Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Intersections of Space and Ethos

Pressing economic, environmental and social crises underline the need for a redefi nition of the dominant views, perspectives and values in the fi eld of architecture. The intellectual production of the last two decades has witnessed an impressive number of new design techniques and conceptual dis- placements refl ecting the dynamic and fl uid relation between man and his dwelling space. However, contemporary market forces are favouring the growth of a star system in architectural production based on technological innovation, spectacular imagery and formal acrobatics, and are neglecting the social, environmental and moral implications of spatial design. Perhaps the time has come to think anew about the possible critical intersections between space and ethos, not only as an answer to the negative consequences of modernity, but also as a remedy to the negative aspects of globalisation. The aim of the present collective volume is to enliven the ethical dimensions and dilemmas of architecture as they are shaped within the complexity of our times on two levels: the level of critical and refl ective discourse and the level of social and cultural reality occasioned by post-industrial modes of production and new technologies. Thirteen distinguished academics and researchers investigate the complex relations between architecture, space and ethics from divergent and interdisciplinary perspectives: philosophy, sociology, the humanities, the arts, landscape design, environmental design, urban design and architectural history and theory.

Kyriaki Tsoukala is Professor of Architecture and Socio-Psychology of Space at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou is Lecturer in Architectural Concepts and Theories at the National Technical University of Athens, Greece.

Charikleia Pantelidou is a Researcher in Architecture and Theories of Space at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. Routledge Research in Architecture

The Routledge Research in Architecture series provides the reader with the latest scholarship in the ﬁ eld of architecture. The series publishes research from across the globe and covers areas as diverse as architectural history and theory, technology, digital architecture, structures, materials, details, design, monographs of architects, interior design and much more. By making these studies available to the worldwide academic community, the series aims to promote quality architectural research.

An Architecture of Parts Architects, building workers and industrialisation in Britain 1940–1970 Christine Wall

Towards an Articulated Phenomenological Interpretation of Architecture Phenomenal phenomenology M. Reza Shirazi

Architectural System Structures Integrating design complexity in industrialised construction Kasper Sánchez Vibæk

Space Unveiled Invisible cultures in the design studio Edited by Carla Jackson Bell Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Architectural Temperance Spain and Rome, 1700–1759 Victor Deupi

Assembling the Centre: Architecture for Indigenous Cultures Australia and beyond Janet McGaw and Anoma Pieris The Films of Charles and Ray Eames A universal sense of expectation Eric Schuldenfrei

Intersections of Space and Ethos Kyriaki Tsoukala, Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou and Charikleia Pantelidou

Ars et Ingenium: The Embodiment of Imagination in Francesco di Giorgio Martini’s Drawings Pari Riahi Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Intersections of Space and Ethos

Edited by Kyriaki Tsoukala, Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou and Charikleia Pantelidou Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 First published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2015 Kyriaki Tsoukala, Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou and Charikleia Pantelidou The right of the editors to be identiﬁ ed as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice : Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identiﬁ cation and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Intersections of space and ethos / [edited] by Kyriaki Tsoukala, Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou and Charikleia Pantelidou. pages cm. — (Routledge research in architecture) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Space (Architecture)—History—20th century. 2. Space (Architecture)—History—21st century. 3. Architecture—Moral and ethical aspects. I. Tsoukala, Kyriaki, editor. II. Terzoglou, Nikolaos-Ion, editor. III. Pantelidou, Charikleia, editor. NA2765.I58 2015 720.1—dc23 2014029310 ISBN: 978-1-138-78324-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-76877-9 (ebk)

Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Contents

List of ﬁ gures and illustration credits ix Contributors xi Acknowledgements xv Prologue: rethinking space and ethos: critical intersections xvii KYRIAKI TSOUKALA, NIKOLAOS-ION TERZOGLOU AND CHARIKLEIA PANTELIDOU

PART ONE Creating architecture: between nature and culture 1

Introduction 3 CHARIKLEIA PANTELIDOU

1 The space of weather 6 JONATHAN HILL

2 In which way is ‘ethos’ revealed in space? “. . . ordine geometrico demonstrato” 18 KONSTANTINOS MORAITIS

3 Heritage values as means and ends of place ethics 30 VASSILIS GANIATSAS Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 4 Ethic and ornament in the modern and contemporary age 41 CLAUDIO D. CONENNA AND KYRIAKI TSOUKALA viii Contents PART TWO Rethinking urban space: intentions and critique 57

Introduction 59 KYRIAKI TSOUKALA

5 The many-chimneyed distances: ethical prospects of urban space 62 ANGELIKI SIOLI AND ALBERTO PÉREZ-GÓMEZ

6 Access and the ethos of space 72 CHARIKLEIA PANTELIDOU

7 The Singapore Flyer: view, movement, time and modernity 82 IAIN BORDEN

8 Ethic and space in contemporary Western societies 92 KYRIAKI TSOUKALA

PART THREE Human condition and space: philosophical orientations and conceptual transpositions 103

Introduction 105 NIKOLAOS-ION TERZOGLOU

9 Architecture and intellectual development 108 JOHN SHANNON HENDRIX

10 On the ethical signiﬁ cance of space and shaping space 123 KARSTEN HARRIES

11 Architecture as the receptacle of Mitsein 138

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 NICHOLAS TEMPLE

12 Towards a new ethical ‘paradigm’ in the creation of spaces 150 NIKOLAOS-ION TERZOGLOU

Epilogue: contemporary problems and new directions 161 KYRIAKI TSOUKALA, NIKOLAOS-ION TERZOGLOU AND CHARIKLEIA PANTELIDOU Index 167 Figures and illustration credits

The authors and publishers gratefully acknowledge the following for permission to reproduce images in the book.

PART ONE 1.1 William Kent, Rousham, 1737–1741. Antinous at the end of the Long Walk © Jonathan Hill 10 1.2 William Kent, Rousham, 1737–1741. Detail of Antinous at the end of the Long Walk © Jonathan Hill 11 2.1 At the outskirts of seventeenth-century Dutch cities, bourgeois’ houses summed in series of small properties, preﬁ gured with their adjacent gardens, the future garden cities of the twentieth century © Konstantinos Moraitis 22 2.2 In the gardens of Prince William of Orange in Het Loo Palace, the application of geometry was associated with organizational clarity © Konstantinos Moraitis 23 4.1 Swiss Re Tower in London, architect N. Foster © Kyriaki Tsoukala 50 4.2 National Stadium in Beijing, architects J. Herzog and P. de Meuron © Kyriaki Tsoukala 51

PART TWO Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 7.1 View of the Singapore Flyer © Christopher Cheng 2013 83 7.2 View from the Singapore Flyer © Christopher Cheng 2013 85

PART THREE 11.1 View of the Dome of Santa Maria del Fiore from Via dello Studio, Florence © Photo Scala, Florence 2014 144 11.2 View of the interior of the Thermal Baths in Vals. Peter Zumthor (1990–1996) © Hélène Binet 147 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Contributors

Iain Borden is Professor of Architecture and Urban Culture at the Bart- lett School of Architecture, UCL, where he is also vice-dean for Com- munications for the Bartlett Faculty of the Built Environment. Authored and co-edited books include Drive: Journeys through Film, Cities and Landscapes (Reaktion, 2012), Bartlett Designs: Speculating With Archi- tecture (Wiley, 2009), Manual: The Architecture and Ofﬁ ce of Allford Hall Monaghan Morris (Birkhauser, 2003), Skateboarding Space and the City: Architecture and the Body (Berg, 2001, revised edition forthcoming), The Unknown City: Contesting Architecture and Social Space (MIT, 2001) and InterSections: Architectural Histories and Critical Theories (Routledge, 2000). Claudio D. Conenna studied architecture in Argentina (National University La Plata) and he completed his doctoral thesis at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki on the topic of the relations between architecture, place and environment. He taught Architectural Design and History of Architec- ture at the National University of La Plata (1985–1993) and since 2001, he teaches the same topic at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. Among his publications are books (edited individually and collectively) and articles in architectural journals from Mexico, Ecuador, Columbia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Greece, Spain, Switzerland and Finland. He has received awards and distinctions in national and international architectural competitions. Vassilis Ganiatsas is professor of Architectural Syntheses and Theory of

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Architectural Design at the National Technical University of Athens. In 1987, he completed his Ph.D. thesis (University of Edinburgh) on “ Per- manence and Change: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Problem of Relat- ing New Architecture to Existing Settings”. He researches, publishes and teaches “Philosophy/Theory/Methodology/Studio of Architectural/ Urban/Landscape Design”, “Philosophy/Design/Management of Monu- ment Protection” and “Epistemology/Ethics/Aesthetics of Architectural Works” through Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and Ontology. His xii Contributors Architectural/Urban Design projects have been awarded sixteen prizes in national/European competitions and the 2010 EUROPA NOSTRA Medal. He is an invited professor/lecturer/critic in schools of architecture in Europe, the United States and Japan. Karsten Harries is the Howard H. Newman Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. He is the author of more than 200 articles and reviews and the following books: The Meaning of Modern Art ( 1968), The Bavar- ian Rococo Church: Between Faith and Aestheticism (1983), The Bro- ken Frame (1990), The Ethical Function of Architecture (1997), Inﬁ nity and Perspective (2001), Art Matters: A Critical Commentary on Mar- tin Heidegger ’s The Origin of the Work of Art (2009), Die Bayerische Rokokokirche: Das Irrationale und das Sakrale (2009), Between Nihil- ism and Faith: A Commentary on Either/Or (2010) and Wahrheit: Die Architektur der Welt (2012). John Shannon Hendrix is Professor of Architectural History at the Univer- sity of Lincoln, UK, and an Adjunct Professor of Art and Architectural History at Roger Williams University, US. He has published ten authored books, ﬁ ve edited books, and twenty-seven articles on the subjects of architecture, art, aesthetics, history, philosophy and psychoanalysis. He is especially interested in the intersections of architecture and philosophy, and the potential for architecture to facilitate intellectual development. Jonathan Hill is Professor of Architecture and Visual Theory at the Bartlett School of Architecture, UCL, where he directs the MPhil/PhD Architec- tural Design programme. An architect and architectural historian, Jona- than is the author of The Illegal Architect (1998), Actions of Architecture (2003), Immaterial Architecture (2006) and Weather Architecture (2012); editor of Occupying Architecture (1998) and Architecture – The Subject Is Matter (2001); co-editor of Critical Architecture (2007) and a series editor of the Ashgate ‘Design Research in Architecture’ books.

Konstantinos Moraitis is an architect-engineer and Professor at the School of Architecture of the National Technical University of Athens. He is responsible for the postgraduate seminar “ History and Theory of Land- scape Design ”. He wrote his doctoral thesis on the subject : “ Landscape – Allocating Place through Civilisation. Exposition and Theoretical Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Correlation of the Most Signifi cant Modern Approaches Concerning Landscape ”. His postgraduate studies include Ethical and Political Philos- ophy, Seminar of Aesthetics (Université I de Paris, Panthéon-Sorbonne). He has a postgraduate degree in Arabic and Islamic Studies (Panteios School of Political Sciences, Athens). His publications are numerous and include architectural projects and scientifi c articles, participation in collective editions and tutorial books concerning landscape design. Contributors xiii Charikleia Pantelidou received a diploma in Architecture and her PhD on Urban Space from Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. She also holds a law degree and a master’s degree in Criminal Sciences from AUTH. Her research is focused on new forms of urban exclusion, private-public space and collective housing. She has published articles in collective vol- umes and international journals on architecture and social qualities of space, and has co-edited several books on theoretical aspects of architecture and space. She taught architectural theory and design and social theory of space in the Department of Architecture, AUTH. Alberto Pérez-Gómez was born in Mexico City in 1949, where he studied architecture. In 1983 he became Director of Carleton University’s School of Architecture. Since January 1987 he has occupied the Bronfman Chair of Architectural History at McGill University, where he founded the His- tory and Theory Post-Professional (master’s and doctoral) programmes. He has lectured extensively around the world and is the author of well-known books such as Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science (1983), Polyphilo or The Dark Forest Revisited (1992), Architectural Representation and the Perspective Hinge (1997) and most recently, Built upon Love: Architectural Longing after Ethics and Aesthetics (2006), as well as numerous articles published in major periodicals. Angeliki Sioli obtained her diploma in Architecture from the University of Thessaly, Greece, in 2005 and her post-professional master’s degree in Architectural Theory from the National Technical University of Athens in 2008. Since September 2009, she has been a PhD candidate of the History and Theory Program in McGill University’s School of Archi- tecture, where she works under the supervision of Professor Alberto Pérez-Gómez. Her research is seeking connections between architecture and literature in the public realm of the twentieth-century European city. She further explores her theoretical interests through the studio and history courses she teaches at McGill. Nicholas Temple is Professor of Architecture at the University of Hud- dersfi eld, having previously taught at the University of Lincoln as head of the school, Liverpool University, Nottingham University and the University of Pennsylvania, where he was an assistant professor. He has lectured widely in Europe, the United States and Asia, including Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 a visiting lectureship at the Moscow Architectural Institute. A Rome Scholar at the British School at Rome, Temple was recently awarded the Paul Mellon Rome Fellowship. Among his published works on architectural history and urbanism are Disclosing Horizons: Architec- ture, Perspective and Redemptive Space and Renovatio Urbis: Archi- tecture, Urbanism and Ceremony in the Rome of Julius II (Routledge, 2007 and 2011). xiv Contributors Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou obtained a diploma in Architecture (2000), a Mas- ter’s of Science (2001) and a PhD (2005) at the National Technical Uni- versity of Athens. He also holds a degree in Painting from the Department of Fine Arts of the Athens School of Fine Arts (2009). His doctoral thesis was awarded the Second International ICAR-CORA Prize in 2007. He has published a book in Greek called Ideas of Space in the 20th Century (Nissos, 2009). He is a lecturer on Architectural Concepts and Theories at the National Technical University of Athens, having previously taught at the University of Patras (2007–2010). Kyriaki Tsoukala studied architecture in Geneva. She completed two doctoral theses on the Socio-Psychology of Space (France), as well as a docent degree thesis (Habilitation à Diriger des Recherches) on the Organization of Space and Planning at Paris X-Nanterre University. She is currently a professor at the Department of Architecture of the Faculty of Engineer- ing, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, and a member of editorial and scientifi c committees of international journals. Her publications include books on the perception of space and the social quality of architecture, and collective works as an editor on epistemological issues of hypermodern architecture (in Greece and France). Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Acknowledgements

The editors wish to thank the external reviewers of the initial book proposal for their important comments and suggestions: Prof Emeritus Dr. Dr.h.c. Dalibor Vesely, Prof Emeritus Pierre von Meiss, Prof Raymond Quek and Dr Ben Campkin, Director of the UCL Urban Laboratory. Also, we would like to extend our sincere thanks to our editors Jennifer Schmidt, Alex Hol- lingsworth, Edward Gibbons and, especially, Sadé Lee, at Taylor and Fran- cis, for their support of the project. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the careful and precise review and layout of our ﬁ nal typescript by L. McCoy, Denise File and Renata Corbani, at Apex CoVantage. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Prologue Rethinking space and ethos: critical intersections

Kyriaki Tsoukala, Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou and Charikleia Pantelidou

Introductory remarks The age we live in, a critical turning point in historical time, raises urgent questions of ethos and life. That is the framework for the exploration of the cultural intersection of ethos and space that is articulated in this collective work, a subject that is treated under various manifestations and approached in different ways, hence the plural number in the title of the book: Intersec- tions of Space and Ethos . In this age of ours there has been an intense rekindling of interest in ethics as a fi eld that might possibly provide rules for answers to its problems. The questioning of the values and models of modern life that were established at the very beginning of the modern age, the escalation of their devaluation in the twentieth century which, in the realm of space, reached its pinnacle in the 1960s, is attended today by a planet-wide economic crisis. Meanwhile, the omnipresent digital technologies are breaching spatial and social boundaries, diffusing the processes of globalisation in economics and culture, and raising new issues requiring immediate solution within an increasingly hazy system of values. Contradictory processes sweep through our everyday lives, perpetuating this structural state of contradictory multiplicity that generates problems and at the same time spurs on creative reorderings of our material-spiritual life. With these pressing economic, environmental and social crises and structural changes pointing to a need for a theoretical reorientation of our value systems, planning priorities and established ideological and educational hierarchies, the relation between ethos and space justifi ably attracts research Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 interest. Architecture, as a collective art and science organically incorporating the social dimension of spatiality, seems preeminently to lend itself to defi nitive analysis in the light of the previously mentioned redefi nitions and reorderings in contemporary studies of space. This notwithstanding, the current situation in academic studies reveals the virtual absence of the necessary dialogue between architecture and ethics, an absence due to the persistent dominance of an aesthetic and technocratic evaluation of architecture and to the post-modern distrust of any appeal to moral normative xviii Tsoukala, Terzoglou and Pantelidou values that would recall collective, emancipatory projects or “grand narratives” (Lyotard 1979). In this framework, architecture is often reckoned as a simple three-dimensional installation of the current ethics of authority, an impressive bearer of the dominant ideology in space, a crystallisation of the status quo in concrete, steel and glass.

Contemporary problems and aims Contemporary architecture takes for granted – at the level of algorithmic design principles – the particular weight attached to form and the corresponding subjective morality of the void and its attendant freedom, as well as the persistent interest in the process and the morality of the incomplete that frames it. At the same time, the rapid transformations in the relation between public and private, and in the character of the public due to electronic technology and the cultural model of neo-liberalism that is sovereign in the Western world, lead to large-scale public- or collective-use constructions, favouring the development of a star system in architecture as well. In this climate, contemporary architectural forms are more intimations of a morality impressively different from that of Modernism than an ‘event’ containing this new morality. This renders almost inevitable their provocative, paradoxi- cal adoption by the market and their transformation from a point devoid of meaning (an aesthetic that runs counter to grand narratives) into a spectacle (depending on the demands of our consumer culture), a state of affairs that implies a veering of initial design morality towards high-quality technological achievements in regard to both boldness of construction and perceptibil- ity and aesthetic of line. The time may have come for us to reconsider the ethical dimension of space beyond the contemporary insistence on technology, oriented towards aspects of life that transcend the techno-aesthetic: environmental, cultural, political and those relating to social classes and gender, domains whose coordinated articulation could perhaps, in the given situation, correspond to the perspective of expectations of happy human living. What we want to do in Intersections of Space and Ethos is introduce a ﬁ eld of encounter where thinking about space can meet considerations of ethics. We will dwell initially on ‘space’ and ‘ethics’ as concepts which vary as chronotopical mental and practical constructs that engage with the era and the particular characteristics of the geographical landscape, with the aim of delimiting, through these conceptual clariﬁ cations, our own percep- Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 tions and positions regarding them and communing our intentions regarding a critical examination of their ideological polarity.

Space We will not be attempting to trace the beginnings of the concept of space in the fi eld of architecture, but will confi ne ourselves to the difference in its meaning from the beginning of the twentieth century and the appearance of the Modern movement to the contemporary architecture Prologue xix of post-structuralist approaches. Modern architects and historians have tended to interpret space as a static, neutral container or an aesthetic construct refl ecting only the design intentions and formal demands of the architect. However, since the explosion of geography after World War II, the complexity of space and its divergent interpretations and mediations through use, manipulation and power somehow fragmented the serene vision of Modernity’s idealism (Hubbard et al 2004). We therefore tend to view ‘space’ as a multilayered, dynamic system of material and immaterial relations which mould social and individual practices and, inversely, are informed by them. Space incorporates different and confl icting ethical values that characterise specifi c conditions of production as well as of human existence and has an active role in instigating patterns of human actions. In this spectrum from the crisis of the Modern movement (directly after World War II) to the present, conceptions of space shifted as rapidly as the other changes that characterise this age. Initially, the concept of space was replaced by that of place (Norberg-Schulz 1980) and architecture was expressed through concepts of phenomenology, embodied in the idiomatic materiality of social, cultural, psychological and existential qualities. The complexity of the notion of place contrasted with the rationalistic contrac- tion of the notion of space and highlighted the problem of its articulation with other sectors of social and individual life. It would not be long before the meaning attached to the concept of place underwent a shift, an outcome of the uncertainty and fl uidity created by the new modalities of globalisation and the spotlighting, through psychoanalysis, of the dark, unknown and imponderable facet of humanity. The concept of space was redefi ned and since then has moved dynamically, with the help of the new technologies, towards fl uid, amorphous, incomplete and interactive constructions that are rooted in an intersubjective-empirical-corporeal-plural vision of man (Lucan 2009). Considering these last transformations in the concept of space as indicative of the reorderings in the socio-economic and cultural sphere and ideological clashes and shifts, we aim, in this collective volume, to present a critical examination and rethinking of the contemporary notion of space.

Ethics/morality/ethos

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 In the fi eld of ethics, reviewing the modern and post-(hyper)modern period, we see that perceptions synchronise with the dynamic of developments in socio-economic, cultural and political space, falling back to reform, then surging forward again to lay down new foundations for the real situation (Kondylis 1991). The contestation of modern ethics (and here we refer to the initial form given it by the Enlightenment) does not date from the post-modern period (after the 1970s), but from the beginning of the twentieth century. It can, however, be argued that in the contemporary phase of globalisation (after 1980), this contestation became more emphatic due to xx Tsoukala, Terzoglou and Pantelidou the dynamic of the post-industrial manner of production and the new technologies. Before we look at the turning points in the conceptual evolution of ethics, it would be useful to clarify the term morality and distinguish it from that of (normative) ethics. Both terms refer to the sphere of values and the discourses relating to values (Renaut 2005). The difference in the two – Renaut observes – is not linguistic but epistemological and philosophical. While in (normative) ethics there is a common pattern, an awareness of a collective project that serves as a point of reference (duty, happiness), in the case of morality, each individual shapes his own values and explains them to others. We see the distinction between these two terms in the ideological approaches to the concept in different ages. Whereas in modernity, the meaning of ethics was reduced to catholicity, universality and propriety, contemporary (subjective) morality gives priority to the concepts of desire and the individual good, save that the individuality of the latter does not refer to the self-based individual of modernity, but to the individual who contains otherness and thus constitutes a fl uid pluralistic singularity. Since ‘space’ is culturally constructed or produced within social strug- gles and relations, and given the complex intertwining of the existential and the psychoanalytical element in these relations, we would refrain from conceiving of ‘ethics’ only as an abstract system of normative laws or as an externally imposed set of rules and instructions that permeate individual, subjective morality. We prefer to examine ways of real, social conduct and attitude in everyday situations: what we call ‘ethos’. Harries makes the following claim: “Time and space must be shaped in such a way that man is assigned a dwelling place, an ethos ” (Harries 1996: 395). Ethos therefore has to do with the way man dwells in his everyday existence. The intersections between ‘space’ and ‘ethos’ which follow focus on the relations between the multiple ways of living (and dwelling) and their spatial consequences. Conversely, in the present collective volume, we also examine the various ways in which spatial confi gurations infl uence forms and ways of life.

Observations Here are our concluding remarks-observations:

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 I. The meeting of space and ethics (a result of our age’s keen interest in the domain of ethics) betrays a particularly unsettled state as regards questions of space and society today. Ethics comes to the fore every time that the framework of human lives has a negative impact on them, and the harder it is to see a way out of those problems, the more interest in it escalates. Coordinating the questioning of space and ethics opens the way for a critique of contemporary urban and architectural space in view of the construction of a new ethos. Here, however, the critical spirit is exposed to the risk of another function of this conjuncture, one that is diametrically opposed to that of criticism: in a fragmented Prologue xxi world of inward-looking individualities that remains in a permanent state of commodiﬁ cation, the meshing of space and subjective morality can often, through skillful interpretation, assume a role of apology for the purportedly enforced acceptance of this world and the abandonment of more vigorous positions on the part of the arts and the sciences of space. II. In its interplay with the ﬁ eld of ethics, space seeks qualities that would support its appointed end of contributing to a life for its human occupants that is richer in stimuli, interesting and in the end, better. Here, the interplay of space and ethics involves ideologies and projects that differ as regards the interpretation of a better life. The focus of the engagement of space and ethics is thus not distanced from ideology, which gives ethics an historical character and separates it from a possible essentialist understanding. III. In the measure that we are endeavouring to articulate questions of ethics in our consideration of space, we accept an active interpretation of space as able to excite a human response and not simply as a container for human activity. Since, then, we are energising space for a better life, we are obliged to include in our planning agenda ways and means of addressing contemporary economic, political, cultural and ecological problems. However, in order to avoid futile, perfectly parametered and inward-looking actions, it would be useful for care and concern to be our planning guidelines, coordinated in a more global social condition that would establish the terms of an inalienable – in accordance with the initial goals – activity.

How, then, can we establish for architecture and the disciplines of space the terms of a critical function against the status quo, where, however, the criteria are not set by an abstract normative moral framework, but will take shape depending on the historico-socio-cultural parameters in each case and, indeed, in conditions of everyday habitation, while still ensuring this possibility of critical function? Our decision to reﬂ ect on architecture in the domain of ‘ethos’ (rather than ‘normative ethics’) falls precisely within this epistemological research orientation. In the texts that follow, we have attempted to consider architecture as an active condenser and creator of ethos, as a network of pathways for

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 awakening and shaping a new ethos. With this in view, the Intersections of Space and Ethos compose a place of reﬂ ection, meditation and critical consideration. Links to the past and plans for the future interlock in this mental journey, while the variety of approaches to and delvings into our topic foster a pluralistic understanding and description of it.

Structure of the book The book is divided into three parts, each defi ning a distinctive theme and introducing a different perspective on the relations between space and ethics. xxii Tsoukala, Terzoglou and Pantelidou The fi rst section, “Creating architecture: Between nature and culture”, explores various manifestations of the relation between space and ethos through environmental and cultural-communicative aspects of architecture. The second section, “Rethinking urban space: Intentions and critique”, explores the questions and problems raised by the modern and contemporary ‘global’ city in terms of the relations between urban space, architecture and ethics. And fi nally, in the third section “Human condition and space: Philosophical orientations and conceptual transpositions”, the authors seek to refl ect on architecture not only as a confi rmation and a reinforcement of established moral rules, but also as a fi eld of emergence of new possibilities. The epilogue will briefl y summarize the main issues and problems raised by the previous essays and provide some possible directions in rethinking on the dialogical relation between space and ethos. A possible conceptual approach that could sketch these directions is rehearsed and developed. This book is a product of the work of the research laboratory investigating the relation between society, science, philosophy and space in the Architecture Department of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, which engages in fruitful dialogue and invaluable collaboration with its counterpart at the National Technical University of Athens, the NTUA School of Architecture’s “Architectural Space and Communication” laboratory.

Bibliography Harries, K. (1996) “The Ethical Function of Architecture”, in K. Nesbitt (ed.) Theo- rizing a New Agenda for Architecture. An Anthology of Architectural Theory 1965–1995 , New York: Princeton Architectural Press. Hubbard, P., Kitchin, R. and Valentine, G. (eds.) (2004) Key Thinkers on Space and Place , Los Angeles and London: Sage Publications. Kondylis, P. (1991) The Decline of Bourgeois Culture. From Modernity to Postmo- dernity and from Liberalism to Mass Democracy , Athens: Themelio. (In Greek). Lucan, J. (2009) Composition, Non-Composition. Architecture et Theories, XIXe -XXe Siècles , Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes. Lyotard, J. Fr. (1979) La Condition Postmoderne: Rapport sur le Savoir , Paris: Minuit. Norberg-Schulz, C. (1980) Genius Loci. Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture , New York: Rizzoli. Renaut, A. (2005) La Philosophie (in collaboration with J.-C. Billier, P. Savidan and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 L. Thiaw-Po-Une), Paris: Odile Jacob. Part 1 Creating architecture Between nature and culture

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Introduction

Charikleia Pantelidou

Part 1 develops around a central thematic axis focusing on relational infl u- ences between landscape and building architecture as productive process, representation or built structure and its environment conceived in terms of culture, nature or an interdependent condition between them. Drawing on a broad fi eld of arts, sciences and philosophy, the essays that follow refer to the Western world in a time span extending from the seventeenth century to the present, attempting in each case the theoretical activation of architecture’s potential for generating social ethos. In the examination of their main topics, the four essays extend their scope to probe further issues of today’s critical debate. Whether as methodological preference or thematic choice, the authors develop their arguments in a framework of comparison and observation of old and new, past and present, providing critical considerations, interpretations, revelations, preventions and improvements of a future ethos that is being architecturally created. In the opening chapter in Part 1, “The space of weather”, Jonathan Hill elaborates on a genealogy of the inclusion of weather and climate change in contemporary architectural thinking. Hill underlines the need to recognise a complex interdependence between nature and culture. Noting the deep- seated impact of empiricism, he explores the course and the context of an architectural environmentalism that has remained a profound infl uence on architectural practice. He discusses the emergence of the picturesque as a new type of design and a new way of designing that embraces subjectivity, nature and movement, and points to the establishment of a perception referring to a hybridisation of nature and culture that takes place within it

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 and projects the uncertainties of identity. He goes on to note the articulation of a picturesque modernism that becomes explicit in the middle of the twentieth century by Nikolaus Pevsner and which aimed at a modernism that was local, empirical and environmentally aware. Today, we fi nd ourselves confronting anthropogenic climate change, a relation that may serve as a stimulus to architectural imagination and to foster cultural, social and environmental benefi ts. Taking into account the fact that architecture, landscape and the weather are all products of nature-culture relations in mutual interdependence and interaction, Hill introduces the term “coproduction”, 4 Charikleia Pantelidou establishing architectural creativity as a “feisty dialogue of distinct voices and unexpected conclusions” between multiple authors. In Chapter 2, “In which way is ‘ethos’ revealed in space: “. . . ordine geometrico demonstrato”, Konstantinos Moraitis comments on Baruch Spi- noza’s Ethica, Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata , as evidence of the correlation between ethical philosophy and the deductive character of geometrical theorems. Moraitis examines the relation between representation, formation and construction of landscape, social mores and principles of social organisation. He argues that ethical norms are reinforced by the production of sensorially imposed indications which become emphatically communica- ble, thus resulting in a sensorial imposition of rules of acting. Changes in social mores bring about the alteration of their particular spatial perception, establishing in each instance a particular geometry. A comparative study of the social and landscape order of seventeenth-century Holland and the royal France in the same period leads the author to the conclusion that a Euclidian geometrical organisation is characteristic of a political and social ethos that is related to the stability of the social reality. Continuing the exploration of his initial question – in relation to the promotion of normative terms concerning social activity through material accomplishments – Moraitis arrives at the contemporary context, emphasising the theoretical inadequacy of the concept of environmental ethics that shifts the focus of interest from urban social control to natural infl uence and extending it to a consideration of the current social reality and an expanded fi eld of social infl uences, continuous transformative processes and, in this case, a new, topological order. In Chapter 3, “Heritage values as means and ends of place ethics”, Vassilis Ganiatsas explores ways to bridge the prevailing perceived antithesis between preservation and development or, on a more general level, between identity and change. Placing heritage values in the fi eld of ethics means to think about them as entities that embody antithetical values by absorbing changes in their environment. Situating his approach in the context of Aris- totelian ethics and practical philosophy, Ganiatsas recognises heritage values not as instrumental means for other values, but in themselves as proper and fi nal ends of any preservation scheme. Their dynamic potential in a quest for ways of resisting and as alternatives to the prevailing system of values resides precisely in this ontological transposition of heritage places from bearers to agents of values. Considering heritage as a counterparadigm

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 for the system of global consumerism, Ganiatsas seeks the conceptual tools for the institution of heritage as an ethical paradigm of proper development and new sustainable ways of living in terms of reuse of existing structure as material and as lifestyle values in response to the natural environment. Drawing on the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, the author proposes the concept of ‘horizon’ as such a tool, defi ning it as the plane where the identities of local cultures converge with global change and the external conditions with internal needs of societies. Introduction to part 1 5 In Chapter 4, “Ethic and ornament in the modern and contemporary age”, Claudio D. Conenna and Kyriaki Tsoukala explore the signifi cations assumed by the relation between ethic and ornament in the two periods and attempt a critical examination of different architectural views of the matter in reference to the social-cultural context in each case. In support of the positions developed in the chapter, the authors cite and consider characteristic architectural examples. Conenna and Tsoukala argue that the social- pragmatic condition that distinguished the industrial phase of modernity turns architecture towards the search for primarily ethical foundations, while the ethic of autonomy and catholicity feeds a newly constituted aesthetic of the age. In this phase, ornament is interwoven with the concept of construction, creating a harmonious architectural whole. In post-(hyper) modernity, the ethic of autonomy is replaced by the ethic of independence, of multiple deviant truths, of desire and by the ethic of communication. The authors observe the formation of three architectural trends in this phase. The fi rst, having recourse to the ethic of independence on the one hand and on the other responding to the contemporary technological context, employs parametric geometry in pursuit of a creative reinterpretation of the modern movement, organically linking ornament with functional and structural elements and surfaces of the building. The second trend, drawing on the theories that combat the conceptual doublets and with the use of up-to-date technological achievements, attempts to resolve the antithesis between ornament and decoration into a single synthesised theme, combining ornament and decoration with the building’s function and static bearing structure. In the third trend, and at a remove from concerns relating to any functional-symbolic synthesis, architecture addresses the relation between ornament and decoration discretely in the context of a fl uid communication and a continuously changing reconciliation. Conenna and Tsoukala conclude that contemporary architecture is trapped on the scale of the individual without satisfying broader material-spiritual collective/social needs. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 1 The space of weather

Jonathan Hill

Things of a natural kind The architect is principally an invention of the Italian Renaissance. The term ‘design’ derives from disegno , which means drawing, and associates the drawing of a line with the drawing forth of an idea. Associated with intellectual labour, the drawing unlocked the architect’s status, and the authored book theorised and disseminated it. Drawing, writing and building established an interdependent and multidirectional web of infl uences that together stimulated architects’ creative development. In the new division of labour, architecture resulted not from the accumulated knowledge of a team of anonymous craftsmen working together on a construction site, but the artistic creation of an individual architect in command of drawing who designed a building as a totality and at a remove from a construction site. The architect associated with disegno was established in Italy around 1450; in France, a century later and in Britain, in the early 1600s. Reasserting classical antiquity, the Renaissance associated the immaterial with timeless geometry and the material with temporal decay. Emphasis- ing the immaterial idea of architecture, not the material fabric of building, disegno restricted the architectural imagination to ideal forms. But in built architecture, the relations between the immaterial and the material were sometimes considered with great subtlety. In most cases, modestly scaled working farms of Andrea Palladio’s villas recall the relaxed rural life evoked in classical antiquity by Virgil and Pliny, while their elegant but inexact proportions refer to the immaterial and its uncertain presence in the material Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 world. Subsequently, the baroque drew further attention to subjective interpretation; for example, baroque drama exploited the dialectical potential of allegory, in which meanings are not fi xed, but endlessly changing and open to appropriation and revision (Benjamin 1998: 159–161). In a signifi cant departure, empiricism emphasised that ideas are subject to experience and provisional rather than universal. The principal British contribution to the Enlightenment – the natural light of reason – empirical investigation was applied extensively, infl uencing the arts as well as the The space of weather 7 sciences. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , 1690, John Locke dismisses the search for ultimate truth, accepts that there are limits to what we can know and argues that conclusions must be in proportion to the evidence: “Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct” (Locke 1975: 1, 1, 46). In An Essay Concern- ing Human Understanding , three sequential chapters are titled “Of simple Modes; and fi rst, of the simple Modes of Space”, “Duration, and its simple Modes” and “Of Duration and Expansion, considered together”. But in emphasising individual passions and emotions, Henry Home, Lord Kames, in Elements of Criticism, 1762, provides a more subtle appreciation of time and space that distinguishes between dimension and perception: “travelling with an agreeable companion produceth a short computation both of the road and of time: especially if there be few objects that demand attention, or if the objects be familiar” (Kames 1762: 1, 126). Countering the Platon- ist and Cartesian traditions in which knowledge is acquired by the mind alone, empiricism concluded that personality and morality develop through a dialogue between the environment, senses and mind, drawing attention to the conditions that inform knowledge and self-understanding, notably the weather. In “Method for Making a History of the Weather”, 1667, Robert Hooke argued for regular and consistent weather records. Locke concurred, daily recording the temperature, barometric pressure and winds for many years (Locke 1704–1705: 1919). In 1663, Christopher Wren presented a “Descrip- tion of a Weather Clock” to the Royal Society, and six years later, Hooke constructed the mechanical ‘weather wiser’, the fi rst automated weather station that recorded air pressure, humidity and temperature, rainfall, wind direction and speed. A national network of meteorological observatories was proposed in the 1680s, but the idea did not receive widespread support until it was revived in the second half of the eighteenth century. Empirical investigation was not immediately and extensively applied to the weather because it was assumed to lack reason, although it was recognised as an inviting challenge to rational explanation. Emphasising moderation and restraint, Locke required a degree of detachment from the natural world, but Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, infl uenced a profound reassessment, associating nature with moral virtue, and praising the weather, in Characteristicks of Men, Man-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 ners, Opinions, Times , 1711:

HOW comfortable is it to those who come out hence alive, to breathe a purer AIR! To see the rejoicing Light of Day ! And tread the fertile Ground! How gladly they contemplate the Surface of the Earth, their habitation heated and enliven’d by the Sun , and temper’d by the fresh AIR of fanning Breezes !. (Shaftesbury 1999: 2, 94) 8 Jonathan Hill I shall no longer resist the Passion growing in me for Things of a natural kind; where neither Art , nor the Conceit or Caprice of Man has spoil’d their genuine Order, by breaking in upon that primitive State. Even the Rocks , the mossy Caverns , the irregular unwrought Grotto’s , and bro- ken Falls of Waters, with all the horrid Graces of the Wilderness it-self, as representing NATURE more, will be the more engaging, and appear with a Magniﬁ cence beyond the formal Mockery of Princely Gardens. (Shaftesbury 1999: 2, 101)

Previously, uncultivated nature was considered to be particularly brutish and deformed and the immaterial soul, “as a visitor in matter”, could not “be truly at home in nature” (Tuveson 1960: 11). Shaftesbury acknowledged an ideal order, but, departing from Plato, conceived nature not as debased but as a means to contemplate the divine (Plato 1929: 121). The eighteenth century increasingly associated the changing natural world with journeys in self-understanding so that one became synonymous with the other, uniting “the world in the self, the self in the world” (Wiedman 1986: 102). In an increasingly secular age, empiricism’s attention to subjective experience emphasised the seasons of a life as well as the seasons of a year, so that the transitory pleasures of the present were acknowledged more often than the eternal joy of the afterlife. In Britain, an island nation, the experience of nature, landscape and weather became the means to contemplate the passage of time, more so than in any other European country. Derived from the Latin nascere , meaning ‘to be born’, the term ‘nature’ has numerous meanings in which the principal distinction is between, fi rst, a concept through which humans defi ne themselves in relation to what they think they are not, and, second, the phenomena and processes of which humanity is a part, as in Darwin’s theory of evolution in The Origin of Spe- cies , 1859 (Darwin 1996: 109). The term ‘landscape’ initially referred to land managed and cultivated by an agrarian community. Expanding its meaning, by the sixteenth century, it also referred to a picture of nature, and in the eighteenth century, it was applied to a prospect of actual nature in a garden, which in 1770 Thomas Whately so vehemently stated was “as superior” to a mere “painting, as a reality to a representation” (Whately 1771: 1). In each of these meanings, ‘landscape’ acknowledges a human intervention, indicating why the prefi x

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 ‘natural’ is applied to a landscape that is seemingly unaffected by humanity even though this has been impossible for centuries. Such a landscape is culturally defi ned, refl ecting what we have learned to see as natural, notably so in Britain, the fi rst industrialised nation. The earliest meaning of the term ‘culture’ also referred to farmland and endured from the Middle Ages to the late eighteenth century. Originating in the early sixteenth century, a further meaning emphasised that the successful and prosperous cultivation of land enabled a person to become cultivated and cultured. Both meanings were in use in the eighteenth century, but only The space of weather 9 the second – human culture – continued into the nineteenth century. Jona- than Bate describes the picturesque landscape as “a symptom of the growing division between” the two “senses of the word ‘culture’ ” (Bate 2000: 3–5, 11–12). But as it was conceived holistically in social, aesthetic and ecological terms, the eighteenth-century ‘Georgic’ estate can, alternatively, be understood as a key moment when nature and culture were interdependent in meanings of the term ‘landscape’. In an era that was fortifi ed by descriptions of rural life and had yet to face the full force of industrialisation, the gentleman farmer was a model for the enlightened management of nature and society. Written in the fi rst century BC, and derived from georgos , the Greek term for farmer, Virgil’s four-volume Georgics were particularly infl uential. Noting the attention given to parks and gardens as well as farms and fi elds, John Barrell concludes that the English Georgic tradition allowed “its inhabitants a life of work and play together” and was “concerned to soften as much as to recommend the hard moral lessons of Virgil’s original Georgics ” in which “rewards and pleasures are always in the future” (Barrell 1980: 36–37). In Britain, the title of architect associated with disegno was in its infancy when another appeared alongside it, concentrating fi rst on landscapes, not buildings, because they were more clearly subject to the changing natural world. The value given to the ideas and emotions evoked through experience encouraged a new type of design and a new way of designing. The rev- erence for subjectivity and nature, and the association of one with the other, found expression in the picturesque, which is a deceptive term because it emphasises one aspect of the eighteenth-century landscape to the detriment of its other qualities, such as the importance of the senses and the seasons to design, experience, understanding and the imagination. Drawing an analogy between design and experience, the designer conceived the picturesque landscape while walking the site and imagined its future occupants in motion too. In 1840, Humphry Repton remarked: “The spot from whence the view is taken, is in a fi xed state to the painter; but the gardener surveys his scenery while in motion; and . . . sees objects in different situations” (Repton 1969: 96). Employing multiple perspectives in a single image and conceiving a network of interrelated scenes and alternative routes, the picturesque designer responded to specifi c conditions and incorporated varied themes in a single

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 garden, such as history, politics, love and death. Movement was implicit even when the garden visitor was static, because any single view was understood in relation to other potential views and was but one part of a complex and changeable whole dependent on all the senses, as in William Kent’s design for the garden at Rousham, 1737–1741. Accommodating multiple journeys, abundant allegories and imported trees, the picturesque was associated with the choices and opportunities available to the prosperous and fortunate in eighteenth-century English society and came to personify the liberty and liberalism they professed. 10 Jonathan Hill Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016

Figure 1.1 William Kent, Rousham, 1737–1741. Antinous at the end of the Long Walk. © Photograph, Jonathan Hill. Architecture’s relations with nature and climate have infl uenced architects since at least the fi rst century BC. Indebted to the treatises Airs, Waters, Places and Breaths , and emphasising the infl uence of air movement on health, the The space of weather 11 Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016

Figure 1.2 William Kent, Rousham, 1737–1741. Detail of Antinous at the end of the Long Walk. © Photograph, Jonathan Hill.

Hippocratic tradition was acknowledged by Vitruvius and widely disseminated in the Renaissance, notably by Leon Battista Alberti (Vitruvius 1960: 38–39, 170–171; Alberti 1988: 9–11). But in a signifi cant design innovation, the picturesque instigated a more intense, profound and temporal dialogue 12 Jonathan Hill with nature, establishing an architectural environmentalism that has had a profound infl uence on subsequent centuries. Representative of this new appreciation, the picturesque adopted the ruin as its emblem – a hybrid of nature and culture, architecture and landscape – which was understood to represent the passage of time, growth as well as decay, potential as well as loss and the future as well as the past. The ruin acknowledged the effects of time and place rather than a fi nite object, emphasising a symbiotic relationship with its ever-changing immediate and wider contexts, and recognising the creative infl uence of natural as well cultural forces. The eighteenth century increasingly conceived the immaterial as temporal and subject to experience rather than timeless and distinct from the material, not only in the actual absence of matter, but also in the perceived absence of matter seen through mists and storms, establishing a dialogue between the immaterial and material that associated self-understanding with the experience of objects subject to weathering and decay. In diminishing an object physically, ruination was understood to expand its metaphorical potential: “for imperfection and obscurity are their properties; and to carry the imagination to something greater than is seen, their effect” (Whately 1771: 131). Britain was so associated with its landscape that the ruin offered a means to negotiate between nature and culture, and refl ect the uncertainties of identity. Evoking life and death in a single object, the ruin of a building was linked to the ruin of a person or a place, as well as their potential for renewal. For an individual as well as an island nation, self-understanding was synonymous with the experience of landscape in all its forms: the air and the sea, as well as the land.

Picturesque modernism The association of space and time was also seen in the early twentieth century, although the connection to the eighteenth century was never acknowledged or made explicit by early modernists. In Von Material zu Architektur , a 1928 Bauhaus publication translated into English in 1930 as The New Vision: From Material to Architecture , László Moholy-Nagy articulates a dynamic space-time continuum (Moholy-Nagy 1947: 60). Moholy-Nagy’s understanding of space relies on early-twentieth-century developments in art and physics. Questioning linear perspective, cubists noted that we understand a space not just in an instant, but in relation to all our other experi-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 ences of that space accumulated over time from many viewpoints. In the 1905 theory of special relativity and the 1916 theory of general relativity, Albert Einstein refutes the Newtonian distinction between energy and matter as mass, and identifi es a dynamic fi eld defi ned by the three dimensions of space and one of time. Agreeing that space does not have an independent existence, Moholy-Nagy describes it as “this material” and writes that the “phrase ‘material is energy’ will have signifi cance for architecture by emphasizing relation, instead of mass” (Moholy-Nagy 1947: 57–61). Also in 1928, reasserting the association of spatial-temporal experience with the The space of weather 13 weather, Sigfried Giedion writes that “There arises – as with certain lighting conditions in snowy landscapes – that dematerialization of solid demarca- tion that distinguishes neither rise nor fall and that gradually produces the feeling of walking in clouds” (Giedion 1995: 169). Only in the mid-twentieth century was the connection between modernism and the picturesque made explicit, notably by Nikolaus Pevsner. The diverse origins of the picturesque and its openness to new infl uences were important in the eighteenth century, and again two centuries later, when at the height of the war, Pevsner recalled the traditional two-way cultural dialogue between England and continental Europe, describing the picturesque as England’s principal contribution to European architecture (Pevsner 1944: 139). For Pevsner, the picturesque was “tied up with English outdoor life and ultimately even the general British philosophy of liberalism and liberty” (Pevsner 2002: 232). His promotion of the picturesque culminated in “The Englishness of English Art”, the 1955 BBC Reith Lectures, which soon appeared in book form. The fi rst chapter emphasises the prevalence of climate in art and literature and suggests that a phlegmatic pleasure in unreliable weather is particularly English (Pevsner 1956: 14). While recognising that national character is far from permanent and that a fascination for the atmosphere is European as much as it is English, Pevsner attributes two traits of English liberalism – moderation and imagination – to a mild and misty climate: “That moisture steams out of Turner’s canvases . . . and lays a haze over man and building, dissolving their bodily solidity” (Pevsner 1956: 18–19, 163–164, 185–187). Eight years earlier, and in conjunction with his colleagues at The Archi- tectural Review – Hubert de Cronin Hastings, Osbert Lancaster and J. M. Richards – Pevsner had published an editorial in the celebratory 50th anniversary issue titled “The Second Half Century”. Calling for a ‘new humanism’ alongside a new environmentalism, this text, which implied a reassessment of modernism as well as the magazine itself, promoted “a new richness and differentiation of character, the pursuit of difference rather than sameness, the re-emergence of monumentality, the cultivation of idiosyn- crasy and the development of those regional dissimilarities that people have always taken pride in” (Hastings et al 1947: 36). For Pevsner, aware of resistance to a new architecture, the picturesque was a means to make modernism familiar. Remarking that the picturesque and “the modern revolution

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 . . . had all the fundamentals in common”, he also wished to distinguish between interwar and postwar modernism (Pevsner 1954: 229). Noting an increasing sensitivity to place and “a new faith in nature”, Pevsner drew attention to the picturesque in order to question one modernism – universal, mechanical and insensitive – in favour of another that was local, empirical and environmentally aware (Pevsner 1943: 27). Denying that picturesque modernism was nostalgic, he evoked Locke to conclude: “In planning and architecture today, ‘each case on its merit’ is the functional approach” (Pevs- ner 2002: 233). 14 Jonathan Hill Coproduction Weather and climate differ in duration and scale. Unlike the weather, which we can see and feel at a specifi c time and place, we cannot directly perceive climate because it is an idea aggregated over many years and across a region. In Britain and the many other nations where ‘picturesque modernism’ remains an abiding infl uence, its increasing contemporary relevance depends on anthropogenic climate change, which is now the principal means to consider the relations between nature and culture. Despite the burgeoning environmental movement in the 1960s, human-induced climate change was not widely acknowledged by scientists until the mid-1970s. But the weather and climate have been essential to the architectural imagination, and the history of poetic and practical responses to anthropogenic climate change is centuries old. John Evelyn’s Fumifugium: or The Inconvenience of the Aer and Smoak of London Dissipated , 1661, was the fi rst book to consider the city’s polluted atmosphere as a whole, as well as the fi rst to recognise miti- gation and adaptation as responses to human-induced climate change many centuries before these principles were widely accepted by scientists. Offer- ing a “Remedy” for the “Nuisance ”, Evelyn proposes a number of practical and poetic measures, including the relocation of coal-burning trades, butch- ers and burials to the east of the city so that the prevailing westerly winds would carry the smoke away from London and the rivers and ground-water would be unsullied (Evelyn 1772: 3, 28, 34–37). Emphasising the allegorical and poetic as well as practical signifi cance of his treatise, he proposes that the edges of London are to be forested with trees and planted with fragrant shrubs so that wood would replace coal as the principal fuel and the whole city would be sweetly perfumed (Evelyn 1772: 47, 49). His remedy – a perfumed botanical garden – would have implied good health due to the known medicinal properties of certain plants and also promoted associations with Heaven and the Garden of Eden (Jenner 1995: 544–546). Whether Evelyn in the seventeenth century or an environmental cam- paigner in the twenty-fi rst century, critics of climate change have often adopted biblical metaphors in which environmental catastrophe is the pun- ishment for human failing and a return to Eden is the aim. But few people propose a full retreat from modern, technological society. Paradoxically, many of the proposed scientifi c ‘solutions’ to climate

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 change reaffi rm a faith in technological progress that has been a principal cause of anthropogenic climate change, and they are unlikely to be implemented due to insuffi cient scientifi c knowledge and political inertia due to confl icting agendas of countries and corporations. In a parallel scenario, the rhetoric of sustainability tends to reduce architecture to a technical issue and the architect to a technocrat, employing a debased empiricism devoid of the poetic and practical implications of Evelyn’s environmental research. Climate change is not only a scientifi c concern. The dangers posed by anthropogenic climate change are real and need to be addressed when The space of weather 15 and where possible. But climate always changes, whether by human agency or other means. In offering a dialogue with the changing environment and recognising the weather as a stimulus to the imagination, the association of architecture with landscape is compatible with a complex, creative and contextual engagement with climate change that is not just driven by fear and may stimulate cultural, social and environmental benefi ts, whether at a local, national or regional level. Contemporary technologies – whether mechanical, digital or craft – infl uence urban and rural landscapes. For accuracy and effi ciency, a modern-day tractor is guided by a satellite navigation system. At a casual glance, a landscape may appear to be subject to human order and no more natural than another ‘cultural’ artefact. As an idea, ‘nature’ is a human construction. But the places, species and phenomena that we include within nature are real and not solely subject to our imagination and will. Just because we have named something does not mean that we have made it, or even understand it, however extensive our infl uence. Despite the reduction of wildlife habitats and proliferation of pesticides, a landscape is teeming with life forms that are subject to their own rhythms and intertwined in a complex network of relations with other life forms, including humanity. The English origin of the term ‘wilderness’ is self-willed land. In 1881, Darwin remarked: “Worms have played a more important part in the history of the world than most persons would at fi rst assume” (Darwin 1881: 305). In a similar vein, according to the entomologist Edward O. Wilson, “insects are the little things that run the world” (Grissell 2001: 124). Thriving everywhere, they so greatly outnumber humans that their combined weight outweighs the human population by six times, and their history with the plant world is 400 million years older (Grissell 2001: 35, 144, 234). Even in a suburban garden, there are likely to be around 1500 insect species and a much larger total population. Human decisions infl u- ence other life forms, but they do not control them. In newly industrialised nineteenth-century England, the moth Bistonbetularia mutated as its habitat was transformed in just a few decades. Renamed Bistoncarbonaria , its pale wings had turned black, offering camoufl age against predators in soot-clad cities. The term ‘coproduction’ explains nature–culture relations and the cities, landscapes and weathers we inhabit (Rayner 2003: 287). Equally, people

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 are natural as well as cultural beings. Just as the intermingling of natural and cultural forces creates the contemporary weather, a building, garden or fi eld results from the relations between nature and culture that arise during its conception, creation and use. As architecture, landscape and the weather are each a product of nature–culture relations, they inform, affect and alter each other in a complex developmental process that is never one-way. The term ‘author’ has sustained over half a century of criticism because it has been associated with sole authority. But rather than a term such as agency, which may dissipate creativity, the ‘coproduction’ of multiple 16 Jonathan Hill authors recognises that natural forces, as well as cultural ones, together create a building or a landscape. Authorship is not necessarily self-refl ective. An insect, bird or worm may not be self-aware in the sense that we usually ascribe to human authorship, but their decisions are not mechanical and instead depend on the conditions they encounter. Acknowledging that authorship involves accidents as well as intentions, the contemporary sciences of climate change, ecology and complexity theory are consistent with the idea of nature as author. Sometimes competing, sometimes affi rming, each author may inform or deny the other, as in a feisty dialogue of distinct voices and unexpected conclusions in which authorship is temporal and shared, and architecture is a coproduction of nature and culture.

