The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force
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The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force AIR U N I VE R S ITY l review from the editor's aerie One of the Review’s stalwarts achieves a considerable feat with this issue: two articles in succession. Lieutenant Colonel Edd Wheeler provided "Women in Combat: A Demurrer" in our November-December 1978 edition, and he now shows his versatility with the lead article, "Prospects for the Manned Bomber: High Noon or Sunset?" Our cover relates to the early morning of the manned bomber's day as it depicts a “ gaggle” of Keystone bombers over the Golden Gate—before the bridge was there! Of course, reactions are encouraged—either an in-depth article to present in response or just a letter would be helpful. Although we do not yet have a Letters-to-the-Editor column, we have often printed comments and ideas, either in whole or in part, that come in through the mail. Speaking of ideas, the generation of new ones is a principal purpose of the annual Air Power Symposium of the Air War College. The 1979 session will take place just as this issue appears, and it should be some encouragement to participants to know that three of the articles herein were originally presented at last year’s symposium. Lieutenant Colonels Phillip Heacock and Roger Schell deal with related themes in "The Viability of Centralized Command and Control (C2)” and "Computer Security: The Achilles' Heel of the Electronic Air Force?" Another symposium paper, related in a different way, is "The Airborne Forward Air Controller: Future Needs and Opportunities,” by John Ellis of the Rand Corporation. Perhaps inclusion of these articles will stimulate other symposium participants to look on the Review as a potential outlet for their ideas. Probing on into the world of military thought, David Maclsaac's review- article about Karl von Clausewitz introduces us to the theory of warfare through one of the masters. Don Hutchinson considers the same subject at another level as he discusses USAF doctrine in "A New Look at an Old Problem." If any of the participants in the Air Power Symposium of 1979 (or other potential authors) would like to engage in this effort to stimulate new concepts but is uncertain as to how to get started, just write or call the Review for an author’s guide. It may just give you enough on format and methods to clear away whatever inhibitions exist. Give us a ring at 205-293-2773 or Autovon 875-2773. Jmuary-Februiry 1979 Vol. XXX No. 2 articles Prospects for the Manned Bomber 2 High Noon or Sunset? Lt. Col. Edd D. Wheeler, USAF Computer Security: The Achilles’ 16 Heel of the Electronic Air Force? Lt. Col. Roger R. Schell, USAF The Viability of Centralized 34 Command and Control (C2) Lt. Col. Phillip K. Heacock, USAF The Airborne Forward Air 38 Controller Future Needs and Opportunities John W. Ellis, Jr. 48 Going Along for the Ride! William G. Holder departments AIR FORCE REVIEW 58 Blue Flag Capt. Thomas J. Norton, USAF IN MY OPINION 69 A New Look at an Old Problem Lt. Col. D. L. Hutchinson, USAF 74 What about the Club? Maj. Barry D. Guyse, USAF Up-or-Out Again: A 80 Skeptic’s View Col. Orin C. Patton, USAF BOOKS AND IDEAS Master at Arms: Clausewitz 83 in Full View Lt. Col. David Maclsaac, USAF World Peace and the Soviet 94 Military Threat Capt. Steven E. Cady, USAF 99 Potpourri 03 THE CONTRIBUTORS )SPECTS FOR THE MANNED BOMBER high noon or Lie u t e n an t Colonel Edd D. Wheeler ITH cancellation of the B-l by the all but imminent. Many believe the clock to administration, the future of the be climbing toward high noon for bomber manned bomber is uncertain. The advocates. Others believe, however, every- bomber once enjoyed a position of un- thing is settled about the decision except assailable supremacy among strategic the dust. In their eyes, the bomber is flying forces. It was the strategic force. Roman- toward its sunset. ticized names such as Flying Fortress and Stratofortress were indicative of the Controversial Texture glamor and formidability attached to the aircraft. That has all changed, of course. The texture of discussion on manned The bomber has been brought down to bombers has usually been controversial earth. There are those who even seriously and marked by uncertainty. For example, question its continued usefulness as an it has been more than 30 years since the instrument of twentieth-century warfare. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey attempted I believe that the manned bomber can to gauge the effects of World War II continue to play a valuable part in the bombing on Germany, but scholars are projection of modern air power. But that still digging through the rubble. The case role will be somewhat diminished, at any for strategic bombing was hardly helped rate different from years past. The change by overstated claims in behalf of air power will require accommodation in perceptions during the immediate postwar period. One by both military and civilian defense authority even declared that a central planners. The Air Force, commanded reason for storming Fortress Europe by largely by men with venerable — and land was to divert German manpower venerated — flight experience, will have to from the Luftwaffe.1 Still, it is incon- accustom itself to an environment in testable that Allied bombing, through the which manned flight is no longer pre- vehicle of the manned bomber, was a eminent insofar as strategic air power is major influence both in shortening the war concerned. Civilian planners also must and winning it. adapt. They should come increasingly to Notwithstanding its combat achieve- recognize that, though there are missions ments, the manned bomber has later for which the bomber may no longer be encountered heavy flak. There was the ideally suited, there are other missions to matter of Vietnam, the evidence on which which it brings impressive and needed is predictably disputed. A Rand analyst, capabilities. while acknowledging the intentionally The change in perceptions and expec- limited scope of U.S. bombing, claims that tations may be attended by a sense of it not only failed to make a dent in the anxiety, particularly for military leaders. North Vietnamese economy but also failed Advocates of the manned bomber have in its avowed objective of promoting a lost an important round with the exit, at negotiated settlement.2 Architects of the least for now, of the B-l. At best they seem Linebacker II series later in the conflict to be fighting toward a draw. Criticism would render, as might be expected, a may intensify. Detractors of the bomber, different interpretation of the efficacy of fortified by collapse of the B-l program, bombing. could line the streets. A final decision is Once the dominant component of our still pending as to whether at some point in national military power, the bomber now the near future a new bomber will be built. plays a more modest role. “ Today,” A shoot-out of sorts on this issue appears according to McGeorge Bundy, “ it is a 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW supplementary guarantee against the countering through use of defensive madness of an attempted surprise attack, avionics. Even so, it must be conceded that a diversifier that helps frustrate any bombers will not typically outperform Strangelove among Soviet planners.”3 As interceptor systems with respect to veloc- previously noted, there are those who ity. That concession made, its meaning or would be less kind in their assessment of relevance remains far from clear. the bomber’s decreased importance. For Speed alone, then, is not the strongest of instance, many critics of the B-l argued, points for the bomber, at least not for rather spuriously, I believe, that not only present subsonic bombers. Even the B-l, was the program too expensive but that with its capacity for supersonic “dash,” bombers have become altogether obsolete, would not have done much better in terms twentieth-century dinosaurs. of outdistancing the most modern of Arguments against the bomber are those Soviet fighters which, however for- usually articulated in terms of low capa- tuitously, happened to achieve inter- bilities and high costs. That is, the ception. No aircraft, of course, will simply bomber is seen as slow, vulnerable, outaccelerate hostile missiles; though, a expensive, and, in a familiar phrase, not bomber in supersonic flight would present cost-effective. Let us examine these a much more difficult target than a slower criticisms in the larger context, without one against antiaircraft artillery fire. which the criticisms themselves lose much But the issue of speed is not one- meaning. dimensional. It transcends mere Mach number. Enter the analyst, who would be The Track Record: quick, sometimes too quick for those rooted Laps Behind and Those Ahead in operations, to point out that speed should be measured in terms of getting How fast is slow? The typical B-52 pilot away from the perhaps threatened home might answer that it is 520 knots (600 base as well as getting into the threatening mph); the typical analyst, that it depends; target area. Aircraft caught on the ground the typical critic, that it does not matter. are like mallards on the moat, relatively Assuming that the last answer is not the easy prey. most helpful one, what of the other two In that air bases may be subject to attack responses? by intercontinental ballistic missiles Six hundred miles per hour is not a (ICBMs) on notice of less than 30 minutes terribly impressive performance charac- and by submarine-launched ballistic teristic.