AUGUST 1996

FM 100-6 Information Operations

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY r MiIitaryReweew Headquarters, Department of the Amy Lieutenant General Prepared by L.Cl. tbkier US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE VOLUME IJ(XVl — November-December 1996, NO 6 Commandant,USACGSC Prol,,,,or ,1 BUIIW< 100-96 -,1 .2 Brigadier General CONTENTS Joseph R. Inge W ~~rn~atiafl~,USACGSG 2 Information Operations FM 100-6: Information Operations Milltasy Retiew Staff 3 by Colonel Michael D. Starry, US Arm~ and LieutenantColun@lGeorgeL Humphries Eo%x in Chief Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Arneson Jr., US Army Lieutenant Coiord MichaelL Roddin 16 Information Operations on the Nontraditional ManagingEditor Battlefield Qptain HEWWE.Bush by Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. MurphB US Army Ed@r,LatinAmerwanEd- 19 Joint STARS: A Force XXI Enabler PhiliipR. ~Wki Production Editor by Lieutenant General Ronald L. Watts, US Army Retired J-STARS: The Future of Ground Warfare D&;a;yty by Major Jeftiey C. A/fie( US Air Force

Debra Fowkx llurbin 25 The Art and Science of Battlefield Visualization Manuscnjx Editor by Lieutenant Colonel David L. Simpson, US Arm~ Char’%s A. Mattinsun ill and Lieutenant Colonel Richard E Brown, US Army Reserve Art andDesign BMe L Hammond 30 Leadership Manuscr@VEditorii#AssMint Mf3rriafn Clark 31 Navigating the Fog of Technological Change Subsc@ionManager by Captain Christopher D. Kolenda, US Army Patricia L. Wilson 41 Reflections on Leadership S@retaly by Lieutenant Colonel Joel A. Buck, US Army

Consulting Editors 45 A Different Twist: Nonrational Views of Leadership Colonel14ayrmmdoG. da Silva IWO by Lieutenant Colonel Donald H. Homer Jr., US Army -%0 ArmH E?ra#an Edition CObfldvictort). Gu2man &it&rn *Y, t4(sjm3n04mefJ00fI Edlfton 51 Debugging the Battlefield: Winning the War Lieutenant Cobriel Hemtin Rw Patron &g90finaArmy, tdispano4rwn@n EditlL3n Against Insect Bites and Related Diseases by Major Jeffrey M. Gambel, US Army

58 Fort Leavenworth Update 59 Military Review—75 Years of Service to the US Army # JOEL f3-HUDf3QN by Jerold E. Brown AdmkriafratiwAaMant to the sacre&uyOffheAmryoz3dl Mh’fary Rewetis MbJzhrt is to prov’Mea forumfor 67 CAS3: Fifteen Years Later the open exchange of ideas on milttary affairs to fo- by Colonel Albert E. Bryant, US ArmK and Joan Dietrich Silver cus on cmc%pts, doctrineand warfrghting atthetac- tic#and @educ 2!%l%?2%K-7e%%%%!x 71 PW96: An Eagle’s Wew W- mkti the CombinedArms&rttet by Colonel Robed E. Ryals, US Air Force andCcfnmwrdand GeneralStaffCoOege. fw~ Btifefw~m-w,gw=~g mW@W ~ . f#3wfiMwrmfion,but tr viewsexpreseed herein 77 Almanac: aretfmseoftfIe a@ors, notthe OepaftmentofDe- fenseor U9elernents.Thecw-wt does notneces- The Juggler and the Supreme Commander &ijy reftect the MMat US Army Iii VUdoes by Colonel Cole C. Klngseed, US Army r -wzww&?zts:%:”s sibk for the accuracy and source documentation 81 Insights: ofmaterialthey pwvide. iWfifagI H43vAw reserves therighttoedit~. SaaiaOfoffickddkmbutmls Force XXI: Getting it Right one par ?0 offkm? far majorcommands,IX??PS,dhm by Major David J. Lemelin, US Army eiom rrtajofstaff agencies, gwrraoncommanda, ArmyacMb,R@wecommsmkend@fef_. marrdorganizatiorwonaper280frk19refQrmadi@ 84 Review Essay: cornmande,hc@kdsandunif9 andonetofiifor Activeand Fwerve brii and ba~Iis4g Colin L Powell: Leader rma=@wfWdgwteoffk=@ by Colonel James E. Swatiz, US Army Reserve @8wL$a@aMemmkrc$lm MkYo- 86 Letters W%qvHe@ew(us IS$NW!8-4148)(USPS t23- $30)IsfwbkrWdbimoMtyfor$18US#@0F~ WKf 87 Book Reviews contemporary readings for the professional !!x.%l%%%%#%”&.%4us& all oOic22 %&4%%3%Y’’%%%?2 91 Index January 199&-December 1996 -s -, w Lewew@h, Fm the Editor

This issue of Military Review is a landmark issue, because it is the first one we have produced directly from negatives as opposed to “camera-ready copy.” Our new desktop publishing equipment— to include all software for preparing Military Review for transfer to the Internet-has arrived and is up and running. All refund checks from the Fort Leavenworth Nonappropriated Fund Activity have been mailed to paid subscribers. The decision to eliminate the Fort Leavenworth-based subscription operation was based on providing Military Review to paid subscribers at the least possible cost. While this decision may cause some minor inconvenience, I believe it is in our readership’s best long-term interest. Instructions for continuing a k(ilita~ Review subscription through the Superintendent of Documents were furnished with the refund checks and are available on page 96. The Superintendent of Documents has been receiving subscription applications, so apparently the system is working. Do you have an idea or opinion about where future Army doctrine should be headed? With the recently distributed US Army Field Manual (FM) 100+ Information Oprations, and F’M 100-5, Opratiom, due for a rewrite in 1997, aspiring writers with recent field experience should consider entering Military Review’s 1997 Writing Contest, which features both of these publications as our theme. The three winning manuscripts will be published in Military Reviey and their authors will receive cash prizes of $500 for fmt place, $250 for second and $100 for third place. See our inside back cover for details! Military Review’s 75th Anniversary edition production is well under way, and we fully expect it to appear no later than February, which will mark the journal’s ofllcial 75th anniversary. It will be a collector’s item, and the USACGSC Alumni Association has expressed an interest in offering single issues at a cost to be determined. Watch this column for more information. Somewhat regrettably, I will no longer be the editor in chief when the 75th Anniversary edition is published. I have been reassigned as the director for Defense Information in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, with a reporting date of 21 October—long before this issue is distributed. Until my successor is named, Lieutenant Colonels George Humphnes and Mike Roddin will beat the helm, and I have full confidence they—indeed, the entire Military Review staff-will continue to serve you, the reader, to the best of their combined abilities. I thank you and them for the opportunisty to serve as Military Review’s 40th editor in chief.

Colonel Richard M. Brtiges Editor in Chief, August 1995 to October 1996 Wfiting Contest Do you have an idea or opinion about where future Army doctrine should be headed? With the new US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations, on the street, and FM 1oo-5, Opera[ions, due for a rewrite in 1997, aspiring writers with recent field experience should consider entering Mili[ay Review’s1997 Writing Contest. The three winning manuscripts will be published in Military Review, and their authors will receive cash prizes of $500 for first place, $250 for second and $100 for third place. Entries should focus on new ideas about battle command and future operations or the impact of new technologies, concepts and doctrine on the tactical and operational levels of war. Manuscripts should also specifically address some aspect of either FM 100-5 or FM 100-6. Entries that do not meet contest theme or submission parameters will be returned without consideration. Deadline for submission of manuscripts is 1 July 1997. Al contest manuscripts will be considered for publication, provided they are original and have not been previously offered elsewhere for publication. Manuscripts should range from 2,000 to 3,000 words and be typed and double-spaced. A Milituy Reuiew writer’s guide is available upon request. Send inquiries or entries to: Milituy Reuiew, US Army Command and General Staff College, 290 Grant Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254, or call Mrs. Pat Wilson at (913) 684-9327 or DSN 552- 9327for additional information. Coming Next:

The Army and Society Leadership Strategy Doctrine Development Operational Art Training and Thctics

LieutenantColonelCharlesW.Ame80n Jr., US Army

HE UNITED STAI’ESand its allies unveiled ‘1’a radicallynew form of wark in the Persian mwgding in ‘“ ‘imtf??@ Gulf in 1991. By exploiting knowledge, the coali- &yond &e lkuwi@?e-esmore than tion force devastated Iraq’s formidable military ma- jWaikckJngan advemuy% ‘ chine, astonished the world, confounded defense powWhi&?pmtectingyour ~-; critics, surptised itself and quite possibly “changed an awa.rvnm OJ and sendivity lb, non- .. the standards for performance of US forces in tiukt@y soum inf~. Nonmilitary armed conflict.” ] This article outlines US Army sources can provkle tictical-kvel information information operations (IO) doctrine and how it en- in near real b“meto worklwtie audiences ables multidimensional operations. It also profiles with the potential of profoundly the recently released US Army Field Manual (FM) influencing operab”ons. 100-6, /formation 0per(~~i~~~l,~40cttine that is relevant to today’s multidimensional operations as well as future Force XXI operations. IO doctrine describes the importance of informa- all far superior to what existed previously.2 tion and how to win the information war today and In Operation Deser? Storm, General H. Norman in the future. FM 100-6 identifies information as an Schwarzkopf could observe in near real time, orient essential enabler of military combat power at the in minutes, decide in hours and act the same day. strategic, operational and tactical levels. It discusses Today, emerging information age technologies are how information age technologies can multiply nwolutionizing the battlefield. In the not-toodistant leaders’ and soldiers’ talents and potential, allowing future, the Army will be confronted by a wide array them to quickly defeat an opponent in a joint, com- of new and potential adversaries and unknown dan- bined, multinational or interagency operation. IO gers as war!lghting technologies, including weap- provides the framework for an integrated approach ons of mass destruction, proliferate worldwide. The to gaining and maintaining information the modem competition can acquire new technology and ad- soldier needs to fight and win, while denying that vanced weapons at unprecedented speeds. same information to a current or potential opponent. Experiences in the Persian Gulf give us a glimpse of the power of information for the Army: “On 16 Warfare’s Evolving Nature February 1991, elements of the 3d An-nod Division As long as war has been waged, information has (AD) encountered the Iraqi Republican Guards’ been key. Knowing the battlefield, controlling vaunted Tawakalna Mechanized Infantry and Medi - forces and informing leadership are challenges na ADs. Advancing through a sand storm using today’s commanders have always faced. Leaders in global positioning system (GPS) locators and thermal agrarian age armies gathered data by human ob- sights on their M 1A 1 tanks, the Americans spotted servation. It took weeks to get reports, months to a line of dug-in vehicles 3,000 meters away. Match- decide on a plan and a season to execute the plan. ing his position to that of the enemy’s that had been During the US Civil War, commanders began us- passed electronically, the company commander of ing industrial age technology, such m the telegraph, the lead unit determined he had found the Tawa.kalna to gather and pass information. By World War II, AD. He ordered his platoons on line and opened fk. the wireless radio wm prominent. Theaters were Secondary explosions of ammunition quickly con- linked by undersea cables and short-wave radios— firmed the nature of the targets. In minutes, a single

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 3 US tank company annihilated an entrenched enemy ess, integrate, decide and act on that information; fonx ten times its size, destroying 144 pieces of and attack their potential adversary’s ability to equipment without taking a single casualty.”3 That sense, process, integrate, decide and act on that engagement was primarily characterized by the use, same information. manipulation and availability of information and il- Such a framework’s effectiveness will depend on lustrates the kind of synergy that new technology, our ability to enable and protect friendly informa- coupled with improved persomel and training, pro- tion and INFOSYS, while exploiting, denying or at- vides even at ground combat’s lower levels. tacking the enemy’s C2 capability. The IO concept Automated information systems (INFOSYS) integrates three fundamental components: greatly increa..e our opportunities to manipulate op- � Relevant information and intelligence (RII). ponents. The success of our keystone doctrine, FM � Effective INFOSYS. 100-5, Operations, is largely due to integrating � A combination of C2 warfare (C2W+civil commercial electronic technology into military re- affairs (CA) and public affairs (PA) operations fo- search and development. In addition to the video cused on gaining information dominance for the game images seen on television during the Gulf commander. War, this equipment includes: F?vI 100-6 defines information as “an essential � Portable computers that help manage every- foundation of knowledge-based warfare.”5 The FM thing from intelligence data to logistics information. states that knowledge-based warfare will help com- � Communications that tie together the com- manders more effectively coordinate, integrate and mand and control (C2) network. synchronize battlefield functions. “To gain the rela- � Locators tied to GPS satellites. tive advantage of position (maneuver) and mmsing � Apache helicopter Hellfire missile laser- of effects (firepower), commanders must act while guidance systems. information is relevant and before the adversary can � Sofiware that keeps computers running.~ react. Targeting an adversary’s information flow to The theory that information is a tool with the influence his perception of the situation or prevent power of combat weaponry is now a demonstrated him from having or using relevant information con- reality. We have entered an era where information tributes directly to decisive operations. As the com- dominance is essential to military operations. For mander targets the adversary’s INFOSYS, he pro- this reason, and as a result of recent conflicts, the tects his own. Realizing that absolute and sustained Army realizes it has entered an era when winning dominance of the information environment is not the battlefield information war has become increas- possible, commanders seek to achieve information ingly essential to successful combat operations. dominance at the right place, the right time and in Thus, winning the information war has become one the right circumstances. They seek information of the Army’s five long-range modernization objec- dominance that defines how the adversary sees the tives for land-force dominance. battlespace, thus creating the opportunity to seize the initiative and set the tempo of operations.”6 The Concept and Doctrine FM 100-6 acknowledges that the accuracy, Like any company or corporation, the military lethality and range of modem weapons have forced must perform at least four key functions with re- commanders to disperse their formations, thus de- spect to knowledge: acquire, process, distribute and centralizing control and execution. The manual also protect information, while selectively denying or reminds us that massing the effects of dispersed sys- distributing it to adversaries and./or allies. If we tems depends on accurate and timely information break each of these functions into its components, flow. Information flow disruption or corruption can we can construct a comprehensive framework for negate weapon and system effects. Armies can now knowledge strategy-key to many, if not most, of target information or an adversary’s INFOSYS to tomorrow’s military victories. In 1994, the US alter battlefield chemistry and yield success.’ Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRA- The speed and pervasiveness of microprocessing DOC) began developing an overarching operational and information technology are creating a revolu- concept and follow-on doctrine to articulate the tionary change in military operations and warfare. Army’s role in support of the National Military Targeting information extends beyond the battle- Strategy for information warfare. After nearly two field and involves more than just attacking an ad- years, TRADOC published FM 100-6 in August versary’s information flow while protecting your 1996. The doctrine establishes a framework ena- own—it requires an awareness of, and sensitivity to, bling friendly forces to control available and rele- nonmilitary source information. Nonmilitary vant information; protect their ability to sense, proc- sources can provide tactical-level information in

4 November - December 1996 “ MILITARY REVIEW A target, making up part of an Iraqi radar site, is locked on and destroyed by an INFORMATIONOPERATIONS AH-64 Apache helicopterin the opening strike of Deserl Storm. The Apache’s Hellfire missile can be seen fallingtoward the target in the firsttwo frames.

environment h no~possible, commundem seek to achieve infi%nutio~ dbminunce at the right plhce, the n“ghth“meand in the n“ghtcircumstances. They seek informuti”on dominunce thut dejines how the adversary sees the battlespace, thus creah”ngthe opportunity to seize the inithtive and set the tempo of opendions. 9’ near real time to worldwide audiences with the po- formation technology will revolutionize how tential of profoundly influencing operations. nations, organizations and people interact. Global IO defines the operational situation by generating communications will accelerate and expand collec- understanding, providing context and influencing tive awareness of events, issues and concerns by perceptions. As described in FM 100-6, IO: electronically linking organizations and individuals � Enables and protects friendly INFOSYS. around the world and is characterized by a merging � Synchronizes force application. of civilian and military information networks and � Connects hierarchical and nonhierarchical technologies. systems. Global information environment (GIE). To � Links sensors, shooters and commanders. help conceptualize this expanded operating environ- � Degrades, disrupts or exploits adversary opera- ment, FM 100-6 outlines the GIE and defines it m tions by attacking the adversary’s C2. “all individuals, organizations or systems, most of Units conduct IO across the full range of military which are outside the control of the military or Na- operations: from operations in garrison, through de- tional Command Authorities, that collect, process ployment, to combat operations, to redeployment. and disseminate information to national and intern- IO greatly expands a commander’s battlespace, in- ationalaudiences.”8 cluding interaction with the media, industry, joint The doctrine suggests that “all military operations forces, multinational forces and computer/satellite take place within the GIE, which is both interactive networks worldwide. Within the context of joint and pervasive in its presence and influence. Current and/or multinational operations, the Army’s ability and emerging electronic technologies permit any as- to dominate the information environment has taken pect of a military operation to be made known to on great importance. For example, the Army’s a global audience in near real time and without the force-projection capability is based on accurate and benefit of filters. With emy access to the global or timely information being disseminated rapidly to national information network, suppression or con- key organizations. trol of the spread of information maybe neither fea- sible nor desirable.”9 In Chapter 1, FM 100-6 dis- The Operating Environment cusses some of the adversaries and other FM 100-6 notes that today’s geostrategic envi- non-Department of Defense (DOD) organizations ronment is complex and will be even more complex that can intrude into a commander’s battlespace. in the future. It is commonly predicted that infor- These actors and influences help shape an informa- mation technology will make a thousandfold ad- tion batdespace called the military information en- vance over the next 20 years. Developments in in- vironment (MIE).

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 5 —

GIE and MIE. FM 100-6 defines MIE as an en- we can find effective ways to deal with them ... vironment within the GIE, consisting of INFOSYS so, as soon as the opposite side obtains a set of and organizations-friendly and adversarial, mili- communication equipment of the digitized forces, tary and nonmilitary-that support, enable or si - the former can find their way into the latter’s net- nitlcantly influence a spec~lc military operation. f 0 work to steal a lot of information or send false in- “Adversaries, perhaps supported by nonaligned na- formation to the network.”14 As witnessed in this tions, will seek to gain an advantage in the GIE by report, the threats to the information infrastructure are genuine, worldwide, technically multifaceted and growing. Informah”on dominance is defined FM 100-6’s Chapter 1 outlines the range of as “the degree of information superiority threats, including individuals and groups motivated thut allows the possessor to use INFOSYS by military, political, social, cultural, ethnic, and capabilities h achieve an operah”onul religious or persona.lhdustrial gain. ]5 Threat can advantage in a conflict orb control the come from unauthorized individual users or insiders situutibn in operations short of wa~ whi!e to the most complex national efforts, such m foreign denying those capabilities to the advensary.” intelligence services and adversary militaries. ... Building a knowledge advantage Boundaries between these groups are indistinct, and requires a highly developed sense of whu.t it is often hard to discern the origins of any particu- info--on is required and an ability to lar incident. For example, actions that seem to be munage the use and disseminah”on of tti the work of hackers may actually be the work of a knowledge at the right place and time, foreign intelligence service. ‘b for the desired pupose. FM 100-6 outlines several ways adversaries could influence or attack opposing INFOSYS and services. Attacks can be designed with delayed ef- employing battlespace systems and organizations of fects, such m corrupting a data base or controlling their own. In addition, the media, think tanks, aca- program, or with immediate degrading or physically demic institutions, nongovernmental organizations destructive effects. Regardless, military operations’ (NGOS), international agencies and individuals with overall effectiveness is degraded if the user’s confi- access to the information highway are all potential y dence in the data’s quality is eroded. Spurious data significant players in the GIE. These entities can or false signals could be transmitted to erode confi- ai%ct the strategic and operational direction of mili- dence in the accuracy and effectiveness of critical tary operations before they even begin. Indepen- systems such m GPS.’7 dent of military control, their impact is always situa- Due to increased and worldwide access to our tionally dependent. Their activities may cause an information infrastructure, the globalization of unanticipated or unintentional effect on military op- networked communications creates vulnerabilities. erations.” 11 Threats against computers, computer systems and As technology enables greater numbers of indi- networks vary by the level of hostility (peacetime, viduals, groups, organizations and nation-states to conflict or war), technical capabilities and motiva- be linked to the world through the GIE, these users tion. During the last decade, we have come to can be expected to pursue their own interests by at- understand that threats to all forces, from strategic tempting to manipulate and control information’s to tactical, come from a variety of new and dif- content and flow within the MIE. 12 ferent sources and continually exis~ even during periods of relative peace. The Threat The demand for data and communications is in- The Challenges creasing because today’s style of warfare is heavily Commandefi and national leaders face significant dependent on knowledge and leveraging informat- and interrelated challenges in dealing with and an- ion for a force-multiplying effect. The overwhelm- ticipating the effkcts of the global visibility of op- ing requirement for data makes US forces vulner- erations and rapid changes in information technolo- able to attacks in the information dimension. 13 gy and their impacts in the GIE.’8 Army Chief of A recent article in the Chinese army newspaper, Staff General Dennis J. Reimer sees the challenges Jiefangjun Bao, reported that “digitized forces en- this way: “America’s Army will need soldiers who hance their fighting capacity mainly through are capable of assimilating a rapid flow of informa- changing the way information is transmitted. Bear- tion ... capable of performing diverse missions ing this characteristic of digitized troops in mind, across the spectrum of war and operating in a multi-

6 November - December 1996 “ MILITARY REVIEW lNF0f3hlAm0N0pERAm0NS nationai environment ... comfortable with technol- ogy, culturally aware, a good information processor, adaptable, tenacious under stress and of sound judg- ment.” 1g FM 100-6 discusses a host of significant chal- lenges facing today’s leaders as they operate in a full-dimensional, dynamic environment. Specifi- cally, information security, continuous operations, policy, public opinion, morale, legalities and rules of engagement (ROE) have always challenged lead- ers and soldiers. However, the pervasive and intru- sive nature of today’s GIE and the global visibility of military operations greatly influence a com- mand’s combat power. Information dominance—responding to chal- lenges. Information dominance is defined as “the degree of information superiority that allows the possessor to use INFOSYS and capabilities to Thirteenth+entury soldiersengage in an early form of PSYOP by achieve an operational advantage in a conflict or to bombarding a city with their captives’ heads. control the situation in operations short of war, T&y, C%V opemtions inlegrate while denying those capabilities to the adversary.”2° and synchronize the capabilities of PSYO~ Thus, creating information dominance has two deception, OPSEC and EW. ... Historically, equally important facets: building up and protecting C2W has had a primarily offensive focus friendly information capabilities; and degrading en- (C2+z@ck). Now, greater emphasis is being emy information capabilities. If dominance is pkzced on the defensive side (C2~rotec~. achieved, the commander can gain a knowledge ad- Although successful armies have practiced vantage over the enemy or retain situation control. these Go disciplines since the beginning of Today, commanders can generate a knowledge ad- recorded hiktory, modem warfare, wtih its vantage by using innovative technology and human techniques that permit their force to more readily emphasis on infonnution and INFOSYS, seize or retain the overall initiative and to increase requires a new pempective. its lethality and survivability. Building a knowledge advantage requires a highly developed sense of field visualization and situational awareness tied to what information is required and an ability to man- recent technological C2 system advances. age the use and dissemination of that knowledge at the right place and time, for the desired purpose. The Building Blocks FM 100-6 compares IO to the air power con- IO integrates all aspects of information to sup- cept: A ground commander can enjoy levels of port and enhance combat power’s elements, with knowledge advantage ranging from information the goal of dominating the battlespace at the right supremacy to information parity. An enemy can time and place and with the right weapons or re- also achieve a knowledge advantage at our ex- sources. The term infomtion operations is de- pense. Information dominance can change over fined as “continuous military operations within the space and time and vary by echelon. An Army MIE that enable, enhance and protect the friendly may achieve information dominance at the opera- force’s ability to collect, process and act on infor- tional level but lose it at the tactical level. The no- mation to achieve an advantage across the full tion of information dominance is not new. range of military operations. IO include[s] interact- Throughout history, commanders have sought to ing with the global information environment and leverage the temporary opportunity that comes exploiting or denying an adversary’s information from an information advantage, whether that infor- and decision capabilities.”22 mation comes from terrain knowledge or satellite Unit support for IO activities includes acquiring, imagery.21 FM 1W-6 outlines six responses to the using, pro&ting, managing, exploiting and denying challenges of achieving sufficient information information and INFOSYS. Information activities dominance. These responses range from time- occur within three interrelated IO components— tested informational techniques used by genera- operations, RII and INFOSYS—which operate tions of high-performing units to enhanced battle- within a battlespace established by the MIE, as

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 7 depicted in Figure 1. Army organizations conduct systems and forces that execute 10.”25 Histori- IO activities as part of a dynamic, iterative proc- cally, CZW has had a primarily offensive focus ess to support each component in an integrated, (C2-attack) . Now, greater emphasis is being placed fulldimensional operation.23 C2W, CA and PA are on the defensive side (C2-protect). Although suc- the three operations the Army uses to gain and cessful armies have practiced these two disciplines maintain information dominance and effective C2.24 since the beginning of recorded history, modern C2W o rations. In Chapter 2, FM 100-6 de- warfare, with its emphasis on information and scribes CWF as the joint warllghting application of INFOSYS, requires a new perspective. FM 100-6 information warfare in military operations. C2W’S cites three factors that make CLW considerations aim is to influence, deny information to, degrade or critical today: destroy adversary Cz capabilities while protecting � Continuous, high-volume information flow friendly Cz against such actions. In developing FM dictated by the relationship between modem mili- 100-6, TRADOC leveraged the joint construct for tary technology and military operations. C2W—using the five operational elements found in . Vulnerabilities created by widespread incorpo- Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 3210.03, ration of advanced technology for INFOSYS and Joint C2W Operations—as well as the Army’s rich intelligence. history and experience using these measures in op- . Radical improvements in INFOSYS and intel- erations from World War 11through Operation Des- ligence capabilities resulting from explosive techno- efi Storm. FM 100-6 outlines C2W as the use of logical advances. deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), Today’s MIE complexity and range incrw.se the electronic warh.re (EW), operations security (OP- difllcuky of disrupting an adversary’s C2 capabilities SEC) and physical destruction to attack an adver- with any single attack or combat power application. sary’s C* capabilities, while protecting friendly op- “This places a p~mium upon the effective integra- erations. US Armed Forces have always employed tion and synchronization of fiendly physical de- these capabilities, but they were just recently inte- struction, EW, deception and PSYOP to achieve grated into CZW operations. This integration im- maximum results when launching attacks. Like- proves the friendly targeting process by directing wise, cadul integration and synchronization is re- the power of traditional attack, deception, PSYOP, qukd to fully protect our critical INFOSYS/iitelli- EW and OPSEC at the adversary’s decision cycle, gence architecture from adversary attacks. Wk.bout thus gaining control of the cycle and generating in- complete and thorough integration and synchroniza- formation dominance. tion of the five C~ elements across both C2-attack “Today, C2W operations integrate and synchro- and C2-protec~ operational eflkctiveness will be re- nize the capabilities of PSYO~ deception, OPSEC duced and potential vulnerabilities exposed.”26 and EW to facilitate the application of appropriate CA operations. CA performs an integral IO role by interfacing with critical actors and influences in the GIE, Whether in peace, conflict or war, CA sup- port improves military operation conduc~ combat power consolidation and information dominance. “Although conditions differ across the spectrum of conflict, CA activities establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations among military forces, civil au- thorities and the civilian populace in an AO [area of operations] to facilitate military operations.”27 During Operation Res/ore Democracy, CA activities informed the local populace through the news me- di~ public discussion and PSYOP informational products and programs about the legitimate Haitian government’s re-establishment. This information exchange promoted understanding of, cotildence in and positive perception of measures supporting mil- itary operations. A civil-military operations center (CMOC) can be setup to interact with key actors in the GIE, in-

“.-,, cluding NGOS, private volunteer organizations and Figure1. InformationEnvironments. local authorities. “CA elements support military op-

8 November - December 1996 “ MILITARY REVIEW The news medih serve as a public forum for anulyzing and critiquing military goals, objectives and actions and have a great impact on political, stmtegic and opemtional planning; deciswns; and miwwn success. “The reality of near real-h”me information, processed and tmnsmtied ~ greater speeak and to wtier audiences thun in the past, hus bridged the gap between whut occurs on the ground and the goals and objectives of the National Nlilitmy strategy.... Commandem must be involved in thk IO dimenswn. erations by applying their skills and experience in accomplish the mission. ‘This information also public administration, economics, public facilities, helps soldiers combat the effects of enemy propa- linguistics, cultural affairs and civil information and ganda or misinformation.”s” by collecting information relevant to the CCIR “Commanders ensure that PA operations are syn- [commander’s critical information requirements]. chronized with other combat functions and promote CA personnel have an intricate and important role early coordination of PA, CA and PSYOP functions in providing information during both the intelli- during the planning process. A continual exchange gence cycle and the operational planning cycle.”08 of information must exist during execution as well. PA operations. As discussed earlier, most mili- Although each function has a specific audience, in- tary operations are open to intense public scrutiny. formation will overlap, making it crucial that mes- FM 100-6 notes that national and international news sages are deconflicted and coordinated.”s 1 media play a big role in shaping public opinion. The news media serve as a public forum for analyz- Relevant Information and Intelligence ing and critiquing military goals, objectives and ac- Throughout the history of organized warfare, tions and have a great impact on political, strategic leaders have struggled with how to best capitalize and operational planning; decisions; and mission on available information. The drive to know as success. ‘The reality of near real-time information, much as possible about their own forces’ location, processed and transmitted at greater speeds and to combat effectiveness and current activity and their wider audiences than in the past, has bridged the enemy’s location, disposition, combat effectiveness gap between what occurs on the ground and the and intended actions has been a durable characteris- goals and objectives of the National Milita)y Strate- tic of successful commanders.sz gy. Therefore, the public affairs officer monitors Information is vital to command, because it is the public perceptions and develops and disseminates medium that allows the commander’s decision- clear and objective messages about military opera- execution cycle to function. Information gives di- tions.”z9 Commanders must be involved in this IO rection to the force to help it accomplish its mission. dimension. Relevant information has a direct relationship with For example, commanders can use their own in- the MIE in two important ways: ternal information program to tell soldiers how they � The act of collecting, processing or disseminat- fit in, what is expected of them and how they help ing relevant information is the principal criterion a

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 9 commander applies to include an individual, orga- determining relevance and fusing information.”36 nization or system as part of the MIE. “The integration of INFOSYS-both vertically � It is the product or medium drawn from or used and horizontal y—facilitates tactical and operational by those same players that serves as the 10 basis agility, initiative, depth, synchronization and versa- or currency. tility essential to Army success in joint and com- “The collection, processing and dissemination of bined operations. Global connectivity is essential relevant information is the key to achieving situa- for linking strategic, operational and tactical aspects tional awareness throughout the force, which of IO and the ability to project forces worldwide.”37 INFOSYS support operations globally with com- munications-automation architecture-both space- Command& develop ‘Vechnikaland and terrain-based-and can do so with a minimum tuctical pkms to acquire dial informutibn. of physical repositioning. However, they are config- Info-won can be acquired through unxi to support Cz, whether in a strategic deploy- personnel, technical means, intelligence ment phase or when moving for a tactical attack. collection systems, tactical reportr”ngand “Both military and commercial INFOSYS play im- intelligence or information dimeminatedjhm portant roles in this architectum.”38 other DOD or non40D agencies at Today, through Force XXI experiments, the operational, stnategic or natr”omdlevels. Army is beginning to digitize the battlefield by ap- Collectin of information about advemaries plying technologies that integrate C2 so it flows and the envtinmeti is munaged thnwgh across each level of operation or war. “The migra- the MI collection cycle.” tion of the current Army Command and Control System (ACCS) to the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) incorporates a common Cz oper- creates the opportunity for unity of effort toward ating environment at all echelons. This integration mission accomplishment. The commander operates of modern INFOSYS with our tactical units con- within the GIE, adjusting his MIE to enhance his tinues to enhance their connectivity, decision mak- situational awareness as appropriate for the opera- ing and ultimately, lethality, survivability and the tion at hand.”33 ability to control operations tempo. Advanced The commander focuses on RII requirements. weapon systems and sensor technologies baxd on His operational requirements dictate the CCIR, interoperability, digitization and spectrum suprem- which dictate RII collection efforts. “To be effec- acy will contribute directly to improved effective- tive, the unit’s intelligence cycle must be managed ness of the force.”s9 to provide information based on the priorities in the concept of operations. A key to successful IO is an Fundamental Information Activities accurate IPB [intelligence preparation of the battle- Former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. field] focused on the MIE. During combat opera- Sullivan said that information delivered quickly and tions, intelligence analysts must continually perform accurately can create conditions for decisive victory. an information-oriented BDA [battle darnage as- The trick, he said, is to make the friendly view sessment] to ensu~ IO remains effective, RII sup- match ground truth and then deny that picture to the port to IO begins in peacetime and must be continu- enemy. IO brings information for the total force to- ous throughout all phases of an operation or gether under one purview by acquiring information campaign.”34 friendly forces need to fight; using RII to attain a knowledge advantage; protecting information’s in- Information Systems tegrity, timeliness and accuracy; exploiting the ad- INFOSYS enable commanders and staffs to versary’s information advantage; and denying the monitor the current situation; synchronize opera- adversary correct information, causing him to per- tions; integrate and synchronize operations across ceive a distorted story that leads to his failure. In battlefield operating systems (BOSS); coordinate other words, information technology provides the joint air and naval support; update weapon systems capability to manage the breadth and depth of data targeting parameters; and control close, deep and and make it available to the wadighter when and rear operations as one operation.35 “INFOSYS col- where it is most needed. lec~ process and disseminate information relating to FM 100-6 discusses six fundamental activities re- current and future operations. Automation has lated to conducting IO: acquiring, using, protecting, made great advances in information processing, but exploiting, denying and managing information and human beings remain the most effective system for INFOSYS. “When effectively executed, these criti-

10 November - December 1996 c MILITARY REVIEW Full+menswnal operations require carefil coordination and synchronization. Once the commander issues gutiance, “. .. the stifl coordinates and integrates information requirements and INFOSYS to synchronize the cn”tical information flow with the operti”onal concept. Management information and INFOS YS must focus on oper~”onal requirements that will den”ve information from reconnaissance, counter- reconnaissance, communications and security operations. cal activities supplement the human skills of battle ligence collection systems, tactical reporting and in- command, speed decision making, minimize or telligence or information disseminated from other eliminate uncertainty, focus combat power, help DOD or non-DOD agencies at operational, strategic protect the force, harness organizational capabili- or national levels. Collection of information about ties, link the MIE to the GIE and enhance situation- adversaries and the environment is managed al awareness for soldiers and leaders. These activi- through the RII collection cycle.”4’ ties apply to both information and INFOSYS [and Use. The commander sees his battlespace include] hardware, people, organizations and pro- through the use of space, air and ground systems to cesses.’’~() These informational activities for friend- acquire relevant information and provide a current ly forces will be integrated, and the efforts of each situation. He must expand his thinking to include will contribute to the success of all. A short descrip- all INFOSYS and organizations accessible in the tion of these fundamental IO characteristics follows. GIE. “Once the data is acquired, analyzed and Acquire. Leaders must consider required infor- collated, the information is used to update and vali- mation’s nature before allocating resources to get it. date a common situational awareness. This com- Necessary information includes ME17’-T [mission, mon situational awareness provides the basis to re- enemy, terrain, troops and time available] and the fine, continue or adjust decisions, plans and basic who, what, when, where and why questions. operations. The nature of that information includes its accuracy, . Information is focused and used by issuing timeliness and overall relevance to the situation in guidance, prioritizing assets and establishing re- consonance with the CCIR. Considering informa- quirements. tion sources available and the information’s nature, . Staffs then refine the guidance into OPLANS commanders develop “technical and tactical plans [operations plans] or OPORDS [operations orders]. to acquire critical information. Information can be They seek to integrate information at all eche- acquired through personnel, technical means, intel- lons and plan the use of all available information,

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 11 qywdless of the source.”~z tive advantage in applying combat power or con- Protect. “While the proliferation of information trolling a situation in OOTW.”W) and information technology can be a great advan- Cz-attack measures, including nonnuclear elec- tage, it is also a potentially significant risk that must tromagnetic pulse generators, space-based informa- be accounted for in every operation. Protection of tion denial systems and computer viruses, usually soldiers and equipment, although not new, has in- precede but often occur simultaneously with ground creased in importance in today’s information-rich and air operations. “CZW may replace air suprema- environment. Friendly information and INFOSYS cy as the essential first step in operations. Televi- must be protected throughout the battlespace. Op- sion and other communications media provide erationally, protecting information requires viewing means to bolster or undermine the will of entire friendly vulnerabilities from the enemy’s Cz-attack populations. Another method of attack may be perspective. Commanders must examine the vul- through access to enemy battlefield computer sys- nerability of their soldiers and systems to exploita- tems and information manipulation. Through our tion or attack by an enemy capable of attacking successful friendly IO, adversaries will be forced to friendly Cz on a wide front by employing EW, de- exercise command through 19th century means, struction, deception, propaganda [and 0PSEC].”4S while US forces operate state-of-the-art, 21st- Exploit. Joint Publication 1-02, The Joint Dic- century systems.”47 tionun, describes e.rploitation as “taking full ad- Manage. Full-dimensional operations require vantage of any information that has come to hand carefid coordination and synchronization. Once the for ... military operational purposes.” FM 100-6 commander issues guidance. the staff coordinates states that “all information environments and sys- and integrates information requirements and INFO- tems surrounding an operation, friendly and adver- SYS to synchronize the critical information flow sarial, military and nonmilitary, offer chances for with the operational concept. INFOSYS manage- exploitation. Generally, exploiting an adversary’s ment must focus on operational requirements that INFOSYS is making use of that adversary’s INFO- “derive information from reconnaissance, counter- SYS, data or communications without his knowl- reconnaissance, communications and security op- edge. A flexible approach to exploitation is pre- erations. Managing information includes managing ferred. The level of exploitation, whether simply the electromagnetic spectrum, deciding what monitoring or corrupting data bases, depends on sources and systems to use, ensuring a reliable flow the situation and the desired objective.”W Ex- of information between nodes and levels (horizontal ploitation may not always mean directly attacking and vertical integration) and resolving differences or degrading an adversary’s Cz ability. Regardless, among information from multiple sources.”~s exploitation depends on thoroughly understanding the adversary and GIE surrounding a potential AO. The Planning Process FM 100-6 warns that information gathering and in- Given information’s pervasive and dynamic telligence work must begin in peacetime in order to nature, FM 100-6 empha..izes thorough, detailed analyze the AO and determine how potential adver- pkmning consisting of five basic steps applied saries operate. In the information age, “knowledge across the three IO components+perations, RII of the adversary’s information infrastructure is as and INFOSYS. important a.. knowledge of a potential advers ‘s Mission analysis. Once the commander ana- strategies, tactics, techniques and rocedures.”4-? lyzes the mission, he formulates the overall concept ! Deny. IO’s offensive aspect-C--attack-makes of operations, considering how IO can contribute to attacking an adversary at all levels simultaneously achieving the mission. “Under the direction of the with overwhelming force possible. Cz-attack pre- J3/G3, the staff analyzes the command’s mission vents an adversary from exercising effective force and concept of operations to derive a concept of IO. Cz by denying him information or influencing, de- Simply, ‘How can IO sup~rt the mission?’ The grading or destroying his information and INFO- staff must consider both C--attack and C2-protect. SYS. “IO gives the commander the means to attack Flexibility is required as 10 support may shift over an adversary throughout the depth of the battle- the course of the overall operation.”49 space, far beyond the range of direct or indirect fire In Chapter 6, FM 100-6 discusses the staff’s plan- systems. The goal is to degrade the adversary’s ning responsibilities, including examining enemy confidence in either his data or his ability to com- and friendly INFOSYS within the context of the mand and control operations. By attacking or con- commander’s MIE and determining the capabilities fusing his sense of the battlefield, friendly forces both sides need to operate effectively. The staff also gain information dominance and a subsequent rela- “sets out the requirements and conditions needed to

12 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW US warships escorting reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf, 1988. Threats to neutral shippi by Iran caused a steeprise in both oil prices and insurance rates“?or shipping.

I

“Pkmnem must be aware thut the counter40 the advemary hunches will likely tirget US civilian infrastructures. The mere thre~ of such an action muy also generate significant effects, both real and psychological. For example, an adversary announcement chiming the insertion of a virus into a particular banking institution-3 computer operti”on could trigger a panic with major economic repercussions, regardless of the adversary -kactual execution of such an attack. ” establish information dominance. The staff consid- bilities. This step develops potential targets for ers nonmilitary INFOSYS influences or capabilities Cz-attack and Cz-protect and ensures integrated ef- beyond traditional military control that may impact fects’ deconfliction. “For Cz-attack purposes, nodes the operation, such as local or regional communica- critical to more than one advermry system may tions networks, radio, television, computer net- have a higher priority. Vulnerability may override works ... and the news media.”s” This analysis criticality, with more critical nodes that are less vul- produces a list of critical nodes and vulnerability nerable receiving a lower priority. Priorities should analyses: be balanced and shifted between Cz-attack and . C2-u/tack analysis identifies adversary Cz sys- Cz-protect as required to support the unit mission. tems of CZW interest and determines the critical Cz The Cz-attack product is a prioritization of the list and C2-attack nodes in those systems. The Cz- of critical, vulnerable adversary targets from earlier attack focus increases payoff by identifying key tar- work. Similarly, CQ-protect targets should be identi- get vulnerabilities for offensive action. fied in terms of criticality and vulnerability, then . C’2-protectfocuses on the adversary’s capabili- prioritized.”sz ty to detect, locate and attack critical friendly Co Concept of operations. An IO concept of opera- nodes to disrupt the friendly decision-making tions must be formulated. ‘The G3/J3 reviews his process. As with Cz-attack, intelligence plays a ma- sets of potential Cz-attack and Cz-protect targets. jor role by providing information on adversary sen- He assesses available IO capabilities to develop an sor capabilities, target selection and attack means. IO concept of operations that best suppofis the over- The focus is on the physical destruction, jamming all operational mission and is synchronized with the and intrusion, as well as the deception and PSYOP overall concept of operations. Synchronization of means available to the adversary. The product is a the IO operation. both internall y—among the five list of critical, vulnerable nodes and processes that C“W elements and CA and PA—and extemally— Cz-protect must address.s ] across all the BOSs—is absolutely critical for Prioritization. Next, the staff must prioritize achieving decisive Cz-attack and Cz-protect results. both friendly and enemy critical nodes and vulnera- The impact of proper synchronization is to focus the

MILITARY REVIEW � November - December 1996 13 effect of the entire range of friendly capabilities to “IO taskings normally become part of the basic achieve maximum effect at the decisive point in order paragraph 3 concept of operations and coordi- time and space.5s nating instructions. Additional IO details are cov- The commander and staff must consider these ered in a separate annex that consolidates applicable specific areas in pkmnin+ 10/CzW into one coherent operational discussion. � Operations-both C--attack and Cz-protect— When a separate 10/CzW annex is written, it should objectives from a friendly and enemy perspective. include an 10/CzW synchronization matrix that es- The basic OPLAN/OPORD and the CQW annex tablishes time lines, responsibilities, sequence of ac- synchronize physical destruction, EW, OPSEC, tions and desired effects.”s~ deception and PSYOP to maximize Cz-attack and Additionally, “planners must be aware that the Cz-protect. Many CZW activities can have the ef- counter-IO the ad”~ersarylaunches will likely target fect of maximizing protection while degrading an US civilian infrastructures. The mere threat of such adversary’s C2 capabilities. Other influences in the an action may also generate significant effects, both commander’s information battle space, such as real and psychological. For example, an adversary media, governmental organizations-and NGOS, lo- announcement claiming the insertion of a virus into cal or regional sociticultural influences, percep- a pmticular banking institution’s computer opera- tions, attitudes and opinions can have a direct im- tion could trigger a panic with major economic re- pact on mission success. percussions, regardless of the adversary’s actual ex- � RII requirements. ecution of such am attack.”55 � INFOSYS support requirements. Feedback. The final step is to set up monitoring Execution. The G3/J3 controls and directs both and feedback mechanisms. A continuous damage the IO planning and execution phases, with support or effects assessment process is critical in order for from the G2 and IO element specialists on the staff. the commander to revise his continuing situation es- The keys are: timate and adjust operations accordingly. The five- � Selecting the best Cz-attack capability for the step planning process is illustrated in Figure 2. best effect~eny, influence, degrade or destroy. ‘“TheArmy is embracing a new era characterized � Synchronizing effects application to reinforce by the accelerating growth of information, informa- the five CZW elements and CA and PA capabilities tion sources and information dissemination capabil- by not allowing them to conflict. Similarly, Cz node ities supported by information technology. This protection needs to be tasked to available means new era, the so-called Information Age, offers and/or additional protective tactics, techniques and unique opportunities m well as some formidable procedures adopted by the force. challenges. New technology will enhance the Army’s ability to achieve situational dominance on land, where the decisive element of victory for our nation has always been critical. At the same time, it will enable adversaries to employ many of these same capabilities. This new technology also allows the Army to transform itself. “The Army is changing the way it does business in the foxhole; in its schools and training centers; and in its doctrine, training, leader development, or- ganizations, materiel development and soldier de- velopment. Responding to the challenges and op- portunities of the lnjhnation Age, the Army is preparing the wa.rflghter for operations today as well as in the 21st century. Information and the knowledge that flows from it empower soldiers and their leaders. When transformed into capabilities, information is the currency of victory. “IO integrates] all aspects of information to ac- complish the full potential for enhancing the con- OpwationOrder other Annexas se rataAnnex duct of military operations. IO [is] not new. In [its] *concept ~Sgnal �c 5 � TaskOrganization � Intelliice � PAOperations simplest form, [it consists ofl activities that gain in- � CommandandSignal : ~~~w$ Support � Movement formation and knowledge and improve friendly ex- � CAOperations ecution of operations while denying an adversary Figun32. 10PlanningProcess

14 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW lNFORIUIAllONOperations

fog and friction will remain; the challenge of sorting Joint Pubfic&n 142, The Joint out the signals from the noise amidst a mass of ex- Dictionary,&scribes explixlzdbn as “ting panding data will also remain. Many solutions to jidladvantage of any information that has the dilemma of uncertainty for the commander are come b hand for ... mi&uy operatiorudpur- technical. But there can be no information revolu- poses.” FM 1004 states thd “d information tion without the human influence and understanding envimunenA and systems sumxmding an of soldiers and commanders who link and integrate opemtion, jh%uily and &e_ mihhry information, technology and action. IO do[es] not and nonmii%luy, offer chunces for exphi- offer any panaceas. Perfect knowledge is not the tin. Genenn?ly,expbting an adversary h objective. The military objective remains-to enter INFOSYS ti making use of tti advemzryk an operational theater capable of achieving superior INFOSYS, alu!aor communications nAative combat power against an enemy or to estab- wMout his knowledge. lish situational dominance in 00TW.”57 An increase in information availability does not guarantee certainty-it potentially increases ambi- similar capabilities by whatever possible means. guity. Current staff organizations, procedures and Effects of IO produce significant military advantage analytical methods must adjust to master the richer for forces conducting such operations.”56 flow, faster pace and huge volume of information. “Notwithstanding the synergy possible with the The challenge is to find better, not just faster, analy- power of information and information technology, sis and decision-making procedures. MR

NOTES 1 The F&/rhrmakM Ww:mestoryofbmwn&ms , Corymrs End Irlw- 25. hid. r Systems rn tfre Parstan Gutf War (Fwhx,V& AFCEAIntwllaOld Press,1W2), 26. Ibid 27, Ibd., 2-6, 2 GEN Gordon R Sulhvan, 4’Amerca’sAnn&Wnwu p the Infwati wti (oti. 28. Ibd. do,FL:AUSA Instlute for Land Warfare Sympowm, 8 ebruary 1994). 29. Ibd. 3. Bruce W. Watson, Mifi&ry Lassm?sof ftw GM War (Novato, CA: Presicfii Press, w Ibid. 1991), 11-112 Ttis tmk contans numerws exwnples of combining technology wth 31. Ibid , 2+. well-trained manpver to gain tacWaJ suparidy. 32. Ibid. 4. MAJ Wayne K. Maynard, ‘The New American way of War,” Miktary Reww (No- 33 Ibid. VembSr 1993), 5–16, 34. Ibd, 5 US Amy F&d Manual 100-6, /nfwma@n Cpemtions (Washington, DC us Gov- 35. Ibti., 2-7. ernment PrIntmg OfIke [GFO], August 1996), w 36. Ibid. 6 Ibid 37. Ibd., 2-8. 7 Ibid. 36 Ibd. 8 Ibd, 1-2 3. Itxd. 9. Ibtd. 40 Itnd 10. Ibid 41. Ibid 2-9 11 IM., 1-3. 42. I&i.;2-io. 12 IM 43. ItM.,2-11 13 De@Wwnt of the Amy (DA), “lnformatcm Operakms (10) Intent and Strategy,” 44. Ibid Message No. 0319482 (W.shmgton, DC: Headqwtem, DA, Se@ember 1996) 45 Ibd., 2-12 14 Xua Ixmfang and Wel Y@arg, ‘O@Jzed Forces KJllerhas Come Into Being,”Ae- 46. Ibid. farxwr &o (30 %nl 1996) 47, 13GGeneral Morris J. Boyd and M&l MK+IWI Wcmdgerd, ‘“ForceXXI Operabons,” 13 FM 106-6,i+. Mi&ny Re@w (Novwnber 1994), 17-28. 16 Ibtd., 1-6. 48 FM 100-6, 2-13. 17. Ibid. 49 ibid ,6-6 18. Ibd, 1-7 50 Ibid 19. Chef of Staff of the Amy, ‘Warm the InfcmnabonAge: Yekw Paper No 95-07, 51. Ib+d (Washmgtcm, DC GF’0, 16 November 1995). 52 Ibid 20 FM 1CCL6, 1-9 53 Ibid., 6-8 to 6-9. 21 Ibid. 54. Ibd., 6-1o 22 ItXi., 2-3 55. Ibd. 23 Ibd 56. Ibid,, Iv. 24 Itxd., 24. 57. Ibid., v

Cokmel Michael D. Stmy k the directo~ Future Battle Directorate, Oj@e of the Depuy Chiefof Staflfor Doc- trine, Hea@arters, US Arm)’ Training and Doctrine Command (TR4DOC), Fort Monroe, W@nia. He received an A4.Ea!fum Geotgia Stite Universip, an A4.MA.S. fi-om the US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) and a rnasterk in National Securip and Strategic Shuiies jkxn the US Naval War College. He is a graduate of the USACGSC and School ofAd\anced Military Stuak. He has heki a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States, Korea and Europe, including commanak~ 2d Battalwtk 82d Field Artil- lery Regiment, Ist Cavalq Di\i.vion, Fort H& Taas; tsxecutiveofice~ 1st Cavahy Di~kion Artih’q during Op- eratiom Desert Shiekland Desert Storm; chief of pkms, Hea&patiers, Combined Field Army (Republic of Koteal US), UijongbW Korea; and secretmy of the general stafi US Field Ati”llery Cente4 Fort Sil~ Okkhorna. Lieutenant Colonel Charles U! Arneson JE iY a professor of militaty science at the Uni}’ersip of Florida at Gainesville. He received a B.S. ji-om the University of Wuconsin at Phkville and an M.A. jiom the Universip of Wwconsin at Madison and is a graduate of the USACGSC. He has held a }~arktyof command and staffpositions in the Continental United States and Europe, including dbctrine staff ofice~ Ofice of the Depup Chiefof Sta#for Doctrine, Headquarters, TWDOC, Fort Monroe; joint command and control stafl oficec Joint Interoperability Test Centeq Fort Huachuca, Arizona; amistant division signal ofice~ 3dArmored Div&ion (3AD), Fran@r6 Ger- many and during Operation Desert Storm; S3, 143d Signal Battaliot4 3AD, Frankjia-t; and brigade signal ofice~ 2d Brigade, 3AD, GelnAauset4 Germany.