Bibliography Alberti, L. B. (1988) On the Art of Building in Ten Books, trans. J. Rykwert, N. Leach and R. Tavernor, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press. Barrell, J. (1980) The Dark Side of the Landscape: The Rural Poor in English Paint- ing 1730–1840 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bate, J. (2000) The Song of the Earth , London: Picador. Benjamin, W. (1998) The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. J. Osborne, London and New York: Verso. Darwin, C. (1881) Formation of Vegetal Mould through the Actions of Worms with Observations on Their Habits , London: John Murray. Darwin, C. (1996) The Origin of Species , Oxford: Oxford University Press. Evelyn, J. (1772) Fumifugium: Or, The Inconvenience of the Aer, and Smoake of London Dissipated, ed. S. Pegge, London: B. White. First published in 1661 with a slightly different title. Giedion, S. (1995) Building in France, Building in Iron, Building in Ferroconcrete , trans. J. D. Berry, Santa Monica: Getty Center. Grissell, E. (2001) Insects and Gardens: In Pursuit of Garden Ecology, Portland: Timber Press. Hastings, H. de Cronin, Lancaster, O., Pevsner, N. and Richards, J. M. (January 1947) “The Second Half Century/The First Half Century”, The Architectural Review 101: 21–36. Jenner, M. (1995) “The Politics of London Air: John Evelyn’s Fumifugium and the Restoration”, The Historical Journal , 38, 3: 535–551. Kames, H. Home, Lord (1762) Elements of Criticism , Dublin: Sarah Cotter.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Locke, J. (1704–1705) “A Register of the Weather for the Year 1692, Kept at Oates in Essex”, Philosophical Transactions , 24, 298: 1917–1937. Locke, J. (1975) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Moholy-Nagy, L. (1947) The New Vision 1928 fourth revised edition 1947 and Abstract of an Artist , trans. D. M. Hoffmann, New York: George Wittenborn. Pevsner, N. (P. F. R. Donner) (January 1943) “The Lure of Rusticity”, The Architec- tural Review , 93, 553: 27. Pevsner, N. (November 1944) “The Genesis of the Picturesque”, The Architectural Review , 96, 575: 139–146. The space of weather 17 Pevsner, N. (April 1954) “Twentieth-Century Picturesque: An Answer to Basil Taylor’s Broadcast”, The Architectural Review , 115, 688: 227–229. Pevsner, N. (1956) The Englishness of English Art: An Expanded and Annotated Ver- sion of the Reith Lectures Broadcast in October and November 1955 . London: Architectural Press, 1956. Pevsner, N. (2002) “The Genius of the Place”, in S. Games (ed.) Pevsner on Art and Architecture: The Radio Talks , London: Methuen. Plato (1929) Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles , trans. R. G. Bury, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rayner, S. (2003) “Domesticating Nature: Commentary on the Anthropological Study of Weather and Climate Discourse”, in S. Strauss and B. Orlove (eds.) Weather, Climate, Culture , Oxford and New York: Berg. Repton, H. (1969) The Landscape Gardening and the Landscape Architecture of the Late Humphry Repton, Esq, ed. J. C. Loudon, Farnborough: Gregg International. Shaftesbury, A. A. Cooper, third Earl of (1999) Characteristicks of Men, Manner, Opinions, Times , ed. P. Ayres, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Tuveson, E. L. (1960) The Imagination as a Means of Grace: Locke and the Aesthet- ics of Romanticism , Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Vitruvius (1960) The Ten Books on Architecture , trans. M. H. Morgan, New York: Dover. Wiedman, A. (1986), Romantic Art Theories , Henley-on-Thames: Gresham Books. Whately, T. (1771) Observations on Modern Gardening: Illustrated by Descriptions , London: T. Payne. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 2 In which way is ‘ethos’ revealed in space? “. . . ordine geometrico demonstrato ”

Konstantinos Moraitis

In Greek, the word ήθο ς – ethos – corresponding to the English word ‘ethics’, is a noun of masculine gender. Hence, we used the term demonstrato in the title of the essay instead of the feminine participle demonstrata related to the feminine noun ethica .

Landscape aesthetics in relation to social ethics The remark that imposition of ethical suggestions may correspond to imposition of aesthetic indications formulates the starting concept of the present chapter; not only because according to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous dictum, “ethics and aesthetics are one and the same” (Wittgenstein 1977: 71). But also because theoretical or practical involvement in architecture or landscape architecture proves that ethical norms are especially favored, either indirectly or in an assertive way, by the production of sensory imposed indications. Thus, they augment their communication impact and facilitate suggestion of social behavior. If additionally embodied in the stability of representational or ‘built’ structures, they may perpetuate their infl uence in excess of a specifi c historical period. In any case, those sensory projected indications refer to evaluation criteria and thus to aesthetic order. In particular, the present chapter insists on the remark that the previous imposition of norms, regulating social praxis through aesthetic indications, has been crucial in shaping aspects for landscape, related either to landscape perception or to landscape formations and constructions. In an even more specifi c way, our contemplation insists on the social profi le of the Nether-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 lands in the seventeenth century. It comments on Baruch Spinoza’s work on ethics, described by its author as “ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata” (Spinoza 1954), as evidence of the correlation between ‘ethics’ and ‘geometry’ or, in a more accurate description, of the relationship between ethical philosophy and the deductive character of geometrical theorems. This remark suggests that during the seventeenth century, geometry participates in the doctrine of rationalism as a founding theory element. More- over, the title of Spinoza’s book proves that during that historical period, geometry appears to be the theory ﬁ eld where organized deductive thought In which way is ‘ethos’ revealed in space? 19 may be developed par excellence, presenting a method for the veriﬁ cation of thinking and the validation of practical activity. Consequently, geometry offers the visual proof for the regulation of the sensible world and, ultimately, the visual proof for the regulation of perception, interpretation and formatting activity concerning space. Discussing in detail the historical context of seventeenth-century Nether- lands, where Spinoza lived and worked, we may comment in addition that cultural control concerning landscape and garden architecture practices was principally related to the Euclidean geometric approach, while landscape painting had already introduced expressive tendencies much closer to natural reality, in accordance to the development of the upcoming empiricist view. We may thus note that correlation of cultural control with landscape perception may accept a ‘wide’ range of expression modalities, in reference not only to general social norms but also to particular expressive means, developed in a given society. Within this broader approach, aesthetic standards relating to landscape are particularly important for the presentation of differentiations in cultural and social values. Their importance resides in the fact that culturally formatted places described as ‘landscape’ constitute the substratum of social life in general. Moreover, their importance resides in the multitude and complexity of the relationships ascribed to them that may even approach the amplitude of cosmic experience. Thus, we may determine the objective of the present chapter to be to explore the representation and the material formation of landscape, characterized by geometric or other regulating patterns, in correlation to the organization principles and ethics of societies. We have already chosen as a starting paradigm landscape perception and the landscape architecture in Netherlands during the seventeenth century in comparison to the Baroque patterns of landscape formation during the same period in France.

Why an interest in seventeenth-century Netherlands? Baroque is historically suggestive of the promotion and imposition of social norms through artistic means in the context of the seventeenth-century Counter-Reformation. Fine arts were intentionally used for the ampliﬁ cation of the papal church and Catholic kingdoms’ prestige (Wölfﬂ in 1967), presenting a tendency which seems to be extremely evident in the case of

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 landscape design, either in urban environments as, for example, in St. Peter’s square in papal Rome, or outside cities or in peri-urban areas, as, for example, in Vaux le Vicomte and Versailles landscape and garden formations in royal France of the seventeenth century. In the Vaux le Vicomte gardens, an innovative landscape design example of its time, the French landscaper André le Nôtre proposed a system of design patterns founded on axial symmetry, on exhaustive schematiza- tion of plantation, on strict orthogonal Euclidean formalism and on the application of ‘trompe-l’oeil’ related to the illusionary perspective effects of 20 Konstantinos Moraitis ‘anamorphosis’ 1 (Andersen 1996). The Vaux le Vicomte gardens, a ‘thaumaturgy’ of cultural sophistication and extreme opulence, were moreover coupled with the increasing political and economic power of Nicolas Fou- quet, minister of fi nance of Louis XIV. The ‘Sun King’ assessed the unprecedented quality of his minister’s estate in the context of a demonstration of his political power and replied in kind, proving his determination to preserve his sovereignty; he imprisoned his potential political opponent and eventually made him disappear for the rest of his life. Then the French mon- arch assigned the same ingenious garden and landscape architect, André le Nôtre, in order to proceed to the grandiose landscaping of Versailles, being absolutely aware of the political importance of this project. In a fully conscious way, the Catholic king of France, the lucent Apollo of the European political sky, transformed the gardens of the palace into a “political theater, theatrum politicum” (de Jong 2001: 66), following the habit of the cultural promotion of the royal political status, a habit already imposed by Medici gardens in Florence, and then transplanted in French territories by Floren- tine queens of France, namely Catherine and Marie de Medici. Beware, however! This ‘landscape of applied control’ as developed under the infl uence of papal and royal regimes had nothing to do with a fi eld where organizational design decisions were denoted through obviously apparent correlations. In a clear way, government systems in Counter-Reformation European countries recruited the control capability of rationalism, negated its critical dimension and attributed to it a “mechanical” (Grossmann 2009: 157) organizing function whose premises were intentionally hidden. Never- theless, why do we oppose this hidden ‘optical reason’ to seventeenth-century Netherlands? Because while visual order of landscape in the case of the Catholic kingdom of France was associated with a hidden royal or papal center of control, Dutch culture attempts to install perceptible evidence in landscape organization. Spinoza’s Ethics attempt to introduce the demonstrative character of geometry into the area of a medieval-originated scholastic authority. The guidance of ethical aspirations, even the validity of the proof of divinity, can be based on verifi able and consistent recommendations, on proposals as strictly structured, as the reasonably controlled, deductive geometric theorems. Therefore, geometry must not be accepted as a practice whose principles remain inaccessible to common perception, as ‘miraculous’ knowledge

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 similar to the one described by Jean-François Niceron in his Thaumaturgus Opticus, a treatise concerning the illusionary perspective use of ‘anamorphosis’, of “anamorphosis abscondita”,2 as Allen Weiss prefers to call it, by describing both an artiﬁ cial construction and a hidden use of illusion (Weiss 1992: 43–66). On the contrary, it ought to ensure the validity of the eviden- tial process and thus enable the largest possible social agreement. Undoubtedly, “ethics demonstrated in geometrical order” appear to extend the emphatic statement of the father of rationalism, according to whom the rational discipline of cognitive process would provide the opportunity to In which way is ‘ethos’ revealed in space? 21 abandon the theoretical ‘splint’ applied by previous scholastic education (Descartes 1999: 11, Rule Two). It would not only regulate philosophical reasoning unequivocally, but moreover, it would permit a radical reorgani- zation, a ‘reconstruction’ of the world, concerning theoretical and scientiﬁ c approaches, social behavior and even material formation of spatial structures.

Cultural landscape in seventeenth-century Netherlands in relation to the development of the novice bourgeois society In addition to his main philosophical work, Descartes wrote works concerning particular scientifi c objectives, like Dioptrique and Météores , where his interest in optics is made evident, as well as his interest in applied constructional arts (Descartes 1966: 163, 198, 199). Less prevalent is the commentary on his activity as an engineer and designer who, during his stay in Nether- lands, elaborated a proposition for a fl oating bridge and even a design proposal for a wheelchair for men disabled by war (Baillet 1691: V.1, 256–259). In the context of the philosopher’s personal interest, a substantial ethical shift occurred, describing his move from a destructive use of reason, associated with his military education and his military activity, to a utilitarian innovative prospect. This reorientation was related to an unidentifi ed social subject, which was characterized, however, by a clear volition for benefac- tion. Descartes presents the example of medical science as a model of the amendment, of the ‘therapeutic’ ability of reason which his contemporaries would have to exercise for the benefi t of the new emerging society. In his Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Sciences (Discours de la Méthode), as well as throughout his whole life, he emphatically demonstrated and often raised in contradiction to theoretical philosophy, to ‘speculative philosophy’ (“philosophie speculative”), alien to practical concern, the need for immediate effective connection to the world. He primarily insisted on the doctor’s or engineer’s approach, scientifi cally trained in order to deal with immediate practical problems and to answer them with workable solution. The ‘landscape’ of the world is, therefore, that very landscape to which we must direct our efforts, possessing an attitude of rational corrective intervention on one hand and pure scientifi c arguments on the other.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 “[Spinoza’s] Ethics”, notes Roland Caillois, “ascribe the mastery of the system, offering an expression of prudence” (Spinoza 1954: 9). Profound analysts dare to claim that behind Benedictus Spinoza, enthusiast of the Cartesian paradigm, Baruch de Espinosa, a Dutchman of Jewish origin, still existed as the author of a work “infl uenced by Jewish and Arabic tradition”. However, the fundamental methodological proposition of Spinoza’s work refers to the rigorous and deductive evidence of reason, which also quali- fi ed landscape representation or landscape formations in the historical and geographical space of seventeenth-century Netherlands. During that period, 22 Konstantinos Moraitis the approach to nature and landscape perception seems to possess the same regulating rational volition, the same desire for scientifi c and social clarity, as the one claimed in general by the Dutch bourgeoisie of the period. Activating its visual exploration to its very limits, Dutch society had soon reached empiricism, thus investigating the multiple manifestations of natural regularity that could allow knowledge and cultural transformation of nature to be developed. An important manifestation of this innovative approach was clearly related to pictorial representation, which rather tried to unveil natural qualities instead of artistically concealing them. In the case of landscape representation in particular, painting is related to the extended vision of urban or agricultural domains. It proudly displayed the novice economic reality of the Dutch bourgeois class: the new conditions of the land ownership, the wealth of new landowners and their novel activities. There- fore, landscape presented the literal and fi gurative ‘ground’, the emblematic ‘fi eld’ of the novice social development; golden meadows, ports where the boats arrive proudly, in full sail; wealthy cities living in a state of “continuous Sunday” (Alpers 1983). Landscape requires no longer the presence of the holy religious reference on the foreground, of the sovereign in person or the chancellor represented as the central subject of a painting; it does not restrain its position anymore to the secondary background of the table, but it fi nally conquers the central presence of obvious interest. In an analogous way, landscape and garden formations refer to the everyday social life. In this context, there are numerous gardens belonging to Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016

Figure 2.1 At the outskirts of seventeenth-century Dutch cities, bourgeois’ houses summed in series of small properties, prefi gured with their adjacent gardens, the future garden cities of the twentieth century. © Sketch, Konstantinos Moraitis. In which way is ‘ethos’ revealed in space? 23 numerous bourgeois owners that dare to approach, or even demand, the cultural and, in essence, the economic and political proscenium, imposing widely, in multiple social fi elds simultaneously, the bourgeois ethics. The bourgeois’ houses at the outskirts of the cities of Netherlands, summed in series of small properties, prefi gure with their adjacent gardens the future garden cities of the twentieth century. In an even more radical way, landscaping formations in Dutch cities of the seventeenth century acquire, for the fi rst time in Western history, public quality; they are the fi rst to present the ethics of the public park available to all urban citizens. Returning to the formal features of landscape formations, it is worth noting that the design geometry remained simpler, easier to be conceived, although infl uenced by French standards. Even in the gardens of the highest-profi le social groups, as in the governor’s gardens of the ‘Stadtholder’ Prince William of Orange in Het Loo Palace (later, King William ΙΙΙ of Great Britain), the application of geometry was associated with organizational clarity. Another contribution of Dutch landscaping to the development of Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016

Figure 2.2 In the gardens of Prince William of Orange in Het Loo Palace, the application of geometry was associated with organizational clarity. © Sketch, Konstantinos Moraitis. 24 Konstantinos Moraitis important botanical gardens was also associated with strict denotative geometric organization. Plant species were presented in scientifi c order in a visually prominent way, arranged in a geometrically organized manner, creating landscape ‘tables’ of botanic display. In the latter example, the aesthetic order of the geometrically organized landscape of seventeenth-century Netherlands possessed a clear scientifi c orientation: “Botanic science demonstrated in geometric order”. For the scholar interested in landscape history, the correlation between landscape standards and social ethics in terms of innovative changes seems to be a common historical phenomenon. In the range of modern Western history, starting as early as the Tuscan Renaissance down to present days, aesthetics of the landscape present a signifi cant number of paradigms con- noting social behavior that are often related to explicit political reference. Following our last remark, we may continue, insisting on two statements offering the conclusive comments of this essay. If the fi rst conclusion accepts that Euclidean geometry is characteristic of regulating ethics demanding the stability of the social reality, then the second conclusion tends to expand its claim. It insists on the fact that different social conditions require different landscape paradigms in order to display and impose their special ethical quality. They require, for example, the visual reference to topology in order to associate it with the contemporary constant displacement of social behavior. Some of the previous correlations occur in a process of indiscriminate infl uences. Others, however, as in the examples of societies that need to pub- licize their particular cultural and civil personality, are clearly displayed in a way that becomes even clearer when compared to other historical examples. In this context, we have already noted that Euclidean geometric organization corresponds to the political ethics of Baroque kingdoms or to the growing bourgeoisie of the seventeenth century, related in each case to different aspects of representations and material formations of landscape. From a methodological point of view, we may notice in addition that our examples possess an even greater didactic importance as we choose to compare two regions of central political and cultural signifi cance in their time, which possess, however strongly, contrasting trends, such as France and the Nether- lands in the seventeenth century. Closer to us, other examples of innovative landscaping proposals seem to also present specifi c features in terms of their correlation to social ethics. Eng-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 lish standards of landscape architecture in the eighteenth century were clearly linked to radical bourgeois political views, while Romanticism in nineteenth century projected on the autonomous, natural landscape features that refl ect its general objection to the growing centralized Western society; natural example, Romanticism insisted, had to defi ne both social and individual behavior. However, the most important contribution of ‘landscape ethics’ related to broader social ethical norms, providing landscape reference and, therefore, aesthetic infl uence, is probably the one most associated with the environmental consciousness of our era. Even the newly introduced term ‘environmental In which way is ‘ethos’ revealed in space? 25 ethics’ indicates its confl ict with the dominant cultural example. It presents a clear preference for natural environment, and thus, transposes the interest from the urban center of social control to the ‘periphery’ of natural infl u- ence, completing in its own way an overturning Romantic reaction, which pertained primarily to late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Protestant ethics and landscape ‘genius’: Landscape as a description of social behavior It is not a paradox that reference to seventeenth-century European society, and especially to Dutch society, offers the central paradigm for one of the most infl uential texts of modern theory, that of Max Weber’s concerning Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism . The critical reviews of Weber’s proposal insist on his theoretical correlation between religious ethical norms and Western capitalist development. However, they scarcely indicate another theoretical specifi city of his work: the demonstration of ethics as a normative fi eld that penetrates the entire range of social life, acquiring multiple practical validities, validities that concern ‘πράττειν’ in general acting on every aspect of cultural activity. Through Protestantism, Weber remarks,

the moral conduct of the average man was . . . deprived of its planless and unsystematic character and subjected to a consistent method for conduct as a whole. It is no accident that the name of ‘Methodists’ stuck to the participants in the last great revival of Puritan ideas in the eighteenth century just as the term ‘Precisians’, which has the same meaning, was applied to their spiritual ancestors in the seventeenth century. (Weber 2005: 71)

This very rational obsession is the one that brought to Protestant faith its distinct ascetic tendency, which was indicated as capable for human transformation, moving man from the condition of “status naturæ” to the condition of “status gratiæ” (Weber 2005: 72). However, this very transformation from the natural state to the state of grace was also related, in the case of Protestantism, with economic amelioration and organization of places dedicated to life, habitation and production – that is to say, with

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 the organization of landscape. It is in many ways signiﬁ cant that a number of important gardens of the seventeenth-century Dutch belonged to fanatic reformers, to Mennonite merchants (de Jong 2001: 98–118). The ‘genius’ of Dutch landscape is the spirit of simultaneous economic growth and aesthetic quality, thus presenting distinct features of the ‘status gratiae’, of the condition of man who, after receiving Divine Grace, returns it to the world, expressing two central modalities of the Protestant ethics, production rigor and aesthetic elegance, “ordine geometrico demonstrate”, presented in an apparently demonstrable way. 26 Konstantinos Moraitis This rationalization of the world is related, Weber insisted, to the elimination of magic, to the elimination of the incomprehensible as a means of salvation and, therefore, as a means of effective control of the world (Weber 2005: 70). This last statement simulates Spinoza’s Ethics, indicating that even theological documentation of the world has to lose at least a part of its occult depth for the sake of a demonstrable approach. This abolition of magic, of the hidden miraculous ingredient participating as a structural element in the royal mythology of Baroque landscaping, becomes evident in the gardens of the seventeenth-century Dutch. Not only was geometry of landscape design no more a ‘thaumaturgy’, but, as the demonstrable theology of Spinoza’s Ethica indicates, even miracles ought to use the arguments of the obvious geometric proof in order to join the systematic and methodic approach of the normative social behavior. In the conclusion of his Critique of Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant comments:

[T]wo things ﬁ ll the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reﬂ ect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within. I have not to search for them and conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness or were in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect them directly with the consciousness of my existence. (Kant 2010: 164)

The great thinker reminds us immediately a few lines later of the basic position of his criticism. The awareness of the moral law “begins from my invisible self . . . and exhibits me in a world which has true inﬁ nity, but which is traceable only by the understanding” (Kant 2010). Thus, moral law belongs essentially to the realm of the intellect; it does not correspond to common perception. It should, however, be described as ‘traceable’ and in this sense as ‘perceptible’ so that it could be visible, like starry heavens, so that it could be clearly introduced in the ﬁ eld of human perception. Thus, I see moral law, like starry heaven, “before me”. The commentary on the previous quotation should not limit its remarks to arguing that it is simply a metaphor. It should continue questioning, trying to explain why is this metaphor valid. It had to explain concretely why a reference to a landscape perception is necessary, indeed, to a

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 strong landscape perception, described as ‘sublime’, and thus related to qualities that ‘transcend’ individual disposition, just as moral law does.

Contemporary landscape ethics as a broader “epistemic”3 paradigm If both ideology and material social creations indicate a continuity of infl u- ences, if “the mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifi cations of the body” (Spinoza 2009: Part 2 , prop. XXIII), In which way is ‘ethos’ revealed in space? 27 then we would rather complete this chapter by insisting on the investigation of the terms through which material accomplishments promise to promote and impose normative terms concerning social activity during the present historical period. Today, for the fi rst time in modern history, the prevalent habitation paradigms in Western societies – and consequently the paradigms concerning their relation to place and therefore their landscape perception – cease to refer to building architecture or to conventional urban structure and insist on assimilating the terms of natural transformation. Modern Western history had experienced in the past natural oriented variants of landscape design. It had constructed public urban parks invading the built body of the cities; it had proposed and constructed garden cities; it had attempted to preserve natural terrain. It had edited books in reference to nature and had immortalized nature through its modes of representation. However, it is the fi rst time that both social imagination and scientifi c pragmatism claim so intensively the invasion of nature in the urban zones by completely revers- ing the cultural signifi cance of urban centrality in favor of the natural city borders. It is this intense claim that seems to legitimize nowadays the term ‘environmental ethics’, as well as the concepts related to them. Nonetheless, this ethical direction appears, through the conventional environmentally friendly aspect in which it is usually presented, rather incapable of expressing the deeper epistemic and epistemological reversal in progress. Nearly all of our intuitions concerning the formation of the world, as well as the system of our means for representation, are ‘obsessed’ by the qualities of the topological transformation.4 This obsession does not necessarily have to do with a ‘naturalistic fallacy’, emulating human and social behavior or cultural attitudes with natural entities. It does not refer to nature for the validation of social ethics. Rather, it refers to the emphatic feeling of affi nities between the two domains, the social and the natural, related to structural transformation, and thus indirectly explaining why the twentieth century appears to be the period of development of meta-ethical theories. Ethical qualities may also correspond to transformation processes and may be demonstrated in topological order: ‘ordine topologico’. They immerse and spread themselves into the ‘sea’ of social infl uences; they emerge again, coming up to the surface like living

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 aquatic bodies constantly replacing and adjusting themselves under the impact of a continuous morphogenesis.

Notes 1 Anamorphosis : The term describes an illusionary perspective distorting the drowned image in such a way that the viewer has to use special devices or occupy a specifi c vantage point to reconstruct the image. The word is derived from the Greek prefi x ανά-, ‘ana-‘, meaning ‘back’ or ‘again’, and the word μορφή, ‘mor- phe’, meaning ‘shape’ or ‘form’. 28 Konstantinos Moraitis 2 Abscondita : From the Latin verb ‘abscondo’ that derives from the prefi x ab(s), meaning ‘from’ and ‘condo’ (=con+do), meaning ‘to give with’. Thus, ‘abscondo’ means ‘to construct’ or ‘to hide’, and ‘abscondita’ is the past participle of feminine gender meaning ‘constructed’ or ‘hidden’. 3 Epistemic – Épistème: The adjective ‘epistemic’ derives from the noun ‘ épistème ’, reproducing in French the Greek word επιστήμη – ‘science’. French philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault introduced both terms in his work The Order of Things, Les Mots et les Choses (Foucault 1966) in order to describe the “historical a priori”, that is to say, the historical preconditions that ground knowledge and its discourses. According to author K. Moraitis, contemporary epistemic tendencies are oriented toward natural paradigms and, moreover, toward scientifi c perception of the landscape or landscape metaphor, as in topology or catastrophe theory. 4 Topology : Topology, from the Greek words τόπος – ‘place’, and λόγος – ‘study’, is a branch of mathematics concerned with the properties of space that are preserved under continuous deformations, including stretching and bending, but not tear- ing or gluing. According to French mathematician René Frédéric Thom, we may compare topological intuition with the perception of a natural landscape under constant transformation. Author K. Moraitis insists on the concept that topological thinking, and moreover topological intuition, introduces a type of cultural mentality having to do with continuous transformation contrary to Euclidean stability: “Contemporary ethics demonstrated in topological geometrical order”, as opposed to “former ethics demonstrated in Euclidean geometrical order”.

Bibliography Alpers, S. (1983) The Art of Describing. Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century , Middlesex: Penguin. Andersen, K. (1996) “The Mathematical Treatment of Anamorphoses from Piero della Francesca to Niceron”, in J. W. Dauben, M. Folkerts, E. Knobloch and H. Wussing (eds.) History of Mathematics: States of the Art, San Diego CA: Aca- demic Press. Baillet, A. (1691) La Vie de Monsieur Descartes , Paris: Daniel Horthemels. Online. Available at: http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k75559n (28 June 2014). Descartes, R. (1966) Discours de la Méthode , Paris: Garnier-Flammarion. Descartes, R. (1999) Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii , in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothof and D. Murdoch (trans.) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , Volume I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Foucault, M. (1966) Les Mots et les Choses. Une Archéologie des Sciences Humaines , Paris: Gallimard. Grossmann, H. (2009) “Descartes and the Social Origins of the Mechanistic Con- Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 cept of the World”, in G. Freudenthal and P. McLaughlin (eds.) The Social and the Economic Roots of the Scientifi c Revolution , Boston: Springer. Hunt, J. D. (1990) The Dutch Garden in the Seventeenth Century , Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks. de Jong, E. (2001) Nature and Art. Dutch Garden and Landscape Architecture, 1650–1740 , Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. Kant, I. (2010) The Critique of Practical Reason , trans. T. K. Abbott, Electronic Clas- sics Series, Hazleton: Pennsylvania State University. Online. Available at: www2. hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/kant/critique-practical-reason.pdf (29 June 2014). In which way is ‘ethos’ revealed in space? 29 Santini, C. (2007) Il Giardino di Versailles. Natura, Artifi cio, Modello , Bologna: Leo S. Olschki. Spinoza, B. (1954) L’ Éthique , trans. R. Caillois, Paris: Gallimard. Spinoza, B. (2009) The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata) , trans. R. H. M. Elwes. Project Gutenberg E-books. Online. Available at: www.gutenberg.net (29 June 2014). Weiss, A. S. (1992) Mirroirs de l’Infi ni: Le Jardin à la Francaise et la Métaphysique au XVIIe siècle , trans. M. Sitbon, Paris: Seuil. Wittgenstein, L. (1977) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness, London: Routledge and Keagan. Weber, M. (2005) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism , trans. T. Par- sons, London: Routledge. Wölffl in, H. (1967) Renaissance et Baroque , trans. G. Ballangé, Paris: Le Livre de Poche.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 3 Heritage values as means and ends of place ethics

Vassilis Ganiatsas

Places as agents of heritage values The dominant paradigm of places in heritage preservation is that of the expressions of cultures in space, spatial leftovers of the past. Places are considered as imbued and bestowed with cultural meaning as if they have been inert geographical entities before, tabulae rasae to be inscribed by the societies that inhabit them and expressive systems of beliefs, sets of values and ways of life, much like produced cultural artifacts (Tuan 1977). Contrary to this prevailing paradigm, I’ll herewith be arguing that each place, apart from being a mere sum total of monuments and sites and a historic palimp- sest, is primarily self-constituted as an entity that showcases its own ethics and behavior out of its character in time (Casey 1998, Malpas 2006). Heritage places consist of monuments and sites. I herewith take ‘monuments’ to denote discrete artifacts with an original intentional or ad hoc acquired meaning, while sites to denote contexts of established tangible and intangible heritage values. Monuments and sites, as objects and contexts in places, are both considered expressive systems of the past, emanatory of cultural values, and living examples of concrete entities presenting a character surviving the past and claiming relevance to contemporary and future times (Lowenthal 1985). In the case of preservation of a monument or a site, it’s a matter of interpretation of its values, created in the past but relevant to us today since we acknowledge them as such, on an equal basis with other present-day values of ours. Sometimes, values of the past are being assessed as more important than they have been at the time of their initial creation. But then, so be it, Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 since what matters most is the fact that we actualize and render them contemporary to the extent that preservation of past values could be very well considered a form of contemporary development. Alternatively, development of a monument or a site is a matter of present-day values necessarily related to something already existing and in need of development. Attempts to theorize heritage values could be summarized in two main trends: an empirical one derived from practice (Feilden 2003) and a conceptual one drawing on philosophical grounds (Riegl 1982). Feilden’s basic Heritage values and place ethics 31 categories of values, such as cultural, functional and emotional, in several ramiﬁ cations, can hardly be considered a system, as they are cited in an additive and open-ended scheme unrelated among themselves. Riegl, on the contrary, establishes a conceptual system by dividing heritage values into commemorative/memory heritage values ( Erinnerungswerte ), such as age, historical and intentional, and present-day heritage values ( Gegen- wartswerte ), such as newness, use and relative art. Riegl’s approach, by its conception qua systematic, enables the cross-consideration of heritage values and the assessments of their synergies and conﬂ icts. In following Riegl, I could argue about the mutual and shared appropriation of heritage and development values to our times, about the need for interpretation and the necessity of creativity in managing them. Preservation and development may differ in scale and degree, but they share a common scope, i.e., expressing current values. Thus, a common theory is both possible and needed in order to interrelate between heritage preservation and contemporary – for every present – development (Ganiatsas 2012).

Synthesizing heritage and development values as a matter of ethics Although both sets of values, i.e., relating to preservation and development, are equally important parts of our contemporary reality, they never cease to be in mutual opposition and interdependence. Merging of antithetical values is theoretically insolvable, as any new value that could allegedly syn- thesize them should necessarily surpass both in a Hegelian sense by overrid- ing their distinct importance and by rendering them as mere intermediate historical steps toward more comprehensive (better?) values. Consequently, a synthesis of heritage and development values is herewith proposed not in a Hegelian sense, leading to some resolution at a superior level, but rather as an active dialectical process of mutual consideration, interaction and constitution. Thus, both sets of values are being considered as mutually dependent, although in congruence, rather than mutually tolerated or in confl ict. Plato, in referring to the political art as a kind of knowledge which is distinct from theoretical knowledge, which is based on principles and general laws ( episteme ) and the most synthetic of the arts, emphasizes its synthetic character which resembles the act of weaving together opposing values and Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 virtues at variance, such as courage and moderation (Plato 1997: 305e–306). In following the Platonic conceptualization of synthetic arts, the herewith attempted synthesis does not aim at some overarching theory to guide practice, but is primordially of a practical nature, aiming to inform and support proper actions that could bridge pseudo-dilemmas springing from the opposition ‘preservation or development‘. In terms of the monuments and heritage sites as entities, under preservation or development, this opposition is guised as one between their identity and change, this time with identity 32 Vassilis Ganiatsas considered as a passive, static and already accomplished state hostile to change and change considered as an abstract and, for that matter, irrelevant imposed agent for an identity under consideration. A synthesis could resolve de facto the false opposition by a particular practice that pays tribute to both a developing identity and a proper change to the needs of that identity in development. Syntheses like the aforementioned, by the actual choices employed and the very modes of bringing together the opposites, render cultural acts as meaningful, culturally relevant and important, exactly as tokens of the achieved resolution. Synthesis is intrinsically practical – a synthetic praxis – an act and not a theoretical resolution, and for that reason, its exercise is an art and not a science. Many scientifi c disciplines are necessary to contribute to heritage preservation, but fi nally, and actually, it all comes to what we should do in particular cases for particular monuments and heritage sites in our everyday practice (Ganiatsas 2011: 27–36). To that end, the art of building of the past, as manifested by our valued monuments and sites, will fi nally provide answers by analogy. In order to do so, they have to be considered not as mere carriers of past cultural values, but as living embodiments, tokens and agents of values that partake of the contemporary horizon on which they are assessed as such (Gadamer 2004: 237–238, 301–306). Monuments and sites are not mere cultural examples, typical and inter- changeable within a culture that produced them, but ontological entities encompassing in their unique way antithetical values by the way they absorb and internalize inferred changes by their continuous development. In this sense, monuments and sites are not representative of some retrospec- tive nostalgic view of the good old times, but a necessary methodological tool for current problems. Seen from their viewpoint, monuments and sites are ontic entities surviving the time of their initial creation and are living paradigms of how their identity adapts to change, of how proper development is possible and of how oppositional values can be acknowledged on equal terms in the same entity. Alternatively, from the viewpoint of heritage and development as practices, monuments and sites could be considered concrete examples of their dialectics, a dialectics of their existing identity in view of its carrying capacity for development. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 A hermeneutical approach to heritage values management This kind of herewith suggested dialectics of opposing values fi nding a creative synthesis in monuments reveals the hermeneutical power of monuments in establishing cultural meaning and partaking in cultural development. On these premises, philosophical hermeneutics could adequately describe the dialectics between heritage and development as a proper scheme able to reveal the ontological content of heritage and its potential to explain the Heritage values and place ethics 33 resilience of heritage in expressing different meanings and partaking in dif- fering cultural environments (Gadamer 2004: 267–298). According to philosophical hermeneutics, a proper, to each monument and site, the dialectical hermeneutical scheme would necessarily acknowledge a common ground of shared ends, a shared horizon upon which a dialogue of past and contemporary relevance of a monument could be assessed and its potential activated and a consensus about the equivalence of opposing values in dialogue be achieved. Above all, a hermeneutical approach could validate the dialogue itself as most important rather than as some defi nite outcome. From a hermeneutical viewpoint, what is most important is the dialogue to be literally kept in place. Practicing preservation can never be an activity claiming neutrality and, on ethical grounds, irresponsibility. For each monument or site, evaluation and choices made are fi nally the inescapable constituents of each preservation act, even if most of the times these choices are not perceived by their beholders as conscious and deliberate. Every act of preservation manifests de facto certain choices, hierarchies reached at and established and a specifi c interpretation of the monument or site at stake and, based on these, a fi nal adoption of a certain set of values at the expense of others. Heritage values conceptualized as such emerge as active constituents of a contemporary creative, synthetic praxis of preservation. Values of the past made explicit through their interpretation and present-day values, made evident by their adoption, are inextricably and mutually intertwined to the extent that we cannot say which precedes which. The philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that our contemporary values for the preservation of monuments and the values we ascribe to the past are actually two sides of the same coin and should be considered in relation to each other (Gadamer 1986: 28). As a consequence of the previous considerations, it is obvious that the practice of preservation is more a creative act rather than a technical issue of managing and implementing established practices. Above all, the creative management of values, interpretations, preferences and actions cannot be theoretically prescribed. We can only safeguard this process against arbitrariness by demanding the integrity of the documentation and the interpretation process as bases for preservation; but in the end, preservation should be a practice deploying intentions, choices and interpretations, as well as

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 an overall stance, an idea or an aspiration that could resolve all confl icts of values. This is not to introduce a philosophical analysis or an aesthetics, which could be helpful anyway, but rather to interpret heritage preservation as a creative act by encouraging new interpretations and novel practices. The preservation of monuments is not to be considered as fulfi lling a check- list of prescriptions, but rather, enriching the debate by building examples of how we defi ne values, how we interpret them and how we transcribe them to contemporary reality. We have to keep in mind that by preserving 34 Vassilis Ganiatsas a monument, we also create a monument out of a monument by the very actual way we treat it, by the very actual mode of its preservation. For this reason alone, we collectively should take full credit and full responsibility rather than hiding behind alleged objectivity and neutrality by just comply- ing with principles and the propriety of applying principles. After all, even if one could apply all existing principles cited in heritage protection and management charters, it could lead nowhere, since they could, at best, only guide and not generate proper action, as their role can only be limited to discouraging inappropriate action and encouraging appropriate action and not dictating one.

Heritage values as ethical means and ends Preservation of heritage values in monuments and sites is not a technical application, nor an issue of applicable theoretical principles, but rather, a par excellence ethical one in the Aristotelian sense, a problem of proper practice, where phronesis more than episteme is needed since the main problem is to decide what is proper to do in a particular situation when faced with problems of preservation of a particular and unique monument or heritage site. In this attempt, for everyday practice of heritage protection and management, the most important issue is to interpret and understand places, establish proper ends and devise proper means towards those preset ends. In discussing managing heritage values, it’s important to discern between them as ends and means in order to be best appropriated and in a uniﬁ ed way. It seems that we need a radically new approach in order to reconsider means and ends, to establish proper ends and proper means and to bring together preservation and sustainability of values as congenial social practices in a unifying praxis. This discussion about means and ends lies at the heart of Aristotelian ethics and constitutes the foundation of a practical philosophy. Aristotle argues in his Nicomachean Ethics that “decisions of wise persons are not mere intuitions, but can be justiﬁ ed by a chain of reasoning” (Aristotle 1925). This chain of reasoning has a starting point which is the initial act of choosing a proper end. This seeming paradox of establishing an intended chosen end at the beginning of the practical inquiry is the eidetic difference between

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 practical and theoretical philosophy. Theoretical, or contemplative, philosophy starts from observations and thoughts and proceeds by argumentation about the nature of things and ideas, while practical philosophy predeter- mines the goal and subsequently directs, evaluates and guides all means toward the accomplishment of that preset goal. According to Aristotle, there can be no theoretical guide to ethics – just ethical habits in getting accustomed to setting proper ends. Practical wisdom, what he calls phronesis , will follow in devising proper means in order to achieve and accomplish those preset ends. In his own terms, “virtue Heritage values and place ethics 35 makes the goal right, practical wisdom the things leading to it” (Aristotle 1925: 1144a, 7–8). Yet, this herewith suggested practical philosophy, rightfully called practical wisdom, is not merely a matter of some mechanistic application, nor an issue of intuition alone. It demands a rational process which equals that of theoretical inquiries in depth of thought and strength of arguments. Practi- cal philosophy seems relevant to our inquiry because in dealing with heritage values, we actually, by deﬁ nition, set beforehand the end result of our actions, i.e., the protection of an established and cherished heritage value. Heritage values are intrinsically valuable, not as intermediate instruments toward some other values, but in constituting themselves as the proper ends of any preservation scheme.

Establishing heritage values as proper ends in themselves: A question of ethics In dealing with monuments and sites as constituents of places, we usually start off with the acknowledgement and cherishment of values as a foundation of our inquiry whose ﬁ nal end is their preservation. So the end is already there, in the very monument with the cherished values embodied in it. From the moment we characterize a monument as such, the most important issue is not if we should preserve it, but rather how best to accomplish this already preset end of preserving it, qua valuable. As it is the characteristic case for all practical philosophy, it is not a matter of what, but a matter of how. Yet, characterization of a monument or a site as of value is not enough to suggest the way it should be handled in order to be properly protected and managed. What is at stake is that its embodied values should be clari- ﬁ ed, interpreted and clearly understood by acknowledging both – our view of these values and the capability of the monument itself to either verify or refute our projected values. This double-reference, and for that reason double-check, nature of all contemporary interventions to monuments, at whatever scale, could safeguard our unavoidably cultural reading against arbitrariness. No historic analysis or thorough documentation is ever enough for the correct interpretation of the values of the monument. All interpretations are

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 formed in the contemporary horizon of our current values, and it is not a matter of correctness or not. It is always the case for these values of being legitimate or not, after being considered against the monument they relate to, as being proper to its identity or not. We can only see the values of the past that can reach our horizon, but this is not a problematic issue. Because any quest of objectivity is futile, what really matters are continual cultural acts of interpreting, adjusting and appropriating the values of the past in our own terms. After all, the very fact that we are able to see values in the creations of the past veriﬁ es that 36 Vassilis Ganiatsas we still share those values today. It is matter of painstaking documentation, historical analysis and interpretation in order to understand and make heritage values concrete in contemporary terms, but still this process cannot guarantee desired results in monument preservation. In this endeavor, we have the monument or site at stake as the touchstone for verifying or refut- ing the possible legitimacy of our readings, interpretations, understandings and conceptual narratives of their existence. Heritage values should be reconsidered as to what they stand for, i.e., proper ends in themselves, and our actions for their protection should be considered as following proper choices to acknowledge their being ends in themselves. This is not a matter of discovery of absolute truths about them, but rather, choices reached after careful and caring interpretation of what they stand for, of their embodied values. That is what practical wisdom is about – choices that, although made in a subjective basis, set the ends toward proper action. If we value heritage, we should preserve it for what it is – not for another purpose or for the sake of another value. In Aristotle’s terms, a heritage value is a ﬁ nal end and not an instrumental means toward another end, be that other end economic or social. Heritage is primordially and primarily a social value by being heritage, by being itself, and therein lies its capacity to anchor, safeguard and guide social development and resolve socio-cultural oppositions. In these terms, heritage is not simply yet another possible engine for economic development and growth, but the basis, the stronghold and the anchorage of any engine for any proper development.

Monuments and sites as ethical paradigms of/for the art of building We collectively started off by preserving heritage as a minor and limited practice amid dominant practices of development. We then went on by preserving heritage as an alibi, as in situ museum pieces amid omnipresent rapid as well as uncritical economic growth and development. We’ve now reached a point where all models of development are rendered not only obsolete, but also unsustainable and even dangerous, physically and spiritually. This chapter argues that we should now move toward adopting herit-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 age as ethical paradigms of proper development and new sustainable ways of life (Ganiatsas 2012: 151–161). It is time to reconsider heritage not as a side and secondary aspect of social values, but as a holistic exemplar, an ethical paradigm of a sustainable way of life in terms of reusing the existing building stock, being in response to the natural environment and redefi ning our cultural values. Each monument should be considered a paradigm in itself, as evolving and developing while maintaining its identity, thus constituting a valid anti-paradigm to the dominant current paradigm of uncritical endless growth. This anti-paradigm is Heritage values and place ethics 37 not suggested to relate only to monument preservation, but in analogy to development as a whole in all of its aspects, issues, aims and ends. Starting with the currently dominant paradigm of unlimited development, we should ask ourselves: What is the limit of growth? Where is growth leading to? Is it leading to an end we value and desire? For the time being, it seems that we are trapped like the angelus novus of Paul Klee, who is regretfully looking backwards while a strong wind is blowing his wings and carries him unwillingly to the future (Werkmeister 1982). This is the main reason for our experience of preservation and development as a dilemma since we don’t really know what to value against what. In paraphrasing Gadamer, we could say that the archaeologist of the future will face a severe problem in interpreting our times. We seem to behave in a schizophrenic way, valuing and spending our fi nancial resources in preservation while craving economic growth. There is nothing wrong in valuing both what we already have and what we want, and it couldn’t be otherwise. The problem arises when those sets of values are set in opposition and confl ict for different stakeholders, different cultural groups and society as a whole, when preservation of monuments is alternatively and interchangeably considered as both – the most valued cultural asset and at the same time an obstacle for its development. Monuments and heritage sites occupy commercial space in our cities and traditional settings, and the problem arises as to whether they should give up their space or not. In the case of archaeological sites, the problem becomes acute: protection/preservation of an archaeological site not only demands fi nancial resources, but also occupies a place that could be otherwise developed. Heritage can play a vital role of being a valid anti-paradigm, an alternative to the current global consumerism, because:

1. It is a living example of sustainability, a witness and a real proof that another way of life is possible. It is a pragmatic, full model of life, instead of a utopian abstraction or extrapolation. 2. It’s ours , because we value heritage not for the sake of the past, but for the sake of our present in contemporary terms. In addition, we value the embodied nature of heritage in our monuments, their very corporeality being the reason for relating to and identifying with them.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 3. It’s there in place, pinpointing to the importance of place not as a cultural product, but as a cultural basis and a prerequisite for building up our identity. Monuments and heritage sites, by being place-bound, form part of social life – not just of ours, but also, by outliving our lives, of the ones to come.

More than the current sustainable paradigm, heritage is not only embedded materials and energy to be reused, recycled, modifi ed and transformed, but also embedded and embodied values of life that, it seems, we fi nd so 38 Vassilis Ganiatsas diffi cult to surpass today. In a sense, since we value it, heritage is condensed ethics of good life. We urgently need to develop the relevant conceptual tools to redeem this embedded expertise and make the best of it for the needs of contemporary development. This proposed methodology of redemption could be analyzed in three steps:

1. We should adopt local proper exemplars for development instead of abstract theoretical models. Toward that end, we have to re-examine modernity in its obsession toward pointless and endless growth and reassess glocality as ﬁ nally favoring globalism instead of the locality it supposedly addresses. Degrowth is not a solution, as it negates development altogether, while the problem is proper development and not abolishing it in toto, as that would be irrelevant and dangerous for local cultures, which follow different rhythms of development and growth. 2. Paradigms or exemplars of development should be analyzed in their pragmatic and practical nature so that they can be imitated by analogy. This method will allow for each local culture to be part of the world through its particular and distinct way of existing and not as just another locality of the world in an additive sense. 3. Local societies should adopt their own heritage as the paradigm for their development. In these terms, it is more appropriate to speak of development of their identity in parallel to adjusting to supra-local and global issues of development.

