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Battle of Khafji” Air Power Effectiveness in the Desert Volume 1(U)

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Battle of Khafji” Air Power Effectiveness in the Desert Volume 1(U) Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency “Battle of Khafji” Air Power Effectiveness In The Desert Volume 1(U) STUDY DIRECTOR: MAJOR DANIEL R. CLEVENGER U.S. AIR FORCE STUDY REPORT U.S. AIR FORCE July 1996 Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency Force Application Division 30521 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 INTRODUCTION 2 BEFORE THE BATTLE 7 THE AIR CAMPAIGN STARTS 11 IRAQI ADVANCE 13 AIR INTERDICTION 18 AIR POWER RESPONSE 19 WITHDRAW UNDER FIRE 23 AFTERMATH OF KHAFJI 24 EFFECTS OF THE GULF WAR AIR CAMPAIGN ON GROUND FORCES 25 THE ATTRITION REQUIREMENT AND THE GO AWAY BRIGADE 28 DIFFICULTIES WITH BDA 31 POSTMORTEM 34 CONCLUSION 36 APPENDIX A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON KHAFJI: AIR POWER VS TROOPS 41 APPENDIX B INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL (RET) CHARLES HORNER, USAF 56 APPENDIX C INTERVIEW WITH MAJ GENERAL (RET) THOMAS OLSEN, USAF 63 APPENDIX D INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL DAVE DEPTULA, USAF 72 APPENDIX E INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR MICHAEL EDWARDS, USAF 78 APPENDIX F INTERVIEW WITH CAPTAIN ROB GIVENS, USAF 83 APPENDIX G INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR PAUL HAVEL, USAF 90 APPENDIX H INTERVIEW WITH CAPTAIN CHARLES STONER, USAF 96 APPENDIX I INTERVIEW WITH TSGT WILLIAM ALEX, USAF 102 APPENDIX J INTERVIEW WITH TSGT RON JOHNSON, USAF 107 APPENDIX K INTERVIEW WITH TSGT KEN TAYLOR, USAF 110 APPENDIX L INTERVIEW WITH TSGT CLAY WATSON, USAF 119 APPENDIX M INTERVIEW WITH SSGT BRAD SIMS, USAF 123 APPENDIX N INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR JIM BRADEN, USMC 127 ACRONYMS 140 BIBLIOGRAPHY 143 DISTRIBUTION 149 TABLE OF FIGURES FIGURE 1: KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS (KTO) 2 FIGURE 2: OPERATION DESERT STORM AIRCRAFT BASES 10 FIGURE 3: THE KHAFJI BATTLEFIELD 13 FIGURE 4: BOEING/GRUMMAN E-8A JSTARS 20 FIGURE 5: KILLBOX GRID OF KUWAIT AND SOUTHERN IRAQ 21 FIGURE 6: 30 MILE BOX AROUND THE WASHINGTON BELTWAY 22 FIGURE 7: MECHANIZED DIVISION VEHICULAR STRENGTH 29 FIGURE 8: TANK DIVISION VEHICULAR STRENGTH 30 FIGURE 9: BATTLEFIELD ATTRITION, 23 FEB. 1991 34 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Gulf Lesson One is the value of air power. President George Bush1 On the night of 29 January, 1991 elements of an Iraqi Corps attacked forward deployed units from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the US Marines south of the Saudi Arabian/Kuwaiti border. The Iraqis seized the Saudi town of Al Khafji before being stopped by coalition air power and ground units. Saudi Arabian National Guard forces, reinforced with Qatari tanks, and supported with coalition air power reclaimed the town on the 31st of January. Coalition air interdiction efforts conducted inside of Kuwait prevented the Iraqi reinforcements from ever reaching Khafji, allowing the in-place coalition ground forces to deal with the Iraqi offensive. Coalition air supremacy permitted air power to execute perhaps the ultimate flanking maneuver in the third dimension and enveloped Iraqi follow-on reinforcements from the air. Thus the Iraqi attempt to draw the coalition into a ground war of attrition, at a time of their choosing, failed. CENTCOM retained the initiative, did not have to reposition any coalition ground forces in response, and was able to continue moving coalition ground forces westward for the eventual flanking attack sometimes referred to as the “Great Wheel,” or the “Hail Mary” as General H. Norman Schwarzkopf referred to it. AFSAA is re-creating this battle for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) and the Director of Modeling, Simulation and Analysis (AF/XOM). This battle provides a historical demonstration of air power effectiveness against moving armor in the desert, and will provide a framework for further analysis. Information has been extracted from numerous documents and interviews with actual “Battle of Khafji” combatants. This information is supplemented with the best available intelligence and US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) standard ground force employment and tactics information to provide the higher levels of detail needed for a re-creation in a mission- level model. This document presents initial and unclassified background information on the battle. General information about the conflict, the air campaign, bomb damage assessment (BDA), air power effects on ground forces, and other relevant information is also presented. The additional information will foster a better understanding of the “Battle of Khafji” and general air power effectiveness in the desert. Selected transcripts of interviews conducted for the project, which contain significant information, are included as appendices. Continuing work will re-create battalion and brigade size portions of the battle in a mission-level model, and overall Operation DESERT STORM activity in a campaign level model for analysis purposes. Mission level modeling and simulation will have a real-time virtual capability. This battle re-creation will then provide a historically based framework for analysis of force structures, weapon