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 15 LieutenantColonel 13ennisM. Murphy US Army OST WOULD AGREE that life in the milit- grate and synchronize our chosen organization so Mary was simpler 10 years ago. The enemy our entire focus is on the center of gravity (COG)? was known and understood. Our forceswere arrayed This is not a new challenge. We have been doing it and ready on the Fukla Gap. Our mission-essential throughout our history. What is new is having a full task list (MIXL) contained two clear-t entries- range of lethal and nonlethal assets at our disposal delay and defend. The levels of war were distinct. and understandingthe COG as something other than Tacticswas the art most of us studied and felt com- a form-or terrain-oriented “hub of all power.” fortablewith. It was where “webelonged.” Strategy was left to thegenerals and we trusted theirabilityto MM!Sp execute it. Ten years ago, we started to get a handle BattleSpaceis a “box”that includesbreadth,width on operational art-something we knew existed but and height in which a commander positions and had always placed in the “too-hard box.” Weestab- moves forces over time.1 We can think of battle- lished schools to study it and sent our best and bright- space as four+ imensional. Because battlespace is est off to staffs to implement its tenets. We were glad considered without regard to boundaries, the com- to leave diplomacy to the US State Department and mander can expand his thinking on how he will dom- the politicians. inate the enemy and protect the force. The com- The information age has changed everything. mander certainly considers the COG as he develops Much has been written recently on our Army’s future his battlespace concept. Force– and terrain+x-iented and the place of land combat in Force XXI. Observa- COGS make this a fairly objective consideration. For tions of recent operations, to include the planning, example, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf identi- preparation and execution of NA~’s Bosnia mis- fied the Iraqi Republican Guards as the operational sion, show that the iiture is already here. COG in Operation Desert Slorm. He then envi- Today, the lines are blurred because we see over- sioned the method and means to attack it, which af- lap at all levels. The picture is so muddled that at the fected his consideration of the battlespace and ability center of this overlap is a phenomenon that can be re- to shape it. Consider, however, a case when the COG ferred to as “the strategic soldier’’—the Marine pla- is less conventional. toon leader involved in a firefight in the streets of What if the enemy COG is popular support of a Haiti, a dead Ranger dragged through the streets of belligerent force or leader, the enemy political or Mogadishu and a pilot shot down over Bosnia. All military leadership itself or a faction’s perception these actions spurred National Command Authority that a peace agreement is being enforced unfairly? involvement. This phenomenon will be with us as These possible scenarios are quite likely to occur in long as CNN broadcasts the action as it happens. today’s complicated environment and will become Thus, we as leaders must understand how to focus common on future battlefields. These types of op- this picture in today’s complicated world—a world erational COGS are not limited to military operations where influencing people’s hearts and minds may be other than war. On the contrary, it is plausible that more important than destroying the enemy. these situations may occur in mid-intensity conflicts We really do not need to establish a new paradigm as well. for this. We simply must understand how to view our If a populace’s “perceptions” are the COG, how is complicated world in our established models. Given the commander’s vision of his battlespace affected? all available assets, how do we shape the battlespace, Perceptions are shaped by many factors. Now, not weight and organize the main effort and then inte- only must the commander consider height, breadth,

16 November - December 1996 “ MILITARY REVIEW l?%ecommunder may seethe COG as so impn!imt thut he establishes a speckdJTF tofocus its effo~ on perceptions. 7%isJTF woukl be on the same level as major subotii&e communh and wouki represent afinctionul command repo~”ng directly ti the commander. Timeliness may bean issue thut leaak tu thh fonndon as well. Elim”nding several kzyem of s&# coonlinution allows quick response to a crisis in a world where CNN ojlen beats us to the punch. depth and time in visualizing battlespace, he must tional C2W assets for nonlethal attacks.3 Doctrine also consider perception and all factors affecting it. allows this, because it recognizes the need for close External audiences, media, rumor and disinforma- coordination between traditional C2W, PA and CA.4 tion affect people’s perceptions, and all can be pres- No longer is the PA officer simply responsible for ent outside the traditional four-dimensional hometown news releases or getting an article back to battlespace. In fact, these influences are decisive the post newspaper. No longer is the CA officer a points—the keys to attacking COGs-and the com- forgotten augmentee looking for a ride. They are mander must consider them as intermediate objec- both integral parts of mission success, and their fill tives if he cannot directly attack perceptions. 2 Orga- integration into the planning process is critical. nizing and weighting a main effort with field artillery While much has been written recently about C2W, brigades, armored cavalry regiments and enhanced there has been little discussion of how to organize to logistics will not work here. The commander must best use it and other assets to assume the main effort turn to the previously neglected arrows in his quiver with a focus on the enemy COG. of assets to complement these lethal means. Commanders can choose from several options. The commander may see the COG as so important Information Warfare that he establishes a special joint task force (JTF) to Wehavetruly become proficient in using lethal as- focus its efforts on perceptions. This JTF would be sets and electronic attack thanks to our Combat on the same level as major subordinate commands Training Center methodology. Divisions can inte- and would represent a functional command report- grate and synchronize these assets because we have ing directly to the commander. Timeliness maybe an focused our training on them. Now the time has issue that leads to this formation as well. Eliminating come to train a new generation of leaders to integrate several layers of staff coordination allows quick re- and synchronize the nonlethal assets at their disposal. sponse to a crisis in a world where CNN often beats The information age has sensitized us to a variety of us to the punch. As a second option, the commander assets that have always been available but have rare- may delegate the mission to a component such as the ly been organized, integrated and synchronized with Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC). our traditional assets. The synergism created by us- The JFACC will require information warfare staff ing all the assets at a commander’s disposal will spell augmentation to expand its lethal targeting expertise. success in the information age. Command and con- As a third option, the commander may forma special trol warfare (C2W) is critical to this success. staff section to focus solely on the COG. The special While C2W consists of psychological operations staff would work at the same level as the primary (PSYOP), electronic warfare, deception, operations staff reporting to the chief of staff. This tailored sec- security and physical destruction, it is only a subset tion would be fully integrated into planning and of information warfare. Recent studies, observations could even take the lead in staff planning, integration and war games have indicated that civil affairs (CA) and synchronization. The commander’s fourth op- and public affairs (PA) should be considered addi- tion is to incorporate his information watiare assets

MILITARY REVIEW . November – December 1996 17 JTF planning group includes establishing humanitar- P&of th batllespace+haping ian assistance to “attack” an enemy operational COG oprah”ons developed by the JTF pkhnning defined as “the perceptions of the populace that US group includes establishing humunitirian efforts in-country are beneficial to them.” The se- assistance to %tack” an enemy opemhkwzal lected course of action (COA) for this attack in- COG defined as “the perceptiims of the volves the establishment of an immunization clinic Popukiace.”... [This] involves the establish- within the country near a major belligerent force. ment of an immunization clinic within the This continues shaping operations that began with country near a ~“or belligenmt fome .... the crisis’ onset. The commander is concerned [imd includes]#w integmted effortsofNGOs about, but not threatened by, the belligerent force. and nonkthul assets. This attack involves the integrated efforts of nongov- ernmental organizations and nonlethal assets. “Doc- tors Without Borders” establishes the clinic; PSYOP teams use handbills and broadcasts to ensure the under the Joint Force Fires Coordination Cell populace knows about the clinic; CA coordinates (JFFCC) for further consideration in targeting. In with local oftlcials to establish the clinic’s site and any case, he establishes a main effortof information when it will be set up; and PA ensures widespread warfare to attack the enemy COG. clinic media coverage. Targeting A plausible “fallout” benefit from this effort may Another option is for the J3 or J5 to take the lead be human intelligence (HUMINT). A local citizen, in developing plans to shape the battlespace. The ecstatic that his family is receiving care after months JFFCC plays a critical role in this effort. The JFFCC of neglect, tells an interpreter at the clinic that he has representative in the planning group ensures that heard the belligerent force will move north to attack both lethal and nonlethal fires are fully integrated the Americans in 48 hours. HUMINT will be the and synchronized with other operating systems. primary intelligence source to determine the status of Then, he must go a step further by integrating and nontraditional COGS and their decisive points and synchronizing his assets to support the overall fires will play a critical part in the targeting methodolo- effort. This is typically accomplished within the tar- gy’s “detect” phase. This drives the planning group geting cell. Where do information warfare assets fit to develop and analyze branch COAS. into this picture? Arguably, some C%V assets fit The information age plays a big role in today’s nicely into the targeting methodology. Does PSYOP modem battlespace. The destruction of the elite Re- have a target or target audience to attack? What publican Guards or the second operational echelon is about CA and PA? If so, perhaps the place to inte- a far cry from shaping the hearts and minds of grate these nonlethal asse~s is within “the targeting people. Information warfare suddenly has the prom- ~rocess under the joint force fires coordinato~ l%; inent role as the main effort against such COGS. Yet, bmmander may also opt to form these assets and the model commanders use need not change. Focus their representativesunder a C2W cell. In this case, all available assets on the COG to shape the battle- the C%Vofficerwould integrateand synchronizehis space, organize and weight the main effort and inte- assets and then come to the targetingcell for further grate and synchronize their effects. The key is to use integration with lethal fires. In either case, they fall all assets. The sooner we teach a new generation of within the targeting process at some point. leaders to do this, the more successful we will be. MR An example might clarify the process. Consider NOTES the following scenario: The United States is in- 1. us/Vlrl Field Manual loo-5, @e/akms(wshln@on, DC” us Government PrInb ~ GPO],June 1993), 6-12. volved in a noncombatant evacuation operation in 2.1~s Jcintpll~ (JP)3-o, LIMr’ha rb M @e@ions (WShmgton, cc: GPO, Fabrwy 1996), III-21. Africa. The Army force headquarters is deployed 3. AUS~yT~lW*~_~~ti~sw~ew ccaductedfrom 14t021 Nowmber 1996at Fcxt HuacIww Arizons. Resdkshowmd in+ountry to conduct the evacuation. Part of the the need for integratingavil #aim and public affairs in cummand and cxmtrd warfare. 4. JP 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Contro/ Warfare (Washington, battlespace+haping operations developed by the DC: GPO, February 1996), IV-6.

r Lieutenant CohelDennis M. Murphy k a student at the USArmy War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsyl- “ vania. He received a B.S. j%m the US Military Academy and an M.S. @m Pennsylvania S@te Universi~ and is a graduute of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Armed Forces Staff College. He has heki a variety of command and staflpositions in the Continental United States and Europe, including senior fire- power observerltrainq Battle Command TrainingPmgr~ Fort Leavenwo& Kansas; commandq 4th Battal- WP 29th Fiek.iArtilby Regime@ 1st Armored Division (Ist AD), Baumholde4 Germany; depu(Yfk support coortiti~ Ist AD, Baumholder; exec~”ve ofice~ 3d Batkdwtq 320th Fieki Artillery Regiment (31320thFA), Fort Campbell Kentuc~; andS3, 31320thFA, during Operations Deserl Shield and Desert Storm.

10 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW . A

It isspring IW, and anE-8C Jo&t Simeilk?nce tan@rindimct-fimartilkg without forward observ- Target At@.%Radar System (J-/$TARS)ainm@ k em In essence, J-STARS is the f-ard observer jlying in “Bk#and” airspace monitoring,a “Red- h talgets beyond ~ ~s~ ~t?e. hnd” anndnedforce buildup near Redlhdk bmkr � I%wides high-molution synthetic aperture ra- with Bkknd. The J-S7XRS cm is in constant dar (SAR) still imagery of militarily significantob- communication with an Airborne Warning and jects in NKI’. By using moving imagery to “cue” ControlSystem (AWACS)cm, &o@ng along the where and when to collectSAR imagery, J-STARS’ Redbd bordkr tracking aixmji activity J-SEARS military value is enhanced and the need to commit and AWAC3 km been pmvtiing 24-huur swveil- signflcant resources to collection and analysis is kmce since being deplbyed by tti US National mdlwed. Cornrnand Authmity (NCA) to monitor potential � Maintains a data base of prior moving imagery Red&mdaggmsion against Blueland. in designated areas, making it easy to compare this J-STARS continuous> collects information and imagery with other sensor results, facilitating predic- displays it aboard the aim-aji in near real-time (NRT) imagen that shoti.v the Redland forces’ tive analysis of when vehicles will arrive at desig- mo}’ements and locations. Simultaneously, J-STARS nated points. The data baws also permit reviewing provides the same imagen to a US militaq liaison movement “history” to allow quick detection of team at Blueland 3 mi[itaq headquatiers, to the w- changes in movement patterns and to help locate gional commander in chief k (CINC5) headquatiers, concealed facilities. to the Joint Chiefs of Sta# in Washingto6 D.C. and � Allows commanders at echelons from maneu- to XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters at Fort ver brigades to corps and joint task forces to simul - Bragg, North Carzdina. taneously see movement patterns in their areas of interest-an unprecedented capability during crises S SCENARIO illustrates the revolutionary or conflicts. F contribution J-STARS brings to crisis man- � Monitors both friendly and threat vehicle n~ove- agement and Army Force XXI operations support. ments, thus contributing to situational awareness, J-STARS makes these contributions because it: which should dramatically Educe potential fratricide. � Provides moving imagery finm moving target � Allows joint service commanders to better inte- indicator (MTI) radar products. This allows quick grate operations. For example, a corps commander, detection of virtually any vehicular movement within division commander and joint force air component an m 150 kilometm wide by 150 kilometem deep, commander can simultaneously see the same move- even if movement occurs in darkness or bad weather. ment from their mpective command posts (CPS). � Precisely tracks ground vehicle, boat, helicopter The J-STARS “system” consists of a 707 aircraft, and other slow-flying aircraft movement with suffi- a 24-foot radar housed in a “canoe” under the for- cient resolution to track individual convoy vehicles. ward fuselage, radar signal processors and 18 oper- � Provides accurate moving vehicle locations ator consoles (17 J-STARS and one navigator/ good enough for US Air Force targeting and Army selfdefense oriented) located in the aircraft’s rear. Tactical Missile System, multiple launch rocket sys- All operator consoles am identically configured so the air mission commander can quickly tailor his The views expressedin (hivarticleaw threeof theauthoranddo not pqwrt towflectthepositionof theDepumnentof theArmy,theDepart- operators’ responsibilities to support changes in ment of Defeme or atlj’ other go~’w-nnwnt ofice or ogenq: -Editor commander’ priorities. For example, one operator

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 19 might be assigned to watch each division m, two, The radar is managed by an on-board radar sys- to watch the corps’ deep battle m, two, to study tems operator who programs radar service requests SAR image~; three,to interfacewith fighteraircraft meived from the ground commander via the GSM attackingground targets;two mom, to interfacewith SCDL or from an aim-aft console operator. Each GSM has two operator workstationsthat can main- tain data bases, display IVIll and SAR imagery,au- l%eJ+lT~ %ystem” consists of tomatically track designated target movements and a 707 aimufl, a 24+ot mdhr housed in a give commanders and staffs reports to help the “canoe” under the forw&@elizge, radw battle command pmcms. The Army plans to locate signal pmcessons and 18 operator consoles a GSM with each maneuver and aviation brigade, (17J-S19UlS and one navigator/se& division artillery, division and corps headquarters &fense oriente@ bated in the timfik rean and selected cop artillery units. GSMS will allow AU o~tir consokw w identically con- each commander to concentrate on that portion of jigumd so the air miwkm commander can the J-STARS radar coverage which supports his quickly @ibr his o~-m’ responsibilities to concept of opemtions and maneuver scheme. suppti changes in. .. ptinlies. For the Army to obtain maximum benefit flom J- STARS, the ground commander must have contigu- ous coverage, allowing his staff to build data bases, track convoys or monitor other command priorities. Army, US Marine Corps or Air Fome aim-aft con- The ground commander must also have the authority ducting missions behind enemy lines; three, to seek to direct where the radar is “looking” while J- out mobile missile launcher indicators; one, to man- STARS is supporting ground operations. For exam- age radar service quests; and two, to handle spe- ple, the ground commander may want to maintain cial mission requests. continuous high-resolution J-STARS coverage of a The J-ST~S workstation operatom do not com- named area of int.mst (NAI) where he suspects a pete with Army Ground Station Module (GSM) Secondahelon armorml fonx may be assembling. workstation operators. The J-STARS operators arE He may also need the capability to rapidly revisit the joint service approach to fighting integrated this NAI while simultaneously maintaining wide- battles. The J-ST~S joint service cmw is especial- area radar surveillance of his enti mm of Respons- ly helpful during crisis managemen~ fonx project- ibility(AOR). This process-known as “interleav- ion, strikes, raids and similar operations where ing” MTI—must be programmed by the on-board sensor-to-shooter connectivity is desired or GSMS radar operator. If the ground commander loses J- axe not in a position to support the Army ground STARS coverage to other priority tasks, such as commander. The airborne workstation operators SAR or moving the aircraft to another orbi~ J- might also be seen as an Army deep operations STARS will not be able to maximize ground com- coordination center extension. mander support. The~fore, dedicatedorbits w es- The J-ST~S radar “sweeps” an ma more than sential to suppofi Force XXI-typeoperations. At the 250 kilometm from the aircraft’s orbi~ processes same time, the Air Fom commander will depend on MTI radar products on-board and simultaneously J-STMS to control air strikes against mobile targets. sends the Rsults to the on-board operator consoles A solution to the growing dependence of both via a local ma network and to Army GSMS via a services on J-STARS Rsulted from a xvcent genend surveillance and control data link (SCDL). Thus, oflker review conducted by US Army Training and the aimti and GSM console operatom can observe Doctrine Command commander General Wdliarn the same imagery simultaneously, communicating Hartzog and Air Combat Command commander with one another via SCDL and “Have Quick” fR- General John M. Lob. They saw AWACS employ- quency-hopping radios. ment as a template for J-STARS and concluded that The J-STARS radar also can develop SAR mo~ aircrafl were needed than the 20 in the current bridge, milroad, atmored vehicle and CP imagery. program. Both leaders stated a need for 40 to 50 Although these are small-area images, the user can aimrail and tasked a joint team to determine the best build a “mosaic” from them. When the radar is do- number. ing SAR, MTI coverage is interrupted. Thus, com- Operation Desert Storm lessons leaned show the manders must make trade-off decisions about urgency of expanding the J-STARS fome structure. scheduling MTI and SAR coverage. It is possible During the war, only two J-STMS aima.fl we~ to mod MTI, switch to a SAR of the same H available, and both we~ taken out of Ml-scale de- and then overlay the MTI on SAR images. velopment and deployed to the Persian Gulf, where

20 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW they flew 49 missions in 49 days. Due to limited sustainment capabilities, US Central Command CINC General H. Norman Schwarzkopf opted to fly one aircraft each nigh~ with missions averaging about 10 hours. Only five developmental GSMS we~ available. This situation did not allow com- manders to maximize the NRT capabilities that exist in curmt production ahafl and GSMS. Often, the CINC tasked J-STARS to suppofi Scud missile-hunt- ing activities in Iraq, sevedy limiting J-STARS sur- veillance in the Kuwait theater of operations. When suppdng the Kuwait theater, J-STARS genemlly flew a kuge orbit behind the two US corps and the Marine Expeditionary Fome; thus, no commander had continuous coverage of his AOR. In addition, the GSM located at a corps CP was not ~adily avail- able to support a division or brigade commander. During Deserf Storm, commanders we~ not fa- miliar with J-STARS’ capabilities. Doctrine, tactics, TheJ+T~ &r also can develop techniques and procedu~s ~s) we~ in their in- SAR btige, mil~, armored vehick?and CP fant stages; and GSM operators had not trained with imagery. Ailhough these are snudkrea im- the headquartm they supported. These and other ages, the user can buikl a “mosm”c99~m them. training-dated factors limited commandem’ ability When the &is dbing SAR, MTI covenzge & to take maximum advantage of the superb ~al-time interrupted. Thus, commandem must make moving imagery J-STARS produced on each flight. trade+ff deciswns about scheduling ... Despite these limitations, J-ST~S made numerous coverage. It is possible to record M’T.1,switch major contributions to Deser-?Srorm’s success. One to a SAR of the same area and then overihy particularly memorable example was the battle of the MT’ on SAR iinages. Khafji. J-STARS was in an orbit position to pr- ovidegood support to the joint forms at Khafji. Its imagery revealed Imqi second~helon force move- ment will be observed, mcodxl on data bases and ment toward Khafji and helped commandem immed- transmitted in NRT to designated locations. This in- iately react to the situation. This was a true joint formation will help senior officials determine Red- operation, with J-STARS giving the ground com- land’s actual capabilities. In observing a potential mander unprecedented information on Iraqi maneu- ag~ssor’s training and logistic suppofi activities, J- ver and providing the air commander information STARS’ high-resolution moving imagery provides a on secondahelon convoys that were immediately capability similar to football game film. Like game turned into targets of opportunity. film, moving imagery can be ~played in slow mo- One could argue that J-ST~S and other sensors tion or stopped to improve understanding of specific had an impact on Iraqi forces-at both the opera- situations. The MTI and/or SAR imagery can be tional and tactical levels. Tactically, J-STARS brought to the UN Security Council as proof of po- helped p~vent reinforcement of the Khafji Iraqi tential hostile activities. In the future, this same in- lead echelon, making it easier for coalition forces to formation could be downlinked via satellite commu- defwt isolated Iraqi units. At the operational level, nications to the US contingency corps headquartm J-STARS detection and targeting of Iraqi movement to assist in their intelligence p~paration of the bat- may have had a significant impact on the Iraqi cam- tlefield, should they have to deploy. paign plan and future maneuver. While J-STARS Should the NCA decide to intervene, J-STARS made significant contributions to the war effo~ it can support fomes during early+mtry operations and was only a small fraction of what will be available can rapidly transition from crisis management to when J-STARS aim-aft and Army GSMS are field- support combat ground and air forces by using data ed in the programmed quantities and dedicated or- bases aheady established to support commandem’ bits become reality. priority area coverage. In the fi.Itun3,if a covering Returning to the vignette described at this ~icle’s fome has the mission of delaying an invasion by beginning, one can see how J-STARS could support Redland forces while the United States builds up its crisis management. Redland ground vehicle move- military fo~es in Blueland, J-STARS will provide

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 21 information dhectly to tactical aircti and helicop- suits. For example, all transponder interrogations ters and via GSM to the covering-force commander. might be displayed as “blue dots,” and radar sight- J-STARS can play a key role in economy-of-force ings of other unknown moving vehicles would be operations by providing the covering-force com- displayed as “red dots.” While this would not help mander with accurate information concerning whe~ the dhect-fw combat identification issue, it would Redland forces aR massing and in what st.mgth warn a commander about potential clashes between and where therv appears to be no activity. friendly forces on the battlefield. The United States also performs peacekeeping J-STARS is A; it is not just a development sys- (PK) missions. J-STARS can fly a “nonobtrusive” tem. Six J-STARS a.imrafl m scheduled for pro- orbit while m~aintainingcoverage of the PK force’s duction. By early 1997, J-STARS will be able to AOR. Because J-STARS can track single or multi- maintain a continuous orbit to support Army ground ple vehicles, the radar system allows commander commanders. J-STARS lTPs arE being developed to “cross

E\~e@ting Pierw saw was so indejnite, that in no part manner than did his predecessor of 20 yearnago.” 1 As of the scene befow him could he find anything fidly corre- a critical part of this change in perception, comrnandm sponding to his preconceptions. Thew was ~wwhere a will need systems that can provide comprehensive pic- field of battle such as he had e.rpected to see, Iwthing but tures of the dynamics of the modem, nonlintxir battlefield. jields, dells, }twa’s, troops, carnp-jiws, ~ilbges, nwunds, Such a thorough view helps commanders make important stwams. W4th all Pierre h e~orts, he could not discover decisions that affect force employment. in the li~’inglandscape a militan position. He could not The E-8A/B/C Joint Surveillance and Targeting Attack e~’endistinguish between our troops and the enemy k Radar System (J-ST~S) is a joint US Army/Air Force I must ask someone who understands it, he ttwught. system capable of providing a comprehensive pictme in —Leo Tolstoy,War and Peace near real time (NI?T). One J-STARS system consists of Military analyst Ralph Peters reminds us that today’s an Air Force-owned E-8A/C aircrafl manned by Air military professional “perceives the temporal, spatial and Force and Army mission crews and an Army-staflxi mechanical dimensions of warfare in a mdically different Ground Station Module (GSM) that receives and distrib-

22 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW INFORMATIONOPERATIONS

utes the aircraft’s air pictm to forces and cornmandem rnardm by giving them access to valuable, accurate NRT who need it. Vkually, whenxer the aircraft goes, so goes radar image~ data that can greatly suppoti decisions af- the GSM.2 J-STARS has the capability to detect, locate fecting their maneuver elements, such as regrouping, de- and track thousands of fwed and mobile targets on the ploying, shifting or moving fomes to decisive positions.7 ground over thousands of square kilometers from a great J-STARS support would also include indications and stand-off distance. J-STARS provides a revolutionary de- warnings (I&W) of threat activities. Doctrinally, J- velopment in the way air and ground commanders gain STARS is already envisioned as part of the Army’s tactical and operational battlefield corrqmhension. Its operational-level intelligence network integration.8 J- unique capabilities are provided through the E-8C’S radar, STARS will also add to the pool of tactical and opera- which detects and tracks moving and stationary ground tional knowledge, allowing field commanders to position targets for acquisition, analysis and attack in NRT. By their forces and determine probable places and times for performing surveillance, targeting and battle managemen~ attack and defense. J-STARS will enhance commanders’ the E-8C, coupled with its GSM, will directly contribute ability to display and determine moving and massing tar- to the delay, disruption and destruction of the enemy’s of- gets and give them the intelligence to define where deep fensive and defensive momentum. attacks may occur.9 The world got its first significant glimpse of J-STMS’ Moreover, data nxeived hm J-STARS operators can capabilities at the Gulf War’s end when it significantly also be gleaned from deep in the threat’s rear area. This contributed to denying Iraqi forces any night sanctuary data will include information about railhead activities, as- and kept continual pmssuR on them in the Kuwait theater sembly areas, LOC with respect to convoy activity or of operations. For example, the planned Iraqi attack at staging areas, movement of enemy ground units out of Khalji--under the cover of darkness-was to be a sur- ~~t~~’ ‘ileld activiti~ and artillery unit dispkMx- prise by advancing armor. However, on 25 January 1991, J-STARS detected and tracked an Iraqi armored column B&ause J-STARS will span both ground maneuver of 71 vehicles near the Kuwaiti border. Guided by J- and air campaigns, joint doctrine will be executed syner- ST~ information, coalition air power attacked the col- gistically. 11 In fac~ J-STARS is the first co-combatant for umn and destroyed 58 vehicles.3 both land and air commandem, because it supports the complementary execution of maneuver and interdiction. The J-STARS Revolution J-STARS ~]OWS land and air commanders to be perfectly Through its moving target indicator (M’IT) radar mode, matched to offensive operations as they seek to smwe the E-8C offers the fwst wide-~ longduration system decisive terrain, deprive the enemy of mcmrces, gain tac- that can coordinate attacks against a variety of enemy ve- tical information and deceive, divert and hold enemy hicles, including diflicuh-to-hit targets such as mobile fomes in position. 12 surface-to-surface and surface-to-air (SAM) missiles.4 Whh this new ability, sortie efficiency and safety are en- J-STARS on the Modem Battlefield hanced, because fi,ghtem no longer need to loiter in high- A vital part of what J-STARS provides is information threat areas searching for targets. Target attack rates will relating to terrain. This has been a major concern for be increased. or the sortie may never need to launch in battlefield commanders throughout military history, al- the fnt place, meaning fewer a.imraft and aimmws will be ways playing a big part in any atte t to avoid enemy exposed to ground fire.5 Specifically, MTI informs com- strengths and strike his weaknesses.Y 1- At Gettysburg, manders about: General Robert E. Lee knew that two corps of Major � Convoy movements along lines of communication General George G. Meade’s army were on the field, but (LOC), giving the convoy’s direction, speed, location and what about the other five? Where was Meade’s flank? time sighted. Wdmut Major General J.E.B, Stuart’s cavalry, I.AXwould � Identity of enemy choke points, operational bridges not countenance a vague march beyond an unknown and causeways, logistic sites and the classification of ve- flardq as some of his oflicers proposed. Tbday’s field hicles as track~ wheeled or unknown. commanders are faced with similar problems: Whae is Through its other radar mode-the Synthetic Aperture the enemy? What are the topographical characteristics of Radar (SAR)--the E-8C provides data on stationary and the land he may be occupying, and what are its natural fixed-target sets. Mobile targets that stop can be precisely impediments and features that can be exploited? When- located. SAR allows descriptions of both natural and ever possible, commandem must reconnoiter the terrain manmade ground feature. This mode detects the pos- where they will conduct the main effort. 14 When radar- sible presence of artillery, SAMS and other air defense mapping the terrain,including its natural and manmade artillery (ADA) units in selected locations and provides obstacles, J-ST~’ SAR will help correlate highly accu- images of defensive positions such as trenches and revet- rate mapping information. ments. Fimlly, SAR offers limited battle darnage assess- Moving across this terrain are modern armies that rely ment (BDA), such as a postattack assessment of damage heavily on vehicles for mobility and resupply. In nonlin- to bridges. ear battlefields such as the Balkans, targeting vehicles is J-STARS and the field commander Historically, more complex. However, in futuxe conflicts, J-STARS ground force commandem have dealt with limited infor- will give commanders the abWy to assess effectiveness mation about the location and movement of enemy by optimizing their battlefield execution against moving ground forces, The kick of detailed, accurate and timely The views erpmsed in this article am those oftheauthorandh not information influences how commanders plan and con- purportto rejlectthepositionof theDepartmentoftheAm-Y,theDepart- duct missions.6 J-STARS supports ground force com- ment of D@ense or atly other government ofice or agency.

MILITARY REVIEW � November - December 1996 23 targets A large variety of vehicle types would support an the revolution in dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK). escalating conflict: armored vehicles, artillery, pwtable J-ST~S will make vital DBK contributions, fmm pro- surveillance and tracking radars, muzzle velocity rwims, viding automated target recognition to providing data tactical communications jammers and portable air defense about an opponent’s operational scheme and networks. systems. The SA-6 missile that downed a US Alr Force Thus, J-STARS will be an integral player in battlespace F-16 over the former Yugoslavia, for example, was a self- awareness, target recognition, interopembility, data ex- propelled (SP) air defense system transported on a chan e rates and weapons’ reach, accuracy and effective- tracked, Russian-made chassis. The variety of SP ness.?6 One example is the Army’s Enhanced Position mounts, reload, transport and maintenance vehicles that Location Reporting System, which helps field command- support mobile SAM systems is extensive. Therefore, ers ptwisely locate friendly and enemy vehicles. 17 with the E-8C and GSMS, field commanders will have an Armed with J-ST~S information, commanders will instant assessment of an aggressor’s readiness to use these determine more accurately what forces they need to meet combat and combat support vehicles to conduct short- any enemy aggression. Perhaps a potential aggressor’s notice, high-tempo attacks. Thus, a wide variety of t.ime- awareness that we have a very accurate picture of his critical. priority target arrays can be attacked, including intentions and can sufficiently counter the tlmat he poses theater ballistic missiles and their associated transporter- will serve as a powerful deternmt. Implementing J- erector-launcher vehicles. In this case. J-STARS will STARS doctrine into command, control, communications prove integral to future theater air defense operations. and intelligence forces is just beginning to occur. Suflice Because J-STARS provides highly accurate radar im- it to say, the enemy’s intentions, like the nxondite Mino- agery in all but the most severe weather, battlefield conti- taur of Cretian legend, will not be as indiscernible as in sion, exemplified by Pierre fmrn Tolstoy’s War and past conflicts. bed with incisive information from J- Peace, will be significantly reduced. STARS, modem battlefield commanders will deal poten- tial enemies the same fate dealt the Minotaur, who met Force Application his end at the bludgeon of the heroic Theseus. MR Many people are unaware of J-STARS’ role in force application, thinking it is simply “another sensor” out NOTES there, emptying data into a pool for joint intelligence anal- 1 Ralph Peters, “Afterthe Revoiubon,”Parwneters (Summer 199S), 7. ysis. However, t.lmugh its ability to provide pmcedura.1 2 ~J+T~Sgmtim_s_~avwdti__Md- ule (GSM) but may alternately Incfude chffweti mwwatwe that @orrrrs the same control, the E-8C’S cent.mllem directly contribute to the air runctlorl. 3. CPT Joe R@saccI, “JcintSTARS, Impact m&it=tw&lcc#ne”, (Lan@ey interdiction (AI) effort, directing fighter-bombers as they Pir Fcwe Base, Vlt Px, land, Sea AuMcaww owlshad oa- attack enemy movement before enemy elements deploy FIW,3. Rossam sanexperwmd tac&offmrwtio has be&assig&ttob J-ST~ prugramfwtlvee years, Hehasbaenparticularty effedvein the J-STARS sys- ff~rbattle or become hadened and wetted. After hand- tem’s mch@e capsbiiii to the fo&ronf of the pid cwnmmty% Oplrla)ns* posi- tiO~~adv~arahBovm,basedon hands+n~e~~ off fmrn the Airborne Warning and Cent.d System the E-8+%C anmft, whii tndudes missiom ti~WPPOr’t Of@@OfI@?tErnk3V- (AWACS), fighters such as F-15Es or F- 16CS can contact m. 4. US Army Field MarNJsI(FM) 34-25-1, &r?t SwwUar@ the E-8C for target information and tasking. For example, tm w STARS] (kvashngton, DC: US c+wernmant _T*&%]Y& 1995).,.2-12. an F- 15E pilot may be told to conduct armed reconnais- 5 Rossacu, 1. sance along a road and attack enemy convoys, or an 6 ItM., 2. 7. FM 100-7, C%msIW Fwce 7he Armyrn 7heater QxnMons (WashIrgtcm, DC: F- 16C pilot may be given an ama where he is to dest.my GPO, May 1995), 5-1. 8. Itmd.,A-23. enemy tanlcs. Although the specific targets are not pre- 9. FM M-25-1, 1-1 and l-2 planned in these instances, the pilots may be able to plan 10. Ibid., 1-3. 11. Rossacci, 1. their routes and select their armaments using information 12. FM lIX-7, 5-1. provided by J-ST~S. Immediate (askings may occur if J-STARS locates a high-value target that should be de- {kT%L~&Y”3(L-&-l@3-5, Qwatrms ($&stingtwr, DC: GPO, ha 1993), 8-2. ‘m 15.~JFACCml*ti~hk~=-b-%~ stroyed or if the joint forces air component commander Center. (JFACC) tells E-8C o ators to redirect fighters against 16. Stuart E. JMrrsorr and Martin C. IjbicId, t%rniwwi3aa@am Krw$@c+h _E@W~on, ~~~~nse~preSS, ~, IW5). a high-priority target. 1Y 17. Tomvknowledoe, there arenoolmsto mccmcmte or cordate the JSTARS md Enharwed Pasrtion I&awn RepoftIfi S@ern (#LRS) Wchno@w. Howwr, Ulls s By sparing fighter time and effort in hunting targets, not beyofrd therealmofpossbly. Fwm,EP~SsM~Wr~~mm@tid- J-STARS will enable the JFACC to do AI more efflcient- vanced techncrkqes assmated wth DBK.

F Iy. Ck~se air support (CAS) is normally performed by \ controllers aboard the EC- 130 Airborne Command and Major Je~ C. Aljie6 US Air FOX%is thechtij Aerospace Control Center (ABCCC), which funnels CAS aircmft to ControlDivisioh32dAir OperationsGroup,RamSteinAir Basq a forward air controller (FAC) who directs the terminal Germany He receiveda BA. from the University of Marykmd and an M.A. jiom California State Universip and is a graduate of attack. However, because the Air Force has only seven the Joint Air Operatwns Staff Course and the Allied Air Fonxs ABCCC aircraft, the E-8C may inherit a larger CAS mle Central Europe TacticalLeadership Program. He has held a va- when an ABCCC aircraft is not available. The E-8C con- riep of command and staff pon”dons in the ContinentalUnited trollers could send information about vehicles-tracked, States and Europe, blcluding chief Airborne Command and wheeled or unknown---dkctly to CAS aircraft if an Control System Plans, US Central Command Air Forcq Shaw ABCCC or a FAC is unavailable. However, even with Air Fore Base, South Carolina; chiej Training TacticsDew40p- the ABCCC and FAC in the picture, J-STARS informa- ment Sectiotb Trainhlg Wng (NATO), and NATO A WACS evab - tion will help the ABCCC or FACS prioritize targets, ator (jighter locator), Geil&hen Air Basq Germany; weap- ons and tactics ofice~ Ist Squadq NA1’OAWACS, Geilenkir- helping to build pilots’ overall situational awareness. chen; and jlight commanck~ Counterair Tactics Awareness As a new system with many emerging capabilities, J- TrainingCourse, ~nakllAir Forre Base, Floriak. STARS is embarking upon new missions and enhancing L J

24 November - December 1996 c MILITARY REVIEW ...... _.— —

Lkmtenmt “CplonelDavidL“-i~~~d LieutemmtCok)nd Rkhard E B- US Army Rieserve

UIUNGTHE Laduna M&aiven em the D w Army Commmdm m chief (ma) h Korea and Europe voiced a need for “3-D map dis- plays”fw #wir warf@Mng forces. In 1994, Lieu- am##’w#e pd@4wMatquqwrr#q? tenant CkmeraiJohn E. Mdler, commanderof the *a bdkthdkihit&Si@ d3nmp Us Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort H+~, acwmp@rw&hdk&#titi L&tv@nw~ Kansas, was tasked to review the rw- imkml?r&’@h?daStdmmk?p. quimment. After conductingan analysis,Mdkr changedthe misskmfbm a requirement for “3-D Wrain” to a requirement to write a concept with “a systems which support it. We then discuss the dW]- deeper perception of the needs of commanders of culties of defining the concept and the attempts to the 21st century.”1 Miller tasked the US Army operationalize the art of battlefield visualization. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pro- gram Integration Office-tiy Battle Command Battlefield Visualization as a Science System (TPIO-ABCS) and the US Army Command The BV concept includes these general categories and General Staff College (USACGSC) Concepts related to science and technology. We will examine and Doctrine Directorate (CDD) to comprehensive- each of these “axes.” ly addms battlefield visualization (BV). In 1996, � Ten-ah visualization. current CAC Commander Lieutenant General L.D. � Man-machine interfaces. Holder directed the Center for Army Leadership � Modeling and simulation. (CAL), Fort Leavenworth, to become involved in � Planning an operation and subsequent rehearsal BV’S human dimension. of the plan. It is generally accepted that battle command pro- Terrain visualization (TV). TV is the ability to ficiency is the key element in mission success. cognitively process terrain’s likely effects on an op- Battle command’s cornerstone is BV. TRADOC eration. This capability, an essential field soldier Pamphlet (Pam) 525-70, Battlefield Plsuali:ution skill, is much more than a “3-D map” on a computer Concept, states that battlefield visualization is “the display. TV is the ability to look at a ma-r other process whereby the commander develops a clear depiction of the earth’s surface-and be able to understanding of the current state with relation to visualize the effects of the elevation data contour the enemy and environment, envisions a desired end lines, although there are other methods of themati- state ... and then subsequently visualizes the se- cally showing relief and topography. Terrain also quence of activity that moves the commander’s includes feature data, such as swamps, forests, des- force from its current state to the end state.”z BV, erts and all other natural obstacles that a force can like battle command, has both art and science com- use to its advantage or the enemy’s demise. Terrain ponents. To be effective, leaders must discover the includes man-made and cultural objects, such as appropriate balance between BV’S art and science bridges, roads, churches and museums. TV is mom and maintain it. than just contour line interpretation. This article focuses on the science of battlefield The traditional paper map, a depiction of the visualization to provide information about many earth’s surface as seen from above and drawn to current initiatives, as well as about the conceptual scale, is still the bottom line in TV. The need for

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 25 paper maps will exist for the foreseeable future. Man-machine interfaces. This BV mpect looks The way ahead points to digital maps that can be intensively at the cultural gap between the computer displayed on computers. Advantages to the digital community and the military. The scientists and en- approach are as follows: gineers who build our computer systems are not sol- . Scale. Digital map products allow users to diers. Soldiers, particularly maneuver commanders “zoom in.” and their staff ofilcers, assimilate large quantities of � vector map products. V6ctor maps, unlike bit- data, analyze it and make decisions. The military mapped images, allow tduction and expansion of decision-making process is a synthesis of available an entire map. If enough data has been collected on information and the decision maker’s own life expe- a specific ~ the computer display can theoretically riences. “Military personality” does factor into the show terrain at scales of 1:5000 or mom, an order process and manifests itself as the individual’s of magnitude better than standard military maps. “likes” and “dislikes” in how he digests data, mak- � 3-D capabilities. Given sufficient elevation ing this a critical element. data and computer-processing power, 3-D terrain Therefore, the information computer designers views m possible. However, there is a caveat: 3-D add to a display must be presented to fit the user’s map capability does not guarantee all “overlay da~” experience and personality and the job tasks de- such as friendly and enemy situations, can operate tailed by the operations analyst. This display tailor- in consonance with the 3-D map. 3-D displays will ability adds user-friendly aspects to the system and allow significant battlefield analysis, but it comes focuses commanders’ and staff ofllcers’ attention with a cost. on significant information that might otherwise be- � kfensura/ion. This is the technique of making come lost in a sea of data. meamrements off the map. Today’s digital maps Display devices and human-facto~ engineering provide a wide range of capabilities that will fit prw+entanother challenge. The command post (CP) transpanmtly into military operations and planning. environment is unique. Thus, the CP tactical user Mobility analysis will become relatively effortless, needs a variety of computer display devices that do and other applications can take advantage of the not exist in the commercial sector, which is the usual computer’s numberaunching ability. source of computer technology. The business world Computer-based TV also has several drawbacks: understands desktop monitom that m engineered for � Data bases and updates. Someday, organiza- a single user. Commanders and staff planners work tions will build data bases of the enti~ world’s to- in a tactical operations center, where they do a lot pography, with the capability to update that informat- of highly interactive, collaborative thinking in front ion and supply it to all the forces who need it. It of a map saturated with data. The computer display will be an enormous undertaking that will depend on must be engineered for operational planning. how much of the defense budget we am willing to The division and echelons above it need displays commit to it. Wkhout a major technological breakt- that can portray both the friendly and enemy situa- hrough, this may take years. tions, the digital map and all operational symbols . Communications. Maintaining the data base in and other geometry on a very large wall unit which a “sanctu~” with the United States means we allows collaborative staR planning. Brigades and must have a way to distribute the information. battalions need displays that will fit in tents, com- Whether terrain data is distributed over a commu- mand and control vehicles and standardized inte- nication system via a disk or printed circuit card, the grated CP shelters. Company commanders need amount of information to be transported to the end displays they can operate during armored or dis- user adds to the cost of obtaining the terrain resource. mounted fights. � Wtilt happens }t’hen the computer dies? Our Modeling and simulation. Modeling and simu- US Marine Corps bdmn quickly point out that a lation involve a continuum of activities ranging paper map with a bullet hole in it is still a map. from training evaluation and military operation However, a computer with a bullet hole in it is better (TEMO), to advanced concepts and requirements defined as a door stop.3 (ACR), to research development and acquisition Digital maps are not conceptual—they are reality (RDA). BV touches each modeling and simulation and we must assimilate this technology expeditious- discipline, with digital terrain the most common de- ly and without protest. Army Chief of Staff General nominator. ACR and RDA focus more on BV’S de- Dennis J. Reimer called digital terrain BV’S “long velopmental aspects+hey are the tools of analysts pole in the tent.”q There are many long poles in the and the shapers of new warfighting doctrine. tent, but the digital terrain pole is without question TEMO is a very broad subject and much more apt one of the longest. to affect field soldiers’ lives.

