment Korea. in that period. I will take two more questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that we are going Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your understanding to leave Japan and go to Korea, can you tell that Israel is refusing to negotiate with us whether the President is going to express PLO, Palestinians in general, or only those any degree of dissatisfaction with the degree Palestinians ivho want a separate Pales- of political oppression in South Korea? tinian state?

Secretary Kissinger: We have stated the Secretary Kissinger: I haven't had an op- importance that we attach to the security of portunity to learn all the refinements of the South Korea. We have also, I believe, made Israeli position on that point. My under- clear our general view with respect to the standing is that they will not negotiate with form of domestic conduct we prefer, but I the PLO, and I am not familiar with any do not want to predict now what the Presi- other group that labels itself Palestinian dent will discuss in his private talks with that has come forward as a candidate for President Park. negotiations. Last question. Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been consider- able talk in the Defense Department over the Q. Have you received any explanation last few years about reducing the size of why the Japanese Parliament hasn't yet been U.S. troops in South Korea. Are 7jou about presented with a bill to ratify the nuclear to do that noiv? Has the decision been made Nonproliferation Treaty, and are you satis- to to do that? Is that why you are going fied with the explanations? Korea? Secretary Kissinger: Since we have not not going to Secretary Kissinger: We are I'eceived such an explanation on this trip, I less South Korea in order to discuss—much can't, obviously, express any satisfaction or of forces. We to announce—any reduction dissatisfaction with it. The United States that are going to South Korea for the reason favors the ratification of the Nonprolifera- I indicated before. It is an ally. It is a tion Treaty. country whose security is important not only to the United States but also to Japan, and The press: Thank you.

892 Department of State Bulletin VLADIVOSTOK, NOVEMBER 24, 1:35 A.M. U.S.-Soviet relations and the world situa- tion. It was a get-acquainted session between Press release 511 A dated November 25 the President and the General Secretary. Ronald H. Nessen, Piess Secretary to And I think it went very well. President Ford: Gentlemen, as you can see, All the rest of the discussions this evening the Secretary will brief you on today's meet- concerned SALT—that is, all of the discus- ing. sions that Ron Nessen mentioned dealt with Let me quickly run through the sequence the subject of SALT. of events so the Secretary can devote his I think that you remember, as I told you, time to substance. I believe that progress was made in October. The first meeting lasted from 6: 15 to 8: 15 I think that we went further along the road and all the participants who are listed in the that was charted in October. We went into

briefing that Jack [John W. Hushen, Deputy considerable detail and many aspects of it, Press Secretary] gave you took part in that. and we will continue the discussions to- There was then a half-hour break, during morrow morning. And certainly, enough which the President and the Secretary took has already been discussed to give impetus a walk. The meetings resumed at 8:45 and to the negotiations in Geneva. lasted until 11:30. Now, how much more precise we can be tomorrow, what further details can be de- veloped, that remains to be seen, The second meeting lasted from 8:45 to and we will of course brief you after the 11:30. The President, the General Secretary, session tomorrow and let you have the results. the Secretary of State, and the Foreign Min- We will undoubtedly discuss other issues ister attended that. Then there was a half- tomorrow, including the Middle hour break from 11:30 until midnight. East and Europe, but today, the exclusive focus after The last meeting lasted from midnight the train ride was on SALT. until 12:30. The four participants, plus Barry [Barry Schweid, Associated Ambassador [Anatoliy F.] Dobrynin, took Press]. part in that. The dinner was then postponed. Q. Mr. Secretary, did you say that there The President walked back to his dacha with ivonld be nothing left to discuss because you his staff and had a snack, about which I will have already achieved the optimum of what tell you later. you expected to achieve at this meeting? The schedule for tomorrow is for the Secretary Kissinger: Well, if we had al- meetings to resume at 10 o'clock until ap- ready achieved the optimum that is achiev- proximately 2 o'clock, at which time the able, there would not be anything left to dinner that was canceled tonight will take discuss tomorrow. place at 2 o'clock. — We had a very satisfactory talk today. I I will give you further details later, but didn't have any very precise expectations I think at this point you would like to hear about what we could get. I talked to a about the substance of the meetings from number of you, and I think I had explained Secretary Kissinger. that we will try to build on the discussions Secretary Kissinger: I can't go into too of October. That has been done. How much much substance, and as a matter of fact, I further we can go—we are really now in here primarily because I promised some am areas of considerable technical complexity of you on the airplane that I would be here. and relationship of various types of forces There were two major topics discussed to- to each other, but I would expect that we on the train ride.^ For about an hour day will make some further progress tomorrow and a half, there was a general review of morning. In fact, I am reasonably confident that we will. ' President Ford was greeted at Vozdvishenka Air- port in Ussuriysk by General Secretary Brezhnev Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press In-

on Nov. 23; they traveled by train to Vladivostok. ternational] .

December 23, 1974 893 well MIRV's, you. are talking i Q. Do you knoiv if %ohat has happened numbos, as as today could be called a breakthrough? about total delivery systems or are you talk- ing about total warheads or what? Secreary Kissinger: No, I would not call Secretary Kissinger: Well, this is one of this a breakthrough. The last time I used the issues that is being discussed. But the word "breakthrough" I suffered from it generally speaking, we are talking about for months to come. total delivery systems. I think, certainly, enough was discussed nan today to help the negotiators considerably. Q. Total delivery systems? isiK

there a specific pro- : Q. Dr. Kissinger, ivas Secretary Kissinger Yes. intt posal that ivas put forward by one side or Q. What— the other? Secretary Kissinger: Total delivery sys- Secretary Kissinger: The sequence of tems. events has been as follows: In October, in Moscow, the Soviet Union made a proposal, Q. Has this been one of the subjects of or advanced considerations, that I consid- discussion, hoiv to define the number that you ered that we have described as constructive. then will make known? Building on these considerations, the United Secretary Kissinger: Well, obviously, when States made some counterproposals which S( you discuss strategic limitations, you discuss will be before the Soviet leaders when we atmi what sort of numbers would be considered meet today. reas appropriate as well as how you would then The Soviet leaders, in turn, advanced some define them and this is part of the discussion. considerations of their own to which the President, in turn, responded today; so it is Q. Dr. Kissinger, to follow up what I asked' two a process in which the views of the before, as I understand the events as you de- Pres sides are being brought closer without as yet scribed them, the sequence, today the Soviets being identical but we are in the same gen- came forward with a proposal modifying eral ball park. We are talking about the their vieivs on what we had given them ear- same thing, on the same principles, and each lier ? exchange refines the issues more clearly and Secretary Kissinger: Today, the Soviets re- brings them closer. sponded to what we put before them, which Q. Mr. Secretary, are you talking about in turn was the response to what they had MIRV's? Can you give ns any specifics of put before us in October. That is correct. what area you are talking about? Q. And when ivas it that ive gave this re- Secretary Kissinger: We are talking about sponse to them ? comprehensive limitations including num- Secretary Kissinger: Oh, let's see. I guess bers as well as MIRV's. on the Tuesday or Wednesday, whenever I Q. Including numbers? had lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin. I guess on Wednesday before we left on the Secretary Kissinger: Including overall trip. numbers as well as MIRV's. Q. And it was at that lunch? Q. Do you think now that you have come closer to your goal in 1975 on an agreement? Secretary Kissinger: That is right. loii

