Causation in the Law
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Without Causation, Fraud and Subsequent Loss Are Not Adequate Grounds for Recovery Tom O'connor
Loyola Consumer Law Review Volume 9 | Issue 4 Article 4 1997 Without Causation, Fraud and Subsequent Loss are Not Adequate Grounds for Recovery Tom O'Connor Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons Recommended Citation Tom O'Connor Without Causation, Fraud and Subsequent Loss are Not Adequate Grounds for Recovery, 9 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 309 (1997). Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol9/iss4/4 This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RECENT CA SES Without Causation, Fraud and Subsequent Loss Are Not Adequate Grounds for Recovery by Tom O'Connor In Mark Law v. Medco Research September 1, 1992 should have a new drug was "on track." These Inc., 113 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1997), provided "storm warnings" to articles reported that: (1) Defen- Mark Law ("Plaintiffs") filed a class investors and satisfied the notice dants' supplier of pharmaceuticals, action suit for similarly situated requirement. These articles called Fujisawa, was suing the company investors in Medco Research Inc. Defendants an "overpriced hype which sold Fujisawa the production ("Defendants"), claiming Defen- job" whose stock was bought by facilities for Defendants' drug, and dants defrauded their investors. The "idiots." In reviewing this argu- (2) Fujisawa's production facility United States Court of Appeals for ment, the court noted that these had quality and regulatory problems the Seventh Circuit dismissed the articles were not given credence by in producing a number of its drugs. -
The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: an Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1987 The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines Alan O. Sykes Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Alan O. Sykes, "The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines," 101 Harvard Law Review 563 (1987). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. VOLUME 101 JANUARY 1988 NUMBER 3 HARVARD LAW REVIEW1 ARTICLES THE BOUNDARIES OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT RULE AND RELATED LEGAL DOCTRINES Alan 0. Sykes* 441TICARIOUS liability" may be defined as the imposition of lia- V bility upon one party for a wrong committed by another party.1 One of its most common forms is the imposition of liability on an employer for the wrong of an employee or agent. The imposition of vicarious liability usually depends in part upon the nature of the activity in which the wrong arises. For example, if an employee (or "servant") commits a tort within the ordinary course of business, the employer (or "master") normally incurs vicarious lia- bility under principles of respondeat superior. If the tort arises outside the "scope of employment," however, the employer does not incur liability, absent special circumstances. -
Criminal Law--Conspiracy and the Felony Murder Doctrine in Kentucky J
Kentucky Law Journal Volume 29 | Issue 1 Article 14 1940 Criminal Law--Conspiracy and the Felony Murder Doctrine in Kentucky J. Wirt Turner Jr. University of Kentucky Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. Recommended Citation Turner, J. Wirt Jr. (1940) "Criminal Law--Conspiracy and the Felony Murder Doctrine in Kentucky," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 29 : Iss. 1 , Article 14. Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol29/iss1/14 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL In conclusion, it is submitted that the felony murder doctrine in Kentucky is based on the same principles as the negligent murder doctrine, since to convict a defendant of murder for a death occuring during the commission of a felony there must first be a felony dangerous to life and, secondly, the death of the victim must be the necessary or natural consequence of the felony. J. GRiANVILLE CLARK CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY AND THE FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE IN KENTUCKY* Defendant was indicted jointly with two others for the crime of wilful murder by setting fire to a house and burning a child to death. The evidence showed that defendant was not near enough to aid and abet in the crime. -
Vicarious Liability and Liability for the Actions of Others II
InDret Vicarious Liability and Liability for the Actions of Others II Pablo Salvador Coderch Professor of Law Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona (Spain) [email protected] Carlos Ignacio Gómez Ligüerre Assistant Professor of Law Universitat Internacional de Catalunya, Barcelona (Spain) [email protected] July 2002 www.indret.com InDret 03/2002 Pablo Salvador and Carlos Gómez Summary 1. Vicarious liability or liability for the actions of others as a mean of overcoming the principle of individual liability 2. Civil and Criminal Rules governing Civil liability for the actions of others 2.1. Reasons for the existence of two sets of rules that are almost identical, one in section 1903 of the Civil Code and the other in section 120 of the Criminal Code 2.2. Liability due to personal dependency: parents and tutors 2.3. Liability stemming from professional dependency: employers and school owners and teachers a) Relationship of Dependency b) Performance of their liabilities and services c) Reimbursement in favor of the principal 3. From Dependency to Control 4. Bibliography 2 InDret 03/2002 Pablo Salvador and Carlos Gómez Abstract The two traditional branches that regulate civil liability in Spain are the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 (sections 1902, 1903 and 1904) and the Spanish Criminal Code of 1995 (section 120), they determine the harm caused by actions or omissions that are neither crimes nor misdemeanors and those deemed to be, respectively. This work analyzes vicarious liability or liability for the actions of others as one of the legal mechanisms anticipated to overcome civil liability once it has been determined that the principle of individual liability –due to negligence or strict liability– is impractical given the limited solvency of the majority of individuals responsible for a damage. -
Restatement Redux
Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 48 Issue 6 Issue 6 - November 1995 Article 3 11-1995 Restatement Redux Anita Bernstein Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Torts Commons Recommended Citation Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 Vanderbilt Law Review 1663 (1995) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol48/iss6/3 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BOOK REVIEW Restatement Redux PRODUCT LIABILITY. By Jane Stapleton.* Butterworths, 1994. Pp. xxvii, 384, index. $50.00 Reviewed by Anita Bernstein** I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1664 II. THE VALUE OF COMMON-LAw RESTATEMENT: A RETROSPECTIVE .............................................................. 1666 A. The Restatement at Century's End ........................ 1667 1. The First Problem of Variation .................. 1669 2. The Second Problem of Variation .............. 1671 B. Some Benefits of Restatement ................................ 1675 III. CAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY BE RESTATED? A THREE- QUESTION FRAMEWORK ..................................................... 1677 A. What is the Problem? ............................................. 1678 B. To Whom is the Solution Addressed? ......... ........ ... 1683 C. Do Normative PrinciplesGuide -
Conversations with Professor Peter Frederic Cane by Lesley Dingle1 and Daniel Bates2
Conversations with Professor Peter Frederic Cane by Lesley Dingle1 and Daniel Bates2 10th July 2012 This is the fourth interview for the Eminent Scholars Archive with an incumbent of the Arthur Goodhart Visiting Professor of Legal Science. Peter Cane is professor at the John Fleming Centre for Advancement of Legal Research at the Australian National University, Canberra. He holds the Goodhart chair jointly with his wife Professor Jane Stapleton. Interviewer: Lesley Dingle, her questions and topics are in bold type Professor Cane’s answers are in normal type. Comments added by LD, in italics. All footnotes added by LD. 1. Professor Cane, normally at this juncture I would be interviewing the incumbent Goodhart Professor as a follow up to a first interview, and would concentrate on how the time during the tenure had transpired. In your case, we are faced with an interesting circumstance, because the first interview was with Professor Stapleton. So, here we are, at the end of the academic year but, instead of just a backward glance, I hope we can spend a good deal of the interview looking at your early career, as well as some reflections of your time here. You and Professor Stapleton constitute the fourth holder of the Professorship, but you are the fifth incumbent to be interviewed. So, briefly, could we look at your early career, how it developed, and then come to the Goodhart material and perhaps at the end, very broadly, some aspects of your personal research interests? You were born in Maitland in New South Wales in 1950. Correct. -
Dressler Criminal Law Outline
DRESSLER CRIMINAL LAW OUTLINE I. INTRODUCTORY POINTS A. Sources of Criminal Law. 1. Common Law. 2. Statutes Derived from Common Law. 3. Model Penal Code. 4. (Bill of Rights) B. Criminal Law v. Civil Law 1. Criminal a. Defendant is punished (incarcerated) b. The criminal conviction itself says defendant is a moral wrongdoer. It is a condemnation by the community/ “a morality play.” → (Moral blameworthiness) • Usually about things you are not supposed to do as opposed to things you must do • 2. Civil a. Defendant pays victim. (compensation) b. Defendant is not morally stigmatized. (tort claims) C. Theories of Punishment. 1. Retributivism “Is it more about desert” a. People should get what they deserve. b. Humans have free will. If they choose to do wrong, it is appropriate to punish them. c. Looks backwards. Only punishes to the extent of the wrongdoing. d. Justice for the victim • The moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him or her which is a necessary condition of punishment • Wouldn’t want to punish someone mentally ill bc they are not morally culpable • Rests on moral culpability 2. Utilitarianism – “What good does it do” • Focuses on what punishing that particular person accomplishes a. All forms of pain are bad. Punishment is not good, but neither is crime. Punishment is proper if imposition of pain will reduce the likelihood of future crimes. b. Punishment is justified in so far as it produces some net social benefit. Forward Looking c. Forms of utilitarianism. i. General deterrence: ● convince the general community to avoid criminal conduct in the future ii. -
Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton Alex Kreit [email protected]
American University Law Review Volume 57 | Issue 3 Article 2 2008 Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton Alex Kreit [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons Recommended Citation Kreit, Alex. “Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton.” American University Law Review 57, no.3 (February, 2008): 585-639. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton Abstract This article considers what limits the constitution places on holding someone criminally liable for another's conduct. While vicarious criminal liability is often criticized, there is no doubt that it is constitutionally permissible as a general matter. Under the long-standing felony murder doctrine, for example, if A and B rob a bank and B shoots and kills a security guard, A can be held criminally liable for the murder. What if, however, A was not involved in the robbery but instead had a completely separate conspiracy with B to distribute cocaine? What relationship, if any, does the constitution require between A's conduct and B's crimes in order to hold A liable for them? It is clear A could not be punished for B's crimes simply because they are friends. -
§ 3.2 Causation: the Requirements for Holding an Actor Accountable for a Result 125