26 November - December 1996 “ MILITARY REVIEW TEMO, and its many capabili- ties, can be used to teach skills at the individual level. The Army already uses tank, field artillery and helicopter simulators. The student gets real-time feedback and an after-action review of his exercise performance. TEMO has an impact on all echelons, from the rifle squad to the corps staff. Units training at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, or the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, Ger- many, come in contact with simu- lated forces. They fight battles against real enemies—the NTC Soldiem, pati”cukwly maneuver commanders and their or CMTC opposing force (OP- sti!oflcers, assimikzte kzrge quantities of data, analyze it and FOR)---and virtual enemies—the make deciskms. The miltiry deciswn+naking process is a syn- Synthetic Theater of War forces. thesis of avaikzble informahon and the deciswn makerk own life However, staffs may not have expem”ences.“Military pemonality” does factir into the process the opportunity to travel to a com- and manifests &elf as the individual “likes” and “dislikes” in bined arms maneuver training area that offers everything the how he digests data, making this a critical element. NTC offers. For them, a virtual exercise will be conducted in their own CPS but will be “plugged into” a simulation nied terrain. They can now see their own positions that provides a robust OPFOR and a full “blue force from 3-D computer displays just as the OPFOR sees complement.” them. In the next logical step, we ask that the opposing � Trvops. The blue forces are arrayed in counter- “red’ force be upgraded to match the enemy we ex- position to the enemy. The commander can “see” pect to encounter in a deployment area. Further, we the disposition of his own force, thanks to the modu- ask that the friendly or “blue” force’s data base con- larity provided by the blue force’s data base and the tain “real-world” contingency data. If we really be- location updates the computem automatically post to lieve we train as we intend to fight, then we have the situation map or data base. almost accomplished a very significant step. � 7_imea~wil(ible. The addition of time to the sim- The tactical/operational decision-making ulation facilitates war gaming. This occurs interac- process @laming). Planning, rehearsing and exe- tively in response to the courses of action (COA..) cuting an operation are the summation of the BV staff planners built during the tactical decision- axes. Because the process is driven by mission, en- making process. The ABCS allows collaboration emy, troops, terrain-time, all parameters have been and the opportunity for the staff to test each COA met a.. follows: either in mal time or at .aneven faster pace. The staff � Mission. The force’s mission is clear and is can develop plan branches and sequels and test them highlighted by computer graphics and display sym- in a “fa..t-forward” mode. bols soldiers understand. The commander and his principals can brief the . Enemy. The enemy is templated, aggregated staff work at a display depicting the entire force’s and arrayed on the computer display and can interact area of operation and influence. The display can be with staff planners for war gaming. scaled m needed to give the planners the exact view � Terrain. The terrain is depicted m a map back- they need in either two or three dimensions. ground, scaleable and capable of visually depicting Rehearsal capabilities. When the commander weather effects, soil type and condition and slope approves the plan and transmits it to subordinates, and elevation. Map updates appear m overlay data the force can interactively rehearse the operation. without cumbersome acetate wall hangings. The While this can be done at the force-level CP, sub- commander and planners have visual access to de- ordinate commanders and their principals also can

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 27 — —

increases in operating tempo, battle space and infor- Historically, we dkvebped critkal mation in the 21st century, it seems unlikely this information thkcemment skills through yearn strategy will adequately address our needs. After of e~en”ence in tactical or troop assignments. conducting a mission analysis, it became clear to As the Army tmnsitims to aforce where CAL that the most pressing requirement was to im- kwdivs will spend less time in those assign- prove leaders’ critical information discernment menl$ no comsponding Stmtegy exti to skills. adkquutely adllressthiskey kderdevelopment A key conceptual BV skill requirement is critical need....A consistktilkadershotioming is information discernment. 7 Historically, we devel- oped critical information discernment skills through the inabihly to detmni”ne whatinfomution is years of experience in tactical or troop assignmen~s. cdical and then to pmpedy package and As the Army transitions to a force whe~ leaders quickly disseminate thut information to the will spend less time in those assignments, no com- appmpde kwel. We hy@hesized that there sponding strategy exists to adequately address this mi”ghtbe a direct relhtibnship between the key leader development need. A review of findings kzck of improvement in discerning crdical in- from previous Army Warilghting Experiments formation and the lack of helbpment and (AWES), Battle Command Training Program assessmentof concern competencies. (BCTP) Warfighter Exemises and Combat Training Center rotations indicates that a consistent leader shortcoming is the inability to determine whaf infor- interactively rehearse the operation using remote mation is critical and then to properly package and displays. As the operation unfolds, the commander quickly disseminate that information to the appropri- will articulatehis intent for the operation in a single ate level. We hypothesized that the~ might be a di- purpose statement and can express his intent graphi- rect ~lationship between the lack of improvement in cally as his force closes with the enemy en route to discerning critical information and the lack of de- the objective. velopment and assessment of conceptual competen- ties. The question became how to assess that possi- BaUlefield Vlwalization as an Art bility in a cost-effective and critical manner. TRAI)Oc Pam 525-70 tells us that BV is develo- To better understand the problem, CAL-with ped “through training, practice, experience, wis- the support of researchers from the Army Research dom and available battle command technologies.”5 Institute (ARI) and Industrial College of the Armed The “art” obviously derives from the experience Forces (ICAF)--developed a BV case study that and wisdom portions of the equation. Experience explored commander and staff critical information and wisdom, coupled with intuition, give the com- discernment performance and its relationship to con- mander the intellectual background required to de- ceptual capacity. This initiative was undetien at termine what information on the battlefield is criti- Fort Leavenworth during the PRAIRIE WMRIOR cal. The challenge we face is developing these 1996 (PW 96) AWE in May 1996. We exploredthis attributes and articulating a requirement for them. relationshipby studying 50 Command and General As cognitive attributes or conceptual competencies, Staff College Ofllcer Course (CGSOC) students their development does not fit into the typically lin- during PW 96 who served as commanders, chiefs ear training strategies the Army is accustomed to. of staff and primary staff officers. Our first step was We know many leaders develop these skills, given to measure their current conceptual capacity. enough experience, but we are not sure how to ana- We used two psychological testing instruments to lyze all that relevant experience to identify explicit measure conceptual capacity before the exercise. principles or processes. Emerging leadership doc- The first was a modified version of the Career Path trine ident~les tkme categories of competencies: Appreciation used at ICAF. The second instrumen~ technical, interpersonal/communicative and concep- Biodata, measured conceptual capacity using bio- tual. The Army has invested signiflca.nt ~sources graphical data. ICAF and ARI experts interpreted to design formal programs that develop the fwst two the results and returned them to Fort Leavenworth. categories but has virtually ignored conceptual The second step was to measure critical informa- skills development.b tion discernment behaviors observed and assessed Historically, we have assumed that formal pro- during PW 96. Observers, who wem primarily grams which develop conceptual skills were umec- BCTP observer/controllers and CGSOC tactics essary. Our leaders generally could acquire the req- instructors, were given a critical information uisite skills on their own. Given the expected scomheet for daily observations. Additionally, an

28 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW INFORMATIONOPERATIONS

ARI 360-degree assessment instrument-called to address these additional aspects of BV’S human Azimuth—measured leader competencies, includ- dimension and to assist in the design of strategies that ing problem solving and critical information dis- ackkss conceptual competency development. cernment behavior Although we discovered nothing earth-shattering, As with many studies, this one raised more ques- we have a better appreciation of just how far we still tions than it answered. After conducting the statisti- have to go. With a few resources and the commit- cal analysis, we gleaned the following insights:8 ment of additional bright minds, we can take some . Measuring information discernment perfor- steps forward in developing training strategies that mance by observation was difficult but not impossi- will prepare our leaders conceptdkzlly for the chal- ble. We believe this was the first time critical infor- lenges ahead. mation discernment behaviors had been measured The science of BV is relatively straightforward. this way. As a resul~ normative or doctrinal stand- We are looking for the tools commanders need to ards did not exist for comparison. We suspect that help them in the decision-making process. These the critical information discernment measure needs include improved mapping and terrain visualization, mo~ testing and nfmement. computer displays, automated decision aids and ro- . We think our observers became more profi- bust communications. cient in observing critical information discernment The art of BV has more subtle implications. It performance as their experience increased. Im- challenges us to think about the way leaders cog- provements in observer training are likely to in- nitively approach problem solving and decision crease that proficiency. making. The challenge for many of us will be dis- � We suspect that conceptual capacity is probably cussing unfamiliar concepts, which makes us un- not the single predictor of critical information dis- comfortable. The BV effort is not only concerned cernment success but probably one of several. As with automating tasks but with learning about hu- such, it is likely that the relationship between critical man strengths and limitations in the anticipated in- formation age environment.9 Working with the information discernment and conceptual capacity is disciplines of psychology and behavioral science is not simple and straightforward but complex and essential for us to determine an adequate needs as- moderated by variables that have not been identified sessment and, most important, to develop workable completely. strategies to enhance leaders’ critical information � Several important variables-such as group discernment performance. MR cohesion, lack of an actual rank hierarchy, motiva- tion and experience-were not assessed in this case NOTES 1. LTG John E. Miller gave ihia guidanca during a TPIO-ABCS lmelirg at FciI Laa- study, therefore limiting the ability to generalize the vemwlh, KS, KI hklV 1994, 2. US Army TraInmg and Doctrine CQMmand (lWU30C) Pamphlet (Pam) 525-7o, findings to tactical or troop units. This suggests the 8aff/@M Vii&w Campt &@ton, DC: US Gwemrnent Printing Offm lGPO1. 1 October 1995). 2 need to conduct futu~ studies with individuals in ‘ 3.%6 statement &-made during a briafing by LTC Joe Ketch @Vaahingtm, OC: actual tactical or troop assignments. Haa@xvtera, DqarWmt oflhe/Wny, 20 Juna 1996), 4. Awny Chief of St#GENDannia J. Reirner madettwcwnnwmt � Refinement in the measures for critical informa- Aecsbrla 5 amP%&7wmtia’F”a- in*”Tg am- tion discernment and other conceptual competencies 6. E. Khevar, W. Lynch, M. MatttI&, T. Owana au3 J. Spears, “Striki a Balance in Laa+w O@@opmant ACaaafor Cmcg@aj (lm@amX,”lVati Ro- is essential. The standard on which the measums m~ Papr Sariea 9242 (CamMdga, MA: Fkward Uniwaily,% 1 ), 37. should be based is demonstration of ability. This pro- 7 TRADoc Pam 525-70 3 vides a possible focus for fu~ mseamh and training development efforts. Follow-up studies m needed

Lieutenant Colonel David L. Simpson is a leaakr devehptnent action ofice~ Leader Development @ice, > Center for Army Leadership, Fort Leavenworth Kimsas. He received a BA. from OkMwma State Universip and an MA. from the University of Okkdloma and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Stafl College. He has held a variety of command and staflpositions in the Continental United Sates, Kowa and Australiq including plans ofice~ Australian Army 1st Divhiot~ Etwggera Barrach, Queenslat4 Austrahh; S3, 1st Battaliotq 87th IJfantty Re@nen4 atulS3, Divhwn Support Cotnmat~ 10th Mountain Diviwbn (Light), Fort Druq New York ass&ant professor of military science, Norwich University, North@~ Vermont; and executive oficeq 4th Battaliorh 31st lnfantty Regimen4 Fort Silt Oklahoma. Lieutenant Colonel Richard 1?Browq US Army Reserve, is the telecommunications manager for the Battle Command Proponenq Divisiot~ US Army Traking and Doctrine Command Program integration Ofice- Army Battle Command Systems, Fort Leavenwoti Kansa~ and serves with the 5052d Logistics Comnuuti Belto~4Missouri. He received a B.S. fim the University of Massachusetts and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Sta~ College and the US Army Management StaflCollege. His former positions in- clude telecommunications manage~ Combined Arms Development Activity, and tekcornmunicadon.s manage~ Deputy Commanding General for Combat Developmen&, CombinedArms Cente~ Fort Leavenworth; andjield a~”lkty specialist, Tactical Data Systems, Directorate of Combat Developments, Fort Sil( Okkzhoma. )

MILITARY REVIEW . November – December 1996 29

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CaptainChristopherD. Kolend~ US Army

EADERSHIP, unquestionably the decisive L element in the successfid conduct of military plans and operations,has formed the backbone of ef- fective armies from classical antiquity to today. However, the current technological revolution in modern wark has prompted some to quest.io~ or dou~ leadership’s primacy as the Iinchpin for battle- field success. This “revolution:’ many technocrats suggesg will fundamentally change both leadership’s nature and the way leaders control their units. Sim- ply stat@ they believe technological innovation will Rpk kadership as the driVing force behind miii- tary effitiveness. I believe the proponents of this argument aIE con- fused about kadership’s nature and the ftiom that should influence the way leaders control their units. a transformation in the “characteristic styks of mili- T~hnology is a product of human ingenuity. It deals tary leadership.” Whereas in the pas~ the supnme with the hands, and while it does affect leader and commander and SW planned an operation and then soldier skills and competencies, it is a neutral fxtor spent the next day or two letting the “machine [the in the relationship between leader and led. Leader- mihtmy organization] conduct its initial operations ship, on the other hand is an agent of the mind. It on virtual autopilog” an aide today would most likely focuses on developing the quality of human interac- fmd the field marshal pacing back and forth at an tion between the senior and subordinate. Further- electronic command post (CP), talking to pilots or more, the way leaderscontroltheirunits dependspri- tank commander on the tint line by radio and marily on organizational maturity, not technology. maybe peeking over their shouldem via remote cam- Undemanding this will allow the US Army to keep eras. All this, Cohen contends, raises the profound technology in its proper place as the mind’s servant. problem of centdization of authority: “Although all military organizations pay lip servkz to delegation of Will Twhnobgy Change maximum authority to the lowest levels of com- the Way We Lead? man~ few military leaders can resist the temptation Eliot A. Cohen argues that% a period of rwolu- to dabble in their subordinates’ business.”3 tionmy change in the conduct of war, difkrent kinds As Cohen insightfully suggests, the Armed of people-not simply the same people difknmtly Forces’ technological nwolution raises some impor- . tmmed+ise to the top of armed services.”l While tant issues about the nature of command and leader- military Oqpimtions still need specialists in direct ship as we enter the 21st century. His argument combat “the new technologies will incnxi.singly implies that if we am to filly exploit our new bring to the fom the expert in missile operations, the technology’s capabilities, we must change our lad- space general and the electronic warhe Wizard.”z ership style. Furthermore, he believes that develop- Cohen says technology’s changing nature demands ments such as digitizadoq remote sensoring and a

MILITARY REVIEW . November-December 1996 31 mture does change with technological innovatio~ The second assumption k equally analyzing leadership solely in terms of evolving

Mktakenm.. m 7herwsona &9adefoptsfbrmom “styles” may be plausible. However, we would have cWtnlMdordSenMWdcontdhas #ttbto to accept the troubling notion that as a result of de- dowRhtechndug)L Ane&cUVekMkrse&?c& grees of technological developmen~ humanity has an “ c#mttv/mdholi&Medon his devolved into a series of di.flerent species across cul- ~7- kMWmsoft?U@tWning tures and throughout history. At its very minirn~ k?W!ls&fsufWdMe IemM!?’ -** notwithstanding the more egregious implications, abllitib~ As an orga@ation matunx along such a contention suggests that studying past leaders these lines, contd moves tiom centrabd to is superfluous because their technologies were much decentfahzed .... In this wa~ ofganhations difkrent fkom ours In his study of Genemls Geo~e move away horn mere technological efficiency C. Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisen- toward the maim of human effectiveness. hower and Gecxge S. Patton, Edgar F. Puryear sug- gests that “the study of -t captains and the classi- cal writers on war will always be necessary in the commander’sabilityto sit invisiblyor “cybernetica- development of military leaders, for wam will always lly”in an aimmil cockpit or tank turret neaxsitate a be won by men. Wmpons may change, but not hu- movement iiom decentmlized to centralkd author- man natwe.”5 If human nature mnains the same de- ity. In sho~ technological innovations have anti- spite technological advances, then motivating human quated our old ideas about leadership’s natw. Our beings must also have an enduring quality. Thus, new technology demands a new kind of leader. leadership, the dynamic of human motivation, is as Cohen’s argumen~ an example of the technology timeless as human natw. Diffenmt leaders have dif- paradi~ mts on two central assumptions. First he ferent styles, but leadership’s subskwce does not implies that technological evolution engenders a fun- change. damental change in human natw, a sort of techno- Beneath the cigar

32 November -December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW “Mhough d mh’%wyoganizatkms pay lip semke to dekgatbn of maximum authority“ to the kmvest*vek of command *W military leaders can resist the temptation to dWMe in their subordinates’ business.” As Cohen insightfully suggests, the Anneal Fomes’ technological revolutkm mikes some important isues about the Mum of command and kadwship as we enter the Zlst century His atgunent implks that if we am to My exploit our new technobgyk capabilities, we must change our leadership style. current technological revolution will change the face coed is pushed. One who is led follows willingly. of battle again, but we must never allow the human Following connotes a voluntary act done of one’s spirit to fade in the fog of technology. Leadership’s own accord. A leader’s task is to inspire this volun- substance inspires this spirit, beginning on the in- tary action. In other worcks leadership rneam to in- side through the leader’s character and vision and spiw the spirit and act of followership. then moving outside to the organization in the form To inspire followemhip, the leader must accom- of a healthy, winning culture. plish two things. Firs~ he must provide a coherent di~ction that people will voluntarily follow through Defining Leadership the future’s uncertainty. This di~ction takes the form Deftig leadership is difficult but necessary if we of character and vision-the “inside” of leademhip. m to fi.dly understand the substance beneath its People will vohmtarily follow only when they be- styles. For example, simply deftig leadership as “a lieve in the leader as a pemon (character) and in the process by which a soldier influences others to ac- direction the leader wishes to tie the organization complish the mission,” blurs the line between lead- (vision). Second, the leader must establish a healthy, ership and coercion, because coercion is also a way winning cultw when people will work together and to gain compliance. 7 A tyrant or dictator coerces excel-the “outside” of leadership. This cultuIe——— subjects to do his bidding, not fi-om a genuine, posi- environment or command climate-results when the tive desire but km fear of pm punishment or leader aligns performance results with shad organi- death. A subject does not follow but merely com- zational values. As the organizadonal culture ma- plies, doing just enough to get by. One who is tums, the leader taps into this excellence by moving

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 33 is the basis of what Stephen Covey, head of the Cov- ey kadership Center, calls “principle-centmd lead- ership.” According to Covey, “If there isn’t deep in- tegrity and fundamental character strength, the challenges of Me will cause true motives to surface and human relationship faihuv will Eplace short- term success ... It is character that communicates most eloquently ... IVhaJwe are communicatesfar mow eloquently than anything we say or do.”8 In establishingthe principles of argumeng Aristotle tells us that “moral character. .. constitutes the most ef- fective form of Persuasion.’” Principles of character form a leader’s behavior foundation and the r&tion- ship between him and subordinates. Principles pro- vide consistency and predictability, forming the basis of decision making. Principleantemd leadership gives us a coherent basis to molve competing ethi- cal, personal and interpemonal demands mponsibly, ptictably and consistently. Ancient philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca saw the principles of morality as grounded in the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, justice, courage and moderation (self- discipline), from which all other virtues spring. US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, A4ilitaryLead- ership, lists 11 principles of leadership that present “universal and fundamental truths which have stood the test of time.” 10 It also lists the four indi- vidual values all soldiers must have-courage, candor, competence and commitment-as well as In his study of Gened& lkfaahal~ the “professional Army ethic,” which encompasses MacMhu~ Eisenhower and Patton, Ed@r E loyalty, duty, selfless service and integrity. 11While Pulywlr that ‘Ihe study of gleat these principles and values are important, we must captiihs ati!l%%skal Wtem on war WM simplify and condense them into a set of funda- ahvap be necessary Mhedeve@me nt of mental principles that embrace all these precepts m#taykadw@ rwamvi7/ahvaysbew onby and offer a more complete framework for decision men. kfi?apons IIMy Chf)@?, but not human making. nature.” If human nature mains the same The principles of trustworthiness, respect and car- despite technologld� adwanq then motivat- ing form the foundation for outstanding leaders and ing human beihgs must also have an endurihg soldiem, as well as for small units and large organi- ~om.12 Taken together, they express our COE quaq. 771U$IeadeWq � the d)mamic of human motivatkm, k as tknekss as human na- convictions, making our behavior, dationships and tue. M9kent kalfem flaw? MW?nt Styk$ but decisions consistent and pnxlictable and grounded in kademhijts substancedbesnotchange responsibility and good faith. This does not mean we will never make mistakes-only that we have the greatest probability of doing what is right and fi-om centralkmd to decentmlized control. Thus, to just in a given situation. When we combine trust- insphe followedip, we must understand the dynam- worthiness, respect for the dignity of others and car- ics of dinxtion and culture. ing for others’ well-being, we acquire a principle- Direction through Character and Viion centmd ~fenmce point to guide oumelves and our A leader first establishes coherent direction organizations. through principles of character. This pivotal notion To lead means to serve, not to rule, Seneca tells

34 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW LEIU)ERSHIP us. 13 Those who lead well am equally well obeyed. Trustworthiness, qxzt and caring lay the founda- Simp#y Mnihg kadersh@ as ‘h process by tion in character for leading well. They cut deeper which a soMier influences othem to aixompkh than style. A congenial personality or charisma may the mksioq” blum the line between k?adi?mh~ be helpfi.d superficially, but no amount of either can and coemion, because coemkmbakoawayto ever overcome a fundamental character defect. gain complkmce. A tyrant or dictator comes Leadership begins on the inside with these prin- subjects @& hh Wins not Iium a genuine ciples, which form the substance of the leader’s positive cksiie but fnnn &r of pain, punkhm4W character and make him a person subordinates want or death. A subject does not fo//ow but to emulate. merely complies, doing just enough to get bF The second component of coherent direction is One who is coerced is pushed. One who vision+mr desited end state or overriding goal. The is led follows willingly three elements of a proper vision statement-r commander’s intent-w deftition, simplicity and ent d.kvction, and the organization goes nowhere. believability. FirsL we must articulate exactly what The various tasks and plans become ends in and of it is we want to accomplish. Only with a clear goal themselves. Even if they m fulfilled the organizat- can we devise the appropriate means to achieve it. ion moves no closer to its goal, because the goal has Secon~ we must present the vision clearly and sim- lost its meaning. An organization is like a symphony ply so everyone in the organization can understand orches~ made up of different people with different and rwnember it. The vision is a concise statement roles and specialties. If everyone plays his own tune, or phrase that everyone can sink his teeth into; it is he may sound good himself, but the result as a whole not a well-crafted essay. This enables everyone to is noise and confusion. The symphony devolves into kmp in the fodi-ont of his mind whatever the leader a collection of individual instruments. When all am has defined as critically important. Third, the vision inspired by a common spirit and play to the best of must be believable-something attainable and im- their abilities, the result is music. Vkion provides a portant. When people believe in what they are do- foundation for the organization to work together m ing, the~ is no limit to what they can accomplish. a team toward a common goal. A clearly defm~ Aristotle, the student of Plato and tutor of Alexan- simple and believable vision focuses the energies and der the GreaL recognized the importance of a clearly actions of the organization’s leaders, soldierx and defined vision. “Whenever skill and knowledge smaU units in the proper direction. Harmony results, come into play, these two must be rnastemd: the end not chaos. and the actions which are the means to the end.” 14 Principles of character and clearly defined and ar- The end or the goal---the vision-provides a clear ticulated vision form effective leadership’s founda- sense of puqmse, enabling us to determine which tions. T&en together, they provide a cohenmt dire- means are appropriate and how to properly channel ctionpeople will voluntarily follow, and they inspti them. We decide on the vision first; the means and confidence in the organization. Trustworthiness, R- actions follow finm and must support it. Keeping spect and caring form the basis for decision making the end clearly in mind provides coherent direction in our behavior and relationships with others. Vi- for our actions. We make certain that whatever we sion provides the end state and serves as a focus for do on a given day does not violate the criteria we the organization’s plans and actions. When one have defined as sup~mely important. 15 When we component is absen~ the impetus for followenhip begin with the end in mind and use it to guide our begins to erode. Even if the vision is sound no one own and subordinates’ actions, we follow the Ger- will voluntarily follow a leader who is untmstwor- man poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s advice that thy, treats people with disrespect or does not care “things which matter most must never be at the for their well-being. At the same time, no one will mercy of things which matter least.” follow even a good person if they do not believe Vkion drives what we do and how we do i~ Tasks in the vision. Alexander the Great, never lacking and plans aR designed to accomplish the vision; they in charisma or martial prowess, suffered his only are the means. When a task or plan no longer sup- “defeat” at the hands of his own army when his sol- ports the vision, the plan must be changed or dis- diem rebelled on the Hyphasis River in I.mt@ be- carded to meet the new situation’s mdity. When we cause they no longer believed in his character and allow inappropriate tasks or plans to override the vi- the dkction he wished to take them. 16 Sound sion, the result is chaos. Everyone moves in a differ- principles of character and vision form leadership’s

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 35 —

To develop such an organizatio~ the leader must VWond@vemvhatwedoandhowwe&iL set an example people want to emulate in terms of Task andpkzns an desi@ed to accomplish the Esults and values. Leadership begins with the leader Won; they are the means When a task or *n and works out toward the organization. The leader no /onger sqwts the vkkm, the pkw must be can talk about results and values all he wants, but un- changed or discarded to meet the new situatbn’s less his words are consistent with actions, they are Iwlity When we allow ina~piate tasks or meaningless. Actions speak volumes. If the leader pkms to ovenkk the MOn, the A?@ i$ chaos. pays lip service to values but rewards personal com- Eveqmne moves in a MR!n?nf die, petition and individualism, people will opt for results and the oqanizatibn goes now~. 7W vafidus and dis~gard values. If people m in doubt whether tasks and pkms &ecome ends in and of them- results or values count more, they may also opt for selves Even ti they a~ fhlfil~ the oqanizatidn results because results are easy to measure. Either moves no *r to its goal 6ecause the goal case creates a results-only cuku~ and the “sickness” has M its meaning. that comes with it. The leader must determine the organization’s core inner core and provide the catalyst for creating an values and align his actions and policies with them. effective organizational culture. Just as trustworthiness, qxct and caring form the principles of character in leademhip, trusg respect Organizational Culture and caring should form an organization’s core val- When the leader aligns the principles of character ues. The leader makes these COIEvalues a M.@ by with vision, he establishes the foundation for collec- setting the behavioml example-’’wallcing the talk.” tive excellence by creating an oqynizational atmo- For example, if the leader talks about trust but ash sphere of genuine willingness. 17 Character and vi- a subordinate to do something unethical to avoid a sion together foster an environment of trust, which reprimand or cover up a mistake, then trust becomes is the primary sustaining value between leader and optional. What counts in this environment is “look- led. WM subordinates’ trus~ the leader develops a ing good,” not doing what is right, and subordinates healthy, wiming organizational culture. Culture will soon get thk message. constitutes the values, beliefs and customs of a given Likewise, if the leader talks about respect but be- society or collectivity; it is a coherent behavioml rates and belittles subordinates, his corrosive atti- framework in which people are expected to act vol- tude becomes acceptable in the organization. If the untarily. The leader must foster a healthy, winning leader talks about caring but neglects quality-of-life culture to unleash the soldiem’ natural desire to excel issues for soldiers and families or fails to provide and to channel those energies in a positive, cohenmt safe and realistic training, no one will believe that direction. caring is valued in the organization. If a leader The leader establishes such a culture by aligning considers teamwork to be a com value but sponsom desired performance results with positive, shared val- individual competition rather than competition ues. A performance-only culture is dangerous. Re- against a common performance standar& then he is sults without values inevitably leads to selfkh indi- actually rewarding selfish individualism. People vidualism and dysfunctional behavior. To be will try to “beat the other guy” instead of working effective, organizations must function as teams. together, because the leader has shown this is im- Selfish individualism is immature and destructive. It portant. results not only in orchestra members playing their Each organization must have a set of com values own tunes, but in their feverish attempts to outdo one to establish a cohenmt behavioml fkarnework that another and to stop at nothing to do it. The noise and unleashes people’s natural desk to excel. Organiza- confusion promote hostility, which becomes a cancer tional culture begins with the leader. When he sets that eats away at the inside of the organization, the example, he makes his weds ml and genuine. dooming it to ineffectiveness and stie. On the other Aligning performance results with positive, shared hand a culture emphasizing values without results, values leads to an environment of trust rather than while not dysfunctional, is merely inept. Such a unit fear. The leader must foster and develop this atmo- endangem itself and those around it. Only when we sphere An effective leader builds and leaves behind match performance Rsults with positive, shred val- an effective organization; an unprincipled leader ues do we get an outstanding organization whose leaves behind a dysfimctional one. A leader makes membem fimction as a healthy team. a decisive, long-lasting imprint on the organization.

36 November - December 1996 c MILITARY REVIEW LE/UIERSHIP

Methods of control A healthy, wiruing organizational culture springs fmm the leader’s character. As leadership moves from the inside ou~ the leader must establish consis- tent control within the organization. Unpredictable control methods lead to confusion. Frustration sets in when a leader haphazardly or arbitrarily employs diffe~nt control methods. People expecting mom relaxed control get upset when the boss sticks his nose in their business and dictates how they should perform a certain task. Those anticipating stricter control become baffled when they m reprimanded for failing to take filtiative. Just as fostering an envi- ronment of trust mquks consistency in character, developing a pdctable amount of space among subordinates and their units demands consistency in control. Control methods fall into four broad catego- ries: total, detailed, directive and apathetic. Each 77wthreesbnenhW aptqxwMon method has its own risks. statement+w commander’s intent+re Total contd is delusional, even in the information definition, simplicity and believability. First, age. No single person can ever control every aspect we must articulate exact/y what it i$ we want to of and every human being in an organization, al- accomplish. On/y with a clear goal can we though some will try. Total control is an extime form of micromanagement-a zerodefect mentahy Wise the appnpWe means to achieve iL based on an absolute fear of mistakes. In opting for Seam@ we must present the Won&a@ and total control, the leader makes the statement that he simply so everyone in the on@zation can trusts no one in the organization. In the extreme f= undhtand and remember it 7he Won ik a that something might go amiss, the leader tries to concise stah?ment or phtase that everyone can control everything and everybody. Mistakes m in- sink his teeth into; it is not a well+rat?ed essaF tolerable; initiative nonexistent. The hyperactive 7M enables everyone to ksep in the Ibrehnt field marshal with a penchant for peering cybernet- of his mind whatever the leader has defined ically over the shoulders of individual tank com- as critically important. Third, the vision manders exemplifies the absurdity of total control. 18 must be believabl~omething attainable People end up simply doing what they are told-no and important. mo~, no less. The leader has little sense of what is important; everything is a priority. This organization dinates must do everything. Personal growth op- may do some things well but will never improve be- portunities are great but rare. The chances of hitting yond a superficial level. In attempting to eliminate the lottery aR one in several million and so are the all risk of mistakes, the leader eliminates all opportu- chances of this organization’s being effective. nity for sustained growth. People are not expected Apathetic control creates a vacuum, and someone to learn or take initiative. They are merely required will step in to fill it At that poin~ the~ is no longer to do what they are told. This control method is sim- apathetic control, only a figurehead occupying a ilar to saving your money by stufling it into a mat- leadership position. Someone else is running the tmss. By risldng nothing and trusting no one, you organization. gain nothing in Eturn and mortgage the future to ir- The two extremes are clearly inappropriate: One rational fear. is a tyranny; the other a vacuum. However, they Apathetic conlrol is the opposite. It is a gamble, do establish the extreme limits—the outer like playing the lottery. The leader places no con- boundaries---+f control. This leaves the middle trols whatsoever within the organization, giving no two---detailed and directive control-which are both guidance, providing no R.sources and offering no acceptable. Both methods, however, have risks. One plans. It is an exbeme form of “make it happen” accepts risk in the positive direction, focusing pri- leadership-a complete abdication of responsibility. marily on preventing downside risk. The other ac- Anything goes; there is no coordination. The subor- cepts risk in the negative direction, choosing to

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 37 make decisions and that people have a natural desk 7hefeadermustckMermihe theoqpn- to excel and will try to accomplish the goal to the izatbnb com w31uesand a#n his actibns and best of their abilities. The leader provides control policies with them.... 7W Ieadw makes these through dirwtion. He clearly states the g~ pr- com values a reality by setting the behavioral ovidesguidance and resources and offers a plan with exzunpl+’’walking the tak” For exam~ if the the best probability of success, given the cu.mmt situ- had?r talks about trust but asks a subordinate to ation and anticipated changes. Subordinates are not do somethi~ unethical to avoid a qrimand or only guired but expected to use their initiative cover upamk#ake@entrustbecomes “ when the plan no longer dlects the nm.lity of a What couti in this mhunment &‘ z 9%? changing situation. The leader expects them to nx- go@ ’’not doihg what is q~ and subodities ognize and exploit opportunities fmt and then report wiWoongetthWneSage. their actions. The leader seeks to achieve unity of effort by using the goal to channel everyone’s ener- mitigate risk by positive grwvth. gies in the proper dinxtion. This method emphastis Detailed control is the stricter method. It rests on trust Dkective control does not mean units ~ run- the twofold assumptionthat those at the top are mom ning “winy nilly” throughout the battlefield. Their likelyto make good decisionsthan those at loweror- efforts are dirwted toward a common goal, and they ganizationallevels,and that left to their own devices, are trusted to work together and do their best to people will naturallystray. The decision-makingau- achieve that goal. When they see a better way to thority remains solely with the leader, who clearly mch the goal, they a quired to do it without statesthe goalsand means to achieve them. Subordi- waiting for orders. nate leaders have little space to make decisions and Directive control accep~ the risk of mistakes or exemise initiative outside of some very narrowly de- short-term decline in order to achieve long-te~ sus- fined boundaries. The leader provides detailed in- tained growth and excellence. Giving subordinates structions on what to do and how to do it and expects the initiative to exploit opportunities entails accepting subordinates to carry out his plan exactly as written. that a subordinate may make a mistake. Honest mis- Achieving unity of effort through strict coordination takes should be learning opportunities, not bases for is the primary means of accomplishing the goal. castigation; otherwise, the foundation of trust tim Through rigid adhenmce to detailed plans, this con- subordinate to leader will erode and the subordinate trol method focuses on mitigating the risk of mist- will be far less likely to take initiative again. The akes and faih.m. Initiative is neither nqukd nor leader exercising dimtive control, therefore, must expected. As long m subordinates stick to the plan, “hedge” against downside risk but must do it posi- the oqymkation will usually achieve its goal. tively. These hedges come in the form of guidance, Problems arise with MISmethod because external initiative and training. factors are not always cooperative. When the situa- Initially, directive control’s hedges against down- tion changes unfavorably, detailed control demands side risk = similar to those used in detailed control. that the plan be carried out anyway. Even if subordi- The leader clearly states the goal or vision, provides nate leaders n3cogn@ an opportunity to achieve the adequate nxmrces to accomplishthe goal, fixes E- goal in a dtiemt way, they are not allowed to do it sponsibilityfor task completionand establishesgood because it would undermine the plan. To account for and bad consequences for performance. The differ- this, detailed control requires subordinate leadem to ence begins with delegation. In its strictest sense, de- qort the changed situation and await instructions tailed control does not provide for delegation of au- for a change in plans. A leader who uses detailed thority. All planning is centmlized at the top. For control well plans for a myriad of alternative and directive control, the planning authority may be with- contingency plans to deal with fluid situations, but held or delegated. When the leader is responsible for the decision to implement these EStS with him alone. the planning, he still provides a detailed plan that of- Opportunities a.R often fleeting, and a detailed con- fem the best probability for success. When delegating trol method bears with it the acceptance that these the planning,the leadergives clear guidelines to sub- will be missed. LOst opportunities will be overcome ordinates but delegates the detailed planning. by new plans and decisions at the top. The next major di.Herencebetween the two meth- The last control method is directive. It rests on the ods is plan execution. Directive control seeks to twofold assumption that in a period of rapid change, hedge against lost opportunity by placing a primacy those directly in touch with the situation can best on lower-level initiative. In a detailed control envi-

38 November - December 1996 s MILITARY REVIEW DiiectW control accepts the&k of mi$takes or ShoWerm declihe in onier to achieve &ng-term, sustaihedgmuth and excekmca Giving subo@wtes h itifW to expbit qportunities entails accepting that a subordinate may make a mistake. Honest mistakes should be learning ofpoifun#ies, not fwses b cast@Wn; ~ the @un&tibn of IJust from subditie to Mkw will enxk? and the subordinate will be lhr k likely to take initkdfve again. ronmeng subordinateleadersmust ask permissionto battle illustrates the importance of this training. De- deviate from the plan before they act on an opportu- tailed control focuses on the hamk; directive control, nity. In a dkective control environmen~subordinate on the mind. leaders act fmt and report later. Likewise, if the Directive control nAies on leader-subordinate trust, senior leader recognizes an opportunity fm~ he is- which is built on proper fundamental skills and cre- sues the appropriateorder to the subordinateleader. ative decision-making abilities. It is the most ap- Goal accomplishmen~ not rigid adherence to the propriate control method for a principle-ntemd plan, ditects the effort. Thus, the probabilityof high leader in a matum organization. When the fimda- performanceincnxisessignificantly,because the op- mentals aR absent or subordinates lack decision- portunity for success is seized immediately. making skills, detailed control is appropriate until The third hedge is training. Detailed control E- subordinates arE properly trained. Detailed control quires only that subordinates know what to think. should gradually give way to directive control as They must possess the ability to do their jobs well subordinates master these skills. When subordinate but nothingmonz For directivecontrolto work,sub- leaders do possess these skiUs, detailed control ar- ordinate leaders must know how to think and use IEStSinitiative and risks success at the cost of lives. their creativity to solve diflicult problems on their Dinxtive control enables a mature oqpization to own. This mydres a solid foundation in competence focus on what is most important and does not allow and skill, because creativity is useless and oflen the means to overwhelm the end. ha.rmfid without the proper fundamentals. Dirdve Principleantend leadership is the substance that control focuses on the development of decision- has inspired followership from antiquity to the pm- rnaking skills. The leader must train subordinates to ent. While technical competencies change with tech- solve complex problems and implement plans. The nological evolutiom, leadership’s true substance is leader and subordinate must each understand how timeless. Tmstworthiness, respect and caring, com- the other thinks and is likely to respond to a given bined with vision, provide a cohmnt dkction for situation. This requires a substantial investment in the leader, subordinates and entire organization to time, but the prospect of saving soldiers’ lives in follow. This process works from the inside with the

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 39 —.

The argument that digitization necessitates moving to Dhedive ccmtm@eks to hedge agaihst centraliz@ detailed control because “higher head- Iostqlpoltu nity by @nxng a p“macy on kxver- quarters” can gather more information rests on the kwf initiMve. In a detailed control envinmme@ faulty assumption that efficiency equals excellence. subordinate leaders must ask permission to We may gather and process information mo~ effi- deviate from the plan before they act on an ciently, but its proper use depends on leadership and opportunity. In a dinctiwe control envitonmen~ human effectiveness. Twhnology is not an end unto subordinate ieaders act first and repoti /ate& itself, dictating how we lead; it is merely a tool for . ..lMJhepmbaMty ““ of h~h performance the mind. Not only can we practice d.hwtive control increases si@ilkxWy, because the oppodu nity in an information age, but we can practice it better.19 br success is _ immediately. Focusing on the substance of principleentered leadership enables us to make the choice to control leader’s character outwad to the organization in the our environment rather than be controlled by it. form of a healthy, winning culture. Leadership Through principles of character and vision, leader- aligns desired performance Esults with positive, ship serves as a guide to navigate through future un- shad organizational values. It syneq$zes human certainty and technological change. Leadership, not effectiveness with technological efficiency, thereby technology, inspires followemhip. Working Ihm the providing the basis for qualitative excellence. As the inside ou~ principle-centered leadership promotes a organizational culture matures, the leader moves healthy, winning organizational culture, which is the from detailed to directive control, unleashing subor- key to unlocking the warrior spirit of human effec- dinates’ ctive abilities and channeling them in the tiveness. Effective military organizations use proper dkction. technology to push the envelope of excellence. The move from detailed to d.kctive control has Leadership always has been, and continues to be, the nothing to do with technology. Selecting an ap- pivotal force in unleashing human potential and propriate control method depends primarily on hu- channeling it in the proper dkction. Wkhout the m effectivenessand organizationalmaturitylevels. mind, the hands are useless.MR

NOTES E@’sW,-*tiWb_tiW@totis*: Colonel 11. Ibid., 23and 29. SrXNtWlleekr, Lle@nam Color@ Cwvad Crane, Dr. Robert KcrehLAlan Perry, t@en 12. Ibid., Table 1 Organuational dues are cntrcalin establii any unit’sWHLIre s@erting, van MoblOf and Maggie Hirthe. These three formthebase values foranyoqp@at@n, re@udeee, 3 spedaky. Leaders Shwtdadd crttwvailles tothiiframwmrk to 1. E50t A Cohen, “A Rewlubn m We,’’ Fcfqm Afbm (Spring 1996), 46 example, “customerservim” maybe a main sufprt-Y:sal%!%% 2. Ibid.. 49. ==ewJY~*> * m@f choose _ nstead. Tearnwxk is 3. ltnd.:45arq5$). 4. The c@rah@m argument isequaUypbiemaW, because rtrestsoathefurtfw 13. sen. Letters tromaw&?&%%%%Y&. Smeca,aRc- ~--~~’~~w%= ~ batWeld intelligence, man Stoic, ~fromr4BCto66AD. Hetutored Emperor’ Nero~om 49-62 araJtrkt vvtlichisrnore~and~~the Inh?@onatttrefr’c+%a rxtthatwe’dlenjoy totemper NertJ’sMckedleee. Aft& 13 as4wfSwecatocornmitwiadein66. ~A%$!%?$:%XXti-& arenotpelsorlai rewards. Yweamthem sothat Ywcwreerve Ywrsu~, Ywr IJmtand ywr nation.” 14, Fviatotle.FkMics. tran$ated tmIT.A. Sir LondcfY Penann Books. 1%32).Book Vll, Xiii,pare- 133’lb24. ‘ 15. S9u3n Habits, 96. 16. The bestaccount oftfwrevdti sinAman,~AkwwcM, tmneMed by P. Brunt, LodJ CIasical Ubrary dhion (Camtmdge, Mk Hstvard urr@@ty Press, t 976), BcmkV, paregrap+’s25-29. For further st@ of Alwamix the Great see J.EC. FMer, The GwerafslwofA4Xarrder the Grwf (westPort< c-r: Gmenwwd Prees, 1960); and AB. Bosmrth,”Ccmquest and En@re’ 7he R& of Akxanc4r the Great (Can’bk@ ~ Unk@ Press, 1966). 17. Seven Habits, 15. 16 Helmuthvon Moltke, ~eelder, makeethe ovw, vdwchthe ommmder *=@a* Lsmosttyoniy anafpmentorw Hetherebytakas overthe_forwho6e- 0tli8rfxvsons aredesgnated. Herrwewless ovmduties totiadegree thstheca no +%Q%”z&Y”r.? Onthe AltdlAklc Sdected@p, editedby J. Hughes (htOWtO,CA: Presido Press, 1%X3 164. ‘m an “m &Jiti...w!&%%%i” s%%%%%%?!%% inwar( tuidge, MA: Harvard Unkrer@ &, ‘t965), 256-60. 19. Wrr MoHkeamved atthesmemnci@on ashewnfronted theimpii@hleofthe communkafions rwdutionepavmed by fhetdegmph. Tohrm, fhete@a@wwldmake )andti(good’*. ** fkkii,-onl:*s fhetransmrssmn ofduwtrws (dow)andreports (up) fas@which vmuMaltowe@r@ %%%%1%!%%%15 nate commanders to act ~ Win the crrredve’sfranwmk. Faster cmnrrw- IO. US ~ ‘ii Man@ 22-1oo, MMtaryLmdershrP (WashIngtco, DC: US Gowxn- nicdons vmuld wsure betkx overall cmrdnafico, vhiie strli eswving the kwer-iewl merit Printing&, N0@rnber1966),5 adTeMel. de3sica making, ’@@lieauaeJtobalt!OiMdeuO X$s. sea Ku#res, 77, l13and 133.

r Captain ChnktopherD. Koleti is an instructorin the Department of Histo~J US Military Academy (USAZ4), WestPoin6 New York He mceiveda B.S. @m the USMA andan ALA. @m the Univers@ of W~- consinat Madison and is a graduati of the USArrny CombinedArms and Services StaflSchoo[ He has heki a w-iety of command and staflpositions iJI the Continental United States and Europe, including commander TitwpA, and motor ofie~ 1st Squadm16 7th Cavaby Regimenh Fort H4 Tws; andphzwn leader ad executive offceq Twp L, 3d Squadmq llth Armored Cavalty Regiment, Bad Hersfe14 Germany

40 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW — —

Lieutenant Colonel Joel A. Buck US Army

ECENTL~ I RECEIVED a package in the R mail from my father, containing two small, W“sters dktkmy(Mhes Chan?ctef ha&bound books he had pickedup as ajunior Army as ‘the Cwwhath ofemotbn@ M?ktual officerand carriedwith him throughouta careerspan- and m(?n?lqualtks dktlngukhk?gonqwmonoir ning more than 30 years. A WorldWmII veteran,he group Iivm anothez’:.. M#enant Gene@ re+mtered the Armed Forces in 1950 during a time Howanl D. Gniw US MiHta/y Academy sup when the US Army was wrestlingwith the challenges Mired@ stated, “Chafacter k the ab#ty to currentArmy Chiefof StaffGeneralDennisJ. Reirner understand rk@t fkom wrong, the courage to referredto as the “scientific”revolutionin militaryaf- chose the righ~ and the toughness to fairs @MA).l One volume-published by the De- follow that di?cision through.” partment of Defense in 1950—was The Armed Forces Oj@er. The otherwas the firsteditionof The Army ~cer k Guide, a volume still popular among There is no denying information’spower and the junior officerstoday. My father’saccompanyingnote challenges of developing leadem and soldiem who suggestedI might find “somethingof .value yet today can achievedecisivevictorywhile meeting the needs betweentheir covens.” of a vastly differentworld. Our Army, however,re- In his firstspeechbeforethe Associationof the US mains a values-based organization. Reimer recently Army, Reirnertalked aboutthe changesthat occurred noted that “refocusingon the valuesand making sure in the Army between World War II and the Korean that we’ve got that about right is a terriblyimportant War. Reimer suggested that many of the conditions part of the Army and terribly important to me per- which existedin 1950 are SWwith us today: sonally. I think it’s irnpmtant that we not just talk � We lived in an uncertain world. aboutthem, but that we actuallylive those valuesand � The United States was the world’s greatest eco- demonstratethem in leade~hip positions.”~ nomic power. The Army’sseniormilitaryleadersexpressedsimi- � The United States was the world’s greatest su- lar sentimentsin 1950. The messagehorn the secre- perpower. taryof defenseon the insidecoverof my father’scopy . We had a virtual nuclear monopoly. of TlzeArmed Forces O#icer states,“This manual on � The next war was expected to be a push-button leadershiphm been preparedfor use by the Depart- war with new weapons and machines.2 ment of the Army, the Departmentof the Navy and These two slim volumes my father gave me con- the Departmentof the Air Force,and is publishedfor tained a miniature time capsule. They representeda the information and guidance of all concerned.” snapshot in time of the official and unofficial Close examinationof the scrawlat the bottom of this thoughts about our profession-a picture snapped at November 1950memorandumconfirmsit is General a point in history parallel in many ways to where G.C. Marshall’ssignature. His personal conviction we find ourselves today, facing the technological whileservingasArmy chiefof staff+.hat all US mil- challenges of the information RMA.3 My purpose itary officers share common ethical and moral in writing this article is to ask you, the reader, to ground-inspired the draftingof this volumes take an intellectual pause to reflect on what it means Although the 1950 edition of Z7ieArmed Forces to be a leader. Oflcer has no byline, Brigadier General S.L.A.