systems, tactics, surveillance, command and control, and their interactions. The lesson from the “Battle of Khafji” is that air power can be very effective against massed and moving ground forces in the open desert. This in and of itself is not a new lesson, as a review of modern military aviation in warfare has shown. The new twist to this lesson from the “Battle of Khafji,” is that air power can effectively attack these moving ground forces, even when they imagine they are concealed by darkness. Figure 1: KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS (KTO) INTRODUCTION War is a matter of vital importance to the State, the province of life or death, the road to survival or ruin. It is therefore mandatory that it be thoroughly studied. Sun Tzu2 This report is part of an effort on the part of the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency (AFSAA) to re-create the historical Operation DESERT STORM “Battle of Khafji” for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) and the Air Force Director of Modeling, Simulation and Analysis (AF/XOM). The overall objective is to analyze the effectiveness of air power, demonstrated during Operation DESERT STORM, as a combat resource for a warfighting CINC. This is an effort to gain a better understanding of air power effects on fielded ground forces and to provide better calibration for commonly used analysis models since they may not adequately represent and integrate the full range of air power capabilities at present. An added benefit will be an increased virtual modeling and simulation capability for the Air Force. To fully understand the “Battle of Khafji” requires a quick review of Operation DESERT STORM and of the air campaign. In addition, one cannot fully understand the outcome of the “Battle of Khafji” and its implications without an understanding of air power effects in general, and specifically those effects demonstrated in Operation DESERT STORM. The “Battle of Khafji” is a suitable combat operation to analyze for several reasons. It was the first and only ground offensive action initiated by Iraqi forces during Operation DESERT STORM. The offensive involved some of Iraq’s better units, such as the 5th Mechanized Division. Just days before this battle, the air campaign had shifted its focus to attacks on the fielded ground forces in Kuwait. Therefore, most of the Iraqi equipment involved was still intact or undamaged; they were also relatively well supplied, and their morale hadn’t been severely eroded yet. Indeed, one of the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company Officers (ANGLICOs) attached to the Saudi Arabia National Guard unit that reclaimed Khafji, asserted the Iraqis that made it into Khafji were top notch troops who were well supplied with arms, equipment, food and water, and especially anti aircraft artillery (AAA) pieces and ammunition.3 Since the Iraqi units involved were heretofore mostly intact, the study will show the effects of air power on fresh battle ready Iraqi forces on the offensive, and not the effects on a pummeled and beaten force trying to retreat as a study of later actions might have produced. Also, air power was given the major role in this battle as CENTCOM was busy redeploying forces in preparation for the “Great Wheel” flanking attack, and didn’t want to reposition any coalition ground forces, nor divert any US Army forces from their movement westward. In addition, the Saudi Arabians had a great interest in retaking the town themselves, and their success demonstrated their combat ability and boosted coalition morale. In general, air supremacy assured the coalition uncontested use of the air and denied it to the Iraqis. In-place coalition units consisted of a Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) Brigade reinforced with Qatari tanks, two US Marine battalions of light armored infantry (LAI) and artillery to hold against the initial attacks. Attacking Iraqi elements came from two separate Corps and included one armored division, two mechanized divisions, an infantry division, and special forces. With close air support (CAS), the in-place units held against the attacks, except at Al Khafji. The citizens of Al Khafji had already abandoned the city at the direction of the Saudi government and the city was screened by light forces that withdrew under Iraqi attack. Air interdiction destroyed much of the follow-on Iraqi reinforcements, and totally disrupted the entire operation. Once the Iraqis in Khafji were cut-off from reinforcement, the coalition was able to reclaim Khafji. The failed attempt at Khafji was a turning point in Operation DESERT STORM. Afterward, the Iraqis attempted no other offensive actions and only dug in deeper, dispersed their forces more widely, and otherwise attempted to survive the continuing air strikes. The coalition victory had a positive effect on morale and showed that the “battle-hardened” Iraqis could be defeated. The foundations were laid for greater cooperation between the coalition forces, and valuable lessons were learned allowing better coordination of air and ground power in the coming ground war. The true magnitude of the Iraqi operation was not even realized at that time because the ongoing actions and preparations for the upcoming ground war did not allow sufficient time, or resources to adequately analyze the “Battle of Khafji” at that time.
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