A horizon for balancing identity and change in place ethics The notion of horizon based on Husserl, Heidegger and mainly Gadamer has so far been used to describe heritage values that are necessarily dependent and mutually constituted on our contemporary cultural context. This horizon is constantly shifting as societies evolve. Yet, not everything is elusive due to this constant shift. For every position of ours, the horizon denotes metaphorically what can reach us and what cannot, and in literal terms, what can claim relevance to our contemporary life and what cannot.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 In this sense, it is a quite stable basis on which to assess our criteria and values of the past as values and criteria that belong to the present. Without resorting to any metaphysical teleology, the notion of horizon indicates a necessary relativism in being open to many possible developments while at the same time binding those possible developments to the identity of a local culture where it is set up from. Relativism in this sense is not a philosophical or political stance, or even an abstract notion, but the practical need and the pragmatic limitation of specifi city, the specifi city Heritage values and place ethics 39 of a local culture and its particular heritage in its role in past, present and future development. In fact, the very anchorage of a horizon to a local culture marks the possibilities of cultural production, qua certain adoption of values – a certain culturally relevant concrete framework of values and forms of reality as opposed to theoretical possibilities of absolute values and possible forms (Vessey 2009). The identity of a local culture as manifested by its heritage in its distinct monuments and sites should act as the internal limiting horizon of assess- ing means and ends in relation to change, considered the external horizon. Heritage should defi ne, by setting the limits, the internal capacity and potentiality of each local culture for change and provide a sole measure of consistency, compatibility and propriety for any action imposed toward its development and growth. This notion of a unifying horizon of the present in both its internal and external aspects could be the proper conceptual tool, as it is capable of being constantly generated in following cultural changes and at the same time never failing to ascribe means and ends in response to both external circumstances and internal needs.

Bibliography Aristotle (1925) The Nicomachean Ethics , Book VI, trans. Sir D. Ross, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Casey, E. S. (1998) The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History , London: University of California Press. Feilden, B. (2003) Conservation of Historic Buildings, London: Elsevier/Architectural Press. Gadamer, H. G. (1986) “Storie Parallele”, DOMUS-Monthly Review of Architec- ture Interiors Design Art 670: 17–28. Gadamer, H. G. (2004) Truth and Method , trans. J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall, London and New York: Continuum. Ganiatsas, V. (2011) “The Krakow Charter Revisited: A Synthetic View of Its Concepts, Tools and Methods”, in A. Kadluczka (ed.) KRAKOW CHARTER 2000–10 YEARS LATER , Krakow: Politechnika Krakowska. Ganiatsas, V. (2012) “Heritage as Ethical Paradigms of Identity and Change: In Need of New Conceptual Tools, Practices or Attitude”, in W. Lipp, J. Stulc and B. Szmyqin (eds.) Conservation Turn – Return to Conservation: Tolerance for

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Change, Limits of Change , Florence: Polistampa. Lowenthal, D. (1985) The Past Is a Foreign Country, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press. Malpas, J. (2006) Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Plato (1997) “Statesman”, trans. C. J. Rowe, in J. M. Cooper (ed.) Plato: Complete Works , Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett. Riegl, A. (1982) “The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its Origin”, trans. K. W. Forster and D. Ghirardo, Oppositions 25: 21–51. 40 Vassilis Ganiatsas Tuan, Y. F. (1977) Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience , Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Vessey, D. (2009) “Gadamer and the Fusion of Horizons”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17, 4: 531–542. Werkmeister, O. K. (1982) “Walter Benjamin, Paul Klee, and the Angel of History”, Oppositions 25: 103–125. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 4 Ethic and ornament in the modern and contemporary age

Claudio D. Conenna and Kyriaki Tsoukala

The question of ethic and its connection with spatial phenomena is not a new one; this is clear from the literature and its scope in different periods of the history of architecture and the city. In this text, we will be focusing on the topic of ornament ( διάκοσμος / diakosmos ) and its ethical dimension in the modern and contemporary age. The questions we shall be attempting to answer concern the attributions of meaning to ethic and ornament in those two periods and the recognition and critique of different architectural visions relating to those concepts. We shall begin by considering the etymology of the concept of διάκοσμος ( diakosmos ) and how it differs from that of διακόσμησις ( diakosmesis ). The distinction is signiﬁ cant, and should, we feel, be made clear from the beginning. The word διάκοσμος ( diakosmos ) comes from the Greek verbs διακοσμέω /κοσμέω (diacosmeo/kosmeo ), which mean ‘to arrange harmoni- ously’, ‘to set in order’. The verb κοσμέω (kosmeo ), from which the word κόσμος ( kosmos) comes, also implies adornment, good order, harmony, universal harmony. The word διακόσμησις ( diakosmesis ), on the other hand, although deriving from the same root, contains the additional sense of trimming with decorations. Διακόσμησις ( diakosmesis ), in other words, implies an adding , not the ordering which lies at the heart of διάκοσμος ( diakosmos ). In διάκοσμος (diakosmos ), beauty is in the very structure of the object, while in διακόσμησις (diakosmesis ), the beauty is a beautiﬁ cation, the result of accessory additions to the structure. There is considerable interest in comparing these words with their counterparts in Latin.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 For διάκοσμος (diakosmos ), the corresponding Latin words are ornamentum and ornare , from which comes the verb ad-ornare , which is equivalent to the Greek στολίζω (stolizo =deck, trim, dress). For διακόσμησις (diakosmesis ), there is decoratio, decor, from the verb decorare. Decor signiﬁ es elegance, beauty, attractiveness. In Italian, the word decor-azione declares the action of making something attractive, that is, improving something that has no natural beauty; the Latin decoratio is thus equivalent to the Greek διακόσμησις (diakosmesis ). With the word ad-ornare , the preﬁ x ad- placed before the root verb ornare adds the sense of something added, making 42 Claudio D. Conenna and Kyriaki Tsoukala

it closer to διακόσμησις (diakosmesis ) than to διάκοσμος (diakosmos ), although in Greek, the verb στολίζω ( stolizo) covers a broader range than the Latin ad-ornare . The Latin terms corresponding to the Greek κόσμος (kosmos) are cosmo , orbis, and mundus. Mundus also has the sense of clean, elegant, fi ne, tidy, like the Greek τακτοποιημένο (taktopoiemeno ) (tidy, neatly ordered). This element of harmonious arrangement is also given by the Latin words ordino – ordo – ordinare . The element or occurs in the structure of both orbis and ordo , and also of the words or nare, decor, and ad-or nare. Like the Greek διάκοσμος (diakosmos), ornare, from which the term ornamentum comes, implies the beauty inherent in the object, in its very structure, its particular nature, and not in some external ornamentation, as is the case with διακόσμησις (diakosmesis) or decoratio , where beauty is sought through the embellishment of something that is, by nature, unshapely (lacking harmony and order). In both languages, the terms διάκοσμος (diakosmos)/ ornamentum and diakosmesis/decoratio refer, respectively, to the essence and the appearance of the architectural object. Ethics, on the other hand, is a concept that belongs to the fi eld of mores and ways of living (ethics = applied moral philosophy, moral philosophy in action), and to value judgments in relation to what we ought to do or how we perceive a good ‘way of being’. This second sense corresponds to the English term morality (ethics of reasoned action), a distinction we owe to Hegel. Both terms refer to the “sphere of values and of the discourse relating to values” (Renaut 2009: 676). The difference between the two terms – as Renaut points out – is epistemological and philosophical rather than linguistic. While in ethics there is a pattern/consciousness to which the individual refers (duty, happiness), in the case of morality, the “individual constitutes his own values and explains them to others or refl ects with others on shared values and their practical implications” (Renaut 2009:677). And while the terms diakosmos and diakosmesis have retained their etymological purity in the fi eld of architecture (even if in some theoretical works the distinction is weak, as we shall see), the concept of ethics differs from age to age, a difference expressed by the accompanying phrases ‘of heteronomy’ (before modernity), ‘of autonomy’ (the age of modernity) and ‘of independence’ (contemporary age of individualism in the sense of release from any form of normativity). Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016

Ethic and ornament in modernity We shall start by looking at the connection between diakosmos /ornament and ethic in modernity through specifi c examples of architectural discourse and praxis, before focusing on the contemporary era of post-(hyper)modernity. Disregarding the age of the ethic of heteronomy (the subjection of ethics to religion before the Enlightenment), we draw our material primarily from the industrial phase of modernity. Ethic and ornament 43 Within the climate of the ethic of autonomy that emerges with the dawn of modernism and remains sovereign until the middle of the twentieth century, architecture shapes its identity and its stance on such issues as that of diakosmos and diakosmesis . The ethic of autonomy is projected primarily through the work of Kant, who attempts to conceive a universal moral imperative that does not impinge on the autonomy of the rational subject, that is, to confl ate two initially contradictory states of autonomy. “ Sapere aude” is a distillation of faith in the reason that is shown to be the sole means for safeguarding a critical attitude and free/autonomous assessment (Russ 2005: 233). The Kan- tian sense of freedom refers to a vision of the world as a set of ideas or things, and the choices of a rational, transcendent subject. This ethic unfolds within the European crisis of that age and the upheavals in economic, social and geopolitical assumptions. It redefi nes the whole political structure, and along with it, architecture as a fi eld of projection of social phenomena. The creative thinking of certain architects takes up the question of diakosmos/ diakosmesis , reinterpreting traditional structures and forms on the basis of the new situation in the sectors of technology, materials and social reality. Eugène E. Viollet-le-Duc, an admirer of both Gothic architecture and reason, took a new approach to the question of structure with the use of metal, concentrating the forces of beauty in the construction itself. This rationalist interpretation of Gothic architecture is consistent with the spirit of the age, which denies ill-judged submission to the sovereignty of outdated rules and the conservation of a tradition with all the emotional baggage it carries. Viollet-le-Duc addresses ornament and structure as a single subject (Viollet- le-Duc 1987: II/200), a perception we also see in his mentor, Henri Labrouste, and specifi cally in two of his most important works, the National Library (1862–1868) and the Sainte Geneviève Library (1843–1850) in Paris. Despite the differences in their morphological approach to architecture (Labrouste adhered to the ideology of the École des Beaux Arts and Viollet-le-Duc to the Gothic), the essence of their philosophy was the same, and was taken up vigorously by architectural theorist A. Choisy, a student of Viollet-le-Duc. He admired Doric architecture, which he considered a revolution against the applied decoration of earlier years. This architecture was revived in the Renaissance, acquiring classic beauty in its highest and most abstract clarity (Banham 2008). In the Doric order, Choisy recognised the autonomy and clarity of the architectural object, the possibility of creating a harmonious and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 elegant material spatial entity through the logic of its construction. The idea of making structural steel visible and the bearer of beauty appealed to Hendrik Berlage (1856–1934), who implemented these ideas in the building he designed for the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (1896–1903). On the other hand, his dictum “appearance instead of reality” (Berlage 1996: 127) distils his perceptions of structural and spatial truth. The elaboration of façades he held to be mere decoration, “sham architecture”. His thinking on the frank expression of architecture and on displacing decoration from its material manifestation lies at the heart of modern architecture, which took shape within 44 Claudio D. Conenna and Kyriaki Tsoukala the climate of rationalism, of faith in scientifi c reason and the pragmatism of the industrial age where the machine was proclaimed as an ideal not only in the fi eld of production (mass production), but also in that of aesthetics. It could be argued that a rational pragmatism dominated the restless creative spirit of the architects of that age and led architecture (conditioned by the necessity of mass production) to look for fundamental principles in the fi eld of ethics rather than aesthetics. This social realism created a new aesthetic that fed on the ethics of autonomy and universality. The work of architecture as an autonomous object independent of external supports is organised on the basis of its own structural logic and rivals the functionality and the aesthetic of the machine. The minimalist slogan “less is more” enunciated by Mies van der Rohe expresses the extreme version of this new trend. It recognises no morphological or aesthetic problem except for questions of structure. We would contend, however, that his minimalist view of architecture is not indifferent to questions of decoration. The chrome-clad steel columns of the German Pavilion in Barcelona (1929) and the Villa Tugendhat (1928–1930) in Brno are examples of his views on the subject. In them, he used an ‘added’ protective element to the vertical bearing elements of the buildings, a functional element that contributes to the harmony and good order of the whole. The same thing can be seen in the Seagram Building (1954–1958) in New York, where the metal-clad columns conceal the structural frame. This protective cladding was a necessary component which is not opposed to the spirit of minimal- ism but rather reinforces the achievement of aesthetic pleasure without recourse to irrelevant planes and heteronomous logics. A similar approach (von Moss 1987: 24–37) to vertical structural elements was taken by Adolf Loos: white plaster fi nishing in the Steiner (1910), Scheu (1912), Tzara (1926) and Muller (1930) residential buildings; black Swedish granite on the façade of the Knife & Co fashion house building (1910–1911) and green Greek marble at the base of the façade of the Goldman & Salatsch building (1910–1911) in Vienna. He also followed the same principle in his interiors, covering walls with wood, paper, marble or brick. He explained his views in his famous essay Ornament and Crime, in which, however, he seems to confuse the concepts of diakosmos and diakosmesis. He speaks of decoration (meaning ornament) as an element necessary to both the consumer and the producer when it is dictated by practical considerations

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 (Loos 1980: 53) Similar observations may be made about Jan Duiker, one of the most important exponents of the New Objectivity movement (‘ Neue Sach- lichkeit ’). Like Berlage, Duiker praised the technical values of mediaeval architecture and was negative about decoration (he used the term ornament, but we believe he was referring to decoration). His phrase “art begins where technique ends and architecture where decoration stops” (Duiker 1995: 34 and Polano 2002: 38) is indicative of his views on the essence of architecture. In some of his most important works elements of decoration Ethic and ornament 45 are plainly seen, such as the sculptural chimney and reservoir at the Sanato- rio Zonnestraal (1926–1931) in Hilversum, the sign and signboard for the Cineac (1933–1934) in Amsterdam and details of the entrance to the Grand Hotel Gooiland (1934–1936) at Hilversum. In the new generation of the Deutsche Werbund , Berhens, and later Gro- pius, the founder of the Bauhaus school, stood against decoration, while elements of ornament may be seen in the Allgemeine Elektricitäts Gesellschaft (AEG) turbine plant in Berlin (Berhens, 1908–1910), and the Faguswerk at Alfeld-an-der-Leine (Gropius, 1911). And in both cases we see a free architectural aesthetic of volume that clothes or conceals the building’s frame. And in both examples, Behrens and Gropius use space-ﬁ lling elements to cover the metal skeleton, to create the ‘curtain wall’, a purely functional element that contributes to the harmony of the whole. This is ornament that gives the building a particular neutrality, designed and implemented in a way that does not negate the austerity and simplicity desirable to that age over the whole spectrum of product manufacturing, including architecture. The trend to simplicity was reinforced when the Bauhaus school was taken over by H. Meyer, an enthusiastic supporter of the Neue Sachlichkeit. As an example of his architecture we might cite the suspended courtyard roof and outside staircase running across the entire rear façade of the Petersschule building in Basel (1926). Then there was Auguste Perret, whose Contribution to a Theory of Archi- tecture (1952) discusses ornament, citing H. Pellée: “Architecture, you are entirely without decoration, adorned only with your own virtue. You are the anthem of inspired reason”. Perret goes on to say that “whoever conceals part of the structure deprives architecture of its authenticity and its most beautiful ornament . . . whoever conceals a column commits an error, but anyone who creates a false column commits a crime” (Britton 2001: 236). The structural elements of a building, in their own autonomous logic, are what ornament architecture. The same spirit animated Le Corbusier, who published Adolf Loos’ Orna- ment and Crime in L’Esprit Nouveau, and drew from it his inspiration for L’Art Décoratif d’aujourd’hui, which was published in 1925. In this book, Le Corbusier (1987) compares the crude cheapness of some products entirely lacking artistic value with those which, while undecorated, are paradigms of high artistic quality (von Moos 1987: 25). One of the founders of pur-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 ism with Ozenfant, he transposes from painting to architecture the values of clarity, inseparably linked with the absence of decoration. In his work, the elaboration of form that satisfi es function (“form follows function”) is a kind of ornament because it endows the functional element with aesthetic beauty without detracting from its autonomous (functional) logic. One characteristic feature of his architecture is the brise-soleil , where different forms create a sort of ornament, depending on the scale of the building. With regard to decoration, Le Corbusier supported its abstract artistic character, a position he expressed in, for example, the monument he designed 46 Claudio D. Conenna and Kyriaki Tsoukala for the left-wing mayor of Villejuif, Paul Vaillant-Couturier (1937), or the sculpture La main ouverte in Chandigarh. This brief sampling of modern architecture in the industrial phase suggests that the use of the two terms diakosmos / diakosmesis was often infe- licitous, but this linguistic ineptitude does not invalidate the content of the positions adopted by the architects in this regard – a content that they projected in their realised work with greater distinctness and clarity. Whether the emphasis was on structure (bearing elements) or its “neutral” cladding (curtain wall), ornament was an inherent feature of spatial elaboration for the achievement of the desired new aesthetic: simple and spare, autonomous and without extrinsic infl uence. Through the spirit of the ethic of autonomy, architecture built its own autonomy, constructed its own logic and identity, divested of the alien imperatives of architectural tradition. Creative reinterpretations of this tradition ensure a critical continuity with the past, while the break with heteronomous logic leads to inward-looking explorations of the very nature of the construction, without denying the (social and technological) context within which it takes shape. The confl a- tion of these two apparently contradictory states can be compared to the intrinsic contradiction of an ethic of autonomy as propounded at the beginning of this paper, the contradictory co-existence of a categorical moral imperative and an autonomous rational subject. In the case of architecture, and the more specifi c topic of ornament, which we are considering here, the shaping of an autonomous, self-determined architecture seems to run counter to a universally valid rule of architectural practice. Whereas in the case of ethics the contradiction is much more pronounced due to the reference to the rational subject (the individual opposed to the universal), in architecture the contradiction is equally strong if we take into account its cultural-social inheritance. The argument that the universality of the autonomous logic of the work of architecture derives from the materiality of the discipline – materials and construction technology – is uncon- vincing when we know that architecture is produced within specifi c social and space-time conditions. Consequently, the solutions to the contradictory states observed in the two autonomies, ethical and architectural, are, in fact, comparable. Ornament is woven into the fabric of the concept of construction in the period we are considering, creating a harmonious architectural whole, while the spirit of the age and of mass production contrib-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 ute to the resolution of the contradictoriness we described. Simplicity and austerity work together in a minimalistic clarity of form and by extension refuse to compromise with temporo-spatially partial elements. But the simplicity and austerity come from the context itself, from the productive and social space-time of the architecture. And this specifi c condition of context contributes to the development of an autonomous architecture (the term ‘architecture’ implies the concept of ornament, especially in the period we are concerned with). Ethic and ornament 47 Ethic and ornament in contemporary age Let us move on now to the contemporary age. In the post-humanist era, as it is commonly described, the concept of ethics is defi ned differently than it was in modernity. Although in its offi cial sense it concerns human rights – as Badiou (1998) observed, it rediscovers humanist individuality in the sense attributed to it by a signifi cant intellectual movement (which has its roots in Foucault, Althusser and Lacan) – ethics is linked to the concepts of difference, otherness, multiple truths (Bridge 2000). Detach- ing ethics from the logic of the Self, the primacy of substance and identity, they transform it radically. A contributing factor in this transformation was the contemporary framework of our post-(hyper)modernist culture with its uncertainty, its fragmentation, its continual changes and the dissolution of values and benchmarks. Of course, ethics with its modernist content was already being challenged as early as the beginning of the twentieth century. As Alain Renaut (2009) noted, the secularisation of ethics takes more than a century. The reaction to the anthropocentric view and the supremacy of reason against our innate propensities began to be recorded in the arts in the nineteenth century. In post-(hyper)modernity, then, the ethic of autonomy-propriety is replaced by the ethic of independence, of multiple deviant truths, of desire. This last term, which Lacan insists on, means that desire as an instinctive element of the unconscious is potentially able to create a breach in the institution- alised knowledge of a situation and bring about the desired transcendence of the symbolic order. This is the element that Badiou considers superfl u- ous to a situation and calls an event, contending that it is “what compels us to decide a new way of being” (Badiou 1998: 50). If we do not delve more deeply into the Lacanian interpretation of the term, there is a risk that we will join the camp of those who think that the turn towards desire and multiple small truths is bringing back a selfi sh individualism and pushing us away from collectivity and the social good. And it is here that there is a contradiction between what Lacan’s analysis reveals about the constitution and function of the subject and the political outcome that may result from the (unilateral) insistence on the role of desire and the event in man’s social progress. Replacing the subject with the concept of the person and singleness (the differences between individuals are irreducible and constitute in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 themselves imprescriptible values) creates a new condition for human functioning within which the authoritative structures are theoretically weakened, since on the practical political level, these structures, with their aggregative, pervasive, invisible, but also supremely material universal character, are for the moment at least gaining strength. We will not dwell here on the political weight of the viewpoint of the new ethics. What we are interested in is its impact on architecture. But before moving on to that, we must take a brief look at the concept of communication, which is a term common to both contemporary ethics and contemporary architecture. 48 Claudio D. Conenna and Kyriaki Tsoukala The term ethic of communication, synchronous and supplementary to what we have already said about the ethics of our age, relieves the latter of the harsh criticism of monologicality, since the newer philosophies had, as a rule, reduced the ethic of experience, the relation the subject maintains with itself, to a privileged topos (Lee 2001). The dialogical model defends the displacement of the centre of gravity of the ethic of experience from the subject and its refl exivity to language-mediated communication (cultural policy). Speech acquires particular weight, being in part disencumbered of the qualities of textual formal language (structured by ruling/authority-wielding classes). Speech and everyday existence join forces to combat the values of the single and universal, the like/same and the whole. Within this everyday world, the emergence of desire and small truths is probable, as is a change in the way of being of singleness and (neo)collectiveness. A loose communication in the sense of a lectical reconciliation emptied of meaning by the powerfully established signifi cations of the past and the single universal truth comes to the fore, and with it the newly interpreted concepts of participation, interaction, responsiveness, fl uidity and variability (of meanings) and creative reciprocal infl uence (Ryu 2001). In this age of new technologies, these concepts relate to people’s contacts with one another, and to their relation with the new electronic tools – chronotopes (computers). Architecture in the age of informatics acquires new properties and qualities participating in contemporary refl ections on the ethics of independence and communication. Emancipatory logic, technologism, responsiveness, communication and the absorption of conceptual doublets in the new optic of difference weave the fabric of contemporary architectural thinking and ethics. We shall examine some representative examples of discourse and praxis to see how our subject, ornament and decoration, is reinterpreted by contemporary architectural movements. Although we will be referring to an architecture that wants to participate – in its own morphological/symbolic way – in the abolition of distinctions and meanings imposed from above, we will try to distinguish three trends within it. The fi rst trend, consistent with its theoretical origins, harks back to the ethic of independence and, elaborating the possibilities of construction per se as these take shape in the contemporary technological context, creatively reinterprets the ideas and practices of the modern movement and certain of its predecessors (cf. what has already been said about our subject in modernity) and organically links ornament with the building’s functional

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 and structural elements and surfaces. With the help of parametric geometry, the concept of the independence of architecture (in which the rule is inherent) shifts to independence from the rule, since architecture’s new electronic and mathematical tools correspond to the desideratum of the realisation of ideas about difference, folding, unifi ed surface, conceptually shallow space and coexistence of many small individual spaces. The second trend , looking to the most recent and most advanced technological achievements, succeeds in compounding ornament and decoration in a single theme, combining them with the building’s function and Ethic and ornament 49 static-bearing structure. More consistent with the theories that oppose the conceptual doublets and their social-authoritarian implications, this trend puts an end to the antithesis between ornament and decoration, abolishes the dividing line between them, treating them as a composite subject, as production/self-genesis of form. The third trend , indifferent to the functional-symbolic synthesis of ornament and decoration, handles the question discretely. This trend, however, does not appear inconsistent with the global ethic of our era. We have mentioned the ethic of communication, a fl uid and continuously changing reconciliation. In the context of this ethic, contemporary examples of architecture use decoration as a means of expression, indifferent to its distinction from ornament. It could be argued that of these three trends, the fi rst and the second are continuing to work out the question of construction and its contribution to the making of an independent architecture that is not identifi ed unequivocally with rationalism, but is interested in sentiment and emotion, in the existentialist concerns of the individual. The third trend, on the other hand, realises the concept of independence in reference not only to the architectural environment, but also to the very language of architecture. The building has the neutrality of a box whose sides display multiple small messages, at once the same and different, in a playful and decorative manner. The coexistence of rationalism and sentiment that we fi nd in the second trend is replaced here by a fl uid communication, variable and centrifugally nonsignifi cant. Let us look now at certain examples of these three trends. The fi rst trend is exemplifi ed by the work of Zaha Hadid, with static systems embodying an interesting and original expressivity. In buildings like the Nordpark railway station in Innsbruck (2004–2007), the Aquatics Centre in Lon- don (2005–2011), the Heydar Aliyev Cultural Centre in Baku, Azerbaijan (2007) or the Tower Beijing Complex (TBC) in the Wangjing Soho district of Beijing (2009–2014), shell and static system are as one and function as a prototypical ornament. The works of Norman Foster also belong to this group: in the Swiss Re Tower in London (1997–2004), for example, the external diagonal mesh is not decorative but ornamental, since form and static system do not function separately but are indivisibly linked (Powell 2006: 88) – which is the outlook of Gothic architecture and the philosophy of Viollet-le-Duc. The plastic shape of this tower enhances static func-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 tion and, due to its bioclimatic design, is also very energy efﬁ cient. The diagonal bands of ornament visible through the exterior glass shell over the entire building follow the ventilation shafts extending through each ﬂ oor for optimum interior air circulation. In this building, where static-bearing structure and pinecone shape are organically linked, the architectural result displays an Apollonian geometrical logic. One might compare this tower to another organic proposal, this one Dionysian, where a totally different geometry also follows an organic form, this time a bird-made form. We are, of course, referring to the “bird’s nest”, the National Stadium built in 2008 50 Claudio D. Conenna and Kyriaki Tsoukala for the Beijing Olympics and designed by J. Herzog and P. de Meuron. Here, too, the static system plays a part in shaping the image that its composers conceived for their building. The idea of a diagonal latticework as exterior aspect and static system also appears as ornament in another building by J. Herzog and P. de Meuron, in the Prada Aoyama Epicenter in Tokyo (2000–2003). Here the static surface is an element in the building’s support system and as an all-embracing skin (perimeter walls and roof) wraps the entire building. The question of surface or skin is one of the most important elements in their work (Chevrier 2006). Each building is an experimental drawing board for working out surfaces with perforate, semi-perforate and/ or compact materials, designed to render those surfaces functional (they are usually intended to control interior lighting, a question that by extension affects the external appearance of the building). Whether the surfaces in their buildings are unchanging or variable, moving mechanically and/ or electronically, they incontestably project innovative visual and tangible stimuli exploiting the latest materials and the most advanced design and construction technologies. They open new horizons in terms of alternating Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016

Figure 4.1 Swiss Re Tower in London, architect N. Foster. © Kyriaki Tsoukala’s personal archive. Ethic and ornament 51

Figure 4.2 National Stadium in Beijing, architects J. Herzog and P. de Meuron. © Kyriaki Tsoukala’s personal archive. ornament on the façades of the buildings via variability. Digital design and construction technology offers an ongoing transformation of lighting, ventilation, heating/cooling and general functionality in the building’s interior behaviour, as well as its exterior appearance. Other examples of ornament combined with the functional and static organisation of space and a disposition to communicate cultural messages include Alvaro Siza’s design for the Portuguese Pavilion at Expo-98 in Lis- bon and the roof that EMBT (E. Miralles/B. Tagliabue) designed for the reconstruction of the Santa Caterina Market (1997–2005) in Barcelona. In both these structures, the architects combined functionality with identity in a highly original manner, without resorting to accessory decoration. These Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 contemporary structures do not make use of digital technology tools and methodology, like those mentioned earlier. Their architects, working in more conventional frameworks, succeeded in achieving a combination of ornament and static/functional elements and a renewed and particularly interesting morphological idiom. Alvaro Siza, working with civil engineer Cecil Balmond, used the idea of an awning to cover an exhibition area and realised it with a curved slab of reinforced concrete and prestressed cables. A similar idea, that of an impermanent awning, informs the EMBT project, perhaps as a visual reinterpretation of the old roof that covered the open-air market. The 52 Claudio D. Conenna and Kyriaki Tsoukala roof Miralles and Tagliabue designed is an irregularly shaped undulating col- oured surface that calls to mind the variety of produce displayed on the market stalls beneath. It is a complex structure, a permanent wood-and-metal roof covered by tiny terracotta tiles to achieve the result described, which is designed to give a powerful cultural identity to the theme of the street market. We encounter the roof idea again at the Rolex Learning Centre (2005–2010) in Lausanne, designed by Sejima and Nishizawa and Associ- ates (SANAA). What we have here is in essence a gently curving double surface (roof and fl oor slab) forming a single space punctuated by open patios, a space where the functions intermingle while remaining discrete. The reference to the rolling curves of the natural landscape is abstract rather than mimetic, reminiscent of how Oscar Niemeyer interpreted natural curves in his work (e.g., the installations in the Ibirapuera Park (1954) in Sao Paolo, Brasil. With this undulating double surface pierced by openings of different sizes, SANAA created a functional static skeleton which is in itself ornamental. A similar treatment of space was used by Toyo Ito in projects like the ‘Meiso no Mori’ Municipal Funeral Hall (2004–2006) in Gifu, Japan. The parametrically unifi ed curve of the roof and the vertical elements of the static system create a sensation of buoyancy and the impression of a feather-light awning. In other projects, too, like the entrance to the Barce- lona Expo extension (2002–2010), the Grin-Grin Park in Fukuoka Island City Central Park (2002–2005) in Hakata Bay and the Taichung Metro- politan Opera House (2005–2010) in Taiwan, Toyo Ito works with topological grid systems to create three-dimensional curving surfaces. Ornament and decoration coexist and work together towards the desired static and semeiotic-communicational result. Moving on to the second trend, which combines ornament and decoration in a single theme, we fi nd a more advanced technology than that just described, eliciting in people sensory or emotional responses using motion, voice or other biometric features. This is “interactive architecture” (Fox, Kemp 2009: 81, 87, 110, 145), with sensors that activate elements of the building’s exterior surface depending on ambient climatic conditions (light, temperature) or the kinesiological behaviour of the occupants. This technology was pioneered by Jean Nouvel in the Institut du Monde Arabe (1987–1988) in Paris: the compartments on the façade are actually shutters that open and close depending on the intensity and the angle of incidence

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 of the sun’s rays, creating a highly sophisticated brise-soleil . Today, technologically, we have more advanced examples of this kind of exterior and interior surfaces, where ornament and decoration coexist. These technologies have a dual character, on the one hand making the building more functional and on the other creating new aesthetic qualities in the composition as a whole. An example that springs to mind here is Christopher Bauder’s fl are façade : a kinetic ambient refl ection membrane made of electronically controlled tiltable fl ake bodies which create a dynamic, living skin, allowing the building to adapt its behaviour to ambient weather conditions. Ethic and ornament 53 Similar solutions were developed by Sachin Anshuman with “Pixel Skin 01”, “Pixel Skin 02” and “Robotic Membrane”, and Norman Foster for the Appeals Court Building on Madrid’s Campus of Justice. Because of its functional character, this technology could be described as technologically ornamental-decorative. In the previous examples, the architects handled the question of ornament-decoration in interesting ways, incorporating the latter into the static and functional behaviour of the building. Elsewhere, in contemporary architectural works shaped by a spirit of communication and symbolism, decoration is used as a supplementary element that reinforces the communicative mission of the building in question. An illustration of this third trend is the Swiss Museum of Transport in Lucerne (1999–2009), designed by Annette Gigon and Mike Guyer. The wheel rims that fi ll the space between the double glass panels on the outside of the building communicate its function in a symbolic and decorative manner, while on another of its façades a second skin is sheathed with road signs of all kinds, creating an additional decorative element on what is otherwise an austerely organised building. Two further examples, both in Barcelona, are the luxury Hotel Suites Avenue (2009), designed by Toyo Ito, and Jean Nouvel’s Agbar Tower (1999–2004) in Plaça de les Glorias. In the fi rst, the façade Toyo Ito proposes is a kind of brise-soleil over a regular glass surface; the undulating form of the thin metal exterior sheath has a sculpturality akin to that of the “La Pedrera” house, directly opposite. In the second case, to realise the thematic idea of a geyser spouting from the ground, the tower is covered with a surface of small textured glass tiles that suggests running water. Another building where a similar construction system was used to create a façade with a sheath of small movable glass panels forming a unifi ed surface is the U-Building (1996–1998) in Ibaraki, Japan, designed by K. Sejima & Associ- ates. In all three of these buildings, the exterior surface is independent of the static-bearing structure and the functional surface that surrounds and encloses the buildings. Contemporary technology and science make possible a different, freer expression of architectural form and construction. The concept of a rule or norm is weakened, and the new parametric geometry lends itself to experi- mentation and acrobatics in the framework of the ethic of independence, of difference, of the coexistence of multiple truths and singularities, of commu-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 nication. We saw projections of all these things in the buildings exemplifying the three trends we identifi ed, where diakosmos /ornament and diakosmesis / decoration are either combined and presented in the functional and/or structural elements of the building, or kept separate following different perceptions of the evolution of architecture. These new forms participate playfully in the changes of our age, corresponding to some newly emerging characteristics of Homo ludens . While we may fi nd satisfaction in this correspondence between spatial structure/form and man, the same is not true with a broader consideration of the social preconditions of an architectural design which is 54 Claudio D. Conenna and Kyriaki Tsoukala lacking, limited today to the radicalism of singularity, of the “real” (according to Lacan), of the event. This macrosocial dimension of architecture (by which we do not mean the specifi c great narratives of modernity, but other forms of operation of a society’s global competitive climate), essential to ensuring an ethic of space in our time, should contemplate in worksite terms a social parametric geometry of space, a space naturally artifi cial, creatively achieving a synthesis of the social and the individual.

In lieu of an afterword In architecture, diakosmos and diakosmesis are either kept separate or combined depending on the characteristics of the period. Ethic of autonomy in modernity is projected in architecture in the values of autonomy: frankness of construction and a universality of ways of organising form. In this ethical context (without forgetting the broader characteristics and parameters of that age), the concept of ornament is developed as a structural element of the building, while decoration is condemned to a role of superfl uous accessory, the use of which creates a graphic impressionism. Ornament as insepa- rable element of bearing structure or curtain wall subserves the logic of the autonomy of architecture, protecting it from the incursion of alien elements. This distinction between ornament and decoration ceases to exist in some contemporary currents while surviving in others. A conceptual polarity identifi ed in the world of architecture with the doublets shapely/unshapely, true/sham is tending (in the context of new practical and theoretical search- ing) towards eclipse, abolishing its internal distinctions and divisions in the name of coexistence and minor differences. Unifi ed surfaces, static systems that function simultaneously as roofs, shells and fl oors, create an exciting plasticity through the possibilities of modern digital programmes. Paramet- ric architecture and new materials assure consistency between theory and constructional practice. Meanwhile, two other currents tend to separate the two concepts, the one focusing mainly on the possibilities of construction itself (ornament) and the other on the communicative function of the building independent of its relation with the bearing structure (added decorative features). Of course, contemporary construction and contemporary decorative elements are very different from those of modernity. In the context of the neo-(hyper)modern age, construction and communicative function are

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 redefi ned. Construction ceases to obey an architectural idiom that, while autonomous, builds on strict universal rules. Freed from those rules, contemporary construction can and does on each occasion develop as unique and particular, while in other instances, a building’s exterior surfaces, skins attached to but independent of the core construction, turn it into a fl uid plane of communication. In all the previous cases, the ethic of this contemporary architecture is shaped within a broader climate of desymbolisation and designifi cation, detachment from the rule/truth/reason, and reinterpretation of the small-everyday-ephemeral-impulsive-potential. From the serenity Ethic and ornament 55 of order and the generally controlled preoccupation of the modernist experi- ment, we move to the unfolding of concerns, the playful provocation of the potential, the communication of the ordinary. This ethic is projected from within the architectural form, giving it the free expression, sculptural tangi- bility and communicative richness of the everyday in which, since the age of Lefebvre, the hope for radical change has been invested. The ethical dimension of contemporary architecture spends itself in psychoanalytical views of space that, for all their social content (cf. the three orders composing the ego according to Lacan), are entrenched on the scale of the individual, with the result that innovative architectural experiments – in many cases ostenta- tious to a degree bordering on narcissistic – take no interest in linking the structure with the broader collectivities/social strata and their needs, or in satisfying a spirituality beyond that created by a rift with the psychoanalytical real. We still encounter, as perhaps in every age, an insistence on newly emerging knowledge of human existence and function, divested of all prior experience, which we summarily steep in negativisms, frequently nullifying its global contribution to human civilisation. The synthesis of old and new through a process of critical fi ltration undoubtedly remains a diffi cult undertaking for many areas of our culture, including architecture and its ethics.

Bibliography Badiou, A. (1998) L’Ethique: Essai sur la Conscience du Mal, translated in Greek by B. Skolidis and K. Bobas, Athens: Scripta. Banham, R. (2008) Theory and Design in the First Machine Age , translated in Greek by I. Liakatas, Athens: The NTUA Press. Berlage, H. P. (1996) Thoughts on Style 1886–1909, Santa Monica: The Getty Center Publication. Bridge, G. (2000) “Rationality, Ethics and Space: On Situated Universalism and the Self-Interested Acknowledgement of ‘Difference’ ”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 18: 519–535. Britton, K. (2001) Auguste Perret , London & New York: Phaidon Press. Chevrier J. Fr. (winter 2006) “Ornament, Structure, Space. A Conversation with Jacques Herzog. Basel”, El Croquis, Herzog & de Meuron 129/130: 22–40. Duiker, J. (1995) “Tres Artículos de Duiker, Berlage y la Nueva Objectividad. Mani- festo de Frank Lloyd Wright”, Reseña del Libro Bouwen de Van Loghem. Cuad- ernos de Notas 3, Madrid: ETSAM.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Fox, M. and Kemp, M. (2009) Interactive Architecture, New York: Princeton Archi- tectural Press. Lee, S. (2001) “Transversal-Universals in Discourse Ethics: Towards a Reconcil- able Ethics between Universalism and Communitarianism”, Human Studies 24:45–56. Le Corbusier (1987) The Decorative Art of Today, trans. J. Dunnett, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Loos, A. (1980) Ornamento y Delito y Ortos Escritos , Barcelona: G. Gili. Powell, K. (2006) 30 St Mary Axe a Tower of London , London: Merrell Publisher Limited. 56 Claudio D. Conenna and Kyriaki Tsoukala Polano, S. (2002) Hendrik Petrus Berlage , Milano: Electa. Renaut, A. (2009) La Philosophie (in collaboration with J.-C. Billier, P. Savidan and L. Thiaw-Po-Une), translated in Greek by T. Betzelos and A. Stylianos, Athens: Polis. Ryu, H. (2001) “Ethics of Ambiguity and Irony: Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty”, Human Studies 24: 5–28. Russ, J. (2005) L’Aventure de la Pensée Européenne. Une Histoire des Idées Occi- dentales , translated in Greek by K. Katsimanis, Athens: Typothito. Viollet-le-Duc, Eu. E. (1987) Lectures on Architecture, trans. B. Bucknall, New York: Dover Publication. von Moos, St. (October 1987) “Le Corbusier and Loos”, trans. M. Sobiesky, Assem- blage 4: 24–37. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Part 2 Rethinking urban space Intentions and critique Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Introduction

Kyriaki Tsoukala

The four chapters in Part 2 focus on the relation between urban space and ethics, developing a critique and consideration of both the topic itself and the methodology of approaches to it. From the symbolist literature of the early twentieth century to the global cities of today’s post-industrial society, these four texts attempt multiple different readings and articulations of urban space and ethics, mediated by the conceptual and theoretical domain of architecture and space. The ethos of urban space that emerges from their authors’ varied perspectives, from the different chronotopes, conceptual starting points and theoretical constructs, has a plural character and is expressed in a collage of images of the production, life and experience of the city, its public and private space, its scale and materiality. In Chapter 5, “The many-chimneyed distances: ethical prospects of urban space”, Angeliki Sioli and Alberto Pérez-Gómez explore the spatial ethos of St. Petersburg through the semantic indeterminacies and equivocal semantic entanglements of Bely’s early-twentieth-century novel. The sense of spatial experience that emerges from the narrative, which undermines the intrinsic reality and avoids its conventional codes, is something that cannot be pinned down, something conditional, postponed and possibly anticipated. The city that takes shape on this loom of language, a seemingly unlimited web of continuously interchanging elements condemned to a permanent indeterminacy, takes on that same quality, and its ethos along with it. The authors recognise in this emerging ethos of the urban landscape the Aristotelian moral virtue of wisdom, that is, the virtue of practicality embodied in European cultures in the discipline of rhetoric and through story- telling. This “ethical

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 wisdom” is then cast into modern literature in the early twentieth century. This is precisely H.-G. Gadamer’s argument about how literature picks up the major philosophical topics after Romanticism. Pérez-Gómez and Sioli argue that it should be possible to learn something about the ethics embedded in space through literature, and suggest that this is a much better alternative than the often-misguided top-down dreams of early modern planners. Charikleia Pantelidou, in Chapter 6 , “Access and the ethos of space”, focuses on access as one constituent of the contemporary city. Looking at this subject from a political and sociological point of view, she seeks to 60 Kyriaki Tsoukala identify the parameters of a moral constitution of the concept of access, which she views in the context of its post-modern presentation and the con- current spatial-cultural turn, where the problem of access was articulated within the reality of the fragmentation of space and the intensiﬁ cation of exclusions. She observes a shift in interest from the normative dynamic of space to its punctual experience and an association of the concept of otherness with the problem of access to space. In this context, the moral inadequacy of the concept of access becomes apparent: restricted to the possibility of access, otherness lost any connection with the demand of equality, thereby shrinking into a formal, self-referential and self-evident concept far removed from any real experience rooted in everyday life. The author then examines the relation between the concepts of access and property ownership and argues that the contemporary reconstruction of social organisation on the basis of access to, rather than ownership of, space is a method of intensifying ownership, accumulation and the social gap. In the enduring conﬂ ict between the private and the public, ensuring access to space is on the one hand a proclamation of an equivalent freedom of movement and on the other a freedom that is perceived rather as a discrete entrenchment of the individual. Given the fact that the ethics of space is a function of the economic, political and cultural domain in which space is constituted and operates, the author concludes that the dynamic of free access to space needs to be studied in the context of a simultaneous quest for a spatial-social ethos of harmony between the individual and society, between private and public space. In Chapter 7, “The Singapore Flyer: view, movement, time and modernity”, Iain Borden explores, through an engagement with the work of Henri Bergson and Zygmunt Bauman, how the architecture, engineering and urban positioning of the Singapore Flyer are related to the representations of the new ways and ethics of Singaporean society. Borden takes us into the reality of the global city and the experience of some of its characteristic landmarks, extracting the ethos of the contemporary age from images of new urban phenomena. He looks for it not in the narrative novelistic discourse of space-time experience, but in representations of visitors to the Sin- gapore Flyer as these are constructed through their detached, spot-framed, cinematographic and panoramic relation with the city. The contemporary reception of the triple image of city-nation-world from this point of view,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 in correlation with the position of the self/individual in this ‘inevitable’ harmonious articulation, contributes to the construction of an image of the city that is developing with its own inescapable rhythms, incorporating into its system each individual/collective existence. Borden also considers ways in which these same experiences may offer citizens and visitors potential ways of rethinking Singaporean modernity through more individual and personal responses to the world in which they fi nd themselves. In the fi nal chapter in this section, in Chapter 8, “Ethic and space in contemporary Western societies”, we move from empirical reality back to the Introduction to part 2 61 fi eld of theory for an exploration of the multiple rapprochements of space with the ethos of the contemporary age in our Western societies. In this chapter, Kyriaki Tsoukala looks at the recent history of contemporary versions and visions of space and cites radical considerations of form, its interpretation, normativity and permanence, its constitution as a whole. Here, too, literature as theory serves as a milieu for the construction of a new spatial ethos. Eco and Bakhtin, as exponents of an open polyphony, an open process that is never completed and never delimited, create a place where space encounters an emerging new ethos. Focusing on the moral constitution of contemporary space in the context of post-structuralist approaches, the author observes that the expressions of architecture in an ultimate and extreme attempt at a reversal of points that Western civilisation had for centuries built and assembled take shape within the climate of the new ethic of happiness understood as a possible state that emerges in conditions of variability and performative-corporeal-participatory-dialogical action. The amorphous and the variable work together on the architectural and urban scale towards a semantically liberated and powerfully activated corporeal performative human use of space, while the mutually supportive and participative atmosphere of the groups operating within this space give it a microsocietal multipolarity. Nonetheless, the weak intentionality of invention of a common global fi eld of political action makes collective space a place of activity of monophonic societies. The author argues that an ethical constitution of contemporary space can guarantee the movement of the individual/group within society, in other words, the function of dialogical performative activity in historical-social space-time with its characteristic dynamic diversity. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 5 The many-chimneyed distances Ethical prospects of urban space

Angeliki Sioli and Alberto Pérez-Gómez

“All planners should learn just how great an abyss can separate the rules governing the rationality of a project from the rules governing the receiv- ability of its outcome. So it is necessary to learn to see the act of inhabiting as a focus not only of needs but also of expectations.” (Paul Ricoeur, 1996: 71–72)

And he wanted the carriage to fl y forward, the prospects to fl y to meet him – prospect after prospect, so that the entire spherical surface of the planet should be embraced, as in serpent coils, by blackish gray cubes of houses; so that all the earth, crushed by prospects, in its lineal cosmic fl ight should intersect, with its rectilineal principle, unembrace- able infi nity; so that the network of parallel prospects, intersected by a network of prospects, should expand into the abysses of the universe in planes of squares and cubes: one square per “solid citizen,” so that . . . After the line, the fi gure that soothed him more than all other sym- metries was the square. At time, for hours on end, he would lapse into an unthinking contemplation of pyramids, triangles, parallelepipeds, cubes and trapezoids. (Bely 1978: 11)

Senator Apollon Apollonovich’s dreamy contemplations would keep wan- dering around geometrical ﬁ gures and ideal urban plans, while crossing the rectilineal prospects of St Petersburg “dwelling in the center of the black, perfect, satin-lined cube; his carriage” (Bely 1978: 11). His reveries would be

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 meticulously recorded in a novel that, in its fi nal form and before the intervention of censorship, appeared in the Russian literature in 1922, and presents particular interest from an architectural and urban planning perspective. The novel is titled Petersburg and its author, the symbolist Andrei Bely, would not choose the title haphazardly. The plot’s main protagonist is undoubtedly the Russian city of St Petersburg (Barta 1996a: 12), its streets, public spaces and the activities that emerge in and because of them, in the early days of October 1905; this was an eventful time marked by strikes and public protests manifesting the political tension between the middle class and the The many-chimneyed distances 63 aristocracy, a tension which eventually forced the tsar in power, Nicholas II, to grant the country a constitution (Blair 2006: 71), and led to the fi rst revolution of St Petersburg in December 1905.The narrative’s unraveling focuses on the interactions between the urban environment and its inhabitants, offering an understanding of place as perceived and experienced by them. It also provides invaluable insights in how the city’s unique urban plan is appropriated and how its physical presence infl uences the dwellers’ ethical consciousness and leads to political actions and confl icts driven by conceptions of the common good, a topic we wish to further unpack in this chapter. The story’s opening lines introduce the reader to one of the plot’s main characters, the city’s central and most renowned thoroughfare, Nevsky Prospect:

Nevsky Prospect possesses a striking attribute: it consists of a place for the circulation of the public. (. . .) Nevsky Prospect, like any prospect, is a public prospect, that is: a prospect for the circulation of the public (not of air, for instance). (. . .) Nevsky Prospect is rectilineal (just between us), because it is a Euro- pean prospect; and any European prospect is not merely a prospect, but (as I have already said) a prospect that is European, because . . . yes . . . For this reason, Nevsky Prospect is a rectilineal prospect. Nevsky Prospect is a prospect of no small importance in this un-Russian-but-nonetheless-capital city. Other Russian cities are a wooden heap of hovels. (Bely 1978: 2) A number of unexpected urban characteristics emerge through the literary description. From the outset, the street is emphatically rendered as an important European place of an “un-Russian” capital. St Petersburg seems to be distinctively different from the rest of the Russian cities, no more than “wooden heaps of hovels.” The street is primarily (although hesitatingly) described as serving the circulation of the public, a quality the author surprisingly characterizes as striking. Shouldn’t all streets serve the circulation of the public? Shouldn’t a prospect like Nevsky in particular, in all its architectural grandiosity, the immensity of its dimensions and the proliferation of its public institutions, serve by default the circulation of the public? Bely

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 ingeniously questions this commonplace urban assumption, implying on the one hand that the austere urban plan of the city has historically promoted actions of suppression of this circulation and on the other hand preparing the reader for instances in which this circulation will actually take place and new possibilities of urban appropriation will emerge, altering both the city and its inhabitants. While the plot unravels, the author’s choice of the word circulation is further justifi ed given that circulation also signifi es the public availability and knowledge of something like the circulation of news, the exchange of ideas 64 Angeliki Sioli and Alberto Pérez-Gómez or discussions, temporal interaction between people. With his poetic image of “a prospect for the circulation of the public,” Bely hints towards the fact that Nevsky (as other prospects of the city) will at particular instances emerge as places that enable these temporal interactions. They will bear qualities of what Hanna Arendt has defi ned as the “space of appearance,” one that had a more permanent existence in the traditional cities of Greek antiquity and Christian ecclesia , but that became ‘fragile’ with the outset of European modernity in the eighteenth century, failing to survive the actuality of the movement that brings it into being, and disappears with the dispersal of men and the arrest of the activities themselves (Arendt 1998: 199).These temporal instances as described in the novel will further allow people to raise their own voice, pursue their ethical quests and form their proper opinions:

