Issue 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Joint Force Quarterly
Evolving Theory I ssue for Cyberspace S eventy Educating Future
-three, 2 Strategic Leaders
nd Next Steps Quarter 2014 in Targeting Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 http://ndupress.ndu.edu
GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, Publisher MG Gregg F. Martin, USA, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Photography Editor Martin J. Peters, Jr.
Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley
Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Printing Office
Advisory Committee BG Guy T. Cosentino, USA/National War College; MG Anthony A. Cucolo III, USA/U.S. Army War College; Brig Gen Thomas H. Deale, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; Col Mark J. Desens, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Lt Gen David L. Goldfein, USAF/The Joint Staff; BGen Thomas A. Gorry, USMC/ Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Maj Gen Scott M. Hanson, USAF/ Air War College; Col Jay L. Hatton, USMC/ Marine Corps War College; LTG David G. Perkins, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; RDML John W. Smith, Jr., USN/Joint Forces Staff College; LtGen Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC/The Joint Staff
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/National War College; Mark J. Conversino/Air War College; Thomas P. Ehrhard/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.)/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Mark H. Jacobsen/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University; Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/National War College; James A. Schear/Office of the Secretary of Defense; LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
Printed in St. Louis, Missouri, by
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Airman from 336th Fighter Squadron performs Missing Man Pull-up in flyover during internment ceremony of Brigadier General Robinson Risner at Arlington National Cemetery (U.S. Air Force); Marines reload M777 howitzer with 155 mm artillery shell during multiple-rounds fire mission as part of 2-day dual-fire training exercise at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii (U.S. Marine Corps/Matthew Bragg); UH-60M Black Hawk helicopter pilot and commander of C Company “War Lords,” 2nd Battalion (Assault), 10th Combat Aviation Brigade, Task Force Knighthawk, prepares cockpit prior to launching on personnel movement mission at Kabul International Airport (U.S. Army/Peter Smedberg). About the Cover In this Issue U.S. Navy divers assigned to Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit Dialogue 2, Company 2-2, lowered into water January 9, 2014, from 2 Letter Military Sealift Command rescue 4 In Memoriam and salvage ship USNS Grasp to search for missing Sailor of MH- 6 From the Chairman 53E Sea Dragon helicopter that 8 Are We Really Ever Off Duty? went down off coast of Virginia (U.S. Navy/Wyatt Huggett). Forum 10 Executive Summary 12 The Joint Force Commander’s Guide to Cyberspace Operations Joint Doctrine By Brett T. Williams 76 Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy 123 Cross-Domain Synergy: 20 Achieving Accountability By Fumio Ota Advancing Jointness in Cyberspace: Revolution By William O. Odom and or Evolution? 81 Geography Matters in Christopher D. Hayes By John N.T. Shanahan Maintaining Global Mobility By William M. Fraser III and 26 Combined Effects Power Marshall N. Ramsey By Ervin J. Rokke, Thomas A. Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Drohan, and Terry C. Pierce Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship Features joint military and security studies journal designed 32 Information-Sharing with to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, 86 Reflections on Operation allies, and other partners on joint and integrated the Private Sector Unified Protector operations; national security policy and strategy; By Veronica A. Chinn, Lee T. By Todd R. Phinney efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; Furches, and Barian A. Woodward and developments in training and joint professional military education to transform America’s military and 93 Silent Watch: The Role of security apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. JPME Today Army Air and Missile Defense By Michael S. Tucker and NDU Press is the National Defense University’s 39 “Break Out”: A Plan for Better Robert W. Lyons cross-component, professional military and academic Equipping the Nation’s publishing house. Future Strategic Leaders 99 Leveraging U.S. Civilian The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the By Gregg F. Martin and Capabilities in Africa contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views John W. Yaeger By Charles D. “Buck” McDermott of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. 44 Green Peace: Can Biofuels 105 The Case for the Junior Submissions and Communications Accelerate Energy Security? Joint Logistics Officer JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent By John E. Gay research from members of the Armed Forces, security Training Program policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and st By Wilson T. VornDick 52 Shaping a 21 -Century abroad. Submit articles for consideration by email to Defense Strategy: [email protected], with “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. Or write to: Reconciling Military Roles Recall By William G. Braun III 111 Dieppe All Over Again: The Editor, Joint Force Quarterly and Charles D. Allen Quandaries of Combined NDU Press 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) Joint Operations Fort Lesley J. McNair 60 Targeting the JIIM Way: A Washington, DC 20319 More Inclusive Approach By Harald Høiback Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 By John Bilas, Scott A. Hoffman, Email: [email protected] John S. Kolasheski, Kevin Book Reviews JFQ online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm Toner, and Douglas Winton 118 Bolívar 2nd Quarter, April 2014 ISSN 1070-0692 Reviewed by Alan Gropman Commentary 68 Airpower and Globalization 119 The Revenge of Geography Effects: Rethinking Reviewed by Francis P. Sempa the Five Rings 120 Intelligence Collection By Michael W. Pietrucha Reviewed by Todd M. Manyx Police barrier at pro–European Union rally in Kiev attended by over 100,000, November 24, 2013 (Flickr/Ivan Bandura)
Letter
o the Editor: I write in response dragged through the streets or hung Churchill’s statement mentioned in their to Derek S. Reveron and James from a bridge, the Obama administration own article: “The statesman who yields T L. Cook’s article “From National would have quickly learned whether the to war fever must realize that once the to Theater: Developing Strategy” that American public was ready to see U.S. signal is given, he is no longer the master appeared in Joint Force Quarterly 70 Servicemembers dying for this cause. of policy but the slave of unforeseeable (3rd Quarter 2013). I agree whole- Looking back to March 27, 1999, in and uncontrollable events.” With a near- heartedly with the authors on their Serbia, when Lieutenant Colonel Dale peer adversary, it would not be surprising position that only “vital” national Zelko, flying an F-117A stealth fighter, if missile strikes triggered counterstrikes interests are worth dying for. However, was shot down by an SA-3 missile, we against U.S. forces or territory. But even I caution against accepting their idea should recognize that anytime American with a lesser foe, asymmetric warfare that national interests that are (merely) air crews fly into a combat zone, they might be employed to retaliate against “important” are necessarily worth risk being unable to fly home from that America in a way that caused casualties. killing for. mission. I suggest manned air strikes Second, if the country we strike has To begin, air strikes by manned should be flown only when U.S. vital na- not attacked the United States or an aircraft carry risks. Reveron and Cook tional interests are at stake since the crews ally—or we do not have a United Nations posit the 2011 North Atlantic Treaty risk death and cannot kill with absolute (UN) Security Council Resolution autho- Organization air campaign to prevent impunity. rizing the use of force against them—the genocide in Libya as worth killing for, It might be tempting to argue that United States would be committing but not worth dying for. But we have unmanned aircraft, cruise missiles, or bal- an illicit act of aggression that would to keep in mind that Major Kenneth listic missiles do not carry that same risk technically constitute initiating an act of Harney and Captain Tyler Stark had to and might satisfy this new criterion of im- war. While UN Ambassador and Pulitzer eject from their F-15E over Libya on portant interests that are worth killing for Prize–winner Samantha Power is an advo- March 21, 2011. If we had not safely but not worth dying for. That would be a cate of “R2P” (a responsibility to protect extracted them, and, instead, the U.S. grave error for at least two reasons. First, against genocide, war crimes, crimes public had watched video of their bodies the authors should consider Winston against humanity, and ethnic cleansing),
2 dialogue / Letter JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 the third pillar of the R2P global norm unanimously adopted by heads of state and government at the 2005 UN World Summit states, “If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the in- ternational community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in accor- dance with the UN Charter.” In other words, R2P is expected to use the other instruments of national power, rather than military force, except when a UN Security Council Resolution authorizes that use of force. I believe there is still no better test of whether to employ U.S. military force than the six-point test first articulated by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger View of Zaatari Camp for Syrian refugees as seen on July 18, 2013, from helicopter carrying Secretary in 1984 (and referred to by the authors as of State John Kerry and Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh (State Department) the Weinberger Doctrine): on the ground to provide stability in Iraq •• prevent the emergence of hostile •• The United States should not immediately after the hot war ended. I major powers or failed states on U.S. commit forces to combat overseas recommend the Weinberger Doctrine borders unless the particular engagement also be considered for unmanned aircraft •• ensure the viability and stability of or occasion is deemed vital to our or missile strikes when under the control major global systems (trade, financial national interest or that of our allies. of the U.S. military. We should not be markets, supplies of energy, and the •• If we decide it is necessary to put willing to kill for a national interest that environment) combat troops into a given situation, we are not ready to risk dying for. •• establish productive relations, con- we should do so wholeheartedly, and American security policy experts have sistent with American national inter- with the clear intention of winning. recognized that articulating and prioritiz- ests, with nations that could become •• If we do decide to commit forces ing national interests are fundamental to strategic adversaries. to combat overseas, we should have knowing what resources to commit ever When national interests at stake are clearly defined political and military since Hans J. Morgenthau’s In Defense less than these, we should not be willing objectives. of the National Interest: A Critical to have American Servicemembers die or The relationship between our Examination of American Foreign Policy •• kill for them. objectives and the forces we have was published in 1951. Each administra- committed—their size, composition, tion can have a slightly different take as to —Commander Thomas J. Reid, and disposition—must be continually which are vital national interests. USN (Ret.) reassessed and adjusted if necessary. So which national interests are worth Defense contractor in support of Before we commit combat forces killing for? In 2000, the Commission on •• Space and Naval Warfare Systems abroad, there must be some rea- America’s National Interests defined vital Command sonable assurance we will have the national interests as “conditions that are support of the American people strictly necessary to safeguard and en- and their elected representatives in hance Americans’ survival and well-being Note Congress. in a free and secure nation.”1 Those vital •• The commitment of forces to national interests agreed upon by the 1 Robert Ellsworth, Andrew Goodpaster, combat should be a last resort. commission can be summarized as: and Rita Hauser, co-chairs, America’s National Interests: A Report from The Commission on In 2003, some advocates of “shock •• prevent, deter, and reduce the threat America’s National Interests (Washington, and awe” considered the Weinberger of nuclear, biological, and chemical DC: The Commission on America’s National Doctrine outdated by claiming that weapons attacks on the United States Interests, July 2000), available at
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Dialogue 3 ducation is persistently underval- ued in most military institutions. E This lack of attention is based on two realities of military life: education engenders the habit of questioning, while sound discipline, particularly in combat, requires unhesitating obedi- ence; furthermore, education requires reflection, but war demands action. Thus, the military Services tend to draw broad lines of demarcation between their thinkers and their fighters. One man other than the 19th-cen- tury soldier Sir William Butler who understood the evils of this tendency was a small-town lawyer from Missouri named Isaac Newton “Ike” Skelton IV. Mr. Skelton entered Congress in 1977 and rose to become Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) in 2007. But before he reached this position, Congressman Skelton was a key player in congressional efforts to reduce the dysfunctional inter-Service friction so glaringly displayed during Operation Desert One, the abortive 1980 attempt to rescue American hostages in Tehran. This effort culminated in pas- sage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which is widely regarded as a landmark of con- structive military reform. But Congressman Skelton sensed that the passage of Goldwater-Nichols was not enough; something else had to be done to assure that America’s warriors could think strategically in order for its military Services to act strategically. That something was to enhance the Services’ educational systems. Congressman Ike Skelton, Skelton enlisted the aid of retired Air Force Colonel Archie Barrett, who grad- uated from West Point in 1957, earned a 1931–2013 Ph.D. from Harvard in 1971, and joined the HASC staff after his retirement. With Barrett’s active assistance, Skelton Champion of Military undertook a systematic program to draw attention to the dearth of strategic think- Education ing in America’s Armed Forces, lay out the rationale for education as the primary By Harold R. Winton antidote, survey the state of military edu- cation, and propose concrete reforms to enhance it. Harold R. Winton is Professor of Military History and Theory in the School of Advanced Air and The first two phases of this endeavor Space Studies. took place over the course of roughly
4 dialogue / Champion of Military Education JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 st st 6 weeks from October to November faculty, establish a two-phased system for Services, 101 Cong., 1 sess., Vol. 4 (Wash- ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987, during which Skelton delivered the education of joint officers, form an 1989). five speeches on the House floor that Institute for National Strategic Studies 3 Ike Skelton, “Whispers of Warriors: The over a quarter-century later are still worth at National Defense University, institute Importance of History to the Military Profes- reading. His theme was contained in a a CAPSTONE course for the education sional,” Naval War College Review 53 (Summer series of rhetorical questions in the first of newly selected general officers, and 2000), 7. 4 “Ike Skelton’s Acceptance Speech of the speech: “Where are our strategic thinkers require all intermediate and senior edu- 2012 Sylvanus Thayer Award,” West Point, of today? Does our military structure no cational institutions to adopt essay-based NY, October 18, 2012, available at
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Winton 5 Chairman talks to Servicemembers at Bagram Airfield about the future of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and force reductions (U.S. Air Force/Gary J. Rihn)
From the Chairman
epresenting Servicemembers who military and those we serve falls to every In my nearly 40 years of service, I make up today’s Joint Force is one of us who are privileged to wear have witnessed the increasingly precise R my greatest honor as Chairman. our nation’s uniform. Whether it is a application of force. In close coordination As the principal military advisor to the lieutenant interacting with a local mayor with other instruments of power, our President of the United States, Secre- on behalf of her Soldiers or my own nation has used the military to shape tary of Defense, and the National Secu- interaction with national-level civilian environments, empower diplomacy, rity Council, I work to develop a shared leadership, one of our most important re- and help achieve national objectives in understanding of our capabilities and sponsibilities is to inform decisionmakers complex and uncertain situations. As our the Nation’s needs in order to provide about who we are and what we do. weapons become ever more precise, it is sound advice and to represent the views tempting to choose force as the preferred of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To be effec- Teamwork in a Complex World instrument of power. Precision, however, tive, I must build relationships of trust Our nation’s security depends on more does not always translate into control with those elected to make decisions than just military prowess. Our informa- over a situation. Carl von Clausewitz about the use of military force. But tional advantages, economic strength, reminds us that “war is the province of I did not begin to establish relation- and diplomatic power all play essential chance,” and because our profession is ships with civilian leaders only when I roles in keeping America secure. Our about the management of violence, it is became Chairman. nation requires all of these instruments, our responsibility to explain the capa- Long before I came into this position, and we are strongest when they work in bilities—and limitations—of what force I believed that the responsibility for concert. But this is not a simple task. alone can achieve. managing the relationship between the
6 dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Gaining a shared understanding of how the instruments of national power must integrate to achieve objectives re- quires frequent and substantive dialogue. This dialogue must be based on a solid foundation of mutual trust, and that trust is not built overnight. It can be lost in a minute, so it must be constantly reinforced.
The Ultimate Source of Power Building relationships of trust with our counterparts in government service is essential, but we must also sustain the trust between those of us in uniform and the country we have sworn to defend. All of our power, whether diplomatic, military, or economic, is ultimately derived from the American people. Our men and women in uniform Chairman talks with Jim Miklaszewski (chief Pentagon correspondent with NBC News) and other must always trust that as long as they members of media aboard USAF C-40 aircraft en route to Afghanistan (DOD/D. Myles Cullen) remain in harm’s way, the Nation will ensure they have what they need to national interests. In a world of rapidly policymakers, and, most importantly, the complete the mission. In fact, my moral evolving threats and challenges, it is im- American people is essential to our ability obligation to those serving is to ensure portant that we strengthen that dialogue to effectively provide for the common that when we send them to defend the with the American people. defense. Nation, they will be trained and ready to And that is why in the time remaining accomplish the mission. The American Moving Forward Together to me, I plan to increase my commitment people have demonstrated their appreci- The military theorist Ardant du Picq to have a conversation with our national ation for us in very powerful ways. And once stated that four brave men who leaders and the American people about they trust us as an institution more than do not know each other would not the capabilities of their military, not only any other institution in America. But at dare to attack a lion, but that four less in times of war, but also in times of peace. the same time, I think there is a deficit of brave men who know each other well I encourage you to do the same. It falls understanding between those of us who would attack resolutely. Today’s Joint on each of us to sustain the trust and serve in uniform and our fellow citizens. Force enjoys the best of both worlds. It confidence of those we serve and with This is not the somewhat overstated is comprised of women and men who whom we serve. JFQ concern about losing contact with the have repeatedly demonstrated physical American people. The deficit of under- and moral courage, and among the Martin E. Dempsey standing concerns the very role of the Services there is an unparalleled trust General, U.S. Army military. The Armed Forces have been on and understanding developed over the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a war footing for more than 12 years, and last 13 years of war. We have realized we have an entire generation of military the vision that General Colin Powell leaders who have known nothing else. laid out for the Joint Force just over 20 As we return to our garrisons, we must years ago: “We train as a team, fight as a reengage with our fellow citizens. While team, and win as a team.” interest in the military peaks during The development of our joint capa- times of war, building trust and a true bilities is a great achievement, but it will understanding of the capabilities and lim- not be enough. In an uncertain world, itations of military power takes time and it is vital that we expand the concept of constant engagement. We must encour- teamwork to include our brothers and age a shared understanding of what our sisters in uniform and our civilian coun- profession means not only during times terparts. Understanding among those of of war, but also in everyday life and in us in the military and our fellow servants the everyday business of promoting our in the diplomatic corps, our civilian
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Dempsey 7 Combat Logistics Battalion 4 Marines stand by for sun to set before beginning night marksmanship shoot (U.S. Marine Corps/Mark Stroud)
Are We Really Ever Off Duty?
s we in the U.S. military continue term that best resonates with you. I prefer professional behavior, integrity, respect, to renew our commitment to the the latter as it conveys a more subtle and and bearing, which collectively provide A Profession of Arms, the title of steady narrative that is less prone to tech- an internal beacon to guide us. However, this article asks a compelling question nical interpretations. To others, the short living by such a high military standard for everyone who wears the cloth of the answer of no may not process as quickly. does not mean that we have to sacrifice Nation. While I believe the question has My hope for that particular audience is every aspect of an otherwise normal life, an easy answer, let us not downplay the that by the end of this article, the mean- such as neglecting obligations to family, significance of asking it at every level of ing of the question and resulting answer exercising appropriate periods of rest, and professional development. Most serving shall provide a better understanding of so forth. But it does mean that regardless in the Armed Forces understand the why it is individually and organizationally of time or circumstance, we are always deeper meaning of the question, as well advantageous for us all to live by such a fulfilling our obligations as professionals, as the commitment to the profession and standard of ethical, moral, and professional whether during or after working hours. the American people that goes along behavior. Maintaining a “never off duty” To be human is to be imperfect and with it. Therefore, most military profes- posture is not a new idea or the result of it is safe to say that none of us has been sionals would provide the short answer: a recent study—it has been and should or will be consistently flawless in meeting “No, we are never really off duty.” always remain an integral part of our total a preeminent standard as never off duty. Indeed, we are a more effective and composition as members of the profession. We all face temptation and periods in our a more disciplined force when we live by A disciplined, dedicated, and struc- careers (and personal lives) where we may the high standard of always on duty or tured military career embodies certain be drawn to convenience, greediness, never off duty. You choose and use the individual traits and attributes, such as even luxury, resulting in shortfalls. It is an
8 dialogue / Are We Really Ever Off Duty? JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 individual decision to take the right or card to punch.” Each phrase conveys that wrong road. When wrongful temptation when we volunteer to serve the Nation, it New from overrides Servicemembers’ decisions (the is a 24/7 obligation and our obligations wrong road), our integrity should be im- and responsibilities as members of the NDU Press mediately challenged by our better selves, Profession of Arms never expire. for the Center for Strategic Research our teammates, our profession, and even All five Service branches have unique Strategic Forum 284 our nation’s citizens. Depending on the cultures and identities, and as such, they The Defense Acquisition Trilemma: severity of the decision made, significant define, understand, and implement never The Case of Brazil setbacks can result for the profession, off duty in different ways that ensure by Patrice Franko including degradation in faith and confi- members achieve and maintain standards. dence with the public, injury, even loss of But regardless of Service branch, duty Brazil is a life. This is where those who act less than assignment, geographical location, or puzzling honorably tarnish and scar the reputation individual occupational specialty, there new strate- of our Profession of Arms. Maintaining a are commonalities and consistencies for gic player. conviction of never off duty instills a dis- maintaining professional behavior, ethics, Currently, ciplined standard of living and will help and proper representation of the Nation. its economic guide decisions that may in fact prevent Operating in a mindset of never off duty clout is not or avoid a poor plan or a poor choice. in our everyday lives should prove profes- supported By virtue of qualifying to join the sionally lucrative. I would even go so far by strong Armed Forces, I strongly consider those to say that allowing this operating prin- operational military capabilities. To achieving the title of Soldier, Marine, ciple into our professional lives will raise make its military instrument com- Sailor, Airman, or Coastguardsman our ability to sidestep temptation and mensurate with its new geopolitical to have reached a high watermark in wrongful personal actions or choice. weight, Brazil is undergoing military their lives, and the profession benefits Regardless of one’s military status— modernization. But it faces a secu- greatly from the diversity, skills, and whether taking annual leave or liberty, rity trilemma: it must choose among determination toward excellence our attending school, appearing at a social long-held aspirations of sovereignty, Servicemembers bring. We all want not function, serving an internship, moon- integration into the global value only to be good in our service but also lighting an after-hours job, shopping for chain, and economic sustainability. great in our duty. groceries, or conducting combat actions With its new global reach, the The majority in our formations do it against an enemy force—never off duty Brazilian defense industrial base is right. They challenge themselves to live provides that disciplined methodology to not a continuation of the defense by the moral and professional standard our military lives. It is a behavior rooted industry of the 1980s. Instead, of never off duty, and most believe if in moral soundness, high values, with complex industrial relationships and this standard is not carried to its fullest, cause and effect. It maintains a standard civil society engagement create a individuals and teams can break down and positively impacts professional focus critical disjuncture from the inward in discipline, morals, and ethics, thereby and conduct. It is reachable and sustain- looking pattern of the earlier phase. drawing discredit, failure, or embarrass- able for everyone, every day, every time. Strengthening legal frameworks be- ment to one’s unit, Service, country, We are a much better organization with it tween the United States and Brazil family, and self. A true serving profes- than without it. We are never off duty. JFQ to support defense cooperation sional understands the severity of that would allow private-sector initiatives breakdown and will exhaust every effort Bryan B. Battaglia to deepen bilateral ties. to avoid it. Furthermore, I find that Sergeant Major, U.S. Marine Corps Servicemembers who truly understand Senior Enlisted Advisor to the never off duty become exceptional role Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff models and mentors to all others. and the Senior Noncommissioned Officer At various points along our military in the U.S. Armed Forces career and glide path, maybe even as early as basic training, some key legacy phrases may help as reminders of why one is never off duty: “You get paid 24 hours a day,” “You can be recalled at any time”—and the one I think resonates best—“Don’t think the rules stop or the Visit the NDU Press Web site standards drop at 1700 just because it’s for more information on publications at www.ndu.edu/press/index.html the end of the work day; there is no time
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Battaglia 9 Secretary Hagel conducts news conference regarding Afghanistan and evolving crisis in Ukraine at NATO defense ministerial meeting (DOD/Glenn Fawcett)
Executive Summary
seemingly incomprehensible do? As the costs of the joint force con- right questions about the future of U.S. set of events is occurring as I tinue to rise, voices from all parts of the military strength. One of the more im- A write this column: the People’s political spectrum are asking this very portant questions I ask my students at the Republic of China is asserting its question. Of course, the global security beginning of the courses I teach is fun- desire to extend an air defense zone in environment is rarely without challenges, damental: What do the American people the Pacific, the Syrian crisis continues but without doubt current situations are want their military to do as it meets its unabated, violence in nations transition- hardly going to give us a sense of grow- constitutional commitments? Implicit in ing from one form of government to ing global security. Often those who seek that question lies a more practical one, another is the norm from Iraq to Egypt trends in events are looking to see if such which the current administration (and to Libya, Iran seems to be yielding to a series is expected or is a discontinuity every other administration) is working international pressure to control its that signals a break with the past. or will work to answer: What will be the nuclear ambitions, Venezuela seems Against this backdrop, Secretary of shape, size, and capabilities of the U.S. poised for an economic collapse, bomb- Defense Chuck Hagel rolled out the military in coming years as it works to as- ings and other violence in Pakistan con- Department of Defense (DOD) budget sist in dealing with the world? Hopefully tinue, and the Russian Federation has with significant and ongoing reductions this edition and all future editions of Joint annexed Crimea triggering a possible to the department and the Nation’s joint Force Quarterly will both give voice to response from the North Atlantic Treaty force even as the Obama administration those who have ideas that will be useful Organization (NATO). This particular works to comply with congressional and inform the debate as it evolves. The situation seems to have been taken budgetary limits. Risks will continue JFQ mission continues and we look for- from a script of an early post–Cold War to be calculated. Diplomatic efforts ward to your contribution to our mutual NATO exercise. will be used in concert with military mission success. What if anything can we expect a joint planning to avert confrontations. As This edition’s Forum focuses on a force—weary from more than a decade of interested parties in the outcome of this range of ideas related to cyber concepts warfighting in Iraq and Afghanistan—to environment, we should be asking the that continue to be the hottest area
10 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 among our submissions. Returning to of Staff Strategic Essay Competition, joint logistics course. Three years after these pages to expand on his widely Strategic Research Paper category, and the war in Libya, Todd Phinney assesses read article on 10 propositions on 2013 Air War College graduate John Gay the results achieved in Operation Unified cyberspace, Brett Williams presents a provides a significant contribution to the Protector, the NATO-led portion of that compact guide for the joint force com- debate on whether biofuels could enhance conflict. Michael Tucker and Robert mander, as well as anyone who might our national energy security. Army War Lyons describe a key element in any joint serve on these joint staffs, on how to deal College faculty members William Braun operation at the high end of the conflict with cyberspace operations. Addressing and Charles Allen recommend a serious spectrum: the capabilities and value one of the more vexing problems in look at military shaping capabilities to Army air and missile defense units add the cyberspace arena, John Shanahan prepare the joint force for any contingency to the joint force. Suggesting that U.S. suggests military commanders need to across the spectrum of future conflict. In Government responses to past disasters develop consistent standards for dealing a team effort from the Joint Forces Staff indicate a need for nongovernmental with those who damage systems from College, John Bilas, Scott Hoffman, John responses to humanitarian crises, Charles the inside. A trio of authors from the Kolasheski, Kevin Toner, and Douglas McDermott outlines methods where ci- U.S. Air Force Academy—Ervin Rokke, Winton recommend important changes vilian capabilities would be a better fit for Thomas Drohan, and Terry Pierce—has to joint targeting within a campaign to be these contingencies, especially in Africa. developed a new way to take full advan- more inclusive of nonlethal activities and Identifying a gap in current joint training, tage of combined arms warfare in light interagency, intergovernmental, and multi- Wilson VornDick describes a well-consid- of 21st-century cyber developments. national capabilities. ered program for filling this requirement Highlighting another growing sector of Our Commentary section presents for junior logistics officers. cyber-related activities of interest to the important points of view on three diverse Another international voice brings joint force, Veronica Chinn, Lee Furches, topics. Revisiting one of the most notable us a thoughtful World War II article in and Barian Woodward look to the private if not controversial theorists of the late our Recall section. As some Americans sector to bring about a national answer to 20th century, Michael Pietrucha offers a are not familiar with combined and joint security needs in cyberspace. new look at John Warden’s “Five Ring” operations prior to our entry in the war As promised, this edition has a new theory in light of changes in airpower after Pearl Harbor, Harald Høiback sol- section, JPME Today, which is dedicated and the effects of globalization since idly fills in this gap with a revisit to those to highlighting authors and issues that Operation Desert Storm when the theory fearful days for the Allies at Dieppe in hopefully will engage readers with the was first used in warfighting. Adding an 1942. Three outstanding book reviews Chairman’s emphasis on joint education as important international voice to the on- along with an important joint doctrine a key ingredient to the future joint force. going discussion of developments in the essay on cross-domain synergy by As I mentioned in JFQ 72, our intent is Asia-Pacific region, retired Vice Admiral William Odom and Christopher Hayes to place the journal in direct support of Fumio Ota, formerly of the Japanese round out the issue. authors and ideas from the joint profes- Maritime Self-Defense Force and a Let us know what you think about sional military education community as graduate of the Industrial College of these ideas, and I encourage you to join well as voices from outside the classrooms the Armed Forces, provides rare insights in the discussion about the world ahead to help the best thinking flow into and out from his personal and frequent contacts for the joint force. Our mutual success of the minds of our faculties and students. with senior Chinese military leaders in depends on the great thinking and writ- Like our other sections, we hope this recent years. As the U.S. defense budget ing of our contributors as you continue encourages voices in support of ongoing gets more fiscally constrained, so too to be read and appreciated worldwide by efforts and those with ideas to enhance the will joint force operations. Highlighting a growing audience of more than 60,000 continuing education efforts both here at the importance of one function that readers in print and online. Your leader- the National Defense University (NDU) joint operations support, William Fraser, ship is depending on you to help them and across the Services. the commander of U.S. Transportation guide the joint force no matter what the In our first article in JPME Today, Command, and Marshall Ramsey environment. JFQ addressing specific challenges from the describe the impact of geography on mo- Chairman and the future defense environ- bility support for the successful conduct William T. Eliason ment, NDU President Gregg Martin of global logistics. Editor in Chief and Provost John Yaeger discuss how the We next bring you a range of in- Chairman’s University is undergoing a sights from across the joint force in our significant set of changes in joint profes- Features section—on Libya, the U.S. sional military education delivery to better Army’s contribution to joint missile de- meet the needs of 21st-century strategic fense, better use of civilian capabilities in leaders. From one of the top competi- Africa, improving interagency operations, tors in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the requirement for a junior officer’s
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Eliason 11 Office of Naval Research Project BlueShark creates high-tech, futuristic environment to demonstrate what operational work environments might look like and what emerging innovative technologies might provide in next decade (U.S. Navy/John F. Williams)
The Joint Force Commander’s Guide to Cyberspace Operations
By Brett T. Williams
oint force commanders (JFC) earn mission success increasingly depends and influence operations, particularly the right to command because, on freedom of maneuver in cyberspace. in the realm of deterrence. The ability J regardless of their “native” The preeminent JFC requirement for to collect, analyze, and use intelligence domain, they are able to direct joint freedom of maneuver in cyberspace is information depends on cyberspace. operations in the land, maritime, air, command and control (C2). It is impos- Moving data from sensor to shooter and space domains to achieve cam- sible to fully employ today’s joint force and getting access to information all paign objectives. Commanders must without leveraging cyberspace. Other the way to the tactical edge are funda- develop the same capability to direct examples include the fact that cyber- mental requirements for cyberspace. operations in the cyber domain since space is heavily used to support shaping Finally, there are evolving opportunities to project power in and through cyber- space to support attaining campaign Major General Brett T. Williams, USAF, is the Director of Operations, J3, for U.S. Cyber Command. objectives. Since cyberspace operations
12 Forum / JFC Guide to Cyberspace Operations JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 are fundamental to success, com- in signals intelligence, or the ability to power in and through cyberspace in sup- manders cannot continue to run the configure a firewall. At the same time, it port of campaign objectives. The final risk of inappropriately delegating key is unrealistic to think that we are going to section describes individual cyberspace operational decisions because they and conduct operations in cyberspace without actions that create the effects to execute their staffs lack an understanding of the learning some new concepts and associ- the operational approach. Although this domain. This article argues that despite ated terminology, at least to the level of article focuses on DOD operations, the the technical complexity of cyberspace, this article. concepts are applicable to any organiza- the JFC can and should direct cyber- This operational approach will be ef- tion that finds itself at risk from malicious space operations at the operational fective only if we take the time to evolve cyberspace activity. level of war using current operational current conflict theory to account for doctrine and existing planning and cyberspace. There is an analogy with Four Axioms execution processes. airpower here. Airpower did not change Axiom #1. Use of the term cyberwar is Some people are reluctant to read the nature of war, but it did change its not productive. War, conflict, and com- about cyberspace because they perceive character. We had to alter our mental petition are all characterized by endur- the subject to be “too technical.” This framework for conflict to account for the ing principles that were established piece is intentionally written in the lexi- unique capabilities of airpower. In the long before cyberspace. The creation of con of joint operations to make it easily same way we had to develop airpower cyberspace has simply offered another understandable, but more importantly theory and make adjustments to broader environment or domain within which to to make the point that at the opera- conflict theory, we need a theory for cy- exercise the elements of national power. tional level, we must plan and execute berspace operations that will allow us to Focusing inordinately on the unique cyberspace operations just as we do land, understand the implications of employing nature of cyberspace operations at the maritime, air, and space operations. What cyberspace capabilities at the tactical, op- tactical level tends to draw senior poli- prevents us from taking this approach erational, and strategic levels. The theory cymakers and their military commanders today is a lack of shared cyberspace must capture the ubiquitous nature of into a narrowly defined view of conflict knowledge and an agreed upon op- cyberspace and its relevance and interac- and away from a whole-of-government erational approach that links cyberspace tion with government, commercial, and approach to both policy and operations. missions and actions and places them in civilian sectors. Additionally, the theory The result is a tendency to overstate the larger context of joint operations. must cover the complete spectrum from the relevance of cyberspace operations The approach outlined here con- national security policy to detailed techni- within the context of all other activi- tributes to a shared understanding of cal operations and account for the fact ties that influence the actions of people cyberspace that is necessary for senior de- that the domain changes constantly. The with opposing goals. Relying on tactical cisionmakers both inside and outside the process of operational design could be actions from any single domain to be Department of Defense (DOD). When useful in this endeavor. “dominant” is a pitfall that we have senior leaders meet to shape national This approach to cyberspace op- mostly learned to avoid, and we should security policy, consider operational plans, erations reflects the work of the author not have to relearn the lesson as we or allocate resources, common shared and his colleagues that began at U.S. integrate cyberspace operations into experience means that decisions related to Pacific Command and substantially joint planning. It is the integration of the land, maritime, air, or space domain evolved at U.S. Cyber Command land, maritime, air, space, and cyber- rarely require accompanying background (USCYBERCOM). As much as pos- space operations that achieves campaign information regarding the roles and sible, we use the terminology and objectives. functions of units or weapons systems. processes found in the following joint Axiom #2. Established joint doctrine The same is not true for cyberspace publications (JPs): JP 1, Doctrine for accommodates operations in cyberspace operations, yet we attempt to structure the Armed Forces of the United States, quite well, so we do not need to invent the meeting in the same way: “Skip the JP 3.0, Joint Operations, JP 5.0, Joint anything new. USCYBERCOM staff has background and get to the decision Operation Planning, JP 3.12, Cyberspace found that there are few adjustments re- slide.” The risk in this approach is de Operations, and JP 3.60, Joint Targeting. quired to integrate cyberspace operations facto decisionmaking by the people who The first section presents four axioms into existing planning and execution prepared the brief. There is too much developed by the author that underpin processes. The joint operation planning at stake for our senior leaders not to the main thesis that we can and should process (JOPP) that uses mission analysis understand cyberspace operations in the approach cyberspace operations just as to produce a plan or order adapts well to same way they understand operations in we approach operations in the other cyberspace operations. In a similar way, the other domains. The approach to cy- domains. The next two sections describe the joint targeting cycle, which begins berspace articulated here is useful because an operational approach that allows with an endstate and commander’s it is understandable without a degree in a JFC to provide friendly freedom of objectives and continues with target computer science, significant expertise maneuver in cyberspace and to project development, weaponeering, execution,
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Williams 13 Figure 1. Cyberspace Operations satellites, and other components that allow us to move large amounts of data DOD Information Global at very fast speeds. It follows that cyber- Network Operations space operations are those conducted in *Network focused/threat agnostic O ensive Cyberspace cyberspace with the objective of provid- Operations ing friendly freedom of maneuver in Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) * Project power in and through cyberspace cyberspace and projecting power in and through the domain in support of JFC DCO–Internal DCO–Response campaign objectives. Intelligence and Defensive Measures Actions (DCO-RA) (DCO-IDM) communications are support functions *Mission focused/threat speci c to cyberspace operations just like intel- ligence and communications support Cyber Protection Cyber forces execute Teams DCO- cyber actions: CMT Land operations in all the other domains. Both IDM Cyberspace Defense intelligence and communications func- Cyber Air tions must be more closely integrated Cyberspace Cyberspace Provide Freedom OPE ISR JFC with cyberspace operations than opera- of Maneuver Mission Cyberspace tions in the physical domains; however, it in Cyberspace Objectives Attack is important to maintain the distinction DODIN DCO- Space Maritime Ops RA between supporting activities and the National Mission Teams operations themselves. Supported by all-source intelligence, information technology, and routine communications activities Missions and Objectives and assessment, readily accommodates officer ranks. DOD must rapidly bring Building on these four axioms, we can cyberspace targeting. the same emphasis to cyberspace officer now describe cyberspace operations Axiom #3. We have a pressing need career development. Cyberspace, like the in terms of intent, mission categories, to develop cyberspace operators who are other domains, requires officers who are and actions. In anticipation of at least a credible and effective in the J3 (opera- developed across their careers in a way few fighter pilots and infantry officers tions) and J5 (strategic plans and policy) that positions them to lead at senior levels reading this, it has been necessary to within both the Joint Staff and combat- in both command and staff. Cyberspace include a picture that will serve as a ant commands. For emphasis, that is the officers should spend their first 10 years reference for the discussion. The test J3 and J5, not just the J2 (intelligence) becoming tactically proficient in all as- at the end is being able to define the and J6 (command, control, communica- pects of cyberspace operations, complete terms and articulate the interrelation- tions, and computers systems), and at all Service and joint military education, serve ships depicted in figure 1 to indicate the of the combatant commands, not only on joint staffs, command in their areas minimal level of understanding neces- USCYBERCOM. Despite the technically of operational specialties, and do all the sary for commanders and their staffs to complex nature of cyberspace and the other things necessary to produce general plan and execute cyberspace operations. potential for increasing levels of machine- and flag officers whose native domain is The two cyberspace objectives rel- to-machine interaction, success will cyberspace. evant to the JFC are providing freedom always rely on the leadership and techni- Axiom #4. Words matter. Routine of maneuver in cyberspace and project- cal skills of Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and misuse of the word cyber is one reason we ing power in and through cyberspace to Airmen. Joint staffs consist of what we do not have a common framework for achieve campaign objectives. There are typically think of as operators, members discussing cyberspace operations. Cyber is three categories of cyberspace missions of the combat arms who are educated, neither a verb nor a noun that can stand for attaining these two objectives: trained, and experienced in operations. on its own. Saying “cyber” should not DOD information network opera- Cyberspace expertise usually comes from automatically connote offensive opera- •• tions (DODIN Ops) people with intelligence, communica- tions. Additionally, questions such as “Is defensive cyberspace operations tions, or cryptology backgrounds—career cyber intel?” or “Is cyber comm?” are •• (DCO) fields typically categorized as support counterproductive as they encourage offensive cyberspace operations forces. If we are going to treat operations legacy stovepiped views of cyberspace •• (OCO). in cyberspace like operations in the other operations. Cyber is most useful as part of domains, the Services must commit to the compound word cyberspace, and cy- Cyberspace forces execute four ac- unique career fields for cyberspace. There berspace is simply the manmade domain tions to create the necessary effects in the has been a focus on providing highly and information environment we create domain: trained, technically skilled personnel who when we connect together all computers, cyberspace defense come mostly from the enlisted or warrant wires, switches, routers, wireless devices, ••
14 Forum / JFC Guide to Cyberspace Operations JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 •• cyberspace operational preparation of their security measures are not focused DOD’s Joint Information Environment the environment (OPE) on a specific threat. Instead, our security (JIE). Making JIE a reality soon is critical •• cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, baseline seeks to mitigate known vulner- to providing defensible cyberspace, but and reconnaissance (ISR) abilities from a broad range of threats. no matter how much we improve techni- •• cyberspace attack. For the same reason people lock their cally, leadership awareness and command car doors regardless of where they park accountability will remain essential to DODIN Ops Mission or the fact that we check identification at cyberspace security. Commanders need to Providing freedom of maneuver in the gate, it is prudent to establish a level treat the DODIN like the weapon system cyberspace must be the JFC’s top of security to defend our information it is and hold both users and network op- cyberspace priority because of the reli- environment against a general category erations personnel accountable for their ance on cyberspace for command and of malicious cyberspace activity to include actions. The constantly changing nature control across the joint force. Effec- insider threats. A useful byproduct of of the domain, the low price of entry for tive C2 allows the commander to get establishing strong baseline security is malicious actors, and the large potential information, move information, and that it makes the cyberspace terrain a hard payoff for cybercriminals, hacktivists, use information to make better deci- target and encourages adversaries to go or nation-states means that we must do sions faster than the enemy, which is after softer ones. more than make passwords 15 charac- an advantage we cannot give up and A key tenet of DODIN Ops is to pro- ters long. Commanders must prioritize cannot achieve without assured access vide a consistent level of security across resources to achieve the highest possible to cyberspace. It must be acknowledged all components of the DODIN. This is compliance with IT security directives. that cyberspace will always be a con- important for three reasons. First, the Doing so sets the first line of defense in tested domain, and it is unlikely we will nature of cyberspace, as currently archi- a layered cyberspace defense strategy. ever have continuous or uncontested tected, means that a risk shared by one is Unfortunately, even perfect DODIN cyberspace superiority; however, in the a risk shared by all. Just as a single neg- Ops execution is not sufficient to provide same way we approach operations in the ligent sentry puts an entire base at risk, freedom of maneuver in cyberspace. other domains, we must have sufficient a single careless user or system admin- Defensive cyberspace operations are re- control of cyberspace at the time and istrator introduces risk to an otherwise quired to engage and defeat the full range place we need it. We provide the req- secure network. Second, the majority of of cyberspace threats. uisite level of freedom of maneuver in malicious activity in the DODIN can be cyberspace through the mission catego- mitigated with currently available tech- DCO Mission ries of DODIN Ops and DCO. niques since the vast majority of adversary Defensive cyberspace operations are DODIN Ops include designing, exploitation utilizes known vulnerabili- passive and active cyberspace defense building, configuring, securing, operat- ties. The vulnerabilities are not corrected activities that allow us to outmaneuver ing, maintaining, and sustaining the for a variety of reasons to include lack an adversary. The ultimate goal of information environment that we rely of resources (time, people, money), DCO is to change the current paradigm on for operations. DODIN Ops should inadequate leadership emphasis, hubris where the attacker enjoys significant be done in a proactive manner and (“We are really good, no one can get into advantage. DCO provide the ability to include actions focused on information our network”), or simple ignorance of discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate technology (IT) consisting of hardware the security requirements. Third, strong threats, to include insider threats. As and software, data, individual users, and security compliance allows us to focus our opposed to DODIN Ops, we should system administrators. Examples include efforts on the most sophisticated threats. think of DCO as mission focused and correcting known IT vulnerabilities, All too often our most capable people threat specific. They are mission focused encrypting data, and ensuring user and spend the majority of their time dealing because they are prioritized against administrator training and compliance. with serious compromises that could key cyber terrain to ensure data move It is useful to think of DODIN Ops as have been prevented with basic security securely across the information environ- being “network” focused and threat compliance. ment. They are threat specific because agnostic. They are network focused in Even perfectly executed, the security they are executed against specific threats that they approach security from the provided through DODIN Ops is not with malicious capability and intent to perspective of IT in the operational sufficient alone to defend our informa- affect our key cyber terrain. The first configuration. Traditionally, DODIN tion environment. Until we substantially step in directing the DCO mission is Ops have not emphasized the security evolve the architecture, a variety of tech- having the commander identify the key of data at rest or in motion within or nical and policy challenges will continue cyber terrain. For example, if missile across the information environment, even to inhibit our ability to evaluate, report, defense is a priority then perhaps the though it is the integrity and security of and correct compliance deficiencies. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) the data that matter most to the com- Efforts are under way to address these is key cyber terrain. Step two in this mander. They are threat agnostic in that technical challenges specifically with example is technically enumerating the
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Williams 15 key cyber terrain from sensor to shooter. we must create capacity and diversity in (NMTs), which are trained to the high- Essential elements of the key cyber DCO-IDM forces. Most of the current est technical standards. They operate in terrain for BMDS include the various capability exists at the global level, and accordance with all the legal and policy sensors that collect launch data and the there are a variety of technical and policy guidance impacting operations outside networks and systems that move that limitations that degrade effectiveness. friendly cyberspace. NMT success relies data to a variety of command centers Effective DCO-IDM requires forces that on timely intelligence, information- for attack assessment. From there, the can operate at all levels in the DODIN in sharing, shared situational awareness, data must move quickly and securely a coordinated fashion. USCYBERCOM and close synchronization with the CPTs to direct an appropriate response. One has defined the need for Cyber executing the DCO-IDM mission. rapidly determines there are many Protection Teams (CPT) to conduct the systems involved, all with their own vul- DCO-IDM mission. CPTs are training The JFC Integrated Approach nerabilities along with additional vulner- to a high technical standard, and their As with any military operation, actions abilities at the points where one system capabilities include analyzing key cyber along a single line of effort rarely connects to another. There are more terrain, hunting on friendly cyber terrain, accomplish the commander’s scheme vulnerabilities than we can address, and and emulating threats to test defenses. of maneuver, and the same holds true therefore we must prioritize our efforts The essential task for DCO-RA is in cyberspace. To provide freedom against adversaries with specific capabil- to “kill the archer.” We catch arrows of maneuver in cyberspace, we must ity and intent to interfere with our key with DODIN Ops and DCO-IDM. optimize the employment of forces cyber terrain. DCO-RA, however, is about going after across DODIN Ops, DCO-IDM, and By linking vulnerabilities with ad- the shooter. We do not defend an airfield DCO-RA. One way to think about this versary capability and intent, we have solely with hardened shelters, surface- employment construct is to envision identified the primary risk areas on which to-air missiles, and fighters overhead. By a lever that controls each of the three to focus our defensive efforts. Defending analogy, we should not expect to defend mission areas. There are constraints, BMDS or any other key cyber terrain our information environment with restraints, costs, benefits, and risks involves both subcategories of DCO: DODIN Ops and DCO-IDM alone. In associated with moving the levers up internal defensive measures (IDM) and the same way we go into enemy airspace or down, and there are impacts across response action (RA). IDM are those to shoot down airplanes, crater a runway, all three mission areas when any single actions we take internally to friendly or destroy a C2 facility, the commander lever is moved. Commanders must cyberspace, and RA is taken outside our needs options to conduct DCO-RA achieve a balance that satisfies their information environment to stop or block outside friendly network space to stop the mission objectives at an acceptable level the attack. attack before it reaches our key cyber ter- of risk. Figure 2 is a visual depiction of The essential tasks for DCO-IDM rain. The forces tasked with the DCO-RA this concept. are hunting on friendly cyber terrain mission under the USCYBERCOM The lever on the left represents for threats that evade our security and model are the National Mission Teams DODIN Ops and is set at the baseline directing appropriate internal responses. There are several key requirements for effective DCO-IDM. First, there must Figure 2. Providing Freedom of Maneuver in Cyberspace be sufficient personnel specifically trained to operate on the individual systems and components that make up the key cyber terrain. Second, we must have timely in- telligence and information-sharing as well as shared situational awareness to direct the actions of the hunt mission; simply wandering the network looking for things that do not “look right” is not going DOD Information Global Defensive Cyberspace Defensive Cyberspace to work. Third, we have to evolve how Networks Operations Operations–Internal Operations–Response we think about authorities to operate Defensive Measures Actions on friendly cyberspace. In any example Limits Limits Limits of key cyber terrain, there will be mul- • Command and control agility • Identify key cyber terrain • Policy tiple network authorities and program • Operational exibility • Link vulnerabilities to threat • Rules of engagement managers. Ultimately, the appropriate • Capability and capacity • Authority • Authorities ------commander must have the authority to • Intelligence direct DCO forces to operate across the • Access entirety of the key cyber terrain. Finally, • Capability
16 Forum / JFC Guide to Cyberspace Operations JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 security level. Moving the lever up “hard- support to understand how the target the DCO-RA mission is critical for intel- ens” the environment through actions system operates, access to the target, ligence purposes. The DCO-RA forces such as restricting access to and from the and the capability to impact the target to operating in adversary space provide DODIN, isolating high-risk applications generate the desired effect. Cyberspace critical information regarding attribution; or services, and rerouting traffic to en- targeting is complicated by the rapidly adversary tactics, techniques, and proce- able more effective sensor coverage. We changing nature of the target systems, the dures; and exposing capabilities not yet should carefully consider moving this extensive target development required to deployed. Such intelligence information lever up since network hardening tends achieve a weaponized solution, and our is critical for executing DODIN Ops and to reduce C2 agility and operational nascent ability to describe both desirable DCO-IDM. Our BMDS defense example flexibility. and undesirable effects for cyberspace shows that providing freedom of maneu- The center lever represents DCO- operations. Integrating cyberspace ver in cyberspace requires a coordinated, IDM and is the linchpin to providing targeting within the existing construct synchronized, integrated planning and freedom of maneuver in cyberspace. of joint targeting and the creation of a execution process across all three mis- Hunt operations and key cyber terrain Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual for sions. Key to success is that all forces are analysis enable both the DODIN Ops cyberspace capabilities are major steps in trained to the same high standard and and DCO-RA missions as long as there the right direction. that they have access to the same intelli- is effective information-sharing and Here is a simple example of how gence. We cannot treat DODIN Ops and maneuver synchronization. We would this operational approach provides a DCO-IDM as maintenance activities with like to push the DCO-IDM lever all the response to a malicious cyber event. no need for highly skilled personnel or way up, but there are significant limits. Assume we have intelligence indicators sensitive intelligence information. For instance, it could be challenging just that an adversary is going to launch a to get the commander’s staff to identify cyber attack against a key C2 system, and Cyberspace Integration key C2 requirements by operational we have identified 100 compromised Turning now to the right side of figure phase. As described above, the process servers around the world that will host 1, we can discuss integration of cyber- of technically enumerating the key cyber malware for the attack. Working from space operations with operations in the terrain and its associated vulnerabilities is left to right across our levers, we would physical domains to achieve JFC cam- a large technical challenge. Correlating determine if moving the DODIN Ops paign objectives. The best way to inte- enemy capability and intent with known lever would allow hardening actions that grate cyberspace operations is to use the vulnerabilities is another level of complex- would reduce our attack surface with ac- commander’s existing JOPP. Experience ity. Manning, training, and equipping ceptable operational impact. We would at USCYBERCOM suggests that stan- sufficient teams is a major hurdle. Finally, then task our DCO-IDM forces to focus dard doctrinal planning and execution there are myriad authorities’ issues on the highest risks on the key cyber processes work for cyberspace opera- involved when working across multiple terrain. It is unlikely that we would have tions. Existing boards, bureaus, cells, networks, systems, applications, and sufficient forces to cover all the key cyber and working groups that do mission services. terrain, so we would request additional analysis, course of action development, The third lever is DCO-RA, which support through the normal Request for center of gravity determination, col- we would also like to push all the way to Forces process. Next we would examine lection management, targeting (both the top, but we have to account for two DCO-RA options to determine if there deliberate and dynamic), and assess- categories of limitations that are exactly are any preauthorized, preplanned actions ment all require little if any adaptation analogous to operating in the physical that could be taken to block the attack. to account for cyberspace operations. domains outside of friendly space. The We would have to first verify that planned Of course, personnel with appropriate first limits are the constraints of policy, actions had not been rendered ineffective cyberspace operations experience must rules of engagement (ROEs), and au- due to changes in the targeted networks. be integrated into the commander’s thority for execution. We are challenged Then we would need to confirm that joint staff in the same way the staff has by the fact that these constraints are con- existing ROEs and authorities were the requisite mix of officers with land, stantly evolving as both the domain and sufficient for the commander to order maritime, air, and space experience. our understanding of the domain change. execution. If not, the commander could Additionally, trained and ready cyber- Adding to this challenge, many of our se- request the necessary additional authority space forces must be made available, nior leaders have a limited understanding to engage the enemy. If the ROEs were and there must be an effective C2 struc- of cyberspace operations, and that lack of not expanded, we would potentially have ture with associated processes supported understanding can lead to risk aversion to harden the network and/or redirect by the right information environment or unhelpful focus on tactical issues. The DCO-IDM capability and accept risk in and effective knowledge management second set of limits describes the same other portions of the key cyber terrain. tools. restraints associated with any target. It is important to note that even without A complete C2 discussion is beyond The planner has to have the intelligence authorization to stop or block the attack, the scope of this article, but a key element
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Williams 17 Sailors conduct duties at U.S. Fleet Cyber Command Maritime Operations Center, Fort Meade, Maryland (DOD) for success is the designation of a joint future engagements these operations will all three mission areas—DODIN Ops, force cyberspace component commander increasingly provide opportunity for sig- DCO, and OCO—and then profes- (JFCCC) who operates at the same op- nificant impact throughout the campaign. sionally developed as joint warfighters. erational planning and execution level as Worth noting is that the JFCCC and as- Until we develop such officers, we will the functional component commanders sociated cyberspace forces operate during continue to rely on members of the for the land, maritime, and air domains. both steady state and crisis similar to a traditional combat arms to learn enough The JFCCC will direct DODIN Ops and theater special operations command and about cyberspace to integrate cyberspace DCO to provide freedom of maneuver in that the USCYBERCOM commander operations into the planning and execu- cyberspace and will direct offensive cyber- has combatant command responsibility tion process they already understand. The space operations (OCO) to project power for those forces (similar to U.S. Special second challenge is the level of security in and through cyberspace. The JFCCC Operations Command) in order to glob- we have attached to many cyberspace will work with the other component ally synchronize and integrate activities in operations. High levels of security com- commanders to establish supported and cyberspace. partmentalization can inhibit integrated supporting roles throughout all phases This description is not meant to planning and execution, and this dynamic of the operation. Those familiar with oversimplify the process of integrating is not unique to cyberspace. The third OCO in the context of recent conflicts cyberspace operations into JFC planning challenge is authorities. One could argue may infer that the greatest utility lies in and execution, and admittedly there that it is more likely to receive an execute Phase 0 and I to support shaping opera- are three major challenges that make order authorizing kinetic action that tions, information operations, military this difficult. First and foremost, the could result in death and destruction deception, and preparation of the envi- JFC does not have access to cyberspace than it is to expect a JFC to be delegated ronment. OCO will continue to play a operators—officers who are trained from authority to conduct DCO-RA or key role in these early phases; however, in commissioning at the tactical level in OCO. Hesitancy to delegate authority
18 Forum / JFC Guide to Cyberspace Operations JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 for cyberspace operations is a reflection cyberspace attack is not conducted only a starting point to explain and teach of our limited shared understanding of for offensive purposes. cyberspace operations. This article is cyberspace and in some cases erroneous Cyberspace defense actions are con- focused on cyberspace operations in preconceived notions about the domain. ducted by the commander with authority support of the commander, but there is For actions in the physical domains, over the information environment to a broader implication as well. We have we are comfortable with issues of sov- protect, detect, characterize, counter, a requirement to determine how cyber- ereignty, probability of kill, anticipated and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities. space impacts national security policy, collateral damage, and fratricide. Because Cyberspace ISR is normally authorized grand strategy, and conflict theory; we cannot articulate these same consid- under military authorities and conducted force development including personnel erations for cyberspace in nontechnical, to provide critical operational infor- recruiting, development, and retention; easily understood terms, the authority mation to support follow-on actions. all aspects of resourcing from joint capa- for execution is typically held at a level Cyberspace OPE consists of nonintel- bilities development to programming, above the JFC. One way to address this ligence actions that set the stage for budgeting, execution, and defense challenge is to use the standard target val- follow-on operations. Finally, cyberspace acquisition; military support to entities idation and vetting process for cyberspace attack counters the adversary’s ability to outside of DOD; and force structure targets. This would force us to address all achieve objectives through degradation, across the Active and Reserve compo- of the normal targeting issues to include disruption, or destruction of infrastruc- nents. In these and other endeavors, we intelligence gain/loss, operations gain/ ture and/or capabilities. Cyberspace should fight the temptation to invent loss, and, unique to cyberspace opera- attack can also manipulate data in a way new and unique ways of doing business. tions, technical gain/loss where we have that impacts the adversary’s information Instead we should start with the existing to evaluate the risk of exposing a particu- systems. It is important to recognize that processes and make appropriate adjust- lar capability because that exposure may cyberspace attack, like all forms of attack, ments to account for the unique nature put an unrelated operation in jeopardy. is designed to generate effects in the of cyberspace. Rarely should cyberspace Once we develop the same disciplined physical domains. The desired effect may operations require senior leaders to planning approach and precision attack be as simple as creating uncertainty in the adopt a completely new frame of refer- capabilities for conducting DCO-RA and opponent’s decision calculus, or we may ence regardless of the decision at hand. OCO that we have developed for pros- seek a destructive effect that in the past The military departments play a key ecuting targets in the physical domains, could only have been possible with ki- role in defending our national security the JFC will get execution authority. netic action. Understanding these actions interests, and when the military is called To sum up the bottom right side of and their relationships to the missions into action, we rely on commanders to figure 1, cyberspace operations at the of DODIN Ops, DCO, and OCO is lead our forces. Today’s commanders operational level of war can and should foundational to understanding cyberspace must be prepared to defend the Nation be treated like operations in the other operations. In the same way that JFCs in all domains including cyberspace. They domains. We do not need to invent new understands how offensive counterair cannot do so without trained and ready planning and execution processes; we just contributes to air superiority and antisub- forces, situational awareness of cyber- need to conduct cyberspace operations marine warfare contributes to maritime space, effective command and control, with the same disciplined approach as all superiority, they must understand how defensible architecture, appropriate del- other joint operations and provide com- cyberspace defense, ISR, OPE, and attack egation of authority for execution, and an manders with the relevant considerations contribute to providing friendly freedom operational approach to tie it all together. in familiar, understandable terms. of maneuver in cyberspace. The operational approach described here provides a starting point for commanders Cyberspace Actions Final Thoughts to integrate cyberspace operations within To frame the employment of forces The intent of this article is not to the joint doctrinal framework employed in the cyber domain, we finish with a oversimplify or dismiss the complexity every day to accomplish their assigned description of the four actions listed of operating in cyberspace. Instead it missions. JFQ in the center of figure 1: cyberspace is to advocate for making cyberspace defense, cyberspace ISR, cyberspace operations part of the powerful synergy OPE, and cyberspace attack. These we currently create with joint force actions are conducted by the JFC to operations. Cyberspace is difficult to execute DODIN Ops, DCO, and OCO visualize. We cannot create a two- missions. It is important not to conflate dimensional Big Ass Map that we can the missions with the actions. In other all sit around to discuss operations. At words, the action of cyberspace defense the same time, there is a huge, largely is not associated only with providing unacknowledged benefit in that we can freedom of maneuver in cyberspace, and use existing concepts and language as
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Williams 19 Airmen conduct cyber operations at Joint Base San Antonio–Lackland in support of command and control and network operations (U.S. Air Force/William Belcher)
Achieving Accountability in Cyberspace Revolution or Evolution?