connection this Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think we Q. Dr. Kissinger, in with have come closer to our goal of having an meeting, are you optimistic? in 1975. agreement Secretary Kissinger: I am optimistic about this meeting, yes. Q. Dr. Kissinger, when you say overall

State Bulletin 894 Department of Q. Mr. Secretary, how do the two men get one who takes my advice on that is in deep along? Is there anything you can tell ns trouble. about your personal view? Q. Dr. Kissinger, would you say that the Secretary Kissinger: I have the impres- amount of time you spent on SALT today and sion that the two men get along excellently. the canceled dinner indicate that you are be- On the train ride, the atmosphere was hind schedide in terms of your own expecta- friendly and was turning to cordiality to- tions of the pace of this meeting? ward the end. The subject of strategic arms Secretary Kissinger: No, I is not one that lends itself to small talk, but would say that we have gotten into in the breaks there was an easy relationship, technical subjects of a complication that indicate and I think both sides are conscious of the might the oppo- site. responsibility they have in trying to make progress in this area and are conducting Q. Dr. Kissinger, the walk that you took themselves accordingly. I think the relation- with the President—ivas this just for relaxa- ship between the two men is good. tion, or was it necessary to discuss with the Q. Was the absence of the Watergate President in private certain decisions or ever— other ynatters?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is a different Secretary Kissinger: It was to take relaxa- atmosphere from the one in July for many tion in private. reasons. Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the decision Q. Hoiv so? to go for a 10-year treaty was a decision by a lameduck President, is it still the way to go Secretary Kissinger: Well, in any event, about this? Has there been any change in President Nixon was a lameduck President, your assessment? leaving Watergate aside. President Ford has announced that he is running for reelection Secretary Kissinger: I am not saying that in 1976, so he is not a lameduck President. a lameduck President cannot make correct In July, for a variety of reasons, things decisions.

were not ripe for an agreement. I think now Q. I realize that. — I am not saying things are ripe for an

agreement here, but I think both sides are Secretary Kissinger: I am saying a lame- making a very serious effort to come to an duck President runs up against the difficulty agreement during 1975. that his protagonists know the time limit of his term in office, and I think that the deci- Q. Did you ask President Ford to run to sion to go for a 10-year agreement was ab- improve his negotiating stance? solutely the correct one—remains the correct Secretary Kissinger: Would you repeat one. that question? Q. There were suggestions that it was an Q. Did you urge President Ford to run to option that was not the top option, but it was improve his negotiating stance? an option just taking what coidd be—

Secretary Kissinger: Did I urge him to run Secretary Kissinger: No. The fact of the to improve—that he run? Oh, did I urge him matter is that when we analyzed in July, we to run? were talking primarily about a five-year agreement, five years from now. As we ana- Q. Yes. lyzed the difficulties we faced, we came uni- Secretary Kissinger: I saw that article. I laterally to the conclusion that to try to re-

am not involved in domestic politics, and any- solve these difficulties would not be worth it

December 23, 1974 895 I because both sides would be straining against after the session tomorrow. I would think the the date that the agreement would last and chances have been somewhat improved. considerations would therefore the breakout Q. Is it fair to say that the Soviets were So, almost dominate the agreement itself. ivilling to go into more detail here than what iiiidf President Nixon and I came to the conclusion you had anticipated? that in any event the effort that would have h Secretary Kissinger: No. I thought that to be put into negotiating a five-year agree- licve there was a possibility that—we knew the ment and then selling it at home would not order of magnitude of the discussion, be- really be worth it in terms of its substantive cause we had reached a point where a spe- merit and therefore we did not attempt to cific set of considerations had been put be- narrow the gap by concession here or there fore us. We had replied in somewhat those which could have kept the project going but, terms. rather, moved it into a framework which litis We expect the answer to come back again seemed on substance more promising. ' 1( in those terms, but the discussion obviously Q. Has the progress been such that some required some detailed analyses. I think that sort of agreement will be signed here, and is it has gone reasonably well. there any change in our plans to leave to- Q. Mr. Secretary, ivould you please specu- sides morrow? late on what considerations, political or oth- erivise, may have prompted the Russians to Secretary Kissinger: No. I am certain that move in this direction and come this far and we will leave tomorrow. It may be a few this much progress? hours later in the day than had been tenta- tively planned. Secretary Kissinger: Don't go overboard

There is no possibility of signing a SALT yet on progress. I am trying to give you a agreement here. Whatever is provisionally sense of movement. I have always stressed agreed to here will have to be spelled out in that this is a very difficult subject, and it is very detailed negotiations which are going quite possible that when we resume tomor- to be extremely complicated and which can row, it will turn out that we will not go fur- easily fail. What we can do here is reach ther than where we have reached tonight. I orders of magnitude, of directions in which think both sides have realized, and I think to go, relationship of various categories to the Soviet side has also realized, that at some each other. That sort of thing can be done point we will be so deeply involved on both here. sides in the next round of weapons develop- Spelling this out, what it means, what re- ment and procurement that that cycle will straints are necessary, what inspection, what become irreversible. The cycles can really be requirements there are for this, there is not mastered only at certain strategic intervals, enough technical expertise here, and in any and once they have gone a certain time,

event it is inconceivable that an agreement whatever that particular cycle is will tend to will be signed here. How the guidelines will be completed, and one has to wait for the be given, that remains to be seen after the next one to come around. session tomorrow morning. I think that realization that we have been' stressing for a year, I think it is now ac- Soviets are willing, Q. / take it that the cepted by both sides. And it is obvious that here than yon hoivever, to go into more detail if the race continues that the United States Soviet anticipated. You are saying that the will have to enter certain areas of weapons sign, agreement ISjij Government is eager to an development that it would prefer not to have

will the chance be im- Sofii next year. How much to do. I think it was a combination of factors proved now? like this that has accounted for the progress of the discussions of recent months. Secretary Kissinger: Well, I really would rather wait with making an estimate on that Q. Mr. Secretary, you seem to carefully\