Cutting across columns of conversations, he caught fragments, and sen- tences took form. “Do you know?” was heard from somewhere on the right. And died away And then surfaced: “They are planning . . .” “To throw . . .” A whisper from behind: “At who?” And then an indistinct couple said: “Abl . . .” They passed by: “At Ableukhov?!” The couple completed the sentence somewhere far away: “Abl-ution is not the sol-u-tion for what . . .” And the couple hiccupped And the stranger stopped, shaken by all he had heard: “They’re planning . . .” “To throw . . .?” Whispering began all around: “Probable . . . proof . . .” The stranger heard not “prob” but “prov,” and ﬁ nished it himself:

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 “Prov-ocation?!” Provocation began its revelry all along the Nevsky. Provocation had changed the meaning of the words that had been heard. (Bely 1978: 15–16)

Walking among bunches of people gathered on Nevsky Prospect and weaving together pieces of different conversations, the stranger of the passage – a member of the revolutionary party already aware of the party’s intention to assassinate a high-ranking offi cer and ethically torn by the The many-chimneyed distances 65 moral implications of this action – believes this piece of information to have become public knowledge. The meaning he attributes to his subjective perception, and thus the behavior it calls forth, is affected by the spatio-temporal background and context against which it is perceived (Crossley 2001:67). The city is already a carrier of immense political tension, a receptacle of turmoil and intensity, with its social confi gurations standing on delicate balances. Its political history, overwhelmed with incidents and stories of con- spiracies (implemented in many of the tsars’ own lives), colors further the prevailing mood. In Bely’s narrative this richness is embraced in full and is in constant dialogue with the people’s interaction with the space, with the author exploring constantly the interweaving between an urban environment already embedded with tension and the ebullient inner world of Petersburg’s dwellers. Before ‘walking’ further in this particular urban environment and tracing how its prospects are experienced and appropriated, a deeper understanding of the place itself is necessary. Founded in 1703 on fl at land reclaimed from swamps, this wonderful obsession of Peter the Great driven by both rationalism and geometry was one of the most remarkable new cities of early modernity and became an urban design paradigm for later centuries, with a system of islands, canals and broad, straight linear avenues and streets, named Prospects and Lines, respectively. As the historian Solomon Volkvov points out, Tsar Peter the Great (with the help of the French architect Jean-Baptiste Alexandre Le Blond) plotted the city with ruler in hand, designing broad, straight pershpektivy , a word deriving from the Latin pro-specto , which means to look into the distance (Volkov 1995:10–11). The main pershpektiva , Nevsky Prospect, was built in 1715, following the main design intention of the city to present a clear geometrical pattern, giving a clear priority to the planimetrical conception of the urban space and foregrounding the predominance of a visual experience of the urban environment, one that would allow for clear unobstructed views in great distance, control and surveillance:

The wet, slippery prospect was intersected by another wet prospect at a ninety-degree right angle. At the point of intersection stood a policeman. And exactly the same kind of houses rose up, and the same kind of grey human streams passed by there, and the same kind of yellow-green

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 fog hung there. But parallel with the rushing prospect was another rushing prospect with the same row of boxes, with the same numeration, with the same clouds. (Bely 1978:11)

While Peter the Great’s geometrical obsessions may have originated in the will to materialize a still-believable (Baroque) transcendental political order, Bely captures moments that cause quasi-mystical raptures in this 66 Angeliki Sioli and Alberto Pérez-Gómez austere geometrized urban environment. The novel is unique in portraying the physical environment of the city at the time, without any fi ctive elabo- rations. Robert Maguire and John Malmstad have in particular noted that “through a careful and lavish specifi cation of the peculiarities of climate, geography and prominent architectural features, Bely manages to convey a sense of the actual physical presence of the city” (Bely 1978: xv). He is interested in getting the historical events of the time exactly right, down to the soggy weather (Blaire 2006: 72), and in some chapters he even records the political events reported in the newspapers of the day (Bely 1978: xiv), making the novel a compelling account of how the urban space of the city was appropriated and inhabited by its citizens during the fall days of 1905. The plot weaves around the fi gures of Apollon Apollonovich and his son Nikolai Apollonovich – the Ableukhovs – who live in a house by the banks of the River Neva. Apollon Apollonovich Ableukhov, a sixty-eight-year-old senator (head of a government institution), represents the existing political status quo that feels and fears the forthcoming sociopolitical changes. Leav- ing his home early in the morning, he dreadfully looks at “the expanse of the Neva, where the foggy, many-chimneyed distances were so wanly etched” (Bely 1978: 9) and gazing at the chimneys of the factories that surround the city, fears that the working class will invade the core of St Petersburg and overrule the existing governing class:

Apollon Apollonovich did not like the islands: the population there was industrial and coarse. There the many-thousand human swarm shufﬂ ed in the morning to the many-chimneyed factories. (. . .) Apollon Apollonovich did not wish to think further. The islands must be crushed! (Bely 1978: 11)

Nikolai Apollonovich, his son, is, on the contrary, strongly in favor of this possible change. He is a student of philosophy and involved with the ‘revolutionary’ party. Early on in the novel the reader realizes that Nikolai has given the party some sort of imprudent promise to kill a high-ranking ofﬁ cer. His fellow student, Alexander Ivanovich, visits him in order to deliver for safekeeping a sardine tin. As the plot unravels, Nikolai realizes that the tin contains a bomb with a timing mechanism and that the party demands he use

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 it in order to blow up his own father. This realization takes place in the middle of a masquerade ball in which Apollon Apollonovich also participates and realizes his son’s involvement with the party and the menace that threatens his life. After the events in the ball, the narrative mostly explores the changes in the consciousness and emotions of Nikolai and Apollon, who both will ﬁ nd themselves in the city many times, walking in its prospects alone or among people, trying to decide what course of action to follow. As the time bomb keeps ticking throughout the pages of the novel, the Winter Palace, one of the city’s most renowned buildings and residence of Russia’s ruling class (home The many-chimneyed distances 67 today to the Hermitage Museum), appears to bleed in Bely’s poetic language, a metaphor which hints at Tsar Paul I’s actual murder, an assassination in which his own son Alexander was involved (Barta 1996b: 164), reminding the reader how the city’s history is actually haunted by incidents of such atrocities. Bely describes how such dark memories embedded in the urban environment affected the common man and paradoxically enticed the populace to look for solace and guidance in the city. “Everyone feared something, hoped for something, poured into the streets, gathered in crowds and again dispersed” (Bely 1978: 51). It is particularly in this turmoil that the city streets, instead of transmitting an atmosphere of surveillance and police enforce- ment, were actively appropriated by the citizens as meeting places for political purposes. Their extensive length enabled massive gatherings, strikes and demonstrations, and their Western character was appreciated as a trigger that reinforced the working class’s claim for change and a different future:

Shaggy Manchurian fur hats were pouring onto the streets and melting into the crowd. The crowd kept growing. Shady types and Manchu- rian fur hats were moving in the direction of a gloomy building with becrimsoned upper stories. By the gloomy building the crowd consisted of nothing but shady types and Manchurian fur hats. And they pushed and shoved through the entryway doors – how they pushed, how they shoved! But how could it be otherwise? A worker has no time to bother with manners. A bad smell hung in the air. At the intersection near the pavement a small detachment of policemen were sheepishly stamping their feet in the cold. Their commanding ofﬁ cer looked sheepish. Gray himself in a gray coat, the poor fellow kept shouting and deferentially hitching up his sword, with downcast eyes. And from behind there came at him rude remarks, rebukes, laughter and even, my, my, obscene abuse (. . .). And the ofﬁ cer kept shouting: “Keep moving, folks, keep moving”. (Bely 1978: 62–63)

The “gloomy building with” the “becrimsoned upper stories” in front of which the demonstration takes place is, as literary research has claimed, presumably the city’s university, where a demonstration indeed took place on October 5. As the poetic language describes, the individuals (workers in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 their majority) who pour in the area to join the rest of the citizens melt in the crowd, get absorbed by it, become part of it and subsequently stop standing out. Their bodies act purposively and both seek out and reply to meanings within their environment. The crowd of the city seems to consist only of hats and shady types for Bely – shady because of their indignation against the political regime on the one hand, but also shady in a way that implies they cannot be clearly distinguished in the mass by the policemen who attend to the scene. Policemen are depicted as standing by discreetly, unable or unwill- ing to react. The occupation of the big linear university embankment by a 68 Angeliki Sioli and Alberto Pérez-Gómez massive amount of people weakens the policemen’s control in terms of their power to know who the people are who walk in the streets. It is an interesting contradiction of the earlier image of the city’s urban plan captured by the author, the one indicating how the austere urban plan can acquire an oppressive presence for the city’s dwellers. Their active engagement with the urban environment is not only a way of political action, an active expression of the citizens’ collective awareness, but also a way of interacting with and changing the city – its image, its physical state, its spatial features, even its odor (“a bad smell hung in the air”). It is a “refi guration” of space as defi ned by Ricoeur, an inhabiting as response, or even riposte, to the built environment, where the act of inhabiting is understood as a focus not only of needs but also of expectations (Ricoeur 1996: 66–67). From a phenomenological point of view, which valorizes the a priori existence of place, this observed connection of urban place and architectural program (program understood here as the activities that ‘take place’ in a space) is not coincidental. “There is no doubt that the ordering of a particular place – and the specifi c way in which a society orders space and time – is not independent of social ordering (. . .)” as Australian philosopher Jeff Malpas argues, but that “however this is not to legitimize the claim that place is merely a social construction” (Malpas 1999: 35–35). We should be aware that “the social does not exist prior to place and is given expression except in and through place. It is within the very possibility of place that the social arises” (Malpas 1999:35–36). Experiencing the place while actively participating and interacting with it through their “lived body” as the novel compellingly presents, the place of the city is actually revealed “as capable of telling the characters who and what they are in terms of where they are” (Casey, 2005: xv). The dimensions are not arithmetical or understood rationally, but embodied and “many-chimneyed.” Bely captures this embodied understanding of the place in a most lyrical way, confessing in one of his poems: “I am a symbolist, my organs are measuring instruments” (Boris 1977: 12–13). Fully submerged in the place of St Petersburg, both Nikolai and his fellow student Alexander will realize that they are not assassins and that they are capable of trying to change the fl ow of events. The novel fi nishes with the explosion of the bomb, which doesn’t physically hurt anyone, apart from damaging a small part of the Ableukhovs’ house: Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Nikolai Apollonovich ran up to the place where there had just been a door. There was no door: there was a huge gap from which smoke billowed. Had you looked into the street, you would have seen that a crowd was gathering, that a policeman was pushing them back off the sidewalk, that the gawkers, heads thrown back, gaped at the sinister yellowish-lemon clouds pouring out of the black gaps of the windows and out of a fi ssure that cut across the house. (Bely 1978: 288) The many-chimneyed distances 69 The threat of the bomb, and the political reality it speaks about, trig- gered a new set of relationships among the characters, led the heroes in the streets, transformed their perception of the city and their understanding of themselves. Human actions and emotions resonate with their urban environments in Petersburg to reveal purposeful, poetic dwelling taking place. It could, of course, be argued that the ways the city is appropriated in Bely’s narrative is really particular to the historical changes that took place in St Petersburg during the fall of 1905 and do not relate to a more general common use of the place, which could offer some meaningful architectural lessons regarding space appropriation and interaction with the urban environment outside this strict historical frame. To this disclaimer, Merleau-Ponty’s observation – that history is not the succession of discrete events, past and present, but their cumulative penetration in an unfolding process, and it is habit, as the sedimented effect of the past within the present, that allows this penetration and unfolding to occur (Crosley 2001: 135) – offers the most appropriate answer. Despite the particular historical circumstances taking place in St Petersburg in October 1905, peoples’ interaction with the city, the elements of the urban environment that infl uence and affect their decisions and self-realizations, are all characteristic of the place that St Petersburg was and still is, a city with broad wide streets “for the circulation of the public” (Bely 1978: 2). Indeed, it is not surprising that despite the different incidents of suppression and authoritative control that have haunted the city’s history, St Petersburg has been, since its foundation, associated with a vivid public life, particularly as compared to Moscow, as the essay “Petersburg and Mos- cow,” published originally in Physiology of Petersburg in 1845 by the art critic Vissarion Belinsky, explains: “In Petersburg, the site of well-developed institutions that support a lifestyle both public and anonymous, the streets are still crowded at midnight: ‘Petersburg loves the street, strolling, thea- tre, café, music pavilions, in short all public institutions’ ” (Hakanen 2010: 198–199). Moreover, the article points out that “it is comfortable to walk in Petersburg: there are no hills or slopes, everything is fl at and even, sidewalks are paved with fl agstone, some even with granite – wide, even, and any time of year clean as a fl oor” (Hakanen 2010: 198–199). The ground’s fl atness and the urban design’s linear and wide streets (unlike the narrow streets of Moscow) seem to render the city into a place convenient for walking and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 socializing in public spaces, convenient for circulation. Moreover, St Petersburg emerges as a place where the disclosure of spatial ethics becomes clear through the poetics of narration. It is an invaluable lesson when we consider the architectural task of designing attuned places for the common good. It becomes clear that crucial to architectural meaning are concerns that go far beyond the ‘objective’ formal qualities of buildings, but rather involve temporal events that recognize, frame and modify the habits of a culture. Thus, seeking to make appropriate decisions in the generation of forms and spaces, architectural ethics appear not as norms (sophia ), 70 Angeliki Sioli and Alberto Pérez-Gómez but in relation to the Aristotelian tradition of phronesis , embodied in Euro- pean cultures in the discipline of rhetoric and through story-telling and cast into modern literature in the early twentieth century (Gadamer 1981: 146). Diving into the space of Petersburg thus teaches us about the ethics embedded in space much better than the often-misguided top-down dreams of early modern planners. The city appears through literary poetic language as a container of socio-cultural and political meanings that infl uence the embodied experience and consciousness of its inhabitants seeking the ‘good life’. Their active and fully bodily engaged perception of it reciprocally infl u- ences the city itself, transforming it in ways that often overcome the explicit or veiled intentionality behind urban planning and spatial architectural confi gurations. The novel reveals precisely how Peter the Great’s Baroque geometrical city of prospects enables both the possibility of authoritarian control and the freedom for the Russian people to dream of a revolution, as the ‘innovative’ geometrical plan created the framework for momentous ethical and political decisions, unlike the urban conditions in the “heaps of hovels” elsewhere in Russia.

Bibliography Arendt, H. (1998) The Human Condition , Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Barta, P. I. (1996a) Bely, Joyce and Döblin: Peripatetics in the City Novel , Gaines- ville: University Press of Florida. ———. (1996b) “Symbolization of Urban Space in Burges-la-Morte and in Andrei Bely’s Petersburg ”, in P. Mosley (ed.) George Rodenbach. Critical Essays , Madi- son, Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; London: Associated Univer- sity Presses. Bely, A. (1978) Petersburg, trans. R. A. Maguire and J. E. Malmstad, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Blair, E. (2006) Literary Petersburg, A Guide to the City and Its Writers, New York: The Little Bookroom. Boris, C. (1977) The Poetic World of Andrey Bely , Amsterdam: Hakkert. Casey, E. (2005) Earth-Mapping, Artists Reshaping Landscape, Minneapolis: Uni- versity of Minnesota Press. Cassedy, S. (1985) Selected Essays of Andrey Bely, trans. S. Cassedy, Berkley: Uni- versity of California Press. Crosley, N. (2001) The Social Body, Habit, Identity and Desire . London; Thousand

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Oaks, CA: SAGE. Gadamer, H.-G. (1981) Reason in the Age of Science, transl. F. G. Lawrence, Cam- bridge; MA: The MIT Press. Hakanen, U. (2010) “Panoramas from Above and Street from Below”, in O. Matich (ed.) Petersburg/Petersburg: Novel and City, 1900–1921, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press: 194–216. Malpas, J. (1999) Place and Experience, a Philosophical Topography . Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. The many-chimneyed distances 71 Ricoeur, P. (1996) “Architecture and Narrative”, in Identity and Difference: Inte- gration and Plurality in Today’s Forms, Cultures between the Ephemeral and the Lasting , trans. H. Evans, Milano: Electra: 64–72. Volkov, S. (1995) St. Petersburg: A Cultural History , trans. A. W. Bouis, New York: Free Press. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 6 Access and the ethos of space

Charikleia Pantelidou

Post-modern transformation of urban space The cultural shift that accompanied the swing to modernism included a spatial turn, in which space shot to historical pre-eminence as the element that could provide the answer to the social problem and bridge the way to human happiness. Undertaking such a task necessarily linked space with ethics, a fi eld enjoying a lively revival at the time. Briefl y, the change in culture shifted the focus of interest from the economic to the cultural sphere, taking the position that our knowledge of the world and our practices within it are determined by the functions of communication and not the relations of production. With this position, the passionate utopian desire of Marxist theory was transfused into a new post-modern radicalism that was the very antithesis of modernism (Storper 2001). In the triumph of complexity and informatics, space ceases to function as a place capable of transmitting messages, and operates as a vacuity, devoid of signifi cance but open to varied and unforeseeable interpretations and attributions of meaning (Tsoukala 2010). The freedom opened in this perspective was incompatible with the normative functions assigned to space by the modern movement with its vision of a new world of progress, justice and structural coherence (Terzo- glou 2010). In a competitive world, freedom demands fl exibility and small size, but the fragmentation of space made its subdivisions easier to manage and more controllable. Thus, the concurrence of escape from the iron cage of civilisation and the intensifi cation of socio-spatial control by the forces of the market halted the former at the attempt stage. Not that the question of access to space fi rst appeared with its post-modern Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 transformation, but it is a fact that the reality of segmentation paved the way for its problematisation. Along with the abandonment of class-based society and its bipolar foundation, the distinction between city and country or centre and region was considered obsolete, while the city refl ected a multiplication of sectors and divisions, proclaiming a hierarchy no longer vertical but horizontal (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000). Such a mosaic affords the theoretical possibility of mobility and relocation from one piece to another, a threat that was held in check by controlling access. Our whole life in Access and the ethos of space 73 the Western world is built on this phenomenon of access control, but its post-modern presentation is largely linked to the global reshaping of social life on the economic, political and cultural level. Questions of redistribution of wealth through universal participation in the labour market, questions of democracy through participation in decision-taking and questions of everyday living through participation in the common narrative were encapsulated in the concept of social exclusion, where the problem of access assumed the form of an explicit and irrevocable prohibition in addition to that of control. The spatial expression of this development was refl ected in multiform divisional and boundary tensions and in new forms of delimitation.

Spatialities of difference and spatialities of equality Access to space encapsulates the possibility of enjoying goods, services and rights, the sum of which delimits the contemporary happy life. The position of the barriers to freedom of mobility, free entry into and installation in space, thus cuts across human happiness at the phenomenon of socio-spatial exclusion. But understanding exclusion as a socio-spatial phenomenon – neither solely spatial nor solely social but partaking of both in a dialectical dependence (Soja 2010) – does not concern just the reality of the interlocking of social relations and spatial practices (Madanipour 1998), but also includes thinking that recognises a structural relation between space and the function of capital (Gough et al 2006). Thus, putting forward the question of access to space as an answer to the problem of exclusions manifests a detachment from interaction with capitalism and a clear assignment of the quest and the hope to the ﬁ eld of spatial planning. In the measure that the spatial turnaround focused on improving living conditions within the existing framework, the desired assurance of free access for all replaced the demand for equality and justice. As Aristotle said, there is no greater injustice than the equal treatment of unequals, and the essential inclusion of access in the long list of human rights meant abandoning Lefebvre’s vision of a city built by all, for all. The postulation of free access proved to be a problem of the partial possibility of enjoyment of collective goods, while at the same time redesignating the meaning of the latter as their use by greater numbers and detaching them from the demand of socialisation. In the measure that social integration indicates a sound society, social exclusion is understood as a blow to this soundness, and responsibility for Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 this failure is assumed by those excluded. The barring of the underclass from the accesses available to an ordinary citizen was ascribed to its cultural difference, while its spatial concentration was seen as setting the terms of the problem since it contributed to the establishment of a discrete way of life and a dysfunctional culture that perpetuated poverty and threat- ened social cohesion (Massey and Denton 1993). The development of the post-industrial city was aimed in part at combating social exclusion and integrating the excluded. Partial clearances of working-class neighbourhoods 74 Charikleia Pantelidou and the installation of the middle class would reshape the way in which the poorer classes lived, and at the same time would help upgrade services in those areas and destigmatise them. Large consumer centres combining commercial, recreational and cultural activities would be spaces in which different groups would mix to produce a supra-local culture. The emphasis on the revitalisation of the city centre would also mean providing ethnic minorities with access to a newly recovered urban cosmopolitanism, far removed from the traditional proletarian culture of the city (Gough et al 2006:195–197). Although the class and cultural mix of populations in urban space was a strategy for providing access to culture and in the end to the labour market, it intensiﬁ ed rather than attenuated the problem of exclusion because in a competitive framework of equality of opportunities, the losers tend to be the poor (Gough et al 2006: 207–208). In the measure that the moral dimension of space shifted from its normative function to its localised experience, the phenomenon of socio-spatial exclusion takes on an individualised form and the question of access illuminates difference. Universal access to space means congress, which leads to either a clash of differences or to coexistence when the difference becomes tolerated. The post-modern reinterpretation of freedom as a right to difference places the concept of access within the spatial category of freedom. In the measure that the clash of differences can be expressed in terms of the class struggle, the established order had every reason to incorporate respect for otherness and the provision of access to all into its rhetoric and practice, as long as this was compatible with the existing social distinctions. Combining space and difference through access has not been particularly successful, if one takes into account that, on the one hand, views of the city as a condenser of otherness absorbed and obliterated it, while, on the other, those that insisted on unassimilated difference proved impotent in the face of the consequence of urban fragmentation (Madanipour 1998). In its association with access to space and goods, otherness was restricted to a celebration of the plethora of existing differences, a fact that political liberalism welcomed and further developed. Having assured access, the exercise of the right of the different to coexistence is added subsequently to the given existence of the similar, and no one would expect a magnanimous and supportive making-way on their part. Access for otherness was no threat to the given distribution, since in that framework it always remained formal and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 therefore external in regard to the structural hierarchical constitution of the reality into which access gave it entrance, and was indeed approachable and open to commercial and alternative partnerships. The futility of difference in its relation with access does not nullify the value of that difference, but rather betrays the moral insuffi ciency of the concept of access. The exemplary proclamation of contemporary urban democracy would be: “all have a right of access to goods, regardless of their particular characteristics, class, race, sex, religion, etc.” (so long as they are citizens), where difference is confi ned to itself. The populist celebration Access and the ethos of space 75 of difference for its own sake (Storper 2001:166) is at the point where the only gain for the different is recognition and acceptance of the fact of their difference, which is reduced to a value in itself, while there is no effect on their social participation in the creation and enjoyment of the economy, politics or culture. The concept of free access proposes fi rst of all acceptance of otherness in all its forms, to which it then opens the possibility of enjoying social goods. Economic inequality is a form of otherness; but giving the poor access means tolerating poverty, and no one could easily affi rm that simply providing access to, e.g., work would cure poverty, since the fi eld of labour in the capitalist world constitutes a sizeable capital with a structural function in the generation of poverty. The post-modernist critique of the urban landscape of divisions and clearances speaks in defence of the right of the different to have access to space, but does not go on to offer solutions for their real enjoyment of space. Personal assumption of this obligation means the entry of the different into the free market of goods, but on unequal terms with the social whole. The abolition or blurring of boundaries is stated as a condition of justice among the different (Young 1990), but not all classes can respond to this cosmopolitanism. The narrow and portentous correlation of the concepts of access and difference seems to be linked to a corresponding disregard for and ultimate oblivion of equality. Thus, interest in inequality is confi ned to correction of its consequences without abolishing the disparity itself, despite the fact that genuine difference, not that of biological particularities but that which is engendered within everyday life, experience and practice, refers to the pluralism and complexity of the ways of habitation that a society of equals, no longer divided by class, race or gender, can create (Goonewardena and Kipper 2005: 676).

Tensions between private and public A standard method of managing space in capitalist societies is controlling access to the housing market. The market seeks to maximise its proﬁ ts via the social compartmentalisation of the city and price control (Harloe et al 1992). To function effectively, the free market needs the support of the state, and in this framework the ebbing of welfare provision is taken for granted. The quality of the neighbourhood and residential conditions are a function of income and purchasing power, and the poor are pushed out to deprived

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 districts which are of no interest to the private investment/construction sector. In recent decades the deregulation of the property market and the promotion of owner occupancy has made access to housing more diffi cult for the poor and led to the further deterioration of poor neighbourhoods (Gough et al 2006). In addition, increasing mobility, the decentralisation of services and urban sprawl with the spread of suburbs and urban islets on the outskirts of the city further intensify residential compartmentalisation and the ghettoisation of the poor, while access to the new spatial organisation of life is largely confi ned to the middle classes, the middle-aged and the 76 Charikleia Pantelidou male population (Knox and Pinch 2006). In order to reduce investment risk, businesses look for maximum control over consumer spaces, keeping the poor out (Gough et al 2006). This is where extensive privatisation of space fi nds room for development in the framework of neo-liberalism and today’s extreme exacerbation of socio-spatial exclusion, which thus materialises as the other face of socio-spatial exclusivity. Accessibility in urban infrastruc- tures is, to a signifi cant degree, a function of the class division of land: as a rule, the areas where richer people live have more and better quality services and amenities, while the opposite is true of areas occupied by poorer populations, while at the same time, proximity to urban services and amenities is a factor in the determination of land values. And conversely, differences between districts in access to rare resources – particularly educational – contributes to the perpetuation of class differences and urban division through the shaping of market skills, that is, the indirect determination of any person’s possibility of assuming a particular role in the economic system (Knox and Pinch 2006). Thus, spatial schemes for providing amenities and services are at the same time products of social formation and constituents of its perpetuation (Knox and Pinch 2006). Today, markets are surrendering to networks and access is increasingly replacing ownership (Rifkin 2000). This observation does not mean that ownership is vanishing; rather, it describes the reality of a contemporary intensifi cation of ownership through access. Instead of being bought and sold, property is now customarily let or made available by concession in return for some entrance charge or membership fee (Rifkin 2000). Access is a fl exible concept in comparison with the immobility of ownership, and usually takes place on a de facto noninstitutional social and moral level. As long as space was an object of ownership, the determining criterion for its enjoyment was one’s fi nancial state of health: anyone who had the money could buy property. From the moment that the possession, use and occupancy of space became subject to access, the fi nancial criterion became only one among many: political, as in the requirement of citizenship; racial, as in the condition of whiteness; cultural, as in possession of the necessary cultural capital, etc. Accompanied by additional criteria of such importance in post-modern terms, the category of wealth becomes acuter and more complicated. In spatial practice, access is related to ownership in two ways. One is as a substitute for ownership, when, instead

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 of using a space that is one’s own, as is the case with public space, for it belongs to all the citizens, one uses a space belonging to someone else who allows him access to it, as is the case with the new type of public space and, of course, rented space. The other is as a sort of antechamber to ownership, as occurs, for example, with private, gated communities, in the sense that for someone to be able to acquire a property in the specifi c space, he must fi rst be shown to be a suitable person to occupy that space and thus acquire access to the club of would-be purchasers. In both cases, ownership is reinforced by access. In the fi rst case, concession of the right Access and the ethos of space 77 of use is a commercial transaction accompanied by payment of money, so that possession of property generates wealth. And when it is owned by few, while the rest have only access and a right of use, the wealth accumulates in their hands. In the second case, meeting a set of criteria as a condition for achieving access to the possibility of ownership renders the fi nal acquisition of property more diffi cult and restricts it to those who meet the criteria. In this reinforcing function as regards its relation with ownership, the condition of access is implicated in the contemporary tension in the class-based spatial gap. Obviously, the primary exclusion is that created by ownership of property. Not that this does not apply to public property when it is accompanied by some form of imposition of authority, a clear example being that of urban clearances of public spaces, but the immediate and automatic implementation of exclusion is associated with the concept of private property, since the fact that ‘something is mine’ signifi es and acquires meaning in the understanding that it is not somebody else who is excluded from the use of the property unless he is granted access to it by the owner. We live in times of hyper-intensive ownership, since everything is being priva- tised. In our world, private property is a fundamental primary principle of democracy and an imprescriptible human right: it is the institutional basis for the economic operation of free exchange, since it legitimises the private accumulation of capital (Harvey 2003). And while in antiquity it was an element of the defi nition of the concept of the citizen as a free man as opposed to the slave who could not own property, in today’s ‘privatopia’, it seems to confi ne the content of the quality of citizen to adequate compli- ance with one’s obligations towards private property, one’s own and that of others (McKenzie 1994). In its neo-liberal interpretation, today’s civil society, threaded through with concepts like democracy, free market and human rights, is based precisely on distinguishing those who acquire access to goods by permission of the owner. This civil society comes together today in the new public spaces, which are chiefl y organised around consumer activities. However, the concept of access to space represents an individualised process in which each person comes into contact with the space and the functions it houses without most of them necessarily having any relation with one another. The linking of citizenship with consumption is something that is repeated in such a way as to imply that it is access

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 (to consumption and consumer space) that assures the quality of citizenship and not the other way around, in a modus vivendi of urban tolerance, in a common, parallel life of differences. On the other hand, in its radical comprehension, civil society aspires to universal access as a right of use and presence, to free public space in squares and streets as a declaration of radicalisation of the equality of civil rights as political emancipation, which, however, in the measure of its detachment from the economic framework, falls short of a full human emancipation (Goonewardena and Rankin 2004). 78 Charikleia Pantelidou The question of access seems to be related to the urban world in general, and not just to its contemporary form, where it is clearly heightened as both exclusions and restrictions on access multiply. Indeed, the unequal distribution of public amenities and services in the city, the social clearances of public spaces and the occupation of public space by cameras and security systems are all aimed at controlling public access to public space. Today, however, the question of access is acquiring particular interest in the face of the extensive privatisations of public space and collectivisations of private space. Private residences are increasingly assuming the form of collective, co-owned residential facilities, frequently fenced in by security and privacy measures, shrinking the public city. And traditional public spaces are either put under private management as a source of municipal revenue or are relocated to private spaces where mass assembly is controlled. In this sense, in today’s Western democracies, integration into the public sphere requires access to the sphere of private property (Mitchell 1995:116). The new (public) space is subject to the regime of private property, and participation in publicness depends on private consent. We think, however, that the question of access rests on a more ingrained basis, which reveals its moral inadequacy: the dissociation of private and public. It relates to the historical opposition between individual and society, when the individual replaced nature in the older antagonism between nature and society. The consideration of the individual-within-society and the private-within-the-public is proposed for the removal of this opposition in a framework that emphasises the active dialogical-confrontational quality of public space, which is thereby perceived as both political and social (Pantelidou 2011). In contrast, what we experience in the contemporary Western reality asserts an incompatibility between privateness and publicness, so extended and well established that it is widely believed as natural. Indeed, as private entities, we claim a right of access to public space because it is not self-evidently open to us and our entry into it can be controlled by the competent authority. But the preservation of public space from private access and the intrusion of private interests have been also propounded as a condition of democracy (Madanipour 1998). In the Western world, public space begins where private space ends and, conversely, private space begins where public space or another private space ends. This means that the freedom of one begins where the freedom of others ends, so that one’s freedom is in conﬂ ict and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 competition with the others’. This being the case, assuring access to space is a proclamation of freedom: in public space because that is where the quality of free citizenship is exercised, and in private space because private property is the primary human freedom. Interpreted in such a framework, however, freedom embraces competition with respect to the other and to publicness and comes to be perceived as an entrenchment of the individual in his private self. In this sense, the function of access is part of the management of this antithetical dissociation between public and private, and the intensity of interest in access in our time reveals how dramatic the gap between them Access and the ethos of space 79 has become. To that extent, the concept of access appears to be inadequate to contribute to the perspective of a happy and free life for all.

Access and socio-spatial sustainability In its contemporary dimensions, the concept of access is considered within the context of post-modern thinking and is the product of the intensity of competition and the particularity of collective goods: in the catholicity of ecological scarcity, the democratic desiderandum is universal access. The feeling of mortality awakens in the subject the need for life, but in the ‘war of all against all’ life and death are decided by the objectivity of power. The invocation of ethics in our age has precisely the sense of a substitution for power as a means of distribution of life and death in view of the col- lapse of other means. It is none other than an attempt to engage with the void of emancipation, and with this reactivation, ethics assumes a political role (Bauman 1993). Given that space is an element of our everyday life and also confi gures our practices, it necessarily takes part in this political engagement, and this participation is itself confi gured within the plural context where the space itself is produced in all its forms. The question of access is a fi eld of dialogue and confrontation between concepts and conditions like difference, freedom, equality, democracy, consumption, property, privateness and publicness. If we accept the historicity of human nature, then we see that these qualities and the relations that link them do not have any transcendentally determined content (Jameson 2004), but depend on the praxis of people and its constructions: in other words, on the context of the political, economic, cultural codeterminations and their undefi ned everyday aberrations. Given that the question of access to space and to goods is associated with the consideration of difference, the latter can function as a condition of democracy and freedom only in direct linkage with the social equality that touches the political, economic and cultural domain. Because relations of power are forged between unequals, and historically power is preserved by the imposition of exclusion or of a homogenous assimilation. And in addition, the constitution of this social difference of equals is feasible in the arena of everyday life, where the smooth ground of rules and defi nitions is fi ssured by potential emergences and authentic creation. Moreover, it is the same wide context of life where the ways of removal

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 of the constructed opposition between individual-private and social-public are placed. Today, it is well known that human life is too complicated to be interpreted through simplifying bipolarities and that its intense dynamic is precisely attributed to this complexity: in the perspective of structuring a socio-spatial ethos of the contemporary city, the nonantithetical mediation between private and public should be considered an essential element of the complexity of life. Since it is not possible to live a wrong life rightly (Adorno 2005), we need to make the question of access to space part of the broader social consideration, with its multiple articulations and 80 Charikleia Pantelidou correlations, attempting to rethink and rebuild all of the previous relations. Thus conceived, the ethos of a city that is accessible to all would approach a horizon of socio-spatial sustainability, being further resistant to the mul- tileveled absorbing mechanisms of today.

Bibliography Adorno, T. (2005) Minima Moralia: Refl ections from Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott, Brooklyn, NY: Verso. Bauman, Z. (1993) Postmodern Ethics , Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Goonewardena, K. and Kipper, S. (2005) “Spaces of Difference: Refl ections from Toronto on Multiculturalism, Bourgeois Urbanism and the Possibility of Radical Urban Politics”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research , 29, 3: 670–678. Goonewardena, K. and Rankin, K. (2004) “The Desire Called Civil Society: A Contribution to the Critique of a Bourgeois Category”, Planning Theory 3, 2: 117–149. Gough, J., Eisenschitz, A. and McCulloch, A. (2006) Spaces of Social Exclusion , London: Routledge. Harloe, M., Marcuse, P. and Smith, N. (1992) “Housing for People, Housing for Profi ts”, in S. Fainstein, I. Gordon and M. Harloe (eds.) Divided Cities: New York and London in the Contemporary World , Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Harvey, D. (2003) “The Right to the City”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27, 4: 939–941. Jameson, F (2004) “The Politics of Utopia”, New Left Review , 25, January-February: 35–54. Knox, P. and Pinch, S. (2006) Urban Social Geography: An Introduction, 5th edition, Harlow, GB: Pearson Education. Madanipour, A. (1998) “Social Exclusion and Space”, in A. Madanipour, G. Cars and J. Allen (eds.) Social Exclusion in European Cities: Processes, Experiences and Responses , London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. Marcuse, P. and van Kempen, R. (2000) “Conclusion: A Changed Spatial Order”, in P. Marcuse and R. van Kempen (eds.), Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order? , Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell. Massey, D. and Denton, N. (1993) American Apartheid: Segregation and the Mak- ing of the Underclass , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McKenzie, E. (1994) Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residen- tial Private Government , New Haven: Yale University Press. Mitchell, D. (1995) “The End of Public Space? People’s Park, Defi nitions of the Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Public, and Democracy”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 85, 1: 108–133. Pantelidou, C. (2011) “Convergences and Divergences of Public and Collective Space in the Western World Today”, International Critical Thought 1, 4: 437–443. Rifkin, J. (2000) The Age of Access: The New Culture of Hypercapitalism, Where All of Life Is a Paid-For Experience , New York: J. P. Tarcher. Soja, E. (2010) Seeking Spatial Justice , Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Access and the ethos of space 81 Storper, M. (2001) “The Poverty of Radical Theory Today: From the False Promises of Marxism to the Mirage of the Cultural Turn”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25, 1: 155–179. Terzoglou, N. I. (2010) “Modernity and Post-Modernity: Structure and Deconstruc- tion”, in K. Tsoukala, M. N. Daniil and C. Pantelidou (eds.) Post-Modern Sides , Thessaloniki: Epikentro. (In Greek). Tsoukala, K. (2010) “Complexity and Information in the Contemporary Architec- ture: The Boundaries of the Neutralization of the Signifying Space”, in K. Tsouk- ala, M. N. Daniil and C. Pantelidou (eds.) Post-Modern Sides, Thessaloniki: Epikentro. (In Greek). Young, I. (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton: Princeton Univer- sity Press. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 7 The Singapore Flyer View, movement, time and modernity

Iain Borden

How do we understand fantastical architecture such as the Singapore Flyer observation wheel, which oversees the grandiose Marina Bay urban development in Singapore? An undoubtedly magniﬁ cent engineering achievement, the Singapore Flyer is not a building, keeps moving and has no recognised designer, and therefore consequently resists interpretation through the kinds of conventional conceptual schema normally used by architectural historians, theoreticians and critics. The Flyer is also immensely popular, being visited by hundreds of thousands annually and is frequently offered up by the Singapore Tourism Board and others as representing one of the most visible symbols of Singapore’s rapid modernisation and globalisation. How then might we interpret the Singapore Flyer both as a piece of architecture and as way of perceiving and knowing Singaporean modernity? To begin with, the Singapore Flyer is hardly unique as an observation wheel, despite being the world’s tallest at 165m on its completion in 2008, and it therefore must be understood in the context of other recent creations around the world – including the London Eye (135m, 2000), Dia- mond and Flower Ferris Wheel at Tokyo (117m, 2001), Star of Nanchang (160m, 2006) and Melbourne Star (120m, 2009) – as well as in the context of earlier renowned examples, such as the original Ferris wheel at the Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition (80.4m, 1893) and Riesenrad at Vienna (64.75m, 1897) (Anderson 1992). Yet the Singapore Flyer misses some of the magical qualities associated with these other wheels, and has never quite managed to attract the degree of design kudos as that garnered, for example, by the London Eye via its entrepreneurial architects David

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Marks and Julia Barﬁ eld (Allsop et al 2008). This is perhaps unsurprising given that the engineering-led Flyer has much of its creativity incorporated within the hidden developmental aspects of its design, such as the innovative engineering calculations which were required to minimise the bulk of the 2-D ladder truss rim. It consequently lacks, to the untrained eye at least, those more evidently sophisticated characteristics such as the spider’s web ﬁ ligree construction of the Star of Nanchang, the iconic light shows of the Diamond and Flower or the futuristic passenger pods of the London Eye and Melbourne Star. The Singapore Flyer 83

Figure 7.1 View of the Singapore Flyer. © Christopher Cheng 2013.

From tower to wheel But rather than the design or construction of the Singapore Flyer, what of peoples’ experiences of the wheel, particularly when riding on it? Through such considerations, we begin to reach into the realms of Henri Bergson’s intelligent knowledge: “the faculty of constructing unorganized – that is to say artiﬁ cial – instruments”, wherein we may comprehend not only things

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 as objects, but also their systematic interconnection, as well as our own place within this system (Bergson 1998: 150). In his famous pre-9/11 remarks on the view across Manhattan from the 110th fl oor of the World Trade Center, Michel de Certeau contends that viewers gain an “optical knowledge” of the strategic organisation of the city, but are also cut off from the everyday street-level dynamism of New York (de Certeau 1984). Much of this correlates with the views obtained from the top of the Singapore Flyer – and indeed with the view from almost any high-level vantage point above any city worldwide – but there are also 84 Iain Borden distinct modulations to de Certeau’s model which can be discerned from the Flyer, as we shall see. A tower with a high-level observation fl oor does not offer the same spatio-temporal and visual experience as that of a giant Ferris wheel, despite the apparent similarities of offering a fabulous high-level view. To begin with, to reach the observation deck in a tower, the viewer normally takes an enclosed, high-speed elevator from ground level, part of the joy in such journeys deriving from the stomach-jolting accelerated ride in the elevator cabin itself, followed by a sudden emergence out of the dark and into the panoramas of the observation deck. On the Flyer, by contrast, the journey is itself light fi lled and far more gradual, the movement taking place both slowly and in a literally less straightforward (or straight-upward) manner, the curvature of the wheel creating a steady unfolding of the view as the rotation unhurriedly sweeps round. In addition, at the summit of a tower like, for example, the World Trade Center or Empire State Building in New York, the viewer normally fi nds themselves peering down upon the architectural hustle and bustle of a densely developed city, whereas the Singapore Flyer is comparatively set further apart from its urban neighbours, such that the viewer instead peers out towards rather than down upon the cityscape. And in temporal terms, the visitor to a tower can usually choose how long to stay on the observation deck, moving around the perimeter of the building as many times and in as many different ways as they like before choosing when to descend. At the Flyer, choices are far more circumscribed, for the time of the journey is entirely dictated by the wheel itself, while the spaces of the cabin – although of course allowing a wide-ranging 360-degree view – are far more constricted.

View And what of this view itself? On the one hand, in general terms, the visitor’s view from the Flyer is indeed similar to that panorama from the World Trade Center, where we observe space and the city as if it were an abstract map, where the whole city is rendered as if a giant model, where the messy, organic and conﬂ ictual appears to be controlled, planned and predictable and where a masterly knowledge of all of this can, apparently, be provided by vision alone. This condition is what David Nye calls a “geometrical sublime” (Nye 1994: 87–108), and the Singapore Flyer offers it in abundance.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 On the other hand, the specifi c view from the Singapore Flyer is quite different from that from a New York or London skyscraper and, as we shall see, so, too, is the kind of knowledge which it offers up. From the Flyer, while there is, of course, immediate urban architecture to be seen – such as when looking northwest across the East Coast Parkway highway towards the Millennia Tower, Suntec City and out beyond to serried ranks of Hous- ing and Development Board (HDB) residential blocks – this is neither the dense locality of Wall Street and the fi nancial district seen from the World Trade Center nor the heart of London seen from the London Eye. The Singapore Flyer 85 It is worth remembering here that although the Flyer itself is not a state-owned initiative but a private sector development-led project, it is nonetheless very much part of a government-controlled plan for Singapore’s economic and spatial development (Allsop et al 2008; Henderson 2010; Pereira 2005; Rashiwala 2005; Sim 2005; Tan 2003). The Flyer is above all an intrinsic element within Singapore’s large-scale Marina Bay urban development, overseen by the Urban Redevelopment Authority and incorporating such spectacular constructions as the Esplanade Theatres, renovated Fullerton Hotel, Waterfront Promenade, promontory event space, Art Sci- ence museum, The Sail @ Marina Bay exclusive residences, Helix Bridge and extensive Gardens by the Bay park (Bishop et al 2004: 2; Lee 2008: 177; Davey 2011; Davey et al 2010; Yuen and Goldblum 2008). Marina Bay also forms the setting for many large-scale tourist attractions and events, such as the introduction of gambling at the Marina Bay Sands casino and integrated resort (Henderson 2007; Wong 2008), concerts by world-famous performers and the city’s annual Formula 1 motor race (Singapore Tourism Board 2012). The immediate view from the Flyer, therefore, directly equates with the Singaporean government’s aims for the new marina, using a relatively high degree of aesthetic design and an amalgam of residential, business, fi nancial and entertainment facilities to focus more on giving impetus and ‘global face’ to the country’s strategic development imperatives, and less on the immediate and varied cultural needs of its diverse citizens (Bishop et al 2004: 8–11; Dale 2008; Park 2007; Soh and Yuen 2010; Wee 2007; Yeoh 2005). It also accords with the same government’s positioning of Singapore as the “hub of global culture as well as capital” and a “global city of the arts” through such facilities as the esplanade’s theatres (Arts and Culture Strategic Review 2008; Bishop et al. 2004: 7; Chang 2000; Chang and Lee 2003; Hutton 2012: 50–2; Kong 2009; Kong and Yeoh 2003: 162–84; Park 2007). Moving back to the Singapore Flyer, the immediate view from the wheel allows one to see all of these physical manifestations “writ large” upon the landscape (Hutton 2012: 44), and so suggests the Flyer as a kind of strategic spatial disposition within the planned modernity of Singapore rather than, say, a more localised placement of a tower amongst the comparatively unplanned bustle of London or New York. This is further emphasised by the mid-distance view to the south of the Singapore Flyer and over the Gardens by the Bay project. Here, Singapore is presented as “the world’s premier Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016

Figure 7.2 View from the Singapore Flyer. © Christopher Cheng 2013. 86 Iain Borden tropical garden city” (National Parks Board 2008), and from the high-level Flyer, the utopian character of the project is emphasised by the expansive spread of 101 hectares of landscaping and by a series of unworldly 25–50m high “Supertree” vertical gardens. The ark-like Flower Dome and Cloud Forest conservatories conjure up additional sci-fi allusions – including the environmental sci-fi fi lm Silent Running (1972, dir. Douglas Trumbull) – through the complexly ribbed, curved glass structures which provide Edenic protection for natural habitats at risk from climate change. But it is from the view beyond the mid-distance, in the broad 180-degree arc south of the Singapore Flyer, reaching east across the South China Sea and south and west across the Singapore Strait to Indonesia, that an even greater spatial expansivity emerges. First, the Flyer’s visitor is faced with the skyscraper cluster of Singapore’s 266-hectare Downtown Core to the west, including the Overseas Union Bank Centre, Republic Plaza, United Over- seas Bank, Capital Tower and Ocean Financial Centre. Once the viewer passes beyond their instinctive or relative knowledge of simply recognising the names and other factual details of these buildings, then a more intelligent process of knowing – “a frame in which an infi nity of objects fi nd room in turn” (Bergson 1998: 149–50) – quickly reveals the presence of a major fi nancial operation and its connectivity within networks of electronic communications and transaction, and more broadly within what Manuel Cas- tells calls the “space of fl ows” (Castells 1989; Castells 2010). Hidden from explicit view, but nonetheless intimated at by the splendorous verticality and grand opulence of the towers, are the presence of the 800 company listings on the Singapore Exchange (SGX), an average daily foreign exchange turno- ver of US$260 billion, the management of wealth assets totalling US$1.4 trillion and the accommodation of over 600 fi nancial institutions (Monetary Authority of Singapore 2013). Similarly, and second, the visitor is presented with the hulking traffi c out to sea – particularly the scattered fi eld of massive container ships, including the 18,000TEU Triple-E Maersk class of mega-vessels – plying their trade from the Brani, Keppel, Pasir Panjang, Sembawang and Tanjong Pagar ter- minals and Singapore’s 561km2 of port waters (Wei 1991). Compared to the relatively recent and immaterial nature of fi nancial trade and the Downtown Core, these transporters disclose a more historic, geographic and physical form of globality, with 130,000 vessels totalling 1.5 billion gross tons and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 conveying 30 million containers, 500 million tonnes of cargo and 1 million passengers every year (Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore 2013). This immense shipping of goods around the world’s highly dispersed yet interconnected supply routes and markets also reveals Singapore’s long-held position as a major entrepôt for international maritime trade. And if the visitor swivels 180 degrees to face towards the northeast, the aircraft serving Changi Airport provide similar indications of global transportation: 106 airlines fl ying to 250 cities in 60 countries, with over 320,000 fl ights and 51 million passengers per year (Changi Airport 2013). The Singapore Flyer 87 Third, and turning back to the view over the Singapore Strait, when looking to the southwest or east, the visitor is confronted by something wholly new, something which cannot be seen from ground level: the horizon. This nonrestrictive boundary, along which the deep blue strait and azure Asian sky are conjoined by the gentle curvature of the earth, at once marks the limits of our vision but also tempts us into trying to see beyond it. In the words of philosopher O. F. Bollnow, the horizon “positively entices one into the distance” (Bollnow 2011: 73) and, as the “transcendental condition of the human being-in-the-world” (Bollnow 2011: 74), serves to remind us of our place within a much larger and extensive space which we cannot reach but know to exist. In short, the view of this horizon does not distance us from global space, but encourages to realise our position within it. All of this serves as a simple yet hugely effective reminder both as to Singapore’s position as a major global player and as to the Flyer viewer’s positioning with that global context. These vertiginous towers and colossal ships placed within the expansivity of a global view provide no exact data or precise lessons, but they nonetheless serve as unmissable indicators of Sin- gapore’s global role within both electromagnetic and geopolitical networks (Bishop et al 2004: 14), operating as the seventh most important city in the 2012 Global Economic Power Index (Florida 2012) and offering the world’s second most open economy (Miller et al 2012), second busiest container port (Adam 2011), fourth most important fi nancial centre (Z/Yen Group 2010) and seventh busiest airport (Airports Council International 2012: 53–162). While not all these operations are by any means explicitly legible from the buildings, vessels and horizon, their highly suggestive presence cannot help but be noticed by those viewing from the Flyer. If, as Bergson argues, “[t]he objects which surround my body refl ect its possible action upon them”, (Bergson 2004: 6–7) then here, at the top of the Flyer, viewers fi nd themselves inescapably faced with the imposing scale and extent of Singa- pore’s economy, and by their own corresponding powerlessness. The effect is akin to the sublime, the visitor encountering the presence of a terrifying power of such magnitude and character that it cannot be readily quantifi ed, and within which they nevertheless know themselves to be existing. The Flyer thus allows a jumping of scales between the self, wheel, city, nation and world, providing a glimpse of a global space in which we always live but do not often see or acknowledge; in short, the Flyer imparts – through

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 its form, operation and, in particular, view – an aesthetic symbol and experience for the visitor in relation to modern, globalised Singapore.