MILITARY REVIEW . November-December 1996 41 Thereis no denyinginformation’s power and the chalk?nges of developing I&a&r and sokiibm who can achii?ve decisive victo~ while meting the needs of a vastfy difl%?nt wodd. Our llrm~ howew!~ remains a values-based organhdion. Reirner recentiy noted that “mtbcusing on the values and making sure that we’ve got that about right is a terribly impoftant pad of the Amp ... /think it’s important that we not just @/k about them, but that we actually live those values and demonstrate them in lead&ship positions.”

Marshall has been credited with writing it.b In a and redesigning existing values for America’s Arm . later edition’s introduction, he states, “Difficulty is Reimer has endorsed the importance of this effort.?1 a challenge, not an excuse, and there is much to be Whether the words are commitment, competence, done ... by gaining a surer sense of direction, the candor and courage, or duty, sel@ss service, courage, officer body may contribute splendidly to the ... respect, loyalty, integri~ and honor, the Army re- Nation’s spirit and. .. its unity. Here is a prime and mains a values-based organization. As we seek to compelling obligation.’” clarify our values-on a personal level and as an or- Parallel times or not, today’s Army exists in a world ganization-I suggest that there is indeed “something much changed since 1950. However, the values that of value” between the covers of the thin volumes my form the foundation of our leadership philosophy are father kept close at hand for so many years. timeless. Among the terms highlighted in our current The first chapter of the 1950 TheArmedForces Of- leadership doctrine are commitment, competence, jicer is titled “The Meaning of Your Commission.” It catir and courage. They are cited as individual sol- begins: “Upon being commissioned in the Armed dierly values in US Army Field Manual (FM) Services of the United States, a man incurs a lasting 22-100, Military Leadership, and FM 22-103, Lead- obligation to cherish and protect his country and to ership and Command at Senwr Levels.g Reirner hm develop within himself that capacity and reserve referred to these as charactertraits while discussing strength which will enable him to serve its arms and his leadership philosophy.9 FM 100-1, The Army, the welfare of his fellow Americans with increasing adds compasswn to the list and calls the aggregate wisdom, diligence and patriotic conviction. “the professional soldier’s core qualities.” 10 “This is the meaning of his commission. It is not To help move the Army into the 21st century, the modified by any reason of assignment while in the Center for Army Leadership (CAL), Fort Leaven- service, nor is the obligation lessened on the day an worth, Kansas, is revising leadership doctrine. This officer puts the uniform aside and returns to civil life. includes reviewing and re-emphasizing what we now Having been specially chosen by the United States to call the nine leadership competencies and reviewing sustain the dignity and integrity of its sovereign pow-

42 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW LEADERSHIP er, an officer is expected to maintain himself, and so to exert his influence for so long as he may live, that In the pm fiscal sense, kaders in ttiy’s he will be recognized as a worthy symbol of all that Army Me beiter than their counterpwts of 1S0, is best in the national character.” when statihg pay fbr a second lieutenant was Webster’s dictionary defines character as “the only $21~75pef month. Howeveqthe km of combination of emotional, intellectual and moral “wwlth’’asdkussedfhenbeverybitasbue qualities distinguishing one person or group from tody “h occashd man has become wealthy another.”12 In a recent interview with Army ?lmes, while inthesenkws by making wise invest- Lieutenant General Howard D. Graves, US Military - fhtwgh wrMngq by skill at inventidq or Academy superintendent, stated, “Character is the thtvugh some other means. But he h the ability to understand right from wrong, the courage eX~ihm 77W/?MjMty have no simh pn)sped to choose the right, and the toughness to follow that Indeed, if/eve of money wem fhe mainspring decision through.”13About the importance of char- acter, the 1950 The Armed Forces Ojker says this: ofal!Ameri6an action, theollkxwco@ong “In the beginning, a man takes an oath to uphold his since wouki have di3ihfegmfed.” country’s Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic, to bear true faith and allegianceand to “Abilities vary from man to man, and are partly dischargewell and faithfidly the duties of office. He what heredity and environment have made them. If does this without any mental reservation. nature had not imposed a ceiling, mere striving “Thereafterhe is given a paperwhich says that be- would make every man a genius. cause the President as a representativeof the people “But/lz.ie/ityis the derivativeof personal decision. of this country reposes ‘specialtrust and confidence’ in his ‘patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities,’ he is It is thejewel within reachof every man who has the forthwith commissioned. will to possess it. “The works of goodwill by which those who lead “Given an officer corps composed throughout of the natiorudmilitaryforcesendeavorto win the unre- men who would make the eternal try toward better- servedtrustof theAmericanpeopleis one of the chief ing their professional capacities and furthering the preservationsof the American system of freedoms. working efficiency and harmony within all forces, The characterof the corps is in the most direct sense the United Stateswould become thricearmedthough a final safeguardof the characterof the nation.” not producing one new weapon in its arsenals.” Hopefully,these words have a familiar ring. I en- Buildingon thistheme,the samechapterfurtherde- courage you to stop and think about them for a min- finesthe qualitiesof a leader.They remainas timeless ute. Do not allow familiarity with the words to dim today as they were over 45 years ago: “Tocall forth their meaning. The 1950 TheArmed Forces O@er great loyalty in other people and to harness it to any further states that ”... any officerwho is morally de- noble undertaking,one must first be sensibleof their serving of his commission ... will look beyond the finer instinctsand feelings. Certainlythese things at letter of his obligation and will accept in his own least are among the gentlequalitieswhich are desired heart the total implications of his new responsibility. in every militaryofficerof the United States: “So doing, he still might see fit to ask: ‘But to 1. Strong belief in human rights. what do I turn my thoughts? How do I hold myself 2. Respect for the dignity of every other person. so thatwhile following the lineof duty,I will also ex- 3. The Golden Rule attitudetoward one’sdaily as- empl~ those ideals which may inspire other men to sociates. make their best effort?’ 4. An abiding interestin all aspectsof human wel- “It is suggested that there is a one=wordkey to the fare. answer among the fourlofty qualitieswhich arecited 5. A willingness to dealwith everyman as consid- on every man’s commission. erately as if he were a blood relative. “That word is/iklekty. “Thesequalities arethe epitome of strength,not of “As forpa~”otism, either a man loves his country softness. They mark the man who is capable of pur- or else he would not seek commission at its hands, suing a great purpose consistently in spite of tempta- unless he be completely the rascal, pretending to tions. He who possesses them will all the more sure- serve in order to destroy. ly be regarded as a ‘man among men.‘“ “Valor,on the other hand, cannot be fully vouch- In the pure fisal sense, leadem in today’s Army safed,since it is not given to anyman to know the na- fare better than their counterparts of 1950, when ture and depth of his personal courage. startingpay for a secondlieutenantwas only $213.75

MILITARY REVIEW . November-December 1996 43 —

Army officer is a better man for having studied the Even the issueofmi..itary “~ntness” was works of Admiral Mahan and familiarized himself an item of some discussion in 195(1.. .“Toward with the modern Navy from first-hand experience. services other than his own, any officer is Those who lead sea~oing forces can enlarge their expected to have both a comrade/y feeling and own capacities by knowing more, rather than less, an imaginative interest. Any Army ollker is a about the nature of the air and ground establish- better man for having studied the works of ments. The submariner can always learn something Admiml Mahan and timiliarked himself with the usefil to his own work by mingling with airmen; the modern Navy from iirst-hand eqxwience. airman becomes abetter officer as he grows in quali- 77mse who lead s~qoing times can enlarge fied knowledge of ground and sea fighting. tkir own capacitkw by knowing mom, mther “But the fact remains that the services are not than ~ about the natute of the air and alike, that no wit of man can make them alike, and ground establishments” that the retention of each of its separate character, customs and confidence is essential to the conserving per month. 14 However, the issue of “wealth” as dis- of our national military power. Unification has not cussed then is every bit as true today. “An occasional altered this basic proposition. The first requirement man has become wealthy while in the services by of a unified establishment is moral soundness in each making wise investments, through writings, by skill at of the integral parts without which there can be no invention, or through some other means. But he is the soundness at all. And on the question of fundamental exception. The majority have no such prospect. In- loyalty, the officer who loves every other service just deed, if love of money were the mainspring of all as much as his own will have just as much active vir- American action, the officer corps long since would tue as the man who loves other women as much as have disintegrated.” his own wife.” Even the issue of military “jointness” was an item Our Army is moving out smartly on the journey of some discussion in 1950, as the recently estab- called Force XXI. We are already beginning to work lished Department of Defense wrestled with con- operational and tactical issues for the Army After cerns about complementary, rather than competitive, Next. Hopefully, this article acknowledged that missions and capabilities-concerns still present while the changing technical face of battle has re- today. Reimer has made it clear that leaders in ceived much attention, a return to our values and eth- today’s Army must be an integral part of a joint ical roots is both appropriate and worthwhile. In the team. 15 The Armed Forces Oficer of 1950 balances latest edition of FM 100-1, The Army the first two joint service benefits with a fundamental loyalty to chapters discuss the ethos, professional qualities and the Army. The following passage could just as well constitutional basis for our Army. While today’s have been written today: “Toward services other specific technical competencies differ greatly from than his own, any officer is expected to have both a those of 10, much less 45, years ago, the faces of the comradely feeling and an imaginative interest. Any leaders and the led have changed very little. MR

NOTES

1. Chef of Staff of the Army, ‘Warm the IrrformaticaAge,” YMkw Paper, No. !35-07 8. US Amy F* Manual (FM) 22-100. hMi@ry Lea@shfp (Vkshngton, DC: GPO, (Washington, IX: I+eakquarters, De@mwt of the Army, 16 November 1995). In ttw Juty 1990), ~ and FM 22-103, Leademhjp and Command atSenkxLew#s(WashIng- WQW,GEN DIM* ReImw states that In tl?alast 200 years, there have been SIXrevdu- ton, DC GPO, June 1X7), 22. tiis m mJitaryaffaus the Democ@c Revdubon m France around 1769, the Industnal 9. GEN DennIs Reirner, ‘Ieadersh!p fcwthe 21st Century Empcwwnen t, Enwonment RevolutwI, the Maragenal Revoklm of the late 19th century,the Mectwwed Rwdu- ard the Golden Rule,” Mi&vy Rewew (January-February 1996), 5-9 bon from 1919 to 1939, the SaenMc Revdutw that culmtrated m the AtomIc me and 10. FM 100-1, 7. the oqouwg Infonnatm Rewluton. 11. Center for Army LeadedI Ip (CAL), “Le*er Dew@me@ Update” (Fat 2. Edtcmal O@on, Army ?imes (30 Octoker 1995), 29 Leaverrvmrth, KS June 1994), tmfiw to Army chef of staff. 3 Ye Paper, No 95-o7. 12 Webster’s NW Rivarsde Urwersly Dctmnary, 1964 cd,, S.V.“dwacter” 4. Intmoe+v wth GEN Denrns J, Ramer, Army 77mes (2 !%ptemtx?r 1996), 4. 13 lnterww wth LTG Howard Graves, Afmy Trees (23 November 1995), 16 5. Ameocan Forces Irrfofmatrm Sawce @FW), 7he Armed Fozxs Ofker (Washn?g- 14. Paul D. HarkIns and Phli Harluns, The Army Otb#s G@ (New Yak: ton61CC,US Government Pnnbng Ofke [GPO], 1966), II. McGraw-Hill COmpank, 1951). $ lWre 12-3. 15. Yd/ow Pa@rr, No, 95-07. 7 Itmcf.

Lieutenant Colonel Joel A. Buck h the chiel Leader Development Ojlice, Center for Army Leadership, Fort Leavenwor@ Kansas. He received a B.S. and an A4.S.$-otnKansas State Uni- t’ersi(yand is a graduate of the US Army CommaIui and General StaflCollege. He has held a ~~arie~of command and stafposihons in the Continental United States andEurope, including as- sistant chitfof staff and G3, V Corps Am”llery,Frankjiq Germany; special assistant to the corps convnandeq V Corps Heaalparters, Fran@rt; depu~~ support coordinate 3dArrnomd Di- t~ision(3dAD), Frankj&q and du-in~~Operatkms Desert Shield and Desert Storm,”and erecm”ve ofice~ 2d Battalion, 82d Field Arhlle~ Regiment 3dAD, Fridburg, Germany

44 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW Lieutenant Colonel Donald H. Homer Jr., US Army

E CONCEPT of leadership has generated leader’s personal style and subordinates’ character- T an enormous amount of theoretical and em- istics 10 Some observers have suggested that more pirical inquiry. From 1972 through 1983, an aver- development of the interactionist theory has the age of 250 studies and articles per year dealt with most promise for leadership studies. 11 some leadership aspect. 1 Bernard M. Bass’ revision Although different, the trait situational and inter- of Stogdill h Handbook of Leadership: A Survey actionist leademhip theories embrace the traditional of Theory and Research has more than 3,000 ref- presumption that leadership’s effects are both real erences to leadership studies.z By 1989, nearly and measurable. However, other leadership frame- 10,000 articles and books had been published on works have recently emerged which do not fit under the subject.q the tripartite topological umbrella and do not pE- Despite the plethora of attention, the concept of sume that leadership’s effects are real and measur- leadership remains paradoxically obscure. There is able. In fact, the contem~rary, somewhat radical, little consensus on exactly what leadership entails, view turns the entire leadership concept on its head. and hundreds of leadership definitions have been This new theoretical twist proposes that leadership developed.4 In their books, Philip Selznick called and the process of leading tend to be overly ration- it “a slippery phenomenon” and James MacGregor alized constructs. For this reason, the new models Burns lamented that it wass “one of the most ob- endorsing this proposition are referred to as “nonra- served and least understood phenomena on earth.”s tional” leadership models. Part of the problem is the concept of leadership Given this historical backdrop and review of has been overly romanticized because the term is leadership literature, this article contrmt-s the tradi- synonymous with history’s greatest leaders. In tional view of leadership with the more unconven- 1841, Thomas Carlyle formalized this approach tional, nonrational framework. After solidly with his “great man theory.”b By studying the per- grounding the reader in the traditional view’s tenets, sonal attributes of nmowned figures, he generated I will explore the nonrational approach in some de- exhaustive lists of universal leadership traits. Napo- tail and describe three of the most prominent nonra- leon hiiself had embarked on a similar endeavor, tional models: the garbage can model, the attribu- listing what he believed to be the 115 essential lead- tion theory and the language game theory. Each ership qualities.7 model is outlined with an eye toward potential mili- R.M. Stogdill and Robert F. Bales questioned tary application. I will conclude with a discussion these trait theories, which gave way to situational about the nonratiomd leadership framework’s over- theories holding that “aspects of the situation deter- all utility and how it might be viewed, given the mined the effectiveness of leaders and organizations larger context of leadership theories. they led.”8 Situationalists emphmized the impor- tance of factors such as “the leader’s authority and The TraditionalView of Leadership discretion, the nature of the work performed by the The traditional view of leadership is anchored in leader’s unit, subordinate ability and motivation, the Bums’ Pulitzer Prize-winning book Leadership, in nature of the external environment and role require- which he defines leadership as the process of “lead- ments imposed on a manager by subordinates, ers inducing followers to act for certain goals that peers, superiors and outsiders.”9 represent the values and motivations-the wants Purely situational theories have been displaced by and needs, the aspirations and expectations-of both contingency and interactionist theories, which pro- leadem and followem,”]z This deiinkion implies that pose that leadership is a function of the situation, the leadership is relational, collective and purposeful

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 45 ior is conscious, reasonably autonomous and capa- ble of foresight. In this paradi m, leaders act under the assumption of rationality. 1f Leaders are seen as performing a discretionary role, taking steps to “modify the environment, to which the organization then responds.”ls In the rational ji-amewor~ the clear emphasis is on meanin&l leader action.

The NonrationalViw of Leadership Several nonrational----orat least less &ional— models of leadership exist. These models presup- pose that leaders arc not nearly as capable of effect- ing positive organizational outcomes as one might think. These theories and models hold that leaders often act irrationally, politically, reflexively and [March] nof@sambk@y wEh respect to somewhat subconsciously in a manner that is not intentidq 06-pm- mkwstand- goal-directed, performance-enhancing or optimal for the organization. Other theoretical variants are ing and oganizatkmd hiW/y and WWU~.. m even more critical of leaders’ ability to effect posi- [lfisJgarbage can model ap#es mther well to educatkmd and public intiw including the tive organizational outcomes, postulating instead military. lnteresting~, empirkal research has that leaders simply do not “matter” at all-at least demonstmted that pmbiems are seldom not in the traditional sense. genuinsly molved, meaning that the sohlions Interestingly,these nonrational leadershipmodels selscted and enacted am rarely the best of represent many of the current “hot” research topics in the field. More important, while nonrational all available atternatiw theories may be of current interest to researchers, many of the ideas are rooted in much earlier works. and intimates that leaders wield legitimate power The body of literatureflom which nonrational mod- and authority. Subordinates’ endorsement of the els emerged is neither disreputable, untestable nor leader is seen as a basic mechanism underlying unscient~lc. Rigorously developed and thought- leader-follower relations in organizations. fully conceived, nonrational models represent Implicit in the traditional view is that leadership theoretical extensions of leadership knowledge de- “matters’’-leaders can and do make a difference in rived from many of the most fertile minds to have an organization. This is judged by the organiza- studied the topic. tion’s outcomes and Esults. In this sense, leader ef- The best way to get a flavor for the nonrational fectiveness is analogous to production and accom- leadership perspective is to examine several promi- plishment. As noted, this view is shared by trai~ nent theories. situational and interactionist theorists, who also be- Garbage can model. Jim March’s ideas about lieve the achievement of group goals determines leadership are based heavily on Herbert Simon’s be- whether leaders matter. liefs that at best, leaders act under conditions of The traditional view—and, not surprisingly, the “bounded rationality.” Simon, Mamh’s doctoral ad- oft-espoused military view—represents a bias to- viser and mentor at Carnegie Mellon University, ward the notion that leadership is goal-directed, ra- stresses that “it is impossible for the behavior of a tional and relatively unconstrained. 13 Rational single, isolated individual to reach any degree of ra- theories of leadership presume that the leader: tionality. The number of alternatives he must ex- � Can choose from alternatives. plore is too great, the information he would need to � Understands the organizational environment’s evaluate them so vast that even an approximation to relevant aspects. objective rationality is hard to conceive.” lb March � Can specify each choice’s consequences. extends his conception and sees leadership as being � Has an organized, stable system of preferences overly constrained, both by the leader’s inhe~nt pertaining to possible outcomes. limitations and the often conflicting orientations of . Will choose the alternative with the most bene- persons internal and external to the organization. 17 fit to the organization. He also notes ambiguity with respect to intentions, The idea that leaders act rationally is embedded objectives, preferences, understanding and organi- in the wider social construction that human behav- zational history and structure. To March and his

46 November -December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW T General Matthew B. Ridgway with a regimental commander during an inspection of the 25th Infantry Division’s front. * colleagues, the inevitable confrontation with these multiple sources of ambiguity causes the or aniza- tional leader to make nonrational decisions. 78 More formally, the “garbage can” model postu- lates that organizational leadership and decision making should be viewed as: � A collection of choices in search of problems. � Issues and feelings looking for decision situa- tions where they can be expressed. � solutions iooking for-issues to which they might be the answer. o A network of decision makers lookinp for u work. 19 March nxiuces these postulates to four simple variables: problems, cho& opportunities,solutions and participants. He uses the “garbage can” meta- phor because he views organizations as a collection of these four variables. h-beling the variables as or- ganizational “d?use,” Mamh explains that decisions spring forth from the refuse mixture which appears at any given time. Hence, this model places particu- The idea that /eadem act rationally& lar emphasis on the importance of timing, proximity embedded inthewidefsoc&d con@@on“ that and chance with mpect to leaders’ decisions. human behavior is consciouqreasonably For example, in garbage can terms, leaders are autonomousand capable of foresight In this apt to make a given decision not because it is ap- pamd@m, leaders act under the assumption of propriate or optimal, but because they wem given rationality. feadem are seen as petiorming a a decision-making opportunity where a particular solution happened to rub up against a particular discretionary role, taking steps to “modi~ the problem. In this vein, leaders make decisions sim- environment to which the organization then ply by attaching the most conveniently available nqmds.” Intherationalframewor~theclear solution to the most propinquitous problem accord- emphasisis on meaningfulleaderaction. ing to the garbage cfi’s contents at the time. The ~ty of fiis model is clear: Do not be in your and particularly under the stress and uncertainty of cofiander’s office when he is going through his battle, the military functions more like an organized “in” box! Thus, according to March, leadership oc- anarchy-with ambiguity, not rationality, as the curs mom through happenstance and convenience dominant force. than from rational thought and consideration. Attribution them-y of leadership. Another E- Research has shown ~hat the garbage can model cent leadership concept-which also challenges the applies rather well to educationd-and public institu - traditional, rational images—links leadership to orga- t~ons, including the military. Interestin-gly, empirical nizational outcomes as pm of what Peter L. Berger research has demonstrated that problems are seldom and Thomas Luckman call the social cons?ruetion of genuinely resolved, meaning that the solutions se- reali~.21 This concept sees people connecting lead- iwted mid enacted are rarelv-the best of all available ers and outcomes to make sense of their organiza- altematives.20 Thus, if th; garbage can’s contents tional worlds, n+ywdless of any real or actual leader- are not cotilgured just righ~ most Faders’ decisions ship effkcts. This orientation presumes that: are less thar- optimal. - � People believe and perceive that leadership The model notes that in the context of the military matters. and similar hierarchical, bureaucratic institutions, � These beliefs and perceptions are measurable. the leadership and organizational structures are built � Perceptions ~ shared. on the perception of rational choice and action. This framework is alternatively referred to as “the This veneer of rationality is sufficiently powerful to belief in leadership effect” or “the romance of lead- predispose leaders and subordinates to explain ership.” James R. Meindl proposes that “The greater choices and outcomes as though they were the result relevance of leadership as a concept for organi- of rational processes. March’s disciples would ar- zational science is that it is a phenomenologically gue, however, that during actual military operations, important aspect of how observers and participants

MILITARY REVIEW � November - December 1996 47 ——

7heodMs argue that expkwtions pmvWd by leadem are part of what subodhates expect feadem to dd. Smimich and IWngan explkinthat ‘IWtfMy mktionship instit@nalize a hieramhical pattern of intemction in which cedain individuals are expectedto define the experience of ~ to /ea&and others to have their experiences defined-to follow. So powetiul is this process ... and the expectation that someone [the leader] has the right and obligation to define rea/ity, that leaders are held to account if they do not lead ‘effectively.’”

understand, interpret and otherwise give meaning Bobby Calder conceived the idea that leadership to organizational activities and outcomes. ... It is an attribution process. He believed people have appears that the concept of leadership is a perma- a predilection for using a naive psychology of lead- nently entrenched part of the socially constructed ership for interpreting organizational events. Calder realih that ~’e bring to bear in our analysis of oqa - insisteal that individuals have “what amounts to an nizations.”22 implicit theory of leadership.”z3 With this mind--set, From this, it is evident that the manner in which subordinates believe personal qualities produce cer- leadership “matters” shifts. This orientation posits tain behaviors that, ultimately, produce certain orga- that leadership does matter but in a nonrational way. nizational outcomes. Hence, for Calder, leadership Instead of the leader being linked to organizational is nothing more than a “prime manifestation of our outcomes due to his inherent capacity to produce bias toward perceiving causes for behavior.”24 Oth- actual or intended effects, he is presumed to affect er researchers have echoed this theme, concluding outcomes so his subordinates will understand orga- that leademhip “matters” only in the sense that it al- nizational activities. This belief in leadership, lows people to achieve a feeling of control over shared among subordinates, simpl~les an other- their environment. Selznick suggested this earlier, wise complex process of assessing outcomes and at- observing that “leadership has its own halo, easily tributing their cause to less-salient, less-controllable inviting the tacit resumption tha~ being a good and less-apparent explanations. For example, the thing, it is always in order.”L5 tragic deaths of four Army Ranger students in a wha~ then, can the young squad leader, soon-to- Florida swamp will continue to be explained by be-commissioned second lieutenan~ midgrade ca- many as a lack of leadership, regardless of any reer officer or senior Army leader conclude from more plausible, alternative explanations. the attributional approaches to leadership? Simply

48 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW constitutes effective leadership is not consistent with Nonmtimal Isademhip Inodbk5 should traditional leader effectiveness constructions. bethought ofassup@emen& to, rather than Instead, effkctive leadership’s scope is narrowed to foq Witibnal leadership include only the leader’s ability to define and inter- = yet another tool for the A=& pr@ organizational events and outcomes for subor- kasional’s Iemkrship tool kit Appl)dng leader- dinates. Thus, the leader’s tools are not based near- ship theories need not be a !zero-sum” ly so much on rational and logical deliberations or endeavoz ... Competing theories, when used perfected organizational structures. The more effec- to supplement one anotheq often produce a tive kmdemhip tools are language, drama, stories, myths and legends—all devices that hel leaders sign~ntlygteahw un&mtanding of a particukw $ Wt&ship situti”on which otherwise might manage meaning for their subordinates.z have gone unnotibed or un&tect@ In short, the idea that leadership is really nothing more than a language game is built on the belief that the job of leaders “is to interpre~ not to get the work this: Superiors and subordinates alike will tend to of the organization done.”3° Basic to this leadership perceive you as the cause for whatever happens or conception is the idea that managing impressions fails to happen in your uni~ regardless of whether and shaping perceptions are central to the overall you are the actual cause. Furthermore, such attribu- leadership role.31 Evidence of this view is wide- tions are magnified when organizational outcomes spread within the military, considering that: are extreme. This lends credenceto the old saw that � There are no such things as problems, only leadership matters most at the edges but even more challenges and opportunities to excel. when things in the unit aR going to pot. � The Army is not in the midst of a reduction Leadership as a language game. The view that in force (RIF); it is downsizing. subordinates atibute organizational outcomes to � One of our most recent-and favorite--+om- their leaders is very much related to the notion that rnanders in chief was known M “the great commu- one of leadership’s primary roles or ftmctions is to nicator.” explain events. Here, leaders are notjudged accord- � Soldiers are urged to do more with less during ing to actual organizationaloutcomes as much as by austere budget cycles. the explanations they give for the outcomes. Ac- � Units are not outnumbered or surrounded; they cording to Lewis R. Pondy, “The effectivenessof a are simply experiencing a target-rich enviwunent. leader lies in his ability to make activity meaningfid � Darnage to nonmilitary targets during war is for those in his [organization]-not to change be- not termed civilian damage; it is collateral or resid- havior but to give others a sense of understanding ual damage. about what they are doing.”2b What, then, does one conclude about these nonra- Models postulating that Ieadmhip involves the tional views of leadership? Of what real value are manipulationof meaning via languagepresume that: they to the leader in the trenches? Several points � Leadership is a social phenomenon. are worth considering. � Leadership involves defining reality in ways First, nonrational views of leadership should be that are sensible to those being led. considered additional resources for the leadership � Subordinates depend on the leader, especially practitioner. Each perspective can be thought of as for plausible explanations of reality. a distinct set of theoretical lenses the leader can put � Leader and subordinate roles tend to be rela- on so he can correct varying forms of leadership tively formalizd.27 myopia. Recognizing, for example, that the battal- Theoristsarguethat explanationsprovidedby lead- ion tactical operations center tends to be more en arepart of what subod.inatesexpectleadersto do. chaotic and hectic than rational and deliberate may Linda Smimich and Gamth Morgan explain that be quite useful. It may lead to the conclusion that “Authorityrdationships institutionalizea hieramhical solutions to problems emerging from this milieu patternof interactionin whichcertainindividuals are may have more to do with timing and happenstance expected to define the experience of others-to than with reasoned, calculated action. Armed with lead-and othersto have theirexperiencesdefmed— this recognition, appropriate changes can be imple- to follow. So powerfidis this process. .. and the ex- mented. pectationthat someone [the leader]has the right and Second, nonrational leadership models should be obligation to define reality, that leaders are held to thought of as supplements to, rather than replace- account if they do not lead ‘effectively.’”28 ments for, traditionalleadershipconcepts. In simple In this leadershiptheory genre, the notion of what terms, nonrational models are yet another tool for

MILITARY REVIEW . November-December 1996 49 —

the Army professional’sleadership tool kit. Apply- expect leaders to define and interp~t situations for ing leadership theories need not be a “zero-sum” them, then leaders can attend to the definitions, endeavor. Applying the attribution leadership interpretationsand explanations soldiers demand— theory,for example, should not necessarilyp~clude regardless of how nonrational this might seem. using conventional interactionist theories. On the Similarly, realizing that not all positive outcomes contrary, competing theories, when used to supple- result from well-executed plans may cause leaders ment one another, often produce a significantly to take a little less credit for successes and acknowl- water understanding of a particular leadership situ- edge the role of serendipity and the other organiza- ation which otherwise might have gone unnoticed tional garbage can contents. or undetected. Put another way, the intellectual illu- The underlying value of these unorthodox, uncon- mination of two theories in combination tends to be ventional perspectives is that they give military pro- synergistic. This illumination improves the depth fessionals additional theories and concepts they can and breadth of the leader’s knowledge. use to view, analyze and inteqmt the organizational Third, unconventional leadership perspectives and interpemonal world. Minclfi.d of General Ed- highlight variables practitioners routinely ignore. ward C. “Shy” Meyer’s warning that “leaders can- Part of the “Army way” of organizing and leading no~ must no~ bind themselves to a one-answer, one- is to do things logically and rationally. The empha- method scientology,” one should not dismiss these sis is on reasoned, deliberate action. With this em- theories simply because they are diffemt or chal- phasis comes a bias toward perceiving outcomes as lenge the status quo.32 Instead the Army profession- intended and desired or unintended and unfortunate. al searching for alternative explanations and answers This bias toward rationality overlooks other vari- to leadership challenges should embrace nonrational ables that might be useful when fhlfWing leader ob- views as potentially capable of clari@ing situations ligations. If one realizes, for example, that soldiers that might othenvise remain opaque.33 MR

NOTES 1. Jamas R. Meindland Sarrford B. Ehdich, TwRornance Comge Resd9nt (Nw York McGraw-HillCompanwa, Ev#uation of izablal Pdmmnce,-AcadamYcf G. Marchaml Johanl? Olaen, ”AGabcja Cm Modelof 30, 1987), 91-1T ~&_hfra0k3Sc49nce clJa@ly(March 1972), l-2!% and 2. Bamwd M. Base, -S Ha@wokofLeadsm@x ASumeycd17myad R8- ~ -. -Y sefm#~AdyWf$w York Free FTe9s, 1~1). 19. DcOakf H.8arr, ”MamtI’s Theuyof Le#smhpm O@nU@ns ,2dad. (Englm4’0d ciHta, NtPrwtiOs oaoaf (S@fwd. CA: Stanfod Lk!AwaW..1-). i+d, wwj. ,. ‘ %.&henend March. 4. Robarto M. Fanandez, %tructd Baaeaof 21. Petar LBar9er and Thomas lMckrnan,7he Soci#~ L#Re47y(Naw work%” Sol= - Q@de@ (Volume %%%%w!%ti=x Yak, Doubkday & co. Inc., 1967). ~m-aw ok .- Is,F@w Ipc., 1978); and Base. 22, Jarnea R.t@ndl,,Sanford B. EMichand Janef M. Dd@rich,~Romanceof ~mA@wl@@m (Evanatcm,IL Row, P@wswI & Co., SQenge QK#?eny (-VOlune30, lW), 78-102. Lm#mF@”AchmL=w . 1957), 22”IYKI eums, 2. J. Calder, “An Aunhmon 6. Thomas C-@a, Heroes arrd Hero,Wush@ (- Pdarns, 1841). Zatknld%% @x, edited by B.M. %%%%%’F; 7. GEN Edward C. Mever, ‘Sbadcmfw :A RetuM tO 6aaics; Miktzw ~!v (Juty Islm 1s% 1980),4-9. ‘24.’’ti; 187. 8. R.M. Stc@lt, “Paso@ Factors kaociated wth l@dara@,’’Jcinnafof n&mc?KM%@ss Ana@4s: A= ~ti-W~~~=-71’ roqxs -,R- F.MAM, ~iaon-wesley, P@ldlingco. Inc., 1950); andpaul .Bone,’” Ledednp Ouo VadiaTin Leadem@in _- tiorts, edited by the~of Bahavloral Sw#lOmdQXhrshP, Us fwifary ~luSW( r CW P* NY Avery PubIii Co., 1986),6. 9. Y1.ikii9. Io. f=rad%dbsri’T!w. ~ ~~ for Lmders@UMzati@ nAStudyc# ~~~,@tedtymeOfkadMMaIYm= uSM4(l+ankbro. PA Stdmc4a Book, 1976), 349-61: Robat Tmnenbau - ren H. !%’nnii’% to - a L@amhip”Pattem,” rev. ad., Harw#d B@ness Re- view (May-June 1973); and Bcns, 1-12. 11. ~PetTIYu, Cu@IXOr@=orw A= ES=y(NeWY* ~ Hwaa Inc.. 1986): af!d Bwla. 12. Bums, 19. ‘ m us Gwwrl- nleOt‘3’ Prldng“s%w%%%~)w~~’ 14. Jaws 0. Thmpson, @aw#Kms h Acfioa (New York: Mc@aw-Hill CorrifM-

t3d—0f Ecvlwms (Allturnn, 1978), -587-6(Y8. - -- 18. Mk3aei D. Cd’ianand James G. Mar&I, badem@wdAmb#Y: 7heAmenran

Lietienant ColonelDonuldH. Horw is theS3,37th TransportationGroup,IMwrshzutenq Germu- ny. He receivedaB.S.@m the USMilita~Acaderny (USM), anMS. J%mtheMassachusem Instituti of Technok+yand an MA andPh.D.jhnn StanfordUnivers@and k a graaluzteof the USArmy Com- munaland GeneralSt@College and theMmterStrategistPmgram He has held a varietyof wmmand and staffpositions in the ContinentalUnited States and Europe, including txecutive ofke~ 28th Trans- portation Battalioq lkh.nhei~ Germany; pmfesso~DepartmentofBehavioralSciencesandLeaakr- ship,UMZ4,W~tPoin4NewYorkeo~ 870ti TransportCompanyFortEus@ M@.& and battahnS3,TransportEngineeringAg~,NewportNews,I&@niaHisarticle“LeaderDevelopment and Why It Remains Important” appeared in theJulyAug@ 1995 editin of MilitaryReview.

5(I November - December 1996 Q MILITARY REVIEW HALLENGED BY a broad range of possible all-purpose insect repellent for both skin and Cmissions, America’s 21st

MILITARY REVIEW � November - December 1996 51 against insect bites is also important during offduty hours when soldiers wear casual clothes, especially T-shir@ shofis and sandals that offer little protection. Insectrepellents. Vapor-active insect repellen~s that contain deet for the skin and contact-toxicant applications that contain Permethrin for clothing provide very effective insect bite protection. Be- cause soldiers a.E often simultaneously threatened by several types of insects, overall protection is enhanced by using both deet and Permethrin in most situations.s Stinging insects, such as wasps and scorpions, however, are usually unaffected by instances when vaccines—such as the Japanese these repellents. The best protection from them is encephalitis vaccine—or medications—such as avoidance, properly wearing BDUS and using head antimalarial pills—are available to prevent disease nets or when ama pesticides have been sprayed to control Deel, discovered in 1954, has been used since insect populations. 1957 as a skin and clothing insect repellent by the Even when vaccines are administered and che- military and in commercial p~parations by millions moprophylactic (disease-preventing) medications of civilians. Deet is most effective against mosqui- are taken properly, they are not I()()-percent effec- toes and other biting insects. The military’s primary tive. Diligent use of personal protection mea- insect repellent for the skin—the X@ment deet lo- sures is especially important in light of reports tion in a 2-ounce tube-is less than half as concen- of widening microbial (parasitic) resistance to trated as the older 75-percent deet “bug juice.” Be- preventive medications such as the antimalari- cause of its controlled-release polymer baw, the new als.~ Area insecticide spraying is impractical or repellent lasts up to 12 hours, which is time times ineffective in many combat or other field settings in- longer than the old one. Tbday’s 33-percent deet re- volving rapid troop movements. It also raises envi- pellent has less odor and is far less damaging to ronmental safety concerns and may contribute to in- plastic than the 75-percent solution. Currently, the creasing insect resistance to insecticides. 75-percent deet is only used on skin or clothing Fiild clothing. Although it may be “low tech,” when the 33-percent deet lotion or a Permethrin for- properly wearing BDUS to minimize exposed skin mulation for clothing is unavailable. surfaces is one of the best ways to prevent insect Soldiers should apply the 33-percent deet lotion bites. Because blousing trousers with garters may as a thin layer over exposed skin, as the label sug- facilitate tick or chigger entry, trousers should be gests. They should not apply it under clothing fmly tucked into fully laced boots. If the potential treated with Permethrin or near their eyes, lips or for heat stress is not great and it does not interfere seas where skin is damaged or sensitive. Because with operational demands, soldiers should roll down very low deet concentmtions may aflracl insects, BDU shirt sleeves and button their collars, especially soldiers should always wash off repellent residue or from dusk to dawn when many insects are the most apply another coat when the repellent seems to be active. Medical intelligence should identify excep- wearing Off.h Although deet is a component of most tions such m the Aedes uegyp?i, a mosquito that is commercial repellents, its concentration and method active in the middle of the day and transmits dengue, of delivery vary.7 The 33-percent deet lotion the an acute infectious disease that causes sudden fever, military uses is available commercially at a number intense headache, skin rash and body pain. of stores and outlets as Ultrathon =, packaged in a Soldiers should tuck undershifis into BDU trou- brightly CO]OEd tube. sers to prevent insec~s from crawling onto the skin Adverse ~actions to deet, mostly due to acciden- around the waist. Field caps and helmets also m tal exposure from swallowing and spraying, have excellent physical barriers to insects. In addition, been qmted. Considering deet’s widespread me, soldiers should shake out their clothes before putting however, side effects are relatively uncommon. Be- them on, wear socks and shoes whenever walking yond minor skin and eye irritations, there have been and look closely before reaching into concealed rare cases of toxic encephalopathy (brain inflammat- was. Tears or holes in BDUS should be mpa.kd as ion), particularly in infants and childnm atler re- soon m possible, and soldiers should check one peated use. Individuals should wash the repellent another frequently for ticks on hard-to-see body off their skin as soon as they are no longer exposed axeas and be sure to safely remove ticks. Protection to biting insects. As of February 19%, no scientific

52 November - December 1996 “ MILITARY REVIEW Dr Edgar RowIon Walter R&d Army lnst,lule of Research

evidence linked deet and Perrnethrin with any of the symptoms reported by Persian Gulf War veterans. Several laboratories am conducting acute toxicity studies with combinations of insect repellents, pesti- cides and other agen~s used during that war. Several deet-containing products are being tested or awaiting approval for military issue. These include insect-qellent versions of sunscreen and camou- flage face paint. Per-methrin, a contact toxicant used on BDUS, bed nets and tents, is most effective against crawling in.sec~s,such as ticks, mites and lice, but also is use- ful as a contact mellent a@nst mosquitoes, flies ing, nonirritating and highly resistant to degradation. tain a Permethrin-water mixtwe After the BDU Be@e soldiers deploy, their BDUS should be treated dries, the treatment date is written inside the waist with Perrnethrin and allowed to completely dry be- and collar. Because bite protection lasts for approx- fore anyone handles them. Soldiers should be aware imately 30 launderings, the BDU will probably that certain dry cleaning processes may remove Per- wear out before retreatment is necessary. This is the methrin fi-om BDUS. preferred method for individual BDU Permethrin The three methods of applying Perrnethrin are: treatment. � TO apply the Perrnethrin 0.5 percent concentra- � The Perrnethrin 40-percent concentration in a tion, which comes in a 6-ounce yellow aerosol spray 5.1 -ounce bottle (NSN 6840-01-334-2666) must be CaIl (NSN 6840-01-278- 1336), BDLJs should be carefully mixed with water and applied to uniforms, placed on the ground outdoors and then sprayed. nets or tents with a 2-gallon sprayer (NSN Label instructions should be followed ca.mfully. 3740-00-64147 19). One bottle is enough to treat One can is enough to treat one set of BDUS, and eight sets of BDUS. Anyone using the sprayer must retreatment is authorized after six washings. Perme- wear protective gloves and a respirator. Preventive thrin is also commercially marketed as a tick rqel- medicine or unit field sanitation team members lent under a variety of names, including Perrnanone should supervise spraying. Spray treatment lasts for Tick Repellent 3’ and Coulston’s Permethrin Tick the life of the BDU. Netting can be m~ated after Repellent’@. six washings or one year, whichever comes first. � The Individual Dynamic Absorption Applica- Tent.. should be ~treated after six months in a tropi- tion (IDAA) kit (NSN 6840-01-2454)237), some- cal environment or nine months in a temperate one. times known as the “shake and bake” or “baggie” Afler Perrnethrin treatmen~ fabric must be com- method, is used to wat one set of BDUS. Dispos- pletely dry befo~ anyone touches it with bare hands. able protective gloves, included in the ki~ must be Although Permethrin is neurologically toxic to worn and label directions strictly followed. Blouse insects, it seldom adversely affects humans be- and trousers are treated in separate bags that con- cause it is poorly absorbed and rapidly inactivated.

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 53 —

should not use them unless directed to do so by a physician when the~ is signifkant risk of acquiring an insect-borne disease. Ongoing disease outbreaks and soldier non- compliamm Although current personal protection measws are the most effective ever fielded, soldiem continue to stier from insect-borne diseases during field operations. 8 For example, approximately 200 soldiers we~ diagnosed with malaria while deployed to Somalia for Operation RestoreHope.9 In addition to dengue virus infections in Somali% at least 29 dengue virus infectionsoccurredamong US soldiem in Haiti during Operation Uphoki Democracy. 10 No effective vaccines exist for malari~ dengue and many other insect-borne diseases. I%venting mos- quito-borne malaria and dengue mquim consistent Perrnethrin rarely irritates the skin or causes illness. use of personal protection mea.ums and insect popu- Because some chemical sensitivity can occur, the lation control. To try to pwent malari~ soldiem BDU cap and undenvear should not be treated. If must follow an appropriate chemopmphylactic Rgi- contarnina~ eyes should be flushed with water, men. Investigations of the outbreaks in Somalia and and hands should be washed with soap and water. Haiti led to the recommendation that soldier com- Soldiers experiencing persistent irritation or other pliance with personal protection measunx be en- symptoms should discontinue use and seek medical fomd to p~vent additional cases of the diseases. attention. Permethrin is highly toxic to fish. Ex- Arthropod-borne disease outbreaks also occur treme cam should be taken not to contaminate food during training. For example, four cases of the cuta- or water. If eating or cooking utensils m conta- neous leishmaniasis skin disease we~ identified minated, they should be thoroughly washed before among 51 US Army Rangers who attended the use. When used as directed, Permethrin and the Fnmch Fo~ign Legion’s Jungle Training Course in 33-percent deet extended-duration lotion are safe French Guiana in 1993. Of 34 Rangers who com- and not known to be risky to pregnant women or pleted a questionnaire, 27 said they did use insect developing fetuses. However, pregnant women repellent-primarily commercial repellents they had purchased. Among the four disease cases, one Ranger did not use any repellen~ and the other three used commercial qellents exclusively. *1 Medical treatment costs for the four soldiem totaled approx- m%dmtkmofl � Wear headgear imately $100,000.12 While this cutaneous leishma- **~ <2“ a niasis attack rate of 7.8 percent may be tolerable to

� Wearloose some, the costs to the individual Rangers, unit and *@#l!! tit’llO@l @a fittinguniform military are excessive, -given the datively low cost of prevention, as depi~ti in Figure 1. � Wearsleeves Almost 400 soldiem deployed either to Kuwait in Iii rolleddown 1994 or to Haiti in 1995 participated in a survey about using repellentsto preventinsect bites.’3 Sur- < cTuckin undershirt vey results revealed thaC at thewaist � 52.8 percent were bitten by insects daily or al- r most daily. sRepairtears � 69.5 pement felt they had adequate knowledge /~? 9 and holes about the US military system of pmentiig insect in uniform bites. --E � 45.4 percent could identify the current US g !� Tucktrousers r military-issue insect tqellent of choice for skin ap- 3; intocom Ietely plication, while 35.6 pement we~ uncertain. About ~ laJ, boots 35.6 pe~ent of the mpondents could ident@ Per- methrin as the contact insecticide for BDU applica- Figure1.The DODInsectRepellentSystem. tion; 39.8 percent could not.