896 Department of State Bulletir delineate between a provisional agreement it is probably fair to say that we are moving and a formal signing. Is there a 'possihilit ij toward simplicity, yes, but that is a very that by the time you leave here tomorroiv relative concept. evening you might have reached a provisional Q. Do you have any limit understanding? on the amount of time you will devote to the SALT, and how Secretary Kissinger: I have always be- much time are you prepared to spend on the lieved, and have said so, that out of this Middle East? meeting some guidelines to the negotiators Secretary Kissinger: These meetings are could emerge, and some guides will certainly not clocked, and both of the principals are emerge. Now, whether they will take the fairly gregarious and easygoing so you get form of announced guidelines or simply a into a topic and it runs, and we are not general agreement to instruct the delegation, leaving on a scheduled airliner or from a it is still too early to say. regular airport. So, we will talk about the I don't know what you would call a provi- Middle East as long as either side has some- sional agreement. There will not be a binding thing to say about it. There is no fixed time. agreement; there will not be an agreement We are prepared to discuss it. that reflects itself in the actions of the two sides at this meeting. Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, you also said that you woidd take advantage, in Q. The question then is whether you are the negotiations, of the momentum that has going to sign or not going to sign. built up. Are you building up the kind of mo- Secretary Kissinger: That we cannot say mentum now that would require the benefit until after the meeting tomorrow, but it de- from the additional time here? Do you feel pends on what you mean by "announce." pressured—the fact that we are sitting here There will certainly be something about at 2 o'clock in the morning—against some SALT in the communique. kind of a deadline?

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say whether or Secretary Kissinger: No, because we don't not the Soviets want to have our tactical nu- have anything that we must finish here. We clear weapons in Europe counted into num- didn't come here to make an agreement. We bers, strategic weapons? are not going to make an agreement here. We have come here principally, as I said be- Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't think I fore we left, for the two leaders to have an should go into all the individual details, but opportunity to get to know each other and to when I said that the discussions concerned review Soviet-American relations, hopefully the relationship of various categories of to give some impetus to the SALT negotia- weapons to each other, that has been one of tions. That probably will be achieved. the questions—overseas systems has been Beyond that, we have no necessity—no in- one of the questions that in the past has tention, in fact—to reach any specific agree- been raised. ments because, after all, the two principals Q. Dr. Kissinger, in the past, you talked are going to meet again for a much more ex- about the desirability of tryiyig to work out tended summit when the General Secretary an agreement that woidd in fact be more sim- visits the United States in the spring. ple than the complex arrangements that have Q. Mr. Secretary, why haven't the two previously been discussed. Are we in fact principals met alone, President Ford and saying in our response that both we and the Brezhnev ? Soviets have started moving toward this more simple, more basic formulation? Secretary Kissinger: They will certainly meet alone before the end of the visit here. Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think it is hard to answer this in the abstract. I think The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

December 23, 1974 897 VLADIVOSTOK, NOVEMBER 24, 4:18 P.M. In other words, while we were negotiating the five-year agreement we became extremely Press release 511 dated November 2.5 conscious of the fact that it would lapse at

Secretary Kissinger: If you are all through the moment that both sides would have the with reading the joint statement, let me deal greatest concern about the weapons pro- with that. There is also a communique which grams of the other. And this was the origin we will distribute, and if it should not be fin- of the 10-year proposal and the negotiation ished by the time when I get through with for a 10-year agreement that emerged out of the joint statement, I will talk from it. the July summit. The joint statement, in our judgment, No preparatory work of any significance marks the breakthrough with the SALT ne- could be undertaken in July on the summit, gotiations that we have sought to achieve in so that when President Ford came into office, recent years and produces a very strong pos- the preparations for a 10-year agreement sibility of agreement, to be signed in 1975. started practically from scratch. Perhaps the best way to talk about it Now, in a period of 10 years, the problem would be to go back to the history of the ne- of numbers has a diff"erent significance than gotiations, starting with the summit in July in the shorter period, because over that pe- and the conclusion of the discussions since riod of time, one would have to account, then, in relation to some specific issues be- really, for two deployments of a cycle that is eft'ort. inequali- fore us. usually a five-year And also, bearable for either side in In all of the discussions on SALT, there is ties that might be the problem of aggregate numbers and then a five-year period would become much more difl^cult if were trying over a 10-year there is the problem of the numbers of weap- they ons with certain special characteristics such period. Finally, since as MIRV's. And finally, there is the problem we considered that any of duration of the agreement. agreement that we signed with respect to In July, we were talking about an exten- numbers should be the prelude to further ne- sion of the interim agreement for a period of gotiations about reduction, it was very im- reduction for both two to three years, and we attempted to com- portant the debates for pensate for the inequality of numbers in the sides represent some equivalence that per- interim agreement by negotiating a differen- mitted a reasonable calculation. I won't repeat on this occasion all the in- tial in our favor of missiles with multiple warheads. ternal deliberations through which we went, This negotiation was making some prog- the various options that were considered. There were five in number, but various com- ress. But it was very difficult to establish a relationship between aggregate numbers. It binations of quantitative and qualitative re- would be an advantage on aggregate numbers straints seem possible for the United States. on one side and an advantage in multiple Finally, prior to my visit to the Soviet Un- warheads on the other. All the more so as we ion in October, President Ford decided on a were talking about a time period between proposal which did not reflect any of the op- 1974 and at the end of 1979, during which tions precisely but represented an amalga- various new programs of both sides were mation of several of the approaches. This going into production at the precise moment we submitted to the Soviet leaders about a that the agreement would have lapsed. That week before my visit to the Soviet Union in is to say, the United States was developing October, and it led to a Soviet counterpro- the Trident and the B-1, both of which will posal which was in the general framework of be deployed in the period after 1979, and the our proposal and which, I have indicated to Soviet MIRV development would really not you, marked a substantial step forward on reach its full evolution until the period 1978 the road to an agreement. to 1979. It was discussed in great detail on the oc-

898 Deparlment of State Bulletin casion of my visit in October. The Soviet jor efi'ort in that direction. counterproposal was studied by the President As I said, the negotiations could be difl^cult and his advisers, and it caused us to submit and will have many technical complexities, another refinement, or an answer to the So- but we believe that the target is achievable. viet counterproposal, about a week before If it is achieved, it will mean that a cap has we came here, and then most of the discus- been put on the arms race for a period of 10 sions last night, all of the discussions last years, that this cap is substantially below night, and about two and a half hours this the capabilities of either side, that the ele- morning, were devoted to the issue of SALT. ment of insecurity, inherent in an arms race President Ford and the General Secretary, in which both sides are attempting to an- in the course of these discussions, agreed ticipate not only the actual programs but the that a number of the issues that had been capabilities of the other side, will be sub- standing in the way of progress should be stantially reduced with levels achieved over resolved and that guidelines should be issued a 10-year period by agreement. to the negotiators in Geneva, which we ex- The negotiations for reductions can take pect to reconvene in early January. place in a better atmosphere, and therefore They agreed that obviously, as the joint we hope that we will be able to look back to statement says, the new agreement will cover this occasion here as the period of—as the a period of 10 years; that for the first two turning point that led to putting a cap on the years of that period, the provisions of the arms race and was the first step to a reduc- interim agreement will remain in force, as tion of arms. was foreseen in the interim agreement, that Now, I will be glad to take your questions. after the lapse of the interim agreement, both Barry and then Peter [Barry Schweid, As-

sides could have equal numbers of strategic sociated Press ; Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily vehicles, and President Ford and General News]. Secretary Brezhnev agreed substantially on Q. Mr. Secretary, excuse me, but are the definition of strategic delivery vehicles. bombers under "a"? During the 10-year period of this agree- ment, they would also have equal numbers of Secretary Kissinger: Yes. weapons with multiple independent reentry Q. Bombers are included. When you say vehicles, and that number is substantially no cotnpensation, you mean ivhat we have in less than the total number of strategic vehi- Europe counts against ourselves? cles. There is no compensation for forward- Secretary Kissinger: No. based systems and no other compensations. Q. Excuse me. In other words, we are talking about equal numbers on both sides for both MIRV's and Secretary Kissinger: What I mean is for- for strategic delivery vehicles, and these ward bases, which are not included in these numbers have been agreed to and will be dis- totals. leof cussed with congressional leaders after the President returns. Q. They don't count in this? The negotiations will have go into the to Secretary Kissinger: Strategic bombers details of verifications, of what restraints will are included. be necessary, how one can define and verify missiles which are independently targeted. Q. Yes. But we believe that with good will on both Secretary Kissinger: Forward-base sys- sides, it should be possible to conclude a 10- tems are not included. rf« year agreement by the time that the General Secretary visits the United States at the Q. My question follows on that. What are summit, and at any rate, we will make a ma- the advantages for the Russians in agreeing

December 23, 1974 899 on the numbers of MIRV's being equal, that systems, or I would say all of them, are not they would not raise questions about com- suitable for a significant attack on the So- pensating for our forward-base system? viet Union. At any rate, this is an element

that has disappeared from the negotiation ; (ju Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that we in recent months. should ask the General Secretary for an ex- ittur.

COJStl planation of why he—I can explain to you Q. Secretary Kissinger, have you reached- our point of view on these matters, but I be- agreement on the number of MIRV vehicles lieve that both sides face this problem. or the number of MIRV warheads? arms race has an impetus from at The Secretary Kissinger: The number of least three sources: one, political tension; C' MIRV'ed vehicles. The number of warheads i second, the strategic plans of each side ; and could differ, and of course, there are some '*' third, the intent of each side to anticipate differentials in the throw weight of indi-ji''f'' what the other side might do. The most vol- vidual missiles at any given period, though j*'' atile of those in a period of exploding tech- there is nothing in the agreement that pre- *W''J nology is the last one. vents the United States, if it wishes to, from Cj^ <; There is an element that is driving the closing the throw-weight gap. We are notfcm arms race of insuring one's self against the it it. going to do just to do '^^^^ potentialities of the other side that accel- Q. Dr. Kissinger, when was the discus- Jp™ erates it in each passing year. I would sup- sion matters concluded, and was n pose that the General Secretary has come to of SALT that time used to discuss any other matter? the same conclusion that we have, that what- k it ever level you put for a ceiling, is enough Secretary Kissinger: The discussion o: to destroy humanity several times over, so SALT matters was concluded around 12 :30, i that the actual level of the ceiling is not as and all the time between 12 :30 and the time I decisive as the fact that a ceiling has been I came over here was devoted to other mat- put on it and that the element of your self- ters. The discussions were practically unin- fulfilling prophecy that is inherent in the terrupted, and I will get into these other lillb arms race is substantially reduced. matters after we are finished with SALT. towtl I would assume that it was considerations Q. I have a question on the delivery vehi- race, such as these that induced the General Sec- cles. racei retary to do this. of im Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Q. My question derives from the fact that no bargainer would put himself at a disad- Q. You speak of equality, ivhich I take tc •h\s\ vantage, and I am just wondering what, mean some level that is roughly an equality We from our standpoint, would be the net ad- of total U.S. delivery vehicles in a TiJMD, agreec vantage of maintaining our forward bases mix and the same on the other side. other without the Soviets complaining that there Secretary Kissinger: That is right. is some imbalance or some inequality or in- J,, equation in the overall piirpose. Q. Woidd this, therefore, involve a largerl^ku number of total U.S. vehicles than existea\ik]i[ Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, under SALT One or by taking in the bomben forces the Soviet Union had maintained that for- are you still maintaining roughly the samt ward-base systems should be included in the number of land bases? totals, and this was one of the big obstacles to an agreement previously. The progress Secretary Kissinger: By agreement, we heti that has been made in recent months is that are not giving up the number until the Presi- the Soviet Union gradually gave up asking dent has had enough opportunity to brief, for compensation for the forward-base sys- but roughly speaking, the total number is tems partly because most of the forward-base composed of a combination of missiles, oi fecr,