By John N.T. Shanahan
onsider three scenarios, all based working in an operations-intelligence cell best imagery available is on an unclassi- on actual incidents, and consider on an aircraft carrier that is part of a U.S. fied Web site. Due to the urgency of the C how violations in cyberspace have Central Command (USCENTCOM) situation, the Sailor disregards standard effects far beyond the actual incidents. carrier strike group (CSG) is tasked to operating procedures for transferring Cross-domain Violation. During a provide satellite imagery of a new base of data between networks and downloads crisis in the Arabian Gulf, a young Sailor operations used by the Iranian navy. The the image to an unclassified thumb drive and inserts the thumb drive into a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) USB port to transfer the im- Major General John N.T. Shanahan, USAF, is Commander of the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency at Joint Base San Antonio–Lackland, Texas. His previous assignment was agery in preparation for a briefing to the to the Pentagon as the J39 Deputy Director for Global Operations, Operations Directorate, Joint Staff. commander. Unfortunately, the thumb
20 Forum / Achieving Accountability in Cyberspace JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 drive is infected with treacherous malware, major economic advantage in future than simply enhancing information as- which is subsequently transferred to the business negotiations, but also giving surance, improving automated defense ship’s classified and unclassified networks the offending state a decade’s head start tools, and creating more policies and pro- through this cross-domain violation. in designing an indigenous system and cedures to deter substandard practices. Within hours, the malware propagates allowing it to build countermeasures There is a compelling need to establish throughout both networks and begins against the U.S. system. meaningful accountability for actions or to beacon to a site known for its state- inaction affecting cyberspace operations. sponsored cyberspace espionage activities. Cascading Effects Establishing accountability for activities in There is no choice but to shut down both In all three vignettes, actions in and through cyberspace is now at least as the unclassified and the secret networks on cyberspace led to cascading effects important as attribution when striving to the carrier, isolating it from the rest of the and debilitating consequences in mul- prevent or punish bad behavior whether CSG and from higher headquarters ashore tiple domains beyond cyberspace and that behavior is a result of friendly or and leading to disastrous consequences for affected operational readiness. A root adversary actions. ongoing operations. cause analysis aimed at identifying the When dealing with our own person- Network Protection Shortfalls. At a origin of the consequences quickly leads nel and organizations, providing explicit major Air Force installation in the United to hard questions about the fundamen- accountability guidelines is necessary to States, communications personnel in a tal issue of accountability. In the first assure the confidentiality, integrity, and tenant unit, whose primary unclassified case, should the CSG commander be availability of “blue” cyberspace. We operating network is neither owned nor held responsible? What about the Sail- have not fully developed or implemented operated by the installation host com- or’s supervisors at every layer through- key tenets of cyberspace accountability mander, fail to load a patch directed in a out his chain of command? And what throughout U.S. military operations tasking order that is designed to close a happens to the individual who brought even though we are beginning to grasp significant vulnerability in the unit’s net- an unclassified thumb drive into secure the magnitude of what happens when work. A rogue cyberspace actor discovers spaces on the ship? In the second case, we ignore it or treat it lightly. If we ac- and takes advantage of the well-known what should happen to the tenant unit cept the proposition that our military’s vulnerability using a socially engineered commander? Should the host installa- approach to cyberspace accountability spear phishing email to inject malware tion commander be held accountable is inadequate, yet reject the canard that throughout the network. Consequently, for the tenant unit’s mistake? What achieving accountability in cyberspace is a the entire network must be shut down for about the host installation’s commu- fool’s errand, the next logical question is 2 weeks to clean up the infection, with nications squadron commander? In what it will take to fix the problem. major consequences for deployed person- the third scenario, should the CDC be Because of the ubiquity of cyberspace, nel who rely extensively on the combat barred from future business with the exceptionally low barriers to entry, ease of weather data provided by the tenant Department of Defense (DOD) or the use, dizzying rate of change, and inherent organization. U.S. Government? Should it be forced complexity in both the interconnection Cleared Defense Contractor (CDC) to clean and protect its network before of multiple systems and the internal func- Shortcomings. A small CDC in San it is allowed to continue operations? tioning of individual systems, no single Diego that designs and builds critical These represent only a sample of revolutionary action, policy, procedure, components of a major weapons system the questions that must be answered to or pronouncement will fix our problem fails to adequately protect its unclas- establish responsibility and mete out pun- of accountability in cyberspace. However, sified proprietary network. A known ishment. To help provide the framework we know from our experiences in other nation-state actor gains access to the required to identify the right questions disciplines that certain fundamental company’s network and begins to exfil- and responses, it is useful to examine conditions are necessary to enable a true trate megabytes of data. The National three disciplines that are already associ- and enduring culture of accountability. Security Agency (NSA) teams up with ated with longstanding robust cultures of We do not need to create these elements the Federal Bureau of Investigation accountability: nuclear operations, avia- from scratch in cyberspace. Instead we (FBI) and Department of Homeland tion mishap investigations, and, as simple need a rapid, evolutionary transforma- Security (DHS) to detect and identify as it may sound, driving a car. tion of current activities that focuses on the perpetrators, but the company does Our adversaries and potential fostering and maturing the culture of not take the necessary steps to clean and adversaries—nation-states, nonstate ac- accountability that is based on education safeguard its network even after notifying tors, criminals, hacktivists, and insider and training (and begins the moment the CDC of the ongoing attack. Within threats—are moving ever faster along the one enters the military); establishment of a month the company loses almost all the cyberspace continuum from exploitation clear chains of custody for all networks information on its network relating to the to disruption to destruction. To counter and systems; establishment of defined sensitive weapons system components, the dangers we face in cyberspace today processes and procedures, as well as not only providing the nation-state a requires a more comprehensive approach explicit guidance on acceptable behavior;
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Shanahan 21 advanced methods for controlling ac- military personnel are allowed access to The Social Compact of Trust cess; and a standardized joint process for nuclear command and control or to the In addition to activities undertaken to “cyberspace mishap investigations” that weapons themselves. To receive such ac- ensure safety in nuclear operations, an parallels the process used so successfully cess requires undergoing a psychological approach similar to that used in military in military aviation safety over the past 30 and medical vetting process known as aviation safety over the past 50 years, years. The final and in many ways most the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), especially since the early 1980s when important ingredient in the accountabil- which remains in place as long as an Class A incident rates began to decrease ity soup is enforcement as a commander’s individual maintains access to the nuclear dramatically after an alarming spike in program, as there is a direct and crucial enterprise. PRP involves multiple levels the 1960s and 1970s, can be particu- link between accountability in cyberspace and layers of compartmentalization to larly useful for cyberspace operations. and operational readiness. ensure that only a tiny number of people Serious aircraft mishaps are normally There are useful analogies between are granted access to the entire nuclear followed by two related but distinct military nuclear weapons operations and decisionmaking ecosystem. There are safety investigations, each only 30 days cyberspace operations, and safety, more many technical safeguards throughout long. The first is a safety investigation than any other attribute, exemplifies the nuclear command and control com- board (SIB). It focuses on identifying the concept of accountability in nuclear munications process and with the nuclear and correcting the root causes of a operations. The remarkable safety record weapons themselves to prevent accidental mishap and relies on a candid exchange accumulated over the past 60 years in or unauthorized actions. The strategic of information. This offers the equiva- Navy and Air Force nuclear activities has consequences of one mistake can be lent of immunity from punishment for been directly attributable to an uncom- enormous, so accountability must always admitting to failing to follow proce- promising approach to safety as well as remain at the heart of all nuclear opera- dures or breaking rules in return for unflinching scrutiny of mistakes, adop- tions. Accountability is the sine qua non providing privileged information (which tion of lessons learned, and enforcement of nuclear operations. is never released to the public) deemed actions. Honest mistakes are evaluated On the other hand, cyberspace is crucial to avoiding future similar and corrected, and recommendations ubiquitous. It was designed that way mishaps. The second, an accident inves- for improvement are applied quickly and from its inception, and it is exceedingly tigation board (AIB), is used inter alia consistently throughout the Services unlikely that we will ever turn back the to determine culpability and account- to prevent similar future mishaps. clock with respect to access. In fact, the ability throughout every level of the Intentional negligence or inattention to opposite is far more likely: as cyberspace chain of command, potentially leading detail, on the other hand, is punished is integrated more and more into every- up to loss of aviation rating and even swiftly and unmercifully. To paraphrase thing we do, it is entirely possible that we nonjudicial punishment. Applying the one old-school Air Force general, when will even stop thinking of it as a unique same level of formality and discipline it came to punishing mistakes in nuclear “thing.” Our dependence on cyberspace inherent in aviation safety investigations operations, firing the responsible com- is increasing exponentially every year. It to serious cyberspace mishaps will be mander would be accompanied by the is now an unassailable proposition that it instrumental in enhancing cyberspace admonition, “I don’t know if you are just will always be available, be as secure as the accountability. unlucky or a bad leader, but I can’t afford situation demands, allow nearly instan- Likewise, trust and confidence are to waste any more time finding out.” taneous communication, and be crucial important to cyberspace accountabil- Yet the differences between nuclear to carrying out the quotidian functions ity. Driving 50 mph down Arlington and cyberspace operations are stark of every household, business, academic Boulevard, one can be less than 2 feet enough to suggest that the solution to institution, military organization, and away from traffic approaching in the op- cyberspace accountability lies in a hybrid so much more (though the military posite lane at 50 mph. One small mistake approach that not only includes some must continue to train and exercise to would result in a 100 mph collision. Why aspects of the nuclear enterprise but also the worst-case scenario—a “day/week/ is it we do not drive in perpetual fear of recognizes that the unique nature of the month without cyberspace”). collision with our hands clutching the environment demands other less narrow While the specific physical, admin- wheel in a death grip and our eyes locked solutions. Nuclear operations are special, istrative, and technical controls used in firmly on the road? We trust that the with access restrictions throughout every nuclear operations may not be directly driver in the other vehicle will not veer aspect of operations. We would not want transferrable to operations that depend into us. We trust that his lifelong com- it any other way and we cannot afford on maximizing access to cyberspace, the bination of training and experience has to have it any other way. In this country, combined application of all three types rendered him as interested in and capable every decision involving employment of controls and the rigid enforcement of avoiding us as we are of avoiding him. of a nuclear weapon emanates from one of compliance with those controls offer The probability that he will veer into us is person: the President. In relative terms, insights into the critical elements of a never zero, but it is so low that we essen- only a very small percentage of U.S. cyberspace accountability culture. tially disregard this danger when we drive.
22 Forum / Achieving Accountability in Cyberspace JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Students answer questions during Joint Cyber Analysis Course at Center for Information Dominance (U.S. Navy/Jessica Gaukel)
This mutual trust on the road rests individual or organizational activities in means protection training should begin on two pillars. The first revolves around cyberspace. literally in elementary school and receive minimum standards and the certification First and foremost, we must educate an appropriate emphasis throughout process that bestowed driver’s licenses and train. The ubiquity of cyberspace is one’s entire career to include all military on both drivers, plus the benefits accrued not an excuse for failing to emphasize the professional schools (such as Service by years of experience on the road. The importance of basic cyberspace protec- academies), Service and joint professional second is constructed around a shared tion at every opportunity; to the contrary, developmental education, and techni- understanding of accountability along cyberspace’s ubiquity demands lifelong cal training. Unfortunately, there are with confidence in the consequences of attention to norms of behavior. Within hundreds of real-world case studies to failure to abide by the rules of the road the Air Force, the Nuclear Weapons help drive home the costs and risks of bad ranging from pecuniary penalties, to Surety Program ensures that personnel cyberspace practices in our education and insurance rate increases, to loss of one’s are trained and certified on specified training courses. Despite substantial dif- driver’s license, to causing major damage functional tasks whenever they hold ferences between nuclear and cyberspace to one’s vehicle, and on up to jail time positions that could affect nuclear opera- operations, when it comes to developing and even death. We need to engender tions. It includes initial nuclear surety a culture of accountability the nuclear similar trust and confidence in cyberspace training as well as recurring training for as analogy reigns supreme and should be to drive the kind of self-interested com- long as they perform such duties. In the viewed as the gold standard when devis- pliance that allows us to operate without Navy, the principles inculcated into every ing cyberspace protection training at fear. But how? nuclear propulsion operator are designed every level. In recognition of the prominence of to provide protection through proper Next, we should establish an explicit safety and trust, while also borrowing operations (the nuclear propulsion prin- chain of custody for every network at critical tenets from the U.S. military ciples are integrity, level of knowledge, every installation and facility throughout nuclear enterprise, we must focus on five procedural compliance, forceful backup, the military (and associated CDCs). critical areas to develop and inculcate questioning attitude, and formality). There cannot be any ambiguity regard- the proper degree of accountability for Applying similar standards to cyberspace ing who is ultimately responsible for
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Shanahan 23 every system and every network on any controls, boundary-layer controls, better process. The other action that must given installation. As a wing commander forensics, and trustworthy computing overlay all of those activities is enforce- of a major Air Force installation, I did platforms—is crucial. While one of the ment as a commander’s program, to not “own” every network on my base, principal advantages to cyberspace is include publication of the implications and more often than not I was not even the ability to share information nearly of failure to obey the rules of the road aware of what was happening with several instantly and globally, at every level of in cyberspace and a demonstrated com- major networks and associated systems classification, and with one person or mitment to adhere to it. The command- that were owned and operated by tenant millions, there is no “unalienable right” er’s program for cybersecurity should units. While I was partly to blame for this to unfettered access to all systems and all receive the same emphasis as safety, to lack of awareness (because I never asked information. As the U.S. Government include a requirement that command- all the right questions), the fact that there learned the hard way in the Private ers at all levels continuously highlight were so many different systems under Bradley Manning WikiLeaks incident, in “cyberspace protection” and “cyber- different ownership is symptomatic of the certain cases access to cyberspace must be space safety” while also incorporating chaotic network environment that exists treated as a privilege, not a right. History cyber security into all training, exercise, across DOD today (entropy would be an teaches that regardless of the domain and inspection programs. Discussing it understatement). This is precisely why involved, the “insider threat” remains during periodic safety “down days” is senior leaders are advocating forcefully the greatest danger. That is even truer in important but hardly sufficient. On one for the Joint Information Environment cyberspace, demanding innovative ways hand, we should not expect a “zero- (JIE), which will eventually collapse to minimize the damage caused by the mistake” cyberspace force. Indeed, it thousands of DOD enclaves into a more Private Mannings of the world. We must is even more unrealistic to demand a defensible, secure, and standardized recognize that—analogous to the history zero-mishap culture in cyberspace than architecture that will simplify worldwide of highway safety—the fault does not al- it is in any other domain. On the other cyberspace operations and improve the ways lie solely with the operator. We need hand, there are substantial differences ability to establish accountability. This is systems engineered to be used responsi- between acts of omission and acts of also a crucial step toward changing how bly by people with a reasonable amount commission. The former can be amelio- we view DOD networks—that is, as mis- of training. Otherwise, we may be asking rated through a focus on training, but sion-critical warfighting platforms rather for unreasonable levels of proficiency on there can be no quarter for the latter than utilities we take for granted. the part of the operator and not enough because it can easily put entire networks Third, we should provide defined on the network administrator or software and weapons systems at risk. Still, unless processes and procedures, as well as explicit engineer. and until the consequences of failure are guidance on behavior, for cyberspace Finally, we must establish a formal stated explicitly and adhered to, there operations. The concept of “positive con- DOD-wide “cyberspace mishap” investiga- will always be room for misinterpreta- trol” in nuclear operations is applicable to tion process. We must treat network/ tion and lax enforcement of punitive cyberspace because there must be clearly system mishaps the same way we treat measures. specified standards of performance and military aviation mishaps, for instance, Along with training and certification behavior. These standards prevent inap- by establishing categories such as Type and establishing cyberspace chains of propriate interpretations or assumptions 1/2/3 cyberspace mishaps analogous to custody, explicitly specifying the conse- regarding what to do and how to act. Class A/B/C aircraft mishaps. A Type 1 quences of failure to follow the rules will While this may initially appear to impose cyberspace mishap would be defined using build the necessary level of mutual trust onerous restrictions on the use of “wide the criteria of loss of life, significant dam- and, similar to driving on our nation’s open” cyberspace (and as such are anath- age, or major impact to mission resulting roads without the steering-wheel death ema to those who are convinced that in a requirement for formal general grip, allow us to operate more safely and cyberspace should be no more restricted officer-led SIB- and AIB-like investiga- securely in cyberspace. We must also than the air we breathe), the concept of tions. Type 2 and 3 mishaps would also strengthen and enforce existing agree- positive control is reflected in the road require investigations but at lower levels ments with CDCs. While there will be signs and traffic controls we live by when and with varying degrees of reporting new financial and administrative costs driving vehicles anywhere in the world. requirements. associated with meeting more stringent Absent well-defined guidelines, there will DOD cyberspace accountability require- be too much room for misinterpretation The Commander’s Program ments, CDC chief executive officers, chief or questionable behavior by anyone who We create the foundation for account- information security officers, and chief touches cyberspace in any capacity. ability in cyberspace by training person- information officers must understand Fourth, accelerating development of nel, establishing a chain of custody, that the ultimate price for ignoring the advanced methods for controlling access to providing explicit guidance, improv- rules is debarment from future business networks or the information resident on ing our methods to control access, with the U.S. Government. While this them—such as credential-based access and developing a formal investigative will be extremely challenging politically,
24 Forum / Achieving Accountability in Cyberspace JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 it is essential in halting the egregious critical infrastructure and key resources. DHS identification of the nation-state exfiltration of sensitive information and Nation-states, for example, must be held exploitation operation. When the CDC intellectual property from CDCs across accountable for attacks they allow to subsequently refused to expend the funds the United States and globally. originate from or pass through their sov- necessary to fix its network defenses, it Fortunately, we are not starting ereign territory, even if a nonstate actor was barred from future business with the from scratch in establishing our culture or another nation is ultimately responsi- U.S. Government. of cyberspace accountability. Training ble for creating and launching the attack. programs exist for operators and users As Microsoft’s David Aucsmith puts it, Conclusion of DOD cyberspace, to include annual “We must shift our discussion of doc- The cyberspace genie cannot be put information assurance and protection trine away from attribution and towards back in the bottle. To the contrary, training. Similarly, the beginning of a accountability. People, organizations, cyberspace genies are proliferating by chain of custody already exists with the and states should have an obligation to the millions, so an evolutionary rather certification and accreditation process, assist in cyberspace investigations where than revolutionary approach to account- which requires approvals to both operate their property or jurisdiction is involved. ability is called for. The perfect cyber- and connect systems. The standards for Noncooperation should be viewed as a space defense will never exist. While the training and certification and accredi- sign of culpability.”1 Accountability must the offense-defense pendulum will con- tation process, in addition to required be linked to the concept of cyberspace tinue to swing in both directions, the security controls and a host of other pro- deterrence; that is, our political leaders advantage will reside perennially with cesses and procedures, are documented should form an explicit link between the cyberspace attacker and the inside in a large number of DOD issuances. establishing culpability for a cyberspace threat. Moreover, the wars of the future Moreover, U.S. Cyber Command and attack and the substantial costs that will will be network-enabled, and we ignore the Services regularly perform Command be imposed for disregarding formal this simple fact at our peril. In this game Cyber Readiness Inspections of military warnings. And, of course, this requires of highly complex four-dimensional organizations and CDCs, though these following up with actions to match the chess, the side that can maintain and inspections cover only a small percentage rhetoric. To do otherwise would com- control its own networks while continu- of those eligible to be inspected because pletely undermine one of the core tenets ously adapting to a chaotic, fluid infor- of a lack of capacity. JIE and similar of accountability. mation environment will gain a distinct initiatives demonstrate a commitment Implementation of the processes advantage. To develop and mature the to advancing our security technol- and procedures throughout the five necessary degree of accountability in ogy. Activities such as the Air Force’s focus areas outlined above suggests cyberspace—a domain in which, more Operational Review Board already pro- alternate endings for the three vignettes than any other save the nuclear enter- vide a framework for a cyberspace mishap that open this article. The first incident prise, one tactical misstep may have investigation process. never occurred because of the cyberspace grave strategic consequences—we must Despite these ongoing efforts, we protection training the Sailor received rely on the combination of the five still lack the culture of accountability we throughout his life and early in his Navy focus areas described here with the view aspire to, and we see the result in daily career, because the ship’s network de- that their implementation is a com- intrusions and in network exploitation. fenses prevented insertion of a thumb mander’s responsibility. Unless and until Once again, our experience from other drive into a SIPRNet computer, and commanders place and foster the neces- disciplines that have figured this out over because he knew via the commander’s sary and equal level of emphasis in all time offers a simple explanation: our intent that his commander would not five core areas within their personnel— commanders must make cyber security tolerate the violation of rules prohibiting analogous to adhering to the principles a priority. This will be reflected in the the use of the thumb drive. In the second of nuclear propulsion—the requisite results of inspections, evaluations of unit scenario, the tasking order was imple- culture of accountability in cyberspace and personnel performance, and disci- mented automatically, and even if it was will never take root. JFQ plinary action when failures warrant it. not, there were only a small handful of Similar to the accountability we seek different networks on the installation, al- to establish for our own cyberspace lowing a recently established regional JIE Note operations, these principles also apply Enterprise Operations Center to quickly 1 to development of international norms identify and patch the vulnerability David Aucsmith, “The Technology and Policy of Attribution,” in #Cyber Doc: No Bor- of behavior in cyberspace. Turning remotely. Finally, thanks to new Federal ders—No Boundaries, ed. Timothy R. Sample from the tactical and operational to the Acquisition Regulations and comprehen- and Michael S. Swetnam, 14 (Arlington, VA: strategic level, accountability is equally sive cybersecurity legislation, the CDC in Potomac Institute Press, 2012). important when considering options to the third scenario was contractually and deny objectives or impose costs against legally forced to shut down its network cyberspace attacks that threaten our within the first hour after NSA/FBI/
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Shanahan 25 Member of coalition force surveys terrain in Kabul Province, Afghanistan (U.S. Army/Matthew Freire)
Combined Effects Power
By Ervin J. Rokke, Thomas A. Drohan, and Terry C. Pierce
he information revolution con- networking can mobilize and align the accommodating the broad range of novel tinues to recast how power is power of group action with ease and power emerging in particular from the T generated and how it can be used speed. And individuals can be manipu- cyber domain. This article argues that to achieve desired outcomes. Advanced lated through the Internet to perform a modified construct for how we think technologies and novel communica- harmful acts.1 about the security challenge can enable tion tools are enabling individual and The private sector, not the military, is our military to better observe, blend, group actions to achieve truly disrup- driving this revolution. The Services are protect, and project all types of power tive effects. As recent events confirm, a understandably looking for revolutionary in the natural and cyber domains. In es- single individual operating in the cyber ways to employ these information age sence we recommend supplementing our domain can spark the stock market to technologies in warfare. The problem current emphasis on traditional kinetic lose billions of dollars, attack military is that traditional combined arms war- instruments of power with more explicit infrastructures, and seize the initia- fare (CAW) doctrine used to generate attention to desired effects. tive on key international and domestic maximum combat power in the natural political issues. Web-based social domains of land, sea, air, and space is not Background Combined arms warfare is the tradi- tional concept that modern militaries Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, USAF (Ret.), is Senior Scholar in Residence in the Center for use for maximizing combat power. It Character and Leadership at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Colonel Thomas A. Drohan, USAF, is provides a lens through which to view Permanent Professor and Head of the Department of Military and Strategic Studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Captain Terry C. Pierce, USN (Ret.), is Director of the Center for Innovation at the the security arena and opens the door U.S. Air Force Academy. to a cognitive path for determining how
26 Forum / Combined Effects Power JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Quite clearly, CAW continues to and means to desired ends. Indeed, we enjoy substantial support among senior believe the paucity of such thought is military leaders, particularly those in joint a serious shortcoming, particularly if force. In 2008, for example, General we fail to recognize that our enemies James Mattis, USMC, then-commander are increasingly comfortable operating of U.S. Joint Forces Command, issued beyond the traditional CAW concepts to guidance reaffirming the importance employ the powerful new forces emerg- of using “time honored principles” in ing, particularly in the cyber domain. joint doctrine that have been “tested in Absent such rethinking, the emerging combat” and “historically grounded in cyber forces—ours and those of poten- the fundamental nature of war.”7 He tial adversaries—remain anomalous to also made clear his strong preference for our traditional CAW concept: their a combined arms approach as opposed impacts are neither fully recognized nor to alternatives such as operational net anticipated in the context of struggle assessment, effects-based operations, among adversaries of widely varying and system-of-systems approaches for characteristics for equally disparate developing security strategy and related objectives. It is time to reexamine the force structure: “Our goal is to develop CAW with a view toward retooling it to a joint force that acts in uncertainty and more effectively exploit these emerging thrives in chaos through a common power anomalies. understanding of the essence and nature Cognitive psychologists tell us that of the problem and the purpose of the because humans are frequently unable to operation.”8 grasp complex realities in a holistic sense, We agree with General Mattis’s we craft simplifying “lenses, frameworks, thoughtful goal statement as well as or concepts” to help our understanding. with his further assertion that we need Such is the role traditionally played by operational concepts that link ends to the CAW construct. It is a crucial role policy and strategy through clear ways because it determines the extent to which best to protect national security includ- and means. We need to look no further we are able to view the breadth and depth ing economic interests.2 CAW, in sum, than America’s longest war—Operation of truly difficult problem sets; indeed, it is is the prescribed doctrinal route that the Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan—to at the very heart of achieving an accurate joint force follows in developing strate- see the impact of failing to connect and understanding of our security predica- gies and force structures. It involves fully define desired ends with appropriate ment. We acknowledge that the CAW the “full integration of arms in such a ways and means. We also believe, how- concept has worked well historically and way that to counter one form of arma- ever, that it is time to rethink a theoretical continues to be helpful for assessing ment the enemy must become more construct when empirical evidence begins kinetic power in particular. As the late vulnerable to another.”3 Its historical to mount and very different phenomena defense innovation chief Vice Admiral legacy is impressive, dating back in the emerge that the construct cannot explain Arthur Cebrowski suggested, however, Western tradition as far as the Macedo- or predict. In this regard, the CAW con- the information age has brought new nian armies in the fourth century BC. cept is increasingly unable to adequately forms of power from the cyber domain as Alexander the Great artfully combined accommodate the disruptive striking and well as nonkinetic aspects of power from phalanxes, cavalry, and dismounted resisting power of emerging noncombat the natural domains, which we believe runners in a novel way to conquer the arms. Just as Newtonian physics, devel- the traditional CAW concept cannot Persian Empire.4 In Chinese history, oped in the late 1600s, was unable to accommodate effectively. The result is a CAW was employed during the Spring explain the quantum revolution of the cognitive tension—an incomplete view of and Autumn Period from the eighth early 1900s, the CAW construct is un- power. through the fourth century BC. Over a able to appreciate the dynamics of cyber In response to this tension, we are millennium later, Carl von Clausewitz’s and social network instruments of power “wired” to introduce new concepts or On War offered a theoretical model of sufficiently, particularly the substantial ef- lenses that can proactively engage and conflict that included the basic tenets5 fects they produce nonkinetically. adaptively shape the increasingly complex of the CAW concept.6 Over time this realities we face in the security arena. In combined arms construct has acquired Reexamining CAW his discussion of the evolution of prin- nearly an immutable status as an Against this background we see a need ciples of war, Lieutenant General James unchangeable law of warfighting akin, for more critical thought about how Dubik, USA (Ret.), former commander perhaps, to Newtonian classical physics. the CAW concept can better relate ways of the Multinational Security Transition
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Rokke, Drohan, and Pierce 27 Command–Iraq, draws a parallel between profession that has traditionally relied as well as legitimate endeavors, most of the theories of a scientific revolution and on platforms and combat arms for which fall outside the CAW focus on the theories of warfare. He argues that maximizing combat power, the “reality” traditional instruments of power associ- when a substantial scientific theory faced we perceive when we look through the ated with natural domains. The Stuxnet difficulties, “the adherents of that view CAW lens at the many happenings in Cyber Worm, for example, is a powerful would treat the difficulties as anomalies.”9 cyberspace today is random and unfath- instrument, but it remains an anomaly At first they would try simply to “tweak” omably complex. The CAW lens’s focus for CAW because it is neither a platform their existing theory to explain the on traditional instruments of warfare nor a combat arm, and its effects can go anomalies. As the number of anomalies from the natural domains of land, sea, air, far beyond traditional calculations about grew, however, they were forced to craft and space ignores important parts of the destruction. Cyber attackers are success- a new theoretical construct, which altered “reality picture.” Put simply, the CAW fully compromising the network security the perceived reality to accommodate model is the wrong construct for conflicts of banks. In another example, the self- the anomalies. In sum, General Dubik that include action and reaction in the proclaimed Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber asserts, “the emergence of the informa- cyber domain (as nearly any conflict in Fighters have claimed responsibility for tion age has shifted the very foundations the future will), and it is giving us fits. several attacks against American financial of the profession of arms. . . . Clearly the institutions that have taken these cor- framework that guided decisions and ac- CAW Anomalies porations offline intermittently, costing tions in the past is just that, past.”10 In anomaly theory research, the focus millions of dollars.20 Using Dubik’s metaphor, it seems we is on discovering anomalies and under- Social Network Power. Cyber tech- are in the tweaking phase of converting standing why the current theory does nology platforms operating in cyber the challenges of operating in cyber- not explain their existence. It is only space, such as Google and Facebook, are space “into a warfighting mold shaped when we can identify such anomalies providing a powerful destructive tool to by the four older domains.”11 A recent that an opportunity exists to improve conduct Wiki War.21 The power of such literature review of the cyber domain, the relevant theory.17 Understanding social networks comes from their ability for example, offers recurring CAW how and why anomalies are emerg- to scale like spreading viruses and cre- themes: we must dominate cyberspace,12 ing is how new constructs are built. ate a rapid and direct impact on societal and we must determine how the cyber Against this background, let us look at action.22 For example, the WikiLeaks domain can be mainstreamed into the several anomalies with a view toward story of a U.S. Soldier and recent events CAW model as an operational discipline identifying ways to improve the CAW involving a National Security Agency alongside land, sea, and air warfare.13 construct’s capacity for accommodating contractor stealing and releasing hun- In fact, Navy cyber leaders argue that and exploiting the emerging forces from dreds of thousands of government digital the information technology “network the cyber domain in particular. secrets have done considerable harm to and its components (information, intel- Cyber Soft Power. Unlike the natural our nation.23 In another example, the ligence, technology, and people) have domains, the cyber domain is a man- so-called Syrian Electronic Army hacked become a combat system. In this form, made entity consisting of networked into an Associated Press Twitter feed and they suggest, the network can serve as a systems. It is, in a sense, the world’s reported a fake White House attack that platform from which to launch informa- largest ungoverned space with its own briefly wiped out $136.5 billion of the tion as a weapon.”14 Some CAW pundits medium and constantly changing rule Standard and Poor’s 500 Index value.24 even assert that operating and fighting a sets.18 Significantly, it is also shifting the Our CAW focus on ways and means network as a warfare platform will enable concentration of power—most of which (traditional arms) overlooked the critical cyber networks to join existing platforms is nonkinetic, or “soft”—from combined factor of ends (effects) and the resulting from the physical domains such as ships, arms forces to individuals.19 It generally anomalies were significant. aircraft, and infantry units and form com- does not use physical force in a coercive Virtual Reality Power. As dem- bined arms teams.15 sense, but rather tends to use networked onstrated by the Boston Marathon Such tweaking approaches are focused systems to influence and to persuade bombing, the cyber domain enables on translating the cyberspace anomalies behavior by attracting and co-opting. It is terrorists to recruit, radicalize, train, and into instruments compatible with a CAW distinctive in its capacity to enable single execute in the virtual world in a far more concept conceived for dealing with the individuals to exert uncommon soft rapid and precisely targeted manner.25 natural domains. We take strong issue power and private commercial entities to Indeed, it enables terrorists to live physi- with this approach. Ultimately, we are exert far greater influence over the do- cally in different regions of the natural convinced that it will prove inadequate to main than governmental authorities do. domain of land but to operate virtual force the anomalies of the cyber domain The resulting easy access to this cells for collaboration and execution in into the CAW concepts of mass, speed, domain by both governments and pri- a carefully crafted distributive virtual fires, control, maneuver, dominance, vate individuals creates an abundance world. When it suits their purposes, ter- superiority, and hierarchy.16 As a military of lucrative targets for serious mischief rorists can shift from the soft power cyber
28 Forum / Combined Effects Power JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 domain to hard power natural domains for destructive attacks. Once again, our CAW concept does not provide a lens sufficient for understanding or predicting such activities. Crowdsourcing. Finally, the marathon bombing incident demonstrated the capability of social networking tools to build collaborative virtual communities and then harness the resulting “wisdom of crowds” for constructive purposes.26 The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s public release of two poor-quality im- ages of the suspects with a request for assistance resulted in the mobilization of hundreds of private citizens who reviewed their own photography of the event and provided a flood of helpful images to the police. A similar phenomenon explains how the killing of a young woman in Iran resulted in a powerful mobilization of public opinion by private citizens who used their smart phones to photograph the event and quickly distribute the pic- tures worldwide. The above examples of power emerg- ing from the cyber domain demonstrate a common capacity for producing desired Kandahar PRT security force leads team member through Shur Andam Industrial Park in Kandahar effects by directly influencing the percep- City (U.S. Air Force /Richard Simonsen) tions and behavior of adversaries whether they are individuals, nongovernmental for explaining the fundamental forces of mutual attraction of the planets, CAW organizations, or nation-states. In short nature for several hundred years. Then remains a valid model for understand- they provide measurable outcomes in came Ernest Rutherford’s early experi- ing hard power in the natural domains. efficient ways for the battle of wits. ments with the atom, which revealed We believe, however, that our proposed Regrettably, most of their outcomes are that nature sometimes did not behave in CEP concept can serve, like the concept shielded from view by the CAW lens’s accordance with Newtonian theory. Put of quantum mechanics for Newtonian focus on traditional instruments of war- simply, Newton’s theory of motion and anomalies, as a remedy to explain the fare associated with the natural domains. gravitation had an anomaly; it simply CAW anomalies. did not accurately predict the physical But unlike the classical and modern Newtonian Physics and principles that governed the behavior physics analogy, we believe CEP is a CAW Anomalies of electrons orbiting the nucleus of the unifying construct that can amplify and These and multiple other elements of atom. Niels Bohr, August Heisenberg, preserve the deepest tenets of CAW’s power that are in large part emerging and others met the challenge with a new hard power while integrating the criti- from the cyberspace domain cannot concept for atomic behavior: quantum cally important soft power behavior we be accommodated adequately by the mechanics. are observing in the natural as well as CAW construct. The cyber domain This article proposes a more modest cyber domains. As a new way of thinking, is challenging previously conceived solution for the CAW anomalies. It is a the CEP construct is capable of accom- theories of power by spawning a host complement to the CAW concept that ac- modating and exploiting these forces of anomalies. This anomaly challenge commodates the behavior of participants in a single, all-encompassing, coherent resembles a similar problem the physics in the cyber domain as well as soft power framework. The integrating tenet for community faced in the early 1900s. participants from the natural domains. this framework is effects. Focusing on Just as the CAW construct has explained We call it the Combined Effects Power effects allows measurement of both hard hard power in the natural domains for (CEP) construct. We are not jettisoning and soft power. The CEP construct thus several centuries, Newtonian physics the CAW model. Just as Newtonian clas- effectively overcomes the soft power offered a powerful conceptual model sical theory still explains gravity and the anomalies generated by our traditional
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Rokke, Drohan, and Pierce 29 focus on arms and puts the cyber domain are using the CAW mental construct in fundamental a construct as CAW. Most on the same playing field as the natural attempting to understand cyber power. certainly we are aware of the rich and domains. Such an approach is analogous to using intense dialogue during the past decade The CEP construct also has the abil- reading glasses to observe a distant among Marine Corps leaders such as ity to accommodate not only first- and object. General Mattis and Lieutenant General second-order effects from the CAW con- Then what is CEP? Combined effects Paul Van Riper, who supported the tra- struct, but also to align (or harmonize) power is essentially a way of thinking—a ditional CAW construct, and their Air them with nth-order effects resulting from cognitive path that looks at a complicated Force contemporaries such as Lieuten- soft and hard power regardless of the security problem set through a quite dif- ant General David Deptula and Major parent domains. For example, while the ferent lens and addresses a new question General Thomas Andersen, who led in CAW construct enables understanding at the outset: What effects do we want to developing an effects-based approach of the first-order effects of “sequestra- achieve using both hard and soft power? as a way of thinking about and execut- tion,” the more significant nth-order It expands our frame of reference beyond ing operations.27 The passionate com- effects on subjective aspects of capabil- the traditional CAW lens, which for mitments of these strategists to quite ity, morale, and complex interactions centuries has focused on natural domain different ways of thinking about our of human networking, for example, are weapons systems and asked the ques- security challenges were not reconciled, better understood through the broader tion: How do we most effectively create but nevertheless they allowed sufficient lens of CEP. This is equally relevant for a coherent, flexible force structure and flexibility on both sides for joint effec- distributed operations beyond the range strategy? With CEP’s wider lens and new tiveness in such practical matters as the of traditional CAW supporting forces question, the door is opened for leaders Operation Desert Storm air campaign. as well as for distributed tactical groups and commanders to better understand More important for our purposes, self-organizing (or self-coordinating) the human dimension of conflict—the the substance of this dispute showed for reaction to fleeting opportunities in thinking of our opponents (and allies). remarkable foresight about the doc- accordance with commander’s intent. In Most importantly, perhaps, it recognizes trinal imperatives of the emerging and other words, the CEP construct would that the information age revolution has future weapons systems with which we enable us to rack and stack the different dramatically changed the means of ap- must deal today. As Lieutenant General orders of first- through nth-order effects plication, speed, breadth, and potential Deptula explains: of both hard and soft power more effec- impact of soft power. tively. Indeed, we would see a flattening Put simply, the CEP construct is a Effects-based operations provide a useful and simplifying of the command and con- way to maximize and harmonize hard construct on how to conduct war that can trol hierarchy as well as a wider horizontal and soft power. It allows for the full bridge the gap between the weapons of span of understanding and control for integration of all effects generated from today and the weapons of the future. It al- combat operations. power arising in both the natural and lows useful application of current weapon manmade domains. It rejects the tradi- systems as we acquire a new generation Combined Effects Power tional notion that the “supported effort” of tools needed to fully exploit the concept. Once again, we note that atoms existed is always an arm or platform; cyber do- . . . The ability to achieve effects directly in 1687 when Newton published his main soft power is no longer the default against systems without attacking their Principia Mathematica and that the choice for supporting or secondary ef- individual components would allow a physical science community believed forts. The CEP construct’s new question preferable application of the concept of par- his laws adequately explained atomic and wider lens allow for a level playing allel war [or CEP] than we are capable of behavior. They did not, however. Only field—an accessible battlespace—on today. Indeed, the ultimate application of with the quantum revolution in modern which all domains can participate as ap- parallel war [or CEP] would involve few times were we able to understand the propriate. Whereas the aim of CAW was destructive weapons at all–effects are its nuclear atom. And so it is that the CAW to use all available resources to generate objective, not destruction.28 model has existed for thousands of years maximum hard power, the aim of CEP as the intellectual construct for under- would be to use all available resources to As the late Admiral Cebrowski standing power. But however effective generate power relevant to desired ef- suggested, the long-held principles un- it may have been for understanding fects whether it is hard or soft. The units derlying theories of war were “chafing the effect of destroying opposing force for measurement of effectiveness would against new realities on the battlefields . . . structures in the natural domains, it reflect increments of desired effects, not and when this happens, rules change.”29 is increasingly beset with challenges necessarily levels of physical destruction. Against that background, an emerg- emerging from the cyber domain as well ing group of strategic thinkers such as as nonkinetic forces from the natural Prospects for Change Martin Libicki of the RAND Corporation domains. Furthermore, we are also We are realistic about the difficulties and Major Kris Barcomb, an Air Force concerned that most commanders today of effecting disruptive changes in so cyberspace strategist, is looking at the
30 Forum / Combined Effects Power JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 14 cyber domain quite differently than alternative path for sorting through Ibid. 15 Ibid. simply as new high ground for natural research and development challenges 16 Richard Hundley, Past Revolutions Future 30 domain warfare. For example, Major associated with force structure. We are Transformations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Barcomb asserts that “hard power will be left with the critical question of whether 1999), 11–12; Paul Carlile and Clayton secondary to soft power in cyberspace for policymakers and strategists are willing Christensen, The Cycles of Theory Building in the foreseeable future” and calls for a new to grapple with a fundamentally new way Management Research (Boston: Harvard Busi- ness School, January 6, 2005), 4; Barcomb, 80; paradigm to better understand the proper of thinking about complex and messy Libicki, “Cyberspace.” 31 role of the military in the cyber domain. issues. Whatever the case, it is clear that 17 Carlile and Christensen, 4. Using our vernacular, both Libicki and our potential opponents are increasingly 18 Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, The New Barcomb seem intent on substantially comfortable in this thicket. JFQ Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, modifying the traditional CAW model for Nations, and Business (New York: Borzoi Knopf of Random House, 2013), 3, 6; Martin C. understanding cyber domain capabilities. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa We do not know whether Libicki and Notes Monica, CA: Rand, 2009), iii. Barcomb would agree, but we believe this 19 Ibid., 6. 1 new framework could well focus on what Gary Strauss et al., “SEC, FBI probe fake 20 Perlroth and Sanger. tweet that rocked stocks,” USA Today, April 21 we refer to as the CEP construct. For a discussion of modern technology 24, 2013, available at
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Rokke, Drohan, and Pierce 31 Airman maintains communications cabling including copper wiring, indoor and outdoor cabling, and telephone switches (U.S. Air Force/George Goslin)
Information-Sharing with the Private Sector
By Veronica A. Chinn, Lee T. Furches, and Barian A. Woodward
magine logging onto your bank’s is working and then verify that your bills. This is what can happen when a secure Web site using your personal Internet service is connected. You check major bank is under a denial-of-service I computer to pay monthly bills or other Web sites, and they load without attack. transfer money between accounts to issue. You call your bank to report the At PNC, Wells Fargo, J.P. Morgan pay your mortgage. When you enter problem and they tell you their service Chase, Bank of America, and a host of the Web site address or try to access should be available as soon as they fix other big-name banks, this problem oc- a favorite link, you receive an error a technical issue. Meanwhile, time is curred in September 2012 and again the message. You check to see if your router ticking toward the due date on your following January.1 Millions of customers could not reach their accounts online because so-called hacktivists were using Lieutenant Colonel Veronica A. Chinn, USA, is a Future Operations Planner at U.S. Cyber Command. this method of cyber ransom to prove Lieutenant Colonel Lee T. Furches, ANG, currently serves as the Air National Guard Strategic Planner what they were capable of and to make in the Office of the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Guard and 2 Reserve Matters. Major Barian A. Woodward, USMC, currently serves as a Cyber Defense Capabilities political points. Most major banks have Officer with U.S. Strategic Command. some protection against such attacks.