54 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW . 44 percent said they used commercial, stom- bought repellents exclusively; 44.9 percent used both military-issue and commercial qellents; and only 6 percent used military-issue qellents exclu- sively. . Only 8.9 percent treated their BDUS before de- ployment; 26.9 percent applied the treatment while deployed. � 62.8 percent wem able to obtain military-issue insect repellents while deployed; 25.9 percent said they did not even try to obtain the military-issue m- repellents. � 5 I percent said their commanders did not emphasize use of militan-issue insect repellents enough or, in some cases, at all; 41.6 pment felt their commandem did not emphasize use of any re- pellents, including commercial ones. These survey results and dated data suggest many soldiers are relatively unfamiliar with personal protection military doctrine and do not routinely practice it.lJ Although military-issue mpellen~s wem available, approximately 50 percent of survey m- respondentssaid their commanden did not sufficiently emphasize using them. Each US Army company-size unit is requited by regulation to have a properly trained, equipped and functional field sanitation team (FST) capable of im- plementing field preventive medicine activities be- yond the individual soldier’s scope. 15 As pti of their mission, FSTS train soldiers to use the military- commanders needlessly place their soldiers at risk. issue qellents and enforce their use. A survey of Division- or corps-level preventive medicine asets 14 Army company-size units deployed to Haiti as and civilian contractors are no substitute for paxt of the UN mission found that 10 had no func- deployed and functional FSTS. In the absence of an tional FSTS in-theater. This finding is consistent operational FST, it is unlikely most units will ade- with the experience of other Army units that had quately emphasize soldiers’ use of personal protec- served in Haiti p~viously and that served in South- tion memums until the mission is compromised or west Asia. Without fully fictional FSTS in-theater, soldiers get sick. Specific information about the current personal Personal Protection Items Available protection mewmx system and its implementation Through the Military Supply System is not included in Army publications associated with Item NSN Issue COSt’” field operations-including the Soldier k Manuzl of Common Task~-Skill Le\’el 1; US Army Field Manu- 33%DEETRepellent 684041-284+982 122-OZ $30.33 al (FM) 21-10, Field Hygiene and Sanitation; FM ExtendedDuration tlJbe@ox 90-3, Desert Operations; and FM 90-5, Jungle Op- OS%PermetMn 8840-01-278-1338 128-OZ- $38.35 ClottingAppfiitkm Cansibox erations. The most complete refe~nce, which in- cludes a unit training package, is Twhnical Informa- 40%Perrnethrfn 884041-345+?37 l;N)P~ $52.87 clOthilgA@iition tion Memorandum No. 36, Personal Protecti\’e 24albn Sprayer 37404W5414719 Each $151.10 Techniques Against Imects and Other Arthropods of PressureTypet A4ilitan Significance, produced by the Armed 40%Permethrin 6840-01-334-2888 12151-rnl $188.32 Forces Pest Management Board. 16 The US Navy ClothingAppkatkm bottfeslbox Medical Department’s Cuide to Malaria Pre\’ention *As of 1 October 1996 and Control also describes the system. ]7 t Older sprayers wtiout a pressure gauge can be retrofitted Unauthorized measurts. Although many sol- For more intimation, amtact yourlocalsupptyofficerorCliffMyersatthe DefenseGeneralSupplyCenterat (804)279-3995orDSN6?35-3995. diers me them, commercial products m not autho- Figure2 rized for military use. Thus, commercial repellents,

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 55 ter sites or discarded containers, should be elim- inated by draining or filling after environmental authorities have approved. As they develop wa- ter points and laundry facilities and perform other operations, soldiers should be careful not to create standing water sites. Spraying an - with pesticides should be considered by p~ventive medi- cine professionals only if nothing else controls the insect population and only if done by trained person- nel. Troops should not enter sprayed mas until the residual pesticide has completely dried. Because some ~opod species and their animal hosts am attracted to decaying food and waste, every soldier should follow strict field sanitation, “stash your trash” practices. FSTS m vital to an effixtive area control and field sanitation program. even if they contain deet, should not be substituted for Permethrinformulationsor the standardmilitary- Command Responsibility issue 33-pement deet lotion. Some soldiers have N- The Army’s personal protection measures system ported satisfaction with the bath oil Avon Skin-So- is known to be highly effkctive in p~venting insect Soft” as an insect repellent during recreation or bites. FutuR combat and other missions will expose training. However, Avon Skin-So-Soil’ only pro- soldiers to insect bites and related diseases depend- vides protection against insect bites for 30 minutes ing on the time of year, deployment location and at most. ]g Continual application is not practical dur- other factors. As history hm shown, infectious dis- ing military operations. eases, including those transmitted by insect bites, Another Avon Skin-So-Soft’~ product con- can change the outcome of vital field operations. taining sunscreen and insect repellent—.O5 per- Military readiness ~quim an aggressive field pE- cent citronella oil-became available in 1994. Tests ventive medicine capability, including soldiers’ have shown it is not as effective as deet against proper use of qellents. many types of mosquitoes and other insects. It Data gathered horn deployed soldiem suggests should ne}w- be used as a substitute for the standard they lack knowledge about the military system of military-issue lotion. Other items, such m flea and preventing insect bites, and, not surprisingly, often tick collars, can cause severe skin damage when do not comply with it. Because no one likes insect used by humans. Soldier use of such products vio- bites, many soldiers needlessly spend their own lates federal law, because such uses are inconsis- money on commemial insect qellents rather than tent with labeled instructions. Garlic, sulfur from using standard, effective military-issue qellents. match sticks, diluted turpentine and high doses of These findings probably apply to units throughout B vitamins are not effective insect repellents and the US military, not just to the Army. As with cold- can be toxic. They should not be added to or substi- or hot-weather injuries, preventable illnesses tuted for military-issue repellents. Questions or con- a..sociated with insect bites shou~d be considered cerns about qellents should be directed up the command failure. Commander are mponsible for chain of command. Written medical permission is the health of their soldiers, including appropriate use required before substitution is authorized. The of qellents to p~vent bites. Armed Fomes Pest Management Board executive How can compliance with the Army’s pemonal director, contingency liaison oflicer or the Surgeon protection measum system be increased to accept- General’s entomology consultant may recommend able levels? G~ter compliance will only occur substitutes. when soldiers genuinely believe the system nmlly Arw control and sanitation. Area control and does significantly reduce insect bites and when sol- sanitation arE pm of essential field preventive medi- diers can properly use the system under dstic cine activities, which include insect control by clear- training and operational conditions. To help soldiers ing the environmen~ such as removing underbrush build suillcient confidence, commandem must have that supports arthropod-resting sites or animal a workh-ig knowledge of the system, practice its use hosts. Clearing may be done by raking, cuttin in regular unit training for deployment and strictly grass or controlled and approved burning. ]t enfonx its use in the field-with the help of the Mosquito-breeding areas, usually standing wa- unit’s FST or equivalent. More specifically, com-

56 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW DEBUGGINGTHE BAllLEflELD manders must provide leadership qyirding personal their activity with division or corps preventive protection measures in the following anm.s: medicine assets. � Training and testing soldiers at the unit level. � Providing repellent researchers and doctrine de- Common task testing Anfomes the task’s impor- velopers with information from the field about what tance and ensures ~gular testing to standard. works well and what must be improved in the sys- � Requesting that doctrine about personal protec- tem so it can become even mom practical, effective tion measums be included in field manuals, training and user-friend]y.z1 materials and other devant military publications. � Treating bed nets with Permethrin before de- � Using knowledgeable people—FSTs for ploymen~ when such measures can add significantly example-in a timely manner to adchws soldiers’ to insect bite prevention. attitudes, myths and memories of old practices that The military’s personal protection mea$ures sys- undermine the current system and to discourage sol- tem has no equal. It is a command responsibility to diers from using commercial repellents. enst.w that every airman, Marine, searnan and soldier � Incorporating personal protection doctrine in at risk of receiving insect bites or acquiring an insect- unit standards of operation, budgeting for and pro- bome diseaw uses the system properly. As an impor- curing adequate supplies of standard military-issue tant part of their knowledge about deployment medi- personal protection items and enforcing repellent use cine, unit commanders must lead their soldiem in in the field durin the entire period the unit is ex- countering the significant threats biting insects pose posed to insects.2E to health. This is a vital task that is part of deploy- � Ensuring each company-size unit has a fully ment training.zz As British Lieutenant General Sir functional FST or the doctrinal equivalen~ responsi- Wdliam J. Slim wrote in his World War 11memoirs, ble for teaching soldiem how to use repellents, mon- “Good doctors aE no use without good discipline. itoring their use, providing timely feedback to the Mom than half the battle against disease is fought not commander regarding compliance and coordinating by doctors, but by regimental officers.’’z~hfl?

1. Headquarters, Dep@nent of the Amy, Army FoaJs 94, Force XX/, Anwrca5 of Infedous Dsease, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washmgh, DC Army m the Zlst C%ntury(k%sMgton, DC” us GoveminmfPrinbngOftice[GPO],SW- 13, Jeffrey M. Gamkel (Vhslnngton, DC: DMSIOn of Praventwe Medtane, WRAIR, un- Iember 1994), 9-15. published data). 2. R.L. Hcqer and R.A. WI%, “lrwect Repellent Used tryTroops mh Field: Results 14. B.L Srnoak, J. B. Mcbn, JF Brund e, et al, “An Outbreak of Spotted Fever of a Queskmare,” MrtrtaryMadcma (VOlune 148, 1983), 34-38. RiietfsK6s in U S. Army Troops Dep40yedto%swana,”Emergmghr fectkwsDiseases 3. L.J Leoters and C.H. Llewelivn, Yvlilii Medtane” In PuMc Heafth & ReverrtMe (Vtime 2, 1996), 217-21, and J.D. Gunzenhaussf, “Resuttsof Quesbconare Survey at ~=mci~, ed~d by J.M. Last and RIB. Wal~ (Norvvdk, CT Appleton & Lange, 1992), Merka, Somali, 2U January 1993” (Mogachshu, Scrnaha 227th Medcal Detachment ~], 22 January 1993). 4. G D. Shanks, ‘The Rtse and Fett of Mefloqune as an Antlmalarral Drug m Swfh- 15. US Army Regulatii (AR) 40+ Pmventrve Medmne (Was@jtcm, DC’ GPO, Oc- easl ASIS,”Mi/rtaryMedidrw (Volume 4, 1994), 275-81; and M D, Edstem, K.D. Corccrran, tobw 1990); and US Arm Field Manual (FM) 21-10-1, Unrf Field Sanlafrcm Team G.D. Shanks, et al., “Eva@ion of WR250417 (a ~wznil analq) for Causal Pro@rylac- @%sJ@gton, DC: GPO, ~ober 1989) twktrwty inthe ~m @X’@T-MaCaCS Mufatta Model,” The American@wna/ 16 Armed Forces Pest Management Board, Tec.hncal Informabon Memorandum Of 7_fcTxx#Mdcrne wrdl+@&ks (VOhJMe50, 1994), 181-86 No. 26, Parsenal Protectwe TeehrrQues Against Insects and Other ArUrrqwds of MIII- 5. R.K. Gupta, A.W. Sweeney, LC. Rutled ,RD ~r~@~rKX (Vhshmgton, DC: Walter Reed Army Medii Center, October 1896) Contrdled-Rdease Parsma l-use Plttvopod %+s$yP:E:ii:%%7Tt: of the gude, cell DSN 295-7479 or commercial (301) 295-7479 w Clothing m the Fti,” The Journal of Amencarr asqwto Cbntrd Assoaabon dume write DefanseY est Management Informabon Center, Forest Glen %chwr, WRAMC, 3, 1987), 556+0. Wastmgton, DC 20307-5C01 A 16-rrwwte wdeo cassette (TVT8-232) tied “ApplIca- 6. ZA. Mehr, L.C Rutledge, M D. Buescher, et al., “Attraaon of Mosqutoes to Dtethyf bon of the Mhrcpod Repellent System” can be cbtamed at Id Trammg su~rt Cen- Methyfbenzamde and Ethyf Hexanadiil,” The kNX@ of Anwcan McqLMo Control ters or by contacting the Department of Defame Dtstnbution Center at DSN Ass@@on (1990), 469-76. 795-71 W841. 7 “Insect Repellents,” The Medca/ Lettef (Volume 31, 1989), 4547: and “Bug Off! 17 US Navy MadIcal Department, Gu@e to Malarra Preventron and Control (Norfolk, How to Rec)eJBlrna Insects,”Conswmr F@orts (JuIv 19X3), 451 -W VA US Navy Envronmsdal Health Center, 1991) 8. Afrn&i For&s Defame Pest Manag&ment’An&iyss Center, “Announcements,” 18, L.C Rutkdge, R.A. WIrtz and MD Buascher, “Repellent ActIwly of a Prqme Ttirrcal IrrrbrmafmnBullefm (January-February, 1894), 1 Bath Oil [.Sian-So-Soff’ ],” Mosqurto News (Volume 42, 1982), 557-59; and C.? 9 The Centers for Disease Control and Preventm (CDC), “Malana Among US Mill- Schreck and T.l? McCiwem, “Repellents end Other Pwsonal Protectm strategies fary ParscmnelRetumlng frcm %naha,” 7?reMcrbdify ard MorWity fvfonthfyRepW (Vol- AgaIrtsf _ Al@ctus,” Journal of Arnerkxn Mcsquflo Control Assmatm (Volume ume 42, 1993), 524-2%; J.A Newton, GA. Sc/mepf, MR Wallace, et al, “Malar@ In US 5, 1989), 247~ Marines Returning from Somalia,” Journal of theAmerrcan Medca/ Assoaatron (Volume 19. FM 21-10, FEW Hygene ard Sanflatron @Vashmgton, DC. GPO, Ncwrnber 272, 1994), 397-99 and M. R. Wd4ce, T. W. Sharp,B. Smoak, et al., “Malarm Among 1988), BG W-and RL Enckcm, “Gocd Docbsare not E United States Troops in Sor@ii,” Amerrcan Jour@ of Meda”ne (Volume 100, 1996), (March 1994 57+3; B.G. W-, R,L. Erickson, B.P Petruccelli,YhK k%%%% 49–55 “Preventing k seas and Nor@4tle In”uy m Deployed Urmts,”MMary Meddne (Volume 10 CDC, “Dengue Fever Among US. MIl@y Pemonnel+iarb, Se@emlx?r-Novem - l=, 1*), 39+3 N ad; ti Jx-1o-1. ber 1994,” The Modm#ty and Mortality MmWy Report (Volume 43, Issue 46), 84548; 20.US Amy Forces Command (FORSCOM) Reg.khcm 700-2, FORSCOM Sfand- and T. W. Sharp, M. R. Wallace, C G. Hayes, et al., “DafIge Fever HIU. S. Truops Durng !ngLF Instnxtiom (Ws.hmgtcn, DC: GPO, June 1983) Operabon Restwe fiope, Somai{a 1992-19$X3,” Ths Amermn Journal of Tmpwl Hy- 21. Ladbetter, S. Shallow and K.R. Hanson, “Malaria m SOMSIEL Lessms m Pre- 911XEW+ume 53 1995), 89-94. venbon,”Jcurnfd of the American Medical Assd40n (Volume 273, 1995), 774 11. J Brurxiage, Memorandum, “Prelimmry Epdenwlogy Con.sdtation (EPICON) 22, The fdlowmg individualswntnkuted to or were consdted about ttus arttde Colo- Report Cutaneous [email protected] Oulbraak Amcmg Rangers RrXumed fmm French nel Donald Dnggem, Cdond Pt_NlhpLawyer, Cdond Peter Perkns, @utenant Colonel Guiana” (Washmgfon, DC: Waiter Reed Army Insttute of Research WIR], 9 Septem- Rat Gu ta, Dr Robed Wti, Sandy Evans and Kathleen Huycke. ber 1993) 23 {F Bellamy ad H Llewellyn, “Preventable Casuefhes Rommel’s Flaw, Sllm’s 12. -LTC Alan Ma@, interwew by author, August 1993. Washington, D.C. Deparbnent Edge,” Army (fvfay 1990), 52-56.

Major Jefiq M. Gambel is a preveuth’e medicine oficer with the Divisiotl of Prettwtive Medicine, Walter Reed Army Institute of Re.~earc14Washingtotk D.C. He recei~*eda B.A. from the Utlitvrsip of Matylati anM.S. W from the Universi@ ofMichigat4 atl M.D. ji-om Michigan State Unijw-sih and an M.PH. j%rn Johm HopkiH.sUniversi@. He served as the fore preventive medical of)icec Mith Combat Support Hospita( Tak Force 86 UN Mission in Haiti; and as chiefof the North Camp Medical Treat- ment Facili~, Multinafi”onalForce& Observers, the Sinai Egypt. Hl~ arti”cle4’HealthThreats to Soldiers Serving in the Sinai” appeared in the 1995 September-octoba issue Oj%lilitary Review.

MILITARY REVIEW � November-December 1996 57

75 Years of Service Jerold E. Brown

T HE 11 NOVEMBER 1918 Armistice signaled Expeditionary Forces (AEF). At their urging, the ~ the demobilization of nearly 4 million US War Department di~ted that the Army School of Army ofllcers and soldiem, the largest military fome the Line and the General Staff School be reorga- in US history. Nearly 2 million of them were nized at Fort Isavenworth. Major General Charles deployed to France when the “War to End All H. Muir served as school commandant from 1919 to Wars” ended. America had made its contribution to 1920, establishing the General Services Schools the great coalition that stopped the Kaiser’s armies consisting of the Command and General Staff and made the world, in Pmident Woodrow Wil- School (CGSS) and the Command and General son’s words, “safe for democracy.” The American Staff Correspondence School. The curriculum E- people were ready to return to normalcy and share flected the four functional staff areas Pershing im- in the economic prosperity brought by the war and plemented in the AEF: administration, intelligence, the premise of a better life. The war faded from the operations and supply. Henceforth, Fort Leaven- front pages of American newspapers, leaving the worth would be at the center of progressive change, Army’s role for the futu~ in doubt. preparing the next generation of US Army leadem. Over the next 18 months, the Army shrunk from In this milieu of declining Army fortunes and dy- 3,757,624 to 185,000 soldiers with a projected namic changes within the Leavenworth schools, the st.nmgth of 150,000 by 1921. After conducting a ser- correspondence school published the first issue of ies of hearings into allegations that the War Depart- the Instructors’ Summan {IfMilituy Articles. Actu- ment mishandled appropriations and contracts dur- ally published on 10 February 1922, the first issue’s ing the war, Congress moved toward a major cover was dated January 1922. Primarily compiled ~organization of the Army. In June 1920, Congress for use by the General Services Schools’ staff and pawed-and President Wilson signed-an amend- faculty, the Summa)? was an in-house publication ment to the National Defense Act of 1916. This intended to enhance their knowledge and awanmess amendmen~ oflen ~ferrd to as the National De- of pmmding military issues and idea. The~ is no fense Act of 1920, c~ted a “peace establishment” evidence its founders envisioned the Summan composed of the Regular Army, National Gumd and would evolve into one of the Army’s premier mili- Organized Reserve and set the Regular Army’s en- tary journals-Militu~ Revie~. listed stnmgth at 280,000, including the Philippine Published monthly until the summer break in Scouts. However, almost two decades passed before September 1922, the Summa~ resumed publication Congtess appropriated funds to bring actual strength as a quarterly, appearing in Mamh, June, September to authorized levels. and December. The “new” Summan’s contents in- Although this period of uncertainty and diminish- cluded five sections: ing ~sources saw many Army institutions decline or � Review of New Books Received in the Library disappear, other institutions developed and grew in � Digests of Selected Articles and Documents importance. One such institution was the Fort kav- � Documents Received in Instructors’ File Room enworth School. General John J. Pershing and other � Magazines Received in Library During Month wartime leadem noted Leavenworth graduates’ sig- � Index of Selected Magazine Articles, Docu- nificant contributions to the war effort and the out- ments and Books standing Leavenworth experience in the American In the next year, two mom sections were added:

MILITARY REVIEW . November-December 1996 59 or similar, sections for mo~ than a decade. Begin- ning in June 1923, an annual consolidated index ap- peaIEd separately. Although the first issue contained only five book reviews and 31 pages, the SunznwnI grew quickly. The number of books reviewed doubled by 1923 and tripled by 1925, when .severa.lissues had mo~ than 80 pages. Most books and articles reviewed were published in Europe, M expected in an era VOL 1 Julv. 1!FY2 x,,. 4 1 when European scholars and writers were far mom interested in military matters than were their US counterparts. The documen~s cited or reviewed in r~f:r[{.11. I’RINGIPI. b,S the SumnZar\’ tended to be from other service 4N1) 1)1’,( Is[oxs schools or the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The Summm?’$s influence in these early years is difllcult to determine. Circulation figure am ob- scure, but it appears copies were distributed to facul- ty, staff and students-some copies we~ even sent to National Guard and Reserve units and other serv- ice schools. The Sumnwly was, however, primarily an in-house publication for the school’s faculty and RECONN.AISS.ANCL, students. Section chiefs assigned books, articles and documents to instructors to review in accordance with specific guidelines. Thus, during a tour, each faculty member prepared one or mo~ items for Late Books Received in the Library and Important publication. During these years, a number of fuh.m Articles of Military-Interest that have Appeared in corps commanders, including Innes Swifi Franklin Magazines. Along with a subject index added in Sibert and Troy Middleton, served on the Leaven- 1924, the sllmn{~~, divided its contents into these, woti faculty, and nearly all World War II coqxs,

Military Review Editors — Steering the Course LTC Ezra B. Fuller, Ret., Jan-Jul 1922 COL Rodger Russell Bankscm, Infantry,Jul 1957-Ott 1959 LTC Arthur M. Ferguson, Ret., Jul 1922-Feb 1923 LTC George Babington Macaulay, Artillery,Nov 1959-Feb 1960 LTC Louis J. Van Schaick, Infantry, Feb-Jul 1923 COL Kenneth Earl Lay, Infantry, Mar 1960-JuI 1964 LTC Alfred Brandt, Infantry, Jul 1923-Aug 1927 LTC Albert Nutter Garland, Infantry,Aug-Sep 1964 MAJ Wooden A. Pickering, Infantry, Aug 1927-JuI 1931 COL Donald James Delaney, Field Artillery,Ott 1964-Feb 1972 COL James A. Woodruff, Engineers, Mar 1932-Mar 1933 COL Orville Wells Martin Jr., Armor, Mar 1972-May 1974 COL Frank Keller, Cavalry, Mar 1932-Jun 1934 LTC Rufus Glenn McCue, Military Police, Jun-Sep 1974 LTC Arthur W. Lane, Infantry, Mar 1932-Jun 1934 COL John Howell Chitty Jr., Infantry, Ott 1974-JuI 1976 LTC Samuel J. Sutherland, Infantry, Mar 1932-Dee 1933 LTC Joseph Earl Burlas, Quartermaster, Aug-Sep 1976 MAJ Charles A. Willoughby, Infantry, Mar 1932-Sep 1934 COL Ruby Rose Stauber, Engineers, Ott 1976-Aug 1977 COL W.B. Burtt, Infantry, Jun 1933dun 1934 COL Edward M. Bradford, Infantry,Sep 1977-Jun 1960 MAJ Arthur Vollmer, Cavalry, May-Jun 1934 LTC Ernest L. Webb, Infantry,Jul-Aug 1960 MAJ Fred During, Infantry, Jun 1934-Jun 1937 COL John D. Bloom, Air Defense Artillery,Sep 1960-JuI 1964 LTC Paul R. Davison, Cavalry, Sep 1937-Mar 1939 LTC Dallas Van Hoose Jr., Armor, Aug 1964-Jun 1965 LTC Enrique M. Benitez, Coast Artillery,Jun 1939-Sep 1940 COL Frederick W. limmerman Jr., Armor, Jun 1965-Feb 1967 CPT Malcolm R. Kammerer, Infantry, Dec 1940 COL James A. Rye, Engineers,Mar-Jul 1967 COL Frederick M. Barrows, Field Artillery,Mar 1941-Dee 1945 COL Phillip W. Childress, Field Artillery,Jul 1967-JuI 1990 COL Andres Lopez, Infantry,Jan-Jui 1946 COL Steven F. Rausch, Aviation,Aug 1990-Aug 1992 COL Ramon Antonio Nadal, Infantry,Aug 1946-Mar 1949 LTC Ronald N. Mazzia, Armor, Sep 1992-May 1993 COL Harold Robert Emery, Infantry,Apr 1949-Feb 1952 COL John W. Reitz, Field Attillery,Jun 1993-Aug 1995 LTC Donald Linscott Durfree, Infanty, Mar 1952-Aug 1955 COL Richard M. Bridges, Air Defense Artillery,Sep 1995-Ott 1996 LTC William Delaney McDowell, Infantry,Sep 1955-Jun 1957 LTC George L. Humphnes, Infantry,Ott 1996-Present

60 November - December 1996 “ MILITARY REVIEW LEAVENWORTHUPDATE army and army group commanders passed through the school as students. All would have the oppor- tunity to read the Summan, and many contributed to it. In July 1925, a new title, Re\’ie}t @Current Mili- tan Writings: For the use qf Instructor-sof the Gen - eral Service Schools, Fort Lea\’en~~‘otih, Kansas, ap- peared on the publication’s cover. The subtitle was dropped with the December 1927 issue, perhaps to recognize that the Summan was no longer just a small, in-house publication but had grown in impor- tance m, indeed, the Leavenworth schools were growing in importance. With the September 1928 issue, volume and issue numbers (Volume VIII, Is- sue No. 1) appewd for the first time on the title page. With the June 1929 issue, The Command and General StafT School ~placed The General Service Schools on the Re\’ie~’s mmthead, and in the next issue the contents, which had always appemd on the cover page, moved to page 2. Each issue now exceeded 100 pages. By 1930, the Revie}t’ was sig- nificant in the education of Leavenworth faculty and students and was reaching out to the broader Army community. The early 1930s were not the best of times in the United States or the Army. The stock market crash in October 1929 and the Great Depression’s onset caused further cuts in government and military bud- title change in December 1931 mom accurately de- gets. Modernizing equipment and maintaining and scribed the journal’s content and purpose-l? et’ie}i’ improving facilities left over from World War I we~ of Current Militat~ Literature. The Ke\’iew’had now the War Department’s priorities. With limited dol- achieved the same professional status as other period lars, many needs and projects went unfunded. journals. However, the quality of instruction at Fort Leaven- Few individuals can be identified with the Re- worth continued at the highest possible standard-a ~?iew”searly development. During the publication’s real tribute to the Army’s leadership during those first decade, the school’s library committee com- years. A number of rising stars would paM through piled and edited the Summa}y and Rei’ie}\’. Com- the Leavenworth schools in the 1930s, including fu- mittee service was an additional duty, and many of- ture corps commanders J. Lawton Collins, Ernest ficers resigned to the school served on it at one time Harmon, Frank W. Milbum and M.anton S. Eddy. or another. Although the library committee mem- Clarence R. Huebner and Wade H. Haislip, also fu- bers are known, their names did not appear in the ture corps commanders, served tours on the faculty. ~e~’iew’ until March 1932. Of- the five committee Eddy later returned to Fort Leavenworth as the col- members at that time, one had a significant impact lege’s commandant. on the Review”s future--Major (later Major Gener- During these years, the Revie~ of Current Mi/i- al) Charles A. Willoughby. Willoughby graduated tan Writings continued to develop m a professional in the Leavenwofi class of 1931 and remained to journal. In the December 1930 issue, the full names serve as the school’s librarian. In December 1931, of reviewers and digesters apmd after their con- he was designated the journal’s editor, the first ofli- tributions, replacing the bm initials that had pE- cia.1appointment with that title, although he contin- viously identified contributors. This meant contribu- ued to perform his librarian duties. A complete list tors could now be recognized more readily by the of “editors” is at F@u-e 1. Review’s readership beyond Leavenworth’s schools. As editor for three years, Willoughby was respo- The September 1931 issue used a heavy stock, rath- nsiblefor a number of significant journal develop- er than a paper, cover for the first time. Another ments, including two title changes. In September

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 61 and later one of World War II’s most successful [ MILITARY ~EWS ‘-:: corps commanders, created something of a scandal -1 around fhe T for the Review; causing many undistributed copies to ~ ?q wyORL~ _‘e. be destroyed and pages 67 to 70 of the ~ord copies L7 COLEM DENITEZ. C AC to be sliced out with a razor blade. Major Fred Dur- ing, then an assistant librarian at Fort Leavenworth, Progress of—Aviation cut out the pages after the issue had been printed. In his friendly letter to Collins explaining his actions, During, who served as editor from 1934 to 1937, noted that he cut out the pages because they “con- tained references to the confidential regulations.” The upcoming January-Februaq 1997 issue of A4ili- tary Review will be the first publication of Collins’ article in its entirety-unabridged and uncensored. ?“.1-ll,u,”,A,w,,”,.“...“L).—,...,..,,J,Q*..”.“ “,,,,,,.. ,.,, , . Through time, the Revieu’ became a clearinghouse nti1.*WHyAIR IXMNI. lwO-lm Th, ,“’>,”, @,,,,, ,., ,“,, q,., .,,)..,,. “ ,,, . , An.tio. t, i!m !- S Ann> *z. “:tl!zd m ?u,tr .. ,h. !h. M,,*,”. .!. , 4*j, .,k, .“,, , P.!, i ,,,. !, ,... [1%(1W.,, 1.. d,rilm Lb,. ra,iod obowv.t,.”. ft”.m tm;lw,,, 1,** ~$ ,,,,~$w .*, u. !@ ,, v \ 1!,t ,$( 1 ,, ,.$ for reviews and digests of books and articles on mil- M,* W* t,> .,.,1,.. u,w,..l. f.,r IFwAmv .( {t. P ,W ,J”~~m !., * ,!%4 !,,..~! 4 ! ,.1 I ,, ,.,, , mu’ ‘hi Am, r!.rrhsmd . Wk..> $“ Fr.r,r. t“ 18.!0,.ed .?.1 !l.!! !,” r}. ,,,,, ,.1,..,., , . ,. .,, , ,,. , , , . (hi. -. d “1kb8 dur,,q tbe .w”I.* Amnr!r.n W“ ,-r ‘na,”fy itary affairs, as well as a major forum for debate, A. .Mrwu.u,.uu d!.,!...... S+.k+t”wdJMc,. omq. Are! ,, ,, f, .$. .*,I .,, .. ,, . “,.,, , ,, ,,, , of !)!. { hmf >.”,}.1 l),lk.w ,I ltw Arnv .. 3.1, I,U T ,,,d *,. Bu,rd .( , ,.,. .,. .,,,.,,, , \ , !4. ,,, ,, , m LWr”’ *, ,!f ,1,. ,.., , * w,., IL+pn., .. . .,,,.,,,.d !hw !!,, b!,. !..,!. a .M,,.,.r! .,4 ,,, , , !.,. ,. 4, ; .; for M! ,1.r vu ,,. ,t, w,,. ,, , f . . .,,,:*,,, Pm wr, Kh, A,lv.,.i z ,*, .,,, LM ,, , ,,:!,. ,,,, ”,, , .,, , ,, discussion and dissemination of ideas, theories and

llt<.h -c., .“.4 u.. .?,. 1,.,, <1,.,, t, ;. ,=,.. , ,,,,,11 ., ,,$>.”, !.1lht. I“wm!”....rl. r !, ., F& “ ,,>,, ,,< ,, w d !.!,” ., .I.I. I.,. ..,d ,*. . ,,./,,. , . . . ,*, .,”+ ,, ,’ , ,m.,,,,,,.J ,,. I,,*.,,,,. ,J ,,< +,,. ,,, , ,, to.! M,,,r t’. ,38,4“. .. . :8 ,*IF !! . ..., t,,”l.,,w w,, h 7,,, r,’q,, r,”,. , till,, ,,. . ,,,,, ,*,, . ..,, , ., proposals afkcting the Army’s future. . . . . ,,m-,d (,< ., .,., ,,, ,:4 .rd . .,,,, ,.. ”,{ .,,, * ,,”4 ,,, ,. ,. , b ,, . . ,Atm”j,,, ~, .,,,.. , ,,,, . ~, , ~. .. . fs*L .. WI .8c .,,w.,.u..t Ih. I.,krml ~x..r .-, ,...,,,,,. ,,.,,.1, .,A ,...... ! s ,, , ,, , , , . L ,,,, ,..1 ., tk , hw w,,. +!Tek4 Ily .... ,!,s ,)” .,”s. ,>,h .,, ,.,, .,, h,,, .,,,, ,. , ., ;,. ,.. ,,,, ,, , , ,$ Following Willoughby’s 1934 depature, Asso- T),., h-b!” ,.1, .tnr. ..,.1 ‘)8 r.d.kr ., N . q w,.%{ ,,, ,,,.., h.vr ! ,., * “f , ,.’, ,>3 ,,, .,, ..,, “,.,, ,, +$ )f ,hu *,FC. !!. w, .Mr!c..., ..m.4..’n&, , 1!}, ., ?.!, ,,h, r ,q, , .,.rim.,t,.,,,,. .,x ,,, .,, ,,, . ,. ., , , ciate Editor During became editor. He continued to -r <..nwrwd d t-m rvw..rs I r ,kd. d tht PLW -,,. 4[ t. !,., ./..,,4,, , ,,, .,,, .,, ”, , ,, ..N! I.. ,.!’ hlwhed fl.nfl . m18L.m,l . ..&, U“*h. ,, ,,!M,,.—. l, “ .> ,4! , ,.,. ~,,. ,, , . ,. M push the Review’ in the dirwtion chatted by Wil- loughby. More original articles appead covering topics of contemporary interest in tactics, doctrine, 1932,the title became Quazferly Review of Milita~ logistics and, occasionally, historic battles. Faculty, Literature. A year later, it bec~e Revie< of Mili- students and CGSS graduates wrote most of the tary Literature: The Command and General Sta# original articles, but in December 1935, “The School Quatierly. In September 1934, the Re]’iew’ Struggle Against Ovenvhelming Odds” by German became available by subscription to the general pub- army Lieutenant General Friedrich von Boetticher lic for the first time, widening its audience. The av- appeared as an original study. In 1936, the Review erage issue now ran over 175 pages. These changes published Combat Operations (Tentative), and in suggest that Wdloughby and the library committee 1936 and 1937, the journal published a large folio of we~ slowly defining the journal’s role within the maps for study and use in contemporary military Leavenworth school and the Army. This resulted in problems. Although Combat Operations was a dis- the Review’s most important change since its found- tinct dep- fkom the Revim’ forma~ it mffirrned ing-the creation of a new section of original ar- the traditional nAationship between the Leavenworth ticles written solely for the Review schools and the journal’s origins. Each issue now The publication of an original article in December ran mom than 200 pages. 1933 broke with tradition and set the Revim on a As war clouds rumbled across Asia and loomed new course, allowing faculty and studen~sand active on the horizon in Europe during the late 1930s, the duty and retired oficers-and later, military analysts Review continued to grow. During adopted the title and scholars-to comment on and explo~ ideas and The C’omnd and General Staf School QUAR- issues pertinent to the military profession’s evolving TERLY Re\’iew of Military Literaho??, retaining all state. Willoughby, who would go on to serve as the words of the 1933 title but ma-ranging them to General Douglas MacArthur’s chief of intelligence emphasize the journal’s quarterly natme In Sep- during World War II, accepted for publication an in- tember 1937, Lieutenant Colonel Paul R. Davison dividual research study-titled ‘The Conduct of a became editor. He and Associate Editor Major En- Holding Attack”+y then second-year student Ma- rique M. Benitez expanded the Review, publishing jor J. Lawton Collins. Collins would become articles on current military operations, including the “Lightning Joe” Collins of Guadalcanal fame, wear Sine-Japanese War, the Spanish Civil Wm and air four stars at the close of World War II and serve as power, and news briefs on the latest military situa- the Army chief of staff from 1949 to 1953. tions. The December 1937 issue displayed for the Wk_hhis article, Collins, a 1933 CGSS graduate first time a full-color illustration-mounted ofkers

62 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW in late-1880s full-dress uniforrn+n the cover, re- placing the traditional table of contents that had adorned the cover since 1923 (except for September 1929 to June 1932, when the contents appeared on page 2). The December 1937 issue ran 350 pages, the largest issue in the Re)ie}t”s history. This growth almost certainly prompted Davison’s decision to change from a single-column, 5 1/2-by-9-inch for- mat to a double column, 9-by-12-inch printing for- mat. The larger size contained about the same con- tents in half the number of pages, permitted the use of more illustrations and photos and did not intimi- date readers m much as the smaller-size, thicker is- sues had. The new issues averaged about 100 pages each and featu~d an original photo, usually of new equipment or curnmt training activities, on the cover. Newly promoted Lieutenant Colonel Benitez moved up to the editor’s chair in June 1939 after Davison’s departure. In many ways, Benitez’s as- sumption of the editorship marked a significant tur- ningpoint in the Rc\’kw”s history. Benitez’s first is- sue had another title change-The Command an(l Gew-ul St({f Mod MILITARY REVIEW. Hence- forth, it would be known as MILLLARY REV/EW! and well-educated officer corps increased as the mil - Qua~TerhyRe\’ie\\*of Militat> Literature continued as itary profession became mo& sophisticated and de- a subtitle until April 1943, when MILITARY lL5- manding. The Leavenworth school and A4ilitq’ VIEW commenced monthly publication. Circulation Re\’ievt’played significant roles during this period. was mom than 4,000, and foreign as well as domes- In March 1941, Colonel Frederick M. Barrows tic subscriptions carried CGSS’S name around the became A4ilitwy Re]~iew”seditor and held the posi- world. Original articles and commentaries on the tion throughout World War II. Barrows oversaw world military situation made up about half of the one of the most fertile periods in the journal’s histo- I/eview’s pages, while the other half wm devoted to ry. The journal’s staff gmw to include the assistant digest aticles and book reviews. With the outbreak edito~, and the number of original articles inc~sed of war in Europe in the fall of 1939, the journal that from two or three to as many as 15 or 16 per issue. began as an in-house publication for the Leaven- Most articles wem written by CGSS faculty and worth schools’ faculty and students had matured dealt with doctrine, tactics, training, leadership and into a major military periodical serving a broader lessons bawd on the CGSS curriculum and experi- community, focusing on issues and looking to the ence from units deployed to Europe and the Pacific. future. Digests of fo~iW military articles still constituted a The US entrance into World War LIin December substantial portion of each issue, but no mom than 1941 brought about profound changes in the Army. th~e or four pages of book nwiews wem published. Not only did it herald mass mobilization unlike any MOE important, however, was the decision to in US history, it fundamentally changed the Army. publish A4iliiar~ Review’ monthly beginning in April Unprecedented resources became available to build 1943. Undoubtedly, this decision was a response to facilities, fund research and development, increase the demand for officers to staff newly mobilized pay and benefits, buy vast qm.ntities of arms and formations and to the unprecedented number of stu- hire swarms of civilians for new bureaucracies. den~s going through CGSS. During the war years, Two generations of US soldiers would serve before 19,607 officers graduated from 27 general staff the Army was again reduced in relative size to that classes. The regular course was reduced to 10 of 1939. First World War II, then the Cold War ele- weeks, and a number of special courses were added vated the military profession to a new status in to accommodate Allied officers and command American society. The demand for a highly trained cadres of new divisions. In this milieu, Militat?

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 63 hlilita~ Review’s expansion during World War II, the move to monthly publication and the addition of the Spanish and Po~guese editions led to a sub- IVIIUTARYREVIEWIstantial incmse in duties for the staff. In May 1945, Editor in Chief Barrows supervised two foreign km- guage editors, eight assistant editom and a produc- tion and business manager. In September 1945, an offker serving in the Pentagon was assigned as Mi/- ita~y Revie~”s Washington repnxentative to liaise with various Army agencies. While Military Review) was still located at Fort bmvenworth and organiza- tionally tied to CGSS, it now served a much broader mission than just the faculty and students-it served a worldwide audience. Military Review’s overall appearance and direc- tion did not change appnxiably during the nmain- der of the 1940s and 1950s. Original articles on contemporary and historical topics-many examin- ing and m-examining battles, campaigns and issues raised in World War II-now dominated the jour- nal’s pages. Early in this period, “Books of Intemt to Military Readers” included on]y two or three book ~views and a list of 12 or so titles for nalers’ consideration. By 1960, space devoted to books had Re\’iew played an especially important role in pr- doubled, and the number of reviews averaged eight ovidingdoctrinal education and disseminating lessons or nine per issue. “Foreign Military Digest” a sta- learned fi-om disparate battle fronts. MililaW Review! ple since the Sumnuz~’s founding, demased in im- was published monthly for the next 52 years until portance as the Army became the dominant military downsizing and cutbacks affecting nearly every fac- force in the world and American theorists and schol- et of the Army forced Mili@y Re\’ie\i’ to publish ars took the lead in military thought. Whereas one- bimonthly beginning in January 1995. third of Milita~ Review’s pages we~ devoted to Other wartime decisions had a lasting impact on “Foreign Military Digest” in 1946, by 1959 this sec- Mililan Review. In August 1943, a design featuring tion was titled “Militmy Digest” and included only a tank, half-track, antiaimrafl gun, deuce-and-a-half three items. The section disappeared from Military and B-17, with Grant Hall and the Bell Tower in the Review’ by 1961. Nevertheless, Military Review background, replaced the Grant Hall bell tower that looked much as it had at World War II’s end. had graced the journal’s cover during the previous An internal study in 1960, including a seven-page year. To conform to wartime restrictions, the June questionnaire sent randomly to readers, led to a E- 1944 issue was printed on smaller, more compact styled A4ilitan Review by January 1961. One inch 6-by-8-inch paper. Although the color changed was added to the size of the journal (now 6 by 9 monthly, the cover design changed only once over inches), allowing for wider margins and a larger the next 15 years. typeface for easier reading. The familiar globe and Perhaps the capstone World War II change to military symbols on the cover gave way to a simple A4ilitan Revie~’ was the addition of Spanish and design with Milita~ Review in larger, bolder type Portuguese (Brazilian) language editions in April and “U.S. Army Command and General StatT Col- 1945. Authorized by the War Department at the re- lege [CGSC], Fort Leavenworth, Kansas” reduced quest of our Latin American allies, each issue was a to 1O-point type. Milita~ Review’s mission was di~t English edition translation and appeared with also restated. In a note introducing the new form* the same cover design and format. Copies we~ dis- Major General Harold K. Johnson, a CGSC instruc- tributed t.hmugh the participating Latin American tor after World War II and the CGSC commandant governments and made available to an incnzusing since August 1960, wrote: “We w inaugurating a number of Latin American officem attending the new program of coverage fixiturhg articles on se- Fort Leavenworth schools. lected subjects of military significance by prominent

64 November - December 1996 “ MILITARY REVIEW LEAVENWORTHUPDATE military and civilian authorities. We will continue to welcome and encourage the voluntary expression of military thought. We will disseminate information, ideas and doctrine developed at the College which am of interest to the Army and the military profes- sion at large.” During the next decade, Johnson—who later served as Army chief of sta.R-saw Militaq’ ~evie~’ transformed into an even more dynamic professional journal. Original articles now made up mo~ than 80 percent of its pages, with 12 to 15 articles cover- ing a wide variety of topics each issue. A teader could still fmd a few articles on doctrine, tactics, leadership and other issues of ongoing interest to CGSC faculty and students, but articles on strategic issues, the Cold War, the Atlantic Alliance, regional conflicts and the Middle East increasingly domi- nated the journal. Between 1%5 and 1974, 1I4 ar- ticles appeared about the war in Southeast Asia. While a few civilian scholars and military analysts had published articles in MilitaryReview in the pas~ civilians, including such noted authors as Louis Morton, Brian Bond, John Keegan, Jack Weller and Anthony Herrigan, now wrote a third or mom of the articles in each issue. To make Militant Ret’iew more accessible to ~ad- ers, two indexers at Kansas State University-Mark gling to enlist qualified men and women in a new and Kmn Whg+ompiled a comprehensive sub- �’All Volunteer Army,” and the futu~ looked uncer- ject and author index of the first 43 years of Militaq tain as Army leaders endeavored to chart the Ret’iew and its predecessors. Published in 1967, the Army’s course amid the chaos. Comolidated Index ]922-1965 greatly simplified the Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Mili/a~ Revim researcher’s task and gave students and scholars in was a solid cornerstone of Army professionalism. military agencies and universities a much easier way Although the journal’s editors did not seek out con- to find information on US military thought and de- troversial issues and ideas or contrary opinions, they velopment during one of the most productive peri- did not avoid them either. The subtitle ‘The Profes- ods in American military history. sional Journal of the US Army” appeared on the While book reviews continued to appear in “Mili- journal’s title page in January 1965, perhaps the best tary Books” and new US and foreign military expression of Johnson’s vision for /14ilitaW Ret’ie~’ technology, weapons and equipment were show- four years earlier. cased in “Military Notes,” Editor in Chief Colonel This spirit of professionalism and the central role Donald J. Delaney launched “Reader Forum” in that such a journal should play in the Army contin- February 1969. For the first time, Milita~’ l?et’ie}~’ ued and was enhanced in a revamped Military Re- was open to direct input and fkedback from readers view’. The newly designed journal, now printed on worldwide, who could comment on or critique re- higher-quality 9 l/2-by-7-inch paper and with a cent ~icles, propose fitm articles or simply proffer more durable cover, appeared in April 1978. Al- ideas for the editors and other readers to consider. though illustrations had returned to Milita~ Re- “Reader Forum” continues today as “Ml? Letters.” \’iew”scover with the 50th Anniversary edition in The US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 lefl February 1972, they were usually simple, single- US foreign policy and Southeast Asia in shambles. color drawings or photos. The new cover ilM.ra- For the first time this century, the US”Army found tions wem eye-catching, using a variety of photos itself in a state of crisis. Discipline deteriorated, the and art work in sharp, contrasting colors and pastels, public questioned professional offkers’ ethics and f~uently emphasizing a topic appearing in the is- competency. The dra.11’send left recruiters strug- sue. Beginning in August 1980, ‘“The Professional

MILITARY REVIEW � November - December 1996 65 Journal of the United States Army” moved from the annual subscriptions and another 6,000 copies sold title page to the cover. Inside, the reader found the in Army and Air Force exchanges and book stores. same double; the CAC remains uncertain. However, its mission-as evi- homepage at: ; or the denced by Figure 2—remains the same. Army homepage at: . Nevertheless, the quality and integrity instilled in Mi/tiaryReview and the Public Affairs Center for A4ilitan Re}’iew and its pmkcessors over the past Media on the Bafflefield support the CGSC mission and promote the study and understanding of the im- 75 years must not be compmmised. The dedication pact of media technology and the global information and professionalism of Militan Revie~”s editom and environment (GIE) on Force XXI. In addition, the Mi/L staff have always been its ~test asset. It has fwy Rew”eweditor in chief serves as the CAC senior grown and evolved from a small, in-house publica- public affairs adviser and exercises wider duties for tion into one of the world’s finest military journals. leader development and training issues to address Military Review now serves as one of the Army’s the impact of media technology and the GIE across primary sounding boards for ideas, a debating forum the Army through CGSC and other course instruction. The Public Affairs Center for Media on the Battlefield for current issues and a valuable tool for educating incorporates Combat Training Center lessons learned soldiem in an uncertain and changing world. It must in CGSC courses and corps and division doctrine. continue to accomplish that mission as the Army Figure 2 approaches the next century. MR

JerokiE. Brown is a hktorian and instructor with the Combat Shdies Instihlte, US Army Command and General S@_ College, Fort Lest’enwort4 Kansas. He received a B.A. and an MA. ji-om Pwdue Uni~ersity and a Ph.D. jbrn Duke Unitw-sity A former professor at Midway College, Kentucky he has published ~ariousbooks and articles on milita~planning, World War[1and the Indian Warsand is edit- ing The Historical Dictionary of the US Army, scheduled forpublication in 1997.