900 Department of State Bulletii Heiemb, —

land-based missiles, submarine missiles, limitation, but this is something that can bombers, and certain other categories of still be raised in the discussions; but there is weapons that would have the characteristics no such limitation. of strategic weapons. The total number that Q. Mr. Secretary, what does this initial accurately is equal, and each side, with some statement have to do ivith the Trident and constraints but not very major ones, has es- B-1 program, if anything? sentially the freedom to mix—that is to say the composite force—in whatever way it Secretary Kissinger: Each side has the wants. There are some constraints. right to compose—what it means is that the Trident and the B-1 program had to be kept Q. Is there any further constraint on the within the total number of the ceiling that total throw weight that one side or another will be established by the agreement. But side conld have? Under SALT One, as I re- except for the limitations on heavy missiles, member, there was a limit on the number of the rest of the composition of the force is up heavy missiles. to each side. Secretary Kissinger: The constraints of Q. Are these limits higher than the exist- SALT One with respect to the number of ing forces of both sides and will both have heavy missiles are carried over into this xueapons to reach the— agreement. Secretary Kissinger: No. By the United Q. Up to 1985? States. This is somewhat more complex to Secretary Kissinger: Up to 1985. calculate, depending on what weapons you count. For the Soviet Union, it is clearly be- Q. Throughout the whole period of the low the limits, and for both sides, it is sub- agreement, you said there will be a substan- stantially below their capability. tial reduction. Is this approximately— Q. Will either side reduce its arms totals? Secretary Kissinger: No. I am saying it I tvas not quite certain of your answer. will be the objective of the United States now that we have achieved a cap on the arms Secretary Kissinger: I would say yes. But race. We have achieved a cap on the arms I think you will know about that better when race if we can solve the technical problems the numbers become more of implementing the agreement that was Q. Dr. Kissinger, would you identify for made here ; but I believe, with good will, us what the main hangup was in the five ear- that should be possible. lier options, and what mix the President de- We have always assumed that once we cided upon that was the key to advancing an agreed on numbers, we could solve all the acceptable proposal? other problems, that from the basis of the cap that has been put on the arms race—so Secretary Kissinger: The big hangup ear- that both sides now have a similar starting lier was the combination of time periods and

isjj point—it will be the U.S. objective to bring perhaps the complexity of the proposals; substantial of strategic jjjjli about a reduction that is to say, when you are trying to calcu- there not yet agree- (jiSj forces; but has been an late what advantage in the number of war- ment to any reduction, obviously. heads compensates for a certain advantage in the number of launchers, you get into an Q. Dr. Kissinger, is there any provision hi area of very great complexity, and when you here concerning other types of modernization *' are dealing with a short, or relatively short, —improvements, for example, of MIRV's? time period, you face the difficulty that each Was there any limitation of MIRV's dis- side throughout this time period will cussed? be pre- paring for what happens during the break- Secretary Kissinger: No, there is no such out period.

December 23, 1974 901 — ?

So, those were the big hangups through straint on throw weight except the restraint '.

July. What I believe contributed to this that is produced by the continuation of the ! agreement was, first, that with a 10-year ban—of the limitation of heavy missiles, and able to put to the Soviet there is a restraint on the number of vehi- program we were | less volatile than cles that can be MIRV'ed. Union a scheme that was j what we had discussed earlier for the reasons What was the first part of the question ? of the breakout problem. Q. Are we past that point ivhere ive have \. Secondly, I believe that one of the problems to cut back? that was raised yesterday—namely, that Secretary Kissinger: No. We are not past they were dealing with a new President i that point, but we could easily go past that may have influenced Soviet decisions because | point if we wanted to. it created a longer political stability. ; Thirdly, the discussions, I think it can be Q. I realize that, but we are not physically from fairly complex pro- safe to say, moved past that point. posals to substantially more simple ones, and this permitted both sides finally to come to Secretary Kissinger: No. But don't forget, an agreement. the Soviets have not even begun to MIRV their missiles yet. We are well down the road Mr. Secretary, the goal at the end of Q. if toward that goal. the road is the signing of a strategic arms limitation treaty, in terms of percentages Q. I realize we have a larger plan at the how far down that road does this joint state- moment. My question is ivhether we have to start to subtract. ment put lis ?

Secretary Kissinger: Whenever I have Secretary Kissinger: We do not have to given percentages and made predictions, I start subtracting. into enormous difficulties. I would have got Q. One other clarification question. This< I would stick by my statement earlier. I say aggregate number is yet to be agreed upon? would say that we are over the worst part of Kissinger: that is the negotiation if both sides continue to show Secretary No, number the same determination to reach an agree- agreed upon. did earlier. ment that they Q. It has been agreed upon? The issues that are before us now are es- in both sentially technical issues; that is to say, Secretary Kissinger: The numbers been upon. they are issues of verifications, issues of col- "a" and "b" have agreed identify lateral restraints, issues of how you Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please— certain developments. But those are issues President on which substantial studies were made be- Secretary Kissinger: And the will discuss with the congressional lead- fore we made our original proposals, and them ers, both leaders thought that they did therefore, had we not believed that they were but not want to include them in this statement. soluble, we would not have made the pro- to a posals, so we think that it is going be Q. Well, they ivould then be included in a very difficult negotiation which could fail. treaty But I think we are well down the road. Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Q. Sir, a couple of clarifiers, if I may, that Ratified? I am not clear on. Do I understand that there Q. be a reduction in the number of U.S. will Secretary Kissijiger: In other words, the MlRV's? A7id secondly, is there some liynit agreement will not fail because of the num- on throw weight? Is that what you are say- bers. The numbers have been set and the defi- ing or did I hear you wrong? nition of what is counted in each number has Secretary Kissinger: No. There is no re- already been set.

902 Department of State Bulletin

i — —

Q. Mr. Secretary, what yon are saying in Senator Jackson than me, but it would meet "^t effect is that you have already fixed the ceil- many of the criticisms that he has made in ing, hut you are not prepared yet to disclose the past. It meets the point that has been what that ceiling is ? made by critics of the interim agreement, in my view, only about the inequality in Secretary Kissinger: That is right. num- iOD! bers, because as I pointed out on many occa- Q. And that ivill be disclosed at what sions, the inequality in numbers was not point ? created by the interim agreement—that ex- Secretary Kissinger: Oh, I would expect isted when the interim agreement was signed Btpj during the week and certainly no later than and it simply froze the situation that existed Sttl Iby the time the instructions are drafted for on the day the interim agreement was signed ithe delegation. for a five-year period. But at any rate, what was acceptable for a five-year period was not Q. Mr. Kissinger, does this not mean—in acceptable for a 15-year period—5 plus 10 \other words, will not our MIRV reduction and therefore that principle of equality has \be considerably greater than theirs if we to be maintained here. \have many more, and ivill not their reduc- \tion in nuclear missiles be greater than ours Q. Mr. Secretary, one last question, please. {because they are allowed to have more in Woidd you address yourself to the question 1972? of good faith on this? This is very important Secretary Kissinger: Well, when you are and will be a very important agreement to the security of the people of both nations. talking about a 10-year program, I would What will you say as a statement say within a 10-year program in the absence of faith and a guarantee? of an agreement both of these questions are over 10-year pe- highly theoretical, because a Secreta7-y Kissinger: When the security of riod both and they could easily go over we both countries is involved and the national the total number of permitted vehicles and survival of both countries is involved, you easily go over the total number of MIRV ve- cannot make an agreement which depends hicles. iberi primarily on the good faith of either side. In starting from the present programs I And what has to be done in the negotiations think it is correct to say that this strain on that are now starting is to assure adequate the Soviet total numbers is going to be verifications of the provisions of the agree- greater and the strain on our MIRV num- ment. We think that this is no problem, or

; in practice it bers is going to be greater but no significant problem, with respect to the the same, because there is comes out about total numbers of strategic vehicles. It may be no question that, if we both kept going, the a problem with respect to determining what of vehicles would soon numbers MIRV'ed is a MIRV'ed vehicle. Nevertheless we be- point where even the most exalted reach a lieve that that, too, is soluble, though with military planner would find it difficult to find ey di greater difficulty than determining the total a target for the many warheads that are numbers. going to be developed. Good faith is involved in not pressing Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that this against the legal limits of the agreements in will be acceptable to the congressional lead- a way that creates again an element of the ers, particularly those— insecurity that one has attempted to remove by fixing the ceiling or, to put it another way, Secretary Kissinger: I think this will cer- by putting a cap on the arms race. But I tainly be acceptable to the congressional lead- think that the agreement will be very viable, ers that have been and that the element of good faith is not the Jackson? Q. Including Senator principal ingredient in releasing the agree- If ki

)crte| Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am sure you ment, though it was an important element in can find a more convincing spokesman for producing the agreement.

gulletD December 23, 1974 903 Mr. Nessen: Mr. Secretary, you are going has elements of danger, that an effort should j*'''^' to miss your tour if you don't leave now. be made to defuse it. We are not opposed to [»!*'" the Geneva Conference, Also, we are now passing out the joint com- and we have always . §, 1 to make this agreed that it should be munique. The Secretary wants reconvened at an ap- jfflrf tour. propriate time and we agree to stay in fur- Secretary Kissinger: Let me take another ther touch with each other, as to measures question. that can be taken to alleviate the situation. spcilt: Q. / want to get this right. Do I under- Q. What role does the Soviet Union think U's

stand ivhile you are putting a cap on the fu- the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] n < ture numbers, this agreed-upon total is high- should play in the negotiations? How shouUk er than what each side has now in aggre- they be recognized, and how shoidd they— ! \ gate. The combination? Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the So-'

Secretary Kissinger: I did not say this, no. viet view has been publicly stated. We did not go into the modalities of how they would; Sw Q. That is the inference I get. execute it since we made our position clear fi^stii

Secretary Kissinger: I said specifically it at the United Nations last week. IW is lower than what the Soviet Union has and Q. Specifically the trade reform bill in the in our case it depends on how you compose United States. mm the total number.

Secretary Kissinger. That was touched ^ Q. Mr. Secretary, was there any discus- ftK!r?!f upon. sion on what each side will do for resuming the work of the Geneva Conference on the Q. Where did you leave the ESC? Middle East as soo)i as possible? Secretary Kissinger: The European Secu- Secretary Kissinger: No. rity Conference. We had a detailed discussion

of all the issues before the European Security Imeetiii Q. Does that mean the end of your oivn Conference in which, as you all know. For- efforts, for example, in the area? eign Minister Gromyko is one of the world's JForeig Secretary Kissinger: No. This is a phrase leading experts, and we sought for to means lind t( that was also in the summit communique, move the positions of East and West closer

and it has always been assumed that my ef- together, and we hope that progress can ac- forts are compatible with the prospective ef- celerate. forts of the Geneva Conference. Q. Mr. Secretary, can- you compare the Q. To what extent did the talks get into progress made on nuclear iveapons with the the Middle East situation, Mr. Secretary? progress made by the Soviets with the Mid- dle East? tor

Secretary Kissinger: There was a rather Foreig

lengthy discussion of the Middle East. Let Secretary Kissinger: Not even remotely. krou? me go through the topics that were discussed Q. You did not make any progress on the in addition. Middle East? There was discussion of the Middle East, of the European Security Conference, and Secretary Kissinger: I don't think that ' Seer forces in Europe and a number of issues progress on the Middle East is for us to tkanje

connected with bilateral relations. These were make, and it was a different order of dis tion, ai the key other topics that were discussed. cussion. The progress on SALT was a major specific step forward to the solution of a very difficult Q. Can you tell us about your discussions problem. The discussions on the Middle East on the Middle East? I think may have contributed, and we hope

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think there is will contribute, to a framework of restraint an agreement by both sides that the situation in enabling the two countries that have such

904 Department of State Bulletin — ? —

\ vital interest in the area to stay in touch for a long time, and it's a regular annual

with each other, but it cannot be compared. visit. It has no purpose of reassuring

Q. How miich time do you estimate, Mr. Q. And obviously SALT will be discussed Secretary, you speut discussing the Middle there? East? Secretary Kissinger: Well, I will give the Secretary Kissinger: How much time was Chinese a report of it, but it is not the pur- spent? I didn't keep track of it. An hour, but pose of my visit. The purpose of my visit was is order of that a rough agreed a long time ago before the Vladivos- Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. tok trip was scheduled. It is in terms of

Chinese-American relations, and it is not Q. Was there a question of future sale of based on any need of specific reassurance. any U.S. commodities with the Soviet Union

Q. Questions—

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't hear the Secretary Kissinger Makes Visit question either, but it dealt with economics so

I don't want to answer it. to the People's Republic of China

Secretary Kissinger visited the People's rOKYO, NOVEMBER 25 Republic of China November 25-29. Follow- ing are exchanges of toasts by Secretary Press release 512 dated November 25 Kissinger and Minister of Foreign Affairs you tell us about Q. Mr. Secretary, can Chiao Kuan-hua at a banquet given by the ivith Japanese Foreign your meeting the Foreign Minister on November 25 and at a Minister? banquet given by Secretary Kissinger on No- Secretary Kissinger: We had a very good vember 28, together with the text of a com- meeting in the spirit of partnership that was munique issued at Peking and Washington on November 29. strengthened last week, and I briefed the Foreign Minister about our visit to Korea and the Soviet Union. He in turn told me about his conversations with the French For- EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, NOVEMBER 25

eign Minister. And I thought it was a very

friendly and satisfactory meeting. Press release 513 dated November 26

Q. And you discussed the latest develop Foreign Minister Chiao mMments on SALT? The Honorable Secretary of State and Mrs.