32 Forum / Information-Sharing with the Private Sector JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 If they require assistance, the Federal •• National Cyberspace Security Aware- focused solely on counterterrorism. Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has devel- ness and Training Program Certainly all these efforts can provide oped the capability to track down many •• Securing Governments’ Cyberspace value in countering terrorist-originated criminal organizations involved in denial- •• National Security and International cyber attacks. However, defending the of-service attacks. But what if would-be Cyberspace Security Cooperation.3 Nation against cyber threats transcends attackers, sponsored by terrorist groups, such a single-threaded, counterterror- A key concept presented in the nonstate actors, or nation-states, orga- ism-steeped scope. strategy is “public-private partnership.” nized themselves to conduct a concerted National cybersecurity is an ambi- President George W. Bush stated, cyber assault of more than the financial tious, broadly focused endeavor seeking “Reducing . . . [cybersecurity] risk sector? That might be more than even the to counter a wide spectrum of threats, requires an unprecedented, active part- FBI could handle. which certainly encompasses terrorist- nership among diverse components of Since nongovernmental entities launched cyber attacks. However, the our country and our global partners.”4 own and operate a large majority of cyber threat spectrum includes many This statement suggests that national cyberspace and critical infrastructure, the nonterrorist dangers as well. The teen- leadership at the highest level recognized United States needs not only a whole-of- aged “script kiddie” in his mother’s the need to engage outside the govern- government approach to cybersecurity basement, who may be a cliché but is not ment apparatus over a decade ago. The but also a whole-of-nation approach. The yet passé, still presents a risk to national executive branch released the draft U.S. Government must articulate the infrastructure. Highly organized cyber version of the strategy to the public for details of such an approach in a strategic criminals hack into and mine financial review and convened 10 town hall meet- framework that identifies a significant companies’ databases for monetary gain. ings across the country to elicit feedback. role for the private sector. To develop Internet-based activists—or hacktiv- The public was considered an integral that framework, the Nation needs robust ists—illegally access computer systems part of the resulting strategy.5 information-sharing between govern- to draw attention to their politically or The NSSC prescribes a whole- ment and industry. socially motivated causes. And powerful of-nation approach and accordingly In 2003, the Bush administration nation-states back increasingly robust provides a baseline for analysis of na- issued the beginnings of such a strategy cyber espionage programs. With such a tional efforts to secure cyberspace. Its with its National Strategy to Secure myriad of threat actors and motivations, priorities are separate and distinct, each Cyberspace (NSSC), which called for the United States cannot rely exclusively with its unique required actions and greater linkages between the public on counterterrorism-focused intelligence initiatives, but a common requirement and private sectors. Unfortunately, over reform as a proxy for broader reforms is information-sharing. In subsequent the past decade, several shortfalls or optimized for the unique pursuit of all- years, there were numerous reasons ill-conceived initiatives prevented the threat cybersecurity. for the government’s inability to fully establishment and maturation of such Second, the IC has few mechanisms develop a culture of information-sharing cooperative paradigms. To engender a for the seamless flow of information to between the public and private sectors, whole-of-nation approach to cybersecu- and from potential industry partners. but four issues stand out. rity, the U.S. Government must tailor The ideal role for both the public and legislative and executive branch efforts Information-Sharing private sectors involves information- to cybersecurity, enable information flow Impediments and Shortfalls sharing and flow in both directions. For between the Intelligence Community example, industry must share its real-time First, executive and legislative branch (IC) and the industrial sector, address observations about cyber attacks with the efforts intended to address information- overclassification of threat reporting government on its networks so agencies sharing in our post-9/11 reality failed information, and maintain assignment for can warn other companies about these to emphasize all-threat cybersecurity. the national lead in cybersecurity to an threats. Also, the government, particu- Rather, most of these narrowly scoped entity outside the IC. larly the IC, must be willing and enabled undertakings focused exclusively on The NSSC was the first foundational to share its threat reporting information counterterrorism. For example, the strategic guidance document produced with the private sector. The Nation’s criti- President issued the National Strategy by the United States focused exclusively cal infrastructure owners and operators for Information Sharing and Executive on cybersecurity. The strategy centers on will then be better able to secure their Order (EO) 13388, Further Strengthen- five mutually supporting priorities: systems. At present, information-sharing ing the Sharing of Terrorism Informa- does not occur optimally in either direc- National Cyberspace Security tion to Protect Americans. Both apply •• tion. Private industry currently sees two Response System exclusively to combatting terrorism. main disincentives to information-sharing National Cyberspace Security Congressional efforts as well, to include •• with the government. Their primary Threat and Vulnerability Reduction the comprehensive Intelligence Reform concern is privacy. These companies are Program and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, generally concerned that information
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Chinn, Furches, and Woodward 33 they share about intrusions into their priorities so that our government can If the DOD review includes the networks may leak to competitors or po- work in a more modern, decentralized, National Security Agency (NSA), ar- tential customers and negatively impact public-private manner to address growing guably the most prolific generator of their bottom lines. Also, they fear liability, challenges like cybersecurity and eco- cybersecurity threat reporting, this act especially if it becomes known that they nomic security.”6 could improve the quantity and useful- lost data or caused the loss of data criti- A key element of extending such an ness of cybersecurity threat reporting cal to another company’s or individual’s information-sharing paradigm expressly available for sharing among Federal, financial well-being. These issues signifi- to cybersecurity will include sharing re- state, and local governments and private cantly impede reporting of cyber attacks lated threat-reporting information. The industry. Until this review is complete, to the government. IC holds much of this information in its however, the Federal Government must For its part, the Intelligence databases. Unfortunately, the classifica- remain cautious about overcommit- Community unfortunately focuses al- tion of this information often limits its ting the work of cybersecurity to the most exclusively on information-sharing dissemination to many who could use it extremely capable but super-secretive among its 17 member agencies and to enhance the Nation’s cybersecurity. agency, bringing us to our final issue: organizations. To its credit, the IC seems This leads us to a related impediment to the United States must resist the urge to to understand the need for a broader in- information-sharing. transfer primary responsibility for national formation-sharing focus. While the White Third, the tendency toward overclas- cybersecurity to NSA. House and Congress concentrated rather sification of relevant data impedes the The NSA has remarkable experience myopically on terrorism, the IC devel- flow of useful information to industry in cyberspace operations and information oped more broadly focused publications. partners. Setting the stage for the discus- assurance in the DOD realm, but while Specifically, their 2008 information- sion following the 2001 terrorist attacks, its preeminent expertise is immensely sharing strategy and 2009 Intelligence The 9/11 Commission Report concluded: useful in nonmilitary cybersecurity issues, Community Directive Number 501 assigning the lead to NSA would almost implement 2004 intelligence reform act Current security requirements nurture certainly prove counterproductive in fos- imperatives. These documents are not over-classification and excessive compart- tering whole-of-nation collaboration. To counterterrorism-specific, which allows mentalization of information among illustrate the fears this proposition instills potential for their broad application. agencies. Each agency’s incentive structure in the cybersecurity community, we can However, their shortfall in the context opposes sharing, with risks (criminal, civil, examine the reaction to comments from of nationwide information-sharing is and internal administrative sanctions) then Director of National Intelligence that they do not facilitate sharing out- but few rewards for sharing information. Dennis Blair. In congressional testimony side the IC. As observed, many other No one has to pay the long-term costs of in 2009, he kicked off a firestorm within entities—from state and local govern- over-classifying information, though these the Department of Homeland Security ments to non-IC military organizations costs—even in literal financial terms—are (DHS) and the private sector by suggest- to private industry—have a significant substantial. There are no punishments for ing that NSA’s extensive cybersecurity stake and role in the national solution to not sharing information. Agencies uphold expertise should be “harnessed” to cybersecurity. a “need-to-know” culture of information secure Federal and critical infrastructure Due to the extreme sensitivity of its protection rather than promoting a “need- networks.11 Many saw this as a play for work, the Intelligence Community has to-share” culture of integration.7 a lead role in national cybersecurity and an institutional but understandable re- expressed concern that NSA would gratu- luctance to share information. However, Pursuant to specific 9/11 itously enshroud its cybersecurity efforts cybersecurity differs from most IC Commission recommendations and under high levels of classification. Such missions in its inextricable relationship complementary to the Intelligence a transfer of responsibility would make to the industrial base. The need for in- Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act whole-of-nation collaboration on cyber- formation-sharing in this arena is similar of 2004, Congress passed the Reducing security difficult or even impossible. to that recognized over the past decade Over-Classification Act in 2010.8 Most The 2008 Comprehensive National in counterterrorism. The government significantly, the act requires inspectors Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) stands as must now extend the lessons learned in general from all Federal departments a related example of the effect an overly counterterrorism information-sharing to or agencies with original classification secretive approach might have on col- cybersecurity. In 2011 congressional tes- authority to conduct a review of classifica- laboration. Blair testified that the CNCI timony, Zoë Baird Budinger and Jeffrey tion policies and identify those that may “develops a framework for creating in H. Smith of the Markle Foundation contribute to misclassification of informa- partnership with the private sector an observed, “This transformation we are tion.9 Per a 2011 Department of Defense environment that no longer favors cyber seeing in counterterrorism is built upon (DOD) Inspector General memorandum, intruders over defenders.”12 However, principles and practices that can be ex- this review is ongoing.10 the CNCI is classified Secret. Many ques- tended to other key homeland security tion how a classified initiative can support
34 Forum / Information-Sharing with the Private Sector JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Airman uses spectrum analyzer to check television broadcast network routers (U.S. Air Force/Val Gempis) such collaboration with the private sector effort but only constitute a partial solu- for further improvement of cybersecurity. if that community cannot even access the tion in the end. The first is to identify the critical infra- plan. The lead for cybersecurity is best left According to Harold Relyea, a spe- structure at greatest risk to cyber attack in the hands of an organization less prone cialist in American National Government based on the current threat, its vulner- to overclassification of its work. In 2003, at the Congressional Research Service ability to cyber attack, and the impact on NSSC assigned DHS as the lead, and so it and author of the report Presidential national interests of its degradation or should remain, with augmentation from Directives, there are two primary differ- destruction. The second is to improve NSA and other agencies. ences between an executive order and a information-sharing and ways to more ef- Presidential policy directive. An execu- fectively produce, disseminate, and track Recent Executive Actions tive order has a statutory requirement classified reports that involve critical infra- Many argue that EO 13636, Improving to be published in the Federal Register, structure owners and operators. The third Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, but a PPD has no such requirement, is the establishment of a “Cyber Security and Presidential Policy Directive 21 which means a PPD can be classified. Framework.” The order sets a 2-year (PPD-21), Critical Infrastructure Secu- Additionally, an executive order must timeline to accomplish all these actions rity and Resilience, take the next step be circulated to a general counsel or with the majority of them within 120 toward creating the whole-of-nation similar agency attorney as “a matter of days of the order’s publication.15 Each approach envisioned by the NSSC. circulation and accountability.”13 These of these tasks identifies DHS as the lead Both documents focus on critical infra- differences aside, an opinion written by agency with other agencies in support. structure due to the impact on national the Justice Department Office of Legal In the words of Frederick the Great, security, economic stability, and public Counsel in 2000 concludes that “execu- “He who defends everything defends safety that could result from a deliberate tive orders and directives are equivalent in nothing.” This is no less true in cyber- cyber attack. They only differ in their their force and impact.”14 space than in other forms of warfare, approach. Taken together, they make EO 13636 directs three primary tasks given the tremendous expansion of progress toward a whole-of-nation that must be initiated to set conditions Internet infrastructure over the past two
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Chinn, Furches, and Woodward 35 and development in information technol- ogy, mathematics, and statistics.”18 In the Cyber Security Framework, the labora- tory now has an immensely challenging task that will entail interfacing with many entities, both public and private. Similarly, PPD-21 directs a set of tasks that support the NSSC and requires agencies across the government, as well as industry, to provide input towards a po- tential solution.19 The directive reinforces the 2003 strategy, which suggests that in order to secure U.S. interests in cyber- space, we must ensure that our networks are both protected and resilient. More specifically, it complements the edicts issued in EO 13636 with additional di- rectives seeking to define both the public and private sector cyber environments May 2013 workshop to facilitate discussions on work carried out in area of cyber security under to establish better starting points for a Action Line C5 (ITU/Claudio Montesano Casillas) national movement toward greater cyber- security.20 So while EO 13636 focuses on decades. Therefore, the United States Also, as part of EO 13636, the the critical tasks, PPD-21 focuses on the must prioritize the most critical facilities National Institute for Standards and supporting tasks. or systems that comprise the backbone Technology (NIST) was tasked to PPD-21 introduces three strategic of our societal functions. EO 13636 implement its final version of a Cyber imperatives that will support and enable required DHS to provide the initial pri- Security Framework by February 2014. the original objectives in the 2003 NSSC: oritization of those critical infrastructure The executive order defines the Cyber refining and clarifying functional relation- facilities at greatest risk to cyber attack Security Framework as “a set of stan- ships across the Federal Government, by July 2013. The prioritization uses dards, methodologies, procedures, and enabling information exchange through a risk-based approach to examine how processes that align policy, business, and establishing a baseline for data and system a cybersecurity incident could reason- technological approaches to address requirements, and information integra- ably result in a catastrophic regional or cyber risks.”16 The EO describes what the tion and analysis streamlined to inform national effect on public health or safety, framework will provide as “a prioritized, planning and operational decisions.21 economic security, or national security. flexible, repeatable, performance-based, These imperatives provide the foundation Heads of Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs) and cost-effective approach, including on which the specified tasks in both EO must be involved in the process and information security measures and con- 13636 and PPD-21 can build. facilitate information exchange and rec- trols, to help owners and operators of Each task specified in PPD-21 re- ommendations from the private sector. critical infrastructure identify, assess, and quires DHS to take the lead either solely Regarding information-sharing, the manage cyber risk.”17 In military terms, or in cooperation with SSAs.22 The first executive order takes a two-pronged it might be considered a standard operat- task is to describe the functional relation- approach in improving accessibility ing procedure, a guide against which ships across government agencies. This of cyber threat information to critical critical infrastructure companies measure is essentially a comprehensive “who does infrastructure owners and operators. themselves to ensure they instituted the what” effort at the intersection of critical One approach is deliberately producing most sensible and secure measures to infrastructure and cyberspace. This may unclassified reports to the greatest extent protect their networked systems from take the form of a basic point-of-contact possible. The second calls for granting cyber attack. list, which constitutes a starting point security clearances and classified access to The Information Technology for coordination. The second task is to accommodate instances in which a report Laboratory, a branch under NIST, evaluate existing public-private informa- cannot be declassified but the informa- has undertaken the Cyber Security tion-sharing models and recommend tion is crucial to the defense of critical Framework project. The laboratory has what needs to be sustained or changed. infrastructure. While this task addresses “the broad mission to promote U.S. in- The third task is identification of baseline access, the matter of identifying what novation and industrial competitiveness data and system requirements that should information is to be shared is a subtask of by advancing measurement science, stan- serve as the minimum standard for cyber- the Cyber Security Framework. dards, and technology through research security. Fourth, by October 2013, DHS
36 Forum / Information-Sharing with the Private Sector JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 was to provide a demonstration of a near security clearance processes, which the cybersecurity of U.S. critical infrastruc- real-time situational awareness capability department should be able to resource ture. Unfortunately, the overclassification for critical infrastructure threats and vul- within its current budget authority. of data feeding these reports could com- nerability assessment. Fifth, DHS must However, the order does not provide the promise the integrity of this goal. produce a document that will supersede resources to extend classified data net- To develop unclassified reports, U.S. the National Infrastructure Protection works to the critical infrastructure owner agencies must strip out any information Plan of 2009. The final requirement is a and operator’s facility or to provide physi- that suggests the presence of an intel- research and development plan specific cal security at the new classified material ligence source. Such data are routinely to critical infrastructure security and handling location. As Congress holds the classified at the Top Secret, Secure resilience. This plan is due 2 years from “power of the purse,” complementary Compartmented Information (SCI) the PPD date of publication.23 DHS has legislation can support the executive level. The more SCI data there are in the already been working on many of these order in this and other concerns. original report, the less likely it is that a tasks as part of existing efforts. However, For information-sharing between redacted report would be possible or use- the PPD creates a temporal constraint to the IC and industry, the executive order ful. Thus, Congress must take action on emphasize the urgency and necessity of largely addresses the flow in one direc- the issue of overclassification of cyberse- the six tasks. tion—from the government to private curity threat reporting. Legislators could industry. CISPA or other legislation address gratuitous classification through Remaining Gaps and Potential would need to address the flow in the new acts such as CISPA or through Legislative Solutions opposite direction. The legislation could cyber-specific modifications of existing EO 13636 and PPD-21 in many potentially include legal standards for legislation, particularly the Reducing ways effectively focus on informa- government personnel handling sensi- Over-Classification Act. tion exchange, along with the critical tive information that pertains to private Many will point out that too much in- requirement for resolving the observed industry’s cyber-based intrusions. formation-sharing can prove catastrophic impediments and shortfalls and imple- Legislators would also need to address to national security. A commentary from menting the NSSC information-sharing liability concerns and further incen- the Central Intelligence Agency Center intent. While these directives provide a tives for industry participation in the for the Study of Intelligence laments the workable way ahead in many areas, they executive order’s voluntary programs. nascent information-sharing paradigm are not without significant challenges. For example, expansion of the Enhanced and observes, “the newly enshrined Regarding the first impediment to Cyber Security Services Program bolsters emphasis on ‘need to share’ has swung information-sharing—exclusive focus on the public-private partnership; however, the pendulum much too far in the op- counterterrorism with some inattention being a voluntary program means that posite direction.”25 Certainly the 2010 to cybersecurity—the executive order private industry participation is uncertain WikiLeaks scandal is an example of vul- and PPD represent a refreshing change at best. The Cyber Security Framework, nerabilities to sensitive information. U.S. of direction. These documents demon- in varying degrees, builds on NSSC Army Private First Class Bradley Manning strate a concerted effort on the part of priorities, but its success is also tied to allegedly provided over 260,000 diplo- the Obama administration to develop voluntary participation. One of several matic cables, over 90,000 intelligence much-needed guidance and policy that deterrents to private industry participa- reports, and one video to the WikiLeaks are specific to all-threat cybersecurity. Of tion may be companies’ concern for site, which is dedicated to transparency course, these executive branch directives business confidentiality. Without sup- of government.26 While most of the cannot address legislative shortcomings in porting legislation, EO 13636 lacks the information was classified, none of the this regard. resources to offer incentives to increase compromised information exceeded Some bills are circulating through participation or—as a last resort—com- the Secret level, presumably because Congress, most notably H.R. 3523, pel participation by law. The program PFC Manning only had routine access the Cyber Intelligence and Sharing and must address the concerns of private to Secret-level networks. In this case, a Protection Act (CISPA). If passed, this industry one way or another to improve downgrade of Top Secret information to act would reiterate many elements already participation. Secret or lower could have subjected even included in EO 13636. Additionally, the For the flow of information from more information to compromise on bill has potential to address other short- the government to the private sector, WikiLeaks. falls the executive order could not cover overclassification will likely linger as an While some may see WikiLeaks as a due to separation-of-powers issues. impediment to truly useful information reason to increase security of sensitive Given current budgetary constraints, exchange. EO 13636 directs the great- information and reduce sharing, prudent one potential element of legislation may est possible development of unclassified policymaking will consider the dangers be resourcing for EO 13636–related ef- reports of cyber threats that identify of such a potentially overreactive policy. forts. For example, the executive order “a specific targeted entity.”24 This is While we must secure our classified in- directly tasks DHS with expediting a positive step toward improving the formation, national security as extended
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Chinn, Furches, and Woodward 37 8 into cyberspace still depends on the flow Since the release of the 2003 Reducing Over-Classification Act, Public Law 111-258, U.S. Statutes at Large 124 of information among all parties who can National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, (2010), 2648. contribute to our collective defense. Thus government efforts to attain prescribed 9 Ibid. we must strike a balance between the intragovernmental and public-private in- 10 Patricia A. Brannin, memorandum to need for information security and shar- formation-sharing have proved fractured Secretaries of the Military Departments et al., ing. Accordingly, policymakers should and incomplete. Issues have ranged from October 26, 2011, available at
38 Forum / Information-Sharing with the Private Sector JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 (Photo by Tara J. Parekh)
“Break Out” A Plan for Better Equipping the Nation’s Future Strategic Leaders
By Gregg F. Martin and John W. Yaeger
eforming joint professional mili- we explain the reforms and why they Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint tary education (JPME) has been are necessary, and how they will be Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and a 1996 gradu- R much discussed and debated in implemented. We believe they con- ate of NDU. A firm believer in the critical recent years. At the National Defense stitute an effective strategy for better importance of JPME, the Chairman University (NDU), the time for mean- educating future leaders for the Nation directed the University to update its ingful change has come. The University within a new fiscal reality. curriculum, and among other things, to is moving out on reform. In this article, We want supporters and future stu- incorporate desired attributes for future dents to understand and appreciate the leaders and lessons from the past 13 years strategy, so they can effectively participate of war. In October 2011, he encouraged in its successful implementation. NDU to begin reform. In February 2012, Major General Gregg F. Martin, USA, Ph.D., is the President of the National Defense University Our “breakout” strategy comes in re- he personally rewrote the University’s (NDU). Dr. John W. Yaeger is the Provost of NDU. sponse to guidance from General Martin mission statement. On July 11, 2012,
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Martin and Yaeger 39 he spoke at the University, clarifying his key impediments to better performance. for war-weary and battle-hardened vet- intent that NDU should break out from Any critical problem-solving effort must erans to recuperate and reconnect with its current way of doing business to bet- be based on an accurate diagnosis of the their families is genuine and we support ter support our joint warfighters and the problem to be solved.2 Even well-con- it, but we must try to balance quality of Nation. The Chairman’s emphasis on ceived efforts often fail due to bureau- life for our returning heroes with an aca- change evokes the words of President cratic resistance or for lack of adequate demically rigorous program. Abraham Lincoln inscribed on the walls follow-through. Those that do succeed Relevance. Another common critique of Lincoln Hall here at NDU: “As our often must pass through a brief period is that our curriculum is focused on case is new, so we must think anew, and of relative inefficiency before they carry the past at the expense of the emerging act anew.” the organization to new heights of future, on military history and the immu- In this vein, General Dempsey cited performance. Not surprisingly, many table principles of war, and not enough changes at NDU as a first step toward people associate organizational change on critical thinking skills relevant to cur- broader reform: “As we continue to ad- with administrative turbulence that rent issues: vance ‘[whole of] University’ initiatives at undermines rather than enhances per- National Defense University, we will up- formance. The change we support will The current approach to the professional date the Joint PME curriculum across the be real, substantial, and effectual. military education and growth of senior force to emphasize key leader attributes. We began with a candid appraisal of officers may not adequately prepare them to We will also explore how best to adapt our circumstances and key challenges. meet those coming challenges. . . . [O]ther our learning institutions to serve a global Stated simply, NDU must better equip than some adjustments to accommodate Joint Force.”1 future leaders for an increasingly complex counterinsurgency doctrine, the professional Over the past 2 years, NDU has ab- and dynamic security environment during military education provided by military sorbed significant funding and personnel a period of severely reduced resources. institutions in the past decade has largely cuts, like our partner institutions across the Our five colleges enjoy strong reputa- remained constant in spite of rapid changes Department of Defense. During the same tions and offer many opportunities for in the world.4 period we have prepared broad strategic an excellent education, but a number of guidance to our component institutions, scholarly critiques in recent years point In addition, it is often asserted that executed an “NDU 2020” planning pro- out that we can do better.3 Although our JPME institutions, once a major cess, participated in the Chairman’s Joint views differ, several criticisms are recur- source of innovative educational methods, Education Review, and moved through ring, most notably that our academic have “become an intellectual backwater, a series of scheduled external review and standards are not sufficiently rigorous, lagging far behind the corporate and civil- accreditation events. Now, in time for the our curricula can be more current and in- ian institutions of higher learning.”5 upcoming 2015 academic year, we are novative, our education does not leverage These concerns are easily overstated, implementing the Chairman’s guidance student’s prior training and operational but they have some merit. Certainly we and seizing the opportunity to prepare experience, and our research centers can acknowledge the need to focus more on our future strategic leaders with a program be better linked to our students. imparting leadership attributes demanded that is more focused on individual learn- Changing National Security by a security environment that is “charac- ing outcomes and better postured to Environment. The environment today is terized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid leverage the full range of talent available not unlike the mid-1970s when the deci- change, and persistent conflict.”6 In such to the University. By collaborating more sion was made to consolidate the National an environment, leaders require multidis- effectively across the University’s different War College and the Industrial College ciplinary and adaptive problem-solving colleges and components, we can deliver of the Armed Forces (now the Dwight skills that prepare them to collaborate improved joint education at less cost to D. Eisenhower School for National and innovate. Most of our students now the Nation. In more detail, here are why Security and Resource Strategy) under the have experience in joint, interagency, and and how we will do it. National Defense University. The Nation multinational operations, and some of our was coming out of a prolonged conflict best young leaders in recent campaigns Why Change? and facing diminishing resources. demonstrated a willingness to experiment Change is hard and some always ques- Rigor. Some believe that NDU to good effect. We need to make sure that tion whether it is necessary. Skepticism should accommodate student welfare at our curriculum captures and transmits is understandable. Real change that the expense of necessary academic rigor. their successes in ways that illuminate gen- elevates an organization’s performance Even though the University maintains its eral principles for effective decisionmaking is rare. Many change efforts are ill academic regional accreditation, critics in similarly complex environments. conceived and mostly cosmetic: shuf- note that some of our graduate programs Disconnected Research. Another fling organizational boxes, titles, and do not typically require a thesis and that concern raised about the management authorities without effectively identify- our course credits may not transfer to of the University was its expanding ing, understanding, and addressing the other top academic programs. The need research centers. The good news is that
40 JPME Today / “Break Out” JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 many national security organizations (or “customers”) believe that NDU research is a good value. They vote with their dol- lars, so to speak, and over the past decade spent increasing amounts to fund NDU research. Unfortunately, our students did not receive the full value of NDU’s impressive research capacity. The ability of students to tap into this wider body of expertise at the University was limited. Adapting our educational approach and programs to produce better leaders would be controversial in the best of cir- cumstances. It is even more so in a period of fiscal austerity. The overall resources available to NDU have declined by more than 20 percent in the last several years, from $103 million to a projected $80 million for the 2015 fiscal year. Across the Chairman addresses audience at National Defense University as it welcomes Major General Gregg University, programs have been canceled Martin as its 14th president during assumption of command ceremony, July 11, 2012 (DOD/Tyrone C. and faculty and support staff positions Marshall, Jr.) have been eliminated or gone unfilled. In these circumstances, “business as experiences. A clear lesson from adult for first-hand observation of diverse ele- usual” must give way to a new paradigm. education research is that mid-career ments of the national security system. The key is to make sure our strategy for professionals must be self-motivated to Second Phase: Specialized Expertise. change clearly identifies how to produce learn and that they are best motivated The second phase will deliver the core better-equipped, critical problem-solving when they understand and can participate curricula of our five colleges. Freed from leaders while conserving resources. in structuring their learning experiences. the responsibility to cover basic material, The decisions made by mentors and the colleges will focus on their unique and What Change? students will be codified in a learning distinguishing competencies. The College If we hope to generate better educa- contract that will be reviewed periodically of International Security Affairs will focus tional output at lower costs per student, and at the end of the academic year. on international partnering and irregular it is clear we will have to evolve and First Phase: Foundational Expertise. threats; the Eisenhower School will focus adapt. In the coming academic year, we The first phase will consist of a single on resource management and organi- will implement six major innovations to University-wide core curriculum. These zational performance; the Information break out from our current educational courses will cover foundational mate- Resources Management College (iCol- model.7 These changes constitute the rial that must be mastered by all serious lege) will focus on the cyber domain; the core of our strategy for better equipping students of national security. The mate- Joint Forces Staff College, our southern future leaders. rial will be taught by the most talented campus located in Norfolk, Virginia, will Student Assessments, Tailored subject matter experts we have at the focus on joint campaign planning; and the Programs, and Learning Contracts. University—whether they currently are National War College will offer its focus Prior to or soon after arriving at NDU, assigned teaching, research, or administra- on U.S. national security strategy. students will review their careers to date tive duties—in order to give students the The objective is to benefit students by with faculty mentors. Based on previous best possible educational experience. The strengthening the ability of each college experiences, interests, and career needs, material will meet many of our statutory to offer deeper expertise in its area of students and mentors will build a tailored JPME requirements and introduce the distinctive competence. academic program grounded in a core Chairman’s Desired Leader Attributes, Third Phase: Personalized Strategic curriculum and enriched by electives including gender perspectives, ethics, the Leader Development. The third phase is and research—not by a predetermined, Profession of Arms, and lessons from the tailored to individual leader development one-size-fits-all requirement. Faculty past decade of war. During this first phase, and will focus on electives. All students mentors will not only explain the core students will pair with fellow students from will complete a Capstone research project curriculum offered by the University but other departments, agencies, and other or thesis. This final phase of the academic also work with students to identify topics countries to expand their understanding year challenges students to demonstrate of particular interest and ways to inte- of alternative views and cultures, and they what they have learned in the previous grate these into the students’ educational will exploit our Washington, DC, location two phases by solving a practical problem
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Martin and Yaeger 41 a person’s primary job description is focused on research, outreach, or admin- istration. There are many highly quali- fied faculty members and experts in our regional centers, campus administration, research centers, and diverse colleges who previously were not available to stu- dents—even if the student was intensely interested in their areas of expertise. Under the new program students will be better able to tap the University’s full range of expertise—and our commit- ment to place our students at the center of all we do will be more fully realized. National War College faculty members with seminar students (NDU/Katherine Lewis) Greater collaboration across University components is a corollary in an area of their choosing relevant to in a positive direction. Centralizing, requirement for our student-centric their career goals. Depending on the collating, and analyzing assessment program. The changes we are imple- student learning plan constructed at the results in the Office of the Provost will menting are interrelated and mutually beginning of the year and knowledge enable the University to identify areas dependent, as would be expected in of their next assignment, electives can for improvement and work together on a coherent organizational strategy for directly support the research project or as- whole-of-NDU solutions. change. For maximum effect they must sist the student with broader career goals. Common Academic Calendar. The be administered together. They require Program Evaluations and Ongoing final innovation is a backbone initiative a whole-of-NDU approach to educat- Study Guidance. Throughout the that will reinforce the value of the preced- ing our students. Doing a better job academic year, a concerted effort will ing five changes. Too often in the past, with fewer resources often means orga- be made to improve the way we gather students, faculty and staff were not able nizations must cooperate more across insights from students about their to take advantage of the many University interfaces or stovepipes. This is true educational experiences. They will events relevant to their educational goals for jointness in military operations, for provide feedback on all aspects of the because their schedules would not permit interagency cooperation in the broader educational program. Along with other participation. Conferences, workshops, national security system, and for educa- national security stakeholder feedback, distinguished guest speakers, and partner- tional reform at the National Defense these assessments will be used to adjust ing with research faculty were hampered University. Thus, we are modeling for our the program for better performance. by rigid schedules that allowed students students the collaborative path they will Students will also be encouraged to little free time while on campus. Some need to apply later in their careers. conduct a self-evaluation of how well common scheduling rules will allow all More specifically, we expect the follow- they fulfilled their educational contract. elements of the University to schedule ing benefits from these integrated changes: An objective of this phase is to provide activities that might interest students in The third-phase focus on demon- guidance to graduates for lifelong learn- time slots when they will be free to partic- •• strated problem-solving under direct ing. Their NDU experience should ipate. For example, if lunch periods and faculty mentorship, which builds continue after graduation. If there are time slots for guest lectures are common on critical thinking skills imparted learning areas or topics that students across all the colleges, NDU components in the first two phases, will help would like to pursue, relevant faculty could target these periods for workshops equip future leaders to operate in will provide additional instructional and other events open to student and fac- a complex and dynamic security material and suggested readings before ulty participation. Alternatively, students environment. the students depart for their follow-on could use these portions of their sched- The first and third phases will draw assignment so they can continue the ules to meet with faculty to discuss their •• upon the best talent from across learning process. We consider this final theses or other topics of mutual interest. NDU to ensure students receive the phase of the academic year an important best that the University has to offer innovation both for its potential impact What Are the Benefits? in each subject area, including indi- on students and for the University. A few common themes provide the vidual student research. Our five colleges have benefited from foundation for these changes. Talent Freeing colleges from the burden each of their student assessments, but from across the University will be mar- •• of teaching common foundational organizations that are asked to evaluate shalled in support of student learning as material will allow them to hire and their own performance tend to be biased the first priority irrespective of whether
42 JPME Today / “Break Out” JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 focus their faculties on their areas students. By reordering priorities, we are completed if we are to present students of comparative expertise, which will increasing productivity by tapping the with a significantly enhanced educational be more efficient and make deeper full range of NDU expertise for students, experience when they arrive on campus to expertise available to students. which gives us a bigger educational bang begin academic year 2015. We acknowl- •• The student-centric nature of the for the buck. edge and welcome the participation, integrated program, which stresses Second, we are increasing our abil- inputs, and suggestions from our stellar attention to student needs, interests, ity to pool and share our talented faculty faculty—and from our friends and sup- and learning objectives, will increase across NDU. We will still graduate the porters as we prepare for a bright future. motivation for learning. same number of students, but we will Indeed, the entire University, and all •• Working within a common academic no longer teach all foundational material those who support it, must make these calendar so that teaching, research, with separate faculty at each of our five reforms a priority and participate in their and outreach are mutually supportive colleges. A common academic calendar, implementation if we are to succeed. This will expand student opportunities to for example, creates opportunities to includes our incoming students, who we learn and get the best from the entire leverage expertise found in one com- hope will be encouraged to participate range of activities sponsored by the ponent in other arenas. In recent years, more fully in the change process after University. we have already begun moving in this reading this article. At a minimum, they •• The emphasis on clinical, empiri- direction. For example, the National will now understand why we are moving cal assessments of students, faculty, War College realized its students needed out on educational reform and that we and programs will enable ongoing more exposure to economic issues. It co- intend to practice what we teach. JFQ improvement not only for programs operated with the Eisenhower School to and faculty but also for the students obtain the faculty support for economics so they will continue the learning since Eisenhower has long maintained Notes process after departing the University. such expertise. 1 Martin E. Dempsey, 18th Chairman’s 2nd Term Strategic Direction to the Joint What Are the Savings? The Way Ahead Force (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, One question frequently raised as we At the National Defense University, 2014), available at
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Martin and Yaeger 43 Airman prepares to fuel A-10C Thunderbolt II with 50/50 blend of Hydrotreated Renewable Jet and JP-8; plane then flew first flight of aircraft powered solely by biomass- derived jet fuel blend (U.S. Air Force/Samuel King, Jr.)
Green Peace Can Biofuels Accelerate Energy Security?
By John E. Gay
he evolution of liquid fuel for fuels. Petroleum offered double the Today, global economies as well transportation has a long history thermal energy of coal and as a result as national security interests depend T of innovation that began with the boiler designs became smaller, enabling on domestic and imported oil. As that steam engine. Initially, wood and coal automobiles, ships, and railway locomo- dependency grows, the fundamental were the primary fuel sources for propel- tives to travel faster and farther. The stability of the global oil market is being ling various vehicles both on land and at transfer of liquid petroleum through stressed by inadequate investment in oil sea, but transferring them was dirty and pipes greatly reduced refueling labor and production capacity, persistent geopo- strenuous and required extensive man- provided greater distribution options. litical instability, and rapidly growing power. The discovery of liquid petro- As a result, petroleum quickly became demand in developing nations.1 In addi- leum and the development of refinery the fuel of choice, initiated a global oil tion, reliance on a single energy source processes quickly shifted transportation boom, and created competing interests for transportation fuel—petroleum—has energy from coal and wood to liquid among nations. economic, strategic, and environmen- tal drawbacks. In response to these challenges, and controversially using Commander John E. Gay, USN, is Deputy Public Affairs Officer of United States Fleet Forces Command. Cold War authorities of the Defense
44 JPME Today / Can Biofuels Accelerate Energy Security? JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Production Act, a memorandum of Figure 1. Alternative Fuel Prices vs. Diesel understanding was signed between the $5.50 Secretaries of Agriculture, Energy, and the Navy to each invest $170 million $5.00 to jumpstart a biofuels industry and help lead the United States to energy $4.50 independence.2 The 2007 National Defense $4.00 Authorization Act set an aggressive goal for the military to produce or procure 25 $3.50 percent of all its energy demands from renewable sources by 2025.3 $3.00 Price per Gallon Section 2852 of the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act calls for the $2.50 Department of Defense (DOD) to es- tablish goals regarding use of renewable $2.00 energy to meet transportation needs: $1.50 The Secretary of Defense shall submit Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-10 May-11 Jan-07 May-12 Jan-09 Jan-06 Jan-08 May-10 May-07 Sept-11 Sept-12 May-09 May-06 to the congressional defense committees May-08 Sept-10 Sept-07 Sept-05 Sept-06 Sept-09 Sept-08 the energy performance goals for the Diesel Natural Gas (DGE) Biodiesel (B20) Department of Defense regarding trans- Biodiesel (B2/B5) Biodiesel (B99/B100) portation systems, support systems, utilities, Source: Department of Energy, “Cities Alternative Fuel Price Report,” July 2012, 15. and infrastructure and facilities . . . (c) Special considerations—For the purpose of biofuels by 2020.5 The Army is evaluat- greenhouse gas emissions.8 Today the developing and implementing the energy ing the performance of alternative fuels in most widely used biofuel, ethanol, is performance goals and energy performance combat systems but has not yet formally produced from the fermentation and plan, the Secretary of Defense shall con- established goals.6 distillation of sugar or starch-based sider at a minimum the following . . . (4) Can military research and investment crops such as sugar cane and corn. Bio- Opportunities to pursue alternative energy jumpstart a biofuels industry and provide fuels also include biodiesel—mono-alkyl initiatives, including the use of alternative an alternative to imported foreign oil that esters of long-chain fatty acids derived fuels in military vehicles and equipment, is compatible, readily available, and af- from vegetable oils and animal fats.9 (5) Cost effectiveness, cost savings, and net fordable? This article explores the military Biodiesel is renewable heating oil and present value of alternatives . . . and (8) application and feasibility of biofuels and a diesel substitute used in Europe, and the value of the use of renewable energy offers reasons why biofuels will not lead it is gaining interest in the commercial sources.4 the Nation to improved energy security. market in the United States. Common feedstock for biodiesel fuels includes In compliance with the law, the U.S. Biofuels Defined soybeans, rapeseed, canola, palm, other Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Biofuels are liquid fuels produced from plants, and waste cooking oils and have all expressed an interest in being agricultural or other biological materi- animal fats.10 early users of alternative fuels, although als, and such fuels have been around Untreated bio-oil made from thermal Congress did not require the use of al- for more than 125 years. Some of the processing of tree and plant cellulose is a ternative fuels in military tactical weapon first automobiles and tractors were complex mixture of oxygenated organic systems. The Air Force played a lead role capable of running on biofuel, and the compounds with about 25 percent water in evaluating and testing alternative fuels first commercial cellulosic ethanol plant that is difficult to separate. Bio-oil is for military applications and set a goal to opened in the United States in 1910. not compatible with conventional fuel be prepared to acquire cost-competitive Biofuels production declined over time systems and engines and is unstable in alternative fuel blends sufficient to meet because it was expensive, inefficient, and long-term storage. 11 However, it can be 50 percent of its domestic aviation fuel ultimately unsustainable.7 Corn-based stabilized and converted to a conven- requirements by 2016. Moving well ethanol reappeared in the 1970s after tional hydrocarbon fuel by a complex beyond compliance with the will of the oil embargo as a way for the United sequence called hydrotreating.12 Once Congress, Secretary of the Navy Ray States to reduce its dependency on hydrotreated, biodiesel is compatible Mabus established an aggressive energy imported oil from the Middle East, and with petroleum-based fuels and miscible strategy focused on replacing 50 percent it attracted interest again in the 1990s in many different concentrations of- of the Navy’s energy consumption with as a renewable fuel to help reduce fering “drop-in” advantages without
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Gay 45 Figure 2. U.S. Biodiesel Production on petroleum converted by refineries to gasoline, diesel fuel, and jet fuel. That 1200 makes America most vulnerable to dis- 1100 1100 1100 ruptions in the oil supply. The United 1000 States consumed more than 250 billion
900 gallons of refined petroleum in 2011. 800 Some 61 percent of its crude is imported, with 12.7 percent coming from the 700 700 Persian Gulf.18 In 2001 DOD consumed 600 545 5.2 billion gallons of refined petroleum 500 450 products domestically and another 4.05 315 400 billion gallons overseas, or about 3.6 Millions of Gallons 300 250 percent of the U.S. total of refined petro- 200 leum consumed. 112 Global economic growth has gener- 100 25 5 15 20 ated rapid increases in energy demand 0 .05 2 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 worldwide. Crude oil prices jumped from (est.) $60 a barrel in mid-2005 to a spike of Source: National Biodiesel Board Annual Estimates $140 a barrel in mid-2008. More re- cently, from July 2011 to July 2012, the diesel motor modification. However, same mission. This results in additional price of light crude fluctuated from under hydrotreatment is costly in energy, and logistics requirements in the form of $80 a barrel to just over $110.19 Steady some scientists doubt that there is a net more fuel that will have to be delivered to petroleum price increases have supported energy gain in biofuels because more the troops. the government’s justification for invest- than 50 percent of the energy stored in ing in biofuels development.20 As a result, feedstock plants comes from fossil fuels in Energy Security the volume of biodiesel produced in the the form of nitrogen fertilizers and pes- Energy security is having assured access United States has steadily increased over ticides; energy for tilling, harvesting, and to reliable supplies and the ability to the past 10 years, as observed in figure 2, transport; and the chemical conversion protect and deliver sufficient energy to but this is still only a very small fraction process.13 Because a significant amount meet essential requirements.16 Improv- of the 202.7 billion gallons of petroleum of fossil fuel is required in the life-cycle ing U.S. energy security is principally consumed in the transportation sector in production of biofuels, the cost of pro- about reducing excessive costs to con- 2011.21 cessing biomass into ethanol or biodiesel sumers resulting from disruptions in the Despite the rising costs of crude, is directly linked to the cost of fossil fuels. oil supply. It also means having a robust there is little hope that biofuels prices will When the price of oil increases, so do the supply portfolio. ever be lower than the cost of petroleum. feedstock and production costs of bio- In a 2011 speech on America’s en- Even after the billions in government fuels. Biofuels and associated renewable ergy security delivered at Georgetown subsidies, the current price of corn etha- energy credits are also part of the global University, President Barack Obama nol is $.40 a gallon higher than regular energy trading market, and the biofuels echoed the conventional wisdom of gasoline for the same amount of energy price trends in the same direction as fossil biofuels: in the gas tank.22 Biodiesel prices range fuels, as observed in figure 1. As a result, significantly higher. In 2009 the Defense it is unlikely that the costs of biofuels will The United States of America cannot af- Logistics Agency awarded small contracts ever become more competitive than fossil ford to bet our long-term prosperity, our for hydrotreated renewable HRJ-5 jet fuels.14 long-term security on a resource that will fuel that ranged from $66 to $149 per Biofuels do not offer the same en- eventually run out, and even before it runs gallon.23 Over the past few years, the ergy density as petroleum-based fuels. out will get more and more expensive to ex- Air Force and Navy have staged several Ethanol contains 33 percent less energy tract from the ground. We cannot afford it aircraft and ship demonstrations using per gallon than gasoline and biodiesels when the costs to our economy, our country, compatible drop-in biodiesel and bio–jet contain about 8 percent less energy than and our planet are so high, not when your fuel as a tactical fuel. In 2011 the Navy petroleum-based diesel fuels.15 Lower generation needs us to get this right. It is spent $12 million for 450,000 gallons of energy density has a direct negative effect time to do what we can to secure our energy hydrotreated renewable jet fuel and diesel on battlefield energy security. That means future.17 oil made from chicken fat and algae to operational vehicles using biofuels will support an exercise in the Pacific Ocean. travel less distance per tank of fuel, thus The transportation sector of the The biodiesel used by the Navy cost requiring more fuel to accomplish the U.S. economy almost exclusively relies $26.75 per gallon, nearly 10 times the
46 JPME Today / Can Biofuels Accelerate Energy Security? JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 costs of petroleum-based diesel fuel. That require more fuel to accomplish the same competition for other land use including same $12 million biofuels purchase could mission. commercial forestry, food agriculture, have paid for more than three million In a 2011 report, the Federally industrial agriculture for textiles and gallons of conventional diesel fuel, or the funded RAND National Defense chemicals, biomass for electrical power money could have gone to other critical Research Institute concluded that there generation, and the expansion of urban military programs.24 is no direct benefit to the Department of areas.31 In Afghanistan, fuel reaches the front Defense for using alternative fuels rather Available land to meet future biofuel lines via rail, trucks, and in some cases air- than petroleum-derived fuels.28 Biofuels demands is unevenly divided across the craft from Turkmenistan or Tajikistan. By do not offer a tactical military advantage, world. North Africa, South Asia, and some estimates 70 percent of the convoys and unless their price becomes more Japan have very little arable land left for in the theater of war involve “liquid logis- competitive and the biofuels industry can expansion, and almost half of the world’s tics”—the delivery of fuel and water. By scale up production, there is little chance potentially available arable land is situ- the time fuel reaches forward deployed the United States will significantly reduce ated in only seven countries: Angola, troops, the fully burdened cost—the its demand for petroleum-based fuels in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, commodity fuel price plus the total cost the near future. The challenge of biofuels Democratic Republic of the Congo, and of personnel and assets required to move is production, not combustion. Sudan.32 Also competing with the United and protect the fuel from the point it is States and European Union for land received from the commercial supplier Biofuels and Natural Resources expansion are China, India, Japan, and to the point of use—was estimated by One of the biggest downsides to South Korea. These nations continue to the Marine Corps to range $9–$16 per increasing production is that all biofuels struggle to find additional agricultural gallon if delivered by land and $29–$31 compete with food agriculture for land, land and are leasing land in other nations per gallon if delivered by air. In early water, agrichemicals, and other farming as well as trying to reclaim wasteland and 2009 Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of resources. About 40 percent of the saline land internally.33 Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and corn grown in America today is used to One of the largest competing uses Logistics (AT&L), testified to Congress produce ethanol as a gasoline additive, of land for biofuels production will be that protecting fuel convoys imposes a and food crops such as soybean, rape- the food crops needed to feed a growing huge burden on combat forces and that seed, and palm are used to produce bio- world population. The grain it takes to fill by reducing fuel demand the Services diesels. The large percentage of farm- a sport utility vehicle tank with ethanol could reduce logistics assets and operat- land used to grow corn for ethanol has could feed one person for a year.34 This is ing costs and mitigate budget effects only replaced 6.5 percent of America’s a major concern considering that accord- caused by fuel price volatility.25 In addi- gasoline energy. The ethanol industry ing to the United Nations, the world’s tion, fuel convoys increase casualty risks expanded based partly on expectations population is expected to increase from 7 for Servicemembers from enemy attacks, that gasoline consumption would keep billion in 2011 to 9.3 billion by 2050.35 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), bad rising and that ethanol’s share of that One estimate predicts that by 2020 an weather, and traffic accidents. According growth would continue. Instead, gaso- extra 200 to 500 million hectares of land to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, line demand for 2013 is projected to be will be needed for food, animal feed, and there was one casualty for every 24 fuel 6.7 percent below its peak in 2007.29 pasture to meet the nutritional needs of convoys in Afghanistan and one for every Agricultural markets are also volatile in the global population.36 38.5 in Iraq.26 Fuel convoys are extremely price. When droughts, floods, or freezes According to Nobel Laureate Michel vulnerable to IEDs and are responsible affect crop production, food costs and Hartmut, the growth of plants for bio- for a large percentage of combat-related biofuel prices climb together, which is fuels will undoubtedly lead to higher fatalities. Between July 2003 and May particularly damaging to an economy.30 food prices, which will predominantly 2009, IEDs alone accounted for some 43 For example, the 2012 U.S. Midwest hit poorer people.37 The global com- percent of U.S. fatalities in Iraq and 39.7 drought forced many ethanol bio-refin- munity has yet to address the key drivers percent in Afghanistan.27 ery plants to close and demonstrates the of recent food prices, which have spiked Liquid fuels, whether they are insecurity of a biomass fuel supply and three times in the last 5 years. Estimates petroleum-based or biofuels, have to be the effects on energy security. suggest that the 2008 food crisis forced transported on the battlefield at the same Land. Today all biofuels produced in 100 million people into poverty and cost and risks to our Servicemembers. the United States and European Union some believe biofuels were responsible For this reason, the use of biodiesel does (EU) are consumed domestically, but for at least 30 percent of the global food not offer a tactical advantage for enhanc- current production capacities in both price spike that year. ActionAid, an inter- ing energy security and may increase regions are a long way from meeting national nongovernmental organization, the risks and number of casualties due their own future targets without import- estimated at the time that 30 million to its reduced energy density, which will ing biomass feedstock. The demand for more people went hungry as a direct biomass is growing at a time of massive result of biofuels.38 Future estimates
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Gay 47 organizations operating in 90 countries, estimates that 567 million acres in the developing world have been sold, leased, licensed, or have been under negotiation to foreign corporations between 2000 and today.42 According to the Renewable Fuels Agency, an estimated 500 million more hectares, roughly half the area of Europe, will be needed to meet the global biofuels demand by 2020. Land grabs are an example of how mandatory biofuels mandates are counterproductive to global security, to its supporting pillar of energy security, and to U.S. national security strategy. Water. In addition to requiring more land, biofuels mandates add pressure to natural water resources. Large-scale industrial agriculture operations are often located in major river basins and consume massive amounts of water.43 According to an Intelligence Community Assessment, numerous countries have already over- pumped groundwater to satisfy a growing agricultural demand. This practice is counterproductive because degraded or depleted groundwater produces fewer crops, leading to food security problems and possible social disruption.44 A third of all Africans already live in water-scarce environments, and global climate change is likely to increase these numbers significantly. According to Citigroup’s chief economist Willem Buiter, in the not-so-distant future water will become “the single most important physical commodity-based asset class, dwarfing oil, copper, agricultural com- modities and precious metals.”45 Over the next 10 years, water problems will con- tribute to instability in regions important Sailor presents samples of traditional F-76 diesel fuel and 50/50 biofuel blend to illustrate use of to U.S. national interests, and shortages biofuels in support of Navy Secretary’s goal to cut petroleum consumption in half by 2015 (U.S. Navy/Lolita Lewis) and poor quality, when combined with poverty, social tensions, environmental suggest global food prices could rise by as with no respect for private land rights, degradation, and ineffectual government, much as 76 percent by 2020, pushing an- and converted into plantations and crop will contribute to social disruptions that other 600 million into hunger if U.S. and monocultures. The agriculture products could result in failed states.46 Biofuels EU biofuels goals are met and no other are exported to feed the energy and food mandates in Europe and the United action is taken to prevent hunger.39 demands of the industrialized world with States pressure agricultural expansion and To meet the need for land, large-scale little consideration for the local econo- stress natural resources. These practices land acquisitions, frequently referred to mies.40 This practice creates escalating are detrimental to energy security and as “land grabs,” are taking place around local food prices, food scarcity, and loss could require U.S. military involvement the world. Land formerly used by inde- of job opportunities, forcing widespread in countries where there is currently little pendent farmers for their own subsistence displacement of populations.41 Oxfam security threat. is often confiscated by governments, International, a confederation of 17 aid
48 JPME Today / Can Biofuels Accelerate Energy Security? JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Algae. Some scientists suggest algae Recommendations today true energy independence has may offer biofuels solutions that will not Improving national energy security is become a real possibility even without compete with food agriculture or scarce principally about reducing the cost of the development of alternative fuels. A water supplies. Algae are a potential energy to consumers and preventing dozen years ago, shale gas amounted to energy source that can be converted into disruptions in the oil supply. According only 2 percent of domestic production; biodiesel and bio–jet fuel, and on paper to the 2010 National Security Strat- today it is 37 percent and rising. Natural some scientists believe it could replace egy, the development of new sources gas is in such ample supply that its price petroleum use altogether.47 Algae have of energy will reduce dependence on has plummeted. This unanticipated been studied for many years for produc- foreign oil and provide better energy abundance has ignited a new political tion of hydrogen, methane, vegetable security.53 At this time, an investment in argument about liquefied natural gas— oils, hydrocarbons, and ethanol.48 In biofuels alone will not reduce America’s not about how much the Nation will 2006, after President George W. Bush thirst for foreign oil. The Nation must import but how much it should export.56 declared that the United States was “ad- employ other alternatives, such as According to a 2012 report published dicted to oil,” government algae research improving efficiencies, using new tech- by Citigroup analysts, North America was resurrected and venture capital nologies to tap into domestic petroleum is “the new Middle East.”57 In 2011 flowed into dozens of algae startups. reserves, and developing better conser- the United States registered the largest Scientists and entrepreneurs have been vation practices. increase in domestic oil production of any trying to unlock the energy potential of Efficiency. Global consumption of country outside the Organization of the algae for more than three decades. Some petroleum will continue to grow about Petroleum Exporting Countries, and net companies grow algae in ponds, others 1 percent per year and will remain the petroleum imports have fallen from 60 grow them in plastic and glass tubes primary transportation fuel in the foresee- percent of total consumption in 2005 to called bio-reactors, and others keep their able future.54 The United States is taking 42 percent today.58 Analysts and econo- algae away from sunlight, feeding them steps to produce more fuel-efficient auto- mists believe that North America can sugars instead.49 The National Research mobiles by employing hybrid technology, achieve energy independence by 2020. Council concluded that current technol- developing lighter materials, and improv- Domestic oil and natural gas production ogy scaled up to produce 39 billion liters ing engine and transmission efficiency. has surged because of new technologies of algae-derived biodiesel per year—5 Because of these initiatives, a reversing such as hydraulic fracturing and horizon- percent of total U.S. transportation fuel trend in domestic fuel consumption is tal drilling, which allow companies to tap needs—would require unsustainable lev- expected by 2020. Some of these fuel- hydrocarbons trapped in shale and other els of water and fossil fuel–based energy efficient technologies are compatible for tight rock formations. Government esti- and fertilizer.50 Today’s technologies use in military vehicles and can reduce the mates suggest that domestic production require between 3.15 and 3,650 liters of fuel needed on the front lines. Investing of petroleum will rise another 22 percent water to produce the amount of algae- in fuel-efficient technologies thus en- to 6.7 million barrels per day by 2020. biofuel equivalent to one liter of gasoline. hances our energy security. While domestic production is increasing, As a comparison, petroleum requires Conservation. Liquid fuels make up better efficiency and conservation prac- 1.9 to 6.6 liters of water to produce one the majority of military logistics opera- tices are on track to reduce the amount liter of gasoline.51 Some argue that algae tions and require thousands of personnel of fuel Americans consume by almost 10 can be cultivated in salt water, but even at an enormous cost in both money and percent.59 Collectively these energy alter- salt water algae require all cooling water human life. Until a few years ago, military natives will greatly contribute to overall and evaporative make-up water to be wargaming did not factor energy into national energy security. fresh, or else salinity increases to lethal the equation; it was simply assumed fuel concentrations. would be available on time and where Conclusion John Benemann, a biochemist who needed. Private industry case studies For the United States to achieve energy has spent more than 30 years working on show behavior-based conservation meth- security, it must reduce its dependence algae, says, “algae biofuels cannot com- ods often result in 20 percent or more on foreign oil. However, should the pete with fossil energy based on simple in energy use reductions.55 Even small military—the branch of government economics.” Researchers at the Lawrence consumption reductions can make a big responsible for national security—be Berkeley National Laboratory estimate difference in the logistics burden. Better responsible for investing its limited that biofuels grown from algae in ponds planning, new doctrine, and conservation resources as a venture capitalist to at scale would cost between $240 and training can greatly enhance energy secu- jumpstart a biofuels industry and be $332 a barrel, considerably higher than rity for military operations. forced to purchase fuels at 10 times the current petroleum prices.52 Algae is thus Domestic Oil and Gas Production. cost of readily available petroleum-based not a viable option to support energy Until quite recently, it appeared the fuels? Not only does this not make security at this time. United States was increasing its de- good economic sense, but it also puts pendency on foreign oil imports, but our national security at risk. Biofuels
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Gay 49 Airman prepares to refuel F-16 Fighting Falcon, part of field service evaluation for biofuel operations (U.S. Air Force/Jeremy Lock) mandates divert scarce military resources means more fuel convoys will be needed Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 2012), 18. away from critical programs such as to meet the military’s mission, increas- 3 National Defense Authorization Act for weapons modernization, maintenance, ing costs and risks to Servicemembers. Fiscal Year 2007, P.L. 364, 109th Congress, training, and readiness. America’s mili- The fourth and possibly most compel- Department of Defense goal regarding use of tary is the largest consumer of liquid ling reason is that the greater demand renewable energy to meet transportation needs fuels in the world, but it still only for biofuels feedstock will foster global (October 17, 2006). 4 Ibid. accounts for 3.6 percent of annual U.S. threats and as a result may increase the 5 U.S. Navy, The Department of the Navy’s consumption. This low percentage is likelihood that our nation may have to Energy Goals, available at
50 JPME Today / Can Biofuels Accelerate Energy Security? JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 2007, available at
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Gay 51 Soldier pulls watch during traffic checkpoint coordinated with members of Afghan National Army outside of Combat Outpost Yosef Khel, Paktika Province (U.S. Army/Ken Scar)
Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy Reconciling Military Roles
By William G. Braun III and Charles D. Allen
nce again the U.S. military is an appropriate national security strat- future requirements for a complex transitioning from a period of egy. Even before that strategy is fully international security environment. O sustained conflict to a resource- formulated, the military submitted a This article expands the national se- constrained and uncertain future. budget that comports with fiscal aus- curity debate by advocating adapting the Accordingly, the Nation is again debat- terity while sustaining current readiness joint force to the emerging strategy and ing its global role and how to develop and investing in capabilities to meet security environment through enhanc- ing its shaping capabilities. The principal stimulus driving the need for change is the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, William G. Braun III is Professor of Strategy, Policy, and Landpower in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. Charles D. Allen is Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies in the which sustains the security strategy shift Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the U.S. Army War College. from deterrence and containment to
52 JPME Today / Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 cooperation through engagement. The President Bill Clinton described how the emphasize the use of economic and dip- emerging consensus suggests the future vision could be achieved through a strat- lomatic means backed by the limited use national security strategy will direct a egy of “engagement and enlargement,” of the military as a coercive instrument regionally tailored force for limited en- thus giving it structure. This particular of national power. In this era of fiscal gagement.1 As with any fundamental shift strategy relied primarily on economic and austerity, emerging consensus emphasizes in national policy objectives, strategy, or diplomatic efforts, backed by military a regionally tailored military strategy of operational concepts, the initial guidance force, and was designed to expand the limited engagement. is seldom the last word.2 The military global reach of democracy and economic The current Defense Strategic must be sized and resourced to adapt to prosperity.6 President George W. Bush’s Guidance (January 2012) directs the the realities of strategy and policy adjust- National Security Strategy reiterated military to adapt to the future strategic ments as they occur. It is critical that many of the tenets of the earlier post– environment even as it remains a “global military capabilities are resourced for the Cold War security strategies. Faced with presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific national strategy and that they posture the new reality of terrorist attacks and and the Middle East” and at the same the joint force to create and seize oppor- the emergent demands of two simultane- time is “prepared to confront and defeat tunities. The objective is a military that ous wars, Bush emphasized the role of aggression anywhere in the world,” all protects and advances U.S. interests in military power and highlighted the U.S. with a much smaller size and reduced times of peace while providing robust and prerogative for preemptive action to resources.9 In underwriting this strategy, flexible options to confront aggression counter rogue states or terrorist organiza- the Secretary of Defense is expected to worldwide. tions that might strike without warning.7 develop a joint force that is “smaller and While President Barack Obama’s 2010 leaner” but “will remain agile, flexible, A Shift from Containment National Security Strategy acknowledged ready, innovative, and technologically to Engagement the role of the military, it reverted to advanced.”10 This is a tall order that To establish context for the emerg- much of the language related to coopera- requires prioritization and trade-off of ing military narratives, it is necessary tion and burden-sharing reflective of the risk. The security establishment requires a to trace the trajectory of the national 1990s.8 model for dynamic force adaptation and security debate since the end of World The national security strategy is in a framework to develop the narrative that War II. The Cold War grand strategy, transition again. The strategic environ- guides prioritization. often attributed to “the father of con- ment presents a weak global economy, a The organizational concept of dy- tainment” George Kennan, carried struggling U.S. economy, and shrinking namic equilibrium may provide such a the Nation through the last half of the defense resources. While the current model. It draws on an ecological system 20th century.3 In his famous “X article” national security strategy is not fully metaphor to examine an organizational published in 1947, Kennan advocated developed or articulated, it appears to response to a changing environment. replacing cooperation with the Soviet conform to a general trajectory evident The “open system” ecological metaphor Union with a strategy of long-term since the Cold War, from containment is rooted in chaos, complexity, and sys- containment of their expansionist phi- and deterrence to cooperation and tems theories. Several elements of the losophies. While the strategy matured engagement, with more limited ambi- metaphor can be applied to the military’s during the Cold War, the military’s role tions than those initially expressed in adaptation to the evolving threat, secu- remained stable.4 With a few notable the 1990s. This emerging narrative is rity, and operational environments. exceptions, the Armed Forces provided designed to address a security environ- The dynamic equilibrium metaphor credible and robust conventional ment that includes a nonhostile but captures the interactive and multidi- combat capability to defend national rising rival in Asia (China), international mensional nature of systems and the interests, exercised legitimate coercive nuclear proliferation (Iran, Pakistan, and continuous adaptive change imposed power to maintain international order North Korea), revolutions against exist- by each member of an ecosystem on through containment, and demon- ing world order (the Arab Spring in the the other. This interactive adaptation is strated a mutually assured destruction African Maghreb and Egypt), continued a dynamic where the norm is constant capability that discouraged nuclear unrest in the Middle East (the Levant), change in response to multiple simulta- confrontation. and growing concern over instability and neous stimuli from other members and With the demise of the Soviet Union violence (Mexico and other Central/ elements of the system. There are two and the end of the Cold War, a search South American nations) in the Western broad mechanisms of change within the for a new grand strategy narrative began. Hemisphere. theory—iterative evolution and rapid President George H.W. Bush presented The national security strategy narra- adaptation.11 The first is more common a vision of a “new world order” to tive is expected to focus on engagement in nature. The second can produce rapid Congress in 1990 that emphasized and cooperative relationships to advance (transformational or revolutionary) “cooperation,” where “nations of the U.S. interests and establish a stable in- change, but just as often results in the world can prosper and live in harmony.”5 ternational order. It should appropriately death of many members of the system
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Braun and Allen 53 national strategy and policy objectives. The long-term horizon is based on estimates of future threats, operational environment opportunities, and the range of potential strategy and policy decisions that may be pursued by future administrations. The long-term horizon requires senior leaders to establish aspi- rational goals and a vision of the range of military capabilities to achieve them. The Services’ primary concern is with the near-term horizon, which requires the distribution of resources to maintain readiness while initiating the evolution- ary change and development initiatives that move the force in the direction of the long-term vision. Military Strategy Equilibrium. Absolute war and peace are archetypal states that are never fully realized. Competition spans a continuum from the civil order of peace through major combat manifested by war. Unattended turmoil and misunderstandings among nonhostile rivals can lead to escalation of hostility and increased incidence of extreme violence. Similarly, managing disorder within the context of combat Solider and Afghan police officer search terrain in Kunar Province prior to firefight (U.S. Army/Gary operations is necessary to nurture the civil A. Witte) order associated with peace. and the emergence of a new ecosystem. implementation concepts can facilitate the The U.S. security establishment has Death occurs when an organism stops identification of alternative approaches to acknowledged the vital role of the mili- adapting and no longer actively influences achieving national objectives. Instead of tary in shaping the security environment. or is influenced by the system.12 The physically “pivoting” to the Asia-Pacific In 1997, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs remaining sections address several dimen- and Middle East, one could envision a of Staff General John Shalikashvili stated, sions of the military’s environment that strategy that employs military power in “The military has an important role must be considered as our leaders adapt various regions to rebalance our global in engagement—helping to shape the the joint force for the future. efforts to indirectly influence the regions international environment in appropriate prioritized by U.S. national leadership.15 ways to bring about a more peaceful and Equilibrium in the In addition one may develop innovative stable world.” In the next sentence he Military Narrative ways to exploit military relationships and provided a caveat: “The purpose of our Threat versus Opportunity. National partnerships while employing other in- Armed Forces, however, is to deter and security literature tends toward threat- struments of national power. defeat threats of organized violence to based analysis. Security studies and Time Horizons Equilibrium. The our country and its interests.”16 When military planning are likely to focus on military narrative should include link- faced with austere budgets, reduced force approaches that prevent unfavorable ages to current policy, strategy, and structure, and uncertain futures, senior order and unacceptable levels of disor- resources while engaging proactively civilian and military leaders typically der,13 while identifying and planning for in actions that adapt the organization revert to a rhetoric dominated by the black swan contingencies.14 Conversely, to future threats, opportunities, and force sizing and prioritization mantra to contemporary organizational and busi- political perspectives. This results in two “fight and win the Nation’s wars,” with ness literatures promote strategies that time horizons for strategic decisions that all other uses of the military being “lesser- focus on opportunity identification and affect force development. The near-term included” capabilities. exploitation. horizon is driven by prioritized distribu- The military’s force-sizing con- Applying this opportunity perspec- tion of available resources, which has struct since the Cold War has been a tive to security strategy and military to be justified in the context of current two-theaters strategy. While arguably
54 JPME Today / Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 underresourced, the construct was based Considerations of the role landpower American Landpower: on an aspiration to fight and win two plays in this operational concept appeared Prevent—Shape—Win nearly simultaneous major regional con- late in the concept’s development.20 But The Army Chief of Staff (CSA) has Title tingencies.17 In his February 2014 press even as a latecomer, landpower’s role was 10 responsibilities to field the Army and conference, Secretary Hagel conveyed soon recognized in clearing coastal areas sustain America’s joint force. General that the construct was now passé and of surface-to-ship missiles, providing for Ray Odierno, in the 2012 Army Posture stated as well that “we are no longer siz- land-based air defense, and performing Statement, presented the Army’s ing the military to conduct long and large myriad sustainment functions associated primary roles as prevent, shape, and stability operation.” 18 He went on to say with establishing theater operations and win, with readiness, force structure, and that the Army will be sized to decisively sustaining the joint force. As this joint modernization as the principal rheostats defeat aggression in one major combat operational concept is further developed, to adjust resource prioritization to adapt theater while defending the homeland it is likely that the vital role for landpower the Army to the strategic and fiscal and supporting a joint force engagement will be better understood. environment. Current military force in another theater. If the United States adopts a realist sizing is based on a “fight and win” phi- When not engaged in war, the mili- foreign policy, the approach of balancing losophy. The fight and win imperative tary structure and its inherent capabilities rising powers with regional partners and encompasses decisive joint combat capa- are available to America’s political leaders preserving the ability to counter rivals bilities for the rapid defeat of enemies for other missions. In practice the mili- once hostilities commence is a sound and a decisive end to hostilities. tary does a great deal more than simply strategy. The Air-Sea Battle operational The “win to prevent” paradigm of- preparing for and executing regional con- concept facilitates countering a hostile fers two paths to achieving a political tingencies and major combat operations. enemy with strategic stand-off and anti- objective prior to the onset of combat. Especially with regard to landpower, access/area-denial capabilities. A force-in-being’s “win” capabilities a force capable of fighting two major However, senior national security discourage opportunistic rivals from regional contingencies can accomplish a leaders should reconsider the utility of engaging in hostilities and prevent hostil- number of “lesser-included” tasks during resourcing an operational concept that ity expansion to other regions after the periods of relative peace. The deterrent limits the range of military options to start of conflict. America must maintain quality of a ready force is intended to direct confrontation, especially when a legitimate military deterrent power provide the Nation with sufficient coer- countering nonhostile rivals. Such an ap- by fielding a force-in-being capable of cive power to discourage the escalation proach seems unwise, especially in cases decisively defeating any enemy while of national rivalries into major combat where the rival’s economic markets may demonstrating the political will to use it. operations. Should that deterrence fail, be closely linked to the U.S. economy. The Air-Sea Battle concept combined the military’s mission has historically been This limited approach would leave our with operational concepts for landpower to decisively defeat the enemy. leaders with few military options to (combined arms maneuver, wide area Realist/Balancer versus Idealist/ counter a rival that confronts the Nation security, counterinsurgency, and coun- Engagement Foreign Policy. Air-Sea directly with economic and diplomatic terterrorism doctrines) provide the Battle has occupied a great portion of power, and employs military power basis for decisive combat operations to the public debate regarding the mili- through distant or amorphous proxies. accomplish the military’s “win” mission. tary’s strategic narrative since the release One can easily envision the coercive Air-Sea Battle facilitates coercive access of the Defense Strategic Guidance. Air- power levers a rival could bring to bear to contested areas, thereby enabling Sea Battle’s key characteristics include short of hostilities, making military em- landpower forces to deploy, stabilize, and military involvement starting at the ployment options and posturing to deter exploit successes in the accomplishment commencement of hostilities, withstand- hostilities moot. of strategic objectives. However, short ing an initial attack, executing a blinding The prioritization of resources to of resorting to coercive methods and and suppression campaign against enemy prepare the military for the future must direct hostilities, an emphasis on “win” long-range intelligence, reconnais- accommodate both the future security capabilities offers few military options sance, and surveillance (ISR) and strike environment and the political reality that using cooperation and engagement to systems, and seizing the initiative in the U.S. policy and international action do address rivals who choose to challenge sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains. not align perfectly with either realist or U.S. interests. From this posture, the execution of the idealist perspectives of political science The military’s ability to shape the concept would create time for “options theory. Actual policy and international security environment addresses such to resolve a prolonged conventional political choice reflect a hybrid approach. nonhostile or indirect competition. In conflict on favorable terms” through The range of military capabilities must addition, shaping provides for the es- blockades, sustained logistics, and the accommodate options for dealing with tablishment of conditions that support expansion of military and industrial the future environment that are based in a return to civil order once employment production.19 both realist and idealist perspectives. of “win” capabilities manages extant
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Braun and Allen 55 hostilities. The shaping function is •• Shaping operations permit the mili- defeating threats than developing military directed toward influencing the focal na- tary to contribute to the engagement capabilities to manage the security en- tion’s people and leadership. Influencing and enlargement objectives associ- vironment. Americans understandably segments of a society and their leader- ated with promoting liberty under prefer short-duration, decisive conflicts, ship short of conflict is achieved largely the rule of law, human rights, and and they frequently consider wars to be through trust relationships and coopera- the subordination of the military to acts of political choice. However, in The tive engagements. For the military these legitimate civil authority throughout Utility of Force, Rupert Smith presents operations are normally landpower-cen- the peace-war continuum. a convincing argument that protracted tric. Thus, in addition to traditional fight conflicts “among the people” repre- Unlike combat operations, shaping does and win capabilities, the Army needs to sent the reality of modern warfare.25 not require the threat of hostilities to ex- develop an ethos that embraces shaping Managing the security environment ecute. The military can conduct Building as part of its warrior culture. through shaping offers an attractive Partner Capacity, Security Cooperation, “Shape to win” and “shape to alternative to either proposition—de- Stability, and Security Force Assistance prevent” paradigms have their own cisive large-scale conflict or protracted missions in the absence of a threat; or it mechanisms to achieve desired objectives. war “among the people.” First, shaping can combine these shaping operations The “shape to win” model is analogous operations provide a feasible and prudent with counterinsurgency and counterter- to flexible deterrent options and has been alternative in which U.S. military capa- ror combat missions to synergistic effect associated with campaign planning for bilities advance cooperative behaviors in nonpermissive security environments decades. The “shape to prevent” model to maintain a stable security environ- short of major combat operations. manifests itself in several ways, with the ment short of coercive hostility. Second, In 2005, Department of Defense common theme of enriching coopera- involvement in wars and deteriorating (DOD) Directive 3000.05 established tion and partnerships that contribute to security environments is not always sub- security operations as a core military favorable order. Shaping contributes to ject to U.S. preference or choice. History mission. It directed that stability (shap- achieving national security objectives in is replete with examples of Washington ing) operations “shall be given priority environments that span conditions from being compelled to military action to comparable to combat operations.”21 On civil order to war and back to civil order. restore order or confront aggression. a national scale, this effort was reinforced The shaping role contributes to win- Forward presence shaping operations can when President George W. Bush signed ning and preventing war in a number of provide early warning and offer nonco- National Security Presidential Directive ways: ercive access, thereby opening a range of 44 directing the Department of State military options to prevent war or restore Forward presence shaping opera- to be lead agent, using the Office of •• civil order short of major combat opera- tions provide early warning by means the Coordinator of Reconstruction and tions. Unfortunately, shaping operations of regional cultural engagement, Stabilization to coordinate and harmo- associated with forward presence, part- and opportunities to gather human nize all strategies and plans associated nering to build relationships,26 security intelligence and geographic access with reconstruction and stabilization cooperation, and stability operations27 through established relationships. activities for states transitioning from continue to be misunderstood, under- The shaping role develops a cooper- conflict and civil strife.22 •• valued, and underresourced in austere ation-based capacity and desire for More recently the 2012 Defense economic environments. regional partners to confront military Budget Guidance, which followed the The development of shaping opera- challenges in a manner that could Defense Strategic Guidance, called for tions requires the deliberate resourcing not be achieved independently. “a fresh approach to the traditional ‘two of specific force design, readiness, and Conducting shaping operations with war’ force-sizing construct that had •• modernization initiatives. Embracing supportive partners can block rival shaped defense planning since the end of shaping does not imply undervaluing power ambitions short of hostilities; the cold war.”23 Yet, of the military’s 10 the imperative to “fight and win the it is a realist/balancing argument. primary missions outlined in the guid- Nation’s wars.” Shaping and winning Shaping operations conducted with ance, only 4 are designated as criteria for •• operations are appropriately designed to potentially opportunistic partners force sizing. Three of the four involve provide complementary capabilities. One offer positive cooperative engage- building the capacity to win wars. The generally accepted lesson has emerged ment incentives short of confronta- shaping missions that provide stabilizing from the last several decades of conflict: tion to modify their behavior. presence and support counterinsurgency the resultant civil order—not the defeat Shaping facilitates U.S. force operations are accompanied by specified •• of a specific threat—defines victory in redeployment following hostilities caveats limiting their resourcing.24 modern warfare. By necessity, if there are with some assurance of leaving the Both 2012 defense guidance insufficient resources to prepare for both foundations of sustainable civil order documents convey that the U.S. secu- missions simultaneously, a portion of the behind. rity establishment is more focused on force may temporarily focus on the “win”
56 JPME Today / Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Soldiers rally in urban operations complex at Nevada Test and Training Range (U.S. Air Force/ Michael R. Holzworth) or “shape” role during a particular opera- operations, primarily Building Partner while requiring the Army to develop and tion or deployment. But that does not Capacity, Security Cooperation, and design tailored capabilities to execute absolve operational units of the require- Stability (especially when they involve these missions. Once U.S. political lead- ment to conduct either decisive combat development or law enforcement) fall ership recognizes the value of military or shaping operations with a limited outside DOD’s roles, missions, and shaping operations as a legitimate foreign amount of predeployment or rotational authorities. For this reason, national policy execution tool during peacetime, training. leaders are reluctant to commit resources the Army will have to embrace the America’s security establishment to build DOD capabilities to engage in shaping mission within its professional should acknowledge the vital role of land- these operations, and security-minded jurisdiction. power as the force capable of shaping a interagency partners are not willing to A military argument for resisting the population-centric security environment, allow the department to assume responsi- prioritization of resources for shaping whether through the coercive power bility for their execution. capabilities is a belief that any reduction of combat operations or the influence Shaping operations are necessary to in the “fight and win” capability will generated by shaping operations. “Shape prevent conflict, mitigate its impact, and endanger the military’s contract with the to prevent” and “shape to win” models provide the opportunity to transition to American people—to win the Nation’s define the respective conditions necessary some form of a sustainable civil order. wars. Adherents to this view proffer the to achieve political and military victory in In the last decade of war, no Federal opinion that should the military fail at modern warfare. agency has marshaled the resources or shaping, there are other Federal depart- The arguments against resourcing changed its capability sufficiently to ex- ments and agencies capable of providing shaping capabilities and capacities align ecute these missions as well as the Army. assistance. There is not, however, an- generally with the following themes. Some adjustments in roles, missions, and other agency that can fight and win the First, it is not the function of DOD or authorities are therefore necessary to en- Nation’s wars. the Army to execute these operations. able other agencies to set objectives and This argument has merit. DOD and The activities associated with shaping provide oversight when developing plans, the Services cannot abandon their duty
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Braun and Allen 57 Marines select targets in tactical movement training at Camp Rodriguez, South Korea (DOD/James Norman) to win wars: The notion of winning in The continuity of the U.S. post–Cold given the current fiscal environment. The modern warfare (and arguably through- War security strategy of cooperative argument to limit resource expenditures, out history) involves a great deal more engagement, implemented through however, is compelling in light of U.S. than simply defeating the enemy’s army economic and diplomatic instruments of fiscal circumstances. Faced with a volatile or planting the U.S. flag in the enemy’s power reinforced by military power, is operating environment, austere resources, capital. It involves encouraging legitimate appealing. The past two decades suggest and an ambiguous group of adversaries, government and developing indigenous that even altruistic aspirations to spread the Nation must strive for dynamic equi- force capabilities that permit U.S. dis- democracy, human rights, and economic librium as it adapts the joint force to win engagement with some assurance of prosperity through diplomacy and eco- conflicts, manage security environments, sustainable security and order. nomic initiatives alone are often foiled by and shape civil order within constrained adversaries with different agendas. U.S. resources. The new security culture must Conclusion military leadership must embrace civilian embrace the military’s “shape” and “win” In summer 2013, DOD’s Cost Assess- leaders’ expressed desire to reduce the roles. Shaping operations are primarily ment and Program Evaluation organiza- size and economic burden of the force, landpower centric because they are con- tion released the results of the Strategic while at the same time preparing it for the ducted in the human domain among the Choices and Management Review full range of potential confrontations. people. The Army must and will carry the (SCMR) study directed by Secretary The argument that the military must burden of successfully executing shaping of Defense Chuck Hagel. The SCMR retain the ability to “fight and win the operations in support of America’s for- provided resource prioritization guid- Nation’s wars” when shaping operations eign policy security goals. ance to the Quadrennial Defense Review are resourced as lesser included capabili- Current defense guidance charges effort within three broad funding bands. ties is incongruous with current national the military with defeating future threats It did not alter the regionally prioritized, security strategy aspirations. And it is not and protecting national interests world- limited engagement strategy proposed in realistic to expect the whole-of-govern- wide. To do that in an austere resource the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.28 ment engagement capability to increase environment, the force must improve
58 JPME Today / Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 operational effectiveness and efficiency Then he invokes the role of diplomats, develop- vember 9, 2011, available at
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Braun and Allen 59 Marine Corps linguist for Female Engagement Team 11-2, Task Force Leatherneck, explains how to care for wound at district center in Delaram, Nimroz Province, Afghanistan (U.S. Marine Corps/Catie D. Edwards)
Targeting the JIIM Way A More Inclusive Approach
By John Bilas, Scott A. Hoffman, John S. Kolasheski, Kevin Toner, and Douglas Winton
onsider two scenarios. The reduction in opium production. At neither achievement is attributable to International Security Assistance the same time, a U.S. Army brigade following formalized doctrinal guid- C Force (ISAF) and international defeats an insurgent cell in Kandahar ance on how best to “target” problems community decide to more effectively City without firing a single shot. Yet preventing the achievement of desired and efficiently organize their resources despite a systematic focus on joint outcomes or effects. and activities to tackle the Afghan doctrine and a whole-of-government While Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, opium trade, leading to a significant approach to address these scenarios, Joint Targeting, dated January 31, 2013, provides a rather comprehensive approach to targeting, it does not ad- Lieutenant Colonel John Bilas, USMC, is the III Marine Expeditionary Force Intelligence Plans Officer equately address all the joint, interagency, in Okinawa, Japan. Lieutenant Colonel Scott A. Hoffman, USAF, commands the 455th Expeditionary intergovernmental, and multinational Operations Support Squadron at Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan. Colonel John S. Kolasheski, USA, is a (JIIM) considerations required to Staff Officer assigned to U.S. Army Forces Command. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Toner, USA, is the Public Affairs Officer for U.S. Army Japan and I Corps (Forward). Colonel Douglas Winton, USA, is a U.S. Army synchronize activities and achieve de- War College Professor Candidate. sired effects. JP 3-60 requires further
60 JPME Today / Targeting the JIIM Way JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 refinement as it fails to guide either com- Table 1. Comparison of Joint Publications manders or staffs to examine the process Joint Publication (JP) “Interagency” Instances for adequately including nonlethal activi- JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning 81 ties and interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities. This article JP 3-0, Joint Operations 20 offers several ways to improve the joint JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations 544 targeting process in a JIIM environment JP 3-60, Joint Targeting 5 by reviewing how joint doctrine discusses JIIM considerations and showing how and strategic objectives becomes readily achieve desired effects throughout a joint JP 3-60 remains too focused on “lethal” apparent. Since 2001 joint doctrine has campaign.5 activities, recommending a new cognitive evolved to incorporate interagency, inter- On the other hand, JP 3-08, model to help commanders achieve their governmental, and multinational actors Interorganizational Coordination During desired endstates, providing examples of into military plans and operations, but it Joint Operations, provides both guidance successful targeting across JIIM, and rec- still fails to address how best to involve and best practices for conducting either ommending a more broadly acceptable all JIIM partners in targeting. A quick interorganizational or interagency coor- name for the process. review of current joint doctrine illustrates dination to achieve unity of effort and this point. Comparing the instances common understanding and to ensure a Joint Doctrine of the use of the word interagency in whole-of-government approach toward Joint doctrine is the body of basic joint publications, the disparity between joint operations.6 JP 3-08 explains the principles that guide the employment planning and executing JIIM activities challenges of achieving JIIM unity of ef- of U.S. military force in synchronized, becomes evident (see table 1). fort, but it is focused more on planning coordinated action toward common JP 5-0 states, “Achieving national than execution. goals and objectives.1 It readily rec- strategic objectives requires effective uni- As a result, the Joint Interagency ognizes the need for both coordina- fied action resulting in unity of effort. Coordination Group (JIACG) developed tion and unity of effort between the This is accomplished by collaboration, a combatant commander’s resource to military and other U.S. Government synchronization, and coordination in better assist and coordinate operations. agencies. In addition, joint doctrine the use of the diplomatic, informational, Published in 2007, the Commander’s rightfully acknowledges that achieving military, and economic instruments of Handbook for the Joint Interagency national strategic, theater strategic, and national power”2 and throughout all Coordination Group serves as a bridg- operational desired conditions requires phases in a joint campaign. It outlines ing reference between the JIACG’s ad more than just military instruments how the joint force commander should hoc processes and procedures and the of national power. Indeed, as clearly apply joint functions to joint targeting development of formal written doctrine.7 expressed in JP 5-0, Joint Operation and describes how consensus building It offers useful ideas to improve JIIM Planning, during Phase 0 (shape the among JIIM partners is essential to meet- planning but is silent on interagency par- environment) the diplomatic, infor- ing both national and strategic objectives. ticipation in targeting as a mechanism to mational, and economic instruments The resulting unity of effort creates a overcome the strategic factors that might of national power have primacy, with commonality of purpose between the be preventing the achievement of desired military support in activities such as military and the other instruments of outcomes. As described in this handbook, military-to-military engagements and national power.3 JP 5-0 further describes “the JIACG is a fully integrated partici- foreign internal defense (FID) train- how JIIM organizations can be involved pant on the [combatant commander’s] ing. While military activities typically throughout joint planning and assess- staff with a daily focus on joint strategic have precedence during Phases I, II, ment processes to ensure that command planning,”8 lacking the mechanisms and III (deter the enemy, seize the relationships, objectives, and other plan- inherent in the targeting process to initiative, and dominate the enemy), ning considerations are understood.4 In synchronize fully interagency efforts. primacy reverts to the other instruments turn, this enables JIIM organizations to Current doctrine encourages military tar- of national power in Phases IV and V provide timely and effective feedback and geting to achieve military objectives with (stabilize the environment and enable pertinent input into the planning process. a subsequent coordination in the JIACG. civil authority). Critically, stakeholders JP 3-0, Joint Operations, discusses the Because “many national strategic will achieve greater and more enduring importance of synchronizing plans and objectives require the combined and effects by coordinating and synchroniz- operations with interagency, intergov- coordinated use of the diplomatic, ing military and nonmilitary efforts ernmental, multinational, and partner informational, military, and economic throughout all phases. entities, but it too fails to address fully instruments of national power sup- Assessing operations over the last de- how these parties should be included ported by and coordinated with that of cade, the imperative of JIIM planning to in targeting or focused operations to our multinational partners and various meet and/or promote national interests [intergovernmental organizations],
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Bilas et al. 61 [nongovernmental organizations], and yet recognize the full potential of all the delivery of a lethal effect, but rather on regional security organizations,”9 we pro- JIIM actors during conflict. The exist- how a country can protect itself from pose updating joint targeting doctrine to ing model’s efficacy is proven and useful internal and external security threats. include these participants. The current JP during Phases II and III but becomes While it is true the “assistance” will in- 3-60 defines targeting thusly: less instructive as operations transition struct other security forces on how to kill, to Phases IV and V. Similar to Phase 0, among other skills, there is little to no Targeting systematically analyzes and these latter phases require even greater lethal activity occurring. In reality, most prioritizes targets and matches appropriate coordination and synchronization with SFA and FID involves teaching logistics, lethal and nonlethal actions to those targets interagency, intergovernmental, and mul- command and control, and the staff to create specific desired effects that achieve tinational partners as demands for their functions necessary to recruit, man, train, the Joint Force Commander’s . . . objectives, unique capabilities grow. equip, and sustain host nation security accounting for operational requirements, forces—hardly lethal. capabilities, and the results of previous A New Cognitive Model This lethal/nonlethal dichotomy assessments.10 The references above demonstrate hinders the commander’s ability to vi- that the joint force values building sualize the full expanse of the operating While this description appears to unity of effort with the military’s JIIM environment, creates the strong potential suggest targeting as a comprehensive, partners; however, the doctrine does to overlook opportunities, and can reduce systematic, and inclusive process, a closer not extend to execution via the joint staff efficiency since, as stated earlier, staffs examination of the document reveals targeting process. The following offers often organize into separate lethal and that interagency, intergovernmental, and an updated model for joint targeting, nonlethal targeting cells. This inherently multinational considerations receive little which all JIIM actors can easily use decreases efficiency as it stovepipes infor- attention. Instead, it mostly describes across the range of military operations. mation, creates unnecessary hindrances to how these organizations can inform the Considering the numerous joint information flow among staff sections, and intelligence and assessment processes activities across the range of military all but eliminates synergistic effects among the joint force commander uses when operations during all phases, only a small targeting cells. Rather, individual targeting developing targeting plans. It does not fraction pertains to killing the enemy. cells focus on distinct problems and the illustrate how these same organizations Currently, however, JP 3-60 heavily application of distinct lethal or nonlethal inform the planning and execution of emphasizes lethal employment and activities. Instead of synchronizing efforts targeting operations.11 is disproportionately enemy-focused. after the fact, we recommend a single tar- A further comparison within JP 3-60 Therefore, the first step to creating geting cell and single targeting approach. provides a similar narrative regarding the a more expansive cognitive model of Such an approach is more efficient, more terms lethal and nonlethal. The word targeting is to erase the terms lethal and comprehensive, provides greater synergy, lethal appears 30 times while nonlethal nonlethal from the lexicon since they better synchronizes activities resource al- appears 41 times. Based on this simple confuse analysis and encourage stove- location, and organizationally requires a examination of the document, one could pipe thinking. Organizing the targeting smaller staff. conclude that the two activities earn staff into lethal and nonlethal cells, as is In an ideal setting, targeting is a con- roughly equal discussions, but a more common, decreases effectiveness and effi- tinuous process to assess the operating thorough inspection indicates otherwise. ciency because of the duality of effort and environment (OE) in order to identify Of the 41 nonlethal entries, 7 are about high probability that the efforts them- strategic factors and determine the activi- nonlethal weapons while 12 (30 percent) selves could become desynchronized. ties necessary for achieving operational occur on just two pages (II-15 and II- Indeed, JP 3-60 implies such a staff objectives, develop courses of action 16). JP 3-60 wisely includes examples organization, noting that, “There is typi- (COA) to overcome the strategic fac- to help commanders better understand cally a parallel lethal/nonlethal effort at tors, allocate resources, assign tasks, and the targeting process. However, all four the working group level, due to time and reassess the OE to evaluate the effect examples discuss only lethal activities SME availability. In some cases, an addi- of the activity or identify additional to attack enemy capabilities (destroying tional [Joint Targeting Working Group] strategic factors that might provide new enemy air defenses; disrupting the enemy may be required to process, deconflict, opportunities and/or challenges preclud- petroleum, oil, and lubrication infrastruc- and prioritize all nominated targets.”12 ing the organization from achieving its ture; defeating the enemy air force; and Since killing is rarely the expressed desired outcomes. Since targeting should destroying two bridges). intent across the range of military opera- be tied to a higher headquarters plan, Joint targeting doctrine has cer- tions, what then is “lethal”? Joint forces the commander’s operational approach tainly matured over the last decade to often characterize security force assistance must inform the targeting process to capture the real-world experiences of (SFA) or FID in “lethal targeting.” On bring activities to bear that transform the commanders and staffs continuously closer examination, neither of these joint OE from current to desired conditions. operating jointly. However, it does not force activities focuses primarily on the Subsequently, targeting synchronizes
62 JPME Today / Targeting the JIIM Way JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Air Force major examines patient at temporary medical site at Killick Haitian Coast Guard Base in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, during Continuing Promise 2011 (U.S. Navy/Eric C. Tretter) the activities across JIIM organizations urbanization. The targeting process multinational partners and/or host na- to achieve the intermediate military synchronizes “short-term” activities to tion individuals into the process. objectives or, equally important, the achieve the supporting objectives. objectives/goals of JIIM partners be- JP 5-0’s “operational approach” Organizing the Staff yond merely military objectives. This clearly illustrates how lines of effort Just as commanders must routinely helps inform the development of the (LOEs) extend beyond the scope of adjust task organization to meet envi- Commander’s Critical Information only the military instrument of power to ronmental and operational changes, Requirements, which seek to answer not include, for example, education, infra- they must also consider staff changes only questions on the effective implemen- structure, and economic development. A to ensure the appropriate integration tation of the operational approach but line of effort is a conceptual category that of JIIM partners throughout all phases the targeting process as a whole. allows an organization to unify the ef- of an operation. As noted above, many Targeting is the process of addressing forts of all participants toward a common joint force organizations at strategic the strategic factors that prevent progress purpose. Usually LOEs are closely related through tactical levels have reflexively from current to desired conditions. The but need not be sequential in nature.13 split their targeting staffs into lethal and strategic factors will vary across OEs Hence, optimally applied targeting will nonlethal cells. This dubious bifurcation but might include challenges and op- best achieve synchronization of efforts tends to result in stovepiped analysis portunities such as corruption, security when it includes all JIIM stakeholders. and recommendations that pit the sector capacity, black market economies, While ideal, we acknowledge the inher- “meat-eaters” against the “leaf-eaters.” resource scarcity, ethnic conflict, and ent difficulty and sensitivity in bringing Too often, this results in nonlethal plans
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Bilas et al. 63 Chief engineer discusses power line construction with Kabul Electricity Directorate engineering liaison and U.S. State Department representative in Seh Du-kahn, Parwan Province (U.S. Navy/Tom Jones) that are inadequately integrated with of effort. Officers and senior noncommis- recommended staff targeting process is the overall plan, inadequately resourced, sioned officers with unique experiences designed to develop synergy across the and inadequately executed leaving com- or education may generate the best ideas. staff to produce fully integrated opera- manders and lethal staffs frustrated at Indeed, each cell will require officers and tions. Additionally, this recommendation the lack of nonlethal progress. senior noncommissioned officers who provides an institutional access point and The commander should overcome fully understand their targeting roles and incentive for our interagency, intergov- this divide by organizing the staff around how the process contributes to opera- ernmental, and multinational partners the various lines of effort. Because doc- tional success. In a complex and dynamic to participate since it improves commu- trine cannot anticipate every LOE for JIIM environment, finding the right nication among stakeholders, provides a which an organization might operate, person for the right position will rely on venue for positions to be heard, and en- it cannot prescribe the staff organiza- intuition and judgment that can only be sures that initiatives are better conceived, tion that is optimal for every scenario. marginally informed by traditional staff integrated, and synchronized. The commander or his designated rep- structures and grade plates. resentative should consider individual Organizing the staff into LOE cells Staff Targeting Process skills and attributes more than Service, with the right people does not guarantee Physical organization of the staff is just branch, or rank. Traditional training and the staff will overcome the stovepiping the beginning; inevitably the people professional military education are often tendency. Once the correct cells have who form the staff will separate into insufficient to produce the skills and at- been established, they must coordinate various working groups to address the tributes that yield excellence in analysis their efforts and provide input into problems at hand. Figure 1 depicts a and planning along a nontraditional line other working groups (WGs). Our staff process that might typically lead
64 JPME Today / Targeting the JIIM Way JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 to getting a commander’s decision on Figure 1. The Staffing Process recommended courses of action and/or the allocation of resources. LOE WG Working groups and boards exist in doctrine and in many headquarters to address the first two steps of the targeting Assessment LOE WG Joint Working process: assess the OE to identify strategic CONOP WG Targeting Group Coordination factors, and develop COAs to overcome LOE WG Board the factors. However, little practical or applicable work is accomplished within the groups; rather, in practice, the staff LOE WG sections often work independently of one another outside the respective working Key: CONOP = concept of operations; LOE = lines of effort; WG = working group group meetings to identify challenges and concomitant solutions. Hence, working Figure 2. A New Approach to JIIM Targeting group meetings often become merely informational briefings. Staffs must avoid this tendency. Effective JIIM organiza- Resources Activities Influencers tions will establish an environment in SOF Raid/Attack Military Leaders which the staff purposefully discusses Predator Air Strike Political Leaders Desired ideas at the working groups. Effective USAID Project Religious Leaders Effect JIIM targeting requires a battle rhythm CERP Jobs Program Business Leaders event specifically dedicating time for the Commander Key Leader Bureaucrats staff to focus on the OE and the target- Military Units Engagement Organizations ing process. An enforced battle rhythm also provides the often less-resourced JIIM actors the necessary predictability to Finally, figure 2 provides a new target- of the problem and/or identify compre- contribute. The resulting working group ing model that works throughout the hensive solutions. products should organize the discussion, range of military operations, does not capture and share information across the separate lethal and nonlethal, and is useful Examples of Effective staff, and help subordinate units parallel to all JIIM actors. This cognitive model JIIM Targeting plan and not simply brief the meeting’s is designed to help stakeholders think Following the joint doctrine meth- chairperson. through options to address strategic fac- odology of providing examples to The entire targeting staff gathers to tors throughout the continuous targeting illustrate ideas and concepts, we offer assess the effects of the previous targeting process in order to generate comprehen- an expansion on the two introduced at cycle’s engagements and the overall OE sive and synchronized solutions. the beginning of this article. The first at the start of each targeting cycle. With The steps are as follows: 1) determine example is at the theater-strategic level an agreed-upon and comprehensive as- the desired effect to overcome a strategic whereby ISAF, the Afghan government, sessment in hand, the LOE WGs meet to factor(s), 2) determine the resources and international community employed assess in more detail and develop COAs and activities needed to achieve the ef- a whole-of-government approach to to overcome the strategic factors. The fect, and 3) identify the positive and synchronize Afghan counternarcotics Concept of Operations WG is another negative influencers who have a stake in efforts. The second is an example where gathering of the entire targeting staff in both the problem and the solution. This this new cognitive model was success- which the LOEs present their COAs to cognitive model overcomes the inher- fully applied at the tactical level during the group for consideration and input ent tendency of staffs to see only limited a U.S. Army brigade’s deployment to and ultimately for approval by the meet- solutions within the lethal and nonlethal southern Afghanistan in 2011–2012. ing’s chair. The final Joint Targeting realms. Just as one can defeat an enemy In the first example, ISAF and the Coordination Board provides the com- cell nonlethally by removing a reason to broader international community devel- mander or designee the opportunity to fight, one can also strengthen governance oped programs and policies to confront approve the COAs and provide guidance lethally by killing or capturing those cre- Afghanistan’s opium trade. Although the for the next targeting cycle. The length of ating instability in a designated operating approach did not formally use the target- targeting cycles depends on the OE and environment. A stovepiped organization, ing process explained here, the thinking often the phase. Phase II and III cycles or an organization whose activities are involved with identifying strategic factors may only be days long while the Phase 0, synchronized after the fact, severely limits and courses of action to overcome them IV, and V cycles may be months. the staff’s ability to identify the full scope was similar.
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Bilas et al. 65 Table 2. Afghan Poppy Cultivation and Opium Production State District Support Team determined Year Annual Poppy Cultivation (hectacres) Annual Opium Production (metric tons) that: 1) the subdistrict police commander was related to the provincial chief of 2006 165 6,100 police and might have acquaintances in 2007 193 8,200 the attack network, 2) the manager was 2008 157 7,700 leery about traveling within the subdis- 2009 123 6,900 trict as he had little to offer the people, 2010 123 3,600 and 3) the village elders were politi- 2011 131 5,800 cally disaffected. From this analysis, the commander determined that the risk as- 2012 154 3,700 sociated with maintaining the status quo Source: Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index (Washington, DC: The Brookings coupled with the prospect that this insta- Institution, December 13, 2012), 20, available at
66 JPME Today / Targeting the JIIM Way JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 2 veiled threat of violence to the contrac- Conclusions JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Wash- ington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, tor. The contractor correctly explained Throughout recent history, but par- 2011), xiv. that the villagers lacked the necessary ticularly over the last decade, incor- 3 Ibid., II-8. construction skills. Therefore, the brigade porating JIIM organizations into the 4 Ibid., chapter II. placated the elders by coordinating voca- planning process has been critical to 5 JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, tional training for the village. Due to the achieving national and strategic inter- DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011). 6 JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination visible drama surrounding these projects, ests. To provide basic guidance, various During Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The the subdistrict manager did not want to publications and joint doctrine have Joint Staff, June 24, 2011), I-6. invite the media to the groundbreakings. evolved to incorporate JIIM organiza- 7 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Com- The brigade did not press him on that tions into the military planning process. mander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency point. While local media coverage would One positive example is JP 5-0, Joint Coordination Group (JIACG) (Suffolk, VA: Joint Forces Command, March 1, 2007), i. have been helpful, it was not necessary Operation Planning. However, the 8 Ibid., vi. to overcome the identified problem and current edition of JP 3-60, Joint Tar- 9 Ibid., II-1. therefore not worth derailing ongoing geting, neglects to address all the JIIM 10 JP 3-60, Joint Targeting (Washington, progress. In terms of security, the police considerations required to synchronize DC: The Joint Staff, January 31, 2013), vii. increased their patrolling, and time- activities to achieve desired targeting 11 Ibid., III-19. 12 Ibid., III-3. sensitive operations removed some of the effects. To provide the requisite guid- 13 JP 5-0, III-15. enemy cell leaders and motivated others ance to commanders and staff on fully 14 Report on Progress Toward Security and to depart the area. Overcoming the im- examining both lethal and nonlethal Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress peding strategic factors in this subdistrict activities and incorporating all of the (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, required 2 months of innovative targeting JIIM partners, JP 3-60 needs further December 2012), 23. that did not include any lethal activities. revising. Furthermore, recognizing No shots were fired. This targeting effort that doctrine is only as effective as the helped reduce enemy violence by almost people who implement it, the U.S. 60 percent from summer 2011 to sum- military should engender greater cross- mer 2012.14 organizational exposure to interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational JIIM Engaging partners to include greater integration Finally, a term other than targeting of professional development/educa- might be necessary to synchronize tion programs and training exercises. JIIM efforts. Organizations outside This increased exposure should result the military abhor it as it implies lethal in more understanding, which can activities. Nonmilitary actors some- become the foundation for more trust, times go so far as to say, “We don’t which is a critical ingredient for more do targeting.” A more appropriate effectiveness. term is engaging, which more broadly America’s military has an overwhelm- addresses the numerous options for ing advantage in planning and in the overcoming strategic factors. Engaging ability to incorporate JIIM actors into the may involve lethal force, but it more planning process. While such collabora- commonly involves diplomacy and tion is in the forefront of joint doctrine development. By accepting a new term regarding planning, we fall short when for the process, nonmilitary JIIM actors planning meets execution. It is only when would find themselves more amenable JIIM partners are fully synchronized in to joining the process. Hence, the doc- both planning and execution that we will trinal Joint Targeting Decision Board realize the comprehensive effects neces- would become the Joint Engagement sary to achieve our national and strategic Decision Board, with the JIIM stake- objectives. JFQ holders collaborating to approve courses of action to synchronize the activities to achieve desired effects. The intrepid Notes reader will reread this piece substituting 1 the conjugation of “to target” for “to Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associ- engage” and realize that more compre- ated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, hensive options are available. November 8, 2010, as amended through December 15, 2012).
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Bilas et al. 67 Air Force crews perform preflight checks as B-1 Lancer flies overhead during operational readiness exercise at Ellsworth Air Force Base (U.S. Air Force/Zachary Hada)
racies, seems less applicable against modern peer competitors. What Airpower and happens to the theory when the exploit- able vulnerability is in another ring? Two decades later, it seems that the Globalization Effects interconnected web of international trade has changed the effects of certain warfighting strategies, rendering an Rethinking the Five Rings integrated economy vulnerable to infra- structure (third ring) attacks. This target By Michael W. Pietrucha set is particularly attractive because in a globalized economy, the transport of materials and goods is a chain that lies n 1988 Colonel John Warden, USAF, two decades. The theory advocated partially outside the protection provided developed the “Five Rings” model, airpower as a force that could bypass by the fifth ring. Nowhere is this more I classifying a country as a system the outermost ring to achieve effects apparent than in the realm of maritime organized into five rings. Given trac- against the others, presumably with a transportation, particularly in the Indo- tion in the Gulf War, the model has decisive effect. But this model, which Pacific region. been a staple of airpower advocacy for seemed perfect for Middle East autoc- The implications for military strategy are profound. For the United States, it means that the force-on-force challenge Colonel Michael W. Pietrucha, USAFR, is the Individual Mobilization Augmentee to Pacific Air Forces. of using advanced penetrating systems
68 Commentary / Airpower and Globalization Effects JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 in the teeth of an advanced integrated Figure 1. Altered Five Ring Model air defense system may not be necessary. It also means that the characteristics of Fielded Forces air forces, namely their speed, range, pulatio and flexibility, are well suited to an in- Po n terdiction strategy intended to deprive a ure uct country of the materials needed to sustain str fra day-to-day operations. It is time to reex- In s al amine the strategy assumptions that have ti n e rs s de h served as the foundation for air campaign a ip s e E
L c
planning in the region. i
n
a
g r
Overview O With the pivot to the Pacific, the United States is staking its position as the primary exporter of Pacific stability. As a Pacific nation, it maintains a posi- tion as an explicit guarantor of freedom of access to the global commons. Accordingly, Washington faces several nations who understandably have dif- fering foreign policy goals in a context economic essentials that cannot be shipping. Some 310 vessels (including 70 that is rife with historical enmities, ter- sourced domestically. In 2011 Asia and warships) went down due to the planes. ritorial disputes, and competition for Oceana accounted for 51 percent of the Mines laid by the USAAF accounted for resources, much like any other region world’s maritime cargoes loaded and 56 257 vessels totaling 580,000 tons sunk, of the world. The key difference lies in percent of the cargoes offloaded, dwarf- 36 times the number of ships sunk by one overwhelming geographic factor: ing Europe at 19 percent and 23 percent, mines laid by all other sources combined.2 this region is greatly shaped by water respectively.1 Accordingly, any Pacific Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, mostly and the lines of communication and strategic interdiction will have a signifi- carrier-based, accounted for or assisted commerce that overlay the maritime cant maritime interdiction component. with another 653 ships. While subma- domain. Because of the geography rines sank the vast majority of Japanese of Asia, international road and rail Relevant Air Force History merchant vessels, aircraft counted for the links are inferior to maritime links for For the United States, the application of majority of warships. Maritime interdic- international transport and sometimes airpower against ships got off to a rocky tion was recognized as an air mission by even for domestic movement. It might start. Brigadier General Billy Mitchell the end of World War II. be overstating the case to assert that participated in Project B in 1921, exam- In Korea the U.S. Navy successfully those transportation links are inherently ining the effectiveness of bomber air- blockaded both North Korean coasts, fragile, but some are vulnerable to inter- craft against warships. American planes preventing hostile naval forces from af- diction. The strategy is referred to here sank two captured German vessels, fecting the conflict. In 1972 the United as strategic interdiction, a joint mission followed by the much-heralded sinking States embarked on a mining campaign designed to prevent the movement of of the battleship Ostfriesland. In 1923 designed to shut off the flow of seaborne resources related to military forces or Mitchell’s bombers sank USS Alabama, supplies to North Vietnam, totaling operations. New Jersey, and Virginia, conclusively 80 percent of all war material and 100 In figure 1, the Five Ring model is demonstrating that aircraft could find, percent of oil imports. The mining of altered, keeping the view of a country attack, and sink modern capital ships. Vietnamese ports, following efforts as a system but changing the concentric Nevertheless, Pacific Fleet War Plan at river mining, was a key element of structure of the rings because the trans- Orange exercises remained focused on the endgame maneuvering that ended portation portion of the infrastructure the line of battle, failing to foresee that American participation in the war. has expanded globally beyond the protec- the airplane would define naval warfare By 1975 the B-52 was the premier tion of fielded forces. in the Pacific. Air Force maritime interdiction asset. The Indo-Asia Pacific theater is World War II in the Pacific forever Capable of carrying large numbers of largely maritime, and goods and energy established the reach and lethality of mines derived from Mk-82/83/84 travel mainly by sea. Certain countries airpower in the maritime domain as bomb bodies, the B-52 also carried are completely dependent on maritime U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) aircraft the AGM-84D Harpoon, a ship-killing traffic for international movement of alone sank more than a million tons of weapon that could be employed against
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Pietrucha 69 Table. Removal of Japanese Merchant Marine by Mode of Attack Japan’s diversion of its Merchant Mode of Attack % Marine to support military operations, when combined with interdiction efforts, Submarines 54.7 had a staggering effect on the Japanese Carrier-based aircraft 16.3 economy as early as 1942, when subma- USAAF aircraft 10.2 rine attacks forced the Japanese to resort Mines (mostly delivered by B-29) 9.3 to convoys. After September 1943, 72 Land-based Navy and Marine Corps aircraft 4.3 percent of the petroleum shipped from Naval gunfire 1 the southern regions was interdicted, and the average rose to 91 percent after June Maritime accident/mishap 4 1944. In 1945 not a single ton of sugar or raw rubber got through.8 Japanese posi- Soviet ships from standoff positions. The Harbor when the Chief of Naval tions across the Pacific were abandoned B-52 remains the primary aerial mine- Operations authorized unrestricted sub- as the garrisons could neither be supplied layer, supplemented today by the B-1B marine warfare, making the submarine nor evacuated. The effects of isolating the and B-2A, although its standoff antiship initiative the only interdiction effort enemy maritime effort into small, discon- missile capabilities have atrophied. With lasting the entire war. Carrier- and land- nected bubbles deprived the Japanese navy the focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, there based aircraft pitched in soon after. In of effective interior lines and the air force was no constituency for retaining antiship the Southwest Pacific, interdiction of of the ability to patrol and defend. The weapons, and the capability of employing Japanese naval supply lines was the pri- strategic bombing campaign may have the Harpoon was allowed to slip away. mary mission for the bomber force, and been the icing on the cake. The postwar General George Kenney’s 5th Air Force Airpower Survey recognized as much: Case Study: Japan developed light bombers as “commerce in World War II destroyer” aircraft, introducing skip It is the opinion of the Survey that by The effects of interdiction were illus- bombing to the USAAF. This proved August 1945, even without direct air trated in the Pacific during World War decisive in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, attack on her cities and industries, the II. Japan entered the conflict with in when land-based airpower decimated over-all level of Japanese war production excess of 6 million tons of shipping over a major troop convoy headed for New would have declined below the peak levels of 500 tons displacement; another 4.1 Guinea, losing merely four aircraft. 1944 by 40 to 50 percent solely as a result of million tons were built, captured, or oth- Called “starvation” missions, aerial the interdiction of overseas imports.9 erwise taken into service.3 Japan’s Mer- mining of Japanese home waters com- chant Marine was the essential support menced in March 1945 and was directed Of the total “large” (< 500 tons) pillar for its industry and for supporting at the Shimonoseki Strait, the key remain- Japanese Merchant Marine referenced the conquest of the Western Pacific. ing chokepoint in the Japanese maritime earlier, 8.9 million tons were sunk or Occupied Manchuria and China supply network.6 The effort pinned down removed from use by the end of the War, helped supply raw materials over short warships and merchant vessels of all sizes. as seen in the table. distances, namely coking coal, iron ore, Despite the short duration, aerial mining foodstuffs, and salt. Unfortunately, oil, accounted for almost as many ships dam- Key Lessons rubber, bauxite, and manganese were no aged as all USAAF land-based air during Four key lessons from World War II in closer than the Dutch East Indies and the the entire war: the Pacific are applicable today: United States. In 1941 the Japanese had stockpiled a 7-month supply of bauxite The 313th Wing got into the game late, oper- •• Maritime interdiction not only and 43 million barrels of oil, which ating with mines for only four and one-half affects supplies coming to an adver- turned out to be grossly insufficient:4 months and at a period when the enemy’s sary but it also affects export and merchant fleet had contracted in size and power projection. Imperial Japanese Japan’s merchant shipping fleet was not in scope of its activities. During that short garrisons on Pacific islands were iso- only a key link in the logistical support of period, mines planted by the wing were lated while the forces on the Chinese her armed forces in the field, but also a more destructive than any other weapon, ac- mainland and Korea were not. vital link in her economic structure. It was counting for about half of the total tonnage •• The approach was an asymmetric the sole element of this basic structure which disposed of. To accomplish this task, the 313th strategy for Washington both finan- was vulnerable to direct attack throughout sent out 1,528 sorties and planted 12,053 cially and operationally. The United a major portion of the war.5 mines, a much heavier effort than had been States was immune to a recipro- suggested by the Navy in the negotiations of cal campaign, and the resources The U.S. campaign against Japanese 1944 and, indeed, the heaviest aerial min- employed dwarfed the resources shipping began 6 hours after Pearl ing campaign ever waged.7 destroyed.10
70 Commentary / Airpower and Globalization Effects JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 •• The vast majority of the interdiction efforts occurred outside the effective range of Japanese defenses. Typically, only the destination ports can be defended, and even escorted vessels travel a long, dangerous path to get there. •• This form of warfare is effective against an industrialized nation and the potential effects will be felt soonest by a well-integrated economy. Pacific nations, unlike those in North America and Europe, are vulnerable to the disruption of maritime traffic and less able to guarantee favorable condi- tions on the high seas.
Current Implications The geographic complexity of the Western Pacific is of key importance. Shipping routes to East Asia are con- strained and long archipelagos provide USS Fitzgerald and USS McCampbell maneuver with People’s Liberation Army Navy destroyer a barrier to sea transportation even Guangzhou off coast of North Sulawesi, Indonesia (U.S. Navy/Ian Schoeneber) under ideal conditions. Like the Suez productive population, maintains a rough a second ring worth mentioning, the and Panama canals, the Malacca Straits technological parity with its Western third ring may be rudimentary, the fifth are a limited capacity passage through counterparts, and maintains a significant ring irregular, and the first ring tribal or otherwise impassible terrain that can maritime presence. It has a modernized fragmentary. There may be significant be effectively interdicted. Alternative military with some limited ability to overlaps between rings or ring relation- routes add time and distance, with addi- project power. Unlike Japan, it is a major ships that blend. As shown earlier, a glo- tional complications. Deep-draft vessels land power and produces more of its own balized country could have an oval third that cannot pass through Malacca requirements for raw materials, fuels, and ring crossing outside the protection of must pass sequentially through the food. the outer ring. For an industrialized Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait, Sibutu The vast majority of seaborne imports nation, energy may be a sixth element Passage, and Mindoro Strait, a route come from well outside the capability of in the model. The original Five Rings of 1,300 nautical miles from south to the People’s Liberation Army or People’s model considered energy and fuel as a north. With these passages subject to Liberation Army Navy to effectively second ring “organic essential.” Here, interdiction, the only alternative is to project power. Unlike Japan and South the sixth ring is really the energy pro- swing around New Guinea and east of Korea, which could reasonably expect duction of a modern country including the Philippines. From the east, the vast to maintain northern supply routes to electrical and motive power and the fuel majority of Asia-bound shipping passes Alaska against Chinese opposition, the and infrastructure required to extract, between the Aleutians and Hawaii and Chinese have no such geographical ad- transport, refine, and burn it. Instead must pass through the first or second vantage or supporting alliance structure. the modified model steals energy from island chains. The country imports a massive amount the second ring and transmission infra- For the United States, these condi- of raw materials by sea, most notably structure from the third ring, combin- tions are a blueprint for a strategy that bauxite and iron ore, which drive heavy ing them into a single item and spread- can both serve as an effective deterrent manufacturing. China is also a major ing it out. Since it is not really a ring at and as a means to coerce an aggressor energy importer, which opens up a sig- all, it becomes a connecting layer—the should deterrence fail. While the likeli- nificant vulnerability. glue that both holds the individual rings hood of a U.S. conflict with the People’s together and makes enduring connec- Republic of China (PRC) seems remote, Energy: The Sixth Ring—Sort Of tions among the rings (see figure 2). China provides fertile ground for com- Returning to the Five Rings model, it is There is one more change to the parison to Imperial Japan. The country obvious that it is simple and changes by model, intended to represent the power is heavily industrialized, has a large and country. Some countries may not have projection capability of the fielded forces.
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Pietrucha 71 Figure 2. Sixth Ring as Energy Production production from a number of sources, and a net importer of fossil fuels. The combination of its large size, high con- sumption, and limited energy related infrastructure makes the PRC an excel- lent case study. Coal. Coal accounts for roughly 70 percent of China’s total energy produc- tion and 65 percent of its electricity production.11 The PRC is the world’s largest producer of coal and its largest consumer, relying on imported coal for 7 percent of its energy requirements in 2012.12 Steam coal is used for power generation and coking coal for industrial processes. Well over three-quarters of the energy produced goes to support com- mercial enterprises, especially industry. Some 70 percent of China’s coal reserves and the majority of actual coal produc- tion are located in Shanxi Province, Shaanxi Province, and Inner Mongolia. Figure 3. Power Projection Capability of Fielded Forces Coal consumption is concentrated along the eastern and southern coastlines in the areas of highest population density. Thus, coal must be moved relatively long dis- tances by road, rail, and both inland and coastal waters for a distance that has been steadily increasing even as the capacity to transport it has grown.13 Coal Transportation. Around 2005, the capacity of the railway system to move coal was exceeded, and the demand for coal transport has surpassed even new rail construction, and this condition is unlikely to change. In contrast to the capacity-limited rail lines, port capac- ity to handle coal has grown markedly. China currently has 24 coal terminals for offloading and loading coal. Most are adjacent to rail facilities, indicating that even coal shipped over water relies on rail transport at both ends.14 Here, the outermost ring becomes like a forces internally, energy is the major Over the past decade, Chinese coal planetary atmosphere, thinning out the limiting factor for force projection. In the movements shifted from a rail-only farther away it gets and illustrating the event of a conflict, the energy ring is likely enterprise until more than a third of the difficulty of applying military power at a disrupted from its peacetime state even if country’s domestic coal was transported distance (see figure 3). it is a planned disruption. A country’s en- via water for some of its route in 2010. Consumption and distribution of en- ergy production and distribution, moved Coal consumed in the northern coastal ergy change during wartime. While each from their steady state, are vulnerable to areas is supplied by a network of truck of the rings is also affected by a transition further disruption by a prepared adversary. routes and railways, a method that is both from peacetime to war, the shift in energy insufficient and prohibitively expensive usage by a modern military is substantial Case Study II: PRC for serving the southeast. Instead rail and literally instantaneous. While trans- China is the single largest consumer of lines move the coal to ports such as portation is the foundation for shifting energy in the world, deriving energy Qinhuangdao, Huanghua, and Rizao
72 Commentary / Airpower and Globalization Effects JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 for transport by sea.15 The rail lines are the main method for moving coal from Shanxi and Shaanxi provinces, and all 15 that cross provincial boundaries to the east and south rely on tunnels to get through the mountains. Accordingly, each line can be interdicted at a single point. Most of the coastal traffic originates in the north and travels south from the Bohai Sea. This flow shows a steady in- crease and will continue to climb because the railways have little ability to add coal- carrying capacity.16 Riverine transport is also growing, particularly along the Yangtze. Road transport is inefficient and equally subject to transportation bottlenecks. Coal shortages have become common since 2008, not for lack of Office of Naval Research head of C4ISR explains suite of information technology tools (U.S. Navy/ coal but because it could not be moved John Williams) where it was needed. For the foreseeable future, China’s land-based coal distribu- of between 170 and 310 million bar- peacetime levels even if civilian consump- tion network will routinely operate at rels but no national strategic reserve. tion is much reduced. full capacity, magnifying the effect of any The 10th 5-Year Plan (2000–2005) Oil Terminals. China has many disruption. Notably, much of China’s marked the beginning of the govern- ports including 7 of the 10 largest in railroad transport is electric, which relies ment strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) the world.21 Both oil and coal require on energy produced by coal, which must program, planned in three phases. Phase highly specialized offloading and storage be moved by the railways. 1 established a capacity of 103 million facilities, and China’s oil import data Oil. As coal drives electricity produc- barrels at four sites; phase 2 (wrapping from 2010 shows that of its top 20 oil tion, oil drives transportation. The two up) should expand that capacity to 315 terminals, 10 are large (offloading more are not interchangeable. Coal cannot be million barrels at eight locations; phase than 20 million tons a year) and 10 are used for transport, and oil only provides 3, to be completed in 2020, should bring medium (offloading 8–20 million tons 19 percent of China’s electricity produc- the SPR capacity to half a billion barrels. a year).22 Only two of the large and four tion. The PRC is the second largest The SPR is for crude oil and not refined of the medium oil terminals are adjacent consumer and importer of oil, behind the products, which are entirely reliant on a to the South China Sea. Those ports ac- United States, and its share is increasing commercial storage capacity estimated at counted for only 20 percent of the total rapidly, accounting for almost 40 percent 400 million barrels for all types of refined offload; the vast majority of this oil was of the worldwide growth in oil demand. fuel combined.18 offloaded in the ports that are farthest up In 2011 it imported over 5 million bar- Crude oil must be refined before it the coast. The major terminals at Nanjing rels of crude oil per day, accounting for can be burned, and China does not have and Shanghai and the medium terminals 54 percent of its total demand. Only 10 the domestic refinery capacity for its re- of Yangpu and Nantong are all Yangtze percent of oil imports came overland17 fined fuel requirements. For example, the River terminals, together accounting for while more than 50 percent came from PRC does not refine jet fuel domestically 14 percent of the 2010 offload from the the Middle East. Half of China’s total in sufficient quantities. In 2010 it pro- terminals. oil consumption comes by sea. There are duced 261,000 bbl/day while consuming Energy Vulnerability and Strategic only two oil pipelines for importing crude 348,000 bbl/day, an imbalance that has Interdiction. The vulnerability of a oil, one stretching through Siberia and steadily worsened since 2004.19 In the large industrialized economy to energy terminating at the Daquing refinery and past decade Beijing has undertaken an disruption is inarguable, but a strategic the other extending from the Caspian ambitious effort to increase refining activ- interdiction campaign will not be quick Sea coast in Kazakhstan to the refinery ity. While capacity will increase to about or easy. Targeting the sixth ring would in Dushanzi. The total pipeline flow is 14 million bbl/day by 2015 (from < 6 take a campaign-level effort against a roughly 800,000 barrels a day (bbl/day). million bbl/day in 2000), refinery opera- widely distributed target set. It is the China is making an effort to establish tions are being consolidated into fewer wide distribution that makes this a par- a strategic petroleum reserve. In 2010 refineries of much greater size.20 Wartime ticularly difficult problem for a defender; it had a commercial storage capacity jet fuel demand will rise well above thousands of miles of pipelines, railways,
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Pietrucha 73 and sea lanes cannot all be defended nals, refineries, repair facilities, locks, should also not forget another set of les- by surface-based air defense systems. naval bases, and loading facilities that sons from Operation Allied Force: bridges Similarly, coastal facilities are not deep in- are directly supportive of, or replace- dropped in major rivers are dual-purpose side defended airspace and are among the ments for, adversary maritime capa- barriers; they both break roads or railways most exposed and fragile elements of a bilities. Not to be overlooked in this and block channels. country’s infrastructure. The flammability category are overland oil pipelines Attacks on maritime and supporting of petroleum storage and refining poses and rail lines. infrastructure might be conducted to difficulty even in peacetime. Refineries •• A distant anticommerce strategy further limit port capacity and reduce the are also subject to single points of failure could occur out of effective adversary ability of the adversary to turn to alterna- due to the nature of the refining process. military reach. Such a strategy might tives (however limited). Oil pipelines are The conduct of a strategic interdic- not be lethally oriented, but rather effectively impossible to protect because tion campaign requires a modern military directed toward the seizure and of their length, and they typically cross but puts a premium on the overall possible internment of national-flag the borders in areas that are undefended breadth of joint capabilities rather than vessels. except by air. It is this kind of environ- a niche force designed to penetrate the ment for which the B-2 or LRS-B might A counterforce strategy might be worst of the air defenses. Instead it is a have been designed. Coal-loading facili- more accurately described as a strategy to strategy intended to deter an enemy by ties would be lucrative targets that might counter adversary power projection. The posing a viable threat to critical parts of severely impede power generation in the air defense capabilities of modern surface a national industrial machine that cannot short term while leaving the actual power combatants combined with the increasing easily be defended. It is essentially an in- generation facilities undamaged. capabilities of many a submarine force direct approach that avoids the necessity Last, the distant strategy is one will make this a battle for capable joint of penetrating enemy ground-based air intended to interdict energy at points and combined forces. That will require defense and renders such an investment far closer to the origin than the destina- a robust and effective submarine force inherently less valuable. tion. It would include attack against oil along with an Air Force contribution that The nature of the campaign can also pipelines and remote railway chokepoints includes combat aircraft that can detect, be affected by an alliance structure and but would focus on the maritime ele- identify, and engage vessels from standoff by the strategic depth of the compet- ments of the transportation network. ranges. Removal of even a limited blue- ing sides. In this context, island bases The distant strategy can be conducted water threat will prevent effective use of too far away to employ aircraft against by a mix of forces far from hostile shores. escorted convoys and remove a reciprocal a mainland adversary serve well against Nations may do no more than enforce counterforce strategy from the table. distant vessels within the transportation their traditional rights as neutrals and still An inshore strategy is extremely dif- network. Basing facilities on national impose an effective penalty by denying ficult to execute because it is conducted territory or the territory of allied nations coastal routes that might ordinarily be within reach of hostile air defenses. The provides launch points for aerial surveil- open. Furthermore, this element of the use of low-observable platforms is a key lance, support facilities for naval vessels, strategy can be nonlethal; vessels can be enabler for this part of the strategy, and and key nodes in a “web” designed to interned rather than sunk. Internment of some elements of an inshore strategy prevent certain types of vessels bound for vessels takes those ships and crews off the cannot credibly be contemplated with- an opposing nation from reaching their seas as surely as sinking them, with the out penetrating air defenses one way or destinations. added advantages that internment can be another. However, the payoff is worth A strategic interdiction campaign reversed and no ecological threat is posed the risk because the effects ripple out might have four elements: by an interned supertanker. through the target country. An inshore •• A counterforce strategy can be strategy might be enhanced by the use of Final Thoughts designed to attrit adversary naval air or subsurface-laid minefields in areas The Five Rings are classic airpower forces (gray hulls) to the point where of the coast with high volumes of mari- theory, highlighting the ability to they can neither project military time traffic. Mining has massive effects overfly the outer rings to gain effects power nor defend against U.S. power on seaborne movement even when no leading to a (presumed) short and projection. mines are actually present; merely fear of decisive war. To assume that such a An inshore element can consist of mines is an effective deterrent to move- •• strategy could be conducted against a operations to deny effective use of ment. Given China’s riverine geography, major industrial power is to ignore the home waters including rivers and river mining could be equally effective, if 1999 example of Allied Force and the coastal waters. harder to accomplish. In the event that development of advanced air defense An infrastructure degradation plan a large mine actually sinks a vessel in a •• capabilities. In Desert Storm the tech- could disrupt or destroy specific shipping channel, clearing the channel nological advantages accrued to the coastal capabilities such as oil termi- becomes a very difficult endeavor. We attacker, while the pace of technological
74 Commentary / Airpower and Globalization Effects JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 development in the wake of the U.S. systems, and can be conducted from long Imports (Washington, DC: Carnegie En- dowment for International Peace, 2012), victory now favors the defender. Despite distances to significant effect. It is tailor available at
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Pietrucha 75 Statue of Sun Tzu in Yurihama, Tottori, Japan un Tzu wrote 2,500 years ago during an agricultural age but S has remained relevant through both the industrial and information ages. When we think about security, Japan’s greatest strategic concern is China, and we cannot discuss Chinese strategy without first discussing Sun Tzu. In this article, I demonstrate how contemporary Chinese strategists apply the teachings of Sun Tzu and his seminal The Art of War.1
Why Sun Tzu? Europe first discovered Sun Tzu during the late 18th century. Wilhelm II, the emperor of Germany, supposedly stated, “I wish I could have read Sun Tzu before World War I.” General Douglas MacArthur once stated that he always kept Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass on his desk. At the end of the Cold War, the United States borrowed from Sun Tzu when it created “competitive strategy,” which aimed to attack the Soviets’ weaknesses with American strengths.2 This is exactly Sun Tzu’s meaning when he said an “Army avoids strength and strikes weak- ness.” I have also heard that this idea is referred to as a “net assessment” strat- egy in the Pentagon. When I was a student at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, I studied Caspar Weinberger’s “six tests.” When I first considered his tests I imme- diately thought, “This is the teaching of Sun Tzu.” Let us consider Weinberger’s six tests and the comparable ideas found in The Art of War (see table). Sun Tzu in General Colin Powell added a few tests of his own with the so-called Powell Doctrine, and his tests also have compa- Contemporary rable passages in Sun Tzu. For instance, Powell’s questions “Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entangle- ment?” and “Have risks and costs been Chinese Strategy fully and frankly analyzed?” are similarly mentioned in chapter 2 of The Art of War. By Fumio Ota Contemporary Chinese Strategy In 2001 I had some conversations with Dr. Fumio Ota, Vice Admiral (Ret.), Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, was the Director of the General Xiong Guankai, deputy chief Defense Intelligence Headquarters in the Japan Defense Agency. He is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and received his Ph.D. from the School of Advanced International of staff in Beijing. When I offered a Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. phrase from Sun Tzu in conversation,
76 Commentary / Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 the general recited the whole passage in Table. Sun Tzu. I also visited the People’s Lib- eration Army (PLA) National Defense Weinberger’s “Six Tests” Passages from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War University (PLANDU), the highest The United States should not commit forces “War is a matter of vital importance to the to combat overseas unless the particular State; the province of life or death; the road to educational institute for the Chinese engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our survival or ruin” (chapter 1). military, and asked the vice president national interest or that of our allies. how PLANDU teaches Sun Tzu. He If we decide it is necessary to put combat “A victorious army wins its victories before answered that the ancient strategist troops into a given situation, we should do so seeking battle; an army destined to defeat is the centerpiece of the curriculum. wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of fights in the hope of winning” (chapter 4). winning. According to the Chinese Information Bureau in 2006, the PLA decided to If we do decide to commit forces to combat “Now to win battles and take your objectives, overseas, we should have clearly defined political but to fail to exploit these achievements is use The Art of War as the educational and military objectives. ominous and may be described as wasteful textbook not only for officers but also delay” (chapter 12). for all enlisted soldiers and sailors. The relationship between our objectives and When I was invited by the PLA the forces we have committed—their size, composition, and disposition—must be continually University of Science and Technology reassessed and adjusted if necessary. (PLAUST) to the Symposium for Before we commit combat forces abroad, there “The people [must] be in harmony with their Presidents of Military Institutions in must be some reasonable assurance we will have leaders, so that they will accompany them in October 2011, I spoke to the president the support of the American people and their life and unto death without fear of moral peril” of PLAUST during the symposium. elected representatives in Congress. (chapter 1). Whenever I mentioned a phrase from Sun The commitment of forces to combat should be a Tzu’s writing, he too responded with the last resort. entire passage. He had memorized the strategist’s work. him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally 35 South. On its maps, China portrays a I also had an opportunity to visit out when he does not expect you” (The three-line configuration that includes the the PLA Army Command Academy in Art of War, chapter 1). Hawaiian Islands as the third–island chain. Nanjing where the academy’s motto Since all Chinese military personnel In 2012 a Chinese delegation insisted from a passage in chapter 5 of The Art seem to memorize Sun Tzu, it is possible on Hawaiian sovereignty to Secretary of of War appears on the library wall: “Use that Chinese strategy is based on The Art State Hillary Clinton. Admiral Timothy the normal force to engage; use the ex- of War. All Central Military Commission Keating, commander of U.S. Pacific traordinary to win.” An American scholar members except Xi Jinping are generals Command, was approached in 2007 by pointed out that the Chinese concept and admirals who have memorized his a Chinese admiral who advocated divid- of cyber attack is based on that phrase.3 work completely. Even though PLA weap- ing the Pacific. Due to the declaration There were other framed phrases from ons and tactics are not as sophisticated as that “China will never seek hegemony,” Sun Tzu in the library: “All warfare is those of the major Western powers, this Chinese strategy is clearly deceptive. based on deception,” and “There are comprehensive strategy—which includes We have to look at their real intentions. strategist’s keys to victory. It is not pos- nonmilitary means—is clever, and we must The latest China’s National Defense sible to discuss them beforehand.” understand how China has adopted Sun emphasizes “rapid assaults.”5 Military A phrase of Deng Xiaoping’s Tzu for its contemporary strategy. and Security Developments Involving 24-Character Plan (“Hide our capabili- What is Chinese contemporary the People’s Republic of China 2013 also ties and bide our time”), which was a strategy? It is not necessarily revealed states that the “PRC continues to pur- central tenant of Chinese strategy since in China’s National Defense, which is sue [the ability] to fight and win short the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, published every 2 years. In the preface we duration [conflicts].”6 This is contextu- is derived from Jiang Ziya’s The Six read, “China will never seek hegemony.”4 ally similar to “while we have heard of Secret Teachings on the Way of Strategy, According to reports by the Center for blundering swiftness in war, we have one of China’s seven military classics. Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and not yet seen a clever operation that was Some of Mao Zedong’s characteristics RAND, by 2020 China will be well on prolonged,” which is found in chapter 2 of strategic secrets, such as “When an its way to having the means to achieve of The Art of War. enemy advances, we will retreat,” “When its first–island chain policy. In May 2013 an enemy stays, we will disturb them,” Chinese newspapers discussed possession “Three Warfares” “When an enemy is tired, we will strike of Okinawa. In 2012 a PLA think tank, In 2003 the Chinese Communist Party them,” and “When an enemy retreats, we the Military Science Academy, advocated Central Committee and the Central will chase them” are very similar to Sun a “strong military strategy” that insists Military Commission endorsed the Tzu’s “When he concentrates, prepare that the PLA Navy must protect national “three warfares” concept, reflecting against him; where he is strong, avoid interests west of 165 East and north of China’s recognition that as a global
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Ota 77 Moreover, Beijing has legislated many internal maritime laws to justify its mari- time activities including: •• Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992) •• Proclamation of Territorial Base Line (1996) •• Public Relation Marine Science Research Administrative Regulation (1996) •• Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (1998) •• Marine Environment Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (1999) •• Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of the Use of Sea Areas (2001) •• Desert Island Protection Usage Administrative Regulation (2003) •• Law of the People’s Republic of Chinese bamboo copy of The Art of War with cover inscription suggesting it was either commissioned China on Island Protection (2009) or transcribed by Qianlong Emperor (UC Riverside) •• National Mobilization Law (2010) Maritime Observation Forecast actor it would benefit from learning to Chinese leaders typically mention •• Administrative Regulations (2012). use the tools of public opinion, particu- ideas such as “Chinese Military Buildup larly during the early stages of a crisis, No Threat to the World” (Defense Disintegration Warfare as these tools have a tendency to bolster Minister Liang Guanglie’s statement The PLA International Relations one another.7 The PLA issued 100 in November 2012), or “Peaceful Academy in Nanjing studied disintegra- examples each for psychological, media, Development” (China’s National tion warfare from 2003 to 2009. Then and legal warfare. Psychological warfare Defense), or “Harmonious Ocean” (the in 2010 a PLA publisher issued Disinte- examples cited Sun Tzu 30 times, media theme of the PLA Navy’s multinational gration Warfare. A passage from chapter warfare examples cited him 6 times, naval event in 2009). All of these are 3 of The Art of War, “To subdue the and legal warfare examples cited him examples of media warfare or, in other enemy without fighting is the acme of 3 times. The most cited phrase (from words, propaganda. On March 8, 2013, skill,” appears on the cover of Disinte- chapter 3) is “To subdue the enemy the People’s Daily reported that the gration Warfare. The idea of disintegra- without fighting is the acme of skill,” sovereignty of the Ryukyu Islands is his- tion warfare includes politics, economy, which appears 10 times. The next most torically pending and not yet determined. culture, psychology, military threats, repeated phrase (from chapter 1) is “All This is still another example of media conspiracy, media propaganda, law, warfare is based on deception,” appear- warfare. To Beijing, the Ryukyu Islands information, and intelligence. All these ing half a dozen times. must represent “key ground, ground concepts are clearly building on Sun The PLA Daily reported that when equally advantageous for the enemy or Tzu’s ideas of deception, disruption, and 10 warships, including 2 Kilo-class me to occupy” (chapter 11, The Art of subduing the enemy without fighting. submarines, passed through the Miyako War) because the North and East Sea In 2012, for the first time since its Strait, they were to conduct exercises in Fleets can pass through the area into the establishment, the Minister of Foreign the spirit of the three warfares concept. Pacific with impunity. However, as Sun Affairs Conference of the Association of As it is not possible to conduct media Tzu stated, “Do not attack an enemy Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was and legal warfare as part of a naval ex- who occupies key ground.” China has not able to announce a joint communi- ercise, we should understand that they instead supported Okinawa’s indepen- qué because China had given tremendous conducted psychological warfare with dence activities, which were developed economic aid to Cambodia, the chair the goals of the deterrence, shock, and by pro-Chinese Okinawans and probably country of the conference. The tighter demoralization of Japan. Chinese secret agents as well.
78 Commentary / Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 coordination of ASEAN over the issue of the South China Sea does not favor China. Therefore, China resorted to dis- integration warfare to try to disrupt the ASEAN alliance by using economic ma- nipulation. China has implemented many methods, including historic issues during World War II, in attempts to divide the United States and Japan as well.
Unrestricted Warfare In 1999 two PLA colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, published the book Unrestricted Warfare, which changed the definition of unrestricted warfare from “using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will” to “using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Kurama under way with Arleigh Burke–class guided- non-military, and lethal and non-lethal missile destroyer USS Gridley during passing exercise (U.S. Navy/James R. Evans) means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”8 Power of the People’s Republic of China states, “Of old, the rise of Yin was due Non-armed force includes trade war, (2009), stated that China’s leaders stress to I Chih, who formerly served the Hsia; financial war, a new terror war, and asymmetric strategies to leverage their the Chou came to power through Lu Yu, ecological war.9 As for trade war, China advantages while exploiting the perceived a servant of the Yin.” Paul D. Moore, banned rare-earth mineral exports to vulnerabilities of potential opponents the former FBI chief Chinese intelligence Japan after a Chinese fishing boat skipper using so-called “assassin’s mace” pro- analyst, writes, “Some Americans of was arrested near Senkaku in September grams (for example, counterspace and Chinese ancestry in sensitive research or 2010. In October 2010, when Chinese cyber warfare programs).10 defense-related positions now feel them- dissident Liu Xiaobo was awarded the selves to be under increased scrutiny as Nobel Peace Prize, Beijing reduced its Intelligence Warfare security risks.”13 imports of salmon from Norway. China There are strategic documents other The third secret agent is the double also reduced banana imports from the than Sun Tzu’s that include the topic of agent. Katrina Leung provides a good Philippines when the two countries intelligence. Carl von Clausewitz’s On example. A former high-value FBI and clashed over Scarborough Shoal in 2012. War has only a few pages mentioning PRC Ministry of State security agent, In part two of the book A Discussion intelligence. He writes, “In short, most Leung allegedly contaminated 20 years of of New Methods of Operation, Qiao intelligence is false.”11 B.H. Liddell intelligence relating to the PRC as well as and Wang cite Sun Tzu: “As water has Hart’s Strategy perhaps intentionally has critically compromising the FBI’s Chinese no constant form, there are in war no no discussion of intelligence at all. Sun counterintelligence program. In March constant conditions. Thus, one able to Tzu spends the entire last chapter of 2013 Bryan Underwood, a former civil- gain victory by modifying his tactics in The Art of War discussing intelligence. ian guard at a U.S. consulate compound accordance with the enemy situation may Sun Tzu identifies five types of secret under construction in China, sold classi- be said to be divine” (The Art of War, agents. The first is the native of the en- fied photographs, information, and access chapter 6). Before this passage, there emy’s country. There is no doubt that to the U.S. consulate to the Ministry of is the famous phrase: “An army avoids countering the native agent is important State Security.14 strength and strikes weakness.” This is for antiterrorism warfare. David W. The fourth secret agent is the the substance of unrestricted warfare. Szady, a former assistant director for the expendable type. Sun Tzu states that Western militaries rely on information Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), expendable agents are friendly spies who systems such as computer networks and stated, “the Chinese . . . mastered the are deliberately given fabricated informa- space surveillance. Beijing wants to attack use of multiple redundant collection plat- tion (disinformation) that is related to those weaknesses using cyber strikes as forms by looking for students, delegates the media warfare aspect of the three soft means and antisatellite weaponry as to conferences, relatives and researchers warfares concept. In September 2012 hard means. to gather information.”12 the Global Times reported the result of The U.S. Secretary of Defense’s The second secret agent is the one the March 2006 referendum of Ryukyu annual report to Congress, Military inside the organization. The Art of War citizens. Seventy-five percent of them
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Ota 79 supported independence from Japan and obeyed” (chapter 8), and “If the situation Notes reinstating free trade with China, and is one of victory but the sovereign has 25 percent supported remaining part of issued orders not to engage, the general 1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Japan.15 There was in fact no referendum may decide to fight” (chapter 10). We Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). by Ryukyu citizens, and the vast majority have seen many indications of this includ- 2 United States Military Posture for FY1989 of Okinawans want to be a part of Japan. ing the Han-class nuclear submarine’s (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 5–6, 93–94. This is a typical example of Chinese intrusion into Japanese territorial waters 3 J.P. London, “Made in China,” U.S. disinformation. in November 2004, the antisatellite Naval Institute Proceedings 137, no. 4 (April The last type of secret agent is the weapon test in January 2007, and the 2011), 59. living agent, who collects informa- revelation of the J-20 stealth fighter when 4 China’s National Defense 2012 (Beijing: tion and returns with it. Most living Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Ministry of Defense, 2013), preface. 5 Ibid., chapter 2. agents today engage in cyber espio- China in January 2011. 6 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), nage. The U.S. Office of the National Second, the main theme of the first Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Counterintelligence Executive published half of chapter 6 of The Art of War is Developments Involving the People’s Republic of the Counterintelligence Report (2011), “initiative.” China has made preemptive China 2013 (Washington, DC: OSD, 2013), i. 7 which states, “Chinese actors are the strikes since its establishment, such as OSD, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s world’s most active and persistent per- in the Korean War in 1950; the Strait Republic of China 2011 (Washington, DC: 16 petrators of economic espionage.” crises in 1954, 1958, and 1995–1996; OSD, 2011), 26. The U.S.-China Economic and Security against India in 1962; against the Soviet 8 Colonel Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Review Commission reported in 2009 Union in 1969; and against Vietnam in Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature that “U.S. industry and a range of 1974 (Paracel Islands), 1979, and 1988 and Arts Publishing House, February 1999), preface. government and military targets face re- (Spratly Islands). The first principle of 9 Ibid., chapter 2. peated exploitation attempts by Chinese the Chinese Air Force is securing initia- 10 OSD, Annual Report to Congress: hackers as do international organizations tive through offensive operations.20 The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China and nongovernmental groups including Military Power of the People’s Republic 2009 (Washington, DC: OSD, 2009), 20. 11 Chinese dissident groups, activists, reli- of China (2007) contained a side col- Victor M. Rosello, “Clausewitz’s Con- tempt for Intelligence,” Parameters 21 (Spring gious organizations, rights groups, and umn that asked, “Is China Developing 1991), 103–114. 17 21 media institutions.” Despite the fact a Preemptive Strategy?” But China’s 12 Neil A. Lewis, “Spy Cases Raise Concern that Military and Security Developments National Defense (2008) stated, “China on China’s Intentions,” The New York Times, Involving the People’s Republic of China pursues a national defense policy which July 10, 2008. 13 (2013) listed six specific names of spies,18 is purely [deleted since the 2010 version] Paul D. Moore, “How China Plays the Ethnic Card,” Los Angeles Times, June 24, 1999. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokes- defensive in nature.” 14 Narayan Lakshman, “U.S. jails China- man denied China’s involvement with What should we do for countering based double agent,” The Hindu, March 6, cyber espionage. During the U.S.-China Chinese strategy? We have to know and 2013. Defense Summit in August 2013, use Sun Tzu against China. The general 15 See
80 Commentary / Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Chairman and General Fraser briefed on U.S. Army Military Surface Deployment and Distribution mission (USTRANSCOM /Bob Fehringer)
Geography Matters in Maintaining Global Mobility
By William M. Fraser III and Marshall N. Ramsey
All strategy is geostrategy: Geography is fundamental.