66 November - December 1996 “ MILITARY REVIEW Fifteen Years Later Colonel Albert E. Bryant, US Army and Joan Dietrich Silver

CAS% G&” States and abroad. Ultimately, the small~roup in- � Improved abi& to analyze and sobe struction technique observed at the US Army Ser- rniihry problems. geants Major Academy and the Canadian Staff College’s evaluation system were adapted to � Improved communication skihk. CAS3. Small-group instruction has been so integral � Improved abiUy tu intemct and cooniinate to the CAS3 philosophy that it is even reflected in the as a member of a stiff. architectural design of the CAS3 wing of Bell Hall. w Improved undemanding of Army organ- The Howard K. Johnson wing has 55 classrooms de- ization, opemhlms and procedures. signed to accommodate 12 students each and has no auditorium or any rooms for large-group instruction. THE COMBINED ARMS and Services Staff CASS designers used a systems approach to cur- ~ School (CAS3), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, riculum development, starting with a front-nd anal- opened its doors 15 years ago with the mission of ysis to determine what staffs actually do. Designers training Active and Reserve Component officers to function effectively as staff officers in the field. Months of planning and hard work culminated in a CAS3 became, and renuu”ns,an unique educational setting at the US Army Com- educational setb”ngwhere piwcess, not content, mand and General Staff College. ~ emphasized. CAS35 phiilmophy is to teach Although the impetus for CAS3 came from sever- bow b perform stnff~nctbns. The goal is al sources, the most influential, without a doubt, was for oficem tQlearn to use high-level cognitive the 1977 Review of Education and Trdining of Offi- skills. The interactive and hand&on counse cers (RETO) study, which examined the Army’s en- also emphasizes problem analysh, soluthm tire officer training and education system. The lack coorditin and how to think &her thun of formal training in staff procedures among officers whattothink. Thh is accomplished thrvugh not selected for the resident Command and General realistic &ffproblems in tnu”ning,mobiliza- Staff Ofllcer Course resulted in the recommendation tion, depbyment, kwdemhip and management to bring all officers to a central location for such training. RETO documents contained fairl detailed andprepmtion for combat. suggestions for what was to become CAS-.7 Among the ideas that survived and were implemented were the nine-week course length, conducting the course conducted surveys, collected data and interviewed in two separate phases, establishing a permanent fa- officers. T’hey developed task lists that formed the cility for the course at Fort Leavenworth and using a basis of the initial designs for both the Phase I and combined arms concept. Phase 11CAS3 curriculum. CAS3’S creators were fortunate in that they were CAS3 became, and remains, an educational setting free to develop a creative and innovative approach to where process, not content, is emphasized. CAS3’S learning, unencumbered by any existing content, philosophy is to teach how to perform staff functions. methodology or class size. Curriculum and program The goal is for officers to learn to use high–level designers studied a wide variety of highly success- cognitive skills. The interactive and hands+m ful educational models and progmrns in the United course also emphasizes problem analysis, solution

MILITARY REVIEW � November - December 1996 67 the same “Leavenworth experience” benefiting the Every group sad working wdh AC. That experience consists of fully equipped captains from other branches was the most classrooms built especially for small%roup instruc- beneficial experience at CAS3. Students tion; resident distribution support---each staff group s~ed exposure h other branches akme requires 300 pounds of course materials that must be would make CAS3 worthwhile, because il is counted, collated and distributed throughout the an expen”encenot avadhble elsewhere within course; day-to+lay administrative support from the Army. They MM that before attending CAS3 operations: complete Combined Arms Re- CAS3, they hud onlj a superficial under- search Library resources; direct support and mentor- s@uiYng of and apprecidion for the roles o ship by AC staff leaders and supervisors; total im- branches other than their own. Afier CAS !, mersion in the course with no civilian business or they said they were “able to see the big pic- Pdmily distractions; and improved physical training ture, and everything came togethe~” and fitness facilities and opportunities. Not only has CAS3 improved the RC officers’ military staff skills, it has also benefited many of these officers in their coordination and how to think rather than what to civilian occupations. 1 think. This is accomplished through realistic staff problems in training, mobilization, deployment, External Evaluation leadership and management and preparation for On an Army Research Institute (ARI) survey, a combat. The students learn staff techniques and con- CAS3 student in the 96-1 class said, “CAS3 is an in- duct staff exercises. The end product is an officer vestment in my future,” CAS3’S success has been who can identi~ the problem, analyze it, develop a substantiated independently through external evalu- recommended solution, justify the recommendation ations in 1987 and 1990 and with an ongoing AR1 and effectively communicate the solution. evaluation. The first two evaluations focused on ask- Another unique CAS3 feature is its classroom ing former students about their perceptions of CAS3 instructors, or staff leaders, who are lieutenant colo- some time after graduation. Results of both were nels, two ranks higher than the students. The staff positive, with students reporting their experience as leaders serve as successful role models for the cap- valuable and effective. The current AR1 evaluation tains and provide the attention and feedback that takes a three-pronged approach: student interviews, only a more senior officer can offer. To each of the student surveys and supervisor surveys. 12 individuals in the staff group, the staff leader is a Student interviews. ARI interviews with a vari- facilitator,teacher, adviser,evaluator, proctor, men- ety of staff groups asked students to respond to tor and battalion commander substitute. open-ended questions, such as ‘bWhat experiences did you have at CAS3 which were most beneficial to Reserve Component CAS3 you?” and “What would you change about CAS3’?” The original RETO study recommended a version Every group said working with captains from other of CAS3 for Reserve Component (RC) officers, but branches was the most beneficial experience at little planning was done until 1984 when attendees at CAS3. Students stated exposure to other branches an RC Staff Training Conference decided to move alone would make CAS3 worthwhile, because it is an ahead on the project. During March 1985, RC mem- experience not available elsewhere within the Army. bers meeting at Fort Leavenworth developed a plan They said that before attending CAS3, they had only that included a tentative progmrn of instruction, a set a superficial understanding of and appreciation for of milestones and plans for training RC staff leaders. the roles of branches other than their own. After By 1986, RC staff leaders began teaching the RC CAS3, they said they were “able to see the big pic- version and completed their first classes in 1987. ture, and everything came together.” The students The original model called for an initial two–week ac- were pleased they could act as subject-matter ex- tive duty for training period, six variously spaced perts in the classroom, explaining to the rest of their weekend sessions and a final two-week tmining pe- staff group the role of their branch in accomplishing riod about one year after starting the course. A newer a mission. They further stated that these opportuni- model called for eight weekend training sessions cul- ties were not restricted to the classroom but also oc- minating with a two-week training session. curred during extracurricular activities. Some male To maintain RC program quality, CAS3 leadership officers said CAS3’S mixing of the branches was has always made every effort to keep the Active their first chance to serve with female offkers. Component (AC) and RC courses as similar as pos- Students gave a rest variety of responses about sible. In 1993, CAS3 leaders began giving the RC the aspects of CAS-? they did not like. Some exam-

68 November - December 1996 “ MILITARY REVIEW When asked how they would view majow or other captiins teaching at CAS3, students were genemlly negti”ve, indicating thut these more junwr oficew db not huve the background or experience to provide the mentoring and guidance given by lieutenant cokmels. One open-ended [survey] question concerning the appropriateness of the timing of CAS3 produced dl~erent opinions jiom captnins at different career stiges. The more “senwr”

� .. captains thought they attended CAS3 too lute in their careers, while the more junior captains ...found the timing of CAS3 to be just about right. pies were: too much work outside of class; too many the timing of CAS3 to be just about right. Further writing assignments; too much stress in the learning confirmation of these opinions was found in student environment; not enough time to produce satisfacto- responses to a survey conducted at the end of CAS3. ry products; a need for different types of problems; Student surveys. The ARI evaluation included a too many paper handouts; the leadership block; the student survey given at the nine–week course’s be- decision briefing to the Kansas National Guard ginning and end. The questionnaire had 31 items de- plans, operations and training officer; not being is- signed to assess the students’ perceived levels of sued a personal computer: and the housing facilities. competence in the skills and abilities important for When asked about having lieutenant colonels as staff officers. The initial survey provided base–line mentors, students were generally very positive. They data, and the course+nd survey permitted assess- appreciated the opportunity to work with a field ment of change as a function of attending CAS3. Af- gmde officer every day and to get the benefit of his or ter analyzing the survey data, AR] found that the her knowledge, infbrnmtion and experiences-an op- changes which occurred in 23 areas over the course portunity generally unavailable elsewhere in the were statistically significant. Students said their abil- Army. When asked how they would view majors or ity to prepare and deliver briefings, manage time, es- other captains teaching at CAS3, students were gener- tablish priorities, interact at the individual level, ally negative, indicating that these more junior offi- make decisions. solve problems and understand the cers do not have the background or experience to pro- Army increased significantly. “Ceiling effects” were vide the mentoring and guidance given by lieutenant observed with six of the remaining areas. That is, colonels. students reported such high scores in these items One open–ended question concerning the ap- when entering CAS3 that there was no room for im- propriateness of the timing of CAS3 produced differ- provement. For example, these areas included toler- ent opinions from captains at different career stages. ance for stress, confidence in abilities to accomplish The more “senior” captains—those with seven or difficult tasks, motivation to exceed “minimum” re- more years in the Army—thought they attended quirements and ability to interact within a group. CAS3 too late in their careers, while the more junior In addition to the overall survey data analysis, captains—with three to four years service-found ARI examined responses given by students within

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 69 —

the same branch. The pre-CAS3 survey revealed it was feared this action would have serious negative wide and varied differences among the branches in educational consequences, but ARI research has perceived levelsof competence in staff officerskills demonstrated that the more junior captains are not and abilities. While all branches showed significant adversely affected. To investigate the problem, four improvement over the nine-week period, it was re- staff groups composed solely of “junior” captains assuring to see that some of the more serious gaps participated in every iteration of CAS3 in FY 96 and were closed after attending CAS3.Z FY 97. Four other groups of the “typical” mix of Supervisor surveys. Commanders and supewi- captains attended the course in the same time frame. sors of CAS3 students are now being asked to rate ARI conducted “focus” sessions with the 96-1 and them on staff officer skills and abilities before they at- 96–2 groups to capture their reactions to CAS3. The tend CAS3 and several months after they complete the junior captains were perceived as being more posi- course. This part of the external evaluation began with tive and enthusiastic about CAS3 than their senior class 97-1, and data will be available next summer. counterparts. They believed the timing of CAS3 was The Future of CAS3 just right for them and said they were eager to use CAS3 has remained a dynamic institution over its their improved skills and abilities upon returning 15–year history, evolving to meet the Army’s ever– to their units. ARI further compared the junior and changing needs and demands as it looks toward the senior groups on all available data points, such as En- future. New doctrine and procedures are incorpo- glish diagnostic scores, Nelson–Denny reading rated as appropriate, but CAS3 resists teaching exter- scores and various personality measures. There were nally imposed content. no appreciable differences between the groups on CAS3, like other Army institutions, has recently these measures, thus providing further support that felt the impact of diminishing resources. In October there would be no serious instructional problems. 1996, the length of instruction was reduced from Generally, staff leaders were very enthusiastic about nine to six weeks. Every effort, however, has been their junior groups, finding them challenging and made to maintain the course’s quality and integrity. invigorating—particularly when they tried to keep Gone from the program are some staff technique, up with them in physical training. Thus, the bottom leadership, quantitative skill and resource manage- line is that scheduling the course as a follow+m to ment lessons. To retain as much of the nine–week OAC should not pose serious instructional problems. content as possible, many learning objectives were Although attending CAS3 means a unit loses a key “embedded” in other lessons and exercises to at- officer for six weeks, the payoff to the Army and unit tempt to achieve “more with less.” The impact on is an officer who improves significantly in his ability students and staff leaders will be less flee time, no to solve problems, write, brief and coordinate. The volleyball and, to some extent, a more intense work- officer returns with increased leadership skills and a load over a shorter period of time. vastly expanded knowledge of the Army as a whole. Fiscal Year 1997 (FY 97) will see the eventual As one CAS3 graduate put it “How can the Army af- chronological and academic synchronization of ford lwt to send me to CAS3?” MR CAS3 and the Officer Advanced Course (OAC). Of- ficers will attend CAS3 upon graduation from OAC NOTES 1 Information aboul the hstory and phhsophy of CAS3 was extr~ed from CA.S3, and before they report to their next duty stations. ~~=w, a Cube” A HIstory of the Comkmed Arms and Serwes Staff School” (Fort This means fairly inexperienced captains will attend and CAS3, ‘a~s%%y~~rn~G~$~~~; FkP~-&~i Leavenwalh, KS U CGSC, 1994). CAS3, rather than the more experienced captains 2. A more detaded CAS3 external evaluahcmtill be avalable v@hmthe next year from the Arm Research InsMute’s F@ Leavenvath Urut. Interested reders should ccmtact who have typically formed the staff groups. Initially, Dr. Stanb Halpm at (913) *933 or DSN 552--@33

Colonel Albert E. Bryant is the dit-ecto~CAS-J,US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leaven- J w’orth fin.sas. He recci~”eda B.S. fionr Pcnmyhyatlia Militaq7 Coilege and an M.p~. fion~ s~lippens~rg Uni-

V’ersipand is a graduate of the Armed Forces .%ff College and US Arnly War College. He has hdd a van”ety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Europe, to include commandq 11thAvi- ation Regiment, V Corp.~,Illesheitn, Germany; conunande~ 3d Battalion, 3d A\’iation Regimenb 3d Itfantt-y Divisiot4 Giebelstadt, Germatly; commandq 4th A}’iationTaskForce, 4th IttJan~t Dit’ision (Mechanized), Fort Carsot4 Colorado; chieJ Proft>ssionulSen”ices Branch, Combat ArnLYDi\’ision, Milita~ Personnel Centec Alexandria, I@@ia; and opcraticms trainitlg oficer and assistant txecuhie ofictm Oficc of the Chitf Army Re.vene, Headquarters, Department of the Army Wa.d~ingtot6D.C.

Joan Diett-ichSihyeris a research p~ycho!ogistfor the Arm}’ Research [tLVhh(te (ARt) Unit, Fort Leaven- word~ Kansas. She recei}’e~ia B.S. and an M.S. from the State Uni~’ersityof New York at Buflalo and an M.S. and PhD. jl-om the Uniivrsip of Georgia Her pst positions ha~v included reseaxh psychologist AN Re- searc~lUnit, Fort Bliss, Texas; and enbtineeringpvchologist, Training and Analysis Command U%iteSanak, New Mxico. Siw is the pritlcijnd im’mtigator for the CASJ external etqaluation.

70 November - December 1996 “ MILITARY REVIEW An Eagle’s View

Colonel Robert E. Ryals, US Air Force

OURAGEOUS AMERICANS, shoulder to 100 support personnel from the Warrior Preparation Cshoulder with their coalition partners, planning Center in Germany operated the Alr Warfare Simu- and executing a joint operation to free an enslaved lation as a part of the simulation suite. Rounding out nation and bring peace and a new pollution-fke en- the air component presence wem additional players, ergy source to people of the world. hs it get any visitors and observers, including a USAF Reserve better than that? Welcome to PRAIRIE WARRIOR unit from Birmingham, Alabam~ serving m Red Air 96 (PW 96), a 2010 scenario pitting two first-class Opposing Force (OPFOR) and members of USAF’s military powers against one another in a contest to Battlestaff Training School and Air Ground Opera- determine the future world superpower and prevent tions School, serving as observers and mentors. In- a hegemonic power’s acquisition of a powerful new creased USAF participation had these goals: energy source. The setting for the diplomatic and � Demonstrate to future Army leaders what air military maneuvering wa.. the island continent of power brings to the fight. Lantic~ located 8(K)miles emt of the United States � Show the joint nature of air operations. in the Atlantic Ocean. This imaginary island was a � Emphasize the air operations center (AOC) as clone of major parts of Central Europe. the single source for air and space issues. This article describes US Air Force (USAF) par- Of particular interest to many observers was that ticipation in PW 96, the exercise’s joint aspects, our prime target audiences were USAF and Army some key doctrinal issues addressed during the mid-level ofllcers. These quality individuals will be planning, game execution and how the exercise wm our 21st-century military leadem Their education in viewed by USAF participants. It also discusses joint war-fighting and best employment of all fomes some impacts the “warfighter” training approach is of prime importance to us all. had on the exercise and suggests improvements USAF members who participated in PW 96 wem for PW 97. asked, “Was the benefit worth the cost?” The major- ity said, “Yes, we learned mom about joint wadight- USAF Participation ing and planning joint air operations than we ever The exercise had many changes compmd with thought possible.” It was very satisfying for faculty prwious years, including a more robust air compo- members to see the tremendous increase in student nent presence. This increased participation multed knowledge in both joint campaign planning and war from the Army deputy chief of SW for Operations gaming. By the exercise’s end, many students we~ and Plans and the Air Force deputy chief of staff for asking probing questions about air operations pkm- Plans and Operations agreeing to incmsed air play ning and joint operations with Army units that usual- and presence. USAF interest in PRAIRIE WAR- ly m only heard from much mom experienced air R1OR is also evidenced by a significant increase in planners. Army personnel were impressed that PW funding for the 19% exercise. 96 was the most realistic exercise to date displaying For the first time, 12 Air Command and StafTCol- the digital battlefield. Many Army students wem ex- lege (ACSC) students, five faculty members and one posed for the first time to real joint warfa.E planning dean joined the 76 students and nine faculty mem- and execution. However, there was a recurrent bers of the USAF Element at the US Army Com- theme throughout USAF student critiques-gaming mand and General Staff College (USACGSC) as and mtrictions on both the air and ground com- players in PRAIRIE WARRIOR. In addition, almost manders created significant disconnec~s that were

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 71 sions. At times, these missions support ground com- Many Army students were expsed ponent missions. At other times, they have only for them time to realjoint warfare plimning indirect connection to the ground fight. For exam- and execution. However, there was a ple, the deep attack of strategic targe~s,such as lead- recurrent theme throughout USAF student ership and national infrastructure, may have a crit@e>gaming and restrictions on both delayed impact on enemy actions. However, that the air and ground commandem created impact can make a strategic difference in joint cam- signijicanl disconnects that were bam”ensto paigns, illustrated by the US attack against the Japa- learning and produced some cynicism about nese home islands in World War II, the 1972 Christ- tkfinal insigh& ... Howeveq most students mas offensive against North Vietnam and the hadpostive impresswns and approached leademhip and infrast.ructum attacks during Opera- the gaming aspects as a learning experience tion De.re~~Storm. Whether the mission is CAS, in- h correct in the fhture. terdiction or strategic attack, all military leaders should be familiar with those missions and their proper employment to ensu~ the most effective mil- itary force application. barriers to learning and produced some cynicism Effective joint force application ~uhes an appr- about the final insights. llrne and again, the students eciationof the missions assigned by the joint force emphasized that the exercise should punish mistakes commander (JFC). In any war, there are never and reward successes. Students were unsure this enough forces to achieve all JFC objectives. There- was happening. However, most students had posi- fore, operational at entails properly balancing forces tive impressions and approached the gaming aspects to optimize objective attainment. By properly using as a learning experience to correct in the future. air power, the JFC gets the maximum benefit from his most powerful offensive asset. The JFACC in Is It Joint? PW 96 assumed them were no strictly air compo- Many USAF observers asked, “Is it a joint exer- nent or ground component objectives. All com- cise?’ An oflen unstated, but understood p~mise ponent objectives and tasks flowed from the JFC’S of today’s exemises is if an exemise is joint, it is objectives. That guiding principle facilitated the good, and if it isn’~ it is bad. We consulted joint difficult task of choosing targets and level of effort publications to determine what constitutes a joint priorities. Figure 1 ]kts the Combined Joint Tmk exemise. We could find no criteria. One implied Force’s strategic objectives. criterion was available: “Did it nzeive joint fund- ing?” No joint dollars we~ spent in PW 96. How- Effects-Based Planning ever, fomes from all four services played in a joint Establishing a combined planning board facilitated training confedemtion----consisting of many differ- the planning process. Although similar to a joint tar- ent models-and learned about joint warflghting. get coordination board, the combined planning board Thus, the answer to “Is it a joint exercise?” is a may be the next logical step in joint planning. The matter of degree. A better question is “Did the ex- board met every 24 game hours, and each member emise educate students in joint warfighting?” presented his component’s supporting objectives, PRMIWZ WARNOR, by its charter, is designed m priorities and resources available for use by other a battle stafl’ training exercise for USACGSC stu- components. Component tasks and missions were dents of all services, making it primarily an Army expressed to other components in the form of desired exercise with a joint flavor. By its nature and de- effects. For example, the JFACC was tasked to sign, it trains students for a corps-verwis

November - December 1996 “ MILITARY REVIEW bring desired effects rather than providing a list of ementssurface. The ground commander claims E- universal transverse mercator coordinates and “ser- sponsibilityfor everything in front of him and must vicing targets.” This also allowed for flexible target- be free to engage the enemy whenever he deems ing and attack of moving target groups-a difficult real-world task-and msuked in closer coordination between Army and USAF membem in tracking and Effective joint force application attacking key mobile targets. This wm particularly requires an appreciation of the mikswns important when working with the Mobile Strike assigned by the JFC. In any waq there are Force (MSF). Because this 2010 force had signifi- never enough forces to achieve allJFC cant organic helicopter air power, its enhanced abili- objectives.... By pmperlj using airpowe~ the ty to move in the battlespace nqkd closer integra- JFC gets the maximum benefl~m his mmt tion to optimize targeting and support, further powerjid oflensive asset. The JFACC in PW Educing the fratricide risk. 96 assumed there were no sti”ctly air compo- This was particularly app~nt when an MSF ele- nent or gnxmd compnent objectives. All ment bypawed certain enemy formations and then compnent objectives and tihfiwed~m needed additional JFACC air suppott. The element.. theJFCk objectives. That gutiing principle bypassed included surface-to-air missile batteries, fac~ed the dl#icuk ~k of choosing targets which significantly complicated air support to the and level of effotiptities. forward MSF elements. This highlighted the need for component plan synchronization and integration. “Since the early days of World War II, military ex- perience has demonstrated that air power dominates appropriate. The air commander makes the same ar- the conduct of military operations.” 1 “[A]ctions by gument but includes a wider area. Resolution of ground force units, in coordination with members of these and similar critical issues before PW 96 began the joint team, will be the decisive means to the aided in achieving success. strategic ends.”z Amid all these discussions, joint publications served as guidance-and the focal point for dis- Doctrine: The Great Debate ag=ments. The question of “who is in charge” is Discussion among service repnxentatives during stacked against the air commander because he oper- the PW 96 planning phase was a major learning ex- ates in the joint operations area but does not have perience. Many issues wem addressed before the sole authority for a specific geogmphic ~ as do the exercise began, including doctrinal issues. Key land and naval force commandem.a Another light- among those WM battlespace management. Com- ning rod for joint discussions in the battlespace man- manders in chief determine how to negate enemy ca- agement anma was theater missile defense (TMD). pabilities, whether they are fielded forces, infrastruc- Again, the joint publications provided both guidance ture, lines of communication or leademhip. They and problems. Joint Publication (JP) 3-01.2, Joinr may employ lethal and nonlethal means while mini- Doctrine jbr Theater Counterair Operations, and mizing fratricide risks and friendly and enemy caw- 3-01.5, Joinl 7heater Missile Defense, both discuss skies. A common battlespace picture incmes situ- TMD but from different perspectives, as seen in ation awareness and information dominance and Figure 2. JP 3-01.2 treats air and space defense helps determine “who is in charge” in various situa- the same way it is treated in Southwest Asia and tions. Ultimately, the JFC makes that determination. Korea-as parts of a whole. However, some inter- But if the JFC is dual-hatted or does not fully under- pretations of JP 3-01.5 treat TMD as a separate issue stand the operations of all components, disagre- from air defense, continuing interservice quarrels

F~re 1. CJTF Lantica Fgure2. Differing Wews of Strategic Objectives Air and Space Defense � Establish viable theater of operations in Lantica. � Expel enemy forces from friendly territory. Air � Destroy enemy ability to project forces. TMD Defense 9 Eliminate enemy ability to project force in theater, � Upon termination of hostilities, facilitate rapid JointPub3-01,2 JointPub3-01.5 transfer of responsibilities to civilian author_ii. M Me h ??teetw(hntemir Operations Jmi??w#wMissikDefense

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 73 has a welldesenwd ~putation for winning during The combined amns warjhre syne~ war games, and the students were genuinely appr- and well+ynchrwize~ wel.1-equ~ped air ehensive about the “lo-foot-tall, bullet-proof’ OP- and gmmd forces led by vengejid intermedi- FOR threat. Type A personalities and boundless en- ate service school studenls was about to upset ergy overcame joint warllghtiig diswments, lack the wellkid pkms of the control ceUand of experience and overworked staffs to produce OPFOR. The students hadpliznned for and quality teamwork. Students from all services rolled were seeing the effects of a well+znned up their sleeves and earnestly worked with one other. offensive. The tremendous pounding and They synchronized ground and air attacks to inflict shockj+om the thinl dimen+swnwas evideb maximum darnage on the OPFOR. and expected. ... Students put into action The combination of “full-up” air and ground op- whut they hud learned. erations cd significant problems for controllers and OPFOR in cho~ographing the proper force ra- tios for the corps-verxus

74 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW cell and OPFOR. The students had planned for and Our objectives should include destroying enemy wem seeing the effects of a well-planned offensive. forces well away from our own. Much of that fight The @mendous pounding and shock from the third will be accomplished by air power. If the enemy gets dimension was evident—and expected. Students closer, through political or geographic conditions, saw hours of classroom study and discussion come lack of available friendly fomes or other factors, a together, paying a handsome educational dividend. C1O.Wfight may become necessary. When that oc- Students put into action what they had learned dur- curs, coordination requirements incnxise, but we have ing USACGSC and ACSC. The word went out— many more combat systems, both air and land, to use. no mo~ synchronized attacks with air and ground Avoiding a tank-versus-tank, plane-vemus-pkme forces on the lead enemy corps. To complicate mat- ters, the CFLCC was also faced with transferring some forces to make the force ratios and timing AU t@justmen& to game pihy were work—all in urudktically short time frames. Just made with one goal in nu”nd: setting up a when students we~ about to map the benefits of robust cops+emm-cotps che jigti so the their coordination and planning, adjustments we~ Stu.dem%couki go through the required made to ensure they fought a “robust fight.” This procedures andprocesses. This was an im- left some students and faculty confhed and ques- po~nt objective but crystidlized the inherent tioning the costs and benefits of the changes. problems of choreogmphed engagemen& ... [A] finalwnentidstudent question was, ‘Why Choreography Versus Free Play huve a chse coqpsfight in thejimtplhce” if All adjustments to game play were made with one you can win without d thrvwgh successjid goal in mind: setting up a robust corps-versus

MILITARY REVIEW � November - December 1996 75 For PRAIRIE WARR1OR and exercises in general, Looking to the Future we must encourage fme play, allowing trainees to be Despite some rough spots, most in the Air Force rewarded for their successes and punished for their view PW 96 as a great success. The Air Force will faih,ues. Allowing students to win when they cor- increase the number of ACSC students participating ~ctly apply principles, procedures and joint war- from 12 to 20, designate a colonel at ACSC solely fighting techniques gives them confidence and responsible for PRAIRIE WARRIOR planning and knowledge in their ability. If the close fight occurs increaw funding by 10 percent. The student rE- despite our efforts, then the student.. should practice sponse to P W 97 participation has been tremendous. their close battle skills. Bu4 if through their correct For the 20 positions, 75 students have applied. This planning and execution they can meet their objec- confirms my belief that mom exposu~ to air power tives, we should let them enjoy the fruits of their la- for Army and Air Force offkers is woti the cost of bors. Instilling self-confidence may be mo~ impor- participation. A pure reliance on Army systems dur- tant at this stage than actually practicing all close ing war games and lack of knowledge about air battle skills. If restrictions must be applied to meet power’s capabilities and limitations benefits no one. training objectives, plan them to more smoothly Air Force objectives for PW 97 ate mesh into game play. This require planning ahead. . Build trust and appreciation among the war- If bad weather is programmed to hold down the ef- fighters. fects of air operations, time must be allotted to � Emphasize warfaR’s joint nature. change that weather. � Educate fhtu~ senior leaders on the principles The standard game artificiality of an entire AO go- and application of air and space power. ing to zero-zero weather results in negative training Our enabling objectives W: for USAF and Army plannem alike. If artificialities � Focus on the appropriate ~presentation of air ate the only means lefi to ensure training objectives and space power in achieving the JFC’S objectives. am me~ stop the game and state the required artifi- � Achieve full air and space involvement in the cialities so commanders and staffs can assimilate JFC’S deliberate and crisis action planning and exe- these wudistic changes and continue. At the very cution. least make certain everyone knows what adjust- � Emphasize the AOC as the focal point for the ments were made and why. For example, if air or JFC’S air and space issues. ground unit support must be removed to ensure train- � Improve corporate USAF support to PW 97. ing objectives are me~ stop the game, let all players PW 96 highlighted, for many airmen, the impor- know about the changed situation and then give them tance of fill engagement in exercise and ~al-world adequate time to make appropriate changes. In my planning from the beginning. ACSC is fully en- experience, to do otherwise results in confusion and gaged in PW 97 planning. PRA/R/E WARRIOR has frustration for a large number of players. shown how we may work through complicated war- Despite many short-notice game inputs, PW 96 fighting issues together to reach a better understand- was notable for the reduced amount of choreogra- ing of our individual service and joint capabilities. phy involved compared with other exercises. How- Judging from both USAF and Army student feed- ever, as the game play progressed toward the culmi- back, PW % achieved its goals of teaching battle nating point of corps-versus-corps battle, abrupt staff skills while increasing the understanding of changes thrown at both the air and ground compo- joint warfighting operations, AtlR nent commandem as ~strictions and miirvction of NOTES air power were combined with movement or 1 US PM Force Manual 1-1, Base Aaroqxux LbcfrIne of the Unkd States AIr Force, vol. 2 (Washington, IX: US Govemmenf PnnttngOff@ [GPO], March 1992), 104. changes in operational control of ground units. This 2 US Army Field Manual 1(KMJ, Oparatrons (lWshmgton, IX GPO, June 1993), 2-o reduced the educational experience. 3 Jant PutAcahcm(JP) 3-o, Lhctnne for Joint Opetakms (VVashmgton,OC’ GPO, 1 February 1995), II-19, 4 JP 3-O, 11-15 “~he estabkshmgJFC daiines the authonly and resfmnstnlibesof Editor 3-Note: Readers interested itl continuitlg thi.~dialog with funchonal cxmoorwnt commanders based on the cmncmt of ooeratms and mav alter Colonel Ryals can E -mailhim at tlw fblloning address: 5 Robed E Osgwd. bmitad War The CM LqatoAmercanStrategy (C;cago Unmmty of Chmgo Press, 1957), 9, quoted m A orca Manual 1-1, 32.

T Colonel Robert E. l@als is the dean, Students and A4hsion Support, Air Command and StaflCollege (ACSC), Maxwell h Air Force Base, Akdwna. He received a B.S. from the US Air Force Academy MA.s from the Uni\w-sip of Northern Colorado and the US Naval War College and a J.D. from the George Mason Uni\*ersih School ofl.aw He is an ACSC graduate and a Naval War College distinguished graduate. He has hekl a ~’arie~of command anti staflpmitions in tht~ Continental United States and Asia, including commatuk~ 607(}1Air Operations Group, Osat~ South Korea; director of operations and director of current operations, 7thAir Force, Osan; depup dilision chiej SFcial Projects, Air StajfDitvc- tor of Requirements, USAir Force Heaa@arters, Wwhingtor~ D.C.; ptogratn managec Royal Saudi Air Force F–IS Pro- gram Air Stafl Washi~@x~ D.C.; and operations oficer of an F–117 squadrotk Nellis Air Force Base, Na’ah.

76 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW The Juggler and the Supreme Commander Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, US Army Establishing a second front was one despite presidential rhetoric that he demonstrated a degree of adroitness in of the most contentious issues the “could not feel at eaw if Marshall were coordinating allied military operations Grand Alliance confronted during out of Wmhington,” Roosevelt’s stated in the War of Spanish Succession, Ike World War II, Also contentious was preference for Mmhall as Overlord had proved equally adept in waging co- selection of the commander for Opera- commander was illusory at best.2 Fur- alition warfare. While serving under tion Lhw-lord, the proposed cros..- ther, when confronted with the reality General Fox Conner in Panama in the channel invasion. In appointing the su- of making an immediate decision, early 1920s, Eisenhower acquired an preme allied commander, President Roosevelt dismissed personal senti- appreciation of the intricacies of com- Franklin D. Roosevelt only seriously ment and selected Eisenhower as su- bined operations. Summoned by Mar- considered two ot%cers: Army Chief of preme allied commander for political, shall in 1941 to serve in the Wm De- Staff General George C. Marshall and rather than milita~, purposes. partment’s War Plans Division, he was European Theater Commander General To understand Roosevelt’s or- constantly at the chief of staff’s side Dwight D. Eisenhower. Both offkers chestration of foreign policy, within during the formative stages of the na- coveted the assignment, but neither was which the decision to name the su- tion’s grand strategy to wage a global so selfish as to advance his own cause. preme commander falls, one must un- war. Under the chief’s direction, Eisen- Most observem at the time, including derstand the president’s emphasis on hower not only developed a rough plan presidential adviser Harry Hopkins, personal diplomacy. “You know I am for the subsequent invasion of Europe, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson a juggler. and 1never let my right hand but also proposed the organizational and British Prime Minister Winston know what my left hand does ....I may framework for the European Theater of Churchill concluded the O~~erlordcom- be entirely inconsistent, and further- Operations (EIO) command structure. mand would naturally fall to Marshall, more I am perfectly willing to mislead No wonder Roosevelt, on Marshall’s the cross–channel invasion’s most if it will help win the war,” Roose- strongest recommendation, selected Ike vocal advocate among the combined ;elt told Henry Morgenthau in 1942.3 to be the Em commander. chiefs of staff (CCS). 1 Nothing exemplified Roosevelt’s politi- Between Eisenhower’s arrival in On the other hand, many senior mili- cal adroitness better than his sehxtion London in June 1942 and the end of tary advisers, especially the remaining of the Overlord commander. 1943, Allied troops under his command members of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff When Roosevelt and Churchill, conducted a series of successful am- (JCS) and retired Generdl of the Armies along with the Anglo–American CCS, phibious assaults in North Africa and John J. Pershing, sought to dissuade met at the Quebec Quudrant Confer- Sicily and on the Italian mainland. R(x~sevelt from appointing Marshall. ence in mid–Augwst 1943, everyone, Working within a command framework Their recommendation was based on including the principdl participants, that did not always foster harmonious their firm belief that the Army chief’s took it for granted that Marshall would relatiom among multinational staffs services were needed more in Washing- command the invasion force. Before and egotistical commanders, Eisen- ton than Europe, not that they lacked the Quadrant Conference began, hower’s success in achieving victory faith in Marshall’s ability to command Churchill met Roosevelt at Hyde Park, amid competing national priorities and the expeditionary force. The ultimate New York, and offered to let the presi- dominating personalities, such as Lieu- decision, of course, rested with the dent name the supreme commander. tenant General George S. Patton Jr. and president, who selected Eisenhower in The prime minister actually pre-empted Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgom- December 1943 in the aftermath of the his American counterpart with his ery, was nothing short of miraculous. Teheran Conference, thus securing “generous offer.” However, it had long Ike’s ability to forge an effective mili- Ike’s place in history and launching him been undemtood that the nation provid- tary coalition that met the Western on the path that ultimately led to the ing most of the invasion’s troops would alliance’s political and operational re- presidency of the United States. & for also provide the commander. Both quirements was essential to AJlied vic- Marshall, he continued as chief of staff, Churchill and Roosevelt initially fa- tory in the Mediterranean. Despite providing invaluable service to his vored Marshall, the “American Camot” Eisenhower’s considerable merits, commander in chief and supervising M the prime minister called the Army however, Roosevelt viewed the selec- the largest and most effective military chief, due to Marshall’s towering repu - tion of the supreme allied commander force in this country’s history. Vdtionwith the president and the com- in strategic, not necesrily operational, Why Roosevelt selected Eisenhower bined chiefs, and all felt such an ap- terms. is the focus of this article, which pro- pointment was the surest way to ensure How Washington and the public vides a revisionist interpretation of the the operation would be a success.q would react to the announcement of traditional view that Marshall was the If Marshall was America’s Carnot, who would command the invasion of logical choice to command (3w70rd. Eisenhower was its Marlborough. J@ Europe were political uncertainties. On the contmy, this study posits that as Churchill’s illustrious ancestor had Thus, Roosevelt followed one of his

MILITARY REVIEW � November - December 1996 77 time+onored tactics by surreptitiously cial residence at Fort Myer. commander. ” Even in his wildest releasing the information and testing Eisenhower obviously was not am- imagination, Roosevelt must have the “trial balloon” of public opinion and bivalent about the rumors cumulating known the British would never concur political fallout. Exactly how Roose- through the nation’s capital. At a lun- with this arrangemen~ which would velt informed Marshall that the ~veted cheon on 1 October 1943 at El Aouina make them the junior partner in both command might be his is unknown, but near Tunis, Secretary of the Navy Frank areas of operations. reaction was swift. Neither Roosevelt Knox told Eisenhower that Roosevelt What followed during the next three nor Marshall was prepared for the polit- officially named Marshall M Overlords weeks was a speculative drama in ical backlash they encountered on their supreme commander. Knox, who was which the merits of Marshall and Ei- return to Washington.5 Administration wrong about the selection’s being offi- senhower were repeatedly debated until critics looked at the prospective ap- cial, also reported that Eisenhower the president announced his final deci- pointment as an attempt to “kick Mar- would go to Washington as chief of sion. First, however, Roosevelt stopped shall upstairs,” while other opponents staff. Eisenhower later stated this was briefly at Eisenhower’s Allied Force vigorously objected on political the only thing said to him on the subject Headquarters in Tunisia. Following a grounds, namely that Marshall was of the invasion command, Ccmsequent- brief chat with the president, Eisenhow- virtually indispensable in his current ly, he immediately dispatched his chief er invited King and Marshall to stay in position. More disconcerting to the of stall, Major General Walter Bedell his villa in Chrthage. Somewhat undip- president was the vehement opposition Smith, to discuss strategy with Marshall lomatically, King brought up the issue by Mamhall’s JCS colleagues, who and to tell the Army chief he preferred of the Overlordcommand and told Ei- were naturally reluctant to lose their ac- to stay in the Mediterranean or com- senhower the president had tentatively knowledged leader in strategic discus- mand an army group under Marshall.6 decided to name Marshall invasion sions within the CCS. Keenly aware of Events surrounding Soviet leader force commander. Vkibly embar- the press leaks and the potential dam- Joseph Stalin at the Teheran Confer- rassed, Marshall remained silent as age to Marshall’s standing in Congress ence finally forced Roosevelt’s hand. King attempted to soften the blow to and his own influence with the legisla- The US delegation, headed by the pres- Eisenhower by informing him that next tive branch and the American public, ident, sailed for Afi-icaon 11 November to Marshall, King could think of no Roosevelt characteristically deferred 1943 with an interim stop in Cairo be- officer as qualified as Eisenhower to the official appointment of an Overlord fore proceeding to the Iranian capital. serve as chief of staff. This seemed commander to a more propitious time. En route to Teheran, the commander in about as official as one could get with- Meanwhile, Marshall and Eisen- chief met with his military advisers re- out a presidential announcement, and hower proceeded under the expectation peatedly to discuss the military and Eisenhower resigned himself to return- that Marshall would command Over- political implications of the upcoming ing to Washington. Zord and Eisenhower would return to summit conference. Before their initial The next day, 21 November, Eken- Washington to serve as acting or deputy meeting with Roosevelt, JCS Chairman hower met the president again, and chief of stzdf. Marshall emphatically Admiral William khy convened the Roosevelt seemed to confirm King’s refhsed to discuss the unofficial an- joint chiefs in Admiral Ernest King’s pronouncement. The president initiated nouncement of his projected appoint- cabin to discuss several proposals re- the discussion of the supreme allied ment with anyone, including the presi- lated to the Overlord command. Mar- commander appointment by stating that dent and secretary of war, but he did shall made an off-the+ecord comment although he dreaded losing the sewices invite British General Frederick E. about the line of action he thought the of Marshall in Washington, “Ike, you Morgan, the designated chief of staff president should take regarding com- and I know the name of the chief of for the supreme commander, to Wash- mand in the European theater and then staif during the last years of the Civil ington for consultations in October. stated that “the war had reached a stage War, but practically no one else knows, Meanwhile, Mrs. Marshall quietly be- where the necessity for a command di- although the names of the field generals gan moving their belongings from rective in conformity with general di- ... every schoolboy knows them. 1hate @artem No. 1, the chief of staff% offj- rection of the combined chiefs of staff to think that 50 years horn now practi- > is clearly indicated.’” cally nobody will know who George ColonelCole E. Kingseedis an asso- ciatepmfessocDepartmentof Histo~, US That afternoon, My put the com- Marshall was. That is one of the rea- A4ilita~Acaakmy West Poi@ New York. mand question directly to Roosevelt by sons I want George to have the big He received a BA. ji-om the Universi~ of stating that the JCS was now consider- command-he is entitled to establish Dayton and an MA. and Ph.D. ~1 Ohio ing the very involved subject of high his place in history as a great general.’” State University and is a graduate of (he US Army Command and General Staff command in Europe and the Pacific. He then added, as if thinking aloud, Colk’ge and the Naval War Colkge. He The president immediately countered “But it is dangerous to monkey with a has heki a variety of command and staff that it was his idea that “General Mar- winning team.”lo Eisenhower re- positions in the Continental United States shall should be the commander in chief sponded m Marshall would have. He and Hawaii, including commanak~ 4th Battaliw 87th Infantry Regimen4 25th in- against Germany and command all said he would serve in any capacity the fantry Division (Light), Schofiek.i Bar- British, French, Italian and US troops president so directed. According to rac~ Hawaii He ako worked h the of- involved in this effort.”8 The scope of John Eisenhower, “This encounter was fice of the akputy chiefof stafffor Opera- such a command far exceeded that of the only time that Roosevelt mentioned tions, Headquarters, Department of the Army Wmhingto~ D.C. His article “14c- the proposed cross+hannel invasion it- the Overlord command to Eisenhower to~ in Europe” appeared in the May- self. It is evident that Roosevelt in- before the decision was made.”11 June 1995 issue of Military Review,and tended to appoint a single commander Still, there was room for Eisenhower “Operation Cobra: Preluak to Breakout” in chief for both the European and to hope his own cause was not yet lost. appeamzdin the July 1994 iwue. d Mediterranean theaters, a sort of “super Roosevelt appeared reluctant to make

78 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW ALMANAc an oflicial announcement. Perhaps he will have a bearing on the choice.” ably not for having worked with the was feeling Eisenhower out on his pref- Roosevelt allegedly whispered to chief of staff since the advent of the war erences. Additionally, his historical Leahy, “That old Bolshevik is trying to in Europe, he clearly knew the measure analogy with the Civil War combat force me to give him the name of our of his man. Ye~ the decision to aban- commanders indicated Marshall’s fu- supreme commander. I just can’t tell don Marshall for the Overlord com- ture recognition as a great military him because I have not yet made up my mand obviously troubled him, and commander was paramount in Roose- mind.”14 Stalin refused to let up and Roosevelt invited Marshall to his villa velt’s decision+naking process. Presi- said he did not presume to influence the the next day to settle the issue. Aware dent Abraham Lincoln, however, had decision, but a commander must be of the president’s apprehension mn - waged a national war of reunification; named so that preliminary planning ~ming the decision, Marshall again re- Roosevelt was fighting a coalition war would not be discarded by whomever iterated that his personal preference in which he did not make unilateral wa.. finally chosen. Churchill then sug- should not be a factor in Roosevelt’s command and strategy decisions. This gested that Stalin “be given an answer decision. Let off the hook, Roosevelt was an important distinction on which in conlldence between the three chiefs then said, as Marshall recalled a decade the president had stood in stating his re- of state and that such a decision be later, “Well, I didn’t feel I could sleep at luctance to lose Marshall’s services in made within a fortnight.”]5 In a private ease if you were out of Washington.”*8 Washington. Still, the question was meeting with Stalin the next day, Then he directed Marshall to draft a strictly in the hands of the heads of Roosevelt confh-med that he and Chur- note to Stalin, informing him that “the state, and Eisenhower patiently waited chill would discuss selecting a supreme immediate appointment of General Ei- on the sidelines while the “Big Three” commander with their staffs and make senhower to command of Overlord op- convened their first tripartite summit in the decision within three or four days, eration has been decided upon.” The Teheran. certainly soon after returning to Cairo. president signed the communique im- It was political necessity, not military That iwue finally settled, the only mediately, and Marshall cabled the strategy, that brought the US president matter left was the actual announce- news to Stalin. To his credit and as a to Teheran. Far more important to ment. Many authors have debated the striking gesture of his personal humil- Roosevelt than the selection of an military merits of Eisenhower and Mar- ity, Marshall later retrieved the original Overlord commander was Stalin’s ac- shall, but both were eminently qualified cable and fommrded it to Eisenhower ceptance of the second front in Western to command Overlord if military merit with the accompanying comment: Europe. For more than a year, the alone was the primary prerequisite in “Dear Eisenhower. I thought you might Americans had encountered resistance Roosevelt’s consideration. However, it like to have this as a memento.”lg from the British chiefs and prime min- was not. Convinced of Stalin’s strong All this presumably occurred with- ister on opening a second front in north- advocacy of the invasion of France, out the knowledge of Eisenhower, who west Europe. Roosevelt specifically Roosevelt reasoned that the cross– was busy awaiting the return of the wanted to ensure Stalin had no reserva- channel strategy was no longer in jeop- presidential party. Somewhat bolstered tions about the invasion of Europe and ardy, and there was no longer any need by his own conversations with CMonel when it would occur. That he essential- to appease the British, who still favored Elliott Roosevelt, the president’s son, ly lefl the iwe to Stal@ rather than operations in the eastern Mediterra- Eisenhower dictated a memorandum Churchill, clearly illustrated its political nean. Who would be better than Mar- for his diary on 6 December 1943 in significance. 12 shall in the councils of the CCS? Why which he succinctly outlined the presi- During the initial plenary session demote Marshall to a theater com- dent’s dilemma. The younger Roose- among the heads of state of the Grand mander and risk losing his strategic velt believed what was troubling his fa- Alliance, Stalin suggested that Overlord views of the war in the Pacific theater? ther was that fm~ Marshall’s great be accepted as a basis for all operations Why not leave Eisenhower in Europe contributions to the UN cause entitled in 1944, and other operations be and keep Marshall in Washington? him to a field command on the theory considered diversionary. Moreover, he Still, how should he inform his most that a chief of staff would never be re- concurred with Roosevelt that France, trwted milita~ adviser that he was con- membered in history, while every inde- not the Mediterranean, was the most sidering keeping him in the nation’s pendent field commander would be suitable sector for a decisive blow capital? Unable, or perhaps unwilling given a place possibly far out of propor- against Hitler. The following day, 29 to confront Marshall, Roosevelt depu- tion to his contributions; and second, November 1943, he directly asked tized Hopkins to see the chief of staff there should be a single mind directing Roosevelt and Churchill: “Who will be and seek his personal views. In later the coordination between overlord and the commander in this Operation Over- years, Marshall recalled that Hopkins operations in the Mediterranean theater. lord’?” When Roosevelt and Churchill met with him on 4 December 1943 and This meant an overall command for the told him no decision on the supreme told him the “president was in some European Theater in some form. Elliott commander had been made, Stalin con- concern of mind over his a pointrnent Roosevelt’s solution, similar to the one cluded: “Then nothing will come out of as supreme Commander.”1z Marshall his father had expressed to the JCS en these operations.’” 3 must have known his commander in route to Teheran, was the creation of a Not prepared to identi& the supreme chief was wavering but again refused to single command to coordinate all ac- commander, Churchill and Roosevelt advance his own nomination. Instead, tions against Nazi Germany. Marshall, attempted to backpedal. The prime he characteristically informed Hopkins theoretically, could serve as the execu- minister reiterated that “His Majesty’s that he would acapt any decision the tive of the CCS and retain his current Government had expressed willingness president made. 17 position, thus essentially having a field to give Overlord under a United States Did Roosevelt really expect Mar- command during the most critical stage commander . . . but that decisions here shall to say anything different? Prob- of the operations.z)