Secretary Kissinger: I explained to the Kissinger, all the other American guests,

Foreign Minister in great detail the break- comrades and friends : The last three years or more. itcly. through that was achieved in SALT. Dr. Kissinger has come a long way across the ocean to visit our country on six Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you foresee in occasions. We are glad that he has now come the China visit? to Peking again, providing our two sides Secretary Kissinger: We will have an ex- with an opportunity to continue the exchange change of views and a review of the situa- of views on the normalization of Sino-Amer-

basis. I have no ican relations and on international (f I tion, as we do on an annual issues of specific expectations. common interest. Here I wish to bid welcome to Secretary of State Kissinger, to Mrs. Kis- Q. Is there anything to the reports that singer, who is in China for the first time, and leE; this visit to China is meant to reassure the to the other American guests accompanying Chinese ? the Secretary of visit. itraii State on the Secretary Kissinger: No. It was scheduled A year has elapsed since the last visit of

December 23, 1974 905 Bulleli Mr. Secretary of State. In this year the in- more meaningful to me because I am accom- ternational situation has undergone great panied by my wife and by my children. I am changes, which further demonstrate that the glad that they can share what to the Amer- current international situation is character- ican people and to all of us in public life will flesi ized by great disorder under heaven. The en- always be one of the most significant initia- Vice tire world is amidst intense turbulence and tives of American foreign policy. unrest. This reflects the sharpening of vari- The beginning of the process of normaliza- ous contradictions and is something inde- tion of relations with the People's Republic pendent of man's will. The history of man- of China, and its continuation in the years kind always moves forward amidst turmoil. since then, has not been a matter of expedi- KCHi In our view, such turmoil is a good thing, and ency but a fixed principle of American for- not a bad thing. eign policy. ten The Chinese and American peoples have al- Since I was here last, there have been

'; ie([eli ways been friendly to each other. After more many changes internationally and some than two decades of estrangement, the door changes in the United States. But it was no Mr, ; was opened for exchanges between the two accident that the new American President Im countries, and the friendly relations between saw your ambassador the first afternoon he Ual! the two peoples have developed. Here we was in office, within a few hours of having liketi | ought to mention the pioneering role Mr. taken his oath of office, and that he reaf- warm Richard Nixon played in this regard, and we firmed on that occasion that we would con- yb also note with appreciation President Ford's tinue to pursue the principles of the Shang- Thf , statement that he would continue to imple- hai communique and that we would continue iuipor ment the Shanghai communique. to follow the goal of normalization of rela- le w(

China and the United States have different tions with the People's Republic of China. | lenta

' social systems, and there are differences be- And President Ford has sent me here to Idi tween us on a series of matters of principle. continue the fruitful exchanges of views that entlit

But this does not hinder us from finding we have had in every year, to continue the i Wi common ground on certain matters. It is al- process of normalization, and to affirm again OB c ways beneficial for the two sides to have can- the fixed principles of American foreign pol- proble did exchanges of views and increase mutual icy. standi understanding. the whole, Sino-American I look forward to my talks with the Vice On timiin, relations have in these years been moving Premier and the Foreign Minister. I am tkelir ahead. We believe that the current visit of glad that I have already had an opportunity yondt

Mr. Secretary of State will contribute to the to see the Prime Minister and to recall the'teruii further implementation of the principles es- many occasions of previous visits when wejfiew tablished in the Shanghai communique. exchanged views.

I propose a toast to the friendship between We live in a period of great change and a the Chinese and American peoples, to the period that is characterized by much up-'"' — health of the Secretary of State and Mrs. heaval. We believe that this change must

Kissinger, to the health of all the other Amer- lead to a new and better order for all of thejpniici] ican guests, and to the health of all com- peoples of the world, and it is to this goalfprinm rades and friends present here. that American foreign policy is dedicated. ' kr^ We consider the exchanges on these sub-j ^^ jects as well as others with the leaders of thejleave. Secretary Kissinger People's Republic of China of the greatestkof juj,, Mr. Vice Premier [Teng Hsiao-ping], Mr. consequence. | kohi^

Foreign Minister, distinguished guests, We agree that in the last years, relations jskm.j friends : I appreciate this warm reception on between our two countries have moved ahead to the, seventh visit to China, which is all the steadily. I here to continue my am this process, Mao, t(

906 Department of State Bulletir Hi 'Keitibi

II ! and I am confident that it will succeed. mier Chou En-lai, to the good health and long So, I would like to propose a toast to the life of the Vice Premier and the Foreign Min- friendship of the American and Chinese peo- ister. Gail bei. ples and to the health and long life of the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister, and Foreign Minister Chiao to the health and long life of Chairman Mao, and to our lasting friendship. Mr. Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger, all the other American guests, comrades and

friends : First of all, on behalf of all my Chi- EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, NOVEMBER 28 nese colleagues present, I wish to thank Sec- retary of State Kissinger for giving this Press release 514 dated November 29 banquet tonight to entertain us. In the last days, Secretary Kissinger few our two sides have, in a candid spirit, reviewed the development of Mr. Vice Premier, Mr. Foreign Minister, the international situation over the past year friends : On behalf of all my colleagues, on and exchanged views on international issues behalf of my wife and my children, I would of common interest and the question of Sino- like to thank our Chinese hosts for the very American relations. This has increased our warm and very friendly reception we have mutual understanding and deepened our com- had here. prehension of our common points. Both sides The Foreign Minister and I reached a very have expressed their readiness to work, in important agreement today, which is that accordance with the principles established in we would keep our toasts short, to spare the the Shanghai communique, for the continued mental agility of the press which is here. advance of Sino-American relations. I do want to say that this visit, my sev- Dr. Kissinger and his party are leaving enth to the People's Republic, continues the Peking tomorrow for a visit to Soochow be- progress that has been made on each previ- fore returning home. Here we wish them a ous occasion. We reviewed international pleasant journey. problems and deepened our common under- I propose a toast to the friendship between standing. We committed ourselves to con- the Chinese and American peoples, to the tinuing the process of normalization along health of President Ford, to the health of the the lines of the Shanghai communique. Be- Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger, to the yond the formal exchanges, we gained a bet- health of all the other American guests, and ter understanding of the Chinese point of to the health of all comrades and friends view, which we will take seriously into ac- present here. Gan bei. count in conducting our foreign policy.