Architecture, movement and time Also of particular importance here is the specifi c architecture of the Singa- pore Flyer itself. Most obvious is the way in which the wheel’s cabins operate as framing devices for the viewer, both composing the view into a series of pictorial compositions and separating the visitor from that view such 88 Iain Borden that the overall sense is of disconnection, distance and unreality; it is as if Singapore is being disclosed not as an immediate reality but as a cinematic representation of itself, as a distant land which can be viewed and understood in new ways (the framed camera-like view from the cabin), but which cannot be known intimately. More subtle yet also more pervasive is the revolving movement of the Flyer. The Flyer rotates slowly, near silently and majestically, like a huge clock, and in this sense it could be held to correlate with the precision, accuracy, repeatability and constant measuring of artifi cial machine-measured time, that is, with the time of timetables, diaries, appointments and meetings which sociologist Georg Simmel and others have identifi ed as one of the conditions of urban modernity in the twentieth century (Simmel 1903; Harvey 1989: 165–99), such that “[p]unctuality, calculability, exactness are forced upon life by the complexity and extension of metropolitan existence” (Simmel 1903: 638). However, despite their superfi cial similarity, the spokes and cabins of the Singapore Flyer do not actually move like the hands of a clock, for they glide without jumps, chimes or ticks, and without markers to indicate hours, minutes or seconds. To use Bergson’s distinction, this is not then a time of atomised dates, divisions or schedules, of “one instant replacing another”, but of duration, “the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances”, that is of a more individual and subjective time by which we fi nd ourselves in a continuous, lived condition (Bergson 1998: 4). In short, the Flyer’s continuous rotation reveals not so much the operational and apparent qualities of modern time at an urban scale – Simmel’s stopwatches and schedules – as more the homogeneous, uniform abstract time of capitalism, whereby this kind of time is not only subdivided, regulated and controlled, but is simultaneously treated as homogenous and universal. If then, as Fredric Jameson has argued, genuinely post-modern architecture introduces a new category of urban space, a “complete world” exhibiting a “placeless dissociation” from its locality (Jameson 1991: 40–2), then the Flyer does this also for time, for, through its continuous and jump-free rotation, it signifi es less subdivisions of or within time and more the constant movement between and across subdivisions of time, or, in other words, the unending advancing nature of global time zones, economic cycles, stages of techno-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 logical progress and the lifetimes of individuals or, even, of entire cities or nation-states. The Singapore Flyer is then quite distinct to the individualised subdivisions of Simmel’s metropolitan time (one’s own diary of meetings and appointments), providing instead a counterbalance to the “maelstrom of modern life” and the general speed-up which Marshall Berman and others have identiﬁ ed as one of the essential conditions of modernity (Berman 1988: 16). Thus where in our everyday lives, we often feel the need to synchronise ourselves with the modern world through ever more intensive The Singapore Flyer 89 work patterns and fast-paced communications, the Singapore Flyer suggests another form of synchronicity, one in which we must yield in and to time, just as we do in and to space, and so in and to the larger patterns and operations of capitalist modernity; during the ride on the Singapore Flyer, for a few brief minutes, the visitor’s body keeps in time with that of a utopian planned city, where all is at once constantly moving and eternal, where everything synchronises beautifully and without error. Except, of course, as the visitor well knows, while the Singapore Flyer is seemingly endless in its rotation, for those riding on the wheel, the journey in fact lasts for little more than half an hour. Even as the visitor might begin to feel a synchronicity with global capitalist time – perhaps during the middle and highest juncture of their journey – the impending and ever-nearing ﬁ nality to their ride provides an awakening out of that reverie and into a realisation that Singapore as city and nation, and the global context in which it resolutely places itself and forever aims towards, will always out- live and outlast any single citizen or guest. To return to the comparison with the tower, where the tower in effect tantalises, promising to allow a view of everything but actually delivering very little, the Singapore Flyer initially promises much less, presenting itself largely as a fairground-derived entertainment ride, but, once experienced, discloses much more, revealing the systematic nature of Singapore – as both the city’s plans, extent and reach and also our own position within that system. Unlike the tower, the Flyer never pretends to be about locality, and instead is a much more honest and, ultimately, revelatory disclosure of the nature of capitalist and global space-time and, by implication, of how we are bound up in this modern condition.

Bibliography Adam, S. (2011) “Singapore Miracle Dimming as Income Gap Widens Squeeze by Rich”, Bloomberg Markets Magazine (10 August) www.bloomberg.com (13 June 2013). Airports Council International (2012) 2011 World Annual Trafﬁ c Report , Mon- treal: Airports Council International. Allsop, A., Dallard, P., Hui, H. K., Lovatt, A. and McNiven, B. (2008) “The Singa- pore Flyer”, The Arup Journal 2: 4–5 and 13–14.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Anderson, N. D. (1992) Ferris Wheels: An Illustrated History , Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Popular Press. Arts and Culture Strategic Review (2008) “Renaissance City Plan III”, Singapore: Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts. Bergson, H. (1998) Creative Evolution, New York: Dover Publications, originally published 1907, English translation 1911. Bergson, H. (2004) Matter and Memory, New York: Dover Publications, originally published 1896, ﬁ fth edition 1908. Berman, M. (1988) All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity , Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 90 Iain Borden Bishop, R., Phillips J. and Yeo, W.-W. (eds.) (2004) Beyond Description: Singapore Space Historicity , London: Routledge. Bollnow, O. F. (2011) Human Space , London: Hyphen. Castells, M. (1989) The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban-Regional Process , Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Castells, M. (2010) The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Volume 1: The Rise of the Network Society , Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. Chang, T. C. (2000) “Renaissance Revisited: Singapore as a ‘Global City for the Arts’ ”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24, 4: 818–831. Chang, T. C. and Lee, W. K. (2003) “Renaissance City Singapore: A Study of Arts Spaces”, Area 35, 2: 128–41. Changi Airport (2013) www.changiairport.com/our-business/about-changi-airport/ facts-statistics (19 June 2013). Dale, O. J. (2008) “The Singapore City Centre in the Context of Sustainable Devel- opment”, in T.-C. Wong, B. K. P. Yuen and C. Goldblum (eds.) Spatial Planning for a Sustainable Singapore , Dordrecht: Springer. Davey, M. (2011) “Gardens by the Bay: Ecologically Reﬂ ective Design”, Architec- tural Design 81, 6: 108–111. Davey, M., Bellew, P., Er, K., Kwek, A. and Lim, J. (2010) “Gardens by the Bay: High Performance through Design Optimization and Integration”, Intelligent Buildings International 2, 2: 140–157. de Certeau, M. (1984) The Practice of Everyday Life , Berkeley: University of California Press. Florida, R. (2012) “What Is the World’s Most Economically Powerful City?”, The Atlantic Monthly (8 May) www.theatlantic.com (6 June 2013). Harvey, D. (1989) “Money, Time, Space and the City”, in The Urban Experience , Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Henderson, J. (2007) “Managing the Planning and Development of New Visitor Attractions: A Singapore Model”, Managing Leisure 12, 1: 24–42. Henderson, J. C. (2010) “New Visitor Attractions in Singapore and Sustainable Destination Development”, Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes 2, 3: 251–261. Hutton, T. (2012) “Inscriptions of Change in Singapore’s Streetscapes: From ‘New Economy’ to ‘Cultural Economy’ ”, in T. Ayer, L. Hee, B, Davisi and E. Viray (eds.) Future Asian Space: Projecting the Urban Space of New East Asia , Singapore: NUS Press for Centre for Advanced Studies in Architecture. Jameson, F. (1991) Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism , London: Verso. Kong, L. (2009) “Making Sustainable Creative/Cultural Space in Shanghai and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Singapore”, Geographical Review 99, 1: 1–22. Kong, L. and Yeoh, B. S. A. (2003) The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore: Con- structions of “ Nation ”, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Lee, T. (2008) “Gestural Politics: Mediating the ‘New’ Singapore”, in K. Sen and T. Lee (eds.) Political Regimes and the Media in Asia , Abingdon: Psychology Press. Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (2013) www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/port_and_ shipping/port/port.page (19 June 2013). The Singapore Flyer 91 Miller, T., Holmes, K. R. and Feulner, E. J. (2012) Highlights of the 2012 Index of Economic Freedom: Promoting Economic Opportunity and Prosperity , Wash- ington: The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal. Monetary Authority of Singapore (2013) www.mas.gov.sg/Singapore-Financial- Centre/Overview.aspx (19 June 2013). National Parks Board (2008), quoted in Phua, J. (2009) “Visual and Sensorial Innovations in Urban Governance: The Singapore Landscape Spectacle”, paper presented at the Tenth Berlin Roundtable on Urban Governance: Innovation, Inse- curity and the Power of Religion, Irmgard Coninx Foundation, (18–24 March). Nye, D. E. (1994) American Technological Sublime , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Park, B.-G. (2007) “Imaginative Construction of a Global City as a Strategy for the Growth of Knowledge-Based Economies: A Critical Evaluation of the Place-Marketing in Singapore”, Journal of the Korean Geographical Society 42, 2: 280–294. Pereira, M. L. (2005) “Singapore Flyer Set to Soar in 2008”, The Straits Times (13 September) www.straitstimes.com (25 June 2013). Rashiwala, K. (2005) “Singapore Flyer Now Slated for Completion by End-07”, The Business Times Singapore (1 April) http://newspapers.nl.sg/ (25 June 2013). Sim, G. (2005) “Giant Wheel Project Delayed”, The Straits Times (1 April) www. straitstimes.com (25 June 2013). Simmel, G. (1903) “The Metropolis and Mental Life”, in P. K. Hatt and A. J. Reiss (eds.) (1951) Cities and Society: The Revised Reader in Urban Sociology, New York: Free Press. Singapore Tourism Board (2012) Annual Report 2011/12, Singapore: Singapore Tourism Board. Soh, E. Y. X and Yuen, B. (2010) “Singapore’s Changing Spaces”, Cities 28: 3–10. Tan, S. (2003) “STB Conﬁ dent Singapore Flyer Will Fly”, The Straits Times (10 July) www.straitstimes.com (25 June 2013). Wee, L. W. (2007) “Encoded Histories: Design Review and Regulations in Singa- pore, 1819–2006”, unpublished MA Architecture thesis, National University of Singapore. Wei, L. K. (1991) “Management and Utilization of Singapore’s Port Waters: New Directions”, in C. L. Sien and C. L. Ming (eds.) Urban Coastal Area Management: The Experience of Singapore , Singapore: Association of Southeast Asian Nations/ United States Coastal Resources Management Project Conference Proceedings 7. Wong, T. C. (2008) “Integrated Resort in the Central Business District of Singapore: The Land Use Planning and Sustainability Issues”, in T.-C. Wong, B. K. P. Yuen and C. Goldblum (eds.) Spatial Planning for a Sustainable Singapore, Dordrecht: Springer.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Yeoh, B. S. A. (2005) “The Global Cultural City? Spatial Imagineering and Politics in the (Multi) Cultural Marketplaces of South-East Asia”, Urban Studies 42, 4/5: 945–958. Yuen, B. K. P. and Goldblum, C. (eds.) (2008) Spatial Planning for a Sustainable Singapore , Dordrecht: Springer. Z/Yen Group (2010) Global Financial Centers 7 , London: City of London. 8 Ethic and space in contemporary Western societies

Kyriaki Tsoukala

In the era of globalisation, architectural discourse and praxis have been transformed through inter-reaction with the messages of the times: ultra-rapid change, ﬂ uidity, uncertainty, fragmentation, potential and reinforced virtual reality (Ibelings 2002). At the same time, architecture is in dialogue with contemporary philosophical currents, sharing their critical attitude towards the consequences of modernist thinking and the ‘negative globalisation’ in the construction of contemporary man and his intermeshing with the environment. The discussion on contemporary versions of built space also has an ethical component; but it is an ethics that has been transformed in respect of its modernist (from the time of the Enlightenment) content, although that content has been contested since the beginning of the twentieth century. As Alain Renaut says (2009), the secularisation of ethics takes more than a century: a telling remark here is Rimbaud’s “morality is the weakness of the brain”, a comment expressed in a letter written at the end of the nineteenth century that will take us from Kant’s “moral goodness” to desire and the pleasurable, reviving ancient Greek perceptions of the ethics of sensitivity and nature. In the contemporary period of globalisation, these semiotic changes and shifts in ethics become more apparent and emphatic through the dynamic of the post-industrial manner of production, the advances in the sciences and digital technology and the creation of new hybrid disciplines such as the biotechnologies. This chapter attempts a critique of the contemporary ethical structure of space and contributes to its re-examination through the logic that accepts

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 that the problem, as Lipovetsky (1983: 40) put it, lies in identifying “what has to be protected in order to be opened up and not what has to be opened up in order to be protected”. This will become clearer as we go on.

Opera Aperta : The preamble to endless architecture The period from World War II to the 1970s constitutes the immediate past of the contemporary version of visions of space, and it is there that we will look for some traces of the line of descent of ideas about architecture and its ethical dimension. Ethic and space 93 In the 1960s, the publication of a book entitled Opera Aperta ( The Open Work ) signalled a new textual optics introducing concepts from the natural sciences such as entropy, ambiguity and information. Of course, this is not the fi rst infl ux of concepts from the natural sciences in the history of anthropological/social thinking. Like communicating vessels, the social and economic conditions of the times, technology, the sciences, the arts and philosophy engage with one another in a climate of intensive interaction. In The Open Work , Eco (1989) advocated the active role of the interpreter in textual readings, that is, “open-ended reading” considered an activity induced by and, at the same time, aiming at the style of the text. Some thirty years later, in The Limits of Interpretation (1993), he said of Opera Aperta that it instituted “authoritatively, as free and unpredictable (for whatever the oxymoron is worth), the fundamental relationship between the work of art and the interpreter”. Borrowing Joyce’s “Model Reader”, condemned to insomnia by the textual strategy that pushes him to infi nite perusal of the work, he explains his own position in Opera Aperta : Eco insists on a textual strategy that forces the reader to examine the work itself and not his personal urgings “in a dialectic of fi delity and freedom”. With this book, he was arguing that freedom of interpretation depends on the formal structure of the work, and thus raising the problem of how the work could and should predict its reader. This concept of openness in conjunction with Bakhtin’s dialogical/ polyphonic textual approach at the beginning of the twentieth century, sets up a challenge to concepts like the integral work, predesigned structure, hierarchisation and certainty. The Western world discovered Bakhtin in the 1960s – thanks in part to Kristeva and Todorov – and the translations of his work lent perspective to the anti-monological vision of the world. He captured the interest of the intelligentsia in the period of transition from structuralism to post-structuralism. For Bakhtin (1978), the source of meaning was not the individual – that self-based, self-suffi cient and self-contained ontological unit – but the person who, open to otherness, uses otherness to construct himself within the intersubjective and dialogical situation. Bakhtin’s philosophy stresses coming-into-being, the open process that does not lead to completion and fi nalization, but is constantly renewed by the alternation of historical and social contexts and the active dialogical competitive participation of the subject.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 The visions of built space follow the radical debate on form, with questions such as its interpretation, its normativity and its conformation into a whole, sometimes springing from the predominant consumer model of life and sometimes from ideological starting points and intellectual attitudes to the problem of the construction of consciousness and knowledge. The theories of communication and perception, then, were born in the 1960s as a reaction to the methodology that sought to explore the objectivity of the work of art and the text or the self-referential reality of the work, independent of any context. In architecture, in that same decade, the Smithsons took a stand against the invariability of the relation between the parts and 94 Kyriaki Tsoukala the whole, proposing an open aesthetic, nongeometrical, nonpermanent, an aesthetic of transformation and change that set aside the rules of Euclidian geometry and gave precedence to the interrelations/intercommunication of the spatial elements. Their “street-in-the-air” idea, realised in a number of projects, and the concepts of clusters and rhizomes, nappes, stem and web, attempt to construct a space that transcends the prescriptive/syntactical rules that had previously applied in the context of the individual elements, proportions, rhythms and balances of form. Adopting a topological logic, they avoided the dangers of a hierarchisation of spaces and consequently a programmed emission of messages, while at the same time highlighting the question of movement/communication as the primary issue of the conformation of built space, and together with it the openness, the potential expand- ability and open-ended character of the work (universities of Sheffi eld and Berlin-Haupstadt). A similar approach is seen in the work of Candilis, Josic and Woods (e.g., their plan for the regeneration of the centre of Frankfurt and Toulouse-Le-Mirail). In the same era, Cedric Price was designing the Fun Palace, that neutral minimalistic structure, a three-dimensional web for suspended or assembled temporary spatial arrangements inspired by the concept of accommodating situations rather than serving functions. This same spirit informed Constant’s collage projects for Western metropolitan centres, using as conceptual tools the roamings and conversions of Baude- laire and Benjamin, an antidote to the prevailing monological, semiotically delimited and functionally predetermined spatial model of the plan-mass; while in the case of Team Ten, the shift related to the transition from the architect’s conception and design to the fl uidity of movement and communication of those who inhabit the space, adding to Cedric and Constant the psychoanalytical/existentialist baggage of life experience which embodies the word ‘state’. We will close this brief introductory overview with Super- studio and their Il Monumento continuo project (a monumental but neutral conception, silent in regard to the functions it could support), and the non- fi gurative idiom of Archizoom’s Non-stop city and Archigram’s Plug-in city , which belong to the same postwar conceptual stream. These visions of space abandon the concept of the universal and move towards the empirical, the experiential, the individual, the intersubjective, the unfi nished. They are sequels to the Modern Movement, harshly critical of its values of catholicity, standardisation and utilitarian functionality. We

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 know that, despite the innovations it brought about in matters of spatial organisation, function and form, the Modern Movement in architecture and town planning (from the beginning of the twentieth century through the end of the 1960s) remained faithful to the concept of the rationally planned and universal, that is, faithful to the point of view of the Enlightenment. Through the work of Kant, the rationalism of the Enlightenment created the ethics of duty and the ‘autonomy of the will’. If the ethics of duty stresses that an act is not morally correct unless it is performed exclusively out of Ethic and space 95 duty, without the incursion of any other parameter of interest, well-being or happiness, marginalising any individual addition to man’s active moral predisposition, catholic space is rationalist space, a product designed by reason via a deliberate distancing from the ‘anisotropies’ of those who inhabit it. The revival of classical architecture with its aesthetic rules of perfection of form and the empty public space of that era (with its exceptional expression in the works of revolutionary architects) (Kauffmann 1978) introduce a space constituted with the qualities of catholicity that is beyond any ‘difference’ and ‘particularity’ of an individual or collective nature. Catholicity embraces within its sphere the several differences that characterise a society’s individuals and groups, but, steeped in the logic of the harmonious whole, tends to regulate differences in the name of the smooth operation of what is proper as externally established by those same individuals and groups, based sometimes on pure functional logic (the logic of democratic organisation) and sometimes on a socially weighted logic. One must not forget that the sociological school that was born with our Western industrial age worked in favour of the catholic model, but tended to withdraw and recompose, from the reality of the city, all individual/ collective differences, cultural, social, national, racial, economic, etc. Two early – and still much discussed and variously interpreted – social scientists, Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin, operating within the framework of the Kantian tradition of coordinating reason and experience, attempted to demonstrate the qualities of an urban space whose manner of production and daily life would at once render and reveal the symbolic, oneiric space of its individual/collective mental representations. As Terzoglou has said, they explored “the relation between the objective social ﬁ eld (production of space, socio-spatial practices) and the collective conscious universe” (Terzo- glou 2009: 219). This was the sociological school within which the new currents in architecture and urban planning were moving in the period we are looking at, from the end of World War II to the 1970s. In a period when the concepts of progress and scientiﬁ c rationality were being severely challenged by the catastrophe of two world wars and the concomitant economic and cultural devastation and moral debilitation of entire populations, ideas of the role of experience and everyday life in the broader view of the world acquired particular weight (Lefebvre 1961). The ordinary, with all its psychological and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 psychoanalytical charge, conquered the fi elds of the ‘social’ sciences, which gradually began to deny their very name, replacing it with ‘anti-social’ terms. This is apparent from the moment when the ‘social’ became identifi ed with the symbolic order and the existentialist and dominating structures that construct the subject by alienation . The social and the catholic, despite their differences, become objects of deconstruction aimed at reformulating a comprehensive worldview and reshaping the world on a foundation of difference and personal/communal responsibility (Tsoukala 2010). 96 Kyriaki Tsoukala The architecture of freedom In the post-modern age, the ethic of propriety was replaced by the ethic of happiness (satisfaction of the highest good), an ethic that places the personal good before the social, catholic good. The ethic of duty is rooted in humanism and requires the defi nition of a pan-humanist dimension that cannot be reduced to confi rmation of personal individuality (Renaut 2009: 746). Today’s post-modern anti-humanism sets itself against the subordination of the individual to the universal, arguing that the differences between individuals are irreducible and constitute in themselves indefeasible values (Cal- linicos 1990). The corollary of this is a refusal of the concept of the subject (subordination to the rule or foundation of the self on the logic and will of the individual) and adoption of the concept of singularity (the self based on the whole of the individual’s inner forces). Communication among weakly connected singularities is an expression of contemporary individualism, and the shift from an ethic based on propriety to one based on communication, responsibility or a teleological ethic of happiness and pleasure, or a communal ethic referring to group culture and action (not the broader social classes/strata). In the slide from a supra-individual normative sphere of values (in the initial post-modern phase) to a personal universe of singular and irreducible values, ethics has created a new human operating environment in which more global rights and demands are depreciated, seemingly sacri- fi ced in favour of the experience of a personal freedom that pretends to be able to provide a new foundation for the individual conscience, eliminating any risk of submission to power structures (Bauman 1993). This ‘new’ ethic, which gives priority to individual rights and individual singular and irreducible values (Renaut, 2009: 737), defi nes corresponding spaces of freedom that are expressed architecturally in impressively varied ways and with diverse manipulations. The most aggressive of these, deconstruction, clashed head on with the established geometrical and semeio- logical models in a challenging display of its revolutionary and destructive disposition. Conceptions regarding residential space freed themselves from the socio-economic framework and followed the critical stance of the philosophy of deconstruction. The discourse and praxis of architecture on all spatial scales, from building to city and landscape, joined in contemporary philosophy’s struggle against the whole, dialectic and dualisms. Redefi ning

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 the boundaries, public and private, natural and artifi cial, renewed the perception of spatial experience and activity. The defi ant geometric and symbolic acrobatics in Eisenman’s houses, Tschumi’s functional paradoxalities in the Parc de la Villette and the atmospheric psychological tightrope-walking in Libeskind’s Jewish museums are examples of the deconstructionist philosophy in architecture. The concepts of synthesis and the formal were banned from architectural vocabulary: architecture no longer meant a putting together of opposites, but a combination of different things. The search for a neutral but subversive symbolic/linguistic idiom led to proposals of Ethic and space 97 such techniques as layering, i.e., autonomous and self-contained systems that mesh without hierarchisation and are not determined by a centripetal logic, parasitisms that pollute regularity of form, interventions that disturb its equilibria, hybrid elements alien to familiar forms, abstracts of unsettled (incomplete/unfi nished/indeterminate) meaning. The deconstructionists pushed architecture to its limits, their aim being destabilisation and disar- ticulation, the suppression of the function of the opposites deep rooted in Western thought, the nullifi cation of the relations of dominance that characterise those doublets. Extreme experiments with shape, scale and function, on the same plane as Derrida’s challenging différance and the minor but subversive shift that distinguishes it from différence , since the change from (e) to (a) leaves the word in limbo: it is neither a verb nor a noun, nor any other part of speech. It does not exist. And its intrusion into our language can have unforeseeable consequences. This aggressive period of deconstructionist architecture was followed by works animated by a milder expression of the same spirit of semiotically and geometrically unshackled architecture, and others that focused on the concept of the unfi nished and fl uid or the contingency of interactive space. In the fi rst group, we recognise the game of a blurring of boundaries, a topological ordering of spaces (abandonment of the rules of Euclidean geometry), folding, unitary and monolithic form, a combining of envelope with static system-and-ornament, fl oating space ( espace fl ottant ), the void. All these techniques contribute to a weakening of form, to the sought-after shift to the aformal and non-composition. If deconstruction aimed at decom- position, these trends are interested in noncomposition. In this new way of thinking, space is a unitary state, not an assemblage of parts or a milieu (as Toyo Ito says of the Mediatheque de Sendai, comparing the interior of the building to a watery landscape where everything fl oats freely and is car- ried away in perpetual motion and change), or it negates with the strategy of emptiness the Gestalt hierachisation of form and background or, drawing from the past the concept of decoration (and ornament), attempts to reprieve it from its condemnation (since the time of Adolf Loos) and present it as a tool for weakening form. We also mentioned those trends that focus on the concept of the unfi n- ished and fl uid or the interactive quality of space. In the world of digital technology and parametric programmes, the opposition to regularisation

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 and standardisation does not refer to the morphological idiom of the work, but to the algorithm of its creation. This open algorithmic process produces objectiles (Lévy 1999), that is, forms of a continuously changing geometry, which consolidate in space-time as events in a process of geometric differentiations, a kind of “objets partiels”/“fragments like beginnings without ends” which constitute pre-individual singularities (Lynn 1998; Tschumi 1990; Lucan 2010). In a similar way, we could describe the blob, the repro- cessing of the fold (and both refer to Leibniz’s Ars Combinatoria): combina- tory changes in the identity of a thing that take place during the escalation 98 Kyriaki Tsoukala of its interior complexity, with the result that the object remains singular in regard to its continuity and at the same time multiple in regard to its interior differentiations. In Mille Plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari (1980) invite us to perceive the paradox of singularity = multiplicity, an equation that neutralises earlier views of the two concepts. In their simultaneous manifestation, continuity/singularity and difference/multiplicity describe the open processes of a potentially infi nite number of objectiles. In the same work, we are invited to ponder the characteristics of the proto-geometries “that are neither exact nor inexact but anexact yet rigorous”. Borrowings from Husserl’s Origin of Geometry , Greg Lynn (1998) underlines their rigour and precision despite their lack of unity and integrality. And fi nally, interactive space, the living materiality of architecture that invites us to a fl uid, lived, dialogical experience, functioning as a stimulat- ing source of transformations, a heterogeneous, differential and open plane of forces. With the new structural materials and the possibility of interven- ing in their atomic type, interactivity draws not on the ideal man, but on superhuman nature (e.g., Novac’s allogenesis and Oosterhuis’ superbodies) or on the whole bodily empirical human condition that escapes epidermic communication with its environment to fi nd expression in the deeper level of the fl esh as a phenomenological conceit (Merleau-Ponty 1964). Writing condenses all the aforementioned ideas and unites them in a common progress towards an anti-architectural gesture, a gesture against geometrical clarity. Set against the ideal proportions of architectural order and its anthropomorphism (which Bataille attacked) are indeterminacy and het- erogeneity, the amorphous, the ambiguous, the contested. The new ethos of this contemporary architecture in an ultimate and extreme attempt to reverse the points that Western society has for centuries constructed and assembled takes shape in the climate of the new ethics of happiness understood as a possible state that emerges in conditions of variability and performative-corporeal-participative-dialogical action. The nullifi cation of the boundaries between the individual and social seems to escape – like writing and the line and every form of representation – the primary operations and the intentionality of the mind. The individual is immersed in its new image acting in concert with the collective, while the social and the public – identifi ed with the ‘negative modernism’ of inequalities, wars and destruction – are ferociously ostracised.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Let us now take a look at what happens on the scale of urban space. Here, too, we perceive the same phenomenon. Interactive qualities allow open public space to receive the rich genuine expression and action of individuals and groups, take part in the unfolding of events and, thanks to modern technology and new materials, be continually transformed. Today’s public space is conceived for the individual/group body, not (although without excluding it) the broader social body. Corporeal movement, not as roving through the city (as in the age of Baudelaire and Benjamin) to register, criti- cise and resist its predesigned function and its social inequalities, but as an Ethic and space 99 expression of personal desires or communal interests, creates a new perception of the interpretation and organisation of freely accessible open urban space. The advancement of the collective against the public is no accident, with the former relating to group practices and contemporary communalism and the latter losing ground as identifi ed with the state and the exercise of authority. This contemporary communalism, however, with the emphasis it lays on (local) groups and their role in global competition, underestimates the inadequacy of local micro-group action to redistribute wealth and deal with the causes of inequalities and marginalisation (Bauman 1993, 1997). And while communalism seems to oppose the neo-liberal prioritisation of personal freedom and the more modern ideal of a ‘nationalised society’, in reality, it serves the more sweeping change of direction towards privatism and individualism, phenomena inherent in the evolution of the capitalist system (Goonewardena 2005). Private-collective, individual-group, are the self-defi ning concepts of contemporary urban space, sweeping aside any trace of Kantian thinking about the res publica , and any Voltairean quality it might have had as expressed two centuries ago in the French philosopher’s efforts to give a social dimension to the politically conceptualised identity of void space. With these notions comes a fl uidity, a constant change of scenery, an exaltation of the value of the momentary via a profuse alternation of images/views of three-dimensional space. The previous observations register the weight awarded today to the variable and interactive architecture of non-composition and to collective space as opposed to public. The amorphous and the variable contribute to a semiotically liberated and intensively energised corporeal performative human spatial action in ‘ideal’ conditions of social organisation. On the other hand, the intensely charged dialogical character of collective space resulting from the unidimensional mutually supportive and participatory identitive atmosphere of the groups active within it gives it a micro-social multipolarity. This new quality, however, is tending to displace the vital vector of the social body and its coordinated social claims and demands, weakening the various forms of critical resistance to the cultural and economic mechanisms of society, which are infrangibly linked to inequalities, marginalisation and the default of the public self. The civic defi cit of collective space tends in turn to convert its conversational condition into a stifl ing web of monologues: the inability of the various groups to engage with one

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 another and ﬁ nd a common global arena of political action turns collective space over to monophonic communities. The civic aspect of collective space can be guaranteed by the function of the individual/group-in-society, in other words, the function of conversational performative activity in the historico-social chronotope with its characteristic dynamic. The subject is invited to inhabit the space, receiving, with interactive acknowledgements, his own desires and needs without staking them to an already existing conceptual-semiotic functional order and without disengaging them from the social body. The subject broadens and modiﬁ es the alienated versions 100 Kyriaki Tsoukala of himself, reconstructing adjustments, divisions and priorities that displace aggregate material demands; he registers in his trained ordinary nature the dissociation between the ethic of desire and the ethos of a member of the social body. And let us not forget the structural characteristics of our societies: the waves of immigration, the human wretchedness and marginalisation, the conversion from citizen to consumer, the disintegration of solidarity, the cultivation of fear and insecurity, the institutional entrenchment of inequalities. We should be turning our minds anew to Bakhtin’s ethics, understood as the primal interest in the other, as the steadfast recognition of difference for a dialogical vision of the world. Bahktin insists on the one hand that the individual is tempered by his socio-historical environment (while at the same time militating against any conceit of general laws of socio-historical evolution) and on the other refers to a level of individual freedom of choice, seeking a polyvalent equilibrium of dialogue between these two perspectives so that they can determine one another without becoming entrapped by this dynamic process.

Bibliography Bakhtin, M. (1978) Esthétique et Théorie du Roman , Paris: Gallimard. Bauman, Z. (1993) Postmodern Ethics , USA/UK/Australia: Blackwell Publishing. Bauman, Z. (1997) Postmodernity and Its Discontents , Cambridge: Polity Press. Callinicos, A. (1990) Against Postmodernism. A Marxist Critique, Cambridge: Pol- ity Press. Deleuze, G. and Guatari, F. (1980) Mille Plateaux. Capitalisme et Schizofrénie , Paris: Minuit. Eco, U. (1989) The Open Work, trans. A. Cancogni, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Eco, U. (1993) The Limits of Interpretation, transl. in Greek by M. Kondyli, Athens: Gnosi. Goonewardena, K. (2005) “The Urban Sensorium: Space, Ideology and the Aestheti- cization of Politics”, in Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography 37,1: 46–71. Ibelings, H. (2002) Supermodernism. Architecture in the Age of Globalization, Rot- terdam: NAi Publishers. Kaufmann, E. (1978) Trois Architectes Révolutionnaires. Boullée, Ledoux, Lequeu , Paris: SADG. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Lefebvre, H. (1961) Critique de la Vie Quotidienne II. Fondements d’une Sociologie de la Quotidienneté , Paris: L’Arche. Lévy, P. (1999) Realité Virtuelle, transl. in Greek by M. Karahalios, Athens: Kritiki. Lipovetsky, G. (1983) L’Ère du Vide, transl. in Greek by V. Tomanas, Thessaloniki: Nisides. Lucan, J. (2010) Composition, Non-Composition. Architecture et Théories, XIXe -XX e Siècles , Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes. Lynn, G. (1998) Folds, Bodies & Blobs. Collected Essays , Belgium: La Letter Volée. Ethic and space 101 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964) Le Visible et l’Invisible , edited by C. Lefort, Paris: Gallimard. Renaut, A. (2009) (in collaboration with J.-C. Billier, P. Savidan and L. Thiaw- Po-Une) La Philosophie, transl. in Greek by T. Betzelos and A. Stylianos, Ath- ens: Polis. Terzoglou, N. I. (2009) Ideas of Space in the Twentieth Century , Athens: Nisos. (In Greek). Tschumi, B. (1990) Questions of Space, London: Architectural Association Publications. Tsoukala, K. (2010) “Post-(Hyper)modern Aspects of Space. An Introduction”, in K. Tsoukala, M. Daniil, Ch. Pantelidou, Post-(Hyper modern Aspects of Space (pp. 15–52), Thessaloniki: Epikentro. (In Greek). Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Part 3 Human condition and space Philosophical orientations and conceptual transpositions Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Introduction

Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou

In Part 3 , the authors seek to refl ect on architecture as not only a confi rmation and reinforcement of established moral rules and as a scenographic glorifi cation of the status quo, but also as a fi eld of the emergence of new possibilities. Those possibilities contain the critique of the unjust institutions, laws, systems of values or moral principles that dominate current social relations, power structures and their architectural production. The intention is to refl ect on architecture as a critical and active creator of ethos, as a workshop bringing a new ethos of human existence to birth. This critical endeavour presupposes various philosophical investigations and conceptual transpositions, new intellectual orientations and subversive readings of established ideologies, hierarchies or interpretations. Deep structural changes of dominant ‘paradigms’ require a return to fundamental ideas concerning the relation between the human condition and space. John Hendrix, in Chapter 9, “Architecture and intellectual development”, narrates a genealogical history of basic philosophical systems, from Plato and Aristotle through the Peripatetics and Scholastics, Spinoza, Kant, Schell- ing and Hegel, based on a fundamental aim: the ethical obligation and duty of architecture to communicate ideas and to engage and enact intellectual development. This proposition, which promotes a broader philosophical tenet within architectural culture, might seem surprising. Since the classical Vitruvian triad, architecture is generally only expected to be structur- ally competent, functionally adequate and aesthetically pleasing. Hendrix argues that architecture, as an abstract intellectual act, should transcend functional and utilitarian demands. Using mathematics and geometry, archi-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 tecture organises space, assuming a broader ethical duty: to educate and mould the human spirit through the dynamic interaction between philosophical ideas and material forms (Hendrix 2003). This duty brings to mind the “categorical imperative” proposed by Kant in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1997: 25–31, 41, 52–53). Hendrix vindicates the same ethical autonomy of architecture to express, in total freedom, a complex structure of ideas through signifi cant forms, thus embodying the essence of a cultural epoch. 106 Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou Karsten Harries, in Chapter 10 , “On the ethical signifi cance of space and shaping space”, specifi es and elaborates upon his well-known philosophical refl ections concerning the ethical function of architecture. Those refl ections lead to a recognition of ethos as a necessary dimension of everyday life. ‘Ethos’ shapes the space of life, modulating the process of dwelling. Har- ries’ vision of an authentic dwelling is obstructed by three forces within modernity: the ‘aesthetic’ approach of architecture as surface decoration, the dogma of ‘art for art’s sake’ and the homogeneity of the non-places of late capitalism. In this chapter, Harries reinscribes the demand for an ethical function of space within a more developed understanding of the human existential condition in modernity. Hannah Arendt, in her classic study, revealed the tensions that permeate the human condition in general (Arendt 1998: 17–21). Extending Arendt’s argument, Harries maintains that modernity’s existential condition is characterised by the legitimate claims of two opposite psychic tendencies: the tension between freedom and place, between Fernweh, a longing for distant spaces and adventure, and Heimweh , a nostalgic longing for home and stability. Drawing on the thought of Blumen- berg, Ortega y Gasset, Heidegger and Nietzsche (among others), Harries shows the architectural consequences of this constant strife of space and place. He argues that an architectural ethos capable of balancing between them could open up the possibility of a future, authentic human dwelling. Nicholas Temple, in Chapter 11, “Architecture as the receptacle of Mit- sein ”, examines the moral repercussions of urban life and the meaning of dwelling in the city. Starting from Sennett’s book Together , Temple argues for the need to fi nd new forms of civic, ritual participation in contemporary urban life that would regain the public sphere contrary to corporatisation and individualist behaviour. In order to propose certain spatial or topo- graphical relations that would facilitate a sustainable civic renewal, Temple examines the Heideggerian notion of ‘Mitsein’ (being-with) and its critique by Emmanuel Levinas. He considers if the Levinas/Heidegger dispute could serve as a methodological framework for rearticulating the modalities of collective space in the contemporary world. An interpretation of ‘Mitsein’ as meaning ‘side-by-side’ undermines the ontological principles underlying Heideggerian ‘Dasein’ in favour of Levinas’ ethical model of ‘face-to-face’ relationships. However, perhaps both ideas could direct and orientate contemporary life toward various ritual and communicative models of coopera-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 tion and togetherness. By focusing on two different case studies, the Certame Coronario event in ﬁ fteenth-century Florence organised by Leon Battista Alberti, and the Thermal Baths at Vals in Switzerland by Peter Zumthor, Temple’s argument could join Harries’ overall claim: “By the ethical function of architecture I mean its task to help articulate a common ethos” (Har- ries 1997: 4). Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou, in Chapter 12 , “Towards a new ethical ‘paradigm’ in the creation of spaces,” taking over Harries’ claim, argues in favour of the inauguration of a new ethical ‘paradigm’ in the creation of contemporary Introduction to part 3 107 spaces. The main obstacle to such a project is the aesthetic persistence in the concept of ‘form’ that permeates a large part of post-modern, deconstructivist and contemporary architecture. This persistence inaugurated the formalistic mannerism of the so-called ‘star-architects’. Favoured by the neo-liberal market forces, this trend leads to an architectural production based on technological innovation, spectacular imagery and formal acrobatics, which sets aside fundamental questions of the social, political, humanistic and ethical relevance of space and place. Architecture thus becomes a profession “that can be treated as an instrument, or as a commodity . . . judged mostly by the criteria of technical disciplines”, as Dalibor Vesely rightly observes (Vesely 2004: 3). In order to effect a “paradigm change” from aesthetics to ethics, Terzoglou delves into a brief investigation of written theoretical discourses, trying to ﬁ nd out how the ‘aesthetic’ paradigm became the dominant trend in our times. His basic claim is that this dominance was established by the systematic post-modern devaluation of any ethical claims made by architectural theorists from the nineteenth century until the modern movements of the twentieth century.

Bibliography Arendt, H. (1998) The Human Condition, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press. Harries, K. (1997) The Ethical Function of Architecture , Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Hendrix, J. (2003) Architectural Forms and Philosophical Structures , New York: Peter Lang. Kant, I. (1997) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Vesely, D. (2004) Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation. The Question of Creativity in the Shadow of Production , Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 9 Architecture and intellectual development

John Shannon Hendrix

Architecture has an ethical responsibility to facilitate intellectual development. This proposition might seem surprising since architecture is generally expected to provide shelter, accommodate activity and be aesthetically pleasing – as Vitruvius says in De architectura (I.III.2) to take into account fi rmitas, utilitas and venustas . But Vitruvius also says that “[b]oth in general and especially in architecture are these two things found; that which signifi es and that which is signifi ed. That which is signifi ed is the thing proposed about which we speak; that which signifi es is the demonstration unfolded in systems of precepts” (Vitruvius 1931: I.I.3). Architecture is the organization of space using mathematics and geometry; it is an intellectual act, and therefore it must necessarily signify something, as does any language. Architects have an ethical responsibility to pay attention to what is being signifi ed, along with providing fi rmitas, utilitas and venustas . Thus, architects, according to Vitruvius, should be knowledgeable in mathematics, science, philosophy, music, medicine, law, astronomy, history and the theory of craftsmanship. According to Leon Battista Alberti in De re aedifi catoria , architecture consists of two things, lineaments and matter. Lineaments are the lines of the design of the building in the mind of the architect, the organization of the space by geometry and mathematics. Lineaments are “the precise and correct outline, conceived in the mind, made up of lines and angles, and perfected in the learned intellect and imagination” (Alberti 1988: I.1); nor do “lineaments have anything to do with material.” Architecture involves more than the physical presence and function of the building; it communi-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 cates ideas which are disconnected from the matter, as the signifi ed is disconnected from the signifi er. Architecture is an art, and art is defi ned as the communication of ideas through material form. Architecture adheres to the same ethical requirements as any art form in the communication of ideas. In the communication of ideas, architecture has a responsibility to facilitate intellectual development, because beyond shelter and the security of activity, nothing is more important in human life. A quick look at the writings of Plato, Aristotle, the Peripatetics (Commentators on Aristotle), Robert Gros- seteste, Benedict de Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schelling and Georg Architecture and intellectual development 109 Hegel will support this proposition and elaborate on the methods by which intellectual development can be facilitated. In the Republic of Plato, intellectual development involves a movement from the particulars of sense perception to intelligibles, those things which can be understood but not perceived, including mathematics and geometry, archetypal forms and eternal truths, things which require judgment and intellect beyond sense perception, as in the lineaments of Alberti, or the mathematics and geometry in the organization of space in architecture. The mind progresses upward into the intelligible region, and the intelligible region is equated with the good. The good is “in the intelligible region itself, controlling source of truth and intelligence” (Plato 1955: 517). The good, that which is worth striving for in life, is intellectual development from sense perception to intelligibles; architecture naturally facilitates this, in that it combines matter with lineaments. If the architecture is designed in such a way that the lineaments are discernable through the matter, the conceptual organization of space in mathematics and geometry, then it can facilitate intellectual development. In the Republic , the good is “the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their being and reality . . .” (509). That which is good is that which is intelligible, as understood in the mind as opposed to being merely perceived as a sense object. Architecture facilitates the good when it is understood in the mind as well as being experienced sensually. The good causes the being of the sensible object because it causes the ability to know the sensible object, because it causes the essence of the sensible object, the conception of it in intellection. Thus, the light of the good “gives the objects of knowledge their truth and the knower’s mind the power of knowing . . .” (508). Architecture elucidates the objects of knowledge and engenders the power of knowing. In the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, the highest virtue is found in understanding (1177a14). The highest form of understanding is understanding of the divine, which in Aristotle’s De anima is made manifest through intelligibles. The activity of understanding “is superior in excellence because it is the activity of study; aims at no end beyond itself” (Aristotle 1985: 1177b19), and if the activity of understanding is complete in the human mind, it is because of the presence of “some divine element” (1177b29). The human mind achieves complete understanding in intellectual develop-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 ment when it can receive the participation of a higher intelligence, when it can transcend its own mechanisms of logic and sense perception in order to understand itself. Architecture has the potential to facilitate this development because it stages the dialectic of the material and intelligible and it can facilitate the understanding of the human mind of its relationship to nature and being. In the De anima of Aristotle (Aristotle 1952: 3.5.430a10–25), the active or cosmic intellect is compared to light as it illuminates passive or potential intellect, discursive reason. Potential intellect must be developed in order to 110 John Shannon Hendrix be illuminated by active intellect; the lens of the oculus mentis, mind’s eye, must be cleansed, as it were, through intellectual discipline in order to see clearly. In the De anima (c. 200) of Alexander of Aphrodisias (1979), the active intellect is a productive intellect, or nous poietikos, and the potential intellect is a material intellect, or nous hylikos. The material intellect is perfected as intellection, or intellectus in habitu , in discursive reason, or dianoia . The nous poietikos is seen as a purely spiritual substance acting on human intellect. As the mind of the viewer of architecture is engaged in understanding the mathematical and geometrical organization of space, material intellect is perfected in intellectus in habitu . In the Liber Naturalis ( al-Tabi’iyyat ) of Avicenna (Ibn Sina, c. 980–1037), sensory thought, or virtus cogitativa , is illuminated by the active intellect. The potential intellect, nous pathetikos or nous dynamei , is the material intellect, intellectus materialis, a passive substratum of ideas which is activated in the intellectus in habitu . According to Averroes (1967) (Ibn Rushd, 1126–1198) in the Long Commentary on the De anima ( Sharh kitab al-nafs ), material intellect receives intelligibles from active intellect. The material intellect, intellectus passibilis, from Aristotle’s De anima, distinguishes between individual representations of sense experience. Averroes, like Avicenna, called the passible intellect virtus aestimativa. Averroes distinguished between intellectual knowledge and the habitual knowledge of the passible intellect, as in architecture the mathematics and geometry in the conceptual organization would be distinguished from the sensory experience of a building in the process of perception. In the Liber de Causis ( Kitab al-khayr al-mahd ), a paraphrase of the Ele- ments of Theology of Proclus which was widely circulated in the thirteenth century, the categories of Aristotle were expanded into a tripartite division of the anima rationalis , or soul: a vital operation that causes movement; an intellectual operation that mirrors intelligence; and intelligence, which is active intellect (Brand 1981: III.27–35). The operations of the vital, material part of intellect are divided into narratio or description, the content of language; loquela or discourse, language itself, which causes the narratio ; intelligence, or scientifi c thought in demonstration, which causes the loquela ; reasoning or dianoia , which causes the intelligence; and meditatio or imagination which causes the dianoia (V.61). Such a causal sequence in intellectus in habitu can be seen in the transition from the signifi er to the signifi ed in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 the reading of architecture, as material forms, objects of sense perception, become signifi ers in a language, in a syntax of architectural forms. In the Liber de Causis, the virtus intellectiva is the bridge between the sensible and intelligible, the intellectual operation which moves from the sensory forms to their conceptual arrangement (XIII.115). In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (c. 1230) of Robert Gros- seteste (1981), intelligibles are illuminated in the mind as the light of the sun illuminates intelligible objects, as light enters into a building and illuminates architectural forms. Virtus intellectiva abstracts universal ideas from the Architecture and intellectual development 111 particulars of sense experience to form principles. It is impossible not to abstract universal ideas from the particulars of a building when it is perceived in its conceptual organization. The principia essendi of a sensible particular become the principia conoscendi in the mind. The principle of a thing is fi rst the subject of natural philosophy, then mathematics and geometry as universals, then metaphysics, as described in Grosseteste’s Commen- tary on the Physics (c. 1230). The three levels of knowledge correspond to the three levels of intellect described by Grosseteste in his Ecclesia Sancta: ratio or reason ( nous hylikos ), which is capable of grasping the objects of the natural sciences; virtus intellectiva (nous poietikos), capable of grasping the principles of science and intelligibles; and intelligentia , from the illumination of active intellect, which has complete knowledge of both singulars and universals, as described in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics . Grosseteste called the clarity of vision of the oculus mentis “solertia .” Solertia is the ability to understand intelligibles, as in the signifi ed of Vit- ruvius or the lineament of Alberti; it is a product of the virtus intellectiva , the higher form of intellection, which can be facilitated by architecture. The clarity of vision of the oculus mentis is corrupted by the sensory experience of the body ( Commentary on the Posterior Analytics I.14, 235–238). Through the intellectus in habitu, the practice of intellectual discipline, the mind can overcome its necessary attachment to sensory experience in order to understand principles and intelligibles. The goal of intellection, of intellectual activity, is to uncloud the lens of the oculus mentis as much as possible, to purify the anima rationalis or soul of its corporeal connections and to aspire to see the principia essendi of things as clearly as possible. The experience of architecture, in its combination of material presence and conceptual organization, its mathematical and geometrical principles, can facilitate the purifi cation of the soul and the understanding of the principles of things. Scientifi c knowledge is based on accepted premises, according to Gros- seteste. Scientifi c reasoning, scientia or virtus scitiva, is a demonstrative knowledge based in dialectic and discursive reasoning concerning the permanent aspects of the material world abstracted as concepts. Mathematics and geometry are aspects of the virtus scitiva , as are the principia essendi , the principles of things. Four kinds of universals are available to the virtus scitiva : archetype, intelligible, genus and species (the form of an object). All levels of intellectus involve the abstraction of universal ideas from the par-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 ticulars of sense experience. Architecture can certainly be defi ned as being based on the virtus scitiva . All knowledge and reason must be based in sense experience, following Aristotle. In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, sense apprehends singulars, and universals can be arrived at by intellect through induction from singulars. The universals induced from singulars form the basis of demonstration, which forms the basis of scientifi c knowledge. While human knowledge only knows singulars as corrupted and mixed, in intelligentia , singulars are pure and differentiated as abstract archetypes. The knowledge 112 John Shannon Hendrix of singulars in intelligentia as given by illumination is corrupted by the condition of intellectus in relation to sense experience. Reason is awakened by sense experience, and is able to clarify and differentiate bodies and objects as they are given in sense perception. Actual perceptual experience is multiple and diversifi ed; perceived objects have no necessary connections in size or position. But in human perception in intellection, all objects and acts of perception are unifi ed to form a coherent whole which structures the sensible world. In order to be perceived as architecture, the material forms of a building must be organized and transformed by intellect into a coherent whole; the same is true of space. Space is an a priori intuition (as Immanuel Kant says), a conceptual organization – this is proven by the fact that space cannot be divided; thus, it does not exist in the sensory world. It is a product of what might be called ‘apperception,’ the combination of multiple perceptions which order the sensory world into a coherent whole or system, as in the architecture of a building. In the Hexaëmeron (c. 1237) of Grosseteste, the aspectus mentis is the ability of the mind to grasp ideas through the perception of visual forms, the ability to “see” the concept, the intelligible connected to the sensory object (Grosseteste 1996: VIII, IV, 9). The mind sees the intelligible in the illumination of the intelligentia , the active intellect. Perception is a learned process, a product of the perceiver learning how to recognize objects and relationships, as in architectural vocabulary elements in an architectural syntax. In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (II.6), memory receives the forms of perceived objects as already integrated and synthesized in the sen- sus communis. Memory involves the integration of the imaginatio , the formation of perceived images, and the virtus aestimativa, or discernment in material intellect. Memory is created from sense experience, and universals in experience result from memory, but not as separated from the particulars of sense perception. Perception divides, multiplies and otherwise organizes sensual reality. Per- ception is an intellective process, the most basic exercises of which are mathematics and geometry. Architecture stages the most basic relation between perception and intellection. Perceived objects are divided and organized into parts which correspond directly to the organizational capacities of reason. Geometry and mathematics are the mechanisms by which sensual reality is represented by perception to reason, though sense objects do not inherently