—Colin S. Gray1
dvancements in transportation meter-per-hour (km/h) magnetic levita- technology have seemingly col- tion trains and the first privately owned General William M. Fraser III, USAF, is lapsed the world’s vast distances. space transport shuttle.2 In the future Commander of U.S. Transportation Command. A Colonel Marshall N. Ramsey, USA, was Chief In this century we have witnessed the we may see a “hyperloop,” a partial Strategy Officer for the command. first commercially operated 500-kilo- vacuum tube that carries passengers in
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Fraser and Ramsey 81 USNS 1st Lt. Jack Lummus prepares to dock at causeway for vehicle unloading during maritime prepositioning force offload for exercise Cobra Gold (U.S. Marine Corps/Nathaniel Henry) capsules at speeds up to 1,220 km/h.3 the critical transportation infrastructure environment has required the command But such technological change does not required for humanitarian assistance/ to engage in the most comprehensive and eliminate geography as an important disaster relief operations. However, even collaborative strategic planning endeavor factor either in commercial or in mili- strong states have waged war in the realm in its 26-year history. The result of our tary strategy and operations.4 of geography and about geography. “journey of discovery” is a new strategic Geographic characteristics are often To meet its international security plan recommitting us to our ends, ways, constraining. Nations and significant commitments and protect its national and means. We at USTRANSCOM players on the world stage compete in interests, the U.S. military must remain have determined that the “ends” are the domains of land, sea, air, space, and rapidly mobile and expeditionary, sup- rapidly projecting power and sustaining cyber, and ungoverned areas in these plying and resupplying itself once it it, “ways” are achieving and maintaining domains invite bad actors.5 Weak and is committed. U.S. Transportation global mobility, and “means” are assured failed states often lack critical transporta- Command (USTRANSCOM) provides access and a well-developed and synchro- tion infrastructure that would help them the rapid positioning of expeditionary nized distribution network. overcome their geographic limitations forces. Even with distances collapsed by and support their populace during super technology, geography matters for our Ends typhoons, floods, tsunamis, and other strategy and operations. We have to span In Joint Force of 2020, the Department natural or manmade disasters. These the globe and surmount geographical of Defense (DOD) values global agility, states frequently lack good governance of constraints to execute both peacetime with a premium placed on swift and their geographical area and have porous and wartime missions and be more re- adaptable military responses.6 In this borders allowing groups to train, transit, sponsive to those we support. context, the United States will seek to or provide logistics to carry out transna- Maintaining our global mobil- mitigate conflict escalation or achieve tional threats. Strong states may possess ity capability in a fiscally constrained deterrence by focusing on the decisive
82 Commentary / Geography Matters JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 and quick employment of essential especially during surge operations. to contingency or crisis response opera- and relevant forces. These forces may Through this optimal balance of Total tions. All of these capabilities mitigate the be positioned forward, partnered with Force organic and commercial lift, we time and distance constraints imposed by capable allies, or based in the United can quickly pivot transportation resources geography on USTRANSCOM’s world- States. In each case, strategic mobility is wherever and whenever needed. wide mission. the key element for power projection. Improving strategic mobility will also USTRANSCOM has recognized that require decreasing lift and sustainment Means the ends—superior support to warfighters requirements and making intelligent use Global mobility for rapid power pro- to project power and sustain operations— of prepositioned equipment in coordina- jection requires assured access to the must not and will not change. Most tion with the Services and the Defense global commons (relevant maritime, air, important, we recognized the need to Logistics Agency.9 and space domains outside any coun- develop and implement bold and innova- Acting in our role as the Mobility try’s national jurisdiction), as well as tive ways to adapt to the future operating Joint Force Provider (see figure), access to a viable distribution network environment. At the same time, we USTRANSCOM advises and guides and cyberspace. Assured access often realized that our means—fiscal, materiel, mobility force sourcing solutions to requires multiple paths to preclude a and personnel—will experience increased best effect for the supported geographic single point of failure, which is true not pressure for more efficiency for the fore- combatant command.10 This enables us only for our physical networks but also seeable future. During development of to quickly reallocate mobility capabilities for operations in the contested cyber USTRANSCOM’s strategic plan, we fo- where they are needed while mobilization domain. The global commons are part cused on developing processes, adapting of surge capacity of both organic and of USTRANSCOM’s end-to-end dis- structures, and reinforcing an enabling commercial partners occurs. We can also tribution network, which includes ports culture. rapidly open aerial and seaports in or near of embarkation, en-route nodes, and The command will deliver the trans- the joint operational area. ports of debarkation. DOD relies on portation and enabling capabilities that Maintaining global mobility is the way friendly nations and allies for the use of make America a global power by preserv- to project power rapidly and sustain oper- en-route and destination infrastructure ing our readiness capability, achieving ations. It is also achieved and maintained to facilitate the global surface and air information technology management through freedom of action from assured corridors that comprise the distribution excellence, aligning our resources and access to the global commons, a viable network. Conversely, allies depend on processes for mission success, and devel- global distribution network, and the abil- U.S. mobility capabilities for combined oping customer-focused professionals. ity to rapidly transition from steady state operations. DOD must be free to The vision is to become the transporta- tion and enabling capability provider of choice.7
Ways Global mobility supports the future joint force and globally integrated oper- ations as described in Joint Force 2020 by providing adequate transportation and distribution capabilities and capaci- ties.8 In addition to readily deployable joint forces and sufficient lift, there must be a supporting global network. The foundation of DOD’s global mo- bility capacity is the organic capabilities provided by USTRANSCOM’s Army, Navy, and Air Force component com- mands using Active-duty and Reserve component forces. However, integral to the global mobility capacity needed by the Nation are the additional capabilities gained through our commercial transpor- tation providers. The assets and networks of our commercial partners are absolutely critical in fulfilling global demands,
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Fraser and Ramsey 83 As USTRANSCOM commander, my primary objective for engaging leaders within and outside DOD is helping set the conditions for the GCP-D. We are meeting with key leaders in geographic combatant command areas of respon- sibility to discuss existing diplomatic agreements, sustain partner-nation rela- tionships, secure conditions for retrograde operations in Afghanistan, and explore infrastructure improvements that can serve our strategic requirements. At each stop we engage with U.S. country teams and host nation ministers of defense, for- eign affairs, and transportation. Economic development is often discussed. Partner nations view being part of the GDN as a source of revenue for their countries, and they frequently invest money and political Sailor monitors flights in Joint Operational Support Airlift Center Execution Team area of capital to further this objective. USTRANSCOM Fusion Center (USTRANSCOM/Bob Fehringer) Many of our partner nations have plans to develop transportation-related operate across the entire distribution relationships. This extended reach gave infrastructure that will improve their network with surety. This was true in the command flexibility and access it did capabilities. These plans are frequently un- the past, is true today, and will be true not otherwise possess. synchronized and focus on a single node in the future. Access to the cyber domain is critical such as airfield construction, but without World War II’s historic airlift opera- for global mobility. We execute logistics, an associated road network. As the respon- tion over “the hump” of the Himalayas transportation in particular, through sible agent for the GDN, the command kept China in the fight against Japan information systems operating largely on collaborates with partners to coach them and contributed significantly to the U.S. unclassified but protected networks and in the development of a comprehensive vi- victory in the Pacific. In the China- include participation of our commercial sion for their transportation networks. An Burma-India theater of operations, partners and others through their infor- infrastructure plan that is comprehensive, harsh weather, severe terrain, the enemy, mation technology systems. Adversaries prioritized, and phased will achieve far and host nation sovereignty were all understand that transportation activities greater success, and this approach aligns challenges that airlift had to overcome, can signal operational intent, so our well with our global transportation and especially while waiting on construction information networks provide a lucra- commercial network objectives. of the Burma road.11 Similarly, the Hindu tive target and a vulnerability we must We will continue to foster these Kush, the lack of seaports in land-locked address. In addition our decisive and partnerships to maintain the readiness Afghanistan, the limited number of useful reliable command and control of stra- of the GDN and its ability to respond to roads and airfields, and other nations’ tegic mobility operations is a capability future requirements. For example, the sovereignties are challenges the command our adversaries would like to acquire. viability of the Northern Distribution must overcome today when delivering, Protecting, defending, and mitigating Network (NDN) infrastructure—sea sustaining, and redeploying forces for adverse operations in cyber space is a key and aerial port facilities and road and Operation Enduring Freedom. focus area for USTRANSCOM along rail networks—will remain vital after Initially USTRANSCOM airlifted with its component commands and com- the conclusion of Enduring Freedom. troops, their combat equipment, and mercial partners. Learning from NDN’s successful sup- their sustainment materiel until ground The Global Distribution Network port of deployed forces when ground lines of communication could be estab- (GDN) is the foundation of our Global lines of communication through Pakistan lished. Assured freedom of action and Campaign Plan for Distribution (GCP- were interrupted, we are already part- global mobility allowed the command D). The health of the network is integral nering with U.S. Pacific Command to quickly deploy and employ mobil- to strategic readiness and rapid projection (USPACOM) to lay the foundation for ity forces seamlessly. Our commercial of power for many combatant commands a Pacific Distribution Network as well as partners played a critical role by pro- and their operational plans. Through it with U.S. Africa Command. The Pacific viding extended “reach” within their we provide responsive and agile support Rim is one part of a complex network broader network of capabilities and trade through DOD and commercial partners. of bilateral and multilateral relationships
84 Commentary / Geography Matters JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 that spans vast distances with minimal capabilities exist at various ports, airfields, them and their sustainment increases with basing. Intratheater movement in the and multimodal sites when required. distance.12 When effectiveness and respon- USPACOM area of responsibility is In particular, USTRANSCOM will siveness are not paramount, warfighters similar to intertheater movement globally assess the GDN vis-à-vis the strategic and customers need more cost-conscious and is often referred to as “the tyranny of environment. The heart of the GCP-D is transportation solutions, preferably a range distance.” We must be smart and efficient developing all the requisite elements of of costed options. about the way we use our scarce resources a “warm” network to operate anywhere All strategy must contend with geog- to achieve readiness for the Pacific on the globe, so when the time comes raphy even when it is not about contested Distribution Network. As a baseline we we can quickly respond to it to meet geography.13 Together we are working will nest our efforts within USPACOM’s the Nation’s needs. Synchronization toward a more effective and efficient strategy to ensure we remain responsive of the efforts to set the conditions for command to provide America’s global and ready to perform them. The African future distribution operations is where mobility and enable its capabilities wher- continent has equally daunting distance USTRANSCOM, with the help of oth- ever and whenever needed. Together and access challenges. ers, ensures that efforts are mutually with our components, the Defense We also discuss aerial refueling interop- supporting and achieve the desired objec- Logistics Agency, and commercial part- erability during our engagements. Many tives for strategic mobility. ners, U.S. Transportation Command allied partners use the same platforms Lastly, in the past, USTRANSCOM will continue to deliver the mobility and we do. We have developed standardized operated in the individual land, sea, and transportation options that bolster our procedures, but there is a lack of synchro- air segments of transportation. However, nation’s power. Together, we deliver. JFQ nized certifications. We will continue to through our years of experience in our contribute to the DOD effort to improve Distribution Process Owner role (see fig- aerial refueling interoperability with our ure), we realized we could move combat Notes partners. More must be done in this area equipment via surface land/ocean and air 1 and lessons learned must be turned into routes through multimodal hubs and not Colin S. Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Max- ims on War, Peace, and Strategy (Westport, CT: future solutions. In many cases, our part- only meet required delivery dates, but Praeger Security International, 2007), 78. ners’ preparedness to support coalition also be more cost-effective. Multimodal 2 See “Shanghai Maglev Train,” available operations may hinge on this unique abil- is increasingly becoming our operational at
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Fraser and Ramsey 85 Reflections on Operation Unified Protector
By Todd R. Phinney
s 2010 ended, few in the North tary leaders as well as highlight the 1973 (March 17), authorized a no-fly Atlantic Treaty Organization effect of civilian policy decisions. zone over Libya as well as the use of “all (NATO) would have predicted The Libyan uprising was enabled necessary means” to protect Libyan civil- A 2 that the Alliance, with assistance from by social media on February 14, 2011, ians. After initial rebel military successes four partner nations, would be leading with a freedom movement erupting in in late February, regime forces regrouped an air-heavy joint operation in North Benghazi shortly afterward. The rheto- and began to crush rebel forces and Africa. However, as the Arab Spring ric and violence of the regime quickly population centers across the country. swept across the region, NATO was galvanized the United Nations into pass- Significantly, regime forces appeared rapidly drawn into the unfolding ing two Security Council Resolutions poised to retake the resistance “capital” events in Libya. What followed over (UNSCRs) that described the mandate in Benghazi, putting more civilian lives the next 7 months within the Com- for the military action that followed. at risk. The U.S.-led coalition Operation bined Force Air Component (CFAC) The first, UNSCR 1970 (February 26), Odyssey Dawn (OOD) began on March warrants discussion because what was imposed an arms embargo and froze 19, 2011, when a French air force strike learned can help prepare future mili- regime assets.1 The second, UNSCR package attacked regime mechanized forces approaching Benghazi. The OOD air campaign, executed from Ramstein Air Base, lasted until March 31. NATO Colonel Todd R. Phinney is the Combat Air Forces Chair at Air University and teaches leadership and warfighting at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. During Operation Unified Protector, then took command with the Combined he was a Combined Force Air Component Deputy Director. Joint Task Force (CJTF) positioned at
86 Features / Reflections on Operation Unified Protector JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Royal Air Force Typhoon Eurofighter departs Italian airbase in Gioia del Colle during Operation Unified Protector (UK Ministry of Defence) NATO’s underlying strength is the CAOC at Poggio Renatico,13 the underscored by the contribution and CFACC found himself often on the commitment of its members. However, phone with the CAOC Poggio director complete consensus by NATO nations of operations working to link strategy to normally limits the speed at which the the task and the task back to strategy.14 Alliance operates. The pace at which While attempting to build the CFACC’s NATO accepted and executed OUP cre- awareness, the CAOC Poggio director of ated daunting challenges. As discussed, operations was himself losing awareness the first OOD aircraft struck on March and the ability to lead the fledgling and 19. NATO accepted the no-fly zone hastily assembled team on the operations mission on March 24, and on March floor. Recognizing the untenable nature 31 the NATO CFAC took command of of this virtual presence, the CFACC flew the entire air mission over Libya. While to Poggio on April 1, taking a handful of prudent thinking had occurred, NATO his direct staff. Moving forward improved did not officially begin planning until the the air effort.15 This was critical as each North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to tactical bomb had a very real strategic take over from the coalition.9 The result- importance for the unity of the Alliance. ing challenges of this quick pace were Importantly, the NAC mandated a zero significant. While beginning to plan and civilian casualty allowance for NATO execute combat operations, the OUP fires. Early on, General Jodice identified CFAC faced internal challenges that sig- the unity of the Alliance and partner na- nificantly hampered its ability to execute tions as the “blue” center of gravity and air operations.10 one errant bomb with civilian casualties The first challenge was to overcome could have splintered cohesiveness. structural impediments hampering mis- Other problems arose from a geo- sion execution. At the beginning of OUP, graphically split CFAC structure. Not Naples, and the air component eventually NATO Air comprised two distinct geo- enough legal advisors were available to located at Poggio Renatico,3 both in Italy. graphic regions north and south of the support both Izmir and Poggio, and they In contrast to operations in Iraq and Alps. U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General were initially sent to the CFAC at Izmir. Afghanistan, Operation Unified Protector Ralph Jodice commanded the Southern As a result, the quickly formed team at (OUP) was unique in its relatively short region, Air Component (AC) Izmir, Poggio, now executing combat opera- duration and lack of a “blue” land located at Izmir, Turkey. The Izmir tions, did not have legal advisors for rules component. In total, the OUP CFAC concept of contingency operations was of engagement (ROE) and collateral planned and executed 218 air task- for the commander/CFAC commander damage estimate advice on the combat ing orders (ATOs),4 flew over 26,500 (CFACC) to remain in place along with operations floor. In one case, Poggio sorties including 9,700 ground attack the strategy division, the majority of the elected to delay a strike and roll it onto a sorties,5 destroyed over 5,900 military intelligence, surveillance, and recon- subsequent ATO. However, the report- targets, and deconflicted over 6,700 naissance (ISR) division,11 the “upper” ing cell at Izmir missed that and reported humanitarian aid flights and ground portion of the plans division (guidance, the target as struck. NATO Public Affairs movements.6 Compared to the 38,000 apportionment, and tasking), and the released targeted information the next sorties flown during the 78-day NATO director of staff. Meanwhile, the NATO morning, compromising the target. The air campaign over Kosovo, OUP’s air Combined Air Operations Centers CFAC’s ability dramatically improved planners had fewer assets with which to (CAOC)12 in the Southern region would once all key elements finally collocated execute their task in a much larger area execute the air operation with the resi- at Poggio. The problems discussed make of responsibility—a region comparable to dent “lower” half of the plans division, clear the importance of establishing the Alaska.7 Of NATO’s 28 member nations, producing the master air operations plan correct organizational structure at the all provided staffing and 12 provided and ATO, while executing the ATO with onset and that the geographically split air assets. Sweden also provided tactical the operations division. This distributed OUP CFAC structure significantly de- reconnaissance aircraft. Key to legitimacy mode of operations was in place at the graded operations. in the Arab world, Jordan, Qatar, and the beginning of OUP but was essentially Exacerbating the CFAC structural United Arab Emirates also contributed stillborn from the beginning. Myriad problem was an immediate lack of skilled personnel and aircraft. This involvement problems arose with the CFACC not staffing across each of the CFAC divi- created the first-ever NATO-Arab com- being physically present with the entire sions. That was made worse by the need bat partnership and is best described as an entity to provide unity of command. As to create a new initial estimate of man- Alliance effort with four partner nations.8 kinetic operations were executed from ning because recent AC Izmir exercises
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Phinney 87 KC-10 Extender takes off to provide air-refueling assets to NATO aircraft during Operation Unified Protector (U.S. Air Force/Andra Higgs) were strictly humanitarian rather than ki- most common inhibitors. The CFACC 2011, the President addressed the Nation netic. Also, a single versus geographically established 45 days as the minimum time and indicated that the United States separated CFAC structure—the structure an augmentee should be present for duty. would take a supporting role.18 Much has envisioned and planned for—changed In reality, nations determine deployment been written about the CFAC’s initial in- manpower requirements. To accomplish length, so many arrived late and left early, ability to properly man and equip an ISR its air-policing mission, Poggio had ap- compounding training, continuity, and division. These accounts are true. As aug- proximately 94 personnel who trained turnover problems. Additionally, nations mentees arrived at Poggio, they began and operated with a defensive mindset. expected NATO to fill the operational to fill the fledgling intelligence entity, Once leadership determined that the new needs with members assigned to Alliance which was still split because the original staffing requirement was roughly 400 billets. However, some nations prevented ISR division was at Izmir. Compounding members, a call went out for augmenta- NATO from declaring a crisis establish- issues, the small intelligence cell perma- tion from other NATO and national ment, summer leaves remained, and nently assigned to the air policing CAOC entities.16 The same cadre of leadership members accrued overtime hours at at Poggio was insufficient in skill set and trying to concurrently prepare for and peacetime rates. All these factors made it number for the new task of running a execute combat operations built this difficult to execute missions at the NATO sophisticated kinetic air war. staffing requirement. They also had to organizations that provided staffing At the core of this limitation is the expend precious time and focus on pro- to OUP because they had to continue fact that few countries have the national cessing new arrivals—triaging capabilities, home station tasks. Additionally, some capability to collect intelligence, analyze skill sets, and maintaining awareness on members suffered financially when their it, share it on classified architecture, and the needs and current staffing within the governments adjusted their basic hous- then develop the high-fidelity targeting divisions.17 It also became apparent that ing allowance rate to Italy. The CFAC materials necessary for an aerial campaign the skill sets necessary to fill a peacetime never received sufficient staffing and as where collateral damage is a concern. air operations center position such as a result never used the normal 24-hour As the United States stepped back to a chief of intelligence were significantly strategy for its ATO production planning supporting role following the handover different from those needed for planning schedule. Rather, limited-skilled manning to NATO, the CFAC’s ISR division high-end airpower strategic and interdic- drove a decision to operate on extended capability for Operation Unified Protector tion missions. days, reducing planning capability. suffered when it was needed the most. Ensuring proper manning of skilled The U.S. policy decision to take a Largely absent were U.S. national feeds personnel in the CFAC was a continu- secondary role in OUP exposed NATO providing critical knowledge and the ous struggle. Financial constraints and ISR shortcomings and initially hampered current imagery and trained personnel national political contexts were the two mission accomplishment. On March 28, necessary to make collateral damage
88 Features / Reflections on Operation Unified Protector JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 estimate determinations to prosecute Additionally, the 28 Alliance nations each the Royal Air Force liaison team, with dynamic targets. Most important, the saw the situation and potential Libyan strategy experience from the Kosovo United States did not immediately endstates differently. With this, planners campaign and the International Security provide trained personnel to augment only received broad political guidance. Assistance Force, eventually helped create NATO’s nascent ISR division.19 A perfect OOD planners have since expressed that a functional strategy division at Poggio. storm existed from the beginning: NAC they also suffered from a lack of clear po- Once functional, the CFAC strategy guidance for zero civilian casualties and litical guidance that carried into OUP.20 division had to create a strategy comple- damage to civilian infrastructure, strong The CJTF Naples no-fly zone operations mentary with the CJTF’s plan. Unclear political pressure for the Alliance to take plan on March 27 stated that the assigned guidance, the quick tempo, no-land over the mission, the urgency to prevent mission for the air component was to component, and a stand-alone maritime Benghazi from being overrun, and the “enforce a no fly zone” and “to help mission resulted in a CJTF campaign CFAC shackled by lack of a functional protect civilian or populated areas under plan based on airpower, but not an air ISR division. From his OUP experience, threat of attack.” Translating the broad campaign.24 The CFACC made two General Jodice stated, “ISR is a driver, strokes of this last phrase when matched decisions instrumental in developing an not an enabler for airpower.” with the UNSCR phrasing of “all nec- air strategy. First, he directed the air com- Within days, the CFACC director essary means” left the CFAC leaders ponent to create its own strategy within asked for help from NATO’s Northern grappling to determine the accepted left a campaign plan with the intent of verti- Air Component at Ramstein Air Base. and right limits of the Alliance mandate. cally influencing the CJTF strategy and A U.S. Air Force intelligence colonel The Berlin Ministerial Conference on complementing the CJTF plan. Second, who was weapons school–trained arrived April 14 did provide further clarification he directed the formation of a “red team” at Poggio to lead the ISR division. She by stating that the desired objectives within the strategy division that was in- worked informal networks and a handful were for attacks on civilians to cease, the strumental in gaming possible strategies of U.S. intelligence officers began to ap- regime to withdraw military forces, and a and perceived outcomes. Libya is a large pear within days. Some were Reservists “credible and verifiable ceasefire, paving country spanning almost 1,000 miles who, through creative efforts on securing the way for a genuine political transi- from east to west and 500 miles from funding and orders, answered the dis- tion” to take place.21 On August 23, the north to south. The size of the country tress call and made their way to Poggio. NAC further refined the NATO endstate and limited CFAC assets constrained Facing challenges and frustrations from by establishing three key conditions for what the air campaign could accomplish the monumental task at hand, the ISR success. First, Libyan civilians would no per each ATO period. For instance, the division chief late one night sent an email longer require NATO to protect them CFAC had only enough E-3s to ensure outlining, in blunt terms, the conse- from the threat of or an actual attack; 24/7 coverage with one aircraft on sta- quences of the lack of U.S. support. This second, an external entity such as a stabi- tion. Other large ISR division platforms email went viral within the Pentagon and lization force could ensure stability inside were limited to one flying period per day. was read well beyond the level originally Libya without NATO support; and third, This forced planners either to saturate a intended; however, the ultimate impact regime and rebel forces would adhere to specific area for an extended period or was positive. The message was clear: the terms of a cease-fire, and military and to methodically rove across Libya and NATO needed multilevel U.S. ISR sup- security forces would be back in desig- capture as many snapshots of prioritized port to succeed in the mission. This will nated locations.22 Fortunately, guidance areas as possible. Early remotely piloted be true in future NATO missions and became clearer over time as the nations aircraft coverage consisted of two Air should temper U.S. voting on future built consensus. Force MQ-1s, and these missions neces- NATO operations requiring high-end A clear vision of the endstate and sitated careful planning as their slow ISR support, especially if the United trained strategists are key elements in cre- groundspeed prevented rapid reposition- States lacks an appetite for involvement, ating a winning air campaign plan. Early ing for new priorities.25 At the high water or to support staffing needs. on, the strategy division suffered from a mark, the CFAC could launch just below Formulating an initial air strategy lack of formally trained and experienced 70 offensive strike sorties during an ATO was also difficult. A lack of clear political strategists. In truth, the ownership of cycle to cover an area equivalent to the guidance and trained strategists along this error fell with the sending nations size of Alaska.26 The strategy that even- with differing views between the CFAC filling posts for which their members tually emerged divided Libya into nine and the CJTF made initial strategy were not prepared.23 Few nations possess regions. formulation difficult. Beginning with po- the training programs and opportunities This division fostered a geographically litical guidance, the flash to bang period to groom fully capable strategists, and based awareness with a usable lexicon between UNSCR approvals and NATO they were absent in NATO Air prior to shared by the Airmen at the CFAC and taking the mission was very short—es- OUP. Moving the strategy function to the CJTF staff. The CFACC’s guid- sentially 1 week. This period left little Poggio under the leadership of a British ance to marshal efforts toward coercing time to design a comprehensive strategy. group captain (colonel) recruited from combatants harming civilians drove initial
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Phinney 89 center of gravity analysis. The United deliberate and dynamic targeting pro- the restricted fire line. Whether aircrews Nations mandate and NATO leadership cesses evolved, and by mid-June the or CFAC approved, due to the fluidity did not limit strikes to regime forces. CFAC effectively and rapidly applied fires of the battlespace, limited ISR assets, NATO forces could engage any military across the battlespace. Deliberate target and the strategic nature of every bomb, force threatening civilians. The reality on sets ranged from isolated military sites leadership and aircrews exhaustively the ground was that Muammar Qadhafi’s in the badlands to urban installations in weighed each engagement decision. The forces matched action to the regime’s downtown Tripoli requiring sophisticated U.S. decision to allow employment of the rhetoric. Rebel forces entering a previ- planning and delivery. The ISR division Hellfire II missile from MQ-1 Predators ously threatened town were welcomed chief overcame initial reservations about helped immensely.30 Remotely piloted as liberators. Thus the strategy division preplanned targets by including the aircraft with precise small weapons were focused on Qadhafi’s regime cohesion as senior national representatives28 in the an invaluable asset when attacking targets the primary center of gravity to exploit. initial efforts of the joint targeting work- difficult to find or strike, or targets that Strategists emphasized disrupting regime ing group. This initiative ensured that by required heavy scrutiny to ensure ROE command and control as well as military the time the CJTF commander approved requirements. and paramilitary forces. a target and put it on the joint prioritized Airpower had multiple accomplish- This geographic focus combined target list, national questions and con- ments believed to be firsts in OUP. with the center of gravity analysis yielded cerns had normally been addressed and Often, the limited assets on hand drove four regional approaches with the intent the striker nation was prepared to engage the CFAC to creatively maximize and of protecting civilians.27 Around the the target. Many of the smaller striker employ each airborne asset. Strategically, Greater Tripoli region, NATO focused nations deservedly received accolades be- this operation was the first NATO-Arab on disrupting command and control cause they did indeed punch well beyond military operation. Also, France was and regime forces. These efforts would their weight. Planners and aircrews took deeply involved in the leadership, plan- marginalize the credibility of the regime exhaustive measures to ensure that every ning, and execution of OUP, a significant and reduce its ability to threaten the strike was required and was free of civil- milestone as France had just returned to populace. In the Jalu Brega region, ian casualties. As an example, an aircrew the military portion of the Alliance. Both NATO focused on engaging the forward member terminally “drug off” a laser- Qatar and the United Arab Emirates elements of the regime forces between guided bomb when a civilian approached dropped their first bombs in combat Brega and Ajdabiya. This was critical as the target. In another, the aircrew did over Libya. The British Typhoon also Ajdabiya was the remaining impediment not release on a re-attack when Libyan dropped its initial combat weapons between the regime and Benghazi. In the emergency responders became a collateral and flew its first combat pairings with northwest region adjacent to the Tunisian damage concern. The discipline of OUP the GR-4 Tornado. French and British border, NATO focused on understand- aircrews was commendable, enabling the rotary attack helicopters, normally land ing what was occurring on the ground cohesion of the Alliance and ensuring component assets, flew jointly from naval to deter further advances by the regime continued international support for the platforms while operating under CFAC against the encircled rebel towns. Finally, mission. This highlights the importance command and control. OUP saw the first in the southern part of the Jalu Brega of training to all spectrums of conflict. U.S. MQ-1 “buddy-lasing” for a foreign region, NATO focused on understand- Dynamic targeting also matured, attack helicopter as well as regularly for ing military activities in order to prevent and the CFAC team became more adept foreign jet fighters. The MQ-1 became fielded forces from flowing toward the at effectively solving higher collateral indispensable as a deep radio relay, on- battle area near Ajdabiya. As available air damage estimate scenarios. This was pos- scene commander in case of an ejection, assets were limited, the initial air strategy sible through the selection of weapons and aerial coordinator for time-sensitive relied on regional pulsing. The intent was and a developed and seasoned approval dynamic attacks on behalf of the CFAC. to maximize limited ISR across the bat- process in combat operations.29 Positive U.S. rescue helicopters staged aboard tlespace and provide kinetic activity when identification of regime elements be- Alliance naval vessels to get them closer and where it was most needed. As with came more difficult as they quickly shed to recovery locations in case of ejections any campaign, fog and friction continu- standard military vehicles for Toyotas, deep in hostile territory. Finally, fire ally challenged execution. learned the art of concealment, and support teams operated aboard two dif- Discussions to this point focused on did their best to exploit ROE limita- ferent maritime patrol aircraft platforms the challenges during the few months tions set in place to protect nonmilitary and effectively scoured assigned areas of of OUP. As time progressed, the CFAC personnel, infrastructure, schools, and the battlespace and directed precise fires organization matured and became a mosques. Using a restricted fire line aided against hostile forces. cohesive team. Needed external national aircrews in knowing where within the What ultimately led to the success support became available, at least to ROE they could engage without CFAC of OUP were the people involved from the minimal level necessary to plan and approval. Conversely, the CFAC had to top to bottom. The speed at which execute a successful campaign. Both approve targets on the restricted side of the Alliance took on the mission and
90 Features / Reflections on Operation Unified Protector JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 French corvette FS Commandant Birot, attached to NATO Maritime Task Force 455, operates in Mediterranean Sea during Operation Unified Protector (Italian Navy) structural, manning, and national support became genuine members of the CFAC must defend these because training op- challenges created a serious problem with effort. Strong leadership in a national portunities are limited. AC Ramstein little time to solve it. The importance endeavor is critical. In multinational op- is configuring the JFAC facility with of the leadership of the CFACC and erations with a unified chain of command proper communications equipment and his director during the early days can- where the unity of the nations is a center life support. There is an awareness that not be overstated. NATO and partner of gravity, effective and inclusive leader- NATO, U.S., and European national nation personnel of all ranks arrived at ship by the commander is essential. JFACs need to train, exercise, and be the CFAC and gave their all. In some OUP was executed concurrently prepared to execute together. Looking cases, skills did not match positions and with NATO planning to reduce the size forward, it will once again be up to members willingly accepted unanticipated of the Alliance’s force structure. AC nations to determine if they will send roles. General Jodice made it a point to Izmir took down its flag last summer trained and ready augmentation to the know the name of every staff member and a singular NATO air component will NATO CFAC. Failure to do so will at Poggio. His care for personnel was exist at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. cause the same problems created during sincere and was appreciated at all ranks. As members of OUP returned to their OUP. Finally, in the future, key nations He also recognized departing members regular NATO locations, they took with possessing unique enabling capabilities at each shift change briefing. Many them the lessons of the Libyan opera- and personnel cannot “hand over the members met their national limits on de- tion. The current NATO joint force mission to NATO” and expect success ployment length, went home, and found air component (JFAC) organization without their involvement. a way to return to Poggio. National structure is largely set and doctrinally At 2200Z on October 31, 2011, representatives quickly adorned their sound. A key takeaway is the importance General Jodice gave permission for the flight suits with CFAC OUP patches and of kinetic exercises. Senior air leaders last OUP aircraft, fittingly a NATO
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Phinney 91 AWACS, to depart Libyan airspace. Over ISR module. Rachel McCaffrey, ISR division Long Shadow: The Political and Military Lega- chief, email to author, January 3, 2013. cies of the 2011 Libya Campaign, Whitehall the satellite radio, he dismissed the aircraft 12 The NATO Combined Air Operations Report 1-12 (London: Royal United Services by saying, “For the past 7 plus months, Centers (CAOCs) are air-policing centers, not a Institute, 2012), available at
92 Features / Reflections on Operation Unified Protector JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Patriot Missile operator adjusts launcher settings during field training (U.S. Air Force/Maeson Elleman)
Silent Watch The Role of Army Air and Missile Defense
By Michael S. Tucker and Robert W. Lyons
n March 29, 2013, North had already deployed missile units to potential solutions. Other key players Korean President Kim Jong Un the North Korean coast.1 Roughly in the planning process included the continued his public provocation 7,000 miles away, these North Korean 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense O th and stated that it was time to “settle declarations generated action in the Command (AAMDC) and 94 accounts” and directed his missile units Pentagon and across the Department AAMDC teams that perform the to prepare to strike U.S. mainland and of Defense (DOD). Officers from the missile defense planning, integration, Pacific military bases. The next day Office of the Secretary of Defense, and coordination for theater missile North Korea declared it had entered Joint Staff, and Army were called defense operations. The planning a state of war with South Korea and to assess the situation and suggest resulted in the Secretary of Defense deploying A Battery, 4th Air Defense Artillery (A-4 ADA) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Lieutenant General Michael S. Tucker, USA, is Commander of First Army, Rock Island, Illinois. Colonel to Guam. THAAD is a unique and Robert W. Lyons, USA, is Chief of Staff, 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command. When this article was written, Lieutenant General Tucker was serving as Deputy G-3/5/7 Headquarters, Department of cutting-edge missile defense system the Army (HQDA), and Colonel Lyons was serving as Air and Missile Defense Director, HQDA, G-3/5/7. that provides persistent defensive
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Tucker and Lyons 93 Two THAAD interceptors launched during test, which resulted in intercept of one MRBM target by THAAD and one MRBM target by Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (DOD) capabilities to defeat a wide range of Service has this capability or can achieve to a region, 2) create the ability to stressing ballistic missiles in either the this effect. DOD understands that Army partner with allies there, and 3) provide exoatmosphere (outer space) or the AMD remains the cost-effective, per- a deterrent or calming perspective.”4 endoatmosphere. This capability was sistent solution to address the enduring Additionally, as the wars in Iraq and so new that only two THAAD bat- requirements of the new DOD strategy.2 Afghanistan wind down, the Army and teries existed. Though A-4 ADA was This one event and its effect illustrate other Services are transitioning from a maintained at heightened alert status, both the strategic importance and the combat force to a force of deterrance. the order directed the battery to deploy increased operational demand for AMD. Army AMD is central to the deterrence in significantly less time. As a testa- Chief of Staff of the Army General mission, providing persistent and credible ment to the high degree of proficiency Raymond T. Odierno stated, “Whether defensive capability, assuring allies with and professionalism of the Soldiers and it’s missile defense, whether it’s to build U.S. presence, and providing operational leaders involved, A Battery, 4th Bat- partner capacity, whether it’s to put some access for the joint team. talion successfully deployed in 7 days small element on the ground to do work A combination of strategic factors has and attained full operational capability or operationally employ it to protect elevated the importance of Army AMD in 15 days—weeks ahead of predicted some U.S. interest, that’s what we’re capability. They include threats that have planning cycles. looking to do.”3 evolved in capability, complexity, and ca- The effect of the ongoing THAAD Events in North Korea and Syria are pacity; a defense strategy and policy that deployment to Guam cannot be over- only the most recent demonstrations of place a high value on an enduring deter- stated, as it assures U.S. allies and the critical role AMD plays in today’s rence capability; and an increasing need partners by demonstrating commitment strategic environment. The deployments to maintain joint operational access to to a country or region. THAAD provides of THAAD to Guam coupled with the distant regions of the world. These strate- critical persistent ground-based home- Patriot missile system to Turkey further gic factors have increased the operational land missile defense for Guam and its key validate the thinking that Army missile demand on the Army’s existing AMD civilian and military sites. Additionally, it defense systems are key strategic (or force. In the Army’s G-3/5/7, we have enables dual-mission Aegis ships to per- geopolitical) tools for the geographic a front-row seat to those demand signals form air and missle defense (AMD) and combatant commands. Army AMD through the Global Force Management other critical missions for the geographic Soldiers provide an enduring presence Board process and other forums. We combatant commanders. No other to “1) demonstrate U.S. commitment work with the Army staff, Missile Defense
94 Features / Silent Watch JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Agency (MDA), combatant commanders, Department of Defense and Its Major Defense Strategy and others to ensure the Army will con- Components,” directs the Army to At a symposium in April 2011, Com- tinue to provide the capability needed. “Conduct air and missile defense to mander of U.S. Central Command It has been more than a year since support joint campaigns and assist in General James N. Mattis stated: Army Secretary John McHugh and Chief achieving air superiority.”6 Significantly, of Staff General Odierno approved the no other Service is so charged. The We can reduce the desire for any nation AMD strategy, which was written to Navy is directed to “Conduct ballistic to threaten our nations and our people, synchronize the stakeholders’ efforts missile defense,”7 and the Air Force to reminding adversaries that offensive plans in developing the future AMD force. “Conduct offensive and defensive oper- with missiles cannot succeed, so don’t even Since then, the Nation and the Army ations, to include appropriate air and try. IAMD serves as an important mani- entered a time of sequestration, continu- missile defense.”8 This is not to imply festation of our collective protection and ing resolutions, and increasing conflicts the other Services have small roles. deterrent posture, and increases deterrence around the world. For Army AMD, what Indeed, the Navy and the MDA have by reducing vulnerabilities.9 should have been a straightforward year invested billions and achieved incredible of executing the approved strategy has capability to destroy ballistic missiles In January 2012, the President and additionally become a year of reacting before they reenter Earth’s atmosphere. Secretary of Defense released the new to ever-increasing demands for AMD The Air Force often serves as the higher defense guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global in a time of increasingly constrained headquarters for AMD operations, Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century resources: integrating Services, systems, fighters, Defense. It charted significant changes to radars, and even coalition partners to defense policy including a rebalancing The United States faces profound challenges protect against an array of threats on toward the Asia-Pacific region, a focus that require strong, agile, and capable mil- a global scale. Nevertheless, only the on preparing for asymmetrical warfare to itary forces whose actions are harmonized Army is charged “to provide air and include antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD), with other elements of U.S. national power. missile defense to support joint cam- a renewed emphasis on building partner Our global responsibilities are significant; paigns.” That straightforward charge capacity, and an acknowledgment of we cannot afford to fail. The balance be- has become increasingly important in today’s fiscally constrained environment. tween available resources and our security the current strategic environment. The defense guidance also highlights the needs has never been more delicate.5 The title of this article is deliberate. following challenges relevant to Army “Silent Watch” speaks to the critical and AMD: A new set of AMD capabilities is enduring role our AMD forces execute: being developed and will significantly deploy to faraway lands, often in or near The United States must maintain its change the way Army AMD forces de- harm’s way, continuously “watching” for ability to project power in areas in which ploy, employ, and fight. Game-changing the first shot of the next war. When that our access and freedom to operate are systems such as the Integrated Air shot comes—sometimes after months challenged. In these areas, sophisticated ad- and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle or even years—defeating the enemy can versaries will use asymmetric capabilities, Command System (IBCS) and Indirect lead to greater operational and strategic to include electronic and cyber warfare, Fire Protection Capability Increment flexibility for our leaders, greater control ballistic and cruise missiles. . . .10 With the 2 Intercept Multi-Mission Launcher of escalation, maintaining coalitions, and diffusion of destructive technology, these (MML) weapon system will allow us even possibly helping to prevent that extremists have the potential to pose cata- to be more globally responsive, less war. Every day, AMD forces are on Silent strophic threats that could directly affect constrained by command and control Watch around the world and at home. In our security and prosperity.11 linkages, and better able to organize addition to those deployed around the forces at the component level. globe, 350 Soldiers of the Army National This policy shift is taking place within The Army AMD force is changing Guard protect 314 million Americans the context of a global security environ- to meet the increasing demands of the 24/7 from the threat of a rogue or ment that presents a multitude of security joint warfighter. This article examines the accidental nuclear launch against the challenges for the Nation, the Army, and strategic environment and the role of the United States. Despite budgetary pres- the Army’s AMD forces. It also manifests Army’s AMD team, reviews the Army’s sures, according to the recently released a new concept called Joint Operational AMD strategy one year later, and consid- Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, the Access. ers the implications for the joint force. number one priority is defense of the homeland, which further highlights the The Concept Army’s Directed Role criticality of the global missile defense The Joint Operational Access Concept Providing AMD for the joint force mission area and directs increasing our (JOAC) focuses on how the joint force has long been an Army mission. DOD capability and capacity with additional will achieve operational access against Directive 5100.01, “Functions of the sensors and interceptors. armed opposition that possesses A2/AD
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Tucker and Lyons 95 capabilities. A core component to future, Global Positioning Satellites and capable of reaching the United States, achieving global access is the impor- improved navigation will reduce that and although the size of the Russian tance of setting preconditions, which error to mere meters. UAVs are increas- strategic missile force is shrinking (with could be forward deployment of forces, ingly becoming “near real time” target- arms control limitations and budgetary multinational exercises, or support ing devices capable of bringing lethal constraints), development of new ICBM agreements. The JOAC identifies one of missiles on our forces in short order. and SLBM systems is proceeding. the required capabilities as the ability to The thinking enemy is increasingly Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) provide expeditionary missile defense to practicing “complex integrated attacks,” are highly effective weapons systems that counter the increased precision, lethal- where multiple capabilities are brought can present a major threat to military ity, and range of enemy A2/AD to bear against a single target in a simul- operations. At least nine foreign countries systems.12 “The U.S. requires a more taneous raid to defeat air defenses. will be involved in LACM production geographically distributed, operationally Many countries view ballistic and during the next decade, and many mis- resilient, and politically sustainable cruise missile systems as cost-effective siles will be available for export.14 These posture that allows persistent presence weapons and symbols of national advances in threat capability and capacity and, if needed, power projection. . . . power. In addition, they present an have significantly increased the opera- This rapid response hinges on flexibility asymmetric threat to U.S. airpower. tional demand for AMD capability. and forward positioning of permanent Key findings from the National Air and and rotational forces.”13 Army AMD has Space Intelligence Center’s unclassified Demand a significant role in setting precondi- 2013 report Ballistic & Cruise Missile On July 17, 2013, in testimony before tions for given regions and countering Threat highlight the evolution of threat the Senate Appropriations Defense A2/AD capabilities in a nonescalatory capabilities. North Korea has unveiled Subcommittee hearing on MDA’s fiscal manner, especially in early phases of the new road-mobile Hwasong-13 inter- year 2014 budget, Vice Admiral James conflict. For example, in the U.S. Pacific continental ballistic missile (ICBM) while D. Syring stated, “I am working hard, Command (USPACOM) area of continuing to develop the Taepodong-2. as the new director, with the Army to responsibility there are three Patriot Also in development are an interme- find a way to the seventh and possibly battalions, one THAAD battery, an diate-range ballistic missile and a solid eighth THAAD batteries. The system Army AMD command center, and an propellant short-range ballistic missile is needed, and the system is needed Army Navy/Transportable Radar Sur- (SRBM). By 2015 Iran could develop in more numbers, in my assessment veillance (AN/TPY-2) radar forward and test an ICBM capable of reaching the and discussion with the combatant stationed. These AMD units engage in United States. In 2010, Iran revealed the commanders.”15 multiple exercises with partners and Qiam-1 SRBM, the fourth generation The demand for Army AMD allies. In the USPACOM region alone, Fateh-110 SRBM, and now claims to be is outpacing supply. During recent we participate annually with the Repub- mass-producing antiship ballistic missiles. Congressional testimony, Lieutenant lic of Korea’s forces in Ulchi Freedom It has modified its Shahab-3 medium- General Richard P. Formica, former Guardian and Key Resolve exercises, range ballistic missile (MRBM) to extend Commanding General, Space and Missile with Japan’s forces in Keen Edge and its range and effectiveness and also claims Defense Command, commented that Keen Sword, and with our multinational to have deployed the two-stage, solid- “Our analysis, reinforced by the 2012 partners in Terminal Fury and Talisman propellant Sejjil MRBM. Global BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] Saber. These AMD assets are on Silent China has the most active and diverse Assessment [a recent senior-level tabletop Watch, providing force protection over ballistic missile development program in exercise], reinforces the fact that GCC critical power projection, command and the world. It is developing and testing demands for missile defense capabilities control, and other strategic locations. offensive missiles, forming additional will always exceed the available BMD missile units, qualitatively upgrading inventory.”16 In addition to the afore- Threat missile systems, and developing methods mentioned THAAD and Patriot units in These challenges, as they relate to to counter ballistic missile defenses. It Guam and Turkey, we had counterrocket, AMD, include a danger that has evolved continues to field conventionally armed artillery, and mortar capabilities in the in both capability and employment. The SRBMs opposite Taiwan and is develop- Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, Patriot threats from rockets and unmanned ing a number of mobile, conventionally units in Poland and Jordan, and AMD aerial vehicles (UAVs) to cruise and armed MRBMs. Missiles such as the sites in Japan and Israel. AMD forces will ballistic missiles are increasingly more Dong-Feng 21D ASBM are key com- continue to be forward stationed and capable, longer range, and more precise. ponents of a military modernization deployed in Korea, Japan, throughout Ten years ago, the “circular error prob- program specifically designed to prevent the Gulf, and in Europe according to the ability” of where an enemy missile adversary forces’ access to regional con- President’s priorities and Phased Adaptive would land was often measured in flicts. Russia still has over 1,400 nuclear Approaches for Europe, Asia-Pacific, and kilometers or tens of kilometers; in the warheads deployed on ballistic missiles the Middle East. AMD’s Patriot force is
96 Features / Silent Watch JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 currently more than 40 percent forward deployed or forward stationed, and global demands for Patriot units continue to increase. Four of our five Joint Tactical Ground Station systems currently sup- port overseas combatant commanders. As THAAD and AN/TPY-2 forward-based mode radars are fielded, requests for their deployment remain high as well. We ask Soldiers to deploy to obscure sites, often with little preparation, in many cases breaking new ground for the Nation. They are as much diplomats for U.S. values as protectors of cities. Deployments are never rote; they require intensive command and leadership from all levels with extensive coordination between staffs and the host country to execute successfully. These deployments often call for nonstandard actions that Patriot missile mobile launcher and air defense equipment deployed to U.S. and NATO Patriot missile speak to initiative and quick, effective batteries at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey (U.S. Air Force/Charles Larkin, Sr.) decisionmaking to establish or sustain operations. Once deployed assets are proliferation of threat technology, and AMD and develop capabilities that were operational, the pace remains at a high an era of persistent conflict. It also integrated, joint, and multimission. level with continual improvements to articulates expectations for 2016 and This led the Army to pursue an ambi- site security and procedures coupled 2020 to aid DOD in keeping the AMD tious networked solution called Army with system maintenance to ensure units force and Army staff within this frame- IAMD. At the center of this effort is the maintain a ready status. In addition, these work in the near- and midterm years. IBCS program, which will not only serve deployments are not just 3- or 6-month The strategy’s desired outcomes are as the Patriot’s next generation command tours: AMD units are some of the few AMD’s three imperatives: to defend the and control (C2) system but act as the remaining units that still deploy for 12- homeland, defend the force and critical single mission command system for all month rotations. Once employed, they assets, and assure access for our forces. Army AMD. IBCS will also enable systems normally stay and provide an enduring To achieve these, the AMD strategy has to work together, share data, and employ presence. Silent Watch becomes a lasting four Lines of Effort: assets in new and more efficient ways. U.S. “foot in the door” for improved IBCS will provide enhanced mission attain networked mission command relations with host countries. We face a •• command capability for AMD leaders. It enable defeat of the full range of air long-range threat with the knowledge •• will increase the range of options avail- and missile threats that many lives are at stake if we fail. Thus able to the commander on the ground build partner capacity and maintain we do everything within our power to •• as he tailors the defense design down forward presence ensure that failure is not an option. to component level employment rather transform the AMD force. •• than emplacement of whole batteries and AMD Strategy Innovation Is Key systems. This IBCS-driven evolution will As noted, the Army published its first allow leaders to better manage the battle, With increasing threats and decreas- Service-wide AMD strategy in 2012. with increased operational flexibility re- ing resources, the Army needed Its purpose is to articulate an overarch- sulting in the right capability at the right to develop significant new AMD ing AMD framework that synchronizes location, enhanced ability to manage capabilities quickly and affordably. Service functions in support of Army missile inventories, and added decision The prior approach of developing and joint missions. It describes where time for leaders to improve their ability stand-alone systems (for example, the Army plans to be in the future, how to execute engagements. Army AMD is Medium Extended Air Defense, Surface the AMD force is shaped to support inherently a joint (and coalition) mission Launched Advanced Medium Range the Army and the joint force, and what area—Air Force fighters and Navy Aegis Air-to-Air Missile, and Joint Land must be accomplished to succeed in the ships team with Army AMD Patriot and Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated future operational environment. The THAAD systems to complete actions Netted Sensor) was no longer afford- AMD strategy is informed by the new across the joint engagement sequence. able; we had to “break the mold” with defense guidance, resource challenges, When enabled, IBCS will network across
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Tucker and Lyons 97 the joint community and provide an We offer that budgets are only one July 28, 2013, available at
98 Features / Silent Watch JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Citizens unload relief supplies in Gonaives, Haiti, from landing craft utility embarked on USS Kearsarge (U.S. Navy/Joshua Adam Nuzzo)
Leveraging U.S. Civilian Capabilities in Africa
By Charles D. “Buck” McDermott
[A]s currently structured, the international system for responding to natural disasters is neither as timely nor equitable as it could be. Funding is secured on a largely ad-hoc basis after disaster strikes. —African Risk Capacity Response to the Cost-Benefit Analysis of the African Risk Capacity
evelopment gains in Africa suffer valuable services to the local communi- major setbacks when governments ties, and build mutual trust and good- D are unable to respond effectively will among participants and between to crises. To address this concern, the nations. Regrettably, the U.S. budget Captain Charles D. “Buck” McDermott, USNR, is U.S. military conducts regular exercises crisis caused the Navy to cancel Con- a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College Senior with partner nations that provide valu- tinuing Promise 2013, U.S. Southern Course and U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He is also a retired captain in able training for U.S. and partner nation Command’s biennial humanitarian assis- the U.S. Merchant Marine. forces, improve interoperability, provide tance exercise. The irony in the name of
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 McDermott 99 this exercise—Promise—was likely not other U.S. laws, and military regulation. independent Federal agency to falling lost on the eight Caribbean and Latin In foreign disaster assistance, however, under the authority and direction of the American nations slated to participate. the military often plays a crucial and newly created Department of Homeland Will Africa Partnership Station exercises highly visible role. Security (DHS). After Katrina, coopera- be canceled too?1 What do these cancel- President George W. Bush was praised tion between the states, among the local, ations say about the United States as a for his resolute leadership in the im- state, and Federal levels of government, reliable partner in Africa, and what or mediate aftermath of the September 11, and between the many departments and who will fill the void? 2001 terrorist attacks. The vast majority agencies at each level of government While the U.S. Government cannot of responders at those sites were from improved dramatically, leveraging preex- afford to continue to engage as it has, to the respective cities and states. While isting frameworks. return to a policy of isolationism would the President’s support was welcome, Established in 1996, the Emergency be catastrophic. To maintain global sta- local and state officials led the response Management Assistance Compact bility, improve governance and economic and recovery—the mayor, the gover- (EMAC) is an agreement by 54 states opportunity in Africa, and spur its own nor, the police and fire chiefs, hospital and territories to offer mutual assistance economic growth, the United States administrators, religious leaders, and during governor-declared states of “[has] to think.” The Nation will reduce nearby charities. The Bush administra- emergency.5 EMAC allows states to send reliance on certain military capabilities tion also received international accolades personnel, equipment, and commodities and as a result will need to leverage civil- for its rapid and perhaps overwhelming across state lines with credentials, licenses, ian capabilities in unique and innovative response to the December 2004 Indian and certifications honored in the sup- ways. To that end, this article examines Ocean tsunami, while only 8 months ported state. EMAC also clarifies issues of U.S. emergency response capability at later, the administration was criticized liability and reimbursement.6 Additionally, all levels as a key strength of U.S. gover- for its response to Hurricane Katrina most sizable communities and all nance. The National Response Platform in New Orleans where the city’s poorly states have a designated Emergency (NRP) and National Response Force maintained pumping system resulted Management department or agency. (NRF) concepts are presented as means in flooding and inadequate levees were These local and state offices follow the to “export” that strength to Africa. In breached by the tidal surge. guidelines established by DHS/FEMA addition these new tools of diplomacy New Orleans was aware of the hur- in the National Incident Management will improve public-private partnerships ricane threat and had ample notice of System, National Response Framework, to rebalance a whole-of-nation approach Katrina’s approach but was still woefully and the Incident Command System. to stimulate economic growth and ensure unprepared. Public perceptions of the Indeed, there has been tremendous long-term stability and security in Africa, Federal response to Hurricane Katrina Federal investment in building local and the United States, and elsewhere. and to the 9/11 attack in New York state capabilities to ensure that, to the City were radically different. Did the fullest extent possible, “local disasters” Background failure in Louisiana occur in Washington, can be managed at the local level. When The United Nations (UN) Com- or in New Orleans or Baton Rouge? local capacities are overwhelmed or mission on Human Rights includes Thankfully, the massive Federal response a unique capability is required, local “responsiveness to the needs of the in New Orleans resulted in only 1,833 authorities request assistance from the people” among its five key attributes lives lost.3 That was tragic, but how many state. If the state is unable to meet the of “good governance.”2 Not surpris- more would have died in similar circum- requirements of the local authorities in ingly, the governments of many African stances in Africa? What would have been responding to a specific emergency, the nations lack the capacity to meet even the consequences for governments able governor of the state seeks the assistance the most basic human needs much less to provide only a limited response, a bi- of the Federal Government by making the advanced capabilities necessary ased response, or no response at all? The an official request, in writing, to the to respond effectively in the wake of solutions start at the local level. President. disaster. In contrast, the United States It is said that “Every disaster is a The President might then make an has robust emergency response capa- local disaster [because] it is at the local Emergency or Major Disaster declaration bilities at the local, state, and Federal level that the greatest challenges are and designate DHS/FEMA as the lead levels. Moreover, an equally robust faced and the toughest decisions are Federal agency for the response with other legal architecture provides for rapid and made.”4 That may be true, but in the departments and agencies directed to effective coordination between levels of aftermath of Katrina, it was the Federal support. This was the case in the Katrina government and between departments Government, specifically the Federal response when FEMA assigned the and agencies at each level. Therefore, Emergency Management Agency Department of Defense (DOD) a mission in domestic emergencies the military (FEMA), that was most severely criti- for “full logistics support” at a cost FEMA plays an important but supporting role cized. Following the terrorist attacks of estimated would be $1 billion.7 Despite limited by the Posse Comitatus Act, 9/11, FEMA had transitioned from an how it may have appeared in the media to
100 Features / Leveraging U.S. Civilian Capabilities in Africa JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 outside observers, FEMA was in charge and the military had a supporting role. As a lesson learned, however, military officers and senior enlisted personnel now un- dergo extensive Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) training wherein they learn the importance of deferring media inquiries to public officials to avoid even the appearance of loss of civilian control and to facilitate the military’s earliest pos- sible withdrawal. FEMA in turn recognized that it had to develop its own logistics capabilities re- lying on civilian government agencies and the private sector. As a result, the agency greatly increased the number and capacity of its warehouses and distribution centers. It also established retainer contracts with multiple transportation providers such as short- and long-haul trucks, buses, am- Senegalese marine commandos and U.S. Marines conduct martial arts training during Africa bulances, passenger and cargo trains, and Partnership Station 13 (U.S. Marine Corps/Marco Mancha) airlines. These providers agree to make assets available for hire under contract if airlift would be in high demand in the first exemplifies the problems of relying on a disaster is declared and FEMA or a sub- days of the response. airlift. These include the enormous cost ordinate agency identifies a requirement. Two days prior to landfall, FEMA of air transportation, aircraft availability, This civilian-based response architecture tasked DOD to operate USS Nassau cargo volume and weight limitations, promotes entrepreneurship, small busi- (LHA 4) off Galveston Island for 17 airfield congestion, and fuel consumption nesses, and an increased capacity at the days at a cost of $20 million—or a daily rates. In the likely event that aircraft fuel lowest possible level of government—a operating cost of $1.2 million.9 In addi- is limited or not available at the disaster multilayered civilian approach to emer- tion to helicopter support, USS Nassau site, aircraft cargo capacity is further gency response much needed in Africa. utilized landing craft to transport ve- limited by the necessity to carry sufficient Many recent changes within FEMA hicles and heavy equipment—Humvees, fuel for the return flight. Otherwise, mili- are a consequence of the Post-Katrina backhoes, and front-end loaders—and tary aircraft with aerial refueling capacity Emergency Management Reform Act about a thousand Sailors and Marines are required. of 2006, Title VI of P.L. 109-295 to support debris clearance and other In the American Samoa tsunami (H.R. 5441).8 In conjunction with the requirements.10 USS Nassau had been response, U.S. military C-17 aircraft Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and specially outfitted prior to her departure delivered 667.5 tons of supplies in 10 Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), from her home port in Norfolk. Still, due days from Hawaii to American Samoa, a the Post-Katrina Act authorizes and funds to configuration as a naval combatant, straight-line distance of 2,560 miles. The FEMA to “lean forward” and position as- the ship carried relatively little of the sup- cost was $2.35 million, which translates sets in anticipation of state requirements. plies and equipment needed for a disaster to $235,000 per day, or $3,521 per As a result, the response to Hurricane Ike of this type and magnitude. Accordingly ton.11 For comparison, 667.5 tons would in 2008 was dramatically different. its overall contributions were limited, fill 28 standard 20-foot ocean shipping As Ike advanced and its intensity and particularly given the costs. containers.12 That is less than 1 percent location of landfall were known to a rea- The tremendous cost of using naval of the “average” merchant container ship sonable degree of certainty, hundreds of combatants in disaster response must capacity of 3,000 to 7,000 containers. trucks were put under contract. They were be taken into consideration with the Steaming at 15 knots, a merchant ship loaded at FEMA distribution centers and frequency, intensity, and predictability of could have delivered tens of thousands deployed to predetermined parking areas disasters that come from the sea. Further, of tons of disaster relief supplies and in an arc around the anticipated area of populations living on or near the coast equipment in just 6 days. If the ship was impact. Other assets were made ready at are growing globally to say nothing of carrying only those 28 containers, the Federal airfields, typically on DOD instal- the unique challenges of responding to cost would still have been only about lations, to be flown in by commercial or island disasters. For example, FEMA’s $120,000—around $20,000 per day or military airlift. As another lesson learned response to the tsunamis that struck $180 per ton—a savings of over $2 mil- from Katrina, it was anticipated that rotary American Samoa in September 2009 lion, or more than $3,000 per ton.
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 McDermott 101 Similarly, in response to the Haiti are numerous vessels owned by the U.S. and disaster response. Teams would be earthquake on January 12, 2010, there Government or available on the global made up of professionals from the public was again tremendous reliance on airlift. market that could suffice as interim and private sectors that might include A great number of naval combatants from platforms for proof of concept.14 Still, current and past mayors, city council the United States and other nations re- obtaining the ships is perhaps the easier members, police and fire chiefs and their sponded as well. However, many nations problem to solve. administrative staffs, hospital, school, including America also sent merchant The more challenging issues are likely and court administrators, small business ships that carried vastly more supplies and to be getting the money for operation and franchise owners, and countless equipment than responding aircraft and, and maintenance of the ships, the supplies volunteer organizations. Teams would as discussed in the previous case, were far and equipment to make up the cargo, and include doctors, nurses, lawyers, police- more economical. Because the seaport at the manpower to operate the ships and men, firefighters, construction workers, Port-au-Prince had been rendered inop- to load, unload, and employ the cargo. teachers, clerks, and others. NRF teams erable by the earthquake, several vessels Limited Federal funds currently allocated would be based in major U.S. cities with used onboard cranes, barges, and other to strategic assets and engagements could a core cadre of foreign service, emergency small craft to discharge cargo from sea to be supplemented by contributions from management, and military veterans that multiple points ashore. Some ships also corporate and private donors. The cargo would coordinate and lead these local provided substantial sustainment for re- likewise might include government items professionals. sponders and survivors.13 As impressive as but would ideally be made up primarily of One possible framework for resourc- the global response to Haiti’s earthquake items contributed by private and corpo- ing NRF teams requires partnerships, may have been, it was nonetheless ad hoc rate entities to include nongovernmental cooperation, and cost-sharing among the and expensive, and resulted in question- organizations (NGOs). Creating these levels of government. To retain NRFs as able long-term success. public-private partnerships would be no a Federal asset through DHS, the Federal small feat and would directly challenge ex- Government could pay wages and the National Response Platforms isting paradigms. Any necessary legislation cost of interstate and international travel. In view of these recent cases, discus- would be equally complex, if not more State governments could provide housing sions at various levels of the U.S. so, as it would cross into foreign affairs, and intrastate and local transportation. Government and the private sector have homeland security, and defense. Still, some Local governments could provide health generated many concepts for a capabil- might argue that organizing the people care and the supplies and equipment ity to improve the effectiveness and would be the greatest challenge. The NRP needed to conduct the necessary work on efficiency of disaster response “from concept provides one possible solution. local projects. the sea.” One such concept, National Modeled on the military’s Reserve Response Platforms, is modeled on the National Response Forces force structure, NRF teams would be U.S. Marine Corps Maritime Prepo- There are about 1.5 million NGOs in an Active, standby, or Reserve status. sitioning Force program wherein a operating in the United States.15 Indeed, DOD experience and infrastruc- number of specially constructed ships Roughly 64.5 million citizens volun- ture could be leveraged in standing up are strategically located and loaded with teered at least once in 2012.16 Ameri- this civilian capability. NRF team core the supplies and equipment necessary cans donated $298.42 billion to charity cadres would facilitate training specific to for the Marines to respond rapidly in 2011.17 As DOD budget constraints interstate or foreign deployment in coor- to any number of national security necessitate reductions in military force dination with the appropriate local, state, contingencies. structure, tens of thousands of veter- and Federal departments and agencies. Put simply, the NRPs are “floating ans—disciplined, dedicated, and highly Training in a specific skill or trade would warehouses”: U.S.-flag merchant cargo skilled in expeditionary operations—will not be required because team members ships manned by U.S. merchant mariners be entering the civilian workforce. would be recruited specifically for already and loaded with U.S.-manufactured These facts notwithstanding, it seems having the required skills. disaster response supplies and equipment. very unlikely that the American public NRF teams would perform Active They are able to self-offload in port or would support the creation of a new service in a domestic problem area at sea, support helicopter operations, national force to respond to problems identified by DHS in coordination with and provide additional communications, in Africa or elsewhere overseas with so the states. Other teams would support berthing, and messing capacity. NRPs many problems at home such as crime, planned foreign engagements facilitated would be located near areas prone to or poverty, access to health care, educa- by interagency agreement with the threatened by disaster: the Gulf Coast tion, and infrastructure. Department of State and U.S. Agency for during hurricane season, Presidential The NRF concept proposes a civilian International Development (USAID). In inaugurations, meetings of global leaders, reserve force that would focus on ongo- either case, due consideration would be or humanitarian crises. They might even- ing domestic issues but would also be given to the length of these assignments tually be purpose-built ships, but there utilized for foreign planned engagements to balance costs in terms of travel and
102 Features / Leveraging U.S. Civilian Capabilities in Africa JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 the requirement for more team members Melinda Gates Foundation, the Howard future point, NRPs are located here at against the stress on team members and G. Buffett Foundation, or similar phil- home and around the world. NRPs in their families, communities, and civilian anthropic organizations would be more U.S. ports fall under the authority of employers. Finally, other teams in their successful in distilling the vision and DHS/FEMA. NRPs in foreign ports year of Active service might be held in putting together the relevant stakehold- come under the authority of State/ “Reserve” to respond rapidly to domestic ers to pull off a project of this scale. This USAID. All NRPs are loaded with or foreign crises. may also be true. But the result would the supplies and equipment primar- increase capability in NGOs that by ily intended for State/USAID-led NRP and NRF Teams in Africa definition cannot be directed by the U.S. planned engagements but equally useful While Africa’s future is indeed uncer- Government to achieve national security for humanitarian assistance, disaster tain, its people can be assured of some objectives. Consequently, U.S. foreign response, and civil support operations, things. There will be times of instabil- engagement would continue to be hap- to include theater-opening capabilities ity. There will be natural disasters, hazard and would further undermine should normal sea- and airports prove some minor and easily manageable confidence in the U.S. Government. inadequate, not available, or nonexis- and others catastrophic. There will be Many benefits can be derived from the tent. Increased reliance on commercial manmade disasters, some caused by NRP and NRF concepts. First, media im- air carriers to transport NRF teams has accident and others by intent. Kenya’s ages of American citizens helping African allowed U.S. carriers to increase com- National Disaster Response Plan (2009) citizens in this way provide good press mercial aircraft capabilities, perhaps to recognizes a number of risks common for the United States and restore confi- include aerial refueling, and to expand to African nations to include “drought, dence in America’s ability to lead. NRP business domestically and abroad. famine, food insecurity, floods, epidem- and NRF teams would reduce reliance In this near-future world scenario, ics, landslides, sea waves, tsunamis and on U.S. military forces and capabilities two NRPs are in the Africa region. Each technological hazards, deforestation, and would fill the voids left as a result of is operated by a U.S. shipping company desertification, transport accidents, military budget constraints. NRPs could under contract to the Department conflicts, pollution, structural failure, create or sustain thousands of American of Transportation’s Maritime terrorism, fires, and others.”18 NRP and jobs in manufacturing and transportation Administration (DOT/MARAD), NRF teams, through planned engage- and might also provide overseas business Department of the Navy’s Military ment and in responding to crises, will opportunities for U.S. manufacturers. Sealift Command, or perhaps even help African nations build up their own Importantly, NRPs could “shore up” the American Red Cross. A standby ship is strong civilian institutions to ensure American merchant marine, shipbuilding, in Monrovia, Liberia, supporting routine continued good governance during ocean shipping infrastructure, and other partnership engagements and training. peaceful times and in crisis. national strategic capabilities that are so The second NRP is on a State/USAID– Some have argued that the United vital to a maritime nation. planned development engagement in Dar States should assist African governments Likewise, NRFs would reduce es Salaam, Tanzania. in increasing civilian skills for their military misperceptions about U.S. forces being This hypothetical scenario contin- officers and senior enlisted so each coun- employed in sovereign countries or U.S. ues with a pipeline explosion in Lagos, try’s military can resolve infrastructure, naval combatants “lurking” offshore. Nigeria.20 Hundreds are killed and development, and stability crises.19 While In Africa, where so many nations have thousands are injured. Many more this might improve response capacity at extensive experience with coup d’états are displaced or otherwise affected. the national level in the short term, it is and military-backed dictatorships, NRFs There is widespread social unrest. The not the right answer. It deprives the larger might serve to strengthen public confi- government has insufficient resources population of economic opportunity and dence in civilian institutions. As African to adequately respond to the crisis and eliminates future employment options governments build emergency response requests international assistance. The UN for military members transitioning out of capabilities at the local, state, and national requests that the United States employs the military into civilian life. It also denies levels, they improve their responsiveness the Standby NRP and the ship departs local leaders the capabilities necessary to to their people’s needs. Political stability Monrovia for Lagos. NRF standby forces respond to their own emergencies and ensues followed by economic investment, depart from the United States. In ad- could thereby undermine the authority of economic growth, and improvements to dition, State and USAID surge select civilians at all levels of government. infrastructure, healthcare systems, educa- personnel from Tanzania. Others might say the NRP and tion, etc. State, USAID, and NRF personnel NRF concepts are too complex or even respond to the crisis in support of the naïve to be executed. Given the current Vignette: U.S. NRFs in Africa Nigerian government and in coordina- dysfunction of the U.S. Congress, that A hypothetical scenario describes how tion with the UN and other contributing may well be true. Still others might offer African nations would benefit from nations. U.S. military forces are not that private entities such as the Bill and the NRP and NRF concepts. At some required because providing civilian
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 McDermott 103 capabilities to support the disaster re- men and 900 Moroccan troops, was canceled SAAM Missions” spreadsheet and “Disaster not for budgetary reasons but by the Moroc- Relief–Samoa (30 Sept—UTC)” briefing slides. sponse has freed up sufficient Nigerian can government in protest over U.S. support Cost estimates include return trip, empty or forces to maintain security. However, of a United Nations (UN) effort to moni- with return cargo or personnel. This does not neighboring militaries are put on alert. tor human rights in the disputed territory of include, nor is it intended to negate, the relief If additional forces are required over the Western Sahara. “Morocco cancels war games supplies flown in by FEMA; contracted, other next several weeks, they will be provided with U.S. over rights,” USA Today, April 16, government, intergovernmental organizations; 2013, available at
104 Features / Leveraging U.S. Civilian Capabilities in Africa JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Army corporal explains Standard Army Retail Supply System to Albanian army officers at U.S. Property and Fiscal Office warehouse in Lawrenceville, New Jersey (U.S. Air Force/Mark Olsen)
The Case for the Junior Joint Logistics Officer Training Program
By Wilson T. VornDick
oughly 1,700 junior officers sequestration, and long-term declining DOD already has been on a steady (O1-O3) matriculate annually into budget horizon, the Department of trajectory to become more stream- R one of five Service-specific logistics Defense (DOD) needs to recognize that lined, joint, and efficient since the officer-training courses. Each course resources allocated in otherwise redun- Goldwater-Nichols Department of has its own staff, support, curriculum, dant processes are a waste. These costly Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 budget, travel funding, and school. redundancies can drain the overall health required more joint doctrine, training, But with reduced resources during the of the national security budget environ- and policy.1 If the axiom “business is multiple-year Continuing Resolutions, ment and create resource imbalances. business” applies to DOD, then why does the department allow five distinct business models and curricula to exist where there is currently redundancy of Lieutenant Commander Wilson T. VornDick, USNR, is a Supply Corps Officer. He previously served on the Director of the Navy Staff and at the U.S. Naval War College while completing separate advanced effort? Why is there not combined or degrees at Harvard University and the U.S. Naval War College. joint junior-level logistics training among
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 VornDick 105 the Services if 1) the Defense Logistics skilled veterans in both the private and is completed either through the Naval Agency (DLA) and U.S. Transportation public sectors. Academy, Officer Candidate School, Command (USTRANSCOM) are logis- Logistics Officer Matriculation. Reserve Officer Training Corps, or other tics headquarters with intermediate- and The nearly 1,700 Reserve and Active- accession program, an officer is then senior-level logisticians completing one duty officers who matriculate annually enrolled in the 5-month Supply Corps or multiple joint tours there, and 2) the come more highly qualified than previ- Basic Qualification Course. The graduate current model gears its graduates toward ous entrants. Surprisingly, the Army will then “roll” to the first 2–3 year tour7 that same professional objective?2 makes up almost two-thirds of this in the fleet unless that supply officer is There are significant differences number with about 900 training at the filling a more senior or technical position. in the ranks, tasks, and courses that Army Logistics University in Fort Lee, In that case the officer will receive follow- each Service assigns its organic logisti- Virginia.4 The Army is unique in that it on training such as the Supply Officer cians, but there are still core business subdivides logisticians into three main Department Head Course. This situation fundamentals and competencies that support roles under the Sustainment is rare and only applies to a handful of of- are shared. These include but are not umbrella: Transportation, Ordnance, ficer selectees annually. Otherwise, most limited to food service operations, and Quartermaster. It is important to graduates will go on to complete their contracting, inventory control, sup- point out that the Army dwarfs the other first tour and will not receive any addi- ply chain management, environmental Services precisely because it rolls up the tional formal training in Newport. procedures, procurement, accounting, National Guard and Army Reserve into The Air Force training method and disbursement. Ethics, stewardship, its training progression. Meanwhile, echoes the aforementioned Navy process. and accountability apply to each logistics the Navy trains around 380 Supply Once logisticians are accepted into the professional and should not require Corps officers, or “chops” as they are community, they begin the 5-month distinct instruction—no matter whether affectionately called, at its education Logistics Readiness Officer Orientation the student wears a khaki, blue, or green center in Newport, Rhode Island.5 After Program (LOOP), which incorporates uniform. At first glance it would seem completing the Basic School, nearly 200 sequential training modules intended that each Service is basically operating Marine officers attend the Basic Logistics to prepare logistics officers for their first its own business school even though the Training portion of the Marine Corps tours as well as completion of a core graduates eventually end up at the same Combat Service Support School at Camp logistics competency. After graduation, professional endstate with only different Lejuene, North Carolina. The Air Force’s Air Force logistics community members entry-level instruction. DOD has insti- 37th Training Wing, based at Lackland Air will continue with their own unique tuted mid-level and senior-level logistics Force Base, Texas, trains approximately check-in-the-box, follow-on training, and training with varying degrees of success 150 officers for three logistics com- milestones. These include qualification in the past. However, this cross-Service munities: Logistics Readiness, Financial pins, specialty codes, MBA programs, article proposes that DOD should insti- Management, and Force Support. Finally, internships, joint assignments, and tute a holistic and unified approach to the Coast Guard instructs the small- placement at DLA, USTRANSCOM, training from the entry level up through est number of officers (fewer than 40) or with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). the Junior Joint Logistics Officer through its Acquisition and Engineering This progression is replicated in the other Training program (J2LOT) instead.3 community. Services. Each follows the same general Duration and Progression of professional and career progression de- Status Quo of Logistics Training. The length for course comple- spite their different approaches in training Logistics is no longer a second-rate tion ranges from 55 days for the Marines length and placement. This replication community or subspecialty. It is not the to over 5 months for the Navy, with the and redundancy of effort is also mani- refuge of last resort for flight school length of the Army and Air Force pro- fested in the training material. and infantry washouts. Over the last few grams falling in between. The curriculum Training Material. The overall years, each Service has methodically and duration is completely dependent on each training substance among the Services purposefully enhanced its logistics com- Service’s combination of courses, timing has remained generally the same despite munity standards by raising the bar of of candidate matriculation, and curricu- the fact that each Service’s publications admission. Active and Reserve logistics lum length.6 The Army is very specific in would seem to hide their similari- selection communities currently require breaking its overall training into various ties behind their distinct formats and previous business coursework, MBAs, a segments throughout the first few years styles commensurate with their Service unique logistics skill set, or significant of its officer continuum; the Army’s train- traditions. Food service operations, prior business experience among the ing command has various requirements contracting, inventory control, supply qualifications for a competitive applica- beyond just logistics training to incorpo- chain management, logistics analysis, tion package. The Services’ positions rate in its Army officer corps. The Navy, environmental procedures, procurement, have only been enhanced by the weak- however, takes a more direct route. Once accounting, fuels management, and dis- ened economy and attractiveness of the initial officer accession/indoctrination bursement have a place in each Service’s
106 Features / Junior Joint Logistics Officer Training JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 entry-level publications and training Associated Costs for Training. A the opportunity and forum to network material. These materials are synced or standardized accounting methodology and seek efficient solutions in their ca- piggybacked with the initial training and informatics would be invaluable for reers sooner rather than later. Officers received at the entry-level training center, the Services moving forward, and not today wait as long as a decade into their follow-on training, or hands-on training just in greater ease for assessing J2LOT career to begin this synergy. It is not far- conducted during the first few assign- cost considerations. For example, the Air fetched to envision a scenario in the near ments. Often these same materials are Force estimated that in fiscal year 2012, future in which officers who previously reincorporated later for more senior and a logistics readiness officer costs $27,514 trained together at J2LOT work together specialized logistics positions at DLA, to train over 22 weeks.9 The Naval in solving a complex logistics problem USTRANSCOM, or JCS. Center for Cost Analysis uses manpower- during a joint humanitarian operation Most of the training materials are per-day/under-instruction formula of in Africa. Finally, J2LOT would foster synonymous with other Services concern- $123 a day.10 Under this formula, a Navy further coordination and integration of ing the actual logistics job functional supply corps officer would cost an esti- legacy Service-specific logistical chains, areas. To clarify, aviation is a component mated $13,000 to train over 22 weeks. administrative processes, and informat- of each Service. As a result, each Service The Army’s Analysis Installation and ics. Regrettably, most of these intangible exposes its logisticians to some form of Personnel Costing Division projects that benefits cannot be readily quantified or aviation supply chain management. The a 2nd lieutenant quartermaster could cost manifested immediately. actual personal qualification standards as little as $1,622.66 for one segment of (PQS) and approach to training may vary, training.11 But Army statisticians further Begin the Transformation Now but aviation supply chain fundamentals estimate that if other benefits, pays, initial The time is ripe for J2LOT’s synchroni- are relatively the same. This is also true officer acquisition, and support costs zation and savings to be realized. This with food service operations. The Army are factored in, a quartermaster jumps concept is not new. During World War Food Program and the Navy’s Food Service to $124,769.72. The overwhelming II the Army, Army Air Corps, and Navy Operation Handbook and Food Service conclusion from the data is that there are all had their logistics officer courses tied Management (P-486) are cases in point.8 tremendous short-term and long-term to the Harvard Business School.13 From There are cosmetic differences such as cost considerations in training an entry- 1943 to 1946, thousands of logisticians acronyms usage and military roles and level logistician. However, these costs learned in a hybrid environment of responsibilities, but the guidance and in- could be dramatically lowered through civilian professors and military officers structions are in line. The various logistics a unified or partially unified J2LOT as instructors taught through case- officer communities may have different approach. study methodology.14 This process was accession numbers, training locations, Long-term Cost Savings. The es- disbanded in favor of a Service-specific uniforms, and PQS, but the job require- sential financial considerations for DOD process that was responsive to the Ser- ments and training material are equivalent. to judge in weighing the cost-benefit vices’ individualized needs after World Once again core business fundamentals and analysis of implementing J2LOT are the War II. Now, more than 70 years later, competencies are mirrored in each Service’s unrealized benefits, efficiencies, and gains the current model is becoming increas- entry-level training program. that DOD stands to lose if it does not ingly unsustainable in a modern warfare act. The personal connections, long-term environment that makes joint and Short-term Gains with efficiencies, and “jointness” that J2LOT cost-sensitive requirements of utmost Long-term Efficiencies would spawn are an incredible windfall concern for combatant commanders. Millions are spent annually in operat- for the whole government. First, J2LOT Lessons Learned and Efforts Under ing each Service’s entry-level logistics would create a wholeness of logistics ef- Way. The Services have seen the writing officer training pipelines. The most fect at the O1-O3 level by increasing on the wall and have responded to this expensive variable is the fixed cost of interoperability. This would not only demand signal with various approaches. operating and maintaining the training fill the Active-duty forces but spill over Each Service is in the process of or has commands (salaries, installation mainte- into the Reserve forces as well. J2LOT just concluded efforts at refining its nance, and support). While the disparity could embolden new personal qualifica- overall logistics training. The Army refor- in per diem rates and other support tion standards with a pin or certificate matted its logistics community training costs per student could be significant that would provide an easily recognized and career progression in 2007, which depending on location, some costs are yardstick of logistical expertise for the includes Logistics Officer (MOS #FA 90) uniform among the Services such as combatant commanders and Services to mid-level training at the Army Logistics baseline military salaries. Yet it is almost measure. Meanwhile, J2LOT could also University.15 The Marine Corps fused impossible to capture the full cost of the add valuable Joint Qualification System its Logistics Officer (MOS #0402) with programs because each Service utilizes credit, which is required for future ad- Motor Transport Officer (MOS #3502). its own accounting methodology and vancement.12 Second, J2LOT offers the Air Force logisticians are in the process of informatics to account for its footprint. next generation of military logisticians reviewing and streamlining their logistics
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 VornDick 107 Airmen from 380th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron hold pump under F-15 Eagle aircraft for hot-pit refueling in southwest Asia, March 2012 (U.S. Air Force/Arian Nead) training with ideas to incorporate interop- Meanwhile, several Services have cut Implementation erability with other Services. While the out duplicitous training processes in one Government analysts, private sector Navy has not drastically restructured its Service to combine it with a capability in consultants, and the Services’ logistics supply corps officer community in de- another, resulting in cost savings. This is leaders have already taken a stab at cades, the enlisted ratings have undergone the current flight training arrangement better coordinating joint logistics and tremendous streamlining and consolida- between Naval Air Training Command training. These efforts were stymied tion.16 The logistics specialist rate is a and the Air Force’s Air Education and primarily because they focused on a top- case in point;17 it is basically tasked with Training Command. But a prime example down or middle-out approach. DOD maintaining the Navy supply system and of both joint efforts working in synergy might be best served by focusing on the inventory. It underwent two major con- is the Uniformed Services University for J2LOT bottom-up approach while con- solidations in 2003 and 2009.18 It is clear Health Services in Bethesda, Maryland. tinuing to advance the top and middle from the various logistics personnel trans- This institution has prepared both military approaches. There are a variety of inter- formations and consolidations that the and Uniformed Public Health Service nal and external options for DOD to Services are capable of making the switch medical officers under one roof using a institute J2LOT. Within the department to the J2LOT approach. general program of study since 1972.19 there is the option for inter-Service There already is joint training and Upon graduation, medical officers are memorandums of agreement, JCS harmonization of efforts among Service farmed out to a smorgasbord of govern- instructions, and Office of the Secretary communities such as medical, special op- ment and military entities. In a similar of Defense (OSD) policy directives. erations, and combatant commands. Some manner, J2LOT would build on these Alternatively, congressional legislative Services cross-train their personnel when previous synchronization efforts with the changes to Title 10 or Presidential direc- there is no organic Service-equivalent critical goal of providing a standardized tives could mandate J2LOT as well. training available (common between level of training for the military’s emerg- Title 10 grants the combatant com- Marine Corps and Army logistics). ing business leaders. manders the authority to oversee all
108 Features / Junior Joint Logistics Officer Training JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 aspects of military operations, joint on, Service-specific offsite training at among the military intelligence com- training, and logistics using the forces as- each Service’s current logistical train- munities? Could that same joint military signed to them, while the military Service ing command. The final option would intelligence training incorporate entry- secretaries are generally responsible incorporate holding both the combined level analysts from other intelligence for recruiting, organizing, supplying, curriculum and the Service-specific fol- community members such as the Defense equipping, and training their Service low-on training at the current logistical Intelligence Agency? Finally, could public personnel.20 The Chairman of the Joint training commands’ education centers. affairs, chaplain corps, and the judge Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff are re- Each option presents its own unique advocate general each fashion its own sponsible for formulating joint training set of obstacles. However, J2LOT’s combined training pipeline in the future? policy and doctrine.21 U.S. Joint Forces benefits would dwarf any of these initial Command was DOD’s lead in providing challenges. Conclusion joint training until it was disestablished J2LOT is not intended to destroy any in 2011 and its functions were divvied An Inclusive and Service-specific community or unique out to other commands.22 In light of Viable Construct logistics ability though it may cause these legal structures, the most realistic It would be feasible, efficient, and fis- controversy among and between the approach for implementing J2LOT cally inviting to train other Federal various Services, OSD staffs, and the would be for DOD to identify the Office agencies that have similar logistics Joint Staff. Upon completion of the of the Under Secretary of Defense for courses under the J2LOT umbrella. training, it is not the intention of Personnel and Readiness (OUSD-P&R) Logisticians from the Department of J2LOT to begin swapping Army 2nd with the overall responsibility as was done Homeland Security, Department of lieutenant transportation officers in in previous joint training initiatives.23 The State, and U.S. Agency for International a Ranger battalion with Navy supply example process that follows has worked Development would be ideal candidates corps ensigns from the fleet, just as it is with some fruitful albeit slowly mani- because of the increasing amount of not proposed that an Air Force 2nd lieu- fested results.24 Typically, OUSD-P&R interagency responsibilities that are tenant logistics readiness officer replace eventually assigns one of its principals or now shared in the hybrid environment a Marine Corps 2nd lieutenant logistics deputies to act as the executive agent. To of modern conflict and crisis manage- officer in a Marine Expeditionary Unit. carry out that responsibility, the execu- ment. It would also be possible for the On the contrary, J2LOT reinforces the tive agent would then establish three interagency or one of its members to different Services’ ancillary roles and standing groups: the Executive Steering create its own organic logistics-training identities. J2LOT is not a revolution Group, Senior Advisory Group, and Joint program similar to J2LOT. It is con- against the various Services or DOD Integrated Process Team. Consisting of ceivable that any entry-level officer or writ large. Instead it is a movement that Senior Executive Service civilians and administrator with logistical duties from is part of a gradual evolution of DOD senior flag officers, each group would across the government spectrum could into a more lean, mean, and purple have its own unique set of tasks and be a candidate. DOD could expand force. Simply put, J2LOT seeks a har- responsibilities in order to plan, support, J2LOT enrollment to include interna- monization where redundancy of train- collaborate, and implement J2LOT in tional members as well. North Atlantic ing effort or curriculum exists. At the a time-phased approach. An initial pilot Treaty Organization members, United same time it carries forward core business program would be recommended, and, Nations, and other partner-nations’ mil- principles and competencies, saves scarce if successful, it would transition into a itary logisticians could all train side by resources, and increases efficiencies. rollout period of 2 to 3 years. This hybrid side. The recent logistical cooperation One of the 1,700 logistics officers in and complex method is preferable for among the U.S. interagency commu- training this year could well be the flag DOD because it allows the Services the nity, nongovernmental organizations, officer in charge of USTRANSCOM or opportunity to properly address griev- U.S. military, and other nations after DLA in 2040. DOD’s current trajectory ances, assuage concerns, build consensus, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti highlights indicates that the operating environment and evaluate and execute J2LOT. this possibility. in 2040 will be even more “joint” than J2LOT also raises the specter of it is today. There is a window of oppor- Approach to Training whether a similar method and model tunity for DOD to begin joint logistics The optimal construct for the J2LOT could apply to other military Service- training and harmonization efforts. But would be a combined or hybrid training specific support communities where the this window is closing. Waiting for most program. The first option would be to training and positions are analogous or officers to enter their intermediate and create one unified school with a core overlap significantly. The military’s vari- advanced career phases before learning curriculum in conjunction with follow- ous intelligence communities are a case in joint logistics is too late. The incentives on, Service-specific onsite training. A point since their junior officer training is exist now for DOD to create a curricu- second option would be to mirror the both resource-intensive and redundant. lum and school at the basic officer level. first option and then conduct follow- Could the J2LOT framework be applied DOD needs to get its logistics training
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 VornDick 109 st 22 more joint and whole because, as U.S. Service Operation Handbook, 1 ed. (Mechan- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff icsburg, PA: Naval Supply Systems Com- Instruction 3500.01B, Joint Training Policy Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan noted, mand (NAVSUP), January 2010), available for the Armed Forces of the United States, U.S. “Logistics [is] as vital to military success as at
110 Features / Junior Joint Logistics Officer Training JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Canadian soldier armed with Thompson submachine gun guides German prisoner captured during Operation Jubilee (Library and Archives Canada) he raid on Dieppe in August 1942 is still controversial to the T extent that “The waters have since been muddied so successfully that today hardly anything about the raid is undisputed.”1 The aim of this article is not to purify the muddy water but to draw attention to some enduring facts of war. Many of the quandaries and predicaments the Allies experienced before, during, and after the raid are not unique to this operation. The faith of Operation Jubilee is thus still relevant for today’s military planning, combined joint operations, and postdisaster blame gaming. The article first recapitulates what happened; second looks at why it hap- pened, which is where the muddy water begins; and finally discusses why it went wrong.
What Happened? The raid, originally planned under the codename Rutter, was to take place in early July 1942. Operation Rutter was disbanded primarily due to bad weather but was reinstated with some small but significant changes as Operation Jubilee. In short the operation was to be a “reconnaissance in force,” and accord- ing to the combined plan its aim was as follows:
Operation ‘Jubilee’ is a raid on JUBILEE [Dieppe] with limited air and military objectives, embracing the destruction of local defences and power stations, etc., in JUBILEE, the capture of prisoners, the destruction of aerodrome installations near the town, and the capture and removal of German invasion barges and any other Dieppe All Over Again craft in JUBILEE Harbour.2 The key consideration during the planning stage was the element of sur- The Quandaries of Combined prise. The raid had to come as a bolt from the blue and disappear again almost Joint Operations as swiftly. Hence the attack had to be frontal. Fortunately, intelligence showed By Harald Høiback that “Dieppe was lightly held by a single low-category battalion.”3 A frontal assault thus seemed both necessary and feasible. Lieutenant-Colonel Harald Høiback, Ph.D., Royal Norwegian Air Force, is an Associate Professor at the The alternative would have been to land Norwegian Defence University College in Oslo. the main forces on the flanks and take
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Høiback 111 in Berlin.”6 A series of raids and pin- pricks was thus undertaken, and when Mountbatten was appointed advisor on combined operations, the Prime Min- ister’s message was hard to miss: “You are to give no thought to the defensive. Your whole attention is to be concen- trated on the offensive.”7 Second, both Washington and Moscow pressed hard for more British action. When Roosevelt had accepted “Europe first” after the Japanese attack in December 1941 and the ensuing German declaration of war, he also implicitly wanted “Europe soon.”8 Moscow’s pres- sure on London for opening a second front in the west, in order to give the Red Army crucial breathing space or at least show British resolve through a “sacrificial gesture,” was also getting intolerable.9 In this light a dismal failure could at least silence those who clamored for a second front in 1942. Third, in addition to substantial ex- ternal forces that pulled Britain into the action, there was also considerable pres- sure domestically. Many have emphasised that it was the Canadians who bore the Disembarkation of British commandos on return to England (Library and Archives Canada) brunt of the operation. They had been in the United Kingdom for more than 2 Dieppe in a pincer movement from the raid also included 50 American Soldiers years, producing little but trouble, even rear. However, that would have given belonging to U.S. 1st Ranger Battalion. to the extent that their “main enemy was the Germans ample time for moving up This was a rough kind of on-the-job boredom.”10 Hence the mix was appar- reinforcements. training for the Rangers. Indeed, the first ently perfect. A job had to be done, and Another important issue during plan- Americans killed on European soil during there were people on hand eager to do it. ning was the extent to which Bomber World War II belonged to this group. Far less has been made of the fact that Command should “soften up” the target The operation was a disaster, particu- not only Canadians, but most military by a preliminary attack. The whole idea larly for the land forces. Of the 6,000 men, desperately wanted their share of was rejected, however, because reducing troops who participated, only about the action. In his comments to an assess- the streets of Dieppe to rubble could ac- 2,000 returned to England.4 Even Lord ment dated June 29, 1942, concerning tually have made it easier for the Germans Louis Mountbatten, who saw great bene- the grave consequences that could arise to defend it and even harder for Allied fit from the raid in the long run, admitted from the capture of some of the central tanks to maneuver. Besides, the land- that the operation, on its own merit, had planners, Captain John Hughes-Hallet, ing would have come as no surprise if it been a failure: “The frontal assault on the RN, responded with the following were “announced” by a heavy air raid. town itself failed, as everybody knows.”5 outburst: Furthermore, as the Royal Navy (RN) would not risk a capital ship, it supported Why Did It Happen? I can find no words to express my complete the operation only with destroyers and After the fall of France it was hard to disagreement with the Minutes on this smaller ships. see what options Great Britain had left: paper sufficiently strongly. They all spring All in all the attack consisted of “Churchill’s poor excuse for a victory from the idea—new to this country—that around 5,000 Canadian and 1,000 strategy, apart from the hope of rescue war can be waged without risk, to be more British troops, while the Royal Navy sup- by the Americans and the Russians, particular my views are as follows: (i) plied 237 ships and landing craft and the was to peck at the periphery of Festung Officers of the type who are suitable for seri- Royal Air Force (RAF) 74 squadrons, Europa, foment insurrection in the ous operation planning, soon become useless 66 of which were fighter squadrons. The occupied countries, and pray for a coup for this purpose unless they see actual war
112 Recall / Dieppe All Over Again JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 close at hand. (ii) Such Officers also find it popular with the top Staffs.”15 Indeed, and naval cover,”19 I believe he misses an intolerable to sit at Whitehall month after in retrospection, this turned out to be important point. A lance corporal could month, while their contemporaries have the the main aim: “I have not come here to also have told Hitler that Operation fortune to be waging war and earning all apologise for what was done. I have never Weserübung was impossible due to the the distinctions etc.11 doubted that the operation was a neces- Royal Navy’s command of the sea, and sary step in the preparations to invade that MacArthur’s Operation Chromite In other words, warriors make war if France—and that for this reason alone it against Inchon in 1950 was impossible only for the simple reason that there is a was justified.”16 due to the condition of the beaches. war going on. Many later claimed that the idea of Likewise, would it be possible to capture So far the most basic facts about Operation Jubilee as a preparation for an a French harbor without destroying it the operation have been established. invasion was an ex post facto justification. completely in the endeavor? Could one Churchill was under considerable pres- However, regarding the operation as vital figure that out on paper alone? In the sure to do something, and sometimes training is not a concept that surfaced words of the chief of the imperial general it is better to do something hasty than after the fact. Indeed, already in May, staff, “The object of the operation was nothing at all. But what should this some- Mountbatten had justified the operation precisely to find out whether or not suc- thing be? Now things become a bit more along this line: cess would result.”20 complicated. Even on the tactical level little A German officer who interrogated This operation will be of great value as compares to learning by doing, and for prisoners captured at Dieppe remarked, training for Operation “Sledgehammer” most military men the baptism of fire “Jubilee appeared to be too large for a or any other major operation as far as the cannot be substituted by anything. As a raid and too small for a lodgement.”12 actual assault is concerned. It will not, Canadian soldier put it, “I learned more That hit the nail on its head. The opera- however, throw light on the maintenance at Dieppe than the Army could learn [sic] tion can be explained along both lines problem over beaches.17 me in ten years.”21 Churchill underlined of reasoning, and that has caused much this message: “Tactically it was a mine confusion ever since. It is also a challenge in that the of experience. It shed revealing light on Usually the Dieppe operation is por- operational objectives stated in the com- many shortcomings in our outlook.”22 To trayed as a raid that had slightly outgrown bined plan are rather incoherent. Robert conclude this particular point: “[Dieppe] its feasibility—a “beach too far,” so to Neillands thus wrote, “The problem that taught perhaps the most crucial lesson of speak.13 When we reach the summer of confronts historians is what this motley World War II. . . . If the Western Allies 1942, combined operations (amphibious collection of objectives adds up to in the were to beat the Germans, they would operations against the German-controlled way of an aim.”18 Apparently, there is have to revise radically their approach to periphery) had achieved some significant nothing there about training, testing, modern combat.”23 successes. Therefore one of the driving or rehearsal for later operations. On the So far we have seen why something mechanisms behind Operation Jubilee other hand, the objectives could hardly had to be done, and why this ended up was a kind of incrementalism where raids have been to gain experience. In order as something between a raid and an inva- steadily grew larger and more ambitious. to produce concrete plans you need sion. The last question in this section is Hughes-Hallet, one of the operation’s concrete objectives. An athlete does not Why Dieppe? fiercest advocates, explained the opera- have to prepare for the Olympics on his First of all, the port had to be close tion along this line: daily schedule. The aim of that particular enough to British shores to allow for the day’s training is, perhaps, to win the naval approach to take place under the We therefore decided upon the age old policy gold medal, but the objective has to cover of darkness.24 Second, the port also of raiding. Experts have always differed be something concrete, attainable, and had to be within the protective range of about the efficacy of amphibious raids— measurable. The same goes for Operation Fighter Command. An important spin- and they certainly differed [in] 1942. (As Jubilee. Even if the aim was to prepare for off effect of the raid was that Germany’s we now know their effect on the Germans the big invasion, the objectives had to be Luftwaffe would be forced to encounter was greater than had been expected.) something more tangible. the Allies. Air Vice-Marshal Leigh- Be this as it may—Dieppe as originally Moreover, when Andrew Roberts Mallory’s appeal to 11 Group on the eve conceived was merely one of this series of states, “Dieppe contributed nothing of battle was enthusiastic: raids.14 to the ‘mosaic of victory’ and taught military planners hardly anything that We are about to take part in the first as- However, this time a bigger concern common sense and normal research and sault delivered by the combined forces of piggybacked on this line of action: “But development would not anyhow have the three Services against the Continent there was a difference inasmuch as when dictated” and that a “lance corporal could of Europe in this war. It is an honour first planned it was designed to test have told Mountbatten not to attack a to take part in so momentous an opera- the tactical plan for invasion currently well-defended town without proper air tion. . . . The responsibility is great, but I
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Høiback 113 am confident that every pilot will do his maybe the means were wrong. Britain not the operation’s greatest threat, but damndest to destroy any enemy aircraft should have put even more effort into reluctant British strategists. They had to that may attempt to attack either our ships the bomber offensive, and not, for be kept in the dark. Mountbatten’s later or our fighting men. GOOD LUCK TO political reasons within the Alliance, be hyperbole surprised no one: YOU ALL.25 pushed into a half-baked land opera- tion: “Perhaps no other Allied battle of There is no doubt that this was one of the Leigh-Mallory’s first impression after World War II could be said to have been very best guarded secrets of all time, because the operation was also grandiose: “It has undertaken for such political rather than nothing was put in writing and because been said—and, I think, rightly so—that military aims.”30 nobody except the minimum number of the Dieppe operation produced the great- Conceivably it was the chosen way senior officers who were indispensably con- est air fight the world has ever known.”26 that was wrong. The half-unconscious cerned in the operation were told anything How great a success the air battle was is mix of raid and invasion addressed about it.35 still contested. What is important here is previously was particularly unfortunate: that Operation Jubilee was much more “These two remits—raids and invasion The ensuing lack of printed docu- than the disaster at the beaches. studies—of Combined Operations should mentation, and Churchill’s struggle to The last reason Dieppe was chosen never have been run together.”31 get to grips with the operation during was allegedly because the terrain was Thus the first explanation is his writing of The Second World War, has so difficult that the real invasion, when Operation Jubilee failed because of a lack given critics ample room to roam.36 it eventually came, could under no cir- of strategic skills on the highest level. Thus the second explanation is that cumstances have taken place at Dieppe. Bad Timing? Churchill was cer- Operation Jubilee capsized because Hence, the “final reason for choosing tainly not happy with the cancellation of Mountbatten timed the operation ex- Dieppe was the fact that the planners had Operation Rutter: tremely badly. Apparently everybody already ruled it out as a desirable place to knew about Dieppe, including the capture in the early stages of a real inva- The Prime Minister expressed his dis- Germans. However, there is little if any sion, and we should therefore be giving appointment very forcefully to me evidence that the Germans actually knew nothing away by raiding it now.”27 [Mountbatten], and enquired how soon I about the raid’s resurrection. To sum up, Robin Neillands claimed could organise another raid on this scale, Bad Planning? The operational that the raid has “been a potent cause of as he was extremely anxious to have an plan for Jubilee was so detailed that it left controversy ever since, not least because operation of this nature as soon as it could no room for improvisation once things no one has ever come up with a satisfac- be mounted [and] the only way to do this began to go wrong. Even the Germans tory, controversy-killing explanation would be to re-mount RUTTER under a made a point out of the Allies’ predilec- of what it was actually for.”28 I do not different name.32 tion for detailed plans: pretend to have solved this riddle. What I have tried to do, however, is to show that This was a bold move. Thousands The undertaking was prepared most there is no riddle to solve. The opera- of soldiers had been briefed about the conscientiously. The Operation Order is tion was over-determinated, so to speak, original plan, and common military sense very detailed (121 typewritten pages) in the sense that it had multiple causes, would have been to shelve it for good. and, therefore difficult to visualize as a many of them sufficient in themselves. However, according to Montgomery: whole. The many code words used make it difficult to grasp in its entirety, and even Why Did It Go Wrong? Combined Operations Headquarters more so to use as a basis for issuing orders Since the lessons drawn are not thought otherwise; they decided to revive it in battle. The planning down to the last restricted to this particular case, the and got the scheme approved by the British detail limits the independence of action of explanations are grouped into 10 cat- Chiefs of Staff towards the end of July. the subordinate officer and leaves him no egories, which are of contemporary and When I heard of this I was very upset; I opportunity to make independent decisions enduring relevance. considered that it would no longer be pos- in an altered situation.37 Bad Strategy? Perhaps the blame for sible to maintain secrecy.33 the disaster should go to the very top. Another problem was that the plan- The Prime Minister did not get the bal- Consequently, and paradoxically since ners did not know which assets they ance right among the ends, means, and so many people knew about the original actually had access to. Based on the ways of war. Perhaps the ultimate aim Operation Rutter, it was important to experience with Operation Rutter, the was wrong and he instead should do as keep the new thrust especially secret: following conclusion was drawn: Liddell Hart suggested a few weeks after “Such absolute secrecy that not only Dieppe: “Any wise statesman should would the Germans not learn of the If the planning and preparation are to be disposed to consider the possibility raid’s resurrection, but neither would run smoothly it is essential that: (A) The of ending the war by agreement.”29 Or the British.”34 Indeed, the Germans were planning Staff must know in good time
114 Recall / Dieppe All Over Again JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 what the Command’s capabilities are. (B) with a hand in it; there was no one single abilities. As mentioned before, British in- The Commander-in-Chief’s Staff must operational commander who was solely telligence expected to find Dieppe lightly know in good time what is required of the responsible for the operation from start to held by a single low-category battalion. Command. Unless these two conditions are finish, a Task Force Commander in fact.42 That was not the case, and “Dieppe fulfilled—and fulfilled continuously—we [thus] represented a failure of British will get misunderstandings, delays, and For instance, who had the author- intelligence.”47 sooner or later mistakes which may be ity to abort the mission after the land So the sixth explanation for the di- disastrous. Neither [was] fulfilled in forces hit the beaches? Was it the military saster at Dieppe is that the operation was preparation for Rutter.38 force commander, Major General John driven by best-case thinking and ham- Hamilton Roberts, or the naval force pered by a failure of intelligence. The most important asset the planners commander, John Hughes-Hallett? Bad People? So far we have looked lost for Operation Jubilee was presumably Perhaps the chief of combined opera- into structural factors, but what about the the heavy bombers: “In retrospect, this tions himself, Louis Mountbatten? Even people involved? Obviously, a number failure was the most egregious deficiency a newspaper article written just a month of individuals have been blamed for the in the plan for Dieppe.”39 after the operation stated the point calamity. Thus the third explanation for the unambiguously: Combined Operations’ head of intel- Dieppe disaster is that the planning was ligence, Marquis de Casa Maury, was not good enough. The execution of the The initial plan of campaign was deficient allegedly “utterly useless.”48 Canadian operation and the operational art could because it was more in the nature of a com- General J.H. Roberts, who commanded not have been better than what the rigid bined compromise rather than a combined the land forces, had no previous experi- plans allowed for. plan, and that our own Air Force tactic ence and was apparently not up to speed. Bad Rehearsal? If Operation Jubilee and organisation has not yet the flexibility The naval commander, Hughes-Hallett, was the rehearsal for D-Day, we should to enable it to co-operate with the land force was also inexperienced and presumably perhaps expect that the rehearsal for in a major modern battle against strongly too eager for action. the operation itself was taken good care defended positions.43 The main suspect was Lord of. That was not the case. The dress Mountbatten himself. Nigel Hamilton rehearsal, called Yukon, was a “complete Even Churchill struggled to fathom describes him as “A master of intrigue, fiasco.”40 The RN ability to land troops how such a clumsy and hazardous plan jealously and ineptitude, like a spoilt during pitch-dark night was poor. Instead actually came about: child he toyed with men’s lives with an of developing that ability, it was decided indifference to casualties that can only to postpone the planned landing to the Although for many reasons everyone was be explained by his insatiable, even so-called “civil twilight.” The reverse side concerned to make this business look as good psychopathic ambition.”49 Andrew of that coin was that more light made the as possible, the time has now come when I Roberts seconds the verdict: “He was assault forces more visible to the Germans must be informed more precisely about the also a mendacious, intellectually limited in their pillboxes. military plans. Who made them? Who ap- hustler, whose negligence and incom- Thus the fourth explanation for the proved them? 44 petence resulted in many unnecessary Dieppe disaster is that a serious rehearsal, deaths.”50 Indeed, he even pleaded one that would point out what you Thus the fifth explanation is that guilty: “Mountbatten finally came clean, should practice and prepare for, not just Operation Jubilee foundered through “a boasting that ‘It was I, and I alone who what you should avoid, never occurred. fatal confusion of command.”45 took the—and I must say rather bold— Bad Command and Control? One Bad Intel? In the 21st century, people decision to attack Dieppe’.”51 However, of the main challenges in a combined have great expectations about “action- even here Mountbatten apparently operation is to get the command and able intelligence”: The U.S. Intelligence asked for more than he was entitled to: control relationship right. Who is actu- Community officially defines the concept “Mountbatten has taken a strong line, ally in charge? The decision to skip the of actionable intelligence as “An aware- claiming all the responsibility, which bombers can also be seen in this light: ness of information that predicts the surely is more than he need bear.”52 “Compromise on this, compromise location, timing, and intentions of an This is not the place to whitewash on the bombing, compromise on individual or group.” To those of us Mountbatten or any other, only to point everything. It’s no good!”41 Even dur- outside the Intelligence Community, this out that history has seen many vainglori- ing the operation itself, the lack of a definition is more appropriately matched ous military leaders such as Montgomery, supreme commander was, according to with the term clairvoyance, and common Patton, and MacArthur. In military mat- Montgomery, crucial: sense tells us there is no such thing.46 ters it can be hard to tell where audacity What the Allies lacked in August ends and foolhardiness starts, especially in My own feeling about the Dieppe raid is 1942 was not clairvoyance but a somber advance. that there were far too many authorities appreciation of German positions and
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Høiback 115 The Dieppe Raid’s position in the annals of war is peculiar. Approximately 1,000 men were killed during the operation in a 6-year war that claimed an average of 27,000 lives a day.56 Moreover, Winston Churchill spends less than 3 pages on the operation in his mas- sive six volumes The Second World War, which counts almost 5,000 pages. Even the chairman of the chiefs of staff com- mittee, Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, gave the Dieppe Raid just fleeting re- marks in his diary. Despite the fact that the number of lives lost was comparatively small and that the main actors gave it comparatively little attention, Operation Jubilee is ap- parently the operation during World War II that has produced the most printed papers-per-killed serviceman. Indeed, “one of the last things the history of the Second World War needs is yet another 57 Map detailing German positions in Dieppe area book about the raid on Dieppe.” So where does this overblown attention Thus the seventh explanation is that take a propaganda course which catches come from? the operation miscarried due to sheer us unawares or unprepared, cannot be First of all, in land warfare the oc- madness or other human shortcomings. overemphasized.”54 cupation of soil is the only currency. Bad Press? Even in 1942 military Bad Luck? The oldest explanation Thus the royal parvenu Mountbatten had strategists knew the importance of what for military fiascos is bad luck. Operation nothing to show for himself after the raid. we today call “strategic communication”: Jubilee had its share: His claim that “the battle of D-Day was won on the beaches of Dieppe” was too The Effect of a military operation upon The almost complete achievement of subtle and oblique for his many critics to public opinion is inseparable from the surprise during the channel crossing was accept. operation itself: this axiom has proved itself marred by one mishap. At 3.30 a.m. the Moreover, while success has many repeatedly in this war. The enemy particu- landing craft carrying No. 3 Commando fathers, failure is—as we all know—an larly has employed his own interpretation encountered five or six enemy vessels which orphan. In this particular case, there were of military operations so ably, by intelligent were acting as escort to a tanker. The many others to blame. It was a combined anticipatory planning and careful tim- presence of this tanker is itself important joint operation, so the British could ing, that successful British operations have evidence that the enemy was not expecting blame the Canadians and vice versa, or frequently been made to appear as failures, an operation on our part.55 the military men could blame the airmen with detrimental effect upon the morale of and vice versa, and so forth.58 There are our people and that of Occupied Countries. Wicked tongues would presumably enough pawns on the table to keep this The public relations aspect of Operation say there is no such thing as bad luck, blame game going on forever. On the “Jubilee,” therefore, was approached upon only bad (and often too detailed) plans. other side, for those planning for future the assumption that a public relations Others would say that the operation combined joint operations, Operation plan is an essential part of any military should have been aborted when Hughes- Jubilee is still “a mine of experience.” plan and must be as carefully prepared in Hallett became aware of the convoy. Most senior officers in Britain in advance.53 Nonetheless, the ninth reason the Dieppe 1942 had experienced the Great War and Raid failed was bad luck. they had certainly learned their lesson. So the eighth reason for the Dieppe Bad History? So far, this article has This time there should “be no wholesale disaster was that its biggest problem examined nine generic explanations for slaughters.”59 The pertinent question apparently was not the failure itself, but military failures and the subsequent plac- becomes “How is victory possible except the failure to give the failure a positive ing of blame. The last explanation does by wholesale slaughters?”60 According spin: “The necessity for planning for all not explain the catastrophe itself, but to Max Hastings, the Western world was eventualities, so that the enemy cannot rather the way posterity has dealt with it. lucky almost beyond comprehension:
116 Recall / Dieppe All Over Again JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 42 To defeat Nazi Germany, it was the Admiral J. Hughes-Hallet, Royal Regimental The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgom- Association Dinner, January 20, 1962, CAB ery, 77. Western Allies’ extreme good fortune that 106/6, The National Archives. 43 The Military Correspondent, Evening the Russians, and not themselves, paid 15 Ibid. Standard, September 19, 1942, AIR 16/764, almost the entire “butcher’s bill” for doing 16 Ibid. The National Archives. this, accepting 95 per cent of the military 17 Minute to The Chiefs of Staff Committee 44 Winston Churchill to General Ismay, De- casualties of the three major powers of the from Chief of Combined Operations, May 9, cember 21, 1942, PREM 3/256, The National 1942, DEFE 2/542, The National Archives. Archives. Grand Alliance.61 Operation Sledgehammer was an Allied plan for 45 Adrian Smith, Mountbatten, Apprentice cross-Channel invasion of Europe in 1942. It War Lord (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 205. That our politicians have no taste for was canceled as impracticable in May 1942; see 46 Pete Blaber, The Mission, the Men, and attrition warfare is a good thing indeed Brooke, 255. Me, Lessons from a Former Delta Force Com- 18 for all Westerners in uniform. If any ser- Neillands, 9. mander (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2008), 91. 19 Roberts, 65 and 69. 47 Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten, The Official vicemember has to risk his life, it should 20 Brooke, quoted in Hamilton, 455. Biography (London: Book Club Associates, be for a particular and, one hopes, 21 Report No. 109, Historical Officer, 1985), 193. tangible reason. The main motivation for Canadian Military Headquarters, Operation 48 Hamilton, 441. still remembering Dieppe is that it tells us “JUBILEE,” Part III, December 17, 1943, 49 Hamilton quoted in Ziegler, 193. something important about the West. We DEFE 2/328, The National Archives, 28. 50 Roberts, 55. 22 Winston Churchill, The Second World 51 John Hughes-Wilson, “Review of Robin value life, even the lives of our military War, Vol. IV: The Hinge of Fate (London: Cassel Neilland’s The Dieppe Raid,” RUSI Journal, men and women. JFQ & Co., 1951), 459. December 2005, 93. 23 Hamilton, 427–428. 52 Minute from Churchill to General Pow- 24 Neillands, 9. nall, “The Story of the Dieppe Raid,” March The author thanks Colonel Eldar Berli and 25 A.O.C.’s Message to 11 Group, August 20, 1950, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Lieutenant Colonel Palle Ydstebø for inspiration 18, 1942, Air 16/748, The National Archives. Archives, ISMAY 2/3/247/2a, King’s College and support during the writing of this article. 26 Air-Marshall T.L. Leigh-Mallory, The London. R.A.F. at Dieppe, AIR 16/748, The National 53 C.B. 04244, Combined Report on The Archives. Dieppe Raid, October 1942, CAB 98/22, The 27 Bernard Fergusson, quoted in Villa, 271. National Archives, 194. Notes 28 Neillands, ix. 54 Ibid., 197. 29 Basil Liddell Hart, “Age-old Truths of 55 “Dieppe: A Gallant Exploit Re-Told in 1 Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians War,” March 9, 1942, LH 11/1942/70, Lid- Detail,” Daily Telegram, September 19, 1942, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), 66. dell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s WO 106/4197, The National Archives. 2 “Object,” Operation “Jubilee”: Combined College London. 56 Hastings, xv. Plan, July 31, 1942, AIR 16/746, The Na- 30 Hamilton, 427. 57 John P. Campbell, Dieppe Revisited: A tional Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). 31 Ibid., 429. Documentary Investigation (London: Frank 3 General Ismay to the Prime Minister, 32 Mountbatten, undated replies to ques- Cass, 1993), 1. Minute, December 29, 1942, PREM 3/256, tions about the Dieppe raid [presumably from 58 That the Germans did their best to The National Archives. 1950], ISMAY 2/3/260/2a, Liddell Hart thwart the operation is more or less overlooked 4 Ken Ford, Dieppe 1942, Prelude to D-Day Centre for Military Archives, King’s College during this blame game. That is indeed an (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003), 91. London, 1. enduring phenomenon; we usually give little 5 Lord Mountbatten, Record of statement, 33 Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs credit to our enemies’ skill and proficiency. July 1962, CAB 106/6, The National Archives, of Field-Marshal Montgomery (Barnsley: Pen & 59 Max Hastings, All Hell Let Loose: The 4. Sword, 2010, orig. pub. 1958), 76. World at War 1939–1945 (London: Harper 6 Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illu- 34 Hamilton, 458. Press, 2011), 441. sion?” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 35 Mountbatten, undated replies, 9. 60 Ibid. 2000), 11. 36 See especially Villa. 61 Ibid. 7 Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, War 37 Intelligence Report on British Landing Diaries 1939–1945 (London: Phoenix Press, at Dieppe on 19 Aug 42, H.Q. LXXXI Army 2002), xiv. Corps, August 22, 1942, trans. and dissemi- 8 Robin Neillands, The Dieppe Raid (Lon- nated by SHAEF, February 26, 1944, WO don: Aurum, 2006), 74. 219/1867, The National Archives. 9 Nigel Hamilton, The Full Monty: 38 Undated Staff Minute Sheet: Remarks Montgomery of Alamein 1887–1942 (London: put forward as the result of experience gained Penguin Books, 2002), 465. during the planning and preparation of orders 10 Robert Bothwell, The Penguin History of for Operation Rutter, ADM 179/220, The Canada (Toronto: Penguin, 2007), 353. National Archives. 11 Joint Minute to the Chief of Combined 39 Hamilton, 444, 445. There were many Operations, June 29, 1942, DEFE 2/542, The reasons for canceling the bombers, but we National Archives. should not underestimate the human side of 12 Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized Action, this: “Churchill had told Mountbatten he Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid (Oxford: disliked the idea of flattening Dieppe, where he Oxford University Press, 1994), 87. had once picked blackberries with Clemmie.” 13 Neillands, 7. 40 Ibid., 447. 14 “The Dieppe Raid,” address by Vice- 41 Ibid., 471.
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Høiback 117 Ecuador, and Bolivia—almost half the Confederacy, and enlisting former slaves continent—from atrocious Spanish autoc- was one of his motivations for altering racy. Arana takes us from Bolívar’s ancestry his Proclamation. In the preliminary and birth to his death (and evisceration Emancipation Proclamation issued after after burial by those desiring to possess the Union “victory” at Antietam in parts of the hero), covering everything September 1862, using blacks as Union from his biological heritage, youth and warriors was unmentioned, but in the edict education, travel, politics, military leader- issued on January 1, 1863, it was boldly ship, and governing capability. She tells the announced and produced many thousands whole story including in nongraphic prose of highly motivated black soldiers. By the his “unquenchable libido.” Many below- time of Appomattox in April 1865, there the-Rio Grande Americans call him “the were over 120,000 black combatants in George Washington” of South America the U.S. Army, more than all the soldiers in because of his military exploits. Robert E. Lee’s, Joe Johnston’s, and John Arana produces a three-dimensional Bell Hood’s armies combined. portrait by delivering the travails, ac- With the help of former black slaves, complishments, and failures of the South Bolívar defeated the Spanish armies over American liberator. Readers who want the next 5 years, but he was a better to understand politics south of the Rio general than politician. Arana cites his Grande will benefit from this solid ac- admission of his political shortcomings: count. By learning of Bolívar’s many “At times, it seems the hardest road of Bolívar: American Liberator soldierly attributes we can understand war is that which leads to peace. For why he is revered. Also, however, discov- Bolívar, it was ever so. ‘I am a soldier,’ By Marie Arana ering Bolívar’s abundant shortcomings he liked to say even when others begged Simon & Schuster, 2013 as a politician should leave us wondering him to be something more. Despite his 624 pp. $35 why he is esteemed in that regard. Every well-honed faculties for social justice— ISBN: 978-1439110195 state he established by conquest disap- despite his gift for imparting democratic Reviewed by peared before or soon after his death. ideals—he found the quotidian business Alan Gropman Arana puts the reader inside Bolívar’s of government numbing. He was a man zeitgeist, explaining that Simón was a of the sword, not the scepter. But it was child of the 18th-century Enlightenment. the scepter he was handed when he rode ny U.S. military officer or civil He was familiar with the writings of the triumphantly into Caracas on June 29, servant yearning to earn the philosophers undergirding the European 1821, five days after his decisive victory” A sobriquet “grand strategist” must and American revolutions and admired over the Spanish colonial armies. understand the ethos of the countries of America’s Founding Fathers. Suffice it to say that when Bolívar died Latin America. While many bodies of However, he recognized the destruc- at 46, his approval rating was negative and water are of great interest to the people tive flaw of slavery in the United States, he went largely unmourned. His beatifica- of the United States and its government, despised human bondage, and was not a tion came when his political inabilities were the Rio Grande River is a vital interest. racist. On June 2, 1816, Bolívar affirmed forgotten and therefore forgiven, his ideas A worthy way to expand one’s knowl- total freedom for slaves in the Spanish were exalted, and his military victories edge of the states south of that long river colonies, announcing, “I have come to were elevated. Simón Bolívar is as much is to read Marie Arana’s sound and solid decree, as law full liberty to all slaves who an immortal hero today as evidenced by biography Bolívar: American Liberator. have trembled under the Spanish yoke for autocrats like the late Hugo Chávez. Arana Arana is an exceptionally articulate three centuries.” Bolívar’s emancipation explains why Chávez retitled his country writer (her Bolívar reads like a novel proclamation preceded freedom for slaves The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. because she is an outstanding stylist) in the United States by half a century Understanding Bolívar’s gravitas and who has written a brilliantly composed, (and real liberty for at least 150 years), illustriousness in that continent is the be- exceptionally well-researched, scrupulously and the reasons driving it had some ginning of comprehending the character of documented (100 pages of notes), and similarities to Abraham Lincoln’s moti- the United States’ closest neighbors. This thorough biography of Simón Bolívar, a vations. Bolívar needed the manpower biography is a must read. JFQ hero of the first stripe to South Americans former slaves could provide to defeat the today but at the same time sadly unknown Spanish, and he directed the newly freed to most North Americans. Bolívar is an men to join his revolutionary armies. Colonel Alan Gropman, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D., is the Distinguished Professor of National Security Policy, idol in South America because he liber- Lincoln, similarly, needed blacks Emeritus, at National Defense University and an ated Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Peru, to fight for the Union to defeat the Adjunct Professor at George Mason University.
118 Book Reviews JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Mackinder identified the northern- Fukuyama provocatively proclaimed central core of the Eurasian landmass as the “end of history.” Thomas Friedman the “Heartland” and “pivot” of world pointed to “globalization” as the key to politics and the potential seat of a global understanding world politics. empire. He viewed Germany’s two Then, quite suddenly, the United wars with Russia in the 20th century as States was fighting two wars in Asia (in struggles for command of the Heartland Afghanistan and Iraq), conducting a and preeminence in Eurasia. He also dis- global “war on terror,” attempting to cerned a pattern to international politics prevent two Asian countries (North that repeatedly pitted insular sea powers Korea and Iran) from getting nuclear against continental-based land powers. weapons, and dealing with the ris- With the onset of the Cold War in ing Asian powers China and India. the mid-to-late 1940s, some Western Geography, it seemed, mattered after all. strategists perceived that the U.S.-Soviet That is why the geopolitical writings struggle for the world could best be un- of Mackinder, Spykman, and Mahan are derstood not solely as a conflict between front and center in Robert D. Kaplan’s competing ideologies, but more by new book, The Revenge of Geography. reference to classical geopolitics. Indeed, Kaplan in the recent past has traveled to George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, the world’s hot spots to observe up close James Burnham, and Raymond Aron and write about the difficult and brutal were among those who viewed the Cold work performed by the U.S. military. The Revenge of Geography: War through Mackinderesque lenses. With the end of the Cold War and the What the Map Tells Us About Containment’s intellectual origins can be relative rise of great powers in Asia, the Coming Conflicts and traced back to “The Geopolitical Pivot of Kaplan has taken a broader view of global the Battle Against Fate History.” events. This was first evidenced in his The advent of atomic weapons, 2010 Monsoon, in which he identified the By Robert D. Kaplan however, convinced many in the West Indian Ocean and its surrounding land- Random House, 2012 that classical geopolitics was outmoded masses as the pivot of world politics in 403 pp. $28 and irrelevant. Nuclear weapons and the 21st century. Now, in The Revenge of ISBN 978-1400069835 intercontinental delivery systems, it was Geography, he uses Mackinder, Spykman, Reviewed by argued, made geography less pertinent Mahan, and lesser geopolitical thinkers Francis P. Sempa to international politics. After the U.S. to explain the global politics of today and defeat in Southeast Asia and the Soviet tomorrow. offensive in the Third World during the Kaplan’s is a realist’s view of the ver since the rise of Hitler and the 1970s, Western strategists such as Colin world that accepts human nature as the Second World War, international Gray resurrected classical geopolitics to “Thucydidean pantheon of fear, self-in- Eevents and circumstances have led explain the growing threat to the West terest, and honor,” resulting in a “world to periodic revivals of interest in the ideas posed by Soviet expansionism. In the of incessant conflict and coercion” (p. 25) and concepts of classical geopolitical the- 1970s Gray wrote a monograph entitled that forces strategists and policymakers to orists. As the Wehrmacht surged into the The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era that recognize “the most blunt, uncomfort- vast expanses of Soviet Russia and Impe- introduced a new generation of scholars able, and deterministic of truths: those of rial Japan sought to carve out a greater and policymakers to the works of Halford geography” (p. 28). “[G]eography,” he East Asia and Pacific empire, Western Mackinder, Yale professor Nicholas writes, “is the preface to the very track of strategists and even popular media outlets Spykman, and American sea power theo- human events” (p. 28). such as Time magazine “discovered” the rist Alfred Thayer Mahan. Kaplan reviews what he calls “the “Heartland” theory first propounded by The end of the Cold War, with its grand pattern of world history” (p. 37) British geographer Halford Mackinder in promise of a “peace dividend” and a using the theories and concepts of the his 1904 address to the Royal Geograph- “new world order,” once again seemed great classical geopolitical thinkers to ical Society entitled “The Geographical to consign classical geopolitics to the ash establish a framework to understand the Pivot of History,” revised and expanded heap of history. Europe, the center of past, contextualize current world events, in his 1919 masterpiece Democratic Ideals great power struggles for centuries, was and foresee the emerging trends in global and Reality, and further revised and at peace. There was no peer competitor politics. updated in a 1943 Foreign Affairs article, to challenge America. Strategist Edward That framework—a synthesis of “The Round World and the Winning of Luttwak argued that “geo-economics” the ideas of Mackinder, Spykman, and the Peace.” was replacing geopolitics. Francis Mahan—posits the centrality of the
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Book Reviews 119 Eurasian landmass to the global balance The authors’ background as educa- of power, the distinct and rival geo- tors clearly influenced the organization graphical power centers of Eurasia, and and prose. On a most positive note, the the historic rivalry between land powers book is written clearly and in a conver- and sea powers for regional and global sational tone that educates and informs preeminence. without being didactic. It follows a Kaplan contends that power in well-constructed framework that systemi- Eurasia has shifted from Russia and cally scopes the issues the authors feel Western Europe to what Spykman called are restraints on the current intelligence the Asian “Rimland” and Mahan termed enterprise’s structure and processes. The the “Debatable and Debated Ground.” technical organization of each chapter This region includes the Middle East, will be familiar to professional students Southwest Asia, Central Asia, and the Far in that each chapter opens with a brief East, the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and discussion of the issue followed by a logi- the rising powers of China and India, five cal and detailed examination. At the end nuclear powers (China, India, Russia, of each chapter, the authors provide a Pakistan, and Israel), the volatile Korean synopsis that specifically details the cen- peninsula, lands with vast reserves of oil tral points and then explains how it ties and natural gas, and important maritime into the next chapter. The benefit of this chokepoints. He reviews in separate chap- model is that it allows readers to quickly ters the geo-history of the key countries review the salient points with the option and power centers of Eurasia including Intelligence Collection: of delving into a deeper, more nuanced Western Europe, Russia, China, India, How to Plan and Execute reading, should they desire. Iran, and Turkey and explains their rela- Intelligence Collection in The book is divided into 15 chapters tive importance to the geopolitics of the Complex Environments that comprise the introduction followed 21st century. by four principal sections in which the By Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Kaplan writes that although the authors utilize an inductive reasoning Citrenbaum United States is in relative decline as a model to organize and present their Praeger, 2012 world power, it does not have to go the thesis. The nonintelligence professional 505 pp. $63 way of previous empires such as Rome, will find the introduction and the sections ISBN: 978-0313398179 Venice, and Great Britain. He recom- on underpinnings and synthesis to be the mends that the United States avoid Reviewed by most informative. The lengthy sections getting bogged down in small wars, Todd M. Manyx on operations and specifics can be appre- prioritize its sea and air power assets, and ciated by reading the synopsis at the end become a “balancing power in Eurasia of each chapter. and a unifying power in North America” n this companion piece to the authors’ The introduction provides a useful (p. 346). 2010 work, Intelligence Analysis: How discussion of the conceptual framework While one can quibble with Kaplan’s I to Think in Complex Environments, that should underpin intelligence col- specific recommendations, he deserves Wayne Hall and Gary Citrenbaum lection and analysis in complex urban much praise for reintroducing and apply- have brought forth a superior forum environments representing the dynamic ing classical geopolitical analysis to the by which to consider the challenges nonlinear conditions that produce the 21st-century world. JFQ associated with intelligence collection Complex Adaptive Systems that con- in complex environments. Each author found the ability of our national-level brings with him a lengthy résumé of intelligence collection capabilities to react Francis P. Sempa is an Assistant U.S. Attorney for credible service in the intelligence field. nimbly when supporting lower-level com- the Middle District of Pennsylvania, an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Wilkes University, Hall is a retired U.S. Army officer with manders. It also notes that the enterprise and a contributing editor to American Diplomacy. over 30 years of intelligence experi- is essentially protecting itself from making ence, and he has remained active within the changes required when it resists the the intelligence field by participating calls from experienced junior leaders who in numerous seminars on intelligence understand the changes needed but lack training and intelligence transformation. the seniority to effect them. Citrenbaum is actively involved in issues The introduction also presents the associated with intelligence transfor- authors’ concept of what Advanced mation. Accordingly, both speak with Collection should seek to do. At its most authority on the issues they raise. elemental level, Advanced Collection
120 Book Reviews JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 serves “a distinct purpose [to] find . . . to commanders at all levels. The thoughts often fleeting observables . . . at the right put forth by Hall and Citrenbaum are New from time, at the right place, and in the right not a prescription on how we should activities” as they relate to the modern “fix” intelligence. However, their ideas NDU Press battlefield’s center of gravity, the popu- are provocative and will challenge intelli- for the Center for Strategic Research lace (pp. 2, 5). Later, this basic concept is gence professionals to reflect on how they Strategic Forum 285 further refined, with Advanced Collection can provide better support. They will The Flawed Strategic Debate on Syria being “The creative design and use of challenge everyone else to consider the by Richard Outzen technical, cyber, human, and open-source myriad elements that affect intelligence collectors in all domains in pursuit of dis- collection and how the consumer can crete, subtle, nuanced, and often fleeting help focus the intelligence enterprise and observables, indicators, and signatures” use intelligence as yet another arrow in (p. 292). the commander’s 21st-century quiver of In the subsequent chapters, Hall weapons systems. JFQ and Citrenbaum discuss the constantly evolving nature of the operating environ- ment and define 11 specific challenges to Lieutenant Colonel Todd M. Manyx, USMC, is a career Intelligence Officer assigned as the G-2, working in the chaotic and fluid environ- Marine Forces Reserve, and Inspector-Instructor ments that our forces face, particularly in for the USMC Reserve Intelligence Battalion. urban areas. They take care to note that by focusing on four kinds of patterns— human/social, technical, functional, and organizations—we can identify anoma- lies that will help focus the Advanced Collection effort. In detailing the numer- ous challenges we place on ourselves, the Opponents of forceful U.S. action authors also take time to provide specific in Syria have warned of dire conse- remedies to each problem. quences, but have generally failed The most useful chapter provides an to address the costs of inaction. The in-depth discussion on critical thinking. results of episodic and ambivalent This chapter makes clear that critical action are also dire. Those arguing thinking has a deep bench of military against robust assistance to the op- theory behind it and is substantively dif- position have used Afghanistan and ferent from the other forms of thinking other historical analogies to support discussed in other sections. Critical think- their positions, but the arguments ing is unique in that, while it is essential frequently employ faulty history and for the success of Advanced Collection, it faulty reasoning. There are options supports every professional regardless of for coherent, effective action with occupation or specific problem. regional support in pursuit of lim- The intelligence field I work in today ited, achievable goals. is not the same field I joined in the mid- 1980s, and that is a good thing. No longer are we focused on the FM-100 series with its attendant foldout sections detailing how the Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment would array itself on the battle- field with the expectation that collection plans could be derived from such blunt tools. Today the intelligence professional has access to infinitely more information, powerful tools, and, after more than a decade of irregular warfare, a solid under- standing of what it will take to continue Visit the NDU Press Web site to improve our intelligence “fighting po- for more information on publications at www.ndu.edu/press/index.html sition” and remain relevant and valuable
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Book Reviews 121 New from Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision NDU Press (to be signed within 6 months) for the Center for Strategic Research JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of Strategic Forum 286 the Operational Environment Targeted Killing of Terrorists JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations by Nicholas Rostow JP 3-02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation JP 3-05, Special Operations JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations JP 3-26, Counterterrorism JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control JP 3-63, Detainee Operations The battle against terrorism raises JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning important legal and policy concerns JP 4-09, Distribution Operations for the United States. Efforts to prevent terrorist attacks include the JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support controversial practice of targeted killing, for example—the identi- JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) fication and killing of individuals JP 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations (November 20, 2013) involved in terrorist operations and organizations. Authority for targeted JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence (October 22, 2013) killing exists in domestic and inter- JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations (November 20, 2013) national law. As a matter of policy JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations (August 14, 2013) even if it is not legally required, the United States should use the Geneva JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Conventions of 1949 to guide its and Nuclear Environments (October 4, 2013) confrontations with terrorists. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations (July 16, 2013) JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations (September 30, 2013) JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency (November 22, 2013) JP 3-27, Homeland Defense (July 29, 2013) JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (July 31, 2013) JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations (August 7, 2013) JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (September 11, 2013) JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (October 16, 2013)
Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at www.ndu.edu/press/index.html
122 Book Reviews JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Airman helps Marine load missile at Kunsan Air Base, South Korea (U.S. Air Force/Armando A. Schwier-Morales)
Cross-Domain Synergy Advancing Jointness
By William O. Odom and Christopher D. Hayes
oday the separate military Ser- But despite tremendous progress in In a recent Foreign Affairs article, vices that make up America’s achieving jointness, U.S. forces still the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff T Armed Forces work together lack the ability to integrate seam- explained these challenges to the external more often than at any time in the lessly. Moreover, the ability to sustain audience and highlighted the impor- Nation’s history. Their success over the and build on the considerable gains tance of cooperation among the Armed last decade of war has cemented the achieved in the conduct of joint opera- Forces.1 Within our ranks, improved power of “jointness” in accomplishing tions is uncertain as our Armed Forces cooperation hinges on viewing military military objectives. Our ability to inte- reset from a decade of sustained combat problems from a comprehensive cross- grate land, sea, air, space, and cyber- to face a future of complex challenges domain perspective rather than viewing space military capabilities is unmatched. and constrained resources. them through an individual Service lens. To support this shift in focus, the Joint Staff introduced cross-domain synergy as a central idea in recent joint concepts. Colonel William O. Odom, USA (Ret.), Ph.D., is a Writer/Editor in the Joint Staff J7 Joint Concepts Division. Lieutenant Commander Christopher D. Hayes, USN, is Deputy Director of the Joint This article expands on the idea of Concepts Division. “cross-domain synergy” by exploring its
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Odom and Hayes 123 Marine launches Puma unmanned aircraft system at Patrol Base Boldak (U.S. Marine Corps/Bobby J. Yarbrough) historical roots, summarizing its usage is achieved when the integrated use of in more than one domain can afford in recent joint publications, and noting land, sea, air, space, and/or cyberspace decisive advantages. implications for the future joint force. capabilities produces a combined effect The U.S. military has operated in greater than the sum of the separate multiple domains throughout its history. What Is Cross-Domain Synergy? effects.4 In military application, cross- Before it could fly, the United States The Department of Defense (DOD) domain synergy is the use of two or combined land- and sea-based capabili- recognizes five domains: land, sea, air, more domains to achieve a military ties to win pivotal victories at Yorktown space, and cyberspace.2 Physical space advantage. This frequently involves (1781), Vicksburg (1863), and Santiago delineates the land, sea, air, and space application of capabilities from one (1898). With the advent of flight, the domains with the physical characteristics domain to another, with the principal Army, Navy, and Marine Corps added air of each determining the relative capa- aims of improving operational perfor- domain–based capabilities to their grow- bilities and vulnerabilities of the actions mance and reducing unnecessary joint ing and rapidly modernizing arsenals. that occur within them. Cyberspace has force redundancies. In World War II and Korea, amphibious different physical characteristics than landings exemplified cross-domain opera- the geographic domains. It is a crosscut- Cross-Domain Operations tions. Advances in aviation technology ting global domain within the informa- Are Not New eventually led to the establishment of a tion environment consisting of the While the term cross-domain synergy is separate Service with responsibility for interdependent network of information new, the underlying concept derives the air domain even as the Army, Marine technology infrastructures including the from the age-old military maxim that Corps, and Navy continued to develop Internet, telecommunications networks, advises commanders to approach their own air capabilities. Most Services computer systems, and embedded the enemy asymmetrically—to apply have since expanded their organic cross- processors and controllers.3 Synergy is strength against an adversary’s weakness domain portfolios to include space- and the interaction or cooperation of two while protecting one’s own vulnerabili- cyberspace-based capabilities. or more organizations, substances, or ties. The history of warfare is rife with At first, physical domains largely de- other agents to produce a combined use of asymmetry in strategy, opera- fined the Services, with the Army focused effect greater than the sum of their tions, tactics, and technology to defeat on land, the Marine Corps and Navy on separate effects. Cross-domain synergy an enemy. The ability to operate fluidly sea, and the Air Force on air operations.
124 Joint Doctrine / Cross-Domain Synergy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 As each developed cross-domain capa- jointness. Four years ago, the Capstone First and Foremost, the U.S. Military bilities to support its activities within a Concept for Joint Operations V3.0 called Must Understand Both the Adversary specified geographic domain, it reaped for achieving “joint synergy” and noted and the Environment. Knowing the the benefits of cross-domain capabilities the importance of thinking in terms of enemy is a prerequisite to effective mili- without the need for inter-Service coordi- joint functions independent of a specific tary operations and achieving synergy in nation.5 In the last 50 years, technological Service. Last year, the Joint Operational operations against it. In addition to as- advances significantly increased the reach Access Concept V1.0 (JOAC) expanded sessing an adversary’s military capabilities, of each Service’s land, sea, air, space, and the idea of joint synergy by shifting the defense establishment must better cyberspace capabilities and largely erased the focus from Service capabilities to understand the human factors derived the geographic distinctions that once domain-based capabilities. The JOAC from cultural, ideological, and political delineated the Service’s operational do- cited leveraging cross-domain synergy motivations that shape the enemy’s inten- main. As a result, joint operations became as the central idea of the concept and tions and actions. No less important is increasingly commonplace as each Service envisioned a “seamless application of understanding the physical environment took advantage of the additional and combat power between domains, with and the myriad factors that influence the often unique capabilities offered by other greater integration at dramatically lower combatant’s decisions. Today the United Services. Today the overlap between echelons than joint forces currently States faces adversaries who are patient, Service capabilities is so great that it has achieve.” Most recently the Capstone persistent, and elusive—adversaries who shifted the focus of joint operations from Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force have learned to hide from the Nation’s coordination along the seams of geo- 2020 reinforced the idea of cross-domain overwhelming military capabilities graphically defined Service boundaries to synergy by specifying that “cross-domain and exploit its weaknesses. This new integration of Service capabilities within synergy should become a core operating challenge requires broadening intel- shared domains. To leverage the Armed concept in all joint operations” and call- ligence analysis to include cross-domain Forces’ cross-domain capabilities fully, ing for better integration of joint forces perspectives on the enemy’s potential the Services must embrace an evolved un- to achieve this effect. These documents weaknesses to identify its motivation, derstanding of jointness. This has become reflect the complexity of the changing critical vulnerabilities, and ultimately its abundantly clear over the last decade. security environment, embrace the pace center of gravity. Integrating the unique of technological advancements, and perspectives of the 16 separate agencies Leveraging Cross- underline the necessity of combining of the U.S. Intelligence Community Domain Synergy capabilities within and across domains as well as those of foreign partners can In recent combat operations, the to optimize our ability to respond to contribute to developing the strategy, U.S. military has integrated Service threats. These concepts acknowledge operations, and tactics to defeat the capabilities in ways unlikely to happen that jointness is the key to conduct- enemy. A comprehensive cross-domain in peacetime. Wartime demands have ing operations across domains and this view of the enemy may identify vulner- accentuated appreciation of jointness ability gives the U.S. military an asym- abilities that might have passed unnoticed and accelerated the development of metric advantage with the potential to when seen through the narrower lens joint solutions. A generation of future create decisive synergy. They emphasize of a single Service or agency, and offer military leaders has learned through viewing military problems from a mul- expanded opportunities to strike at weak firsthand experiences from Panama tidomain perspective without regard points from the land, sea, air, space, and through Afghanistan that joint opera- for Service ownership of the domain or cyberspace. The nature of intelligence tions offer a greater range of capabili- assets. They apply across the spectrum work makes this inherently difficult, but ties than single Service operations and of military activities from combat op- the benefits of a holistic understanding of that the benefits of combining Service erations to humanitarian missions and the rival system, developed through joint, capabilities outweigh the costs. Integra- operations other than war. combined, and interagency intelligence tion of special operations and general analysis, far outweighs the challenges. purpose forces along with intelligence, Implications for the Joint Force In peacetime, intelligence development surveillance, and reconnaissance capa- The creation of cross-domain synergy (collection, analysis, processing, and dis- bilities and the enormous expansion of requires approaching military problems semination) should be the main effort. integrated fires are among the notable from a multidomain perspective. It The U.S. Military Must Broaden Its examples of improved jointness gen- entails building a comprehensive view Knowledge of Available Capabilities. erating successful multi-Service cross- of the adversary and the environment, The scope of American military capa- domain operations. understanding available capabilities, bilities is potentially overwhelming, and Recently published concepts, in- and integrating those capabilities. the list continues to grow and evolve. formed by military operations ranging The key is to advance jointness from It takes years to learn how to employ from combat to humanitarian assistance, integrated Service efforts to a singular a single Service’s capabilities, not to highlight the synergistic potential of multidomain effort. mention staying abreast of new tactics,
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Odom and Hayes 125 Marines provide security at landing zone near Boldak, Afghanistan, during Operation Pegasus II (U.S. Marine Corps/Austin Long) techniques, procedures, and technical innovations. Formal education in joint operations usually occurs only after 10 years of immersion in Service-specific programs. However, practical exposure to joint operations is occurring much earlier and more often than in the past. In some specialties, familiarity with relevant joint capabilities is a critical individual skill, especially in the growing number of jobs that routinely employ capabilities from multiple domains. Servicemembers traditionally tended to look to their par- ent Services first, then elsewhere when seeking solutions to military problems. Achieving cross-domain synergy requires a mindset that expands beyond tradi- tional Service perspectives to embrace all capabilities without undue consideration of the source. The U.S. Military Must Improve Its Ability to Access and Integrate Service Capabilities. The bumpy transition from Service-centric to joint operations is still incomplete despite 30 years of predomi- nantly joint operations. Make no mistake, American forces have made progress, but the task of accessing and integrating next evolution in jointness must be integrating cross-domain capabilities, Service capabilities remains complicated internally driven and center on the most notably that cross-domain opera- even after a decade of war. Observations ability to achieve cross-domain synergy tions could become too complex to from joint training events and exercises by shifting the focus to employing be practical. While this is an important reveal tendencies to cling to ownership capabilities without regard for Service consideration, it does not preclude pur- of capabilities rather than accepting as- origin. This shift hinges on building suing the concept and moving toward sured access to them, and a few holdouts trust and shared understanding by edu- an interoperable joint force capable of still believe a single Service can do it all cating leaders earlier and routinely par- creating battlespace synergy through without leveraging joint capabilities. This ticipating in joint training throughout seamless cross-domain operations. mindset persists in part because the laws careers—by expanding the scope of the The impetus to achieve cross-domain that establish and regulate our Armed profession of arms to include employ- synergy, however, should never supplant Forces reinforce Service-centricity. Even ing the full range of capabilities. It also the imperative to select the simplest, those who favor jointness tend to define requires development of streamlined most efficient solution. it from the perspective of enabling their means to access and integrate capabili- A domain-based view of capabilities Services. As a result, “joint” is still shaped ties. Despite efforts to function as an not only bridges the Services, but also by the personality and experiences of the interoperable joint force, the military reaches across combatant command senior joint commander rather than by still lacks the authorities, relationships, boundaries. The global nature of current common standards. procedures, and technology to do it military operations often requires the without effort. Again, the U.S. military ability to act across two or more combat- Evolving Our Thinking does this better than at any time in its ant command areas of responsibility. In on Jointness history, but it still cannot reach across fact, “globally integrated operations” The watershed Goldwater-Nichols Act Service boundaries and employ cross- is the capstone concept for Joint Force provided a tremendous external stimu- domain capabilities with the speed and 2020. Conducting cross-domain opera- lus driving the imperative to achieve dexterity it seeks. The JOAC acknowl- tions within a single area of responsibility Service integration across DOD. The edges many risks associated with is difficult, but it is even harder when
126 Joint Doctrine / Cross-Domain Synergy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 the operation involves multiple combat- authorities will advance the military’s global integration of networks have ant commands. Combatant commands ability to leverage the unique capabili- eroded much of the U.S. advantage in remain relatively independent multi- ties these partners bring to operations. military power and technology. At the Service organizations, each tailoring joint Leaders must remain sensitive to the same time, other government organiza- and combined operating procedures challenges of partnering even as they con- tions and foreign partners offer unique to match theater needs. At the same tinue to focus on achieving cross-domain capabilities that can dramatically affect time, the blurring of simultaneous synergy within the “unity of effort” the outcome of military operations. supporting-supported relationships framework. The problems the U.S. military faces demands reexamining what interoper- are more complex, but it has a greater ability truly requires. Globally integrated Conclusion quantity, quality, and variety of tools operations—and the implied requirement The employment of cross-domain capa- with which to solve them because the to access and integrate capabilities from bilities to exploit enemy weaknesses joint force’s ability to achieve cross- multiple combatant commands—neces- and achieve decisive victory is not a domain synergy is at an all-time high. sitate greater commonality in materiel, new idea, but much has changed in However, two postwar trends risk procedures, and policies to achieve cross- recent years. Cross-domain operations undermining the tremendous gains domain synergy. have expanded beyond the combina- the Armed Forces have made in their Another well-known, persistent tion of land and sea operations to ability to execute joint operations and challenge to achieving cross-domain include capabilities delivered from the achieve cross-domain synergy. First, the synergy is accessing and integrating U.S. air, space, and cyberspace. Modern end of combat operations in Iraq and Government agencies and foreign part- technology has vastly increased avail- Afghanistan will remove a powerful ners. Put simply, DOD lacks the authority able capabilities and these capabilities impetus for inter-Service cooperation. to direct changes that would permanently are rarely controlled exclusively by any Second, defense budget reductions solve the problem because they are ex- single Service. Nor are they the exclu- could result in prioritization of unique ternal organizations or they serve other sive tools of superpowers and nation- Service requirements over joint nations. Clearly defined relationships and states. Technology, proliferation, and requirements.
JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Odom and Hayes 127 Soldier inspects static line before jumping from C-17 Globemaster III during mission in support of Joint Operations Access Exercise 12-2 (DOD/Eric Harris)
Ultimately, achieving cross-domain will involve joint forces exercising cross- to be confused with other models that explore synergy is about evolving the under- domain capabilities. Therefore it is vital warfare in terms of cognitive, moral, and hu- man “domains.” In a recent article titled “Joint standing of jointness. Cross-domain that the military forge the next joint force Force 2020 and the Human Domain: Time for perspectives on military problems based on the lessons of recent combat a New Conceptual Framework?” in Small Wars advance jointness. Improved jointness experiences. Those experiences not only Journal, the authors make a valid case for the enables more effective combination of validate the effectiveness of jointness centrality of human interaction in all military the capabilities of the Armed Forces and as the key to achieving cross-domain actions. 3 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of the achievement of cross-domain synergy synergy, but also highlight persistent Defense Dictionary of Military and Associ- in joint operations. To improve jointness challenges in joint operations. Expanding ated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, the military needs to shift from Service- the military mindset to encompass cross- November 8, 2010, as amended through centric approaches to a mindset that domain perspectives builds the trust December 15, 2012), 74. holistically views the military problem and shared understanding the military 4 The JOAC elaborates by stating that cross- domain synergy is “The complementary vice and considers the full range of available needs to address the challenges of joint merely additive employment of capabilities in capabilities. It also requires changes in the operations within a larger interagency and different domains such that each enhances the way the military accesses and integrates multinational context. JFQ effectiveness and compensates for the vulnera- capabilities, essentially transcending bilities of the others—to establish superiority in Service and combatant command owner- some combination of domains that will provide the freedom of action required by the mission.” ship of capabilities and assuming a global Notes 5 Not all cross-domain operations are perspective on military operations to inherently “joint,” such as when one Service 1 Martin E. Dempsey, “The Future of achieve globally integrated operations. provides all the land, sea, or air forces. For Joint Operations: Real Cooperation for Real example, an all-Marine Air-Ground Task Force Historically, the end of combat opera- Threats,” Foreign Affairs, June 20, 2013, operation is not joint, yet it typically operates in tions removes the impetus for Service available at
128 Joint Doctrine / Cross-Domain Synergy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 call for entries for the 2014 Secretary of Defense and 2014 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions
Are you a professional military education (PME) student? Imagine your winning essay published in a future issue of Joint Force Quarterly, catching the eye of the Secretary and Chairman as well as contributing to the debate on an important national security issue. These rewards, along with a monetary prize, await the winners.
Who’s Eligible? Students, including international students, at U.S. PME colleges, schools, and other programs, and Service research fellows.
What’s Required? Research and write an original, unclassified essay on some aspect of U.S. national, defense, or military strategy. The essay may be written in conjunction with a course writing requirement. Important: Please note that entries must be selected by and submitted through your college.
When? Anytime during the 2013–2014 academic year. Students are encouraged to begin early and avoid the spring rush. Colleges set their own internal deadlines, but must submit their official entries to NDU Press by April 23, 2014, for the first round of judging. Final judging and selection of winners take place May 15–16, 2014, at NDU Press, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
National Defense University Press conducts the competition with the generous support of the NDU Foundation. For further information, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to:
https://ndupress.dod.afpims.mil/EssayCompetitions.aspx
General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presents award certificate to Gina M. Bennett. While a student at the Marine Corps War College, Ms. Bennett won First Place in the 2013 CJCS Strategy Article Competition with her paper entitled “The Elusive Defeat of al Qaeda.” Joint Force Quarterly Issue Seventy-three, 2nd Quarter 2014
Flickr Pinterest witter Facebook T ou can also find us on: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm ashington, DC Y Visit us online at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit UARTERLY Press online lately? Q JFQ is available online at the Joint Electronic Library: articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. ORCE F site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 20,000 unique vistors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 20,000 unique vistors each month, NDU OINT 176 pp. J
•
National Defense University, W Aspirational and fulfilling, this book helps prepareAspirational and fulfilling, this book helps young men and women who strive to become NCOs/POs, re-inspires currently serving and stimulates reflection enlisted leaders, by those who no longer wear the uniform.have never served It also gives those who a com- prehensive understanding of who these exceptional men and women are, and why they are known as the “Backbone of the Armed Forces.” A first of its kind, this book—of, by, and for noncommissioned officers and for noncommissioned officers— and petty book—of, by, A first of its kind, this is a comprehensive of enlisted leaders across explanation States Armed the United Forces. Services’It balances with the The Armedleadership manuals and complements NCO/PO by Officer Forces which was published by NDU Press, the latest edition of Written in 2007. a team of Active, Reserve, and retired enlisted leaders from the five Service branches, this centers them in the ProfessionNCOs/POs fit into an organization, book describes how of Arms, defines their dual roles the officer of complementing enabling the force, and and exposes their international engagement. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General know noncommissioned offiMartin E. Dempsey writes in his foreword- to the book, “We cers and petty officers and soldierly to have exceptional competence, professional character, grit—they are exemplars of our Profession Arms.” of The Noncommissioned Officer and Petty Officer: Officer and Petty The Noncommissioned Armed Forces Backbone of the NDU Press, 2013 Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press ave you checked out ave you checked out H