MILITARY REVIEW � November - December 1996 79 against his own proclaimed inclination howw’s instrucbomsto Snvth, see Massa Such a scheme came to nothing, be- howerto smth, f4cksti cbfof Staff, 2 ~~”i~-l cause the British chiefs of staff re- to give Marshall the historic opportunity 77)sPapers of Dw@?tDadEisenhower: 7?reW% Yea/s: ///, ediied by AJlrad D Chader Jr, et al (Balbrnwe The mained adamant that if command of he so greatly desired and so amply de- Johns Hc@ns Press, 1970), 14794? Overlord went to an American, the Served?z1 While he might regret deny- 7. JointChkfaofStaff(JCS), “Minutes, Joint Chwfs of Staff meeting shard ship mthe admiral’scatxn, 15 Novem- British would appoint a supreme com- ing Marshall his place in history with ber 1943at 10@” Racortlsoftheti Chiebof Ster7Part /: 1sM245 Meetings, Reel II (West PM, NY US MIlbry mander for the Mediterranean theater. Generals Ulysses S. Grant and Robert Academy), micwfilm (hereafter ated as Records of tfre Moreover, the British chiefs insisted J(X,194245, MeetK@). E. Lee, Roosevelt could not accept los- 8. Itxt., “Mmtas, rnaetrrg Wfween the presakmt ad that a single command of all forces en- ing his most vigorous advocate in the JCS aboard ship m the presxk?nt’scabin, 15 November 1943 at 1400.” gaged against Germany would disrupt CCS sessions and in the corridors of 9 P ue,303 Forasmllar aaxuntof thecmversa- tion, see‘1 harwood, 770. the CCS theater structure of command, Congress It is ironic that Roosevel~ the 10. For Els@lOWef’S -m of flcesevett’s d~m, particularly if their US counterparts had supreme politician, dismissed the ad- sea Dvoght D, E~ower, Crusade m .Euq?e (New Ywk Doutieday & co. Inc., 1946), 197 their way and the unified European vice of his political consultants and 11. Merle M#er, Ike the Sokler (New York: G P Put- commander had a seat on the CCS. Re- acceded to the recommendations of his nam’s ScmS, 1987), 563. gardless of the supreme commander’s military advisers in what was essentially d.2ffi%$%%s=%12E’:r% %%$% Postwar woddasa hghwprront ythanthedestrucbon of identity, the British insisted the Over- a @itical issue. Not so surprisingly, wy, wtnch he deemed a fcwgrme cnnciuson by late lord commander be subject to CCS in- the Joint chiefs voiced their preferences 13. “Minutes of the Plenary Seswas ~ ~ structions. If he were not, then the CCS in political, not military, terms. United States, Great 8rrtam and the USSR held m the Rus- san Legabon, Teheran, Iran cm 28-29 November 1943,” would be SUpdh.10US. The selection of the supreme com- Rem/da of fhe KS, 194245, Meetrrrgs. 14. Ilnd. F@sev#s comment *uI ‘that old Bolshewk In reality, once the British chiefs ve- mander was a political decision. For ISrecnrded m Stephen Amtxae, The Sugmrra Cafrvnar@ toed the “super command” concept, the upcoming invasion of Europe, tacti- er (Nw York: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 196?3),308; and WIl- Iii Leahy, / Was 7hera (New Yofk WMtlesey House, Mamhall was no longer in serious con- cal brilliance as a field commander, 1950), 208. sideration. From a strictly military per- though desimble, was not a prerequisite 15. Recvrds of the KS, 192+5, Meatmgs. Stwwood a!so tames a complete acxxxmt of the Teheran rregob- spective, any theater command, regard- for commanding a multinational expe- abons 16. Pogue, 320; and Shwwocd, 803 less of it.. importance, would certainly ditionary force. Moreover, Eisenhower 17. Mult}ple sources carry the account of the Hopkns- be viewed as a demotion for Marshall. Marshall conversations, mcludmg David Eisenhower, Ei- had already demonstrated his organiza- senhower At War (New York’ Random House Inc , Returning Eisenhower to Washington tional genius in building a highly effi- 1986), 44. 18. P ue, 321. For Marshall’s VerSIOflof evmts, see and placing him over his former boss cient Allied headquarters, to say noth- Geotge T Marst@ Imarviews and Rermnbcemes for was somewhat ludicrous, as was any ing of his success in commanding three , edited by bny 1.Bland, et al. (Lexington, VA Geor e Marshail Research Foundation, 1991), 344 command arrangement putting Eisen- Anglo-American amphibious opera- ‘mesfiT3tX319. E-W ~taf wed WI fcx h~ Iwrdnesk in forwardIng the cornmwvque and m- hower in a position senior to two for- tions the preceding year. In the end, fonned hlm that he was “hating the memo Wned that you mer Army chiefs of staff-MacArthur MarshaII’s political credits simply out- sent me from Tehera.” See Joseph P. Hobbs, Dear Gw- ed: EI~kS W* Letta to &b-sha// (Baktmwe and Marshall. How effectively Eisen- weighed his military merits. This is the The Jchns Hc@ns Press, 1971), 133 T1-e ongmal mes- sage IS ncw at the Esenhower I_ixary m AIMene, KS hower would have dealt with Mac- key to understanding why the self– 20 ChanUeret al, 15W-87. Arthur in the Southwest Pacific theater proclaimed juggler selected Eisenhow- 21 sherWO@802 was largely too absurd even for Roose- er to command Overlord. In appointing velt to consider. Moreover, switching Eisenhower as supreme commander, 1997 Infantry Army chiefs of staff in the middle of a Roosevelt launched one general on a COnf&mnce global conflict that was already bearing career that ultimately culminated in his The 1997 Infantry Conference (1C 97) the fruits of victory was hardly the most election as the nation’s 34th president will be held at Fort Benning, Georgi% 14 to prudent come of action. and preserved the reputation of the oth- 16 April 1997. Conference theme and top- Obviously flattered when Churchill eras the true “organizer of victory” and ics will be announced in follow+m admin- told him that the Overlord commander the ablest chief of staff the US Army istrative messages from the US Army In- would be either himself or Marshall, Ei- has ever had. MR fdntry Center (USAIC). IC 97 is an official senhower remained focused on his event, and unit and agency representatives Mediterranean operations and prepared NOTES will be invited by separate correspondence. to brief the combined chiefs in Ctiro. 1 Robert Sherwood, Rooaevdt and Hopkins. An /rrtr- All infantry commanders billeted at the mate History (New York: Hzuper & hthars, 1%0), battalion level and above, and their ser- Conducting the briefing with his usual 758-803. Thtshtstorycxmtans an excellent and compkte =~~= aWotntment of Eisenhower as W- geank major, are encouraged to attend. aplomb, he received word of Roose- Conference uniform and dress for social 2. Forrest C. Pogue, c. Marshal Orgauzer of velt’s return. Flying to Tunis, he met the Vktoly 1943-1945 (New%XY VllngPressInc., 1973), event.. will be announced in follow-on president on 7 December 1943, exactly 321, gves Marshall’s accountoftheomvewmnwhen messages. Dedicated transportation assets Rmsev#toid hlm he would stay m Washmgfcn. two years after the United States entered 3. Memorandum of convemdrm between Roosevd will be made available for general officers the war. He received the news of his ap- ad Mm-u, 15 Ma 1942, Presid@rd Dswy, Henry and promotable colonels. Your RSVP will M-u Jr Papers (& Park, NY Franklin D Rcose- pointment directly horn the ux-nrnander velt Mary), 1093, as quoted inWarren F Kimball,7he@- be used by conference operations and pro- ~~princetca, NJ: Prirwtca University Press, 1991),7. tocol to ensure suitable billeting is reserved. in chief. “Well, Ike,” Roosevelt con- Pc$Je,26c. Seealso Sfwwood, 615 and 758; gratulated him, “you are to command Winston twrchdl, C/osmg the Ring (8aston. Hoqhtom Main conference room seating will be lim- Miitn, 1988), 85; and TllWnas Pm, Rceseueftand Mar- ited to 165 attendees. All others should be Overlord.” The greatest military com- shdl (New YoW WIlham Morrow&Co. Inc., 1969), 353 and 363. Saretary SWwon’s dvocacy also InfluencedRoose- prepared to attend sessions in overflow mand in US history went to an officer velt See SWnson’s letter to Roosevdt, dated 10 August rooms. Main conference room seating will 1943, as qucted m Henty ~mscm with McGeorge Bundy, who, three years earlier, was only a lieu- On Actrve Serwce In Peace& WW (New York H~ti& be approved by protocol and the USAIC. tenant colonel. %thars, 1947), 436-343, m wtiti SLimscmdiscusses shall’squaht%trons for the command. Commanders desiring to send represen- Why, Hopkins later questioned, did 5 Forthebest anaiyssofthe snsuingddx4e, see Po- tatives must obtain clearance from the gue, X3-78 and Fomest C. Pogue, The Suprwne Ccm- chief of staff. All requests to at- Roosevelt make his decision against the rnwrd (Washtngfcm,DC (3ffke of the Chief of Milii Htsto- USAIC almost impassioned advice of Hopkins ry, 1954), 25-28. tend IC97 should be fdxed to (706)545- 6 GEN IXwght D Emrhower d~ ~, 6 December 4621 or DSN 8354621, or via E-mail to: and Stimson, against the known prefer- 1943, as quoted m Robert Farrell, The Eker#rowsr Diaries ence of both Stalin and Churchill, (New Yorlc W.W Nc#ton & Co., 1981), 11X3 For Eisen-

November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW Force XXI: Getting it Right Major David J. Lemelin, US Army

I am tempted to declare dogmatical- therefore the chief source of deriving proach. “The art of war is subjected to ~ that whatever doctrine the Armed the nature of future conflict.z However, many modifications by industrial and Forcei are working on now they have determining which “threads” from his- scientific progress But one thing dcxx got it wrong. I am also tempted to de- tory can be correctly run into the fiture not change+he heart of man. In the ckm that it does not matter that they is a tmk at which most armies have last analysis, success in battle is a matter have got it wrong. What does matter is failed. of morale. In all matters which pertain their capaci~ to get it right quickly Force XXI is the US Army’s over- to an army, organization, discipline and when the moment arrives. 1 arching program to “get it right” for the tactics, the human heart in the supreme ----WMichael Howard next century’s battles. Force XXI’s moment of battle is the basic factor. It “Getting it right” for the next conflict main emphasis is on procuring digital is rarely taken into account; and oflen is the chief task facing America’s Army technology and then integrating it into strange errors are the result.”4 today. Throughout history, very few ar- a multitude of systems. Proponents of If Napoleon Bonaparte, echoing du mies have ever “gotten it right” at the Force XXI single+nindedly pursue the Picq’s theme, wm right (and history start of a war. Most armies, ours in- concept that harnessing technology’s seems to support him) and the moral cluded, have failed at this because they capabilities can assure future battlefield factors of battle are at least three times have drawn incorrect lessons from the success. Force XXI’s goals are laud- as important M the materiel, then man past. The US Army today is again in able, insofar as they are an attempt to is not only the constant factor in war but danger of failing to get it right at a time “get it right.” However, the current the dominant one. when, paradoxically, we are making a Force XXI concept is fundamentally Thus, any military force preparing concerted effort to prepare for the fu- flawed because it puts technology on for an uncertain fiture should empha- ture. The reason for this potential fail- center stage. Focusing the mass of size in peacetime those factors or ure is the current institutional emphasis the Army’s peacetime energy and “threads” that have the most impdct on on technological factors at the cost of resources—and thus wagering its soldiers and their performance under lessquantifiable, but ultimately deci- future-on the testing and development fire. This will reap big dividends in the sive, human factors. This article briefly of any particular technology is a costly Mure. The three basic factors that de- explores the human factors and their es- mistake made all too often in military fine human conduct in war are leader- sential place in “getting it right.” histo~. ship, training and cohesion. It is a near In a 1973 lecture to the Royal United No historical evidence suggests that historical certainty that these are the Services Institute, Sir Michael Howard any particular technology or tactic chief phenomena which ultimately de- succinctly stated how to successfully guarantees military success. On the termine an army’s quality. prepare for the next conflict. He astute- contrary, military experience suggests A peacetime army cannot accurately ly obsemxi that “getting it right” in ad- just the opposite. Armies that have fo- predict a future conflict’s nature or vance of a conflict is an unattainable cused on any en vogue concept or gad- technology’s impact on that conflict. goal. In the end, military success is get as the main way to “get it right” This makes it hard to procure the right more a function of an army’s ability to have almost uniformly fared poorly in technology for tomorrow’s battles. adjust more rapidly than the enemy to battle. This has been appropriately cal- What can be predicted is that like a conflict’s conditions. Therefore, the led “the fallacy of the magic weapon.”s hundreds of past battles, the outcome of preeminent task for a peacetime army is The bomber, the tank and other techno- the next battle will be determined not to create a force agile enough to recog- logical developments have at one time by relative technological levels, but by nize the nature of the battle and quickly or another fallen into this category as the opposing force’s leadership, training adapt. This is the essence of “getting it armies and theorists futilely pursued fu- and cohesion. Although technology is right.” ture success chiefly by employing such important, it is subordinate to these hu- The quest to create such an agile innovations. The battlefield results are man factors, which give an army its force involves determining which his- especially poor when this skewed ability to rapidly adapt to the next torical lessons can be applied to future peacetime focus ignores or, worse, has battle’s nature and conditions. Thus, a conflict. Military history is, as Field a negative impact on the development peacetime army can influence the fu- Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke of the human dimension or the moral ture most by focu..ing on human fac- stated, “the most effective means of aspects of combat capability. tors. The rare armies that have invested teaching war during peace” and is Force XXI, as espoused today, em- most of their precious peacetime energy phasizes technology’s value and only and resources in developing leaders, The views exprexwd in this article are those rhetorically acknowledges, if at all, the training units and fostering unit cohe- of the at4thor and ab twt putport to rejkt the pixitwn of theDepartmentof theArmy,theDe- human element’s importance in war. sion have profited disproportionately to partment of Defense or any othergovernment Ardant du Picq anticipated the basic their original investments once conflicts ofice or agencv.-Editor fault of the current Force XXI ap- arose.

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 81 Lead8mhip The most fundamental way for an loses 30 percent of its personnel and its Good battlefield leadership requires army to prepare for fhture conflict is to leademhip changes, the benefits gained good leader development. Whether the devote its thought, energy and re- in cohesion and training during the battlefield is conventional or unconven- sources to unit training. Even with the rotation will be lost. The unit is essen- tional, high or low intensity, in Bosnia traditional paucity of resources in tially a new unit. It is not feasible to de- or the Fulda Gap, the victorious side peacetime, unit training should be the velop du Picq’s level of cohesion with will have the leaders who are best able last to suffer from budget or resource such a degree of instability. The Force to “grasp instantly the picture of the constraints. Institutional energy should XXI initiative has the opportunity to ground and the situation, of relating one be channeled into training first. What- “get it right” by revamping the person- to the other.”s A critical and fundamen- ever is left can be diverted to technolog- nel system to one similar to the British tal part of an army’s “getting it right” ical development, not the reverse. His- regimental system but based on US should be to ensure excellent leader torically, armies that entered a conflict Army brigades. Such a change would training and development in peacetime. with gcmd equipment and unprepared dramatically improve the Army’s cohe- Clausewitz insisted that a command- units either lost the conflict to better- sion and thus, its capdbi]ities for the fu- er must develop his intellect if he is to trained armies or suffered ghastly losses ture. Clearly, the more cohesive the undemtand the battle situation and de- until their tmining, paid for in blood, unit, the more likely it is to “get it right” velop timely, appropriate solutions to caught up to the enemy ‘s. One need not quickly in future conflicts. tactical problems. Leader training, ac- look past our own experience entering The importance of human fdctors cording to Clausewitz, should “give the World War II for an example. seems almost self+.wident. The ques- mind insight into war’s great mass of cohesion tion remains, then, why they get such phenomena and their relationships, then Closely related to unit training is unit short shrift, vis+vis technology, in leave the mind free to rise into the high- cohesion. Rigorous and frequent current Force XXI development. A.. a er realms of action. Then the mind can training fosters unit cohesion, which blueprint for the future, Force XXI can use its innate talents to capacity, com- is so crucial to combat effectiveness look to the experience of two military bining all to seize on what is right and that Martin van Creveld includes it in organimtions emulated by militmies all true---seemingly more a response to the his definition of an army’s fighting over the world, including our own. The immediate challenge than a product of power. He states that cohesion is German army of the l%h and early thought.”~ fundamental-”on it depends the unit’s 20th centuries and the modem Ismeli Frederick the Great said that “War is fighting Power.”g Unit cohesion is dif- army have in common the fdct that they not an affair of chance; a great deal of ficult to define, but it comes from long- consistently---a nearly consistently— study and meditation is necessary to standing relationships between leadem “got it right” before entering conflicts. conduct it well.’” One “thread’ from and soldiers and among soldiem them- This shared ability is the source of military history is that to “get it right” selves. These relationships are solidi- much of the admimtion they receive quickly, an army must have educated, fied over long periods in training or ac- from modem militaries. In their consis- adaptive and decisive leaders, who can tual combat. Du Picq, whose Battle tency, the Germans and Israelis are quickly grasp a situation and then use Studies argues eloquently for the pre- nearly unique in military history. available technology to assist in the eminence of human fdctom in war, They “got it right” because they institu- battlefield solution. Simply having states that a soldier’s sense of cohesion tionally devoted their resources to the good technology does not necessarily includes “respect and confidence in his human factors of military success mean having technology appropriate chiefk, confidence in his comrades and above all else. This priority of resource for the situation. No technology can fear of their reproaches and retaliation if allocation, in the case of both the Ger- ever make up for leadership deficien- he abandons them in danger ... in a mans and Israelis, stemmed from con- cies. A peacetime army, therefore, word, the whole of esprit de corps. scious decision and necessity. None- should invest more heavily in training Cohesive organizations only can pro- theless, both institutions acknowledged leadem than in developing technologies duce these chamcteristics. Four men that human factors were the keys to whose usefulness..is problematic at best. equal a lion.’”() battlefield success. 7Faining History shows that armies have rare- ~ Germans Unit training requires little advocacy. ly developed this level of cohesion. From 1866 to 1945, the German Throughout history, another axiom of Rarer still are armies that developed it army consistently outfought its oppo- “getting it right” is to enter a conflict— before a conflict. Personnel stability nents, despite frequent technological in- of any type-with well+ained units. and the common experience of rigorous feriority, to such a degree that historian History illustrates that units that conduct tnining or combat are the pillars on Trevor Dupuy stated that the Germam basic tasks well and generally perform which cohesion is built. had an institutional “genius for war.’”] well together can readily adapt to ex- Because of its individual replace- Their true institutional “genius” was isting battlefield conditions. Another ment system, the US Army has a dis- manifest in their ability to “get it righ~” constant of history is that tmining must tinct problem with developing high lev- or nearly so, before each of their wars. be frequent and realistic, providing units els of cohesion in most of i~sunits. US The common thread in the German with the opportunity to execute tasks units come closest to true cohesion dur- army throughout this period was the under the most rigorous conditions. The ing demanding Combdt Training Cen- systemic emphasis on leademhip and historian Josephus indicates the Ro- ter rotations. If the unit “freezes” it.. training above all other considerations. mamsunderstood this: “The Romans are personnel for a period before the rota- In 1866 and 1870, the Prussian army sure of victory ... for their exercises are tion, unit cohesion is considerably en- decisively defeated two of the world’s battles without bloodshed, and their hanced. However, if during the course greatest powers — Austria and battles bloody exercises.”g of the year following a rotation the unit Francx-whose armies had more com-

82 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW INSIGHTS bat experience and were equal or supe- lance corporals to senior general staff commanders of the October War, rior to the Prussians in technology. In officers . . . Sound tactical theory aside, showed a lack of tactical inventiveness fa@ the Prussian army had not fought it was in training that the Reichwehr and mental adaptability. In a sense, this a major battle since the Napoleonic suqms.sed all its contemporary rivals, was the hidden cost of mechanim- wars 50 years earlier. Von Moltke, enwing the battlefield efficiency and tion.”1’ In the end, thanks to their in- chief of the Prussian General Staff and tactical success of the German Army in herent superiority in leadership, training architect of those victories, stated: 19394.”13 and cohesion, the Israelis in 1973 over- “Leadership was the primary Prus..ian When Adolf Hitler lifted the ban on came their own strategic failings, a.. advantage. Competent leadership has technological development, the German well as Arab numerical and technical been a tenet pursued with nearly army had solid, cohesive units, well advantages. single+ninded tenacity since the days trained in basic tasks and led by Offi- The Israeli army consistently out- of Schamhorst as the chief means of cers schooled in the intellectual tmdition fought and outmaneuvered its Arab en- ensuring our success in battle.’”2 of the general stall system. This army emies from 1948 onward, despite nu- This “single-minded” pursuit of was exceptionally well prepared to in- merical and technical inferiority. This good leadership was fundamental to corporate new technology and adapt it success can be clearly traced to the Germany’s attempt to “institutionalize” to meet actual battlefield conditions. quality of Israeli army leaders and unit military excellence after being defeated The kmelis cohesion and training. When the insti- by Napoleon. This attempt resulted in Ironically, it is the Israeli army expe- tutional emphasis on these factors the famous general staff system that rience that, next to that of the Wehr- slipped and the enemy’s improved, the was central to German success in all rnachf, has the most influence on the results were nearly fatal to the Israeli conflicts through World War II. At von US Army. The Israelis are admired for nation. Moltke’s direction, to maximize subor- their consistent successes. Of course, m “What makes [the Israelis] unbeat- dinate initiative on an ever+xpanding added motivation to properly prepare able has nothing to do with American b@efiel~ the Prussians commensu- for future conflict, the Isme]i army can- technical support. Rather, it is the supe- rately expanded their leader training not afford to ever get it very far wrong. rior ability of the leaders and the mutual to junior officers and noncommis- Until recent years, the Israelis, like the trwstand experience within Israeli units sioned officers. pre–World War II German army, have resulting from hard training and fight- The result of these efforts was an often been constrained by the lack of ing. This is the secret of warfare that army far better able to adapt to battle- availability of u~o-date technology. we do well not to forget.”lg field conditions and to exploit available In fact, in nearly every conflict, the Is- The idea behind Force XXI is laud- technology than its opponents. The raeli army has faced technically superi- able and almost unprecedented in US Austrians and French, on the other or opponents. *4 military history. Focusing institutional hand, had superior technology in many From its inception, the Israeli army energy on preparing for the future will cases but did not have the quality of ha.. stressed leadership above every- reap great rewards, provided the focus leaders and units to exploit their techno- thing. Its resources are spent chiefly on of that energy is correct. The current logical advantage and “get it right” fmt- leader and unit trtaining. By its nature Force XXI focus is on digital technolo- er than the Prussians. and organization, the Israeli army gy as a means to assure future succew. The German WArmacht’s successes maintains longstanding associations While digitization is certainly the in the early stages of World War 11are and stability within its units. Avraham central technology the Army will use to well known and frequently studied. Adan, a civilian commander in the drive change, the Army is still experi- The Wehrmacht got it nearly right, Yom Kippur War, stated: “The fighting menting to see if technology will have despite the virtual elimination of the ability of the Israeli army stems from the impact on future combat that many German army and its supporting insti- one factor: the human factor, every- planners think it will. The Army must tutions by the Versailles Treaty fol- thing else is of secondary impor- consider the human component of war- lowing World War I. Fortunately— ~ae7715 fare. Much of the Army’s research is or unfortunate y depending on one’s In his study of the nearly disa..trous based on historical analysis of how perspective-the Germans had leaders Yom Kippur War, Edgar O’ Balkmce technological advances have led to fun- who undemtood what facto~ had to be makes the case that the decline in lcad- damental changes in how wars are emphasized in the period of diminish- emhip quality and the Israeli army’s fought. Tle assumption is that infor- ing resources to assure fhture battlefield trend toward soldier “softness” from mation age technologies will again lead success. 1967 to 1973 were major factom in the to change, and the Army intends to an- During the “dark” period between early success of Arab forces. lb This ticipate and be out in front of that 1919 and 1933, the German army fo- decline resulted from two things: the change. cused its limited resources on unit train- “resting on the laurels” syndrome due The Force XXI experimentation ing and cohesion because of institution- to the 1967 victory and the shift in process is designed to determine how al experience and externally imposed institutional emphasis toward techno- much and what type of change is need- sanctions against technical develop- logical solutions to battlefield prob- ed. If information age technologies will ment. Hans von Seekt, chief of the gen- lems. again fimdamentally change the co/z- eral staff and German army command- In The Israeli Army, Edward Lutt- duc?, not the nature of warfare, thenthe er from 1919 to 1926, set the tone for wak says of the emphasis on technolo- Force XXI process will identi@ ap- . the remaining interwar years with his gy and mechanization before the 1973 propriate changes in every mpect of emphasis on “the primacy of training. war: “[S]ome of the middle echelon of how the Army operates its tactical and The Rekhswehr emphasized the train- Lt-Colonels and Colonels in the Ar- institutional forces. The Force XXI ing of soldiem, especially leaders, from mour Corps, the brigade and battalion process must allow the Army to change

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 83 —

2, Didrorraryof MMary and Naval Owtatrorrs, edrted by across the domains of doctrine, tmining, technical ones. Rcbert Debs Hernl Jr. (Nmapolis, MD: US Naval Instrtule, leader development, organizations, ma- It is my opinion that Force XXI 1966), 146, 3. R.GS 13dwc#l,‘The FW Fallam Some Tho~hts teriel and soldier systems. should turn its attention to the Army in- cm British MIlrtarv Ttinkma,” 77w Roval Unrted S#vrces Journal (Feti 1967), ~. - Additionally, Army leademhip has dividual replacement system. By re- 4. Ardant du Pm, f3attfeSludres (Hamisbwg, PA The clearly and consistently stated that sol- placing the system with more stable MIhtary Swvvx PuNISNW CO., 1947#),109 5. Frederick the Great, Instnxfms to His &fHSk diers will be the most important ele- personnel management, the Army (Hamsbu , PA Sta@cJe Boc&s, 1940), 342. 6. (2$vcmClausew@On War, diied ~Mda.Ho- ment of Army XXI-the product of the would improve unit cohesion as well as ward (Princeton, NJ: Prrnceton Unwersity ress, 1976), Force XXI process-because it is only each individual unit’s training level. In 578. 7 Frederrd the Great, 337. through quality soldiers and leadem that a world of diminishing resources, units “8. Josephus, as quoted rn M@tsel Grant, The Army of the Caasars (New York: M. Evens & Co, 1992), WII the full power of technology can be with the same persomel over longer 9 Matm van Crevdd, F@hfr@ Power (Carhsle Barracks, realized. The Army has clearly stated periods would be able to maintain high- PA US Mny War College Press, 1963), 2 10 Du I%q, 122. that it does not propose to create a force er levels of training proficiency than are 11. Trevcx N. Dupuy, A Germs For War (Fairfax, VA Hero Bcmks, 19f34), 4 of “cyber+arriors,” but everything it currently possible. Force XXI should 12 Feld Marshal Helmti Graf w Moltke, MIh?ary@- does with the Force XXI process must also maximize the Army’s fiscal and ~ 1870-1871 (Oxford Oxford UmversriyPress. 1991), 101 enhance the individual soldier’s ability manpower resources to support leader- 13. James S Corum, 7he R- of f3/rtzkneg(liIwence, to do his job. This is the current plan to ship training in Army schools. High KS: Untvers~ of Kansas Press, 1992), XVI. 14. EchvardLuttwak, 7he /sme# Amy. (Lcrtdon’ Penqum-.. build an Army for the 21st century. instructor quality and resource avail- Bceks, 1975)! 200. 15 Avraham A&n, On tfre 6arr&s of tfre Suez (Novato, Therefore, we must keep in mind ability in our schools would dramatical- ~ -m Press, 1980), 119 16. Edgar OBallence, No Vktcy A4YW’rqU/Shad (% that the development of future technol- ly improve the overall quality of our Rafad, M f%Sld10 Press, 1978), 342. ogy is necessary but not sufllcient in leaders at every level and in the Army 17. Lunwak. 370 18. Generai r%n Dorm, had Armor Corp6, m d=- and of itself. It may be true that digital as a whole. Finally, Force XXI initia- Son with ofticersattendhg the US Amy ArmcxCMicer’sAd- technology will have the predicted dm- tives should strive to increase funding vance Course (FWI K’IOX, KY 1993) matic impact on battlefield success; to unit training for obvious and essential reasons. If these shifts in resource al- A4ajor Ih’id J. l.cnudin i.s the S.7, 1 ~t thus, it is appropriate for the Army to tlattalio~ 6-lthArmor Regiment, .M Infan- look into this technology’s potential. location denigrate the acquisition and q Dit’i.vion(Mechanized), Fort Skwurt, However, it is not anywhere near cer- fielding of new equipment, so be it. Georgia. He rtwi~wi a B.S. /i-em the US tain that this technology will, in fact, This difference can be made up by Militan Academy und an M.MJI.S. fkmt skilled leadem and well+rained unik the US Arnly Command and (kneral Staff Iead to battlefield superiority. What is Colkge (USACGSC) and was the (Aweral certain-regardless of the respective once battle is joined and the nature of George C. Marshall A~’ard winner fiw the technological levels of combatants on the conflict is revealed. On the other 19% U.MCGSC graduating class. He has the Mure battlefield-+ that the victor hand, good technology can never make sen’cd in a twiep of comnumd and staff positiotu in the Continental United States, will have superior leaders and units up for poor leadership and training. including commandq Company C, and Force XXI must focus the Army’s di- This assertion is as near a certainty in comrnandec Heaalprters and Head- minishing resources on areas we know war as in anything and must be taken quarters Conyxq Ist Battaliot~ 32d Ar- from history will be the ultimate deter- into account in any vision of the mor Regimentj 1st Ca\*alq Dit’isior~Fort minants of fiture success in any cOn- Army’s fiture. MR H

Colin L. Powell: Leader Colonel James E. Swartz, US Army Resetve MY AMERICAN JOURNEY by “Powell the Soldier” with “Powell the This is a chronicle of the American CMin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico. Man”—underachiever, husband, father, dream. ‘hat Powell is an “American of 643 pages. Random House Inc., New York. trusted friend and potential president. color” is a bonus for those of his ethnic 1995. $25.95. To help readers understand this heritage and for this nation. Powell Few Americans reach such a high level of national service and accom- American soldier, whose greatest traces his success to his strong roots in plish as much as Cohn L. Powell and achievements may still lie ahead, Pow- the South Bronx, where he grew up in remain almost untouched by controver- ell and collaborator Joseph E. Persico a neighborhood peopled by a diverse sy or enemies. Indeed, if former Presi- take us on a global road march. The melting pot of blacks, browns, Jews and dent Ronald Reagan had a Teflon+ke journey begins with Powell’s Jamaican first+eneration European immigrants. ability to avoid controversy, Powell has roots and Harlem birth and ends more He learned to work with othem early in been, in the words of one insider, “bul- than half a century later as this youngest life, and it paid off. He also admits his letproof.” My American Journey is chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff meteoric rise is the by-product of hard Powell’s rags-to+iches personal story, (JCS) attempts to reconcile retirement work and good luck and that his axent which skillfully blends an account of with calls for a return to duty. to America’s heights came afier other

84 November - December 1996 s MILITARY REVIEW REVIEW ESSAY black pioneem had paved the way.1 ism in the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry played in the late 1980s’ han~ntra For yearn, Powell has carried with Regiment in South Korea; learning controversy was not presented. Much him a certain aum that has lifted him to control his temper when he was a of the scandal was revealed after Powell up-+ combination of good kMk..,mili- company-grade officer; trying not to a~sumed V Corps command in Germa- tary bearing and raw talent. Early in his be too self–assured as each coveted ny, and he admits he played a role in Army career, many saw him as a future a~signment led to an even more presti- transferring arms to the Central Intelli- flag officer, and some even incorrectly gious one until he became part of the gence Agency and, eventually, to hdn. predicted he would become Army chief inner circles of Washington’s most Yet he expresses shock with the actions of Staff.z Unquestionably though, it is powmful; and being eternally in love of John Poindexter and Oliver North, his incredibly smooth, even-keeled with his loyal wife Alma and family. whom he credits with linking Iranian temperament, fueled by his quest for Some would argue that Powell is an arms deals to Contra support in Nicara- excellence, confidence in his abilities enigma, devoid of personality and until gua.s Some maintain Powell was more and unparalleled politico+nilitary skill, recently, of a political party. In some directly involved when he was in Wash- that makes him special. ington, but no proof has ever surfmed, In some respects, Powell is too good Colin Powell’s Rules* perhaps because no proof exists. to be true. He has been cdlled many As we learn in the book, this was not things---+ black Dwight D. Eisenhow- 1. Itain’tas bad as you think. It will the first time Powell faced controversy look better in the morning. er, America’s savior and a modem+ay while in uniform. No senior offker Horatio Algier protagonist. But to 2. Get mad, then get over it. ever passes unscathed through such those who know him, Powell would 3. Avoid having your ego so close to tough rites of paxage as combat com- prefer to be known as “none of the your position that when your position mand, racial tensions, others’ jealousy above.” He seems mostly true to his falls, your ego goes with it. and honest mistakes. Powell especially humble South Bronx roots, where he 4. It can be done! faced tough challenges after earning started his climb through the military 5 Be caretil whatyou choose. You flag rank. ranks in 1958, because, as he put it, “I may get it. As an awistant division commander needed a job.”q 6. Don’t let adveme facts stand in of the 4th Infantry Division (Mecha- Powell’s story epitomizes several old the way of a good decision. nized), Fort Carson, Ckdomdo, then Army maxims: Get the right tickets 7. You can’t make someone elseb Brigadier General Powell was given a punched at the correct times in your ca- choices. You shouldn’t let someone less

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 85 key assignments. For an example of thts pmpedve, see President Bill Clinton and former Sec- Whatever his future, Powell has Hi A ~, “Playw - POIIWX The @IIWd’S = retary of Defense La Aspin for their earned his place among this genera- ~m~~” Fc@n AfRws (Nwernker+xernber 1995), .-- ... lack of focus on national policy objec- tion’s role models. We would be well 5. Powell, 329 tives and their views toward the 1992 served to spend less time idolizing Base Force Concept. sports figures and movie stars and more ColonelJamesE.SwartZUSArmyRe- serve,ti a Senwr Service College Fellow Since the book’s publication, Powell time studying the men and women who, at the University of Taas at Austin He re- has backed away from the political like Powell, have achieved greatness ceived a BJ. and an M.A. jknn the Univer- arena, stating he does not have a pass- through effort-and, perhaps, timing— sity of Mimour( an M.MA.S. fim the US ion for public life inside the Washing- but who never forgot who they onm Army Command and General Staff Col- lege (U.MCGSC) and a Ph.D. @m the ton beltway. What next then? Can a were. This is the Colin L. Powell Vniversip oftowa. He k a USACGSC and man of such talent and popularity sim- legacy. MR US Air War College graduate. He k ply shrink into the lecture circuit? Wdl served in a variety of command and stiff a life serving on corporate boards satis- NOTES positions in the Continental Um”tedStates, 1. CcAn LPowallwth Joae@E. Perstco,My American to hclude commanak~ 2d Brigadg 91st fy a leader who has only known nation- Ditqision (Exemise), NOKO, Cah$omia; al service throughout his adult life? -“iwTtl%T*E&r%%A :..- politico+nilitary am.ujq J8, Ojice of the smsofpowell,moatlyfavmtde. Asa Special Fcxc6scap- Will he serve in academia as did Eisen- tam, I was attadwd to Pcwe#’s lxigwle in the 10lst Air- Joint Chiejv of Stafi Washington D.C.; hower at Columbia University and borne D*@rksauit) fwExpettlnf@lyma Badge deputy G5, 1 Corps, Fort Lewiv, Wizshing- testing mthe 1970s. Vvbenthen Colcn@Powell, freshfmm ton; commana!q Ist Bat@l@ 185th Ar- Robert E. be at then Jefferson College the National War College, visitedthe tesling site, a noncom- msstoaedofkersadofhimnawcz ‘There’scurnewbfi- mor Regimen~ San Bernardino, Califor- in Virginia? Or does this hero of mil- nia; and assistant G3, III Coq.w, Fort lions, deep down in his gut, yearn for at %~u~=g$~~to=v~~e day’ Hc~ Texas. His artkle “Morality: A 3. PoweJl, Interview by Kabe Ccxmc, NEiC News Leadership Imperative” appeawd k the least one more bugle cdl where he (waahIrlgton, Ex2 11 Augllsl 1993). 4. Somemntend f%#lhasbeen mweanopportunis- September 1992 issue of Military Review. could change the course of history? bcpliithan awneona whowassimfi y’’dwwemd”fof

FW1/96 Issue more articles highlighting joint war- amazed how many people doing re- Hits Mark fighting in Military Review magazine. search forget to write down the source Your PRAIRIE W~OR % (PW COL Robert E. Ryds, of the items they photocopy. Mihlq ~ theme in the July-August issue was Dean of Students and Misswn Support, Review is printed on the margins in the right on target! We have made three of Air Command and S@#College, print issues to help with this. Also, you MaxweUAu Force Base, Akbama its articles mandato~ reading for this cannot expect to hold people responsi- year’s PRAIRIE W~OR studentre- ble for quoting material without cor- search group at the Air Command and rectly attributing it to Mihlmy Review if Stafl College (ACSC), Maxwell Air Kudos For Webmaster they do not know where the informa- Force Base, Alabama. PW % Com- Please tell those responsible for put- tion came from initially. bined Forces Land Component Com- ting Mi/ita~ Review on the web that it Lily Waters,Pen@on Reference mander (CFIIC) Lieutenant Colonel is a very useful, neat, easy-to-view and Libmian, Wmhington, D.C. Michael D. Heredia’s article was partic- easy+o-print resource. However, I Editor: Thank you for your com- ularly insightful. He correctly pointed have a suggestion-it would be very ments. We understand your concern out the different perspective each ser- helpful if individual articles were iden- about how to properly document ar- vice brings to the battlespace, a per- tified at the top or bottom so anyone ticles when using MiMuryReview on- spective based on training and doctrine who prints out an article can easily line. Indeed, we have wrestled with this but also on battlefield location. identify the source journal, issue and problem in a variety of forums and In my capacity as the PW % joint page numbers. If someone wants to tell found no easy solution. Fortunately, or force air component commander a friend to read an article, he or she can unfortunately given your point of view, (JFACC), I think his most significant find Military Review in almost every the web site makes the concept of observation was the importance of the Army library (post, technical or aca- “pages” superfluous,although whether CFLCC and JFACC understanding demic). We have only a couple of com- we need pages is still open for discus- how “each other’s concept of opera- puters with web access in our library, sion. We are investigating what an elec- tions met the combined joint task force and many people who work in the Pen- tronic magazine should look like-we commander’s intent and why certain tagon have no Internet ames.s in their think it would actually bear little resem- actions were vital.” This guiding prin- Offices. blarm to what we now publish in paper. ciple resulted in close cooperation in Keep up the good work! Having More will follow on this subject at a lat- working to achieve success-the bot- web access is great when our copy of er date, For now, we are identifying the tom line in any conflict. The ACSC Miltaty Review is not on the shelf or is paper version of MilitaryRewinvasthe faculty, staff and students look forward late arriving by mail. Just do not “hide” official “record” version. The on-line to fully engaging with the US Army your identity by not making it plain on edition is an “advanced” version with Command and General Staff College the web version that the mntents came which we are still experimenting. For during PW 97. We also look forward to fkom Mi/ita~’ Review. You would be those who wish to cite an article in Mili-

86 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW LEITERS tan Review for academic work, we rec- Superintendent of Documents or go Iieve it is in our reademhip’s best long- ommend using the paper version. ahead and remit to Militarv Ra’icw at term interest. Instructions for continu- Queshm and comments about Mil- Fort havenworth? - ing a Milita~ Review subscription ita~’ Rm’iew’s hard copy and electronic COL John B. Haseman, USA, Rt&ed, through the Superintendent of Docu- vemions are always welcome. Send GrandJunction, Cobraab ments were furnished with the refund your idem, thoughts or comments to: Editor: Thanks for your recent letter, checks and are available on page 96 of Military Review, 290 Grant Avenue, Colonel Haseman. You are not the only this issue. The Superintendent of Doc- Building 77, Fort Leavenworth, KS paid subscriber who has asked this uments is already receiving subscrip- 66027-1 254; or send a Pacsimile to question recently as Military Review tion applications, so apparently the sys- (913) 684-9328 or DSN 552-9328. makes the transition from the Nonap- tem is working. Milita~~ Review is available on-line via propriated Fund Activity (NW to the As a reminder, Milita~ Review sub- the Fort bavenworth homepage at: Superintendent of Documents. For our scription services are now available ; the many subscribers who have voiced through the Offke of the Superinten- Combined Arms Center homepage at : similar concerns, 1 recommend a two- dent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, ; or the pronged approach to keep it simple. Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. Annual Army homepage at: . We can also be reached elec- Merriam Clark and arrange to send her and APO customers and $21.25 for for- tronically at: have missed. Two, send a check to the page 96 to start your 1997 subscrip- Superintendent of Documents for an tion. As before, credit card orders are annual subscription beginning in Janu- welcome. Phone your orders to (202) How to Renew ary 1997. You do not w~t to miss our 512-1800 or facsimile (202)512-2250. I received my July–August 1996 is- 75th Anniversary Edition in January! A.. always, we solicit your feedback, sue of Milita~ Review with the enve- As of 15 October 1996, all refund lettem to the editor, book reviews and lope sticker reporting that my subscrip- checks from the Fort Leavenworth feature articles for publication in Mili- tion expires with the September– NAF were mailed to paid subscribers. taq Review. We can be reached at October 1996 issue. The PRAIRIE The decision to eliminate the Fort Lea- (913) 684+330/9327, DSN 552+330/ W74RRKlR 96 kue also included, of venworth NAF subscription operation 9327 or facsimile (913) 684-9328. course, your editorial information on was based on providing Milita~’ Re- You can also reach us via E–mail at: the changes in subscription procedures. t’im to paid subscribers at the least pos- . What should I do, await receipt of the sible cost. While this decision may Your continued support and patience letter .YOUmentioned directing us to the cause some minor inconvenience, I be- during our transition is appreciated...

OLD SOLDIERS NEVER DIE: Perret’s MacArthur is driven by an General George Kenney and Colonel The Life of Douglas MacArthur by overwhelming sense of will. Willpower Hugh Casey emerge as heroes; Gener- Gtxffrcy Perret. 667 pages. Random House, is at once the source of his stengjhs and als John Pershing and Robert Eichel- Inc., Ncw York 1996. $32.50. General Douglas MacArthur is one weaknesses. His demand to lead a vic- berger as something considembly less of the most fascinating-and contro- torious drive to retake the Philippines Perret reconfirms the complexities versial-figures in American military during World War 11was inspired as and contradictions that were so appar- history. His legendary career has in- much by a sense of mom] obligation as ent in MacArthur’s persomdity. As the spired a considerable amount of litem- it was to restore his personaI reputation reader will discover, there is plenty of ture that began to appear well before his as a combat commander. His need to grist for the many who either admire or dismissal from command in 1951. redress personal and professional rever- despise this enigmatic figure. More recent works have focused on as- sals on the Korean peninsula in 1950 Stephen D. Coa@ DJCO, USACGSC pects of his service in the Philippines, and 1951 led to a clash of wills with the World Wr II, Japan and Korea. president. Truman prevailed and Mac- Arthur returned home to a short-lived SCAPEGOATS: A Defense of Kim- Geoffrey Perret returns the study of mel and Short at Pearl Harbor by Edward hero’s welcome. MacArthur to biography. Not since the L Beach. 212 pages. Naval Institute press, An- multivolume work of D. Clayton What Perret offers is a fresh look at napolis. MD. 1995. $26.95. James, whom Perret rightfully calls a number of key events in MacArthur’s Fifty-five years ago, Admiral Hus- MacArthur’s “most respected biogm- career. He challenges the interpre- band E. Kimmel, Pacific Fleet com- pher,” has such a comprehensive study tations of several writers as he re- mander in chief, and Lieutenant appeared. Perret argues that “the gen- explores the Bonus March fiasco, Clark General Walter C. Short, Hawaiian De- eral was the quintessential twentieth– Field debacle, liberation of the Philip- partment commander, were the senior century incarnation of the tragic hero pines and MacArthur’s meeting with military ot%cers at Pearl Harbor when ... brought down not by his enemies Tkuman at ~dke Island in 1950. He the Japanese attacked on 7 December but by an immutable fault line that ran also offers his assessment of key figures 1941. They were shortly relieved of through the bedrock of his chamcter.” whose lives touched MacArthur ‘s. their commands.

MILITARY REVIEW � November - December 1996 87 Author Edward L. Beach, a re- It is simplistic to believe Kirnmel and changes as one invention gives way to nowned submariner and experienced Short were solely to blame for the di- the next is the way in which the mes- author, summarizes the voluminous lit- saster. Japanese Admiral Isoroku Ya- sage hits home.” erature that would exonerate Kimmel of mamoto’s carrier strike was a brilliant In other words, for Neuman, the me- primary responsibility for this tactical surprise that caught the United States dium is not the message; the message is surprise that sank or disabled eight US napping. However, military command- the message. In 1992, repugnant battleships. He presents evidence that ers who suffer defeat must anticipate photographs of starving Somalis others in the president’s offke and high- they will-rightly or wrongly+wir shocked Americans, who then pres- er naval command should bear some the consequences. sured their leaders to do something. A responsibility. Beach believes Kimmel RADM Ben Ekema~ USN& Retired, year later, appalling photographs hit the was the scapegoat for the errors of many Englewod, Coihaab news wires of a Sudanese girl, col- others who should have borne much lapsed from hunger, with a vulture at her heels. The photographer won a Pu- more blame than the man on the spot. LIGHTS, CAMEQ Wi4R Is Me- Beach does not present any new evi- dia T~hnology Driving International litzer Prize for the widely publicized dence on this thoroughly researched Politics? by Johanna Neuman. 327 pages. photograph. “For all of this media subject and even admits his book is St. Martin’sPress,New York. 1995 $23.95. attention, nothing happened,” Neuman “second-class revisionist” history. For years, communications students writes. “There was no massive airlift of Written informally with no footnotes, have received healthy does of Marshal food, no invasion of Marines to deliver Beach’s book offers all available daa McLuhan’s edict that “the medium is relief, suggesting that the power of pic- despite its reliability, that would shift the message.” In other words, we react tures to sway policy depends on politi- the blame from Kimmel to others. He more to the context of how a message cal will.” And tha~ whether you call it includes personal evaluations of 29 is sent than to the message’s content. political will or political leadership, is books and committee reports of the di- If you believe this, it is not a far what makes all the difference. Our saster. Those sharing Beach’s opinions stretch to believe the media drive inter- political leadem chose to send a relief are extolled; those disagreeing are national politics. We see starving chil- mission into Somalia. They chose not reviled. dren in Somalia via satellite courtesy of to in the Sudan. Beach believes President Franklin D. CNN. We react in revulsion and pres- Neuman’s central theme is that Roosevelt and his Washington, D.C., sure for our leaders to do something. technology merely opens the door to miIitary and civilian advisem were pri- Leaders, despite common sense and wider public involvement. It does not marily to blame for the Pearl Htior lack of national interest to the contrary, hustle the audience inside. “That still surprise. Those so accused include cave into the ongoing public uproar and requires leadership, and a message. ... General George C. Marshall, Admiral “send in the Marines.” Conventional Media technology is rarely as powerful Harold R. Stark, Secretary of the Navy wisdom credits CNN with a victory. in the hands of journalists as it is in the Frank Knox and Secretary of War In a wide-ranging, perceptive and hands of political figures who can sum- Henry L. Stimson. He personalizes persuasive new book, Johanna Neuman mon the talent to exploit the new inven- their alleged guilt by claiming they in- demolishes McLuhan’s oftquoted and tion.” She adds that pictures drive di- vited such an attack to obtain support widely accepted premise that the me- plomacy—as words did in an earlier for declaring war against Germany-a dium is the message. It matters not to era-only when there is a political theme expressed often by others over Neuman whether news is conveyed by leadership vacuum. the p~t 55 years. telegraph, television, radio, photograph For example, consider the notorious Beach’s most significant accusation or via satellite. What matters is the pictures of a dead US soldier being involves his presentation of evidence message’s content, not the context in dragged through the streets of Mogadi- that Roosevelt and his closest advisem, which it is received. sh~ Somalia, images that many believe despite subsequent denials, held a mid- Throughout her book Neuman em- undermined public support for opera- night 4-hour meeting in the White phmizes this point. The Roman Cath- tions there and hastened our departure. House the night before the attack to olic Church blamed the Gutenberg “The same picture,” Neuman writes, evaluate decoded Magic intercepts sug- printing prss operatom, rather than “in a different setting, might have an- gesting war with Japan was imminent. Martin Luther’s professed ideas, for the gered the public toward staying to They fdiled to inform Kimmel and spread of Lutheranism. Civil War poli- avenge the soldier’s death. As usual, Short in Hawaii until it was too late. ticians denounced the telegraph for in- context mattered.” Beach believes this was a deliberate accurate reporting rather than the parti- Just how much does context matter? slight. san reporters’ shady practices in the Take the famous picture of a lone pro- Assuming the meeting took place, it field. And, so on. tester standing up to the Chinese army is much more logical to believe their “Each genemtion is mesmerized by during the 1989 pro+iemocracy upris- attention was drawn to the imminent the innovations of its times, sure that no ing in llenanmen Square. Neuman landings in Malaysia rather than to a other generation has experienced the says that photograph came to represent potential air attack on Hawaii. Beach emotional upheaval that comes of tech- an individual’s uwage to put his body interprets this as gross negligence, far nological change. ... What history on the line for his beliefs. “But the more serious than Kimmel’s and shows, instead, is that despite the vanity Beijing regime also exhibited the Short’s failing to have their forces ready of each age, journalists always had photograph, with captions explaining when the attack occurred and despite power to sway public opinion, and that the pictures demonstrated the com- their having been warned, almost six more, that politicians always credit the passion of Chinese troops in not mow- months before the attack that war was news media for souring public opinion ing down individuals while still putting imminent. when they fail to win favor. What down social disorder.”