122 Chapter 3. Objective Requirements of an Offense a circumstance, purpose requires only that one the same set out for the 10 In other req[uir·ement of purpose req:uin:ment of knowledge. classified as results, but Thus, if "obstructs" is inter~ § 3.2 Causation: The Requirements for Holding an for example, the state need ouly Actor Accountable for a Result satisfy the special requirements of obstruction would not have occurred § 3.2.1 Requirements of Causation: Factual and Proximate Cause if "obstructs" is viewed as embodying Factual ("but-for") cause: scientific inquiry result element, then the state must prove Alternative sufficient-cause test responsible for bringing about a resulting Proximate (legal) cause: normative inquiry Proximity examples Proposed definitions seem consistent with the spirit and Foreseeability as factor in determining proximate cause Penal Code scheme. Define "conduct" elements Vagueness in the proximate-cause standard actual physical acts of the actor. Define all char- § 3.2.2 Causing Another Person to Cause a Result to be separate "circumsta ements; similarly, Intervening actor's volitional act breaks chain by the conduct should be de separate "result" Influencing intervening actor's exercise of volition "result" elements to be any e in the surrounding Continuum of volition brought about by the offend nduct, that the offense Causing another's crime as form of complicity occur. As with conduct, define aracteristics of a result to § 3.2.3 Multiple Causes "circumstance" dements. 13 Imputing co-criminal's causal conduct mustration: "obstructing an offense of "obstructing lie highway" would essentially "Combined effect" analysis a highway" proof that the actor "engage conduct that caused the obstruc- Dangers of "combined effect" of a public highway." "Obst on" would be a result element; the Serial vs. -
The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason Jens David Ohlin
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 98 Article 4 Issue 1 Fall Fall 2007 Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason Jens David Ohlin Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation Jens David Ohlin, Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 147 (2007-2008) This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 0091-4169/07/9801-0147 THE JOURNALOF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 98, No. I Copyright 0 2008 by Northwestern University, Schoolof Law Printed in U.S.A. GROUP THINK: THE LAW OF CONSPIRACY AND COLLECTIVE REASON JENS DAVID OHLIN* Although vicarious liability for the acts of co-conspirators is firmly entrenched in federal courts, no adequate theory explains how the act and intention of one conspiratorcan be attributed to another, simply by virtue of their criminal agreement. This Article argues that the most promising avenue for solving the Pinkerton paradox is an appeal to the collective intention of the conspiratorialgroup to commit the crime. Unfortunately, misplaced skepticism about the notion of a "group will" has prevented criminal scholars from embracing the notion of a conspiracy's collective intention to commit a crime. However, positing group intentions requires only that the criminal law recognize the rational relationships between individuals who decide to collectivize reason to pursue a common criminal goal; no burdensome theory of corporate animals with unified minds is required. -
Causation and Harm in Data Breach Litigation
Causation and Harm In Data Breach Litigation Demonstrating that a data breach has resulted in an injury-in-fact can be difficult, because it is not always clear what has happened or will happen with the stolen data. by Brian Ellman and Jee-Yeon Lehmann; Analysis Group, Inc. Originally published in Cybersecurity Law & Strategy Brian Ellman Jee-Yeon Lehmann Data breaches can have substantial adverse impacts on firms, not only in the form of negative publicity or harm to a company’s brand and revenues, but through liti- gation that may result. A key point of contention in data breach litigation has been whether plaintiffs have met the injury-in-fact standing requirement of Article III of the Constitution. Demonstrating that a data breach has resulted in an injury-in-fact can be difficult, because it is not always clear what has happened or will happen with the stolen data. For example, suppose hackers gained access to consumers’ personal information but the information has not yet been misused. In that case, the breach will not have resulted in actual economic harm to the consumers even though risk for future harm from the breach may remain. As a result of this dynamic, plaintiffs in data breach litigation typ- ically allege harm in terms of something that could happen (i.e., an increased risk of future injury) rather than something that did happen. The determination of standing under Article III also hinges on whether the pres- ent or future alleged harm was caused by the data breach in question, as opposed to another independent event or factor. -
Professor Barbara Jane Stapleton
Jane Stapleton citation Chancellor, it gives me great pleasure to present to you Barbara Jane Stapleton. The honorary degree of Doctor of Laws (honoris causa) is being awarded to Professor Jane Stapleton in acknowledgement of her distinguished service to the law and the legal profession in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Professor Stapleton is internationally regarded for her expertise in the fields of tort and personal injury law. She has pursued this work at the highest level across four decades, including academic and leadership roles, research and consultancies on complex cases within her field. Born in Sydney in 1952, Professor Stapleton was initially educated in science – she earned a Bachelor of Science with First Class Honours from the University of New South Wales, and a PhD in Chemistry at the University of Adelaide. Soon after, Jane made a critical decision to change her career to law. She received a Bachelor of Laws with First Class Honours and received the University Medal from the Australian National University. She went on to complete a D.Phil in Law at the University of Oxford, Balliol College – this was to be her second of three doctorates, many years later receiving a Doctor of Civil Law from the University of Oxford. Professor Stapleton was admitted as a Barrister of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 1981, and to the High Court of Australia in 1984. In the 1980s and '90s she held various academic positions with the University of Sydney Law School, Trinity College, and Balliol College, Oxford. By 1996 she had been made Reader in Law at the University of Oxford.