I said when I arrived here that the process of improving relations between the People's TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE Republic and the United States is a fixed principle of American foreign policy. This Joint U.S.-PRC Communique principle reaffirmed strengthened was and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State during our conversations. and Assistant to the President for National Secu- So, my colleagues and I and my family rity Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China leave with very warm feelings and a feeling from November 25 through November 29, 1974. The U.S. and Chinese sides held frank, wide-ranging of substantive satisfaction. In this spirit, I and mutually beneficial talks. They reaffimied their would like to propose a toast to the friend- unchanged commitment to the principles of the ship of the Chinese and American peoples, Shanghai Communique. The two Governments agreed to the good health and long life of Chairman that President Gerald R. Ford would visit the Peo- Mao, to the good health and long life of Pre- ple's Republic of China in 1975.

December 23, 1974 907 Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for pre- venting collisions at sea, 1972, with regulations. Done at London October 1972.- 20, »a Extension by the United Kingdom to: Hong Kong, October 30, 1974.

Current Actions Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats iCliia. Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, MULTILATERAL including diplomatic agents. Done at New York ' December 14, 1973.'' Signatiire: Hungary, November 6, 1974.° Aviation Wheat Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade ' treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Janu- convention (part of the international wheat agree- Itorete ary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. ment) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Tiky Accession deposited: Colombia, December 4, 1974; Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to Iraq, September 10, 1974. certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions. Cultural Property Ratification deposited: Spain, December 2, 1974. lipm Convention on the means of prohibiting and prevent- ing the illicit import, export and transfer of owner- ship of cultural property. Adopted at Paris No- BILATERAL vember 14, 1970. Entered"into force April 24, 1972.^

Ratification deposited: Zaire, September 23, 1974. Flesidf Chile

Cultural Relations Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- S"* Agreement on the importation of educational, scien- ricultural commodities of October 25, 1974. Ef- ^''j tific and cultural materials, with protocol. Done at fected by exchange of notes at Santiago Novera- fora

,' Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into ber 22, 1974. Entered into force November 22, 1974. He force May 21, 1952; for the United States Novem- Pakistan tOSSt; ber 2, 1966. TIAS 6129. Ij Ml succession: Zambia, 1, Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Notification of November MS' 1974. Signed at Islamabad November 23, 1974. Entered Mk into force November 23, 1974. kl

Maritime Matters fereta Syria Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-

sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. | L,tUlt

1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS Signed at Damascus November 20, 1974. Entered iteiiifi 4044. into foi'ce November 20, 1974. to 2 Acceptance deposited: Colombia, November 19, Trinidad 1974. and Tobago

Agreement extending and amending the agreement ftisiiiei Oil Pollution of June 20, 1968, as amended and extended, relat- International convention relating to intervention on ing to a program of technical assistance in the field the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, of tax administration. Effected by exchange of Korea with annex. at Brussels November 29, 1969.- notes at Port-of-Spain October 22 and November Done Presidei

Extension by the United Kingdom to: Hong Kong, 12, 1974. Entered into force November 12, 1974. 'lier2 November 12, 1974. - Not in force. ' Not in force for the United States. ^ With a reservation.

908 Department of State Bulletin

I V

INDEX December 23, 197 Ji Vol. LXXI, No. 1S52

China. Secretary Kissinger Makes Visit to the Treaty Information. Current .Actions .... 908 People's Republic of China (Chiao, Kissin- U.S.S.R. ger, joint communique) 905 President Ford Visits Japan, the Republic of Disarmament Korea, and the Soviet Union (remarks, President Ford Visits Japan, the Republic of toasts, communiques, joint U.S. -Soviet state- Korea, and the Soviet Union (remarks, ment on limitation of strategic offensive toasts, communiques, joint U.S. -Soviet state- arms) 866 ment on limitation of strategic offensive President Ford's News Conference of Decem- arms) 866 ber 2 (excerpts) 861 President Ford's News Conference of Decem- Secretary Kissinger's News Conferences at ber 2 (e.xcerpts) 861 Tokyo and Vladivostok 883 Secretary Kissinger's News Conferences at United Nations. Death of U Thant, Former m Tokyo and Vladivostok 883 U.N. Secretary General (statement by Pres- (Energy. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- ident Ford) 882 ences at Tokyo and Vladivostok 88-S Name I tide. Japan (President Ford Visits Japan, the Republic of Chiao, Kuan-hua 905 Korea, and the Soviet Union (remarks, Ford, President 861,866,882 toasts, communiques, joint U.S. -Soviet state- Kissinger, Secretary 883,905 ment on limitation of strategic offensive arms) 866 IPresident Ford's News Conference of Decem- Checklist of Department of State ber 2 (excerpts) 861 Press Releases: December 2—8 'Secretary Kissinger's News Conferences at Tokyo and Vladivostok 883 Press releases may be obtained from the Of- IKorea fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 'President Ford Visits Japan, the Republic of Washington, D.C. 20520. Korea, and the Soviet Union (remarks, Releases issued prior to December 2 which toasts, communiques, joint U.S. -Soviet state- appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. ment on limitation of strategic offensive 503 of November 19, 508 of December 20, 511, arms) 866 511.A., and 512 of November 25, 513 of Novem- m President Ford's News Conference of Decem- ber 26, and 514 of November 29. ber 2 (excerpts) 861 Secretary Kissinger's News Conferences at Xo. Date Subject Tokyo and Vladivostok 883 *515 12/2 Program for the official visit of Middle East the Chancellor of the Federal ErE President Ford's News Conference of Decem- Republic of Germany, Helmut ber 2 (excerpts) 861 Schmidt, Dec. 4-7. Secretary Kissinger's News Conferences at 1516 12/3 Kissinger: Senate Finance Com- . Tokyo and Vladivostok . 883 mittee. Presidential Documents "517 12/3 Claxton receives John Jacob Rog- Death of U Thant, Former U.N. Secretary ers Award. General 882 t518 12/7 Kissinger: news conference. President Ford Visits Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Soviet Union 866 * Not printed. President Ford's News Conference of Decem- t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. ber 2 (excerpts) 861