November - December 1996 “ MILITARY REVIEW BOOK REVIEWS

Still, for all the prodemocracy me- written reports, live satellite broadcast Jz and grandson Robert H. Patton’s The dia coverage, in the end, the Chinese images or digital communication Pattons: A Personal History of an leadership brutally squashed the move- through cyberspace. If the story is American Family. D’13ste also dispels ment. News reporting merely height- good, the truth will come out through several family myths, such as the in- ened awareness of the various move- whatever medium it is conveyed. Neu- trigue surrounding Robert Patton, the ments. It did not cause them or predict man enforces the idea that leadership, fimt Patton to journey to America. the ultimate outmme. even if abetted by media technology, D’Este deftly explores the ancestor Understanding that media technolo- makes the difference in a story’s out- worship impelling Patton to create a vi- gy maybe a partner to policy changes, come. We should remember this the sion of himself as a great warrior who but not an instigator, is instructive for a next time news media coverage is would lead many men in a desperate generation of military public tiairs blamed for a military failure or favor- battle. professionals with a lingering distrust of able media coverage is credited with a D’Este convincingly details how battlefield reporters. Neuman relays a military operation’s success. Patton’s dyslexia—revealed in Blu- passage from John Fialka’s Hotel War- Patrick A Swa& Command Infonna- menson’s 1985 biography, Patton: lle rwrs: Coveringt~ Gulf Warin which tion T- O@e of the Chief of Public Man Behind the Leget@ 1885- a Marine explains that his service treats A@iKs, Wmhington, D.C. 1945--affected his life. He struggled the news media as an environmental to overcome that disability so he factor, such as the rain. “When it rains, could master the profession of arms. PAT’IK)N: A Genius for War by &Io you operate wet.” Neuman notes, “In D’fZstc. 977 pages. HarpcrC’ollinsPublishm, Throughout his career, Patton read, an- the hands of gifted leaders, the new New York. 19%. $35,()(1. notated and took notes from an eclectic tools of communication are, like the “To be a successful soldier, you must blend of hundreds of military works, rain. ... Television only provides a lens. know history.. . . You must read biog- studying military subjects after hours bademhip provides the focus.” raphy. .. .“ These timeless words of with other promising officers such as Cynics would say this is the old advice horn warrior father General Dwight D. Eisenhower. It was sheer “don’t shoot the messenger” argument George S. Patton Jr. to his cadet son hard work that led to his “genius for biased reporters resort to when caught penned the morning of the D-Day in- war.” In documenting Patton’s study for inaccurate reporting. It is a matter of vasion ring true today. Carlo D’Este’s ethic, D’Este benefits from the superb faith to some Vietnam War military vet- Patton: A Genius for War is a compel- work by the late Colonel Roger H. Nye, erans that they could have won the con- ling mustread for America’s soldier- i%e Patton Mind: TIE Professional flict tithe media had not undermined- leadem. Development of an Extraordinary some would say sabotaged—their While any soldier who emulates Pat- Leader. efforts with out-of-context coverage. ton today may risk a shorter than antici- The scion of a prosperous family, Consider the Gulf War’s success and pated career, Patton’s career does offer Patton married Boston’s Beatrice Ban- the favorable coverage that flowed invaluable lessons, Patton wm a self- ning Ayer, one of America’s wealthiest steadily almost from the start. If we made great captain. The ways in which heiresses. D’Este examines how Patton blame the news media for losing the he molded himself into a great soldier used their combined wealth and status Vietnam War, should we credit them and created and capitalized on opportu- to advance his career with an ambition with winning the latest one? nities are guideposts for today’s am- that “bordered on the maniacal.” Dur- Neuman cites retired Lieutenant bitious soldiers. Equally important, ing Washington, D.C., assignments, General Thomas Kelly, Joint Chiefs of Patton’s career highlights avoidable Patton thrust himself into the limelight Staff operations oflicer during the Gulf pitfalls. and gained influence with the capital’s War and the spokesman who daily In 1989, Martin Blumenson, re- leading soldiem, politicians and news- jostled with Pentagon press room re- nowned Patton biographer and The men. Resulting friendships with Secre- porters. Kelly argues the only thing set- Patton Papers editor, observed that the tary of War Henry L. Stimson and Gen- tled by the Persian Gulf War is that the definitive Patton biography was yet to eral George C. Marshall were largely military, with a strong Army and a pub- be written. Meanwhile, noted historian responsible for his surviving several licly supported goal, will have a win- Carlo D’Este, a retired Army lieutenant World War II blunders. ning story to tell. “The best briefer in the colonel, former US Military Academy D’Este makes the most painstaking world could not have sold the Gulf War, history instructor and author of several and successful attempt yet to dispel any more than Vietnam, if it had gone acclaimed World War II books, in- some self-perpetuating Patton fables. on for 10 years and left ftiy-seven cluding Bitter Vitory: Th Battle for D’Este benefited from biographer La- thousand dead and been no closer to Sicily 1943, was beginning the task. dislas Farago’s pioneering books and victory at the end than at the beginning.” The result—D’EXe’s Patton--is pow- archives, but he also points our errors in Again, we come back to leademhip. erful and moving. It is a remarkably Farago’s books and the two motion pic- The military has a success story to tell. objective study of a man who has in- tures they inspired. He authoritatively Its leaders have taken a demoralized, spired little impartiality elsewhere. refites Patton’sfeud with Sir Bernard ragtag conscript force from the Vietnam To comprehend Patton, one must un- L. Montgomery as being overblown. War era and transformed it into the derstand the influence his ancestry and D’Este also disproves Blumenson’s highly motivated, All-Volunteer Force family life had on him. D’Este’s book theory that Patton’s mood swings re- that defeated Iraq in a five-day ground is remarkably more thorough and accu- sulted from a subdural hematoma war and continues to guard US world- rate in this aspect than two others by caused by many falls while riding wide interests. Patton family membem---+musin Fred- horses. Interestingly,however,D’Este We should not fear media technol- erick Ayre Jr.’sBeforethe ColorsFade: accepts without question Farago’s ogy, whatever it takes-photographs, Portraitof a Soldie

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 89 Confederate partisan leader John S. shortest. It is simply the best. The most telling example is the time al- Mosby was a frequent visitor to Pat- LK Steve E Die- USA, lotted to the two contemporaneous ton’s boyhood home. USAnqy Cerwr ofiUiMaryHi@ny, 1863 campaigns. Gettysburg in the As deeply as the fertile Patton W&~ D.C. East nxeived 45 minutes of air time, ground has been plowed, D’Este finds while Vicksburg in the ~ which unharvested information and offeq lasted months and not day% received 12 KEN BURNS’S THE CIVIL W~ minutes. Burns had an Opportunity to fresh insightsinto other aspects of Pat- HistoriansRespond. EditedbyRobedBnmt ton’s life. Patton’sbelief in reincarna- TTW 197 pages Oxtbd Univtity ~ break new ground bu~ as stated, took tion, a dominant theme in the awmd- ~, NewYok 1996. $24.00. the tmditional route. winning film, rates an entire chapter. Ken Burns’ epic miniseries The CiviJ Another critique with lesser merit is D’Este conclud~ “Patton genuinely War was a television watershed. that Burns failed to address women’s believed that he had lived before and Viewed by 40 million people and re- and blacks’ war roles. Again, this was would live again.” “A severe case of puted to have influenced White House a problem of air time, with material out- burnout” is a phenomenon not pre- policy makem during the Gulf W%, it side the battlefield kept to a minimum. viouslyattributedto Patton,but D’Este introduced the Civil l% to many. For lhe home tint generally received proffers it as the reason for Patton’s some, it is their only knowledge of this short shri& so it is not surprising that lackluster performance following critical American period. The series’ this sphere where women made their WorldWar II. He also argues that Pat- lasting impact is underscored by publi- primary contribution was not discussed ton’s own battle fatigue contributed to cation of K& Burnsb The Civif War, at great length. I agree that the women the two infarnou~ near mreer+mding produced more than five years after the who disguised themselves as men to incidentsinwhich Pattonslappedshell- documentary aired. fight represent a fascinating and untold shocked soldiers. D’Este provides a Some of the historians’ critiques are story, meriting at least a brief mention. balanced study of Patton’sprejudi~ valid, but some miss Burns’ purpose l%e limited visual record also worked especially his anti-Semitism, which and limitations. The first charge is that against blacks receiving a large pro- others have avoided. Compassionately, Burns oversimplified the war’s causes, gram share. A casual viewing of Z7ze D’Este addrmes Patton’s infidelity concentratingsolelyon slavery. This is Civil War leads one to believe that while also illuminatingone of Ameri- valid to the extent economic UWS+ emancipation was due solely to Abra- Q’S greatest love stories-the one be- such as tarif@ and politid disagree- ham Lincoln, not to the black slaves’ or tween Patton and his lifelongcompan- men~ such as the questionof a strong freedmen’s actions. A “son” of The ion and wife, Beatrice. central government or states righ~ are Civil Wa~ A&E’s Civil War Journa~ Historians will appreciate the depth put aside. But it is unrdistic to think presented over a multiyear period in of D’Este’s research and his penetrating slavery was not the overarching cause. many episcxk, has addressed women’s analysis. D’Este mined the published The 1820 and 1850compromiseswere and blacks’ contributions. and unpublished body of worldwide over slavery, not economics or politkxd l%e power to educate inhenmt in material,includingarchivaland genea- philosophy. The Republican Party’s Burns’ series was shown by the rising logical sources. He consulted various key policy was a reaction to slavety. In book sales aftenvards as well as in- medicalspecialists and exploitedinter- the limited air time given to consider creased battlefield vishs. It is proper to views with Patton’s family members “The Cause,” Burns was right to hold Burns to a high historical standard, and fellow soldiers. The author ex- concentrate on slavery as the primary since K&nBurnsh The Civd War may plores with fresh perceptions the rela- cause. be for some the sole basis for under- tionships between Patton and other Burns is also criticized for spending standing this seminal US event. Even great men whose paths his crossed- too much time on the military, to the in the face of historical criticism, Burns Pershing, Churchill, Stimson, Roose- detriment of political, economic and so- has combined art with truth to an un- velt, Eisenhower, Bradley, Montgom- cial trends. In the 11 hours he had, precedented degree. ery, Marshalland MacArthur,to name Burns discussed, as his narrator points L~ James J. Ihnphy, u- a few. out, a struggle fought “in ten thousand Fa@i Vi Pattonwas a dominant X)t.kentury places.” To expect similar treatment of and central US Army figure. Like the seismic changes beyond the battle- ArmyBuysSmartWasherSystem manyother great men, he was complex field would have led to mom ove&rn- Chetim Cqoration was mently and imperfect. D’Este conclud~ “Pat- plification ora much lengthier program. awankd a $1.3 million contract to supply ton was art authentic and flamboyant Military events largely controlled the more than 1,000 SmartWasher parts- military genius whose entire life was econorni~ political and social spheres. washingsystemsto US Army and National spent in preparation for a fleeting op- Burns’ emphasis on the soldier over the Guard (ARNG) facilities across 16 states portunity to become one of the great politician or businessman is completely during 1997. aptains of history. “No soldier in the appropriate. ‘Ihe Chernl%eeSrndVasher is the first annals of the US Army ever worked A related judgment concerns the parts-washing system to n#y on biom- more diligently to prepare himself for amount of airtime devoted to events in media~ process that uses completely high command than did Patton.” Sol- Virginia versus the amount of air time safe microorganismsto consume danger- ous oil-based hydrocabo~ ehinating diem who aspire to excellence should given to events west of the Alleghenies. the need to haul away hazafdous waste. study Patton -filly for the inspira- Burns’ traditional view did concentrate The nontoxic ckaning solution also elimin- tional mento~hip he offem from be- on Viginia. He was somewhat driven ates petrochemicalstorage, handling and yond the grove. by the television medium’s limitatio~ tmnspmt problems. D’Este’s Patton is neither the old as the overwhelming majority of sur- For rnm informationon ChernFree,call soldier’s longest biography nor his viving photographs were of the East. (770) 564-5580 or fax (’770)S64-5533.

90 November - December 1W6 � MILITARY REVIEW Military Review Index Volume LX)(VI . January- December 1996 CONTENTS Title Index ...... 91 Author Index ...... 92 Subject index, Articles ...... 93

Addicted to Work?: REVIEW ESSAY R4GE ISSUE DifTerentTwist, A: Nonrational Views of Leadership Capt Patricia A. Gdvin, USAF Resewe ...... 86 Ja@F’eb LtCol Donald H. Homer Jr., USA...... 45 Nov/Dec Advanced Warlighting Experimen~s in Digitizing the Force XXI Battlefield: PRAIRIE W~OR Exercises Margaret A. Fratzel Maj Mark D. Calve, USER ...... 68 May/Jun and Major David P. Pursell, USA...... 17 Jul/Aug Educating the Army for the 21st Century: INSIGHTS; American Civil War’s Effect on US River Cnmsing Col Charles E. Heller, USAR, Ret...... 86 JuVAug Doctrine, The: INSIGHTS;Maj Steve Riese, USA ...... % Sep/Ott Failure of Political Intelligence, A REVIEW ESSAY llCol Alan C. Cate, USA ...... 88 Jul/Aug Army Historians and the Information Age; LtCol S(eve E. Dietrich, USA.....,...... 72 Jar@eb Force XXI: Getting it Right: INSIGHTS; Maj David J. Lemelin, USA ...... 81 Nov/Dec Army Training XX]: The Army’s Future Training FM 100-6: lt~n-murion Operations; Col Michael D. Starry, Strategy; Col David W. Marlin, USA ...... 46 May/Jun USA and Lt Col Charles W. Arneson Jr., USA ...... 3 Nov/Dec Artand Science of Battlefield Vkualization, The: Future of the NationState, The; Philip L. Ritcheson ...... 85 Mar/Apr Lt Cd David L. Simpson, USA and LtCol Richard F. Brown, USAR ...... 25 Nov/Dec Guerrillas in the Brazilian Amazon; Col Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, BrazilianArmy ...... 38 Mar/Apr Attacking Through the MIST Maj Melvin E. Shafer, USA .. 76 Mar/Apr How the Commander Drives Intelligence; Autonomy and Leadership; Lt Col Tn Challans, USA ..... 29 JadFeb Maj John F. Lady lIl. USA ...... 39 May/Jun Battle Command: A Commander’s Perspective: Human Dimension in Force Projection, The: Gen Frederick M. Franks Jr., USA. Ret. ., ...... 4 May/Jun Discipline Under Fire; Lt Col Faris R. Kirkland, USA BattleCommand Battle LAmratories: Where Tomorrow’s Ret.; Morten G. Ender; Co] Robert K. Gifford, USA. Victories Begin; Col Patrick Lamar, USA; Ll Col Kathleen M. Wright; and David H. Marlowe ...... 57 Mar/Apr Billy J. McCollum, USA; Lt Col John A. Collier Jr., Information Operations on the Nontraditional Battlefield; USA and Maj Edwin J. Kuster Jr., USA ...... 53 May/Jun LtCol Dennis M. Murphy. USA ...... 16 Nov/Dec BCB~G)’s Rapid Prototyping Testbed; lnsigks into Canadian Peacekeeping Doctrine; Capt Daniel P. Keller, USA ...... 71 May/Jun Sean M. Maloney ...... 12 Mar/Apr Bridging the Nongovernmental Organization-Military Gap; Inspiring Soldiers to do Better Than Their Best; Co] Guy C. Swdn, USA ...... 30 Sep/Ott Congressma nIkeSkelt on...... 64 Jan/Feb Integmting Force Projection into NTC Rotationx Col Charles Bringing the “Ruptured Ducks” Home: E. Ennis Jr., USA and Maj Michael T. Mahoney, USA .... 10Se@ct WORLD WAR 11ALMANAC; E. Trevor Brown ...... 84 May/Jun Integrating Joint Doctrine: The FSCL in the Lantican Campdign Planning for PRAIRIE W~OR %; llwater of Operations; Col William S. Knightly, USA .... 30 Jul/Aug LtCol Michael D. Heredia, USA...... 23 JuVAug Interagency Command and Control: Planning for Countcrdrug CASS: Fifteen Years Later; Co] Albert E. Bryan~ USA SuppoK Maj Christopher M. Schnaubelt, ARNG ...... 16 Se@Oct and Joan Dietrich Silver ...... 67 Nov/Dec Intervention in Haiti: k+ons Relearned; Case for Employing Nonlethal Weapons, A; LtCol Thomas K. Adams, USA...... 45 sep/oct Maj James B. Linder, USA ...... 25 Sep/Ott J-STARS: The Future of Ground Warfare; Charismatic Leadership: Costs and Benefits: INSIGHTS; Maj Jeffrey C. Alfier, USAF ...... 22 Nov/Dec Cmdr James J. Tritten, USN, Ret., and David M. Keithly . 82 Ja@eb Joint STARS: A Force XXI Enable~ Chemical Smoke and Recon Gunnery: Training for LIGen Ronald L. Watts, USA Ret...... 19 Nov/Dec Success; Capt Robert F. Mortloc~ USA...... 80 Sep/Ott Juggler and the Supreme Commander. The: ALMANAC; Civil Atfairs in the Assault; Maj Jefbey A. Jacobs, USAR ... 65 Sep/Ott Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, USA ...... 77 Nov711ec Coaching the Art of Battle Command; Keeping the Home Fires Burning: Family Suppori Issues; D. Bruce Bell, LtCol John D. Rosenberger, USA...... 27 May/Jun Joel M. Teitelbaum and Col Walter R. Schumm, USAR ... 80 MarlApr Key to Information Dominance, The; CohnL. Powell: Leader: REVIEW ESSAY LIColMichae lR.Nifong,US A...... 62 May/Jun Col James E. Swdrtz, USAR ...... 84 Nov& “Lead Up Front and Give a Damn:” INSIGHTS; Combat Decision Making in “Operations Other Than Waq” Gen Dennis J. Reimer, USA ...... 86 May/Jun LICol Dane L. Rota. USA ...... 24 Mar/Apr Leader XXI Campaign Plan: Lt Col Dough. A. Gilbert, USA . 50 Jan/Feb Communications: Train as You Fight Leadership and Organizational Culture: Actions Speak Louder Maj Eric R. Christensen, USA+ Ret...... 31 May/Jun Than Words; Lt Gen Theodore G. Stroup Jr., USA ...... 44 Jan/Feb Consideration of othem; Maj Gen Robert T. Foley, USA, Leademhip for the21st Century: Empowerment, Environment and Maj Denise A. Goudreau, USA ...... 25 Jan/Feb and the Golden Rule: Gcn Dennis J. Reimer. USA ...... 5 Jan/Feb Debugging the Battlefield: Wining the War Against Insect Logistics Civil Augmentation Progmm, The: Bites and Related Diseasex Maj JeErey M. Gambel, USA .51 Nov/Dec Maj Camille M. Nichols .US A...... 65 Mar/Apr Dedicated Forward Logistics Element Concept, A; Logistics Staff Proce~ses in the Information Age; Maj Cindy–be Knapp, USA ...... 70 Mar/Apr Col Stephen F. Gdrrett, USA ...... 49 Jul/Aug Developing Civilian Leaders for Force XXI; Medical @mnunications for Combat Casualty C2ue; Lt CO1Dallas Van Home, USA. Ret...... 56 Jan/Feb Maj Wdliam G. Tcece, Australian Army ...... 77 May/Jun

MILITARY REVIEW � November - December 1996 91 MeetingLxz&xshipChallengesw a Team; PRAtRIE W~IOR %: Special Opemtions; Lt Col Joseph SMAGene C. McKinley,USA ...... lOJadF’eb G.D. Babb, USA Ret., and Lt co] Curt F. Weime-r,USA .. 40 Jul/Aug Milirary Re-view-75 Years of Service to the US Army; Pre-Positioning Attack Helicopter Afloat; Jerold E. Brown ...... 59 Nov~ Karsten Engelmann ...... 79 May/Jun Mobile Strike Force: A2010 Potential Force; Protecting the Force: The 21st-Century Chemical Corps; Maj Gen Brig Gen Huba Wass de Czege.USA Ret...... 70 Jul/Aug Ralph G. Wooten, USA+and Col Richard A. Jaclwn. USA . 75 %P/~ Mobile Strike Force: An Experiment in Future Battle Providing Coherence for Trdining Force XXI; Maj Gen David Command; Col Rolkmd A Dessert Jr., USA ...... 34 JuUAug H. Ohie, USA and Maj John M. Spiszer, USA ...... 63 JuUAug Multilevel Security Initiatives: James B. Widby and PSYOP h Operdtion Uphold Democracy; Stephen D. Brown 57 Sep/Ott Sgt 1st class Russell Dwire, USA Ret...... 74 May/Jun PW %: An E@e’s View; Col Robert E. Ryals, USA ...... 71 Nov/Dec Navigating the Fog of Technological Change; Capt Christopher D. Kolenda, USA ...... 31 NOVYDIX PW %: lns@s andObservations; Col Thomas E. Brown Jr., USA ...... 11 Jd/Aug Occupation of Japan, The: Legacy for the Cold Wdr and Beyond: WORLD WAR H ALMANAC, Readings in Military Ethics; James H. Toner ...... 35 Jan/Feb Lt CM Joseph G.D. Babb, USA Ret...... 98 Mar/Apr Reflections on Uadership; I-I Cd Joel A. Buck USA ...... 41 Nov/Dec Okinawa: The Last Battle: WORLD WAR 11ALMANAC; Russian Lessons Learned in Bosnia; David W. Fitz-Simons ...... 77 Ja~eb LtColllmothy L. Thomas, USA, Ret...... 38 Sep/@t 00TW A Concept in Flux; Lt Col John B. Hunt. USA Ret. . 3 Sep/Oet Search for Enduring Soldier Qualities, The; Brig Gen John Operational Doctrine and the Environment: INSIGHTS: W. Mountnstle, USA and L. Martin Kaplan ...... 14 Jan/Feb Charles E. Notw...... 101 Mar/Apr Significance of Brazilian Strategic Thinking Operational Law: Plan and Execute; Col WiUiam W. Mendel. USA Ret...... 51 MarlApr Col Patrick Finnegan, USA ...... 29 Mar/@r “Sinews of Peace, he:” ALMANAC; Winston Churchill .. 91 SeI#Oct Qpmtional Vignette: Civil Affairs in Haiti; Smokes and Obsmrants: Development, Use and Control; Col Eric A. Doerrer, USAR, Ret...... 73 Mar/Apr Lt Col Robert M. Gum, USA and Maurice H. Weeks .... 84 Se@Oct PEACEKEEPER 95: 27th Guards Trdin with “Big Red One:” Stmtegy for the Blind: REVIEW ESSAY, Robert J. Bunker . 94 Se@ct Maj Gen Randolph W. House, USA; Maj Mark R. Pires, USA, and LtCol Lester W. Grw, USA, Ret...... 5 Mar/Apr Succes.. at the Sava River: INSIGHTS: PRAIRIE WARRIOR: A Joint and Combined Exercise; Lt Gen Maj Patrick H. Caraway. USA ...... %se@(kt L.D. Holder, USA+and Co] Rolland A. Dessert Jr., USA . . . . 5 Jul/Aug Training: Our Army’s Top Priority And Don’t You Forget It!; PRAIRIE WWOR %: Force XXI Sustainment Operations Gen Demis J. Reimer, USA ...... 55 Ju4Aug Maj John M. Reich, USA ...... 48 Jul/Aug Truman’s Harbingec ALWAC, Harry S. Truman ...... 85 JuVAug

Adams, Lt Col Thomas K., Intervention in Haiti: Dessert. Col Rolland A. Jr.; PRAIRIE WMOR: Lessons Re\vdmed ...... 45 sep/oct AJointand Combined Exercisc ...... 5 JuYAug Alfier, Maj Jeffrey C., J-STARS: The Future Dietnch, Lt Col Steve E.; Army Historians of Ground Wm_fare...... 22 NOV~ andthelnformatio nAg e...... 72 Jan/Feb Alvaro, Col de SOuza Pinheiro, Brazilian Army; Doerrer, Cd Eric A., Ret.; Guerrilla inthe Braziliarr Amazon...... 38 Mar/Apr Operational Vignette: Civil Mdirs in Haiti ...... 73 Mar/Apr Arneson, Lt co] Charles W. Jr., Dwke,Sgt 1st Class Russell, Ret.; FM100-6.1nformation Operation~ ...... 3 Nov/Dec Multilevel Security Initiatives ...... 74 May/Jun Babb, Lt Col Joseph G.D., Ret.; Occupation of Japan, The: Legdcy for Errder, Morten G.; The Human Dimension the Cold War and Beyond: WORLD WAR 11ALMANAC 98Mar/Apr in Force Projection: Discipline Under Fire ...... 57 Mar/Apr Babb, Lt Col Joseph G.D., Ret.; PRAIRIE WMOR %: Engelmann, Karsterr; Pre+%sitioning Special Operation s...... 40 JuVAug Attack Helicopters Afloat ...... 79 May/J~ Bell, D. Bruce; Keeping the Home Fires Burning Emis, Col Charles W. Jr.; Integrating Form Projection Family Support Issues ...... 80 Mad@ into NTC Rotations ...... 10Sepmt Brown, E. Trevo~ Bringing the “Ruptured Duck..” Home: Finnegan, Col Patrick; operational Law: Plan and Execute .. 29 Mar/Apr WORLD WAR1l ALMANAC ...... 84 May/Jun Fitz-Simons. David W.: Okinawa: The Last Battle: Brown. Jerold E.. Mi/itaW Ret’iew----75 Years of WORLD WAR II ALMANAC ...... 77 JadFeb Service tothe US Army ...... 59 Nov~ Foley, Maj Gen Robert T.; Consideration of othe~ ...... 25 Jan/Feb Brown, Lt Col Richard F., USAR; The Art and Frdnks, Gen Frederick M. Jr., Ret.; Battle Command: Science of Battlefield Vkualization ...... 25 Nov/Dec ACommander’s Perspective ...... 4 May/Jun Brown, Stephen D.; PSYOP in Opemtion Uphold Democracy 57 SeP/Ott Frdtzel, Margaret A; Advanced War@hting Experiment Brown, Co] Thomas E. Jr.; PW %: Insights and Obserwdtions . 11 JuUAug in PRAfIUE WARRIOR Exe~ises ...... 17 Jd/Aug Bryant, Col Albert E.; CASS: Ftieen Years Later ...... 67 Nov/Dec Gambel, Maj Jeffrey M.; Debug@g the Battlefield: Buclq L-ICol Joel A.; Reflections on hadership ...... 41 Nov/Dec Whining the War @dinst Insect Bites and Related Diseases 51 Nov/Dee Bunker, Robert J.; Strategy for the Blind: REVIEW ESSAY .. 94 Sep/Ott G-tt. Cd Stephen F.; Logistim Staff Processes Calve,Maj Mark D., USAR; Digitizing the inthelnformatio nAg e...... 49 Jul/Aug Force XXI Battlefield ...... 68 May/Jun Gavin, Capt Patricia A.; Addicted to Work?: REVIEW ESSAY 86 Jan/Feb Caraway, Maj Patrick H.; Success at the Sava Rive~ Gifford, Cd Robert K.; The Human Dimension in lNSIGHTS ...... 98 sep/oct Force Projection: Discipline Under Fire ...... 57 Mar/Apr Cate, Lt Cd Alan C.; A Failure of Politicdl Intelligence: Gilbert,Lt Co] Douglw A.; Leader XX] Campdign Plan .... 50 Jan/Feb REVIEW ESSAY ...... 88 Jul/Aug Goudreau, Maj Denise A.; Consideration of Others ...... 25 Jan/Feb Chahns, L1Col lim; Autonomy and Leadership ...... 29 JadFeb Grdu, Ll Col Lester W., Ret.; PFACEKEEPER 95: Christensen, Maj Eric R.. Ret.; Communications: 27th Guards Trdin with “Big Red One” ...... 5 Mar/Apr Tr-ain&sYou Fight ...... 31 May/Jun Gum, h Cii Robert M.; Smokes and Obscurants: ChurcttilL Winston;“The Sinewsof Peace:” ALWAC .. 91 Sep/Ott Development. Use and Control ...... 84 SeP/Ckt Collier, Lt Col John A. Jr.; Battle Command Battle Heller. Col Charles E., Ret.; Educating the Army Laboratories Where Tomorrow’s Victories Begin ...... 53 May/Jun forthe21st Century :INSIGHTS ...... 86 JtiAug DesserLCd Rolkmd A. Jr.; Mobile Strike Force: Heredia, Lt Col Michael D.; Campaign Planning A Experiment in Future Battle Command ...... 34 Ju!/Aug for PRAIRIE WARRIOR% ...... 23 JuYAug

92 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW INDEX

Holder, Lt Gen L.D.; PRAIRIE WARRIOR: Pires, Maj Mark R.: PFACEKEEPER 95: AJointand Combined Exercise ...... 5 ~Aug 27th Guards Trdin with “Big Red One” ...... 5 Mar/Apr Homer, Lt Col Donald H. Jr.; A Different Twist: Pursell,Maj David P.; Advanced Warfighting Experiment+ Nonrational Views of Leadership ...... 45 Nov/Dec in PILWRIE WARRfORExerci.ses ...... 17 JuYAug House, Maj Gen Randolph W.: PFACEKEEPER 95: Reich, Maj John M.; PRAIRIE WARRIOR%: 27th Guards Train with “Big Red One” ...... 5 Mar/Apr Force XXI Sustainment Optmtions ...... 48 Jd/Aug Hunt, Lt Col John B., Ret.; 00TW A Concept in Flux . . . . . 3 Sep/Ott Reimcr, Gen Dennis J.; “Lead Up Front and Give a Damn:” Jackson, Co] Richard A.; Protecting the Force: INSIGHTS ...... 86 May/Jun The21st

Battle Command Battle Command: A Commander’s Perspective; BCB~G)’s Rapid Prototyping Testbed; Gen Frederick M. Franks Jr., USA Ret...... 4 May/Jun Capt Daniel P. Kol]er, USA ...... 71 May/Jun BattleCommand Battle Lakratories: Where Tomorrow’s Coachingthe Art of BattleCommand; VictoriesBegin;CO]PatrickLamar,USA; M Co] Billy hCol John D. Rosenberger, USA ...... 27 May/Jun J. McCollum. USA Lt Col John A. CollierJr., USA; Communications:Trainas YouFight; and Maj EdwinJ. KusterJr., USA ...... 53 May/Jun Maj Eric R. Chnstcnsen. USA Ret...... 31 May/Jun

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1996 93 Digitizing the ForceXXI Battlefield; Chemical Smoke and Recon Gunnery: Training for Maj Mark D. Calve, USER ...... 68 May/Jun Succew, Capt Robert F. Mortloc~USA ...... 8OSep/Ckt How the Commander Drives Intelligence; Coaching the Art of Battle Command; Maj John F. Lady lIi, USA ...... 39 May/Jun LtCol John D. Rosenberger, USA...... 27 May/Jun Key to InformationDominance, The; Communications: Train as You Fight; LtCMMichael R. Nifong, USA .,...... 62 May/Jun Maj Enc R. Christensen, USA Ret...... 31 May/Jun Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care; Developing Civilian haders for Force XXI; Maj Wfliam G. T&cc, Australian Army ...... 77 May/Jun LtCol DallasVanHoose,USA+R et...... 56 Jan/Feb Mobile Strike Force: An Experiment in Future Battle Educating the Army for the 21st Ckntury: INSIGHTS; Command; Col Rolland A. Dessert Jr., USA ...... 34 JuUAug Col Charles E. Heller, USAR, Ret...... 86 Jul/Aug Multilevel Security Initiatives; James B. Widby and Integrating Force Projection into NTC Rotations; co] Charles Sgt 1st Class Russell Dwire, USA Ret...... 74 May/Jun W. Ermis, USA and Maj Michael T. Mahoney, USA ..... 10Se@&t lntegmting Joint Doctrine: The FSCL in the Lantican Battlefield Simulation/Digitization Theater of operations Col William S. Knightly, USA .... 30 Jul/Aug Artand Science of Battlefield Vkmliz.ation, The; Milita~ Review-75 Years of Service to the US Army; Lt Cd David L. Simpson, USA and LtCol Richard F. Brown, USER...... 25 Nov/Dec Jerold E. Brown ...... 59 Nov/Dec Mobile Strike Force: A 2010 Potential Force; Battle Command Battle Laboratories: Where Tomorrow’s Brig Gen i-hbd Wass de Czege, USA Ret...... 70 Jul/Aug Victories Begin; Col Patrick Lamar, USA Lt Cd Billy J. McCollum, USA Lt CM John A. Collier Jr., USA; PEACEKEEPER 95: 27th Guards Train with “Big Red One;” and Maj Edwin J. Kuster Jr., USA ...... 53 May/Jun Maj Gen Randolph W. House, USA, Maj Mark R. Pires, USA, and Lt CO1Lester W. Grau, USA Ret...... 5 Mar/Apr BCBUG)’SRapid Prototyping Testbed; Capt Daniel P. Keller, USA ...... 71 May/Jun PR41RIE W~OR: A Joint and Combined Exercise; Lt Gen LD. Holder, USA and Col Rolland A. Dessert Jr., USA . . . . 5 Jui/Aug Dlgitiiing the Force XXI Battlefield; Maj Mark D. Calve, USER ...... 68 May/Jun PRAIRIE WARRIOR %: Special Opmtion% Lt CM Joseph G.D. Babb, USA. Ret., and Lt Col Curt F. Weimer, USA . 40 Jul/Aug Multilevel Security Initiatives; James B. Widby and Providing Coherence for Training Force XXI; Maj Gen Sgt 1st Class Russell Dwire, USA Ret...... 74 May/Jun David H. Ohle, USA and Maj John M. Spiszer, USA .... 63 JuUAug Chemical/Biological Operations PW %: An Eagle’s View; Cd Robert E. Ryats USAF .. ...71 Nov/llec chemical Smoke and Recon Gunnery: Training for Succes.. PW %: Insights and Observation Capt Robert F. Mortloc~ USA ...... 80 Sep/Ott Col Thomas E. Brown Jr., USA ...... 11Ju4Aug Debugging the Battlefield: Whining the War Against Insect Readings in Military Ethics; James H. Toner ...... 35 Jm@eb Bites and Related Diseases Maj Jeffrey M. Gambel, USA .51 Nov/lkc Training Our Army’s Top Pnori~ And Don’t You Protecting the Force: Tle 21st-Century Chemical Coqm Forget It!; Gen Demis J. Reimer, USA ...... 55 JuUAug Maj Gen Ralph G. Wooten, USA and Col Richard A. Jackson, USA ...... 75 Sep/Ott Force Projection Attacking Through the MIST Maj Melvin E. Shafer, USA .. 76 Mar/Apr Smokes and Obscurant Development, Use and Gmtrol; CivilAt%dirs in the Assault; Maj Jefiey A. Jam USAR .. 65 Se@@t Lt Cd Robert M. Gum, USA and Maurice H. Weeks .... 84 sep/oct Human Dimension in Force Projection, The: Discipline Civil-Military Operations Under Fire; 1-lCo] Faris R. Kirkland, US4 Ret.; Bridging the NongovemmenPd] Organization-Military (lap; Morten G. Endec Co] Robert K. Gifford, USA, Col Guy C. Swan, USA ...... 30 Sep/Ott Kathleen M. Wright; and David H. Mdrlowe ...... 57 Mar/Apr Civil Aifairs in the AssaulG Maj Jeffrey A. Jacobs, USAR .. 65 Sep/Get Integrating Force Projection into NTC Rotatiow, Cd Charles hteragency Command and Control: Planning for Counterdnrg W. Ennis, USA and Maj Michael T. Mahoney, USA ..... 10Se@ct SupporG Maj Christopher M. Schnaubelt, ARNG ...... 16 Sep/Ott Keeping the Home Fires Burning Family Support I&sue& Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, The; D. Bruce Bell, Joel M. Teitelbaum and Maj Camille M. Nichols, USA ...... 65 Mar/Apr Col Walter R. Schumrq USAR ...... 8OMAprApr Operational Vignette: Civil Affairs in Haiti; Operational Doctrine and the Environment: INSIGHTS; Col Eric A. Doerrer, USAR, Ret...... 73 Mar/Apr Charles E. Notar ...... 101Mar/Apr Doctrine Pre-positioning Attack Helicopters Afloat; KaMen Engelmann ...... 79 May/Jun American Civil War’s Effect on US River Crossing Doctrine, The: INSIGHTS; Maj Steve Riese, USA .....% Sep/Ott Succes.. at the Sava River: INSIGHTS; Maj Patrick H. Caraway, USA ...... !MSe@ct Combat Decision Making in “Operations Other Than WaG” LtCol Dane LRota, USA ...... 24 Mar/Apr Future Army Dedicated Forward @gistics Element concept A, Advanced Warfighting Experiments in PRAIRIE W~OR Maj Cindy+e Knapp, USA ...... 70 Mar/Apr Exercises; Margaret A. Fratzel and Maj David P. Pursell, USA 17 JuYAug FM 1(10-6: lnfornrufion Operarwn.y Co] Michael D. Starry, ArmyTraining XX]: The Army’s Future Training USAj and Lt Col Charles W. Ameson Jr., USA ...... 3 Nov/Dee Strategy; Cd Ddvid W. Marlin, USA ...... 46 May/Jun Insights into Canadian Peacekeeping Doctrine; Campaign Planning for PRAIRIE W~OR %; Sean M. Maloney ...... 12 Mar/Apr LICol Michael D. HerediA USA ...... 23 Jul/Aug EducatiigtheArmy for the 21st Century; INSIGHTS; Integrating Joint Doctrine: The FSCL in the Lantican Col Charles E. Heller, USAR. Ret...... 86 Jui/Aug Theater of Operatiorrs Col Wtiiam S. Knightly, USA .... 30 Jul/Aug Force XXI: Getting it Right: INSIGHTS; A Concept in Flux; Lt Col John B. Hunt, USA Ret. .3 Sep/Ott 00TW Maj David J. Lemelin, USA ...... 81 Nov/Dec Operational Doctrine and the Environment: INSIGHTS; Information Operations on the Nontraditional Battlefield; CharIes E. Notar ...... 101Mar/Apr LICol Demis M. Murphy, USA ...... 16 Nov/Dec Training OurArmy’sTopPriorityAnd Don’t You J-STARS: The Future of Ground Warfare; Forget It!; Gen Dennis J. Reimer ...... 55 JullAug Maj Jetlrey C. Alfier, USAF ...... 22 Nov/llec Education and Training Joint STARS: A Force XXI Enablec Advanced Wartighting Experiments in PRAIRIE W~OR Exercise& LtGen Ronald L. Watts. US~ Ret:...... , ...... l9Nov/Dec Margaret A. Frdtze] and Maj David P, Pursell, USA ...... 17JuUAug kader XXI Campaign Plan; Lt Cd Douglas A. Gilbe~ USA . 50Jan/F’eb ArmyTraining XXI: The Army”s Future Tminiig Stmtegy; LeadershipandOrganizational Culture: Actions Speak Col David W. Marlin, USA ...... 46 May/Jun Louder Than Words; Lt Gen Theodore G. Stroup Jr., USA . 44 Ja@@b Campaign PIanning for PRAIRIE WMOR %; Leadership for the 21st Century: Empowerment Environment LtCol Michael D. Heredia, USA...... 23 Jul/Aug and the Golden Rule: Gen Dermis J. Reimer, USA ...... 5 Jan/F’eb CAS3: Filkn Years I..atefi Col Albert E. Bryant, USA Meeting Leadership Challenges as a Team; and Joan Dietrich Silver ...... 67 Nov/Dec SMAGene C. McKinley, USA...... lOJan/Feb

94 November - December 1996 ‘ MILITARY REVIEW INDEX

Mobile Strike Force: A 2010 Potential Force; Information Operations Brig (km Hubs WaM de Czcge. USA Ret...... 70 Ju1/Aug Army Historians and the Inf(mnation Age; Mobile Strike Force: An Experiment in Future Battle LtCol Steve E. Dietrich, USA ...... 72 Jan/Feb Command; Col Rolkmd A. Dessert Jr., USA ...... 34 JuVAug Art and Science of Battlefield Vhdization, The; PRAIRIE W!RRfOR: A Joint and Combined Exercise; Lt Gen Lt Cot Ddvid L. Simpson. USA and L.D. Hokicr, USA, and Col Rolkmd A. Dessert Jr., USA .... 5 Jul/Aug LtColRichar dF.Brown,USA R...... 25 Nov~ PRAIRIE W4RR/OR 96: Force XXI Sustainment Attacking Through the MIST Maj Melvin E. Shafer, USA . 76 Mar/Apr Opemtions; Maj John M. Reich. USA...... 48 Jul/Aug FM l(H)+: ltljmml(im opmlfimy; Col Michael D. Starry, PRA//UE WARRK)R %: Special Operations: Lt Col Joseph USA, and I,t Col Charles W. Ammon Jr.. USA ...... 3 Nov/Jlec G.D. Babh, USA Ret., and Lt Co] Curt F. Wcimer. USA . 40 Jul/Aug Information Operations on the Nontraditional Battlefield; Protecting the Force: The 21st

MILITARY REVIEW � November - December 1996 95 Debugging the Battlefield: Winning the War Against Insect Reserve Component Bites and Related Dkeasei Maj Jeffrey M. Gambel, USA .51 Nov/Dec CAS% FifteenYearsLateu Col AlbertE. BryanLUSA Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care; and Joan Dietrich Silver ...... 67 Nov/Dec Maj William G. Teece, Australian Army ...... 77 May/Jun Russia/CIS Nation Assistance Russian Lessons Learned in Bosnia; LtCcr113mothy L. Thomas, USA Ret...... 38 Sep0ct Intervention in Haiti: LessonsRekmmcd; LtCol~omas KAdam\ USA ...... 45 seploct Strategy Pre-positioning Attack Helicopters Afloat; Operations Karsten Engelrnann ...... 79 May/Jun Operational Law: Plan and Execute; !Nrategy for the Blind: REVIEWESSAY RobertJ. Bunker . 94 Sep/Ott Col Patrick Finnegan, USA ...... 29 Mar/Apr Tactics PSYOPinOperationUphoki Democra~, StephenD. Brown . 57 Sep/Ott Casefor EmployingNonlethalWeapons, A. Peacekeeping Maj James B. Linder, USA ...... 25 Se@ct Bridging the Nongovernmental Organization– Guerrillas in the Brazilian Amazon; CO1Alvaro de Souza Military Gap; Col Guy C. Swan, USA...... 30 Sep/Ott Pinheirq Brazilian Army ...... 38 Mar/Apr Case for Employing Nonlethal Weapons, A, War on Drugs Maj James B. Linder, USA ...... 25 Sep/Oct Interagency Command and Control: Planning for Counterdrug Civil Affairs in the A..sault; Maj Jeffrey A. Jacobs. USAR .. 65 Sep/Ott Support; Maj Christopher M. SAnaubelt, ARNG ...... 16 Se@@t Combat Decision Making in “Opemtions Other than Wa~” World War II LtCol Dane L. Rota, USA ...... 24 Mar/Apr Bringing the “Ruptured Ducks” Home: WORLD WAR II Imsights into Canadian Peacekeeping Doctrine; ALMANAC, E. Trevor Brown...... 84 May/Jun Sean M. Maloney ...... 12 Mar/Apr Jugglerand the SupremeCommander,The: ALMANAC, Interventionin Haiti: LessonsRelearned; Col ColeC. Kingseed,USA ...... 77 Nov/Dec LtCol ThomasK. Adam%USA ...... 45 Sep/oct Occupation of Japan. The: hgacy for the CMd War and Beyond: WORLD WAR11ALMANAC, 00TVL A Conceptin Flux;Lt ColJohnB. Hunt,USA Ret. . . 3 Sep/Ott l.l Col Joseph G.D. Babb, USA+ Ret...... 98 Mar/Apr Operational Law: Plan and Execute: Okinawa: The Last Battle: WORLD WAR 11ALMANAC: Col Patrick Finnegan, USA ...... 29 Mar/Apr David W. Fitz-Simons ...... 77 Jan/Feb Operational Vignette: Civil Affairs in Haiti; “sinewsof Peace, The:” AL WAC; Winston Churchill .. 91 S@kt Col Eric A. Doemer, USAR, Ret...... 73 Mar/Apr PEACEKEEPER 95: 27th Guards Trdin with “Big Red One;” Georgia Twh to Offer Radar Coune Maj Gen Randolph W. House. USA; Maj Mark R. Pires, USA and U Col Lester W. Grau, USA Ret...... 5 Mar/Apr The Georgia Institute of Technology will offer an intensive short PSYOPin Operation Up/wr!dDemav-a~, Stephen D. Brown . 57 Sep/Ckt coume on radar systems, radar imaging and digital signal processing Russian Lessons Learned in Bosnia; from 28 to 31 January 1997 on their Atlanta, Georgia campus. The LtCollimothy L. ThomWUS~ Ret...... 38 Sep/Ott cost is $1,095 per student. For more information, call the Georgia Success at the Sava Riven INSIGHTS: Tech Continuing Education Division at (404) 894-2547 or E-mail MajPatrickH.Caraway,USA ...... 98Sep/Ott . ~iljfa~ Rev~ew Subscription ‘Form ~ YES, send me subscription(s) to Military Review (MR), at $17 each ($21 ,25 foreign) per year. Total cost of my order is $ . Price includes regular shipping and handling and is subject to change,

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Fax orders to: 1-202-512-2250 ~um!e~~f Charge your order. /t’s easy! Phone orders to: 1-202-512-1800 Mail to: SUPERINTENDENTOF DOCUMENTS Order %cassng Code f?O. Box 371954 * 5756 12#xEE3ml PITTSBURGHPA 15250-7954

Important Ple8se include this completed order form with your remittance.

Statement of ownership, management and ctrcdab (requwed by 39 USC %s5) Of MW&ry f?evl.w, Profesalonal Bullebn Numb-w 100-96. pubbshed 6 times a year at the US Army Command and General Staff CJ31krge(USACGSC), Forl Leavenworth, KS 66027.1254 Name and address of publ!ahar IS Commander, USACGSC, ForI Leavenworth, KS 66027-6910. Current printer IS IPI Graphics, Inc , 7925 Penn Randall P!ace, Upper Marlho. MD ‘20772 Name arid address of edior m chtef IS Lieutenant Cobnel George L tiumphrres, USACGSC, Fori Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254 Owner ISthe Secretary of the Army, Department of the %my, Washington, DC 20!310-1501 Average number of copies of each taaue pubkhad during the precexlmg 12 months was (A) total copes pontexl 12,500, (B & C) total paid and/or requested circulation 2,800 (r)) free d!stnbutmn by marl, earner or other means 9,700, (E) total dWributlon 12,500.

96 November - December 1996 � MILITARY REVIEW