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 contain geometrical and mathematical properties. Architecture is the ordering of the sensible world by reason and the mediation between the human mind and nature. The perception of architecture involves the mechanisms in intellect of the transformation of sensual objects to intelligible objects through mathematics and geometry. Around 1225, Grosseteste wrote in a letter to a student, Adam Rufus, “imagine, even though it be impossible, that the will [ solertia ] of the same architect wishing to build the house were so powerful that this will alone need be applied to shape the material into the house of the design in the Architecture and intellectual development 113 architect’s mind, so that by this application will be fashioned into the house” (Harvey 1972: 23). The process of architectural design requires the clarity of vision of the oculus mentis in the intellectual development of the virtus intellectiva through intellectus in habitu. The design entails the Albertian lineament in the mind of the architect; the better the design, the clearer the vision of the oculus mentis of intelligibles in relation to sense objects, of the relation between sensual forms and abstract concepts as facilitated by mathematics and geometry in the virtus scitiva, scientiﬁ c reasoning. If the process of architectural design is successful, then the architect will accommodate the same intellectual ascension in the mind of the viewer. Not only is the form of the idea in the mind of the architect copied in the material of the building, but also the process by which the form is realized. In the Ethics (1674) of Benedict de Spinoza, there are three kinds of knowledge, based in sense, reason and intuition. Sense knowledge is derived from “individual objects presented to us through the senses in a fragmentary and confused manner without any intellectual order” (Spinoza 2006: 2p40s2), as in apperception, in the immediate sensory experience of the material presence of architecture, for example. Reason, or “knowledge of the second kind”, is derived from symbols, from which “we form certain ideas of them similar to those through which we imagine things” (Spinoza 2006), as in the nous poietikos or virtus intellectiva, related to the processes of perception in intellection. The material forms of architecture, as signi- ﬁ ers in a syntax, become symbols from which concepts are derived. Reason involves “common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things”, as in the principia essendi of things as understood in the intellect. The third kind of knowledge, intuition, “proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things” (Spinoza 2006). In other words, it can be compared to intelligentia , or the active intellect of Aristotle, a universal or cosmic intellect in which the individual intellect participates. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) of Immanuel Kant, knowledge can only relate to sensible objects by means of intuition. Sensibility, the capacity for receiving representations, is the source of intuition, which allows sensible objects to be thought in understanding, from which arise conceptions. Thought is related to intuition, and to sensibility, by signs, or the symbols of Spinoza. For Kant, sensible objects can only be thought as representations.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 All material forms in architecture are representations, as are all words in a language. Sensations cannot arrange themselves or assume certain forms; forms must exist a priori in the mind and be seen as separate from sensation. In the pure forms of sensuous intuition which exist in the mind a priori, “all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations” (Kant 1990: 22). Architecture already involves the ordering of the phenomenal world by a priori sensuous intuition, and it should be understood as such so that it can facilitate intellectual development. 114 John Shannon Hendrix According to Kant, space is not a concept which is derived from outward experience, nor from relations between external phenomena. External experience is, on the contrary, only possible through the antecedent representation of space. Space is a necessary a priori representation; all conceptions of space are based on a priori intuition, as are the principles of geometry. Space is not a discursive concept, as it cannot be divided or multiplied. Architecture thus depends on a priori intuition in perception, rather than in sensory perception or discursive reason. It is impossible to think of architecture without space; thus, space does not exist as a physical phenomenon, and it is reasonable to conclude that architecture does not exist as a physical phenomenon; architecture only exists as it is understood in the mind, as in the signiﬁ ed of Vitruvius or the lineament of Alberti. Knowledge consists of the power of receiving representations and the power of cognizing by means of these representations, according to Kant. Sensible objects are received as representations by a priori intuition, as forms. The forms of architecture are perceived as representations in intuition. Sensible objects are cognized as forms of thought, transformed into signs and symbols, understood as abstracted universals, as in virtus intellectiva . A priori cognition, insofar as it is dependent on understanding, is made possible by a synthesis or conjunction of a manifold of conceptions in relation to the “unity of apperception” (86), the synthesis of multiple singular perceptions of sensible objects. The architecture of a building, as it entails a synthesis of the manifold material parts of the building, can be seen as a priori cognition or intuition, as a model or catechism of the processes of perception and intellection, in an expression of the human condition. As Kant says, “[H]uman reason is by nature architectonic” (269), requiring an a priori unity, and accepting only principles which are part of a possible system. As Kant writes, when “I make the empirical intuition of a house by apprehension of the manifold contained therein into a perception, the necessary unity of space and of my external sensuous intuition lies at the foundation of this act . . .” (92). Without the a priori intuition, apperception, cognition and discursive reason would not be possible. The form of the house is drawn according to the synthetical unity of the manifold in space, which does not exist in phenomena, but rather only in the mind. Sensual perception and apprehension must conform to the synthesis of apperception, which is intel-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 lectual and a priori, and which is also spontaneous (and unconscious) in imagination and understanding. It is impossible to perceive or understand a single form in architecture or phenomena without an understanding of the synthetical unity or manifold, just as it is impossible to understand the meaning of a word outside its syntax. It is necessary to understand the mechanisms of thought and perception in order to understand architecture; the mechanisms of thought and perception are not completely accessible to thought itself, and must in part be ascribed to active intellect, a priori intuition, or the mechanisms of unconscious thought. Architecture, if it is to Architecture and intellectual development 115 accurately represent human thought and perception, should contain a metaphysical element that is not immediately accessible to sensory perception or discursive reason, but which can be understood through higher forms of intellection, in advanced forms of conceptual representation. In the Ethics of Spinoza, the third kind of knowledge, intuition, which “proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things”, is an understanding which constitutes the highest virtue or power of mind (Spinoza 2006: 5p25), as in the virtus intellectiva of Grosseteste, and the highest “ conatus ” of the mind (intelligendi conatus, the striving of the mind, as in the solertia of Grosseteste). The more the mind is capable of understanding, the more its desire or striving to understand is encouraged (5p26). It is the ethical responsibility of architecture to encourage the conatus of the mind. From the highest form of intellection in the virtus intellectiva thus arises the highest form of contentment of mind, and the highest state of human perfection and the highest form of pleasure (5p27). Beyond the importance of the contemplative life in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, where the life of the mind is the best of all possible alternatives, the life of the mind is life itself according to Spinoza. The life of the mind is based on understanding; thus, ignorance is the equivalent of nonexistence. There is “no rational life without understanding” (Spinoza 2006: 4app5); the good is deﬁ ned as that which assists in understanding and the life of the mind, and evil is deﬁ ned as that which hinders the perfection of reason. The perfection of the intellect is the most important thing in life (4app4), and it is the highest form of happiness available to the human being. The perfection of the intellect entails the cultivation of the virtues and powers of the intellect, and the ascension from sensory knowledge to knowledge based in reason to knowledge based in intuition, or from the virtus cogitativa or nous hylikos to the virtus intellectiva or nous poietikos to the intelligentia or active intellect, from sensory apprehension to perception to cognition of abstractions and universals in concepts. The perfection of the intellect is facilitated by architecture as the viewer passes from the sensory apprehension of the material presence to an understanding of the architectural forms to an understanding of the conceptual organization of the architecture, as a conceptual organization or architectonic of being, or a manifold of perception and intellection. The viewer who is guided by reason, by the highest

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 form of desire, is the viewer guided by “that by which he is brought to an adequate conception of himself and of all things that can fall within the scope of his understanding”. Architecture, as a manifestation of reason in perfection, being the highest form of virtue and contentment, has a responsibility to facilitate an understanding of the subject of the mechanisms of reason and perfection, and of the ontological existence of phenomena. It is impossible to grasp being in completion ontologically or epistemolog- ically without the highest form of knowledge, intuition. Without the faculty of intuition, the lower forms of knowledge, by sensory apprehension and 116 John Shannon Hendrix reason, are incomplete and useless. Intuition derives from reason in the perfection of the intellect, as does the conatus , the desire for knowledge. Ideas derived from sensory apprehension are fragmentary and confused, as in the Republic of Plato, but become adequate as they are processed in reason. The desire for knowledge is formulated in reason, not sense experience, so in the experience of architecture, the sensual experience of the material presence alone is not enough to instigate the perfection of the intellect. The perfection of the intellect, the striving of the mind for knowledge and understanding, is completely virtuous because it has no external justiﬁ cation, no ulterior motive. Striving for understanding is “the primary and only basis of virtue, and it is not for some further purpose that we endeavor to understand things” (Spinoza 2006: 4p26). The only true happiness in life is the perfection of the intellect. Architecture is capable of providing happiness in life. As the mind, in the exercise of reason, seeks only to gain knowledge and to understand, only that which is conducive to understanding is judged to be advantageous and to be truly good (4p27). The mind “is active only to the extent that it understands” (4p28), and it is only in understanding that the mind acts from virtue; thus, “the absolute virtue of the mind is to understand”. Architecture in turn is virtuous if it facilitates the understanding of the mind, if it inspires understanding and cognition beyond its material presence and function, if it communicates a metaphysical idea, an idea in reason from which conatus and understanding can be derived. Architecture, like all art, must communicate ideas outside of its material presence, through syntax, signiﬁ ers, signs and symbols. Archi- tecture has the potential to inspire a contemplative life, the equivalent of the good in the Nicomachean Ethics , and to inspire the perfection of the intellect, which is the highest good and virtue, and the highest happiness in life. The perfection of the intellect is the basis for a harmonious life, promoting freedom and understanding, which is the basis for a well-ordered society. As in the Laws of Plato, a well-ordered society depends on the virtue and happiness of each individual, which depends on the perfection of the intellect. Understanding in the perfection of the intellect is the only guarantee of peace of mind and human happiness, which architecture has the capacity to create. In The Philosophy of Art by Friedrich Schelling (based on lectures at the University of Jena in 1802–1803, published as Die Philosophie der Kunst in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 1859), nature “transfi gures itself into a totality and absolute unity of forms” (Schelling 1989: §11) in reason, becoming a “mirror of the divine”. Reason constitutes the “dissolution of all particular forms”, as in the manifold or synthetic unity of Kant. Reason is seen as an intermediary between sensory apprehension and intuition, the middle stage of intellection, as in the Com- mentators on Aristotle and Kant. Absolute indifference, or the manifold, is only possible within reason, as intuition is only possible with reason as a substrate. Sensory apprehension, the real, and intuition, the ideal, form a manifold as well, and the indifference is manifest as potence , corresponding Architecture and intellectual development 117 to virtus , the virtue or power of the mind. The indifference of knowledge and action, of the ideal and the real, is defi ned by Schelling as art. Art is activity “completely permeated by knowledge” (§14). Art combines sensory apprehension, the virtus cogitativa or discursive reason, and intuition, the virtus intellectiva and intelligentia , active intellect. Art combines all levels of intellect in its physical and metaphysical functions. Architecture, in that it is more closely tied to its material and functional requirements than the other arts, is the most problematic in the achievement of the indifference of the real (what is perceived) and ideal (what is thought), but at the same time is thus the most completely representative of human identity in the relation of the mind to the body. Philosophy, like art, entails the indifference of the real and ideal, and is based in reason, as reason is “the matter or objective matter of all philosophy” (§15). As reason is a manifold or architectonic, then architecture itself can be seen as a form of philosophy, based in reason in perception. Art and architecture are the manifestations of philosophy in the real or phenomenal world, the realm as given by sensory apprehension, from which the principles of reason are derived. Art is the “highest potence of the ideal world,” the highest virtus of intuition as manifest in intellection. As the good and virtue are unifi ed in philosophy, as in the perfection of the intellect of Spinoza, philosophy is an ethical science, distinguishing it from the other sciences, and philosophy depends on art. Art and architecture are the objectifi cation of philosophy, the objectifi cation of the concepts developed in the virtus intellectiva , such as the intelligibles of mathematics and geometry. According to Schelling, “Architecture can appear as free and beautiful art only insofar as it becomes the expression of ideas, an image of the universe and of the absolute” (§107), and only when it becomes independent of purpose or need as a mechanical art. Architecture must overcome its connection to its physical function and necessity in order to be art. Architecture is art when it expresses ideas, metaphysical ideas not connected to its material function. As soon as architecture “attains through appearance both actuality and utility without intending these as utility and as actuality”, then it “becomes free and independent art”. In order to be art, architecture “must be the potence or imitation of itself as the art of need” (§111), and its form must contradict its function. Architecture has the potential to be a virtus of intellectual development in its manifold synthetic unity as an architectonic

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 system or syntax, but only insofar as it can communicate its conceptual structure in contradiction to its physical presence. The conceptual structure must contradict the physical presence in order to be perceived in the same way that an a priori intuition can be understood in contradiction to the sensual apprehension of a sensible object. The idea or the absolute, the indifference of the real and ideal, intuition based in reason, are represented in art and architecture through the schematic, the symbolic and the allegorical, which are the potences or virtues of art. The schematic is defi ned by Schelling as the indifference of the 118 John Shannon Hendrix particular and the universal, the real and ideal, within the universal, as in philosophy. The symbolic is defi ned as the indifference of the particular and the universal within the particular, as in natural forms. Allegory involves the temporal sequence of symbols. In allegory, the universal is intuited through the particular, while in the schematic, the particular is intuited through the universal. The schematic is the medium between the sensuous form and the idea, as in syntax in language, or mathematics and geometry, the formula- tion of the idea of the form in the intellect. The movement from the signifi er to the signifi ed, from the sensuous form to the idea, is the movement from the particular to the universal in the schematic, which is the primary mechanism of the architectonic. It is not possible for the schematic to entirely represent the universal in the particular, as it is not possible for either language or architecture; it is not possible for the virtus intellectiva to fully comprehend intelligentia or active intellect, as it is not possible for reason to fully understand sensuous apprehension as a priori intuition. Neverthe- less, architecture, like language and art, facilitates the continual perfection of the intellect, as much as it can be perfected, as the highest form of virtue and happiness in human life in the maintenance of ethical standards in the individual and the state. In the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) by Georg Hegel, the development of the habitus in material intellect through intellection in self-consciousness plays a key role in the dialectic. In order to become self-conscious, Geist or spirit, the intelligentia or a priori intuition, the indifference of the real and ideal, doubles itself as object in its implicit state ( an sich) as material intellect or objective form (Hegel 1977: 177). In that way, the a priori intuition becomes the sensuous apprehension, and the idea takes objective form in the manifold architectonic in art or architecture. It is through the symbolic self-consciousness of intuition that universals develop from potentiality to objective form or particulars. Self-consciousness is independent of material form and desire or conatus , and it is in self-consciousness that intellect is freed from the mechanics of reason and perception in intellect, according to Hegel. The apperception of architecture requires the self-consciousness of intellect; architecture engages intellect and can be art only when intellect is aware of its own mechanisms in its perception. In that architecture is the architectonic manifold of intellect, architecture can represent intellect to itself in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 self-consciousness. The self-consciousness of mind contains the universal ideas and intelligibles for Hegel as the nous poietikos, virtus intellectiva or a priori intuition. Self-consciousness allows mind to translate sense experience in perception into idea, as manifestation of the indifference of the real and ideal. Perception alone, without the participation of self-consciousness, can only present a limited picture of the real to the mind, a picture determined by appearances and inchoate forms. The understanding in self-consciousness or intellection makes perceptible an underlying structure of signiﬁ cation in relation to perceived forms and appearances, as in the conceptual organization Architecture and intellectual development 119 of a building, which allows the experience of the real in perception, in sensuous apprehension, to be integrated with the mind to form an experience which synthesizes the real and ideal, the material and the idea, which is the self-consciousness of spirit. The self-consciousness of mind reveals the presence of mind in sensory perception, the presence of the a priori intuition in the sensuous apprehension. The self-consciousness of mind reveals the necessity of spirit, or active intellect, the indifference of the real and ideal. It reveals the grounds of the relation between the perceiving mind and what is perceived, which is staged by architecture. Spirit is present in what is perceived as intelligible, but it is not revealed by perception itself, perception being a function of reason. The conceptual structure of the architecture, the lineament, is present in a building as intelligible, but it is not revealed by the perception of the architecture alone, but rather by the intellection of the architecture, the understanding of the architecture as idea rather than physical form. The idea of the architecture is understood in particular when the forms of the architecture contradict their functional requirement, which provides a schema for the communication of the idea in relation to the sensuous apprehension of the material. For Hegel, the scientiﬁ c understanding in philosophy (Wissenschaft ) is the development of reason in consciousness, from discursive reason to intuition, leading to the understanding of the relation between consciousness and spirit, the indifference of the material and the idea, and thus self-consciousness. Consciousness is able to see through appearance into the ideas or principles which govern it behind the veil of forms in sensual apprehension. All preliminary forms of consciousness are abstract manifestations of spirit, particular manifestations of the universal, in a hierarchy of sense-certainty, perception in reason and understanding. Spirit, the indifference of the real and ideal in intellection, is the ethical life of society as developed through the self-consciousness of society, which is morality. Society is identical with its morality and achieves an ethical life through the dissemination of the underlying universal principles of spirit, which can be facilitated by architecture. The ethical society is a macrocosm of the ethical or virtuous mind in the understanding of spirit, as in the Phaedrus of Plato, or intelligentia , through reason, or virtus intellectiva, in the indifference of the particular and universal, the individual and the society. The self-consciousness of spirit

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 in the ethical society is the conscience of the society. In the Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel 1977: 748), spirit is the identity of the self-consciousness of mind and the principia essendi, the essence of things as understood by intellect, which is manifest in the religion of art ( Kunstreligion ). The religion of art is part of the ethical spirit of a culture, where the individual self is submerged in the universal, communal spirit (750). The form of spirit in art is the externalization of the essence of spirit, the indifference of the real and ideal, sensuous apprehension subsumed into the manifold architectonic. Architecture by its nature cannot be a form of 120 John Shannon Hendrix individual artistic expression, but rather the expression of a communal identity, thus representing the ethical spirit of a culture. In the Enneads of Plotinus (1966), the second tractate of the fi rst Ennead, called “The Virtues”, describes the aspiration toward the intelligible, as in the solertia of Grosseteste or the conatus of Spinoza, as the source of order and virtue in the individual self. It is through the aspiration toward the idea of virtue that the individual self takes on the likeness of virtue. Civic virtues act as principles of measure of individual virtues. Architecture, as a civic act, can act as a measure and guide for individual virtue. Participation in civic virtue is by assimilation, as in the shared experience of architecture. Plotinus called the aspiration to the intelligible “enthusiasmos ”, as in the possession of the individual soul by the divine. Through enthusiasmos , the individual can transcend consciousness to self-consciousness, toward a universal self-consciousness, the morality and virtue of the society. In ascending to universal self-consciousness and participating in spirit, the individual self participates in the virtues of spirit, and is thus a microcosm of a moral and ethical community. For Hegel, this participation can be facilitated by religion, philosophy, art and architecture. In the Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics ( The Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Fine Art, published in 1886, based on lectures given in the 1820s), art is the principal means, along with philosophy and religion, of the self-understanding of a culture, the purest expression of the spirit of a culture. Art, in particular architecture, reveals the universal in the particular, or the conceptual structure in the material form. The universal that art is capable of revealing is an ethical universal, a universal of ethical relationships which creates community. The universal values of a community are manifest in its individual members in the same way that universal ideas are manifest as particular forms in artistic representation. Art can serve as a heuristic device for the role of the individual in relation to a society, for the identity of the individual in relation to the ethics of a society. The sensuous form in art always refers to something other than itself as a symbol, signifi er or a combination of the two; as the particular form signifi es the universal idea, the art form reveals the ideal in the real, as for Schelling. According to Hegel, the art form “refers us away from itself to something spiritual which it is meant to bring before the mind’s eye” (Hegel 1993: XV); the art form brings the intelligible to the oculus mentis in virtus intel-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 lectiva , facilitating intellectual development. The ideal is not represented in the real in perception, as it is not possible to see spirit; the ideal is rather represented through the real in thought, as the objects of sensuous apprehension are the products of a priori intuition. Art and architecture express the freedom of thought of a culture and the role of spirit in history in relation to the philosophical conceptions of a culture. The freedom of artistic creation is a representation of the freedom of spirit in the ideal. Ethics and morality are principles of justice deﬁ ned in the Phaedrus of Plato as “absolute justice and discipline and knowledge, not the knowledge which is attached Architecture and intellectual development 121 to things which come into being, nor the knowledge which varies with the objects which we now call real . . .” (Plato 1973: 247). Ethics and morality are thus abstractions in the ideal, products of the intellectual development facilitated by art and architecture. The work of art or architecture is necessarily a product of its culture; it is the embodiment of the philosophy and ethics of a culture in the real. In that the purpose of art and architecture is to reveal spirit to the perceiving subject, to manifest the idea in the material, the development of art and architecture parallels the development of philosophy and the development of history. Philosophy progresses toward the understanding of spirit in the ideal, the relation between thought and perception and thought and being. History progresses toward the realization of freedom and self-consciousness in a culture, as the realization of spirit in activity, as manifest in the level of morality and ethics, expressions of spirit which govern that activity. Art and architecture are an index of the development of the relation between the idea as manifestation of spirit in mind and the activity of a culture, the Zeitgeist , as it unfolds in history. Architecture in particular has an ethical responsibility to facilitate the intellectual development of the individual for the virtue, happiness and self-realization of both the individual and the culture.

Bibliography Alberti, L. B. (1988) De Re Aediﬁ catoria ( On the Art of Building in Ten Books ), trans. J. Rykwert, N. Leach and R. Tavernor, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Alexander of Aphrodisias (1979) The De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias , trans. A. P. Fotinus, Washington, D.C.: University Press of America. Aristotle (1985) Nicomachean Ethics , trans. T. Irwin, Indianapolis: Hackett Publish- ing Company. ———. (1952) On the Soul (De anima ), trans. J. A. Smith, in The Works of Aristo- tle , Vol. III, Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. Averroes (1967) “Long Commentary on De Anima”, trans. A. Hyman, in A. Hyman and J. T. Walsh (eds.) Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions (pp. 304–323), New York: Harper and Row. Brand, D. J. (trans.) (1981) The Book of Causes (Liber de Causis), New York: Nia- gara University Press. Grosseteste, R. (1996) On the Six Days of Creation ( Hexaëmeron ), trans. C. F. J.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Martin, British Academy, Oxford University Press. ———. (1981) Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros , ed. P. Rossi, Florence: Olschki. Harvey, J. (1972) The Medieval Architect , New York: St. Martin’s Press. Hegel, G. W. F. (1993) Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, ed. M. Inwood, trans. B. Bosanquet, London: Penguin Books. ———. (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit , trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press. Hyman, A., and Walsh J. T. (eds.) (1967) Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Chris- tian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions , New York: Harper and Row. 122 John Shannon Hendrix Kant, I. (1990) Critique of Pure Reason , trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990. Plato (1973) Phaedrus , trans. W. Hamilton, London: Penguin Books. ———. (1955) The Republic , trans. D. Lee, London: Penguin Books. Plotinus (1966) Enneads , trans. A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer- sity Press (The Loeb Classical Library). Schelling, F. W. J. von (1989) The Philosophy of Art ( Die Philosophie der Kunst ), trans. D. W. Stott, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Spinoza, B. de (2006) The Essential Spinoza: Ethics and Related Writings, ed. M. L. Morgan, trans. S. Shirley, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Vitruvius (1931) De Architectura (On Architecture), trans. F. Granger, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 10 On the ethical signiﬁ cance of space and shaping space

Karsten Harries

Once more Odysseus In his book Die Vollzähligkeit der Sterne, Hans Blumenberg poses the question: Why did we travel to the moon? Was the trouble worth the effort? Is a suffi cient answer to point to the desire to know just in order to know that, according to Aristotle, helps to defi ne a human being, a desire in which he locates the origin of all philosophy and science? Or to point to a curiosity that again and again seeks to open closed doors and calls us to leave home, to explore distant seas, to journey into the unknown? In that case, it would be nothing other than our reason that demands open space and invites us to leave behind whatever places nature and society have assigned to us, to go beyond the perspectives and prejudices bound up with such placement. Must reason by its very nature give birth to what in German is called Fern- weh , that longing for faraway places that pulls us away from home and calls into question every establishment that would assign us our place? According to Kierkegaard’s aesthete, it was boredom that caused Adam and Eve to lose paradise (Kierkegaard 1987: 286). But boredom is negated by the interesting, and the interesting in turn incites curiosity, awakens the desire to know. Again and again this desire will let us lose some paradise or other. Nothing other than our reason lies buried in the snake’s promise, “You shall be like God.” As the animal rationale, the human being is the animal that has fallen out of nature and is now restlessly seeking its place, never quite content with its lot. This restlessness lets us dream of a home that would allow us to be really at home. But paradise never existed. In a lecture he gave in 1951 at the 2. Darmstädter Gespräch with the title Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 “Der Mythos des Menschen hinter der Technik” – this was the same symposium at which Martin Heidegger lectured on “Bauen Wohnen Denken” – Ortega y Gasset compared this discontent “with a love without the beloved”, with a “pain that we feel in limbs that we never possessed” (1952: 116). Hei- degger was of a different mind: he would have the architects that attended this symposium learn from an eighteenth-century Black Forest farmhouse what kind of building once allowed for an authentic dwelling – as if before the Enlightenment human beings had really been at home in their world, 124 Karsten Harries content with themselves and their world. But was this what Heidegger really wanted to say? Ortega at any rate did not want to hear of such contentment; and so he called our discontent “the highest thing the human being possesses, precisely because it is a discontent, because man wants to possess things that he never had” (1952: 117). And does this always wanting more, this striving for what is higher, not determine our essence? Is it not bound up with our reason, which has to assign to everything real a place in the logical space of the possible and thus lets us compare our life-world with other possible worlds, whose temptations and promises seem to render the world to which we have become accustomed sadly defi cient? Again and again human beings have demanded more. Our technology has its origin in such discontent, which wants to create a new world “because, as it is, our world does not fi t us, because it has made us sick. This new world of technology is like a gigantic orthopedic apparatus, that you [and here Ortega was addressing his audience, the architects present who responded to his talk with repeated laughter and applause] want to create, and all this technology has this wonderful, but – as is the case with everything human – dramatic movement and quality, to be a fabulous, great orthopedic device” (1952: 117). A few of the architects listening to Ortega may have thought, as he spoke, of Cain, who, according to Genesis, built the fi rst city and to whose race we are said to owe the invention of technology and the arts, as if architecture, art and technology could return to us the lost paradise. It was the loss of paradise that let Cain turn to building a city and his race to technology to seek there Ersatz for what had been lost. Ortega’s thought goes in a similar direction when he speaks of limbs that we never had and yet miss. Wings and airplanes come to mind, as does our communications technology. First of all, and still most of the time, our body binds us to a particular place. In his lecture, heavy with nostalgia, Heidegger had spoken earlier that day of the importance of a rooted existence. But human beings are not trees, fi rmly anchored in some soil. As it says in an old folksong: “thoughts are free”. This freedom of thought has from the very beginning desired to overcome distance, to trade place for open space. We demand mobility, demand wheels, sails, wings: a freer access to things than our senses allow us. We want to understand things as they really are, not subject to the limits imposed by particular perspectives. Freedom and curiosity, Fernweh and the claim to truth are inseparably bound together.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 A presupposition of every search for truth is the commitment to objectivity; objectivity again demands a bracketing of and going beyond all interests and limitations imposed by some particular point of view. Was Plato not right to teach that to gain access to the land of truth we have to ascend from the cave of our life-world into the light? But this ascent, to which we owe all progress, enlightenment and our science, is shadowed by an ever-growing discontent, for it has denied our modern life-world the aura of home. With the bracketing of all subjective interests and perspectives, the world, as known by science, has, to quote Hans Blumenberg, “to lose its connection Ethical signifi cance of space 125 to all subjects who are yet involved with it, as that world becomes a sphere of indifference toward all ” (1986: 305–306). With this we touch the shadow side of that never-satisfi ed curiosity that Ortega understood as “the highest thing the human being possesses”. It is not surprising therefore that Ortega’s Fernweh should have been countered by that Heimweh or nostalgia that in that Darmstadt symposium found a voice in Heidegger’s contribution and its emblem in his place-establishing Black Forest farmhouse. This change from Fernweh to Heimweh is easy enough to understand: the indifference of the world threatens a loss of humanity. To the self-elevation, the self-transcendence of the earthbound subject, which is a presupposition of science and technology, corresponds necessarily a self-diminution, as Nietzsche saw so clearly. Consider in this connection his ambiguous praise of Copernicus in Jenseits von Gut und Böse . Together with the Pole Boskovitch – Nietzsche means the Ragusan Jesuit Giuseppe Ruggero – Copernicus is celebrated as the “greatest and most successful opponent of visual appearance (Augenschein )” (Nietzsche 1886: 26). What led Copernicus to this victory are considerations that are a presupposition of our science. The visual appearance ( Augenschein ) that is presupposed by our world picture is devalued as mere appearance: doesn’t reality present itself to us here in perspectival appearances, inescapably bound and refracted by particular points of view? A presupposition of the world discovered by our science is the devaluation of the world presented to us by our senses. Nietzsche speaks of “the greatest triumph over the senses that has been achieved on earth up to now” (1886: 26). But is this victory not also a defeat of our humanity? The shadow side of this victory is that self-diminution of man, which according to Nietzsche, has undergone an “unstoppable progress” since Copernicus. Thus, we read in the Genealogie der Moral : “Since Copernicus man seems to have stum- bled onto an inclined plane – ever faster he rolls away from the center – where? Into nothing? Into the ‘piercing awareness of his own nothingness’ ” (1887: 404). The price of our self-elevation, which more than forty years ago let us leave the earth and visit the moon, is, to cite Blumenberg once again, the most diffi - cult of all admissions that a human being can be expected to make, “to allow his world [that is to say the life-world in which we fi nd ourselves initially sheltered and at home] to become the world, to see his life-time in the nexus

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 of other life-times alienated into the time of the world” (1986: 305–306). The progress of science, and especially the progress of astronomy, which let the earth become a spaceship drifting aimlessly in the immensity of the universe, lets us experience this earth increasingly less as being like a ﬁ rmly built and well-furnished house in which everything has a proper assigned place. Already in Kant’s Kritik der praktischen Vernunft we meet with this changed understanding: consideration of the countless worlds that make up the universe “annihilates as it were my importance as an animal crea- ture that has to return the matter, that formed it, to the planet, after it was 126 Karsten Harries equipped for a short time (one does not know how) with vital force” (Kant 1788: 289). Underscoring this insight into the abandonment of human beings by a world that has grown immense, Schopenhauer begins with it the second volume of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung :

In inﬁ nite space countless shining spheres, around every one of them rotates perhaps a dozen illuminated smaller ones, hot within, covered with a solidiﬁ ed, cold rind, on which a mouldy covering has produced living and knowing beings – that is the empirical truth, the real, the world. (Schopenhauer 1965: 3)

The young Nietzsche appropriated this Schopenhauer quote and placed it in slightly changed form at the beginning of “Über Wahrheit und Lüge im Aussermoralischen Sinn”. And can this “empirical truth” be challenged? The world that our science uncovers does not care for us. These heavens do not proclaim the glory of God. Our science does not and cannot know anything of values, God or freedom. For these there is no room in the logical space it presupposes. As already Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi knew, every attempt to fully comprehend all that is has to lead to nihilism, where such nihilism need not lead to typically modern attempts to regain the lost center despite all this – where I am thinking especially of attempts to have art reoc- cupy the place left vacant by the death of God; but also of that second religi- osity, as Oswald Spengler called it, which today attempts to push itself into the place vacated by a religion that science would seem to have relegated to a never-to-be-recovered past. Our modern life-world, shaped as it is by science and technology, is thus anything but gemütlich or comfortable. To be sure, our building and dwelling speaks of an enormous gain in mobility and that is to say also in freedom; but at same time, it communicates a difﬁ cult-to-bear sense of being adrift. What Milan Kundera called the unbearable lightness of being gives birth to a desire for weightiness, for a sense of gravity. Ortega’s grand dream of a technological orthopedics is thus shadowed by Heidegger’s dream of some farmhouse in the Black Forest or by the genius loci of some still medieval town, such as perhaps Messkirch.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Words such as Gemütlichkeit and genius loci are perhaps already suf- ﬁ cient to turn some up-to-date theoretician who has read his Lyotard or Deleuze to dismiss what I have to say here as the words of a theoretical dinosaur. Is there anything that Heidegger’s Black Forest farmhouse still has to teach us? Does talk of some genius loci not attempt to resurrect something that has been left behind by the progress of reason? But the desire for home and for an art and architecture that answer to this desire is not dis- missed so easily, as demonstrated by the widespread tendency to seek com- fort in kitsch productions that nostalgically evoke some supposedly more Ethical signiﬁ cance of space 127 wholesome past. The opposing pull of Fernweh and Heimweh in all of us resists resolution; I want to say: should not be resolved, should be preserved, another reason to listen to Blumenberg when he opposes the centrifugal desire of our astronauts to discover new worlds, the centripetal desire to return home. Fernweh gives birth to Heimweh :

As one engages in such reﬂ ections, one needs to meditate on the strange contingency . . . that the earth, so discriminated by its position in the world – which once, before Copernicus, had been thought to be a singu- larly privileged place for the theoria of the world, where ‘nothing could escape’ one – as a result of the technology of space travel has unexpect- edly extended to us something like grace: the possibility of returning to the earth, once one has been so curious or so craving for admiration to leave it. Odysseus, once again and now dressed in the spacesuit of a human paradigm: to return to Ithaca, this much has not changed, requires and rewards the most circuitous detour. (Blumenberg 1990: 383)

We should note the mention of grace! Blumenberg here suggests to us who belong to this age of the lost center the possibility of a return to a now post-modern geocentrism, which does not deny the Fernweh that we all know. And with this he also provides theory with a pointer towards a possible return home, enlightened by ﬂ ights of thought that have left the earth far behind, a pointer to the possibility of countering the love of theory with a love of the earth.

Three pictures I spoke of the way Fernweh and Heimweh pull every one of us in opposed directions. If our building or our dwelling or our thinking is to do justice to our essence, it also must do justice to this struggle within us. In this connection, windows and doors in which interior and exterior meet demand special consideration. I will illustrate this in three pictures. The ﬁ rst is Caspar David Friedrich’s Frau am Fenster (1822) in Berlin’s Alte Nationalgalerie, the woman, presumably his young wife, one of those ﬁ gures seen from the back, so typical of Friedrich, that seem to look out of

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 their world into the infi nite. But we must be more specifi c. Here the woman looks out of the window onto the Elbe, looks into the open. A few light clouds move across the sky. The masts of the boats invite thoughts of possible journeys, of a freer life. Dark interior and bright exterior are sharply opposed. The open exterior, promising freedom and life, underscores the suffocating quality of the severe space. Here the window is not an opening that allows passage into the open. We feel confi ned. To be sure, with the woman we look through the window. But the picture allows us to see only a small segment of the world beyond. Is the woman dreaming, like a bird in 128 Karsten Harries a cage, of a freedom that the window’s thin cross seems to deny her? This picture does not invite us to think of architecture as providing comforting shelter, but the image of a prison. The basic mood of this picture is a Fern- weh that remains without satisfaction. The second picture is Edward Hopper’s Western Motel (1957) in the Yale University Art Gallery. The motel room in which we see the sitting woman, belongs to the same limitless space of which the large window shows us an arbitrary excerpt. This room permits no being at home. The walls of this room are unable to effectively bind this space. Space seems to fl ow through this room, to deny it all sheltering power. Such a room does not permit a genuine dwelling. As the suitcase and the car visible through the window show, this woman is on her way somewhere. But travel here is not at all enticing. Being underway is rather a fate, perhaps a curse. No trace here of Fernweh. The disengaged gaze of the woman fi ts the portrayed space. The basic mood here is a feeling of abandonment, of not belonging anywhere, of having no home. The third picture is Adolf Menzels’ Balkonzimmer (1845), once again in Berlin’s Alte Nationalgalerie. The focus of this picture is the opened double door, draped with light white curtains, opening the room to the invisible balcony. We almost feel the draft of summer air that carries the bright exterior into the room, bounded by sunlit fl oor, ceiling and walls, the door beckoning us outside, very different from the mirror, which casts us back into the room with its furniture, where the lightless lamps that accompany it only underscore the fl ood of light streaming into the room. The mirror is part of the furniture of this room. Together with the decorative molding that frames the ceiling and the furniture, it helps to furnish the room. In such well-furnished rooms, things have their proper places. Here one could feel at home. But the draft of wind playing with the curtains beckons us outside. The double door opens the room to a beyond that knows no limits. But the curtains veil this beyond, protect the interior, provide it with a permeable boundary. Separating and at the same time joining interior and exterior, this balcony door is the gate through which the light enters that enlivens this room and allows it to become a metaphor of a truly humane dwelling. A centrifugal and centripetal desire here join Fernweh and Heimweh in a play that makes it diffi cult to speak any longer of Weh , i.e., woe. The basic mood here is a contentment with the world that does not exclude a certain tension. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016

Nostalgia and kitsch Bachelard thought that we all dream of a house that promises physical and spiritual shelter, of a home that at times seems to call us in fl eeting memories and which yet never existed even if in some eighteenth-century farmhouse we may perhaps discover its metaphor. The counterpart of Bachelard’s oneiric house is the oneiric city, envisioned by Heidegger in the image of Messkirch, with shady oriels, fountains and images of the Virgin decorating the corners Ethical signifi cance of space 129 of houses (Heidegger 1911: 10). In countless variations this dream will not let go of us and again and again has helped shape our building and dwelling. Examples are easy to fi nd in the United States too. Here is just one: If one considers only fi nancial success, one of the most successful painters in the United States today is the self-styled “Painter of Light” Thomas Kinkade. In his paintings he likes to present us with houses that conjure up a happy past when all was still right with the world, somewhat in the manner of countless cheap postcards, such as Christmas greetings. But not only that: today, a developer promises to allow such dreams to become reality and thus fulfi ll the dream of authentic dwelling. We have the saying: “There’s no place like home”. Literally understood, however, the words say something else: there is no such place! Home so understood is a fantasy. And must we not agree with Ortega? Would the return to a home that would really grant us peace and rest not contradict our essentially restless essence, would mean death in life? In our world, we are never at home as such pictures promise. Kitsch is relatively harmless as long as it remains a matter of paintings or novels that allow human beings to escape at least from time to time a reality that leaves them dissatisfi ed. But kitsch ceases to be harmless when it attempts to embrace reality, for example, when an architect attempts to translate the kitsch visions of some painter into built architecture. And kitsch becomes really dangerous when it becomes a power that shapes the lives of human beings. What is here shortchanged is our freedom. Heimweh here threatens to suffocate all Fernweh and with it our humanity. To be sure, freedom is often diffi cult to bear. This leads to dreams of a weighty architecture that assigns us our place so effectively that it crushes freedom. The kitsch artist and architect Adolf Hitler thus once promised to liberate such dreamers from the burden of their freedom:

Providence has destined me to become the greatest liberator of humanity. I liberate human beings from the coercion of a spirit that has become its own end, from the dirty and demeaning self-tortures of a chimera called conscience and morality and from the demands of a freedom and a personal autonomy that only a very few can ever meet. (Rauschning 1966: 2)

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 As the aesthetic practice of more than one school of art or architecture of those days can show us, this was no isolated or idle promise. When Moses takes too long to reappear, there will always be an Aaron and some golden calf to simulate the establishment of genuine meaning. Nietzsche’s dream of an architecture that would be strong enough to establish genuine community was a dream of architectural practice as the raising of some golden calf. The Bauhaus dreamed a version of that dream; and Heidegger, too, once dreamed it – he, too, like National Socialism, invoking the Greek paradigm. But was it not from the very beginning the task of architecture to furnish 130 Karsten Harries not only the body, but also the soul, with shelter and to establish an order that would allow the individual to recognize his or her proper place. Is this not the ethical function of architecture that raises it above all functional building?

The burning cathedral Faced with such architecture that would assign human beings their place, it is understandable that from the very beginning a certain ill will against architecture should have followed it like a shadow. Doesn’t the Bible tell us that it was Cain who built the fi rst city? And isn’t the Tower of Babel the fi rst work of architecture mentioned there? Just in our age, which let deconstruction become an academic fashion, a fashion that quickly spread from philosophy to the humanities, and somewhat surprisingly also to architecture, we meet with this ill will over and over. Consider, for example, the cover of Denis Hollier’s Against Architecture: The Writings of Georges Bataille. It shows one of the most admired master- pieces of architecture, the cathedral of Reims, in fl ames, victim of a failed German offensive in World War I. But the destructive power of the fl ames is here not mourned or condemned. The picture is not meant to call attention to the inhumanity of war: quite the opposite. Here, the fl ames are the expression of a sublime freedom that refuses to recognize the authority of any pregiven order, be it moral, religious or architectonic. The desire for freedom feeds the ill will against architecture. Architecture is here thought to imprison us and thus to deserve being destroyed, even if such destruction threatens chaos and bestiality. The prison becomes the paradigmatic work of architecture. “It is obvious,” said Bataille, “that monuments inspire social good behavior in societies and often real fear. The storming of the Bastille is symbolic of this state of affairs: it is hard to explain this mass movement other than through the people’s animosity (animus) against the monuments that are its real masters” (Hollier 1989: ix–x). But given that monumental architecture invites good behavior and at times may induce real fear, does this mean that it therefore deserves to be abolished? Is our world burdened by a surfeit of good behavior? Should we, for the sake of still more freedom, return to the labyrinth in search of the Minotaur? Such conviction betrays an ill will that is directed

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 also against the self. As Bataille recognized so clearly, the ill will against an allegedly domineering architecture is also an ill will against reason. Freedom here refuses to be bound by reason, as Kant demanded. “And this,” Hollier observes,

is precisely what, in Bataille’s view, the mythical fi gure of Acephalus was intended to show: the only way for man to escape the architectural chain gang is to escape his form, to lose his head. This self-storming of one’s own form requires, in fact, an infi nitely more underhanded Ethical signifi cance of space 131 strategy than one of simple destruction or escape. The image of Aceph- alus, thus, should be seen as a fi gure of dissemblance, the negative image of an anti-monumental madness involved in the dismemberment of ‘meaning’. The painter André Masson drew this fi gure and Bataille wrote an aphorism to go with it: ‘Man will escape his head as a convict escapes his prison’. (Hollier 1989: xii)

What such an escape from one’s own form might look like was recently demonstrated for us by the French concept artist who calls herself Saint Orlan. Thanks to plastic surgery and psychoanalysis, the possibility of becoming another person today has become more than just an idle dream. Is not our body, too, material to satisfy natural and unnatural desires? Ortega called technology an orthopedic apparatus. Thus, the artifi ce of Daedalus, Greek archetype of the architect, is supposed to have allowed the Cretan queen Pasiphae to satisfy her desire to make love to a bull. Saint Orlan appears driven by a still more obviously unnatural desire: here, it is the dream to be like God, author of herself. And thus, this saint declares God to be her enemy. But what is the meaning of a self that tries to enlist science and technology in an attempt to become another person? Must this self not lose all content? And with this loss, must it not also lose measure and direction? What could become an autonomous subject, fi nally comes to be just a plaything of all-too-timely fashions. Bataille was, of course, not the only one to have attacked architecture. Con- sider, for example, the exhibition “Deconstructivist Architecture”, curated by Mark Wigley and Philip Johnson (1988). The catalogue spoke of the emergence of a new sensibility, fascinated by possibilities of contaminating, disrupting, violating, subverting architecture. That sensibility led to an architecture that self-consciously calls traditional architecture into question, that is to say, an anti-architecture, which in today’s architectural world, both in theory and practice, has played a signifi cant role, so, e.g., in the work of Frank Gehry, Zaha Hadid, Peter Eisenman, Daniel Libeskind, Rem Koolhaas and Coop Himmelblau – the architects celebrated by that exhibition. The work of the architect-turned-anarchitect Lebbeus Woods offers another striking example. Woods turned his back on the presumably promising career

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 that his association with Eero Saarinen had opened up to make “anarchitec- ture” his own, appropriating a term fi rst used by the English architect Robin Evans, and that I had come to associate with Gordon Matta-Clark’s cutting of an abandoned building and with the group of artists he had gathered around himself in 1973 in New York. Here, too, it is not thoughts of an all-too-often-violated nature that feed the ill will against architecture, but thoughts of a freedom made possible by the long-unthought-of possibilities technology has opened up. Has it not become possible to create an environment that answers to our ever-changing needs and desires in ways denied to 132 Karsten Harries us by the all-too-ordered environment that is our inheritance? The utopias that promise such possibilities have to reject the call for a place-bound architecture that accepts without protest the primacy of nature or of the embodied, gravity-burdened self and its life-world as unbearably retrograde, all too ready to content itself with lifeless imitations of the place-establishing architecture of a not-to-be-recovered past. And thus, Woods called himself the enemy of gravity and declared war on it, opposing to its arrogant claim to rule his life his own claim to be a free, autonomous, self-determining spirit. Woods’ declaration of war springs from a desire already familiar to the Enlightenment. With his design of a spherical house, Claude-Nicolas Ledoux presented himself as an enemy of gravity. The enthusiastic embrace of the sphere by the architects of the Enlightenment belongs with the enthusiasm that greeted the fi rst balloons, which promised a godlike freedom from the tyranny of place, promised to fl y across boundaries and whatever false walls separated human beings. Heralds of a freer, more genuinely humane, because truly cosmopolitan, world, “these balls of air are” – said Helmut Reinicke – “the fi rst invention linked to the concept of world revolution. The balloon rises into the sky – as a sign that reason on earth is extending its sway. Such a revolution . . . has this subjective aspect that human beings want to fi nd themselves, want to give themselves a human countenance. This subjectivity is the divinity of religions. The attack on the latter is the greatest presumption and thus liberation. The airship is a practical presumption of that sort” (1988: 76–77). That such ideas were to help shape modernist architectural practice is suggested by Theo van Doesburg’s “Towards a Plastic Architecture”, which demands of architecture “a fl oating aspect (in so far as this is possible from a constructional standpoint – this is the problem for the engineer!) which operates, as it were, in opposition to natural gravity” (1924: 79). Such an architecture answers the kind of modern man envisioned by Corbusier: “The man who is intelligent, cold and calm has grown wings to himself” (1970: 119). In the airplane, whose beauty Corbusier likens to the Parthe- non, the state of mind of this new humanity fi nds its paradigm. Demanded here is an artifi cial, spiritual look. Consider Malevich’s Suprematist Com- positions, which fl oat geometric shapes on a white background that fi gures the infi nite void. Malevich, too, thought of his Suprematist Compositions as giving expression to a new state of mind, the state of mind appropriate to a

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 liberated humanity no longer burdened by bodies that cast shadows. Space here triumphs over place.

Ruin romanticism I would like to return one last time to the image of the burning cathedral. It belongs with a by now quite old discontent with the shape of the world that the reason that presides over our science and technology has built us. Such discontent let the Viennese painter-architect Hundertwasser call “the Ethical signifi cance of space 133 air raids of 1943 a perfect automatic lesson in form; straight lines and their vacuous structures ought to have been blown to pieces, and so they were”. He admonished us to “strive, as rapidly as possible for total uninhabitability and creative mouldering in architecture” (1958: 158). What Hundertwas- ser was after with his admittedly exaggerated embrace of the destruction of architecture by the bombs of World War II becomes clear when we have a look at his transformation of a quite ordinary Viennese apartment house, which has made it into a tourist attraction. It hints at why Hundertwasser might have thought ruins to be spiritually more inhabitable than so-called functional architecture. “When rust settles on a razor blade, when mould forms on a wall, when moss grows in the corner of the room and rounds off the geometric angle, we ought to be pleased that with the microbes and fungi life is moving into the house, and more consciously than ever before, we become witnesses of architectonic changes from which we have a great deal to learn” (1958: 159–160). What here is called the spiritual uninhabitability of modern functional architecture makes it easy to understand the love of ruins. Such discontent, rooted in a suspicion that the progress of technology, while it has opened up countless long-unthought-of possibilities, at the same has alienated us from ourselves, did not have to wait for the modern age. Paradise had no need for building. In this garden Adam and Eve were already at home. And does genuine dwelling not demand a house that should resemble such a garden as much as possible? As Heidegger’s Black Forest house seems to protest against Ortega’s orthopedics, so dreams of paradise have long protested against architecture. But if the fall, and that means the awakening of our reason, has let us fall out of nature, does that same reason not promise us to Ersatz for what we dream of and supposedly lost, yet never possessed? Prefi guring Ortega, Bacon and Descartes thus dreamed already of a science and a technology that would allow us to realize the promise of that paradise to which the cherubim’s fl aming sword is supposed to deny us access. It is a dream that remains very much alive. But does this not ask too much of our reason? Is our reason able to furnish not just the body, but also the soul with adequate shelter? That painters such as Hans Baldung Grien liked to place the birth of Christ not in some barn but in some fantastic ruin invites thought. Is a ruin, architecture

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 caught up in a process of decay or deconstruction not a more fi tting setting for the birth of the Redeemer, who is to rob time of its sting and to deny hell its victory, than any architecture that reason could construct? The conviction that reason alone is not suffi cient to provide for genuine dwelling has survived that death of God proclaimed by Nietzsche. Something deep in us remains dissatisfi ed by both the spiritual and the built architectures which our reason has furnished us and welcomes thoughts of architecture in a state of disintegration. Such discontent feels drawn to ruins that let us experience the mysterium tremendum et fascinans of nature, of space and of time. 134 Karsten Harries Towards a new geocentrism “Kolonie liebt, und tapfer Vegessen der Geist”: “the spirit loves colony and courageous forgetting”. This line from a late version of the poet Friedrich Hölderlin’s elegy “Brot und Wein” speaks of Fernweh and Heimweh . A presupposition of founding a colony is a certain discontent with home. Such discontent lets human beings seek their fortune abroad by founding colonies. But home refuses to be forgotten. The colony remains bound to the home left behind and attempts to preserve in countless ways its image in the new environment. ‘Colony’ thus offers itself as a metaphor of the never-resolved opposition of Fernweh and Heimweh . Should it be resolved? We are dealing here with that opposition of which Milan Kundera has this to say in The Unbearable Lightness of Being: “The only certainty is: The lightness/weight opposition is the most mysterious, most ambiguous of all”. This opposition generates opposing visions of the future: we dream thus of dancing, of fl ying, of a freer existence, less bound by gravity and place; but also of a very different kind of existence, of environments thought perhaps with Kundera or Norberg-Schulz in the image of ancient Prague with its Vltava bridge, guarded by saints, whose genius loci promises to give weight to our existence. Only at the cost of full humanity can the tension of this opposition be eliminated. We are amphibians, belonging to the earth and to light. Thus, one side of us dreams of home and of being sheltered; the other demands freedom and dreams of journeys into the unknown. One seeks the beautiful; the other the sublime. We also dream of what might heal the rift that we bear within us. But building needs to embody that rift if it is to allow for a genuinely human dwelling. But does the repeated loss of supposed centers and foundations that is the price of scientifi c progress mean that human beings should not attempt to make themselves the center of their interests? Is man not the measure of all things? Alberti’s and Cusanus’ rediscovery of the signifi cance of this saying by Protagoras helps mark the beginning of humanism. There is no logical connection between geocentrism and anthropocentrism, and that means also that there is no logical connection between the scientifi cally necessary loss of the cosmic center and the existential loss of the human center. That a whole series of Copernican revolutions has denied us a place near the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 cosmic center is beyond question. I am thinking here not so much of Kant’s Copernican revolution, which denies us knowledge of things in themselves, as of the Darwinian revolution that would have us understand the human being as created in the image of the ape, rather than that of God. I am thinking also of Freud’s revolution, which would have us understand our proud ego as the servant of unconscious urges that prevent us from being master of our own house. But although the progress of science may have left human beings far behind, so far behind that science no longer can see the whole human being, the free and responsible person, our life-world, even Ethical signifi cance of space 135 if increasingly formed by technology, is not adequately understood in terms of that technological world picture that Heidegger likes to conjure up. His essay “The Age of the World-Picture” remains a caricature, even if it gets hold of something essential. Even though science and technology may have left us far behind, they have left us at home, have left us our home. This may disappoint those who like to dream of journeys into some sublime beyond the earth or hope for a technological utopia. The progress of science, more specifi cally of astronomy and astronautics, has indeed disenchanted the world. When they looked up to the stars, Vitru- vius’ fi rst human beings experienced up there a higher, timeless logos. In that logos, human building found its measure. Not so very different was the way the medievals still experienced the starry sky. But what are the stars to us, which the fl ood of artifi cial light and air pollution have made ever more diffi cult to see? Is our artifi cial light, which allows us to change night into day not light enough? And can the same not be said of the light of our reason, this lumen naturale, a light that our science would have us understand not so much as a gift, but as a product of accident? What need is there for God? And yet, the need not to feel alone in the cosmos, to experience spirit answering our own spirit, has survived the end of the geocentric world picture, and survived also the death of God. Does our science not demand the existence of intelligent extraterrestrials? As old as the modern world picture, which lets us understand our earth as by no means unique, is the confi dence that sooner or later we will encounter intelligent life somewhere out there. Nicolaus Cusanus, who was perhaps the fi rst to deprive the house-like cosmos of antiquity and the Middle Ages of its terrestrial center and in its place put an infi nite universe, already played with the thought of intelligent inhabitants of other stars, a thought that was to return again and again with Bruno, Kepler and with the enlightened Kant. And though such expectations met with disappointment over and over, does our science not justify them in that it forces us to think of intelligent life as a product of natural processes, even if the details remain obscure for the time being and elude us? From the very beginning, matter had to give rise to spirit. In view of our quasi-infi nite universe, is it not just another anthropocentric prejudice to think that intelligent life developed only once, here on our earth? Science has no room for what is truly unique. Everything that science can understand is, in principle, repeatable. Unfortunately, with the one exception of the earth, our plan-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 etary system proved quite inhospitable. To be sure, traces of ice are said to have been found on the moon and on Mars, but no trace of inhabitants. And as our astronomers reach ever farther into space with their telescopes, and that is to say also ever further back into the history of the universe, the hoped-for or perhaps feared extraterrestrials have not said peep. And with every astronomical progress, the conviction is growing that for all intents and purposes, we are alone. Even if we suppose that somewhere out there are intelligent beings curious or perhaps stupid enough to want to make our acquaintance, the cosmic distances make it ever more unlikely that we will 136 Karsten Harries ever be in a position to engage these unknown beings in anything resembling a genuine conversation. The distances have become too great; there simply is not enough time. We are alone. Hans Blumenberg, whom I follow with these considerations, understood himself as someone whom technology had left at home. And he invites us to understand ourselves similarly as beings that the progress of science, technology and astronautics has left back at home. Left back at home! That can mean to have missed out on the progress of spirit and its promise, but it can also mean that that progress has left us our home, has not destroyed the only home that we human beings will ever have. Even though our reason has moved the earth from its cosmic center, it has not denied us the experience of the earth as the center of our life. Consider Icarus who, seduced by the splendor of the sun, fl ew high above the earth only to plunge into the sea. We who with Blumenberg understand ourselves as those whom the progress of technology has left back at home, will not be seduced by Icarian dreams, much as we like to satisfy our curiosity and entertain ourselves with thoughts of such fl ights and, well sheltered in our four walls, read about all sorts of courageous explorers, even if their fl ights sometimes end in disaster. We know that the pursuit of truth demands such fl ights. But we also have learned that reason alone is insuffi - cient to give meaning to life. Thus, we are not tempted by accounts of space explorations to play with thoughts of someday being able to leave the earth, to found colonies on Mars or some other heavenly body. Quite the opposite! Thoughts of such journeys only serve to render the earth more lovable, more homelike, just as a winter storm raging outside lets us appreciate our warm living room even more. Left behind by the progress of astronautics! The words hint at something like regret: what adventures are denied to those of us who are determined to stay home? Not that we do not admire the discoverers of new worlds. We, too, would like to see ourselves with Nietzsche in the image of Columbus. To repeat Hölderlin’s saying, “Kolonie liebt der Geist”: “the spirit loves colony.” But that saying is preceded by “ihn zehret die Heimath”: “home will not let go of the spirit”. “Schwer verlässt was nahe dem Ursprung wohnet den Ort”, as we read in his hymn “Die Wanderung”: “only with diffi culty does what lives near the origin leave the place”. We experience home only where a familiar spirit shows itself. Only when

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 we experience our environment as shaped by a spirit like our own do we feel at home. Spirit must answer spirit. That is why Vitruvius let his fi rst humans build their huts in the image of the spiritual order visible in the stars, providing not just the body, but also the soul with shelter. But how much does this narrative still mean to us? Who today still experiences the presence of a higher logos when he looks up to the stars? The disenchantment wrought by the progress of science, more specifi cally of astronomy, is not to be undone. But this disenchantment is beginning to give way to an ever-deeper, still-growing awareness of the uniqueness of our earth. Whether we like it or Ethical signifi cance of space 137 not, we human beings remain bound to this home, which remains the center of our life-world. Our own nature binds us to this earth, to this ground, which fi nally transcends our attempts to understand and master it and in which yet all meaning has its roots. This insight generates, or should generate, a new responsibility: Needed is a new geocentrism. That should guide the way we build.

Bibliography Blumenberg, H. (1986) Lebenszeit und Weltzeit , Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Blumenberg, H. (1990) Die Vollzähligkeit der Sterne, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Heidegger, M. (1911) “Jörgensen, Joh. Das Reisebuch . Licht und Dunkel in Natur und Geist”, in M. Heidegger, Reden und Andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges, Gesamtausgabe , vol. 16, 10. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. Hollier, D. (1989) Against Architecture , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hundertwasser (1958) “Mould Manifesto Against Rationalism in Architecture”, in Ulrich Conrads (ed.), trans. Bullock M., Programmes and Manifestoes on 20th-Century Architecture , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Johnson, P. and Wigley, M. (1988) Deconstructivist Architecture , New York: Museum of Modern Art and Little Brown and Company. Kant, I. (1788) Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft , Riga: Hartknoch. Kierkegaard, S. (1987) Either/Or , Part I, ed. and trans. Hong H. V. and E. H., Princeton: Princeton University Press. Le Corbusier (1970) Towards a New Architecture, trans. Frederick E., New York and Washington: Praeger. Nietzsche, F. (1886) Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Kritische Studienausgabe , vol. 5., Munich, Berlin and New York: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag and de Gruyter. Nietzsche, F. (1887) Zur Genealogie der Moral, Kritische Studienausgabe , vol. 5., Munich, Berlin and New York: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag and de Gruyter. Ortega y Gasset, J. (1952) “Der Mythos des Menschen Hinter der Technik”, in Bartning, O. (ed.) Darmstädter Gespräch: Mensch und Raum (pp. 111–117). Darmstadt: Neue Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt. Rauschning, H. (1966) “Gespräche mit Hitler”, in Wulf, J. (ed.) Die Bildenden Kün- ste im Dritten Reich. Eine Dokumentation , Hamburg: Rowohlt. Reinicke, H. (1988) Aufstieg und Revolution. Über die Beförderung Irdischer Frei- heitsneigungen durch Ballonfahrt und Luftschwimmkunst , Berlin: Transit. Schopenhauer, A. (1965) Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung , Sämtliche Werke, Zweiter Band, edited by A. Hübscher, Wiesbaden: F. Brockhaus. van Doesburg, T. (1924) “Towards a Plastic Architecture”, in Conrads U. (ed.) Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Programmes and Manifestoes on 20th Century Architecture , trans. Bullock M., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 11 Architecture as the receptacle of Mitsein

Nicholas Temple

Introduction “For we are made for cooperation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another to be vexed and to turn away”. (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations , II.I) In Richard Sennett’s recent book, Together: The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation, the author takes a historical view of the role of cooperation in the structuring of society, identifying key developments in social relationships. Aligning religious with secular forms of ritual, Sennett argues that in the age of modernity the social bonds that once made cooperation possible and enduring are waning, leading to signiﬁ cant challenges in our age of globalisation. Sennett urges us to ﬁ nd new forms of ritual participation in contemporary urban life that can address this crisis and thereby avert the serious consequences of social fragmentation. This quest, however, prompts us to consider how the spaces of our cities, many of which have long been emptied of any explicit ritual purpose, can facilitate collective participation that is both meaningful and sustainable to an increasingly atomised (and displaced) social order. Does the search for new forms of cooperation that Sennett suggests also require certain spatial relationships, or situational contexts, for their legitimacy? In this chapter, I propose to address this issue by taking a particular philosophical dispute as a point of reference, highlighting how notions of cooperation as a measure of togetherness raise profound questions about the capacity of architecture to support and nurture social cohesion in our age of globali- Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 zation. The dispute in question, between Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas, concerns the meaning of the term Mitsein , as it was originally applied by Heidegger in his seminal work Being and Time. The central premise of this investigation is that the dispute provides fertile ground for considering Sen- nett’s argument about the role of cooperation in the context of architecture and the city. In order to establish the basis of this connection between architecture and phenomenology, it will be necessary to begin by examining the dispute in question and considering its wider philosophical interpretations. Architecture as the receptacle of Mitsein 139 Being-with Heidegger’s neologism, “Mitsein” (translated in English as being-with), underpins the philosopher’s general theory of human being. The term opens up a horizon of possibilities about what it means to be part of a shared humanity, and how shared experiences of the world are constituted spatially and therefore architecturally. To quote from Heidegger’s Being and Time :

The phenomenological assertion that ‘Dasein is essentially Being-with’ has an existential-ontological meaning. It does not seek to establish ontically that factically I am not present-at-hand alone, and that Oth- ers of my kind occur. If this were what is meant by the proposition that Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is essentially constituted by Being-with, then Being-with would not be an existential attribute which Dasein, of its own accord, has coming to it from its own kind of Being. It would rather be something which turns up in every case by reason of the occur- rence of Others. Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein’s Being-alone is Being-with in the world. (Heidegger 1997: 156–157)

Heidegger’s assertion that “Being-with” does not presume an “Other”, that is “present-at-hand or perceived”, lies at the heart of the philosophical dispute. It seems clear that Levinas adhered to the underlying principle of Heidegger’s concept of Dasein when he states: “For Heidegger, an openness upon Being, which is not a being , which is not a ‘something’, is necessary in order that, in general, a ‘something’ manifest itself” (Levinas 2000: 189). Hence, Being provides the ‘background’ condition, within which entities of the world manifest themselves. This manifestation takes place in presence, which according to Heidegger, “is the greatest claim that a human being makes; it is what ‘ethics’ is” (Olafson 1998: 1). In Levinas’ phenomenology, Heidegger’s model of Mitsein , as encompassing presence in the world, is replaced by an ineluctable orientation to the Other. From this orientational ontology, whose destiny is humanity’s relationship to God, Levinas constructs a more distinctive ethical philosophy which he aptly describes as a “spiritual optics” (Levinas 2000: 76). Underly-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 ing this essentially ‘onto-theological’ slant on phenomenology is an implicit criticism of the ethical ambivalence of Heidegger’s ontology. This is summa- rised in Frederick Olafson’s own critique of Heidegger’s philosophy, when he states that mere presence is an ethics which:

expresses both the strength and the weakness of Heidegger’s way of locating “ethics”. It explicitly connects presence (Anwesenheirt ) with ethics, but it does not acknowledge the even more important connection of ethics with reciprocal presence and this with Mitsein . The trouble 140 Nicholas Temple with this association of presence (but not reciprocal presence) with ethics is that it issues in a conception of the relation of thought to the truth of being as “the original ethic” without reference to our relation to one another. (Olafson 1998: 1)

The absence of any “reference to our relation to one another”, in Heidegger’s originary ethics, is underpinned by what David Michael Kleinberg-Levin calls “the groundlessness of an ethical life measured by what is beyond all human measure” (Kleinberg-Levin 2005: 206). In challenging this groundlessness and its ‘encompassing’ mode of Mitsein , Levinas’ orientational ethics applies the principle of human sociability to phenomenology through face-to-face encounter. Accordingly, as Levinas states: “We therefore are radically opposed to Heidegger who subordinates the relation with the Other to ontology . . . rather than seeing in justice and injustice a primordial access to the Other beyond all ontology” (Levinas 2000: 89). Levinas examines this philosophical model of face-to-face encounter in a number of seminal works in which our mortal relationship with others is interrogated as a form of transcendence. In Alterity and Transcendence , Levinas considers the question of the beginning of philosophy (to take the Socratic model) as an asymmetrical dialogue of the I-you relationship (Levi- nas 1999: 98, 101). It is interesting to note how Levinas uses Heidegger’s foundational principle of Dasein to underpin his own ethical philosophy, but in such a way as to draw attention to the distinction between the two approaches to phenomenology: “I already ask myself whether my being is justiﬁ ed, whether the Da of my Dasein is not already the usurpation of someone’s place” (Levinas 1999: 28). At the same time, it seems clear that Levi- nas takes Heidegger’s principle of Mitsein (as the ‘ground’ of coexistence) as a critical point of departure for developing his own ethical philosophy:

In Heidegger, coexistence is, to be sure, taken as a relationship with the Other irreducible to objective cognition; but in the ﬁ nal analysis it also rests on the relationship with being in general, on comprehension, on ontology. Heidegger posits in advance this ground of being as the horizon on which every existent arises, as though the horizon, and the idea of limit it includes and which is proper to vision, were the ultimate Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 structure of relationship. Moreover, for Heidegger intersubjectivity is a coexistence, a we prior to the I and the other, a neutral intersubjectivity. The face to face both announces a society, and permits the maintaining of a separated I. (Levinas 2000: 67–68)

The last sentence declares the decisive split by which Levinas adds his central philosophical principle (of the specifi city of being with one another) Architecture as the receptacle of Mitsein 141 to Heidegger’s thesis that “ being in general . . . [is] the ultimate structure of relationship”. Oona Eisenstadt, among others, interprets this division in a particular way when he states that face-to-face constitutes Levinas’ “main symbol for the ‘rupturing ethical encounter’. In distinction, the side-by-side would seem most likely to symbolise the kind of unifi ed social action that Levinas calls politics and justice, and might also evoke, in the mind of the reader, the Heideggerian Mitsein” (Eisenstadt 2006: 66). But where does this expression “side-by-side” ( Nebeneinander ) come from, and how might we judge its use as a term of reference for Heideggerian Mitsein in the way Eisenstadt suggests? Whilst side-by-sideness could be identifi ed in strictly spatial/geometric terms as a simple 90-degree orientation from frontal (face-to-face) dialogue, it also connotes certain forms of cooperation that entail mutual autonomy or separateness. Both characteristics, of course, are interconnected, since side-by-sideness assumes a certain detachment, without the burden of direct visual exchange. Can we construe therefore that side-by-sideness constitutes a mode of ‘Being-with’? Signifi cantly, Heidegger responds to this question unequivocally when he states: “As an existentiale , ‘Being alongside’ the world never means anything like the Being-present- at-hand-together of Things that occur. There is no such thing as the ‘side-by- sideness’ of an entity called ‘Dasein’ with another entity called ‘world’ ” (Heidegger 1997: 81). In his famous Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger devotes a signifi cant part of one seminar to explain how side-by-side relationships are inadequate to convey his concept of Being-with, but which nevertheless provides a useful datum for understanding the spatial implications of Mitsein :

Being-with one another is [phenomenologically] not a relationship of a subject to another subject. As an example, imagine that we are in a restaurant, and each of us is sitting alone at a separate table. Then, are we not with one another? Of course, but in an entirely different way of being-with one another from what occurs in our present group discussion. The way we sit by ourselves in the restaurant is a privation of being-with one another. The ones who exist [this way] are not interested in one another, and therefore are with one another this way in the same space. Now, even if I get up and accompany you to the door, it is [still] not the same as in the case when two bodies are merely moving side by Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 side to the door. (Heidegger 2001: 112)

By describing this choice of sitting in separate areas as “privation of being-with one another”, Heidegger is making the case that Mitsein is a ‘built-in’ condition of being human, and therefore side-by-sideness (in the way natural objects are arranged) lies outside the ambit of human experience (Olafson 1998: 21). 142 Nicholas Temple And yet in the increasing mechanisation of modern society, in which effi - ciency of production has dictated – and overshadowed – how we behave alongside each other in the workplace, the notion of side-by-sideness as a spatial register of ‘concatenated’ (effi cacious) cooperation is both compelling and pervasive. In the traditional settings of the workshop, cooperation was in many respects a dialectical process of negotiation (or negotium ), variously entailing both face-to-face and side-by-side interactions, in which a given task was accomplished through mutual support. Sennett states, however, that: “technical innovation changed cooperation in the workshop. Technical change unsettled its social relations. Rituals based on shop hierarchy were subverted” (Sennett 2013: 115). Hence, if “privation of being-with one another” is the consequence of our alienated situations, then the ontological constraints of distanciated side-by- sideness could be deemed its equivalent theoretical construct. What emerges from this initial investigation is that two broadly ‘orientational’ modes of Being-with could be said to lie at the boundaries of Heidegger’s encompassing model of Mitsein . On the one hand, we have Levinas’ uncompromis- ing principle of the fully engaged, face-to-face encounter which involves infi nitesimal responsibility to the Other; an asymmetrical relationship where ‘alterity’ “is reabsorbed into my own identity as a thinker or a posses- sor” (Levinas 2000: 33). On the other hand, the distanciated relationships that characterise side-by-sideness summon forms of (faceless) cooperation between autonomous ontological entities that contribute to synchronous or closely coordinated behaviour typically directed to specifi c ends or goals. In Sennett’s thesis of ‘togetherness’ in the workplace, it is evident that the author is concerned with the ‘middle ground’ between these two positions, to demonstrate how “physical labour can instil dialogical social behaviour” (Sennett 2013:199). This form of behaviour, moreover, entails a triadic relationship, which Sennett calls the “social triangle” (“earned authority, mutual respect and cooperation”) (Sennett 2013:148). He argues that “this threefold relation is often experienced physically, non-verbally; bodily gestures take the place of words in establishing authority, trust and cooperation” (Sennett 2013: 205). It seems that Levinas’ argument of infi nitesimal responsibility that forms an integral part of face-to-face encounter is necessarily circumvented in the social triangle for the sake of the needs and priorities of collective coop-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 eration in the workplace. Quite how Sennett’s thesis of cooperation can be seen in action is suggested in Simon Bronner’s investigation of the Amish barn-raising ceremony. He states that the event “is the most dramatic example of ‘social capital’ among the Amish, which includes face-to-face relationships, extended family and longstanding traditions and rituals that support them” (Bronner 2006: 35). In such an example of collective manual labour, “gestures of movement, facial expression and sound endow the social triangle with sensate life” (Sennett 2013: 206). Hence, the act of building, as much as its mode of inhabitation, has the potential to redeﬁ ne the meaning Architecture as the receptacle of Mitsein 143 of cooperation, an argument that has certain resonance with Heidegger’s premise that building is a form of dwelling and therefore embodies Dasein (Heidegger 2010: 343–363).

Il ‘Certame Coronario’ The debate surrounding the meaning of Mitsein has a bearing upon architectural thinking, in particular the ways in which architectural settings avail themselves of meaningful situations that are conducive to forms of cooperation. Olafson implies such a relationship when he states:

The right place is the world as a space that is inhabited by human beings who are with one another although not simply in the side-by-side manner that expresses a mutual externality; whose Mitsein impinges on the things that matter to them; and who ﬁ nally have to be able to count on one another if they are to have any hope of achieving any real control over the world they are in. (Olafson 1998: 57, n.28)

Perhaps the most obvious historical settings where notions of Mitsein are manifested as demonstrable forms of human participation are religious spaces such as a church. In the assembly of members of the congregation, whose physical side-by-side relationships reinforce rather than obstruct social cohesion and a common religious bond, the church is also the location where this mutual dependency in numbers actively supports the ‘face-to-face’ encounter between individual worshipper and God, through the agency of prayer and participation in the church liturgy. I would like to refer to an unusual (one could say unorthodox) case, dat- ing from the ﬁ fteenth century, where a basilica was used for a purpose other than worship. The example is a literary contest held in Santa Maria del Fiore in Florence in 1441, an occasion which formed part of the celebrations to commemorate the recently completed dome of the cathedral by Filippo Brunelleschi (Crum 2011: 59–79). Called the Certame Coronario by Leon Battista Alberti, who organised the event, the competition was, according to Charles Burroughs, a “spectacle of remarkable irrelevance to the sacred values and purposes the great building had been constructed to accommodate

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 and express” (Burroughs 1998: 40). The liturgical protocols and practices of religious space were momentarily suspended during this event for the sake of inventing different forms of ritual that nevertheless drew inspiration and meaning from the architecture. The theme of the Certame was friendship between individuals, rather than between “humankind and a transcendent deity”, and entailed readings of poetic verse presented to a panel of judges (Burroughs 1998: 40).The prize for the winning entry of the contest was a silver laurel wreath, emulating the classical tradition of ancient poets. However, unable to agree on an outright 144 Nicholas Temple

winner, the judges in the end awarded the crown to the building in which the event was held, a gesture of huge symbolic signiﬁ cance as I will explain later. The most controversial aspect of the contest was the requirement that all participants recite their poetic verse in the Tuscan vernacular, rather than in Latin, a decision which was closely allied to Alberti’s personal ambition to communicate ideas to the widest possible audience. Alberti considered

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 ancient eloquence as part of a more general skill or human facility, facil- ita , which informed other creative and intellectual endeavours besides ora- tory and written tracts, such as painting and architecture (Baxandall 1988: 123–124). Hence, the contest would have revealed how poetic evocations of friendship can be amplifi ed by the decorum of the architectural setting. Alberti no doubt drew upon ancient models of poetic contests for this event, where the city provided the dramatic backdrop to great rhetorical deliveries, only here, the rostrum of the Roman Forum is replaced by the pulpit of the Christian basilica. Architecture as the receptacle of Mitsein 145 The choice of this unusual historical event in which to investigate the architectural implications of Mitsein is justifi ed fi rst on the basis of the manner in which a religious space was used to host an event that celebrated relationships between people. A space otherwise devoted to the ‘face-to-face’ relationships between the penitent and God through worship, and its supporting ‘side-by- side’ arrangement of members of the congregation and those performing the liturgy, was appropriated here to communicate mutual exchange in friendship through the reciting of poetry. Second, the poetry was delivered in the volgare , rather than in the authoritative language of the Church (Latin), further underscoring the principal purpose of language – as Alberti believed – to convey a shared rather than hierarchical (authoritative) relationship between deliverer (speaker) and the audience. In this communicative sphere – to bor- row Levinas’ principle – knowledge of God is mediated by one’s relationship with one another through language (Levinas 2000: 73).Third, the canopy of the dome served as a potent symbol of collective (Tuscan) identity and ultimately of social cohesion that transcended specifi cally religious and architectural purposes. Reciting poetry in the Tuscan dialect in the Duomo both commemorated – and became consonant with – the visual and symbolic reach of Brunelleschi’s dome as the embodiment of the city of Florence and its outlying regions of Tuscany. Alberti implies such a connection when he “portrays the ‘machine’ of the dome as rising above the heavens, and large enough to cast a shadow over the Tuscan people” (Pardo 2001: 228). By awarding the silver laurel to the building, Brunelleschi’s dome could be said to embody the idea of architecture as a receptacle of Mitsein in the sense that the space affi rms Being-with, with respect to others in friendship and to the broader notion of collective belonging (the bond of Tuscan citizenship) communicated through both spoken and visual/architectural language. Of course, this particular (and exclusionary) sense of Being-with, with its territorial, linguistic and cultural defi nitions, bears little direct resemblance to Heidegger’s ‘encompassing’ and universal precept of Dasein , or indeed, Levinas’ principle of infi nitesimal responsibility to all humanity (Levinas 2000: 35–40). Nevertheless, the example provides a vivid case of how architecture can reinforce the bonds between individuals, and thereby constitute a social as well as a religious symbol. By substituting the face-to-face relation between man and God with that between individuals in friendship, Alberti was giving religious space the stamp of Humanism, with the support

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 of classical eloquence, but in ways that would have made it impossible to ignore or dismiss the prevailing religious beliefs and practices of the Roman Catholic Church; the sacred remained present during the contest as a background witness that gave legitimacy and gravitas to the occasion.

Dwelling among strangers Against the backdrop of the social discordances that characterise modernity, which Sennett uses as the context for his thesis on togetherness, Humanist 146 Nicholas Temple evocations of the moral compass of friendship, citizenship and family loy- alty that formed the foundations of Renaissance notions of civitas (and which could serve as a particular theoretical model of Mitsein ) seem remote from twentieth-century theories of alienation and social atomisation that have come to defi ne what is defi cient in modern urban life. More recently, the impact of systematic – technologically driven – globalisation on our relationship to others, and to the world, has prompted intense debates about what social cohesion can mean in contemporary society (Sassen 2014). It is in the context of these debates that I would like to briefl y examine the Thermal Baths at Vals in Switzerland by Peter Zumthor, which in many ways serves as a contemporary ‘response’ to the kind of historical situations as Alberti’s Certame in Santa Maria del Fiore. Located in the remote resort village of Valsin Graubünden, the thermal complex was built as a half-buried extension to an existing hotel, of which it forms part. Built in layers of Vals gneiss, a dark grey stone extracted from a nearby quarry, the rectangular footprint of the building emerges in stratifi ed layers from the southwest slope of the hotel:

The building takes the form of a large, grass-covered stone object set deep into the mountain and dovetailed into its ﬂ ank. It is a solitary building, which resists formal integration with the existing structure [of the hotel] in order to evoke more clearly – and achieve more fully – what seemed to us a more important role: the establishing of a special relationship with the mountain landscape, its natural power, geological substance and impressive topography. (Zumthor 1998: 156)

The architect’s characterization of the thermal complex as a “solitary building”, by virtue of its ambivalent relationship to the nearby hotel, serves as a powerful analogy to how one dwells within it. This relates to a key premise of this study, that a visitor to the Thermal Bath at Vals always arrives as an ‘outsider’, even if he/she has been before. As if discovering the building anew on each visit, one’s initial sense of unfamiliarity with the place – on account of its uniqueness and otherworldliness – gives way to a deeply felt intimacy – even privacy. We can see how this particular architectural response to Being-with unfolds Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 as a ritual journey through the various layers of the building. The visitor accesses the Thermal Baths from a narrow concrete tunnel buried into the hillside. From here, he/she enters a series of small communal changing rooms through leather curtained openings. Surrounded by heavily lacquered and polished wooden lockers, these dimly lit rooms operate as a kind of liminal space that contrasts with the monolithic – cave-like – spaces beyond. The row of exit doors on the south side of these changing rooms leads onto an elevated platform, from where the visitor gets the ﬁ rst glimpse of the layered Architecture as the receptacle of Mitsein 147

stone interior of the thermal baths with partial views of the main tepid pools below. Extending the full length of the landing is a stepped ramp, along which the bather gradually descends into the body of the building, with framed views of the mountainous landscape beyond. From the base of the ramp, the bather arrives at the main level of the building, adjacent to the central square pool. At each corner of the pool are free-standing rectangular rooms, each oriented in the direction of the four sides of the sunken pool, with wide steps Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 between each leading down to the tepid water. The resulting rotational effect of this arrangement draws the bathers into both traversal and forward movements; the former leading to the rectangular pool to the west that projects into the landscape as an external bathing area, and the latter culminating in the main internal relaxation area to the south which faces large framed openings overlooking the Valserrhein river valley. Enclosing the overall rectangular footprint of the building is a series of small rectangular rooms that contain a range of pools, treatment areas and private resting spaces. 148 Nicholas Temple In this constellation of open and closed spaces, Zumthor has skillfully brought intimacy and immensity, ﬁ nitude and inﬁ nitude, into dialogue through the varying scales and ritual settings of bathing:

[T]here was a feeling for the mystical nature of a world of stone inside the mountain, for darkness and light, for the reﬂ ection of light upon the water, for the diffusion of light through stream-ﬁ lled air, for the different sounds that water makes in stone surroundings, for warm stone and naked skin, for the ritual of bathing. (Zumthor 1998:156)

Derived from what Zumthor calls a “profoundly archaic heritage”, this visual and corporeal connection between landscape and bathing spawns situations where the Da of Dasein need not assume the usurpation of the other in the way Levinas contemplates, but rather opens up a shared Mit- sein between strangers (Zumthor 1998: 156).The passage of solitary bodies through openings and level changes that permits visual exchange and physical contact provides the foreground setting against which the background context of the building’s relationship to its surroundings is sustained; or to use Heidegger’s terminology, both background and foreground afﬁ rm a relationship between “earth, sky, mortals and divinities” (Heidegger 2010).

Conclusion In this investigation, I have tried to elucidate how the Heideggerian concept of Mitsein , with its various philosophical interpretations and disputations, provides a lens for examining Sennett’s thesis of cooperation in the modern age and its spatial/architectural implications. By fostering such a philosophical dialogue, architecture has the capacity to open up a ﬁ eld of potential situations where relationships between fellow beings is contingent upon our capacity to relate to the world – as it is represented or circumscribed by a visual horizon or territory. The two case studies examined in this chapter (Leon Battista Alberti’s Certame in Santa Maria del Fiore and Peter Zumthor’s Thermal Baths at Vals) speak of how such an understanding was addressed ritually, topographically and architecturally during two very different periods in history. Whilst the Humanist world of ﬁ fteenth-century Florence could assume that notions of Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 friendship between individuals could be coexistent with regional identity (and that the shadow created by Brunelleschi’s dome could impart such a bond), the age of globalisation is governed by far less coherent spatial (geographical) parameters for sustaining Mitsein , of which Zumthor’s Thermal Bath at Vals could be said to provide a convincing and meaningful response. Rather than bound in friendship through a common ethos or regional identity, as embodied in the dome of Florence Cathedral, the experience of the Valserrhein river valley at Vals – through the receptacle of the bath Architecture as the receptacle of Mitsein 149 building – constitutes a retreat for visitors to take private ‘measures’ of a place, in a world increasingly devoid of spatial registers of Mitsein .

Bibliography Baxandall, M. (1988) Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy , Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bronner, S. J. (2006) “Building Tradition: Control and Authority in Vernacular Architecture”, in L. Asquith and M. Vellinga (eds.) Vernacular Architecture in the 21st Century: Theory, Education and Practice (pp. 23–45), Abingdon, Oxon: Taylor & Francis. Burroughs, C. (1998) “Grammar and Expression in Early Renaissance Architecture: Brunelleschi & Alberti”, Res: Anthropology & Aesthetics 34: 39–63. ———. (2009) The Italian Renaissance Palace Facade: Structures of Authority, Sur- faces of Sense , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crum, R. J. (2011) “Stepping Out of Brunelleschi’s Shadow: The Consecration of Santa Maria del Fiore as International Statecraft in Medicean Florence”, in M. Delbeke and M. Schraven (eds.) Foundation, Dedication and Consecration in Early Modern Europe , Leiden: Brill. Eisenstadt, O. (2006) “Levinas in the Key of the Political”, in A. Horowitz and G. Horowitz (eds.) Difﬁ cult Justice: Commentaries on Levinas and Politics , Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Heidegger, M. (2010) “Building Dwelling Thinking”, in D. F. Krell (ed.) Basic Writ- ings: Heidegger , London: Routledge. ———. (2001) "“Zollikon Seminars, 1959–1969”, in M. Boss (ed.) Martin Hei- degger: Zollikon Seminars: Protocols – Conversations – Letters , Northwestern University Press, IL: Evanston. ———. (1997) Being and Time , translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell. Kleinberg-Levin, D. M. (2005) Gestures of Ethical Life : Reading Hölderlin’s Ques- tion of Measure After Heidegger, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Levinas, E. (1999) Alterity & Transcendence, New York: Columbia University Press. ———. (2000) Totality and Inﬁ nity: An Essay on Exteriority , Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press. Olafson, F. A. (1998) Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pardo, M. (2001) “On the Identity of Masaccio in L. B. Alberti’s Dedication of Della Pittura”, in M. Schlitt and J. Marino (eds.) Perspectives on Early Modern and Modern Intellectual History , Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Sassen, S. (2014) Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy , Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Sennett, R. (2013) Together: The Rituals, Pleasures & Politics of Cooperation , London: Penguin Books. Zumthor, P. (1998) Peter Zumthor Works: Buildings and Projects 1979–1997 , Baden, Switzerland: Lars Müller Publishers. 12 Towards a new ethical ‘paradigm’ in the creation of spaces

Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou

The current dominance of an aesthetic ‘paradigm’ in architectural discourse and production The age we live in is governed by urgent moral, environmental and social crises. The immediate result is that the established productive and educational hierarchies related to the design of space demand serious revaluation and critique. In an increasingly globalised world, where interconnectivity is reinforced, every single action or decision has long-term repercussions. The question of responsibility and ethical quality thus comes to the fore. Architecture, a cultural action with durable results, should become aware of this responsibility. Indeed, since the 1990s, a growing number of voices have been calling for architecture and urban design to be seen as a kind of applied ethics. However, the political, social, environmental and moral implications of spatial design still do not receive enough attention in the current professional and educational debates, obscured as they are by the shadow of production and the speed of global information fl ows. The reasons for this conceptual and methodological regression are many. A fi rst cause is the lack of established theoretical traditions and refi ned conceptual tools for the description, critique and evaluation of the built environment. A second cause is the want of an ability to argue consistently and develop solid conceptual frameworks because of the prevailing design empiricism. This empiricism is connected to a third cause: a deep ideological structure which does not allow for sustained consideration of the relationship between ethics and architecture in contemporary times. I would like to describe this structure as ‘the dominance of a persistent aesthetic “para- Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 digm” ’ in the history of art, the discourse on architecture and contemporary architectural production. Here, of course, I understand the term ‘paradigm’ as defi ned by T. S. Kuhn in his Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions . Kuhn terms as ‘paradigms’ those characteristic achievements of a scientifi c practice which “include law, theory, application and instrumentation together – (and) provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientifi c research” (Kuhn 1996: 10). If it is legitimate to transfer Kuhn’s terminology into architectural thought and praxis, then the dominant aesthetic Towards a new ethical ‘paradigm’ 151 paradigm refers to the discourse on architecture and its modes of production which indicate its importance exclusively on the basis of morphological terms and sensible criteria, visual rules and shape-grammar applications. The dubious principles of this aesthetic paradigm have not eluded the attention of scholars. For example, Karsten Harries describes the ‘aesthetic approach’ to the art of building as a conception which regards the role of architecture as being that of a morphological decoration of a functional edifi ce (Harries 1997: 2–4, 10–13, 23–26). The emergence of the aesthetic approach is related to the old, but still infl uential, dogma of “art for art’s sake” (1997: 16–18). Harries characterises this emergence as the “transformation of the work of art from a world-shaping power, from work having an ethical function, into an aesthetic object” (1997: 164).

The post-modern critique of the ethics and ideology of the Modern movement The consolidation of the aesthetic paradigm in architecture was realised mainly within the framework of the post-modern era. The sweeping criticism by post-modernism of what it itself understood as the ‘ethics’ of Modernism led to the general scepticism of theorists and critics regarding the moralisa- tion of architectural praxis. The most characteristic representative of this critique is Robert Venturi, who essentially inaugurated post-modern rhetoric. In his emblematic work Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture , published in 1966, Venturi articulates the commonplaces of post-modern theoretical suspicion of the ethical character of the Modern movement. He writes: “Architects can no longer afford to be intimidated by the puritani- cally moral language of orthodox Modern architecture . . . More is not less . . . less is a bore” (1966: 16–17). With this direct attack on Mies van der Rohe (‘less is more’), Venturi also discloses the new post-modern values: complexity and contradiction . Charles Jencks, a critical adversary of the Modern movement and advocate of post-modernism during the 1970s and 1980s, writes, in The Language of Post-Modern Architecture, “The modern movement of architecture, conceived in the 1850s as a call to morality, and in the 1920s (in its Heroic Period) as a call to social transformation, found itself unwittingly compromised, ﬁ rst by practice and then by acceptance” (Jencks 1984: 26). Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Here Jencks formulates, without further analysis, another commonplace of post-modern discourse: the direct correlation of the social, reformatory programmes of the Modern movement with a ‘puritanical’ morality originating from the nineteenth century. A few years later, the same critic draws analogies between the Modern movement of the twentieth century and a fundamentalist religion, a Protestant orthodoxy which imposed taboos and moral inhibitions on young architects. In this unprecedented and immoderate assault, the Modern movement is presented as a reactionary 152 Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou and oppressive authority, a fanatical and conservative ideology (Jencks 1989: 7–29). This vehement critique brought to light the deeper moral relativism and subjectivism of post-modernism itself. The post-modern disdain of the ethical problem is connected with a broader dismissal of objective principles and valid laws of architectural creation, namely, an attitude which Jencks and Silver call “adhocism”. As they write: “We live in a pluralist world confronted by competing philosophies, and knowledge is in an ad hoc, fragmented state prior to some possible synthesis. . .”(2006: 49). The recognition of this post-modern pluralistic condition leads to ethical scepticism to such a degree that none of the antagonistic philosophies which Jencks and Silver mention can claim exclusive truth and absolute validity. The demotion of the ethical horizon of architecture as an objective measure of design decisions is paradigmatically reﬂ ected in the philosophy of Philip Johnson. This representative par excellence of post-modern oppor- tunism professes unequivocally his ethical amoralism, of which he seems to feel proud. He writes: “I am of the opinion that we have no faiths. I have none . . . Philosophically, it seems to me we today are anarchistic, nihilistic, solipsistic, certainly relativist . . . cynical . . . Vive la difference, we live in a pluralistic society. I can only talk about me” (2006b: 246). Post-modern nihilism acquired its natural outcome and expression from what was called ‘deconstructivist’ architecture. It is no accident that Johnson curated a particular exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1988. In the text which accompanied that exhibition, he reminded us that the development of Deconstruction in architecture entertains “none of the messianic fervor of the modern movement, none of the exclusivity of that catholic and Calvinist cause. Deconstructivist architecture represents no movement; it is not a creed” (Johnson 2000: 677). The obvious aversion of post-modern thought to any ethical commitment or value which is reminiscent of the Modern movement is striking. It constitutes a negative position which holds together the post-modern rhetoric. Nevertheless, is this ethical apathy of the post-modernists well founded? Some contemporary theorists would disagree: they claim the ethical dimension is located in the internal core of architectural praxis as a design process (Koutsoumpos 2010: 16–27). Consequently, what legitimizes post-modern architecture to ignore this evident ethical dimension of architecture? Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016

David Watkin: The ambiguous interrelation between Modernism and moralizing The problematic nature of post-modern theory is exposed not only by its moral relativism and nihilism, but also by the historical assessments it makes. One of the dominant conceptions of post-modern historiography associates Modernism with the ‘Puritanical’ moralizing of the nineteenth century (Pugin, Ruskin, Arts & Crafts). A characteristic example of this Towards a new ethical ‘paradigm’ 153 perception is voiced by John Wilton-Ely in “The Rise of the Professional Architect in England”, where he writes about A. W. N. Pugin:

If we set aside Pugin’s fervent belief in the Gothic as the only valid form of expression, the criteria laid down in the Contrasts and in his later work, The True Principles of Pointed or Christian Architecture of 1841, also anticipated much of the concern for functional planning, structural expression, and the nature of materials at the heart of Modern Move- ment theory. (Wilton-Ely 1977: 195)

The post-modern rhetorical argumentation which dismisses Modern ethics is founded on such a genealogy, consolidated by the historian David Watkin in Morality and Architecture. The Development of a Theme in Architectural History and Theory from the Gothic Revival to the Modern Movement (1977). The subtitle defi nes Watkin’s historiographical undertaking: to fabricate a cohesive and continuous narration which unveils the ‘theme’ of the relationship between morality and architecture from the Gothic revival of the nineteenth century to the Modern movement of the twentieth century. Watkin argues with reference to such different writers as A. W. N. Pugin, John Ruskin, E.-E. Viollet-le-Duc, W. R. Lethaby, Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, Nikolaus Pevsner, Sigfried Giedion and Furneaux Jordan, analys- ing works and texts with very diverse starting points and intentions (1977: 1–111). Consequently, although his professed critical target is the ‘Whig’ conception of history and historicism, as determined by Herbert Butterfi eld and Karl Popper – namely the predisposition to construct unifi ed, holistic narrations as the unfolding of a ‘spirit of the age’ (Watkin 1977: vii–viii, 6–7, 113–115; 2001: xv–xxxiii) – he himself commits exactly the same error. The genealogy constructed in this extremely problematic work is full of reductions, logical jumps, simplifi cations and omissions (Watkin 1977: 38–39). This happens because the writer does not confi ne himself to ‘objective’ history but launches an extreme polemical assault against Modernism as a whole (Watkin 1977: 8–14; 2001: vii–xiii). One of the principal post-modern historians who forged the connection between the ethics of Modernism and the puritanical moralizing of

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 the nineteenth century is a scholar whom Jencks and Kropf deliberately assign to ‘traditionalism’, or the conservative wing of post-modern thought (Jencks & Kropf 2006: 174–175). The rhetorical-genealogical construction by Watkin reveals the empiricism underlying his scepticism and conserva- tism (1977: 14). Watkin’s extreme empiricism is supported by an absolute individualism, a fanatical faith in tradition and a restrictive understanding of architecture mainly as a process of ‘image-making’ and ‘style’ without any social, philosophical, ethical and political content (Watkin 1977: 10–12, 115). 154 Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou Post-modern reactions to the ethics embedded in basic design principles of the Modern movement Apart from the post-modern assault on a caricature of the Modern movement on the level of general theory and ideology and on the level of the history of ideas, post-modernism reacted against the ethics of Modernism on the level of design principles as well. This reaction related both to the ethics of the absence of ornament and to the ethics of the truth of construction. The reaction to the absence of ornament constitutes an important aspect of post-modern thinking. Joseph Rykwert reinstates the discussion about ornament as a problem of meaning (2006: 65) which Modern rationalism was not able to answer: he thinks that ‘non-fi gurative’ architecture has reached its end because it has failed to communicate with the ‘common man’ through form (2008: 375–377). Modern design ethics called for the absence of ornament. Post-modern thinkers seem to retrogress to the pre-modern ethics of decorative expressive- ness. The most characteristic example of this regression is voiced by Denise Scott Brown and Robert Venturi with the notable idea of the ‘decorated shed’ as an answer to the elitist autonomy of the Modernist purist language. We should not be surprised by the fact that their preoccupation with the mass culture of advertisement and ‘pop’ architecture invokes for its justifi cation the eclecticism and the picturesqueness of the styles of the nineteenth century. They write that the conventional, commercial architecture of post-modernism “may lead us to reevaluate Ruskin’s horrifying statement ‘architecture is the decoration of structure’ ” (Scott Brown &Venturi 2008: 391). Confi rming the interrelation between post-modern formalism and histori- cist architecture, the “Radical Eclecticism” which Charles Jencks proposed (2006a: 86–87) seems to relate directly to the stylistic eclecticism of the later nineteenth century, which Modernism attempted to transgress. The revival of eclecticism in the context of post-modernism laid the foundations for the emergence (or the resurgence) of what we call the aesthetic paradigm; namely, an approach to architectural design which is primarily interested in the aesthetic and ‘communicational’ attributes of the work’s form (Jencks 2006b: 131), neglecting its ethical consequences. Another aspect of post-modern rhetoric reacted against a second consti- tutional principle of Modern design ethics, namely the idea of the purity

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 and the truth of construction. As far back as 1954, Philip Johnson, in an ironic lecture at Yale University titled “The Seven Crutches of Modern Architecture”, renounced the crutch of “clear structure”, which he characterised as the most “troublesome” and “dangerous” of all the ideas for the control of form which the ethics of Modernism had bequeathed (Johnson 2006a: 209–210). Forty years later, the idea of a stable structure as the core of architecture (Wagner) was called into question by the “phenomenalism” of Toyo Ito. Ito laid emphasis on the transient dimension of social events and elevated the Towards a new ethical ‘paradigm’ 155 swirling and fl owing texture of natural and cultural information as necessary for the confutation of architectural duration. According to Ito, architecture in the post-modern era is necessarily precarious, unstable, without permanent foundation, without a ‘structure’ and an order, refl ecting the dynamic world of post-modern mobility. Architecture as a phenomenon, as a changing image, as information on an event, is contrasted with architecture as an invariable structure, as a solid and material reality (Ito 2008: 539–541). Cecil Balmond performed an equally stringent critique of the Modern idea of rigid ‘structure’ which he interprets as a static, Cartesian order that does not allow movement and change, complexity and ambiguity, hybridity and juxtaposition. His counter-proposal is what he calls “the informal”, namely a new dynamic approach to the concept of construction as a relationship between events. Balmond’s irrational concept of emergence led to a renewed emphasis on an inspiration of form, on sensible surface and texture. It is no accident that Balmond invokes again a new Gothic style, a neo-Romanticism in the digital age (2008: 556–558). The post-modern conception of structure as trace and episode dismisses the ethics of rationalism, hierarchical logical coherence and linear sequence which supported the Modern movement: it advocates the concepts of chaos, intuition, instinct and impulse (Balmond 2008: 556–557). The emphasis on transformational events, singularities and topological interactions gave rise, during the 1990s, to what John Hendrix calls “bioconstructivism” (2013: 193–196). Essentially a kind of computer-generated organicism, a neo-Romantic bio-mimesis of the digital era, “bioconstructivism” explores moments of structural instability or catastrophe. According to Gevork Hartoonian, in the context of the post-modern dismissal of the ethics of the stability and purity of structure, we have witnessed a demystifi cation of the Classical discourse about construction (2008: 549–550). I should add that the hierarchical differentiation between the deep level of the core, of the structure as ‘essence’, and the surface level of form is equally deconstructed. In the post-modern era, a hierarchised idea of the whole does not exist: rather, a conception of ‘composition’ prevails, seen as a summation of contingent juxtapositions between fragments which do not retain any logical and representational relation to a presupposed cohesive totality. This logic of montage restores, in the foreground, the independent morphological value of the fragment, the dressing, the decorative

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 shape, at the expense of a structure in force: it renders Gottfried Semper’s thought dominant again. Thus, the resuscitation of the thinking of the Ger- man theorist by researchers into new digital technologies of design such as Bernard Cache is not symptomatic. The post-modern rejection of the Mod- ern ethics of the structure and the new emphasis on the decorative role of the superfi cial morphology of buildings make Semper’s ‘dressing principle’ (2004: 248–250) increasingly timely (Cache 2008: 560–561). Post-modern reactions to the ethics of the absence of ornament and to the ethical lucidity and truth of construction have usually resulted in a 156 Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou relativistic individualism of ‘anything goes’, a manneristic aestheticism of ‘styles’ conceived as personal signatures. The architectural structure lost its ethical content, which sprang from its universal reference to a common social reality. At the same time, it could no longer constitute the fi rm and shared nucleus for the control of form, as happened during Modernism. The ‘form’ of the post-moderns does not have any deeper structure to refer to and to correlate with. It moves in a superfi cial neutrality of a ‘Semperian’ coating. Modern space derived the possibility of its signifi cation through a common, social reference of the form to the ‘structure’. This social reference was founded on an ethics of the ‘structure’ which was articulated on a deeper conceptual level, and that ‘structure’ assembled the common values of culture as a collective order of space. The post-modern ‘solution’ of the design problem led architectural praxis into a sum of individualistic gesticulations of the narcissistic star architects and an unprecedented dwindling of the ethical engagements of space. Simul- taneously, the architect as a subject was ‘liberated’ from any moral inhibitions and responsibilities towards the social body. She/he administered the forms of architectural work as arbitrary masks of a problematic social organisation, as dressings and images which refer to the rationale of fashion and the mass culture of advertisements. Consequently, most large-scale, contemporary architectural products constitute astounding and impressive technological achievements, coupled with a certain lack of humanistic content and values: they constitute mechanical feats with a serious problem with regard to meaning. This ‘new pragmatism’, fostered by novel digital technologies and technocracy, has led to a situation which Mallgrave and Contandriopoulos term “The End of Theory” (2008: 562–563).

Towards a new ethos of space Given all this, I would argue that aesthetic persistence in the concept of ‘form’ and sensible surface which characterizes a large part of post-modern, Deconstructivist and contemporary architectural production has probably come to a dead end regarding the possibility of architecture articulating a world of meaning. Moreover, the dominant formalism of the so-called star architects is unable to respond to new environmental, social and human demands of the everyday life-world. A ‘paradigm change’ from formal aes-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 thetics to spatial ethics would perhaps be a more appropriate framework for meeting those demands. Kuhn wrote: “[W]hen paradigms change, the world itself changes with them” (1996: 111). A change of worldview can only be effected as a set of conceptual transpositions. I shall now propose, very briefl y, that we should transcend the concept of ‘form’ in favour of the concept of ‘space’. ‘Space’ is one of the core concepts which architects often use to make claims about design intentions (Boudon 1971). A historical construction, ‘space’ essentially emerged during the seventeenth century as an organic Towards a new ethical ‘paradigm’ 157 part of the nascent natural sciences and the Scientifi c Revolution (Jammer 1993). Architecture was late in adopting it: in fact, August Schmarsow’s inaugural address at Leipzig, delivered in 1893, was probably one of the fi rst instances where the concept of ‘space’ was organically incorporated within architectural discourse. He wrote: “Our sense of space and spatial imagination press toward spatial creation; they seek their satisfaction in art. We call this art architecture; in plain words, it is the creatress of space” (Schmarsow 1994: 287). Van de Ven’s (almost forgotten) study traced the repercussions of those ideas during the Modern movement in the fi rst decades of the twentieth century (Van de Ven 1987). ‘Space’ is a Modern, dynamic concept that could help us override formalism, since it encompasses many levels of the articulation of the human environment: use, function, scale, appropriation, modifi cation and habits. However, there are two prerequisites: fi rst, that our focus should be on the creation of spaces as places, trying to read the “personhood of place” (Cai- cco 2007) or the “genius loci” (Norberg-Schulz 1980) and the history of each territory; second, that we should distinguish very carefully between morality and ethos. Morality usually means a set of established rules for the governing of human conduct. Either these norms are externally imposed by a dominant class and a ruling power or they simply express a subjective aggregate of utilitarian strategies for the advancement of individual self-interest. Conversely, “ethos . . . names the way human beings exist in the world: their way of dwelling” (Harries 1997: 4). ‘Ethos’ is a common world of moral imperatives that concern the collective way of life in our everyday existence together. A spatial ethos is what we are after: a lived space scaled to the everyday life-world. Ethos is place. Perhaps G. W. F. Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) better explains what ethos really stands for. Hegel, in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right , expounds the dialectical development of objective spirit. The fi rst two phases or moments in this development are abstract right (das Recht ) and morality (Moralität ). Since they are one-sided concepts, they have to be unifi ed on a higher level. In particular, ‘morality’, covering only the formal and subjective aspect of ethics, that is, the interior of the moral will which recognises only itself, has to turn to the idea of organised society: to the concept of ‘concrete ethical life’, Sittlichkeit . “Concrete ethics is for Hegel social ethics” (Copleston 2003: 209).

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Sittlichkeit is ‘the ethical substance’, the union of moral subjectivity and objectivity, the unity of the universal and the particular: in other words, the social, political and institutional conditions for freedom. According to Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Sittlichkeit captures “the concrete mores and ethos of a culture”, where “the self posits itself as a co-member, as it were, of the moral world” (Pinkard 1986: 214, 220). ‘Ethical life’ constitutes a higher unity of multiple people who share a concrete, common world, an ethos, a common good – what Hegel calls “the ethical” (das Sittliche) or “the ethical realm”. He writes: 158 Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou The ethical [Das Sittliche] . . . appears as custom [Sitte ]; and the habit of the ethical appears as a second nature which takes the place of the original and purely natural will and is the all-pervading soul, signiﬁ cance and actuality of individual existence. It is spirit living and present as a world, and only thus does the substance of spirit begin to exist as spirit. (Hegel 1991: 195)

We should understand ‘the ethical’ or the ‘ethical life’ as an intersubjective, public, shared set of background principles and duties which constitute necessary types of concrete ethical relationships. Hegel writes: “The ethical substance . . . is the actual spirit of a family and a people. The ethical is not abstract like the good, but it is intensely actual” (1991: 197). My belief is that architecture should express this common ethos, the concrete moral spirit, the Hegelian Sittlichkeit , through space. Architecture should be conceived as public art par excellence which embodies and crys- tallises the poetry of ethos or Sittlichkeit in actual spaces and places. Mov- ing away from ‘form’ as an expression of individual tastes and self-interests, Sittlichkeit as shared space could help us rethink architecture’s possible contribution to the articulation of a common, collective way of life.

Bibliography Balmond, C. (2008) “New Structure and the Informal”, in H. F. Mallgrave, H. F. and C. Contandriopoulos (eds.) Architectural Theory, Volume II, An Anthology from 1871–2005 , Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Boudon, P. (1971) Sur l’Espace Architectural. Essai d’Épistémologie de l’Architecture , Paris: Dunod. Cache, B. (2008) “Digital Semper”, in H. F. Mallgrave and C. Contandriopoulos (eds.) Architectural Theory, Volume II, An Anthology from 1871–2005, Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Caicco, G. (ed.) (2007) Architecture, Ethics, and the Personhood of Place , Hanover and London: University Press of New England. Copleston, F. (2003) A History of Philosophy, Volume 7, 18th- and 19th-Century German Philosophy , London: Continuum. Harries, K. (1997) The Ethical Function of Architecture , Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Hartoonian, G. (2008) “Ontology of Construction”, in H. F. Mallgrave and Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 C. Contandriopoulos (eds.) Architectural Theory, Volume II, An Anthology from 1871–2005 , Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Hegel, G. W. F. (1991) Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hendrix, J. S. (2013) The Contradiction Between Form and Function in Architec- ture , London and New York: Routledge. Ito, T. (2008) “Vortex and Current: On Architecture as Phenomenalism”, in H. F. Mallgrave and C. Contandriopoulos (eds.) Architectural Theory, Volume II, An Anthology from 1871–2005 , Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Towards a new ethical ‘paradigm’ 159 Jammer, M. (1993) Concepts of Space. The History of Theories of Space in Physics , New York: Dover Publications. Jencks, C. (1984) The Language of Post-Modern Architecture , London: Academy Editions. Jencks, C. (1989) What Is Post-Modernism? , London: Academy Editions. Jencks, C. (2006a) “Towards a Radical Eclecticism”, in C. Jencks and K. Kropf (eds.) Theories and Manifestoes of Contemporary Architecture . Sussex: Wiley-Academy. Jencks, C. (2006b) “13 Propositions of Post-Modern Architecture”, in C. Jencks and K. Kropf (eds.) Theories and Manifestoes of Contemporary Architecture . Sussex: Wiley-Academy. Jencks, C. and Kropf, K. (eds.) (2006) Theories and Manifestoes of Contemporary Architecture . Sussex: Wiley-Academy. Jencks, C. and Silver, N. (2006) “Adhocism”, in C. Jencks and K. Kropf (eds.) Theo- ries and Manifestoes of Contemporary Architecture . Sussex: Wiley-Academy. Johnson, P. (2000) “Deconstructivist Architecture”, in K. M. Hays (ed.) Architecture Theory since 1968 . Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Johnson, P. (2006a) “The Seven Crutches of Modern Architecture”, in C. Jencks and K. Kropf (eds.) Theories and Manifestoes of Contemporary Architecture . Sussex: Wiley-Academy. Johnson, P. (2006b) “What Makes Me Tick”, in C. Jencks and K. Kropf (eds.) Theo- ries and Manifestoes of Contemporary Architecture . Sussex: Wiley-Academy. Koutsoumpos, L. (2010) “ in Humanities. Ethics in Architectural Praxis”, in S. Ban- dyopadhyay, J. Lomholt, N. Temple and R. Tobe (eds.) The Humanities in Archi- tectural Design. A Contemporary and Historical Perspective . London and New York: Routledge. Kuhn, T. S. (1996) The Structure of Scientiﬁ c Revolutions , Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Mallgrave, H. F. and Contandriopoulos, C. (eds.) (2008) Architectural Theory, Vol- ume II, An Anthology from 1871–2005 , Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Norberg-Schulz, C. (1980) Genius Loci. Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture , New York: Rizzoli International Publications. Pinkard, T. (1986) “Freedom and Social Categories in Hegel’s Ethics”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XLVII (No. 2): 209–232. Rykwert, J. (2006) “Ornament Is No Crime”, in C. Jencks and K. Kropf (eds.) Theo- ries and Manifestoes of Contemporary Architecture , Sussex: Wiley-Academy. Rykwert, J. (2008) “Meaning and Building”, in H. F. Mallgrave and C. Contandrio- poulos (eds.) Architectural Theory, Volume II, An Anthology from 1871–2005 , Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Schmarsow, A. (1994) “The Essence of Architectural Creation”, in H. F. Mallgrave

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 and E. Ikonomou (eds.) Empathy, Form, and Space. Problems in German Aes- thetics, 1873–1893 , Santa Monica, CA: The Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities. Scott Brown, D. and Venturi, R. (2008) “On Ducks and Decoration”, in H. F. Mallgrave and C. Contandriopoulos (eds.) Architectural Theory, Volume II, An Anthology from 1871–2005 , Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Semper, G. (2004) Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts; or, Practical Aesthetics , Los Angeles, CA: The Getty Research Institute. Van de Ven, C. (1987) Space in Architecture. The Evolution of a New Idea in the Theory and History of the Modern Movements, Assen/Maastricht: Van Gorcum. 160 Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou Venturi, R. (1966) Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture , New York: The Museum of Modern Art. Watkin, D. (1977) Morality and Architecture. The Development of a Theme in Architectural History and Theory from the Gothic Revival to the Modern Move- ment , Oxford: Clarendon Press. Watkin, D. (2001) Morality and Architecture Revisited , London: John Murray. Wilton-Ely, J. (1977) “The Rise of the Professional Architect in England”, in S. Kostof (ed.) The Architect. Chapters in the History of the Profession, New York: Oxford University Press. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Epilogue Contemporary problems and new directions

Kyriaki Tsoukala, Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou and Charikleia Pantelidou

Contemporary problems and critique Today, the realm of culture is the privileged chronotope in which cultural consumption increases in conditions of an eternal present that instantly satisfi es every fabricated (as plaything-simulacrum) desire (fi xated on the imaginary – without the creative oscillation between the imaginary and the symbolic). Rearticulations in labour procedures, in consumer behaviour, in the organisation of the state, in geopolitical and geographical structures, in social dynamics, compose a landscape of change. Flexibility in relation to employment, elasticity in labour markets, excessive supply of ‘new’ products and models of hyperconsumption accompany the organising principle of the post-industrial economy, i.e., the frenetic compression of the profi tability lag (Bauman 1998; Harvey 1991). New production sectors; whirlwind rates of technological, commercial and organisational innovation; new markets and electronic-plastic-opaque ways of offering fi nancial services form the reality of post-industrial societies. Within this reality of our globalised world, the practices of contemporary architecture take for granted the particular weight ascribed to ‘form’ and ‘technology’. The market assimilates novel technological forms and turns them into a commodity. The result is theoretical vacuity, loss of meaning and the regression of architecture into fashion, spectacle or consumable icon for the globalised mass media. During those processes, architecture loses its legitimacy as a critical, conceptual and cultural discourse for the articulation of values. The contemporary fragmentation of architecture into various technical disciplines measuring different levels of ‘building perfor- Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 mance’ (statics, mechanics, energy consumption, smart materials) alters the conception of architecture’s aim. Architectural creation is cut into special- ised segments driven by determined optimisation criteria or parameters that can be controlled and adjusted using computer programmes. Architecture is thus absorbed by technocracy and economism. Oddly enough, the demand for economy is usually applied to huge, out-of-scale mega-structures with enormous budgets, revealing the hypocrisy of the contemporary globalised post-industrial forces. 162 Kyriaki Tsoukala, et al. With impressive dexterity these technological ‘spatial episodes’ assimilate whatever conceptual propositions emerge from the critical and theoretical architectural discourse that escalates attempts to fi nd a new human habita- tional condition (following the rapid rates of various transpositions in the living conditions of post-industrial societies). The epistemological concern over the question of otherness and difference or the subject of the psychoanalytical void/topos of non-representation and potential moment of emergence of the new is incorporated into the technological miracle of our age and converted into a play of alternating images in the service of the star system and in the end of the commercial production of inhabited space. The tremendous ease with which the post-industrial political-economic system assimilates post-structuralist concepts and perspectives is due in part to the very nature of this contemporary philosophical-scientifi c discourse, which tends to transform the problem of otherness into a major moral issue, redirecting the discussion to urban and political rights, that is, to the institutional framework of equality in a world of provocative and barbaric material inequality (Eagleton 1996; Jameson 1991). This conception gave birth to cultural policy and forged the bonds between the personal, the political and the cultural. Can we imagine a different perspective for architectural creation? Is there a viable alternative to the specialized, quantitative and bureaucratic conception of architecture that leads to ‘singular objects’ or fashionable, spectacular products? The roles architecture has played have always been ones of service to the human community. The ‘primitive hut’ as matrix and epitome of the essence of architecture provided mankind with the basic shelter needed to preserve it from the dangers of the natural world. The radical character of this spatial condition (and its primary signifi cance) lies in the fact that it was the sine qua non for any further human progress in relation to the development of civilisation, of economic and social organisation. Supplementing these roles of protection and development of activities is that of human emotion, through the creation of a poetic language, a poetics of space that transcends symbolised sensory space. These roles work in synergy towards architecture’s primary object of concern, which is human well-being/happiness. If architecture has not always served this end – and indeed as regards both its content and the possibilities of its pursuit – but has sometimes strayed into the service of more partial, more fl eeting and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 more humble aspirations, this is not due to any inherent defect in it, but has been necessitated by the stiﬂ ingly narrow boundaries of the human condition, which carries the weight of the historical and social context and incurs its speciﬁ c conditions. Today, on the theoretical/epistemological level, architecture is seeking other roles, resisting this restrictive dependence on the framework and abstract rules of an imposed moral order: the role of activating man’s (individual and collective) creative powers, and a more active role in dealing with environmental problems. However, very often, the emphasis on ecology and cultural relativity/otherness reproduces in another guise the Contemporary problems and new directions 163 weaknesses of the catholicity and scientism that dominated architectural thinking and practice in earlier periods. The most recent example of this kind of empty, formalistic scientism is the vague discussion concerning ‘sustainable development’ or the possibility for the articulation of ‘spaces of sustainability’ (Whitehead 2007: 33–113). In this desperate architectural search for aims and directions, there remains no prospect other than a profound comprehension of the fact of the plurality of the world on all levels and the consequent realisation that we have to begin with freedom (Bauman 2002: 371), without this realisation concealing the material roots of human happiness and limiting the treatment of contemporary social ills exclusively to psychoanalytical and cultural ties. On this level, architecture becomes open to a broad spectrum of possibilities, closer in fact to its essential purpose, while remaining a linch- pin of criticism and a creator of ethos. And this would be an architectural function of social sustainability.

Toward a new ‘environmental’ ethos of space Today there is a need to readjust the complex relations between the natural environment, economy, culture, technology and architecture. A pressing collective social demand that addresses those relations is the demand for ecological and environmental justice, balance and care. The rising “environmental ethics” (Attfi eld 2003: 1–17, 37–64) has articulated various concepts that could become the centre of a new architectural poetics. The word ethos , in its original Ancient Greek sense, means an accustomed place, signalling the crucial role of the place of habitation and the way in which it takes shape in the forging of the social ethos. In this light, our collective volume attempted a reexamination of the intermeshing of the ecological and the cultural element, contributing to the formation of a new ethos for addressing the urban and extra-urban landscape. The term ‘environmental ethics’ emerges in contemporary architectural thinking, as well as in the broader scientifi c/philosophical domain (accompanied by the phrase ‘sustainable development’), particularly in the wake of the environmental/ ecological degradation and its negative impact on the processes of creation and preservation of life (Georgopoulos 2002; Morton 2007; Sunderlin 2003). The multiplicity of scientifi c approaches to the term ‘sustainable develop-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 ment’ is an indication of the ideological differentiations in approaches to the solution of the ecological problem. Some trends in environmentalism focus on simple corrective patchwork actions for environmental protection, without challenging the course and direction of the political-cultural framework, while others envision new institutional structures, new types of social relations, new ways of distributing wealth and interacting with nature. This scientifi c diversifi cation is seen in the domain of space as well, in relation to its articulation with the environmental ethos. In post-structuralist conceptions, however, this articulation is not characterised by a ‘naturalistic’ perception 164 Kyriaki Tsoukala, et al. equating individual/collective/social behaviour with natural things and referring to them for its validation, as Konstantinos Moraitis says in Chap- ter 2. Rather, in this scientifi c approach, the term ‘environmental’ includes the cultural environment, addressing it as a fi eld of change and transformative processes which we also encounter in nature. Consequently, the term ‘environmental’ refers to a complex nexus of social-cultural-ecological correlations which, however, becomes denser or looser as regards the ecological or human component, depending on the epistemological nuances of the thinking of each particular author. The propositions concerning ‘environmental ethos’ expressed in this collective work share a common recognition of the interlocking of multiple environments in the ‘moral’ and ‘aesthetic’ constitution of inhabited space. The differences are a matter of intonation, whether the accent is on the ecological environment, the urban-social environment or even the existentialist-individual environment. These variations in the intensity and coloration of conceptual areas of the environmental complex do not detract from the common ground mentioned earlier or the conviction of an ethos that is not a notional product but is always correlated with individual/ collective/social action within the broader cultural-ecological context, which it constantly redefi nes. On this practical level of everyday life, where spatial experience as a fl uid meaning, suspended and possibly anticipated, weaves the plural multiplicity of the city and with it its ethos, unalienable otherness and the contemporary conditions of social and cultural difference point the way for urban policies based on equivalent recognition of the members forming the plural and complex social body, without distinction of gender, race or class (Goonewardena and Kipper 2005: 676; Sennett 1997; Bauman 2008). This new ethos takes shape in the conditions of a possible state that emerges in circumstances of variability and human performative-corporeal- participatory-dialogical action in inhabited space and of an atmosphere of solidarity among the groups operating within it, giving it a micro-social multipolarity. The signifi cance of this interhuman relation is stressed by Nicholas Temple in Chapter 11, through the difference in the approaches of Lévinas and Heidegger. For Emmanuel Lévinas, the moral position is that you exist for the other (that you assume responsibility for the other, that you act for the well-being/happiness of the other, which is precious and requires, for its preservation and increase, some effort on your part) and not simply

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 that you exist alongside or along with him (Heidegger). However, the ethical constitution of contemporary space can be guaranteed by the alternation of the individual-group-within-society: the functioning, in other words, of dialogical performative activity in historical-social space-time with its characteristic dynamic. Here the involvement of place is polysemous: added to its historical and social-cultural character is its ecological/territorial quality or structure in the phenomenological sense of the term or – depending on the epistemological approach – its topological marking that recognises structural transformation processes beyond normative logic, eroding Contemporary problems and new directions 165 the conventional ethos of habitation. In this sense, the new ‘environmental ethos’ is also a call to return to earth’s home. It should reveal a sensitivity towards ‘site-specifi city’, ‘territory’ or the ‘personhood of place’ (Caicco 2007: 16–18). While respecting the scale and endurance of each place, an architectural ethos of ecology should also possess an “environmental imagination” and “demonstrate a profound poetry of space, material and light” (Hawkes 2008: xvii). If architecture is to participate in the creation of this new ‘environmental ethos’, we have to move away from the dominant star-system ideology established by the media: a critical resistance is needed for new moral ideals to emerge. Architecture, a collective art, should fi rst of all aim at a social dimension of space. The emphasis on corporeal spatial experience – on radical forms of bodily presence – isolated from other contexts that are considered given and present in any problem but in reality are not taken into account, leads to a form of false consciousness that is Romantic in origin. Although the multiplication of events creates a state of continuous subversion, insisting on it risks creating a political void indispensable for the perpetuation of the post-industrial management model and the star-system condition of spatial production. Opposition to the catholic values of space is attempted through the signifi cant space of the unitary and individual, outside the plural social chronotopes with their historically tested subversive tendencies. The new ‘environmental ethos’ of space assumes the diffi cult role of discrete and indivisible alteration and unifi cation of the individual-social-ecological. As long as architectural education revolves around the sensationalist whirl of the star system, incapable of cultivating scepticism and criticism, architecture will remain a powerful tool for blocking awareness. There is no oxygen for architecture while it is produced by singularities, like the star architects, or by castrated academic environments. The oxygen is found in life itself, and it is to life itself that architecture, as a co-creator of the new ‘environmental ethos’, must turn.

Bibliography Attﬁ eld, R. (2003) Environmental Ethics. An Overview for the Twenty-First Cen- tury , Cambridge: Polity Press.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Bauman, Z. (1998) Globalization. The Human Consequences, Oxford: Polity Press. Bauman, Z. (2002) Postmodernity and Its Discontents, trans. G. I. Babassakis, Ath- ens: Psichogios. (In Greek). Bauman, Z. (2008) Liquid Times. Living in the Age of Uncertainty , transl. by K. Geormas, Athens: Metechmio. (In Greek). Caicco, G. (ed.) (2007) Architecture, Ethics, and the Personhood of Place , Hanover and London: University Press of New England. Eagleton, T. (1996) The Illusions of Postmodernism , Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. Georgopoulos, A. (2002), Environmental Ethics , Athens: Gutenberg. (In Greek). 166 Kyriaki Tsoukala, et al. Goonewardena, K. and Kipper, S. (2005) “Spaces of Difference: Reﬂ ections from Toronto on Multiculturalism, Bourgeois Urbanism and the Possibility of Radical Urban Politics”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research , 29, 3: 670–678. Harvey, D. (1991) The Condition of Postmodernity , Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. Hawkes, D. (2008) The Environmental Imagination. Technics and Poetics of the Architectural Environment , London and New York: Routledge. Jameson, F. (1991) Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Dur- ham, NC: Duke University Press. Morton, T. (2007), Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sennett, R. (1997) The Fall of Public Man , New York: Faber & Faber. Sunderlin, W. D. (2003) Ideology, Social Theory and the Environment, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littleﬁ eld Publishers. Whitehead, M. (2007) Spaces of Sustainability. Geographical Perspectives on the Sustainable Society , London and New York: Routledge. Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Index

 ´ 18 Bakhtin, Mikhail 61 , 93, 100 Balmond, Cecil 51 , 155 abscondita, 20 , 28n2 Barfi eld, Julia 82 access 124 ; space and ethos 59 – 60 , Baroque landscape 19 , 24 , 26 72 – 80 Barta, Peter 62 , 67 aformal, 97 Bataille, Georges 98 , 130 , 131 airplane, 124 , 132 Baudelaire, Charles 94 , 98 Alberti, Leon Battista 11 , 106 , 109 , Bauder, Christopher 52 111 , 114 , 144 , 145 ; Certame Bauhaus 12 , 45 , 129 Coronario 143 , 148 ; De re Baxandall, Michael 144 aedifi catoria ( On the Art of Building Behrens, Peter 45 in Ten Books ) 108 Belinsky, Vissarion 69 Alexander of Aphrodisias: De anima Bely, Andrei 59, 62, 63 – 7 , 68 , 69 110 Benjamin, Water 94 , 95 anamorphosis 19 – 20 , 27n1 Bergson, Henri, 60 , 83 , 87 , 88 Anshuman, Sachin 53 Berlage, Hendrik-Petrus 43 , 44 anthropogenic climate change 3 , 14 Berman, Marshall 88 Apollonovich, Apollon 62 , 66 bioconstructivism 155 Apollonovich, Nikolai 68 Blumenberg, Hans 106 , 124 – 5 , 127 , architecture and intellectual 136 ; Die Vollzähligkeit der Sterne development 108 – 22 123 Arendt, Hanna 64 , 106 body 26 , 87 , 89 , 111 , 117 , 124 , 130 , Archigram: Plug-in city 94 131, 133 , 136 ; building 147 ; cities 27 ; Aristotelian ethics 4 , 34 lived 68 ; social 98 , 99 – 100, 156 , 164 Aristotle 36 , 73, 105 , 108 , 113 , 116 , Bollnow, O.F. 87 123 ; Commentary on the Posterior Borden, Iain 60 , 82 – 91 Analytics 111 ; De anima 109 , 110 ; boredom 123 Nicomachean Ethics 34 , 109 Bronner, Simon 142 astronautics 135 , 136 Brunelleschi, Filippo, 143 , 145 , 148 Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 authorship 15 – 16 Bruno, Giordano 135 Averroes, Ibn Rushd: Long Burroughs, Charles 143 Commentary on the De anima ( Sharh kitab al-nafs ), 110 Cache, Bernard 155 Avicenna, Ibn Sina: Liber Naturalis Caillois, Roland 21 ( al-Tabi’iyyat ) 110 Candilis, Georges 94 Casey, Edward 30, 68 Babel, Tower of 130 Castells, Manuel 86 Bachelard, Gaston 128 catholicity 5 , 79 , 94 , 95 , 163 Bacon, Francis 133 Choisy, A. 43 168 Index chronotope 48 , 59 , 99, 161 , 165 decorated shed 154 civitas 146 decoration 5 , 41 , 43 , 44 – 5 , 48 , 49 , 51 , climate change 3 , 14 – 15 , 16 , 86 52 – 3 , 54 , 97 , 106, 151 coexistence 48 , 49 , 53, 54 , 74 , 140 Deleuze, Gilles 126 ; Mille Plateaux 98 cognition 41 , 75 , 114 , 115 , 116 , 140 , de Meuron, Pierre 50 152 , 164 democracy 73 , 74 , 77, 78 , 79 collective space 61 , 99 , 106 Derrida, Jacques 97 collectivity 47 Descartes, René 133 ; Dioptrique Columbus 136 21 ; Discours de la Méthode 21 ; communication 5 , 18 , 47, 48 – 9 , 53 , 54 , Discourse on the Method of Rightly 55 , 96 ; electronic 86 ; epidermic 98 ; Conducting the Reason, and Seeking fast-paced 89 ; functions 72 ; of ideas Truth in the Sciences 21 ; Météores 21 108 , 119 ; technology 124 ; theories design: origin 6 93 , 94 desire 47 , 48 , 92, 99 – 100 , 115 , 116 , Conenna, Claudio D. 5 , 41 – 56 118 , 123 , 126 – 7 , 131 consumption 77 , 161 diakosmesis 41 – 2 , 43 , 44 , 46 , 53 , 54 contemporary architecture 3 , 5 , 47 , 48 , dialogical 48 , 61, 78 , 93 53 , 55 , 98 , 107 , 150 , 156 , 161 , 163 différance 97 context 3 , 4 , 12, 21 , 22 , 24 , 30 , 49 , 60 , différence 97 61 , 79 , 82 , 94 , 138 , 145, 146 , 154 , Discours de la Méthode 21 165 ; background 148 ; contemporary disegno 6 , 9 technological 5 , 48 ; cultural 38 ; dressing principle 155 cultural-ecological 164; economical; Dutch landscape 23 – 4 , 25 ethical 54 ; global 87 , 89 ; historical 19 , 93 , 162 ; political 20 ; social 93 , Eco, U. 61 ; The Limits of Interpretation 162 ; social and technological 46 ; 93 ; The Open Work 93 ; Opera social-cultural 5 Aperta 93 Cooper, Anthony Ashley: Eisenman, Peter 96 , 131 Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Eisenstadt, Oona 141 Opinions, Times 7 empiricism 3 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 14 , 22 , 150 , 153 CoOp Himmelblau 131 endless 89 , 92 – 5 Copernicus, Nicolaus 125 , 127 Enlightenment 6 , 42 , 92, 94 , 123 , 132 coproduction 3 – 4 , 14 – 16 environmental ethics 4 , 27 , 163 – 4 , 165 corporeal 61 , 98 , 111 , 148 epistemic: contemporary landscape Counter-Reformation 19 , 20 ethics as a broader paradigm 26 – 7 ; Critique of Pure Reason 113 defi nition 28n3 Crum, R. J. 143 equality 60 , 73 , 74 , 75 , 79 , 162 cultural identity 52 Errinerungswerte 31 ; see also heritage cultural landscape: seventeenth-century values Netherlands in relation to the Espinosa, Baruch de 21 development of the novice bourgeois Ethica ( Ordine Geometrico society 21 – 5 Demonstrata ) 4 , 18 , 25 cultural shift 72 ethical life 119 , 140, 157 – 8

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 culture: origin of term 8 – 9 ethical paradigms 4 ; monuments and curiosity 123 , 124, 125 , 136 sites 36 – 8 Cusanus, Nicolaus, 134 , 135 ethic and ornament 5 ; and ornament in contemporary age 47 – 54 ; and Daedalus 131 ornament in modernity 42 – 6 ; Darwin, Charles 15 ; The Origin of and ornament in the modern and Species 8 ; revolution 134 contemporary age 41 – 56 de Certeau, Michel 83 – 4 ethic and space: architecture of freedom deconstruction 95 , 96, 97 , 130 , 133 , 96 – 100 ; contemporary Western 152 societies 92 – 101 Index 169 ethic of autonomy 5 , 43, 46 , 47 , 54 genius loci 126 , 134 , 157 ethic of communication 5 , 48, 49 geocentrism 127 , 134 – 7 ethic of heteronomy 42 geometry 4 , 6 , 18 – 19 , 20 , 23 , 26 , ethic of independence 5 , 47, 53 49 , 65 , 97 , 105 , 108 , 109 , 110 , ethics 23 , 42 , 44 , 46 , 79 ; concept 111 , 112 , 113 , 117 , 118 ; Euclidean 47 ; contemporary 28n4 , 47 ; 24 , 94 ; parametric 5 , 48 , 53 , 54 ; contemporary landscape as a principles 114 broader “epistemic” paradigm Giedion, Sigfried 13 , 153 26 – 7 ; environmental 27 ; landscape Gigon, Annette 53 aesthetics in relation to social 18 – 19 , geometrical sublime 84 24 ; Protestant and landscape ‘genius’ globalisation 82 , 92 , 138, 146 , 148 25 – 6 ; social 27 ; Spinoza 4, 20 – 1 ; Grien, Hans Baldung 133 see also ethic and; place ethics; urban Gropius, Walter 45 space: ethical prospects Grosseteste, Robert 108 ; Commentary ethics of duty 94 on the Physics 111 ; Commentary ethics of happiness 98 on the Posterior Analytics ethos 157 ; revealed in space 18 – 29 ( Commentarius in Posteriorum Evans, Robin 131 Analyticorum Libros ) 110 , 111 , 112 ; Evelyn, John: Fumifugium: or The Ecclesia Sancta 111 ; Hexaëmeron Inconvenience of the Aer and Smoak ( On the Six Days of Creation ) of London Dissipated 14 – 15 112 ; solertia 120 ; virtus intellectiva everyday 22 , 32 , 48 , 55 , 73 , 75 , 79 , 88 , 115 95 , 106 , 157 Guattari, Pierre-Félix: Mille Plateaux everyday life-world 156 , 157 98 exclusion 60 , 73, 74, 76 , 77 , 78 , 79 Guyer, Mike 53

Fernweh , 106 , 123 , 124 , 125 , 127 , 128 , Hadid, Zaha 49 , 131 129 , 134 Harries, Karsten 106 , 123 – 37 , 151 Florence, 20 , 106, 143, 145 , 148 Hartoonian, Gevork 155 ﬂ uidity, 48 , 94 , 99 Hastings, Hubert de Cronin: “The form 27n1 , 107 , 156, 158 , 161 Second Half Century” 13 formal 23 , 74 , 93, 96 , 107 , 113 , 146 , Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 156 , 157 31 , 42 , 105 , 109 ,158: Elements Foster, Norman 49 , 53 of the Philosophy of Right 157 ; Foucault, Michel 47 ; The Order of Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics Things, Les Mots et les Choses 28n3 120 ; Phenomenology of Spirit 118 , fragmentation 60 , 72 , 138 , 161 ; urban 119 74 Heidegger, Martin 38 , 106 , 125 , 126 , freedom 43 , 60, 70 , 72 , 73 , 74 , 78 , 79 , 128 , 129 , 133 , 140, 148 , 164 ; “The 96 – 100 , 105 , 120 , 121 , 124 , 126 , Age of the World-Picture” 135 ; 128, 129 , 130 , 131 , 132 , 134 , 157 , “Bauen Wohnen Denken” 123 – 4 ; 163 Being and Time 138 , 139 ; Dasein Freud, Sigmund 134 139 , 140 , 145 ; Mitsein (Being-with)

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Friedrich, Caspar David: Frau am 138 , 139 , 140 , 141 , 142 , 143 , Fenster 127 148 ; presence ( Anwesenheirt ) 139 ; functionality 44 , 51 , 94 ‘Zollikon Seminars’ 141 Heimweh 106 , 125 , 127 , 128 , 129 , 134 Gadamer, Hans-Georg 4 , 33 , 37 , 38 , 59 Hendrix, John Shannon 105 , 108 – 22 , Ganiatsas, Vassilis 4 , 30 – 40 155 garden architecture 19 heritage preservation 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 Gardens by the Bay, Singapore 85 heritage values 4 , 30 – 40 ; and Gehry, Frank 131 development values as a matter of Genealogie der Moral 125 ethics 31 – 2; establishing as proper 170 Index ends in themselves 35 – 6 ; ethical Kinkade, Thomas 129 means and ends 34 – 5 ; hermeneutical kitsch 126 , 129 approach 32 – 4 ; horizon for Klee, Paul 37 balancing identity and change in Kleinberg-Levin, D. M. 140 place ethics 38 – 9 ; monuments and Koolhaas, Rem 131 sites as ethical paradigms of/for the Kracauer, Siegfried 95 art of building 36 – 8 ; places as agents Kuhn, Thomas S. 156 ; Structure of 30 – 1 Scientiﬁ c Revolutions 150 – 1 Herzog, Jacques 50 Kundera, Milan 126 ; The Unbearable Hill, Jonathan 3 , 6 – 17 Lightness of Being 134 Hitler, Adolf 129 Hölderlin, Friedrich 134 , 136 labyrinth 130 Hollier, Denis 130 – 1 ; Against Lacan, Jacques 47 , 54 , 55 Architecture: The Writings of landscape: description of social Georges Bataille 130 behavior 25 – 6 ; origin of term 8 Home, Henry: Elements of Criticism 7 landscape aesthetics: relation to social Homo ludens 53 ethics 18 – 19 Hooke, Robert: “Method for Making a landscape architecture 24 History of the Weather” 7 landscape ethics 24 , 26 – 7 Hopper, Edward: Western Motel 128 landscape ‘genius’ 25 – 6 horizon 4 , 87 , 140 ; balancing identity landscape painting 19 and change in place ethics 38 – 9 language 48 , 110 , 118: poetic 67 , 70 , Humanism 13 , 96 , 134 , 145 162 ; Tuscan dialect 144 , 145 ; volgare Hundertwasser, Friedensreich 132 – 3 145 Husserl, Edmund 38 ; Origin of Le Corbusier 132 , 153 ; L’Art Décoratif Geometry 98 d’aujourd’hui 45 – 6 hypermodern architecture 5 , 42 , 47 Ledoux, Claude-Nicolas 132 Leibniz: Ars combinatoria 97 individual 42 , 46 , 47, 60 , 78 , 95 , 96 , Levinas, Emmanuel 138 , 139 , 98 – 100 , 119 – 20 , 164 142 , 145 , 148 , 164 ; Alterity and individualism 42 , 47 , 96 , 99 , 153 , 156 Transcendence 140 – 1 ; face-to-face inequality 75 , 162 106 informal 155 Liber de Causis (Kitab al-khayr interactive 52 , 97, 98 , 99 al-mahd/The Book of Causes ) 110 interesting 123 Libeskind, Daniel 96 , 131 intersubjective 93 , 94 Lipovetsky, G. 92 Ito, Toyo 52 , 53, 97 , 154 – 5 literature 59 , 70 liturgy 143 , 145 Jameson, Fredric 88 Locke, John 13; An Essay Concerning Jencks, Charles 153 ; The Language of Human Understanding 7 Post-Modern Architecture 151 , 152 ; London Eye 82, 84 “Radical Eclecticism” 154 Loos, Adolf 44 , 97 ; Ornament and Johnson, Philip 131 , 152; “The Seven Crime 45

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Crutches of Modern Architecture” Lynn, Greg 98 154 Lyotard, François 126 Josic, Alexis 94 Maguire, Robert 66 Kames, Lord: Elements of Criticism 7 Malevich, Kasimir 132 Kant, Immanuel 43 , 92 , 94 , 95 ; Malmstad, John 66 Critique of Pure Reason 26, 113 ; res Malpas, Jeff 68 publica 99 Marks, David 82 Kent, William 9 Masson, André 131 Kepler, Johannes 135 Matta-Clark, Gordon 131 Kierkegaard, Søren 123 Menzel, Adolph: Balkonzimmer 128 Index 171 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 69 opera aperta 92 – 5 Meyer, Hannes 45 ornament: and ethic in contemporary Mies van der Rohe, Ludwig 44 , 151 , age 47 – 54 ; and ethic in modernity 153 42 – 6 ; and ethic in the modern and Miralles, Enric 52 contemporary age 41 – 56 Mitsein 138 – 49 ; being-with 139 – 43 ; Ortega y Gasset, José 106 , 123 , 124 , Certame Coronario 143 – 5 ; dwelling 125 , 126 , 129 , 131 , 133 among strangers 143 – 8 otherness 60 , 74 , 75 , 93 , 162 , 164 mobility 72 , 73 , 75, 124 , 126 , 155 Ozenfant, Amédée 45 modern architecture 43 , 46, 151 modern movement 5 , 48, 72 , 94 , 107 , Pantelidou, Charikleia 3 – 5 , 72 – 81 , 153 ; post-modern critique of ethics 161 – 6 and ideology 151 – 2 ; post-modern paradigm 150 – 60 ; current dominance reactions to the ethics embedded in of aesthetic paradigm in architectural basic design principles 154 – 6 , 157 discourse and production 150 – 1 ; Moholy-Nagy, László: Von Material zu ethos of space 156 – 8 ; interrelation Architektur ( The New Vision: From between Modernism and moralizing Material to Architecture ) 12 152 – 3 ; post-modern critique of the montage 155 ethics and ideology of the Modern Moraitis, Konstantinos 4 , 18 – 29 , 164 movement 151 – 2 ; post-modern moral 9 , 25 , 26 , 43 , 46 , 59 – 60 , 61 , reactions to the ethics embedded in 65 , 74 , 78 , 94 , 95 , 105 , 106 , 146 , basic design principles of the Modern 150 , 151 , 152 , 157 , 158 , 162 , 164 , movement 154 – 6 165 ; goodness 92 ; inhibitions 156 ; paradise 123 , 124 , 133 Modernism and moralizing 152 – 3 parametric: architecture 54 ; geometry morality 7 , 42 , 92 , 119 , 120 – 1 , 129 , 5 , 48 , 53 , 54 ; programmes 97 151 , 157 Pardo, Mary 145 moral relativism 152 Parthenon 132 Moses 129 participative atmosphere 61 multiplicity 98, 164 Pellée, H. 45 perception 3 , 4 , 7 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 22 , nature 6 – 12 26, 27 , 28nn3 – 4, 43 , 53 , 65 , 69 , 70 , Netherlands: cultural landscape 21 – 5 ; 92, 93 , 96 , 99 , 109 , 110 , 112 , 113 , seventeenth-century 19 – 25 114 , 115 , 117 , 118 – 19 , 121 , 152 , 163 Neva River 66 Pérez-Gómez, Alberto 62 – 71 Nevsky Prospect 63 – 5 performative 61 , 98 , 99 , 164 New Objectivity 44 Peripatetics 105 , 108 new pragmatism 156 Perret, Auguste: Contribution to a Niceron, Jean-François: Thaumaturgus Theory of Architecture 45 Opticus 20 Peter the Great 65 , 70 Niemeyer, Oscar 52 Pevsner, Nikolaus 3 , 153 ; “The Nietzsche, Friedrich 106 , 125, 126 , Englishness of English Art” 13 ; “The 129 , 133 , 136 Second Half Century” 13

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Nieuwenhuys, Constant Anton 94 phenomenalism 154 non-composition 97 , 99 phenomenology 138 – 9 , 140 normativity 42 , 61, 93 philosophical hermeneutics 32 , 33 nostalgia 124 , 125, 128 – 30 phronesis 34 , 70 Nouvel, Jean 52, 53 picturesque 3 , 9 , 11 – 2 Nye, David 84 picturesque modernism 3 , 12 – 13 , 14 Pinkard, Terry 157 objectile 97 , 98 place ethics: heritage values as means Odysseus 127 and ends 30 – 40; horizon for balancing oneiric space 95 identity and change 38 – 9 ; places as open-ended 31 , 93, 94 agents of heritage values 30 – 1 172 Index Plato 7 , 8 , 31 , 105 , 108 , 121 , 124 ; Richards, J. M.: “The Second Half Laws 116 ; Phaedrus 119 , 120 ; Century” 13 Republic 109 , 116 Ricoeur, Paul 62 , 68 Pliny 6 Riegl, Alois 31 Plotinus: Enneads 120 ritual 106 , 138 , 142 , 143 , 146 , 148 political 23 – 4 , 43 , 47 , 60 , 66 , 67 , 70 , Romanticism 24 , 59 ; ruin 132 – 4 76 , 77 , 78 , 79, 162 , 165 ; action 61 , Rousham 9 63 , 68 , 99 ; art 31 ; ethos 4 ; inertia 14 ; Ruggero, Giuseppe 125 liberalism 74 ; power 20 ; reality 69 ; ruin 132 – 4 tension 62 , 65 Rykwert, Joseph 154 post-industrial: city 73 ; economy 161 , 162 ; management 165 ; manner of Saarinen, Eero 131 production 92 ; society 59 , 161 , 162 Saint Orlan 131 post-modern 96 , 152 – 3 St Petersburg 59 , 62 , 63 , 65 , 66 , 68 , post-modern architecture 88 , 152 69 – 70 post-modern critique 75 , 151 – 2 St. Peter’s Square 19 post-modern reactions 154 – 6 SANAA see Sejima and Nishizawa and post-modern thinking 79 Associates post-modern transformation of urban Santa Maria del Fiore (Cupola) 143 , space 72 – 3 146 , 148 post-structuralism 93 Sassen, Saskia 146 practical philosophy 4 , 34, 35 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph practical wisdom 34 – 5 , 36 von 105 , 108 ; The Philosophy of praxis 18 , 32, 33 , 34 , 52, 48 , 79 , 92 , Art (Die Philosophie der Kunst ) 116 , 96 , 150 , 151 , 152 , 156 117 – 18 preservation of monuments and sites Schmarsow, August 157 33 , 37 Schopenhauer, Arthur: Die Welt als Price, Cedric 94 Wille und Vortstellung 126 private 60 ; tensions between public Sejima and Nishizawa and Associates 75 – 9 (SANAA) 52 , 53 Proclus: Elements of Theology 110 Sejima, Kazuyo 53 property 75 , 76 – 7 self-consciousness 118 – 19 , 120 , 121 Protestant ethics: landscape ‘genius’ 25 – 6 self-referential 60 , 93 Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Semper, Gottfried 155 – 6 Capitalism 25 Sennett, Richard: cooperation 138 , 142 , public: tensions between private 75 – 9 148 ; Together 106 , 138 ; togetherness public space 60 , 62 , 69 , 76 , 77 , 78 , 95 , 98 142 , 145 – 6 purism 45 sensation 113 purity of structure 155 Shaftesbury, A. A. 7 – 8 side-by-side ( Nebeneinander ) 141 Radical Eclecticism 154 Silent Running (1972, dir. Douglas rationalism 18 , 20, 44 , 49 , 65 , 94 , 154 , Trumbull) 86 155 Simmel, Georg 88

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 rationality 62 , 95 Singapore 60 , 82 – 91 redemption 38 Singapore Flyer 82 – 91 ; architecture, Reims cathedral 130 movement and time 87 – 9 ; from Reinicke, Helmut 132 tower to wheel 83 – 4 ; view 84 – 7 relativism 38 , 152 singularity 54 , 96, 98 Renaissance 11, 43 , 146; Italian 6 ; Sioli, Angeliki 59 , 62 – 71 Tuscan 24 Sittlichkeit 157 , 158 Renaut, Alain 47 , 92 Siza, Álvaro 51 responsiveness 48 Smithson, Alison 93 – 4 representation 4, 8 , 19, 21 , 22 , 24 , 27 , Smithson, Peter 93 – 4 60 , 88 , 98 , 110, 113 – 14 , 115 , 120 social 3 – 4 , 22 – 5 , 36 , 43 , 46 , 60 , 73 , Repton, Humphry 9 75 , 99 – 100 ; behavior 18 , 24, 25 – 6 , Index 173 27 , 142 , 164 ; cohesion 143 , 145 , Tsoukala, Kyriaki 41 – 56 , 59 – 61 , 72 , 146 ; ethics 18 – 19 , 96 ; relationships 92 – 101 , 161 – 6 137 , 142 , 163 ; science 95; triangle 142 uncertainty 47 society 19 , 77 , 78 ; Dutch 25 ; universality 44 , 46 , 54 nationalised 99 ; novice bourgeois urban space: ethical prospects 62 – 71 ; 21 – 5 ; Singaporean 60 ; well-ordered introduction 59 – 61 116 , 157 socio-spatial ethos 79 van Doesburg, Theo: “Towards a socio-spatial sustainability 79 – 80 Plastic Architecture” 132 space and shaping space, ethical Vaux le Vicomte 19 – 20 signiﬁ cance 123 – 37 ; burning Versailles 20 cathedral 130 – 2 ; geocentrism Venturi, Robert 154 ; Complexity and 134 – 7 ; nostalgia and kitsch 128 – 30 ; Contradiction in Architecture 151 ruin romanticism 132 – 3 Villa Tugendhat 44 space and time 12 , 68 Viollet-le-Duc, Eugène-Emmanuel 43 , space of ﬂ ows 86 49 , 153 spatial ethos 157: access 72 – 80 ; access Virgil 6 ; Georgics , 9 and socio-spatial sustainability virtual reality 92 79 – 80 ; post-modern transformation Vitruvius 11 , 111 , 114 , 135 ; De of urban space 72 – 3 ; spatialities of architectura ( On Architecture ) 108 difference and spatialities of equality void 79 , 97 , 99 , 132 , 162 , 165 73 – 5 ; tensions between private and Volkvov, Solomon 65 public 75 – 9 Von Material zu Architektur (The spatial turn 72, 73 New Vision: From Material to Spengler, Oswald 126 Architecture ) 12 Spinoza, Benedict de: Ethica ( Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata ) 4 , 18 , 25 , Watkin, David: ambiguous interrelation 26 ; “Ethics” 21, 26 between Modernism and Moralizing standardisation 97 152 – 3 ; Morality and Architecture 153 structuralism 93 weather 6 – 17 ; coproduction 14 – 16 ; sublime 26 , 84 , 87 , 130 , 134 , 135 nature 6 – 12 ; picturesque modernism superbodies 98 12 – 13 Superstudio: Il Monumento continuo Weber, Max 26 ; Protestant Ethics and 94 the Spirit of Capitalism 25 synthesis 96 , 114, 152 Weiss, Allen 20 synthesis (of values) 31 – 2 Whately, Thomas 8 synthetic arts 31 whole 5 , 25 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 48 , 75 , 93 – 4 , 95 , 112 , 155 Tagliabue, Benedetta 51 – 2 Wigley, Mark 131 technologism 48 wilderness 15 technology 46 , 51 , 52 , 53 , 124 – 5 , 131 , William of Orange (prince) 23 161 William III (king) 23

Downloaded by [New York University] at 13:59 16 August 2016 Temple, Nicholas 138 – 49 , 164 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 18 Terzoglou, Nikolaos-Ion 72 , 95 , 105 – 7 , Woods, Lebbeus 131 – 2 150 – 66 Woods, Shadrach 94 time 7 , 8 , 12 , 46 , 60 , 61 , 68 , 88 – 9 World Trade Center 83 , