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4/2020 How to Progress Ukraine’s Western Integration as a Prelude to Accession to the EU and NATO — Pavlo Klimkin & Andreas Umland PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | UI.SE Summary As the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and their member states become increasingly absorbed by internal challenges, the friends of Ukraine need to seek new paths to increase Ukrainian security, resilience and growth before its accession to the West’s two major organizations. An alternative way to reduce Ukraine’s current institutional isolation would be to develop more intense bilateral relations with friendly states across the globe, notably the United States. In Eastern Europe, moreover, countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova should try to create multilateral networks with post-communist member- countries of NATO and the EU. Pavlo Klimkin was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in 2014–2019, and is Director of the Program on European, Regional and Russian Studies at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future in Kyiv. Andreas Umland is editor of the book series Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society published by ibidem Press in Stuttgart, and Senior Nonresident Fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Prague. © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Language editing: Andrew Mash Cover photo: TT/Shutterstock Introduction such as the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative or NATO’s Individual Partnership The various political effects and multiple Action Plan scheme, will probably remain in 4 repercussions of the ongoing COVID-19 place and may even be strengthened. In pandemic for the international system will 2019, moreover, Ukraine very publicly put be especially far-reaching for weak states the aim of full membership of NATO and 5 located in geopolitical grey zones.1 the EU into its constitution. These Countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and organizations will probably turn ever more Moldova, which are neither military nor introverted, however, as international and economic great powers and not embedded national instability increase throughout the in security alliances or trading blocs, are at year. As a minimum, it seems unlikely that special risk.2 For Ukraine, Georgia and the ongoing crisis will reduce scepticism Moldova, the evolving world crisis will have about further EU and NATO enlargement, the unpleasant consequence that their especially in Western Europe. nations’ already stalling integration with the West may be further slowed.3 In as far as Ukraine’s Ambivalent the European Union and NATO will be Relationship with Western consumed by their various internal challenges and external threats, they will Europe become more inward-looking and even less prone than before to consider accession of In 2019, Ukrainian politicians and experts new members. were already dismayed by a number of what they saw as scandalous decisions and It is certainly true that some of the existing signals coming from West European. These special outreach programmes in which included the unjustified readmission of the Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are included, Russian delegation to the Parliamentary 1 Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister (eds), The 2016. Eastern Question: Russia, the West, and Europe’s Grey www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine- Zone. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic s-understandable-but-senseless-hope-for-nato- Relations, 2016; Ian Bond, Contested Space: Eastern membership/; Steven Pifer, Will Ukraine Join NATO? Europe between Russia and the EU. London: Center A Course for Disappointment, Brookings. Order from for European Reform, 2017; Vasile Rotaru, Russia, the Chaos, 25 July 2017. www.brookings.edu/blog/order- EU, and the Eastern Partnership. Building Bridges or from-chaos/2017/07/25/will-ukraine-join-nato-a- Digging Trenches? Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2018; course-for-disappointment/; Alyona Getmanchuk, Roman Tyshchenko, “Our Existence is Not the European Integration Is Taking Root across Ukraine Subject of Compromises”, Pavlo Klimkin during UCU Despite Russia’s Best Efforts, Atlantic Council. Visit. Ukrainian Catholic University, 5 November 2018. Ukraine Alert, 12 December 2019. ucu.edu.ua/en/news/existence-not-subject- www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/european compromises-pavlo-klimkin-ucu-visit/. -integration-is-taking-root-across-ukraine-despite- 2 Margarita M. Balmaceda (ed.), On the Edge: russias-best-efforts/. Ukrainian—Central European—Russian Security 4 Edgars Rinkēvičs, Pavlo Klimkin, Sven Mikser, Linas Triangle. Budapest: CEU Press, 2001; André Härtel, Linkevičius, Jacek Czaputowicz, Margot Wallström, Westintegration oder Grauzonen-Szenario? Die EU- und Anders Samuelsen, Chrystia Freeland, Teodor WTO-Politik der Ukraine vor dem Hintergrund der Meleşcanu, Jeremy Hunt, Tomáš Petříček, The West inneren Transformation (1998-2009). Münster: LIT Must not Abandon Crimea and Ukraine to Russian Verlag, 2012. Aggression, The Guardian, 27 February 2019. 3 Hilary Appel, The Long-Term Prospects for Ukraine’s 5 Klimkin, Ukraine Will Continue to Move towards the Accession to the European Union: A Focus on EU- EU and NATO with a New President, Opinion. The Level Constraints. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, no. Way Ukraine Thinks, 2 April 2019. 330, 2014; Andreas Umland, Ukraine’s opinionua.com/en/2019/04/02/klimkin-ukraine-will- Understandable But Senseless Hope for NATO continue-to-move-towards-the-eu-and-nato-with-a- Membership, Atlantic Council. Ukraine Alert, 5 April new-president/. © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Assembly of the Council of Europe, from The geopolitical climate for Ukraine, which it had been excluded following the Georgia and Moldova seems likely to attack on Ukraine in 2014;6 and a strangely deteriorate further during 2020. Following conciliatory turn in French President the outbreak of COVID-19, world politics is Emmanuel Macron’s rhetoric vis-à-vis becoming more complicated with every Moscow.7 Moreover, as became clear passing week. The EU and its member following Macron's unexpected advances, states are today confronted with the the French President has numerous pandemic and its uncertain economic supporters in Western Europe in his stated repercussions.12 At the same time, they face intention to change the current character of a new refugee crisis in the South, EU-Russia relations and begin a new complicated situations in the Middle East security partnership. and Africa, increasingly difficult relations with Turkey and an awkward US president Germany has in many ways been supportive with a different understanding of of Ukraine since 2014.8 The Federal transatlantic solidarity than previous Republic will probably continue or may even inhabitants of the White House. strengthen its support for Ukraine in the future.9 Nonetheless, Berlin continues to Russia’s Weakening as Result of irritate Kyiv with its myopic insistence on COVID-19 the completion of Gazprom’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea.10 The It is true that not all recent foreign trends German and Austrian governments have have been disadvantageous for Ukraine. not changed their strong support for the The currently multiplying economic and controversial underwater conduit even in social repercussions of the pandemic in the light of growing resistance to the Russia are likely to dampen the Kremlin’s Russian project in East-Central Europe and the United States.11 6 Givi Gigitashvili, Russia’s Return to PACE. Irrational Kai-Olaf Lang and Kirsten Westphal, Nord Stream 2: Compromise or Defending Russian Citizens from A Political and Economic Contextualisation. SWP Their Government? New Eastern Europe, 10 July 2019. Research Paper, No. 3, 2017. neweasterneurope.eu/2019/07/10/russias-return-to- 11 Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Marcin Terlikowski, pace/. Bartosz Wiśniewski, Szymon Zaręba, Nord Stream 2: 7 Mark Leonard, Macrons Russlandinitiative. Eine Inconvenient Questions. PISM Policy Paper, No. Innenansicht, Project Syndicate, 2 October 2019. 5(165), 2018; Margarita Assenova, Europe and Nord www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/macron- Stream 2: Myths, Reality, and the Way Forward. russia-diplomacy-eu-security-strategy-by-mark- Center for European Policy Analysis Report, June leonard-2019-10/german. 2018; Andreas Heinrich and Heiko Pleines, Towards a 8 André Härtel, The EU Member States and the Crisis Common European Energy Policy? Energy Security in Ukraine: Towards an Eclectic Explanation, Debates in Poland and Germany. The Case of the Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2, Nord Stream Pipeline. In: Anne Jenichen and Ulrike 2019, pp. 87-106. Liebert (eds), Europeanisation vs. Renationalisation: 9 Andreas Umland, Can Germany Become a Major Ally Learning from Crisis for European Political of Ukraine? Counterintuitive Deliberations on a Development. Leverkusen: Barbara Budrich, 2019, pp. Coming Partnership between Kyiv and Berlin, World 169-182; Piotr Przybyło, The Real Financial Costs of Affairs, Vol. 183, No. 1, 2020, pp. 74–89. Nord Stream 2: Economic Sensitivity Analysis of the 10 Sabine Fischer, Nord Stream 2. Trust in Europe. CSS Alternatives to the Offshore Pipeline. Casimir Pulaski Policy Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2016; Andreas Foundation Report, May 2019. Goldthau, Assessing Nord Stream 2. Regulation, 12 Daniela Schwarzer, Shahin Vallée, How Leaders Can Geopolitics & Energy Security in the EU, Central Stop Corona from Undermining the EU: The Health Eastern Europe & the UK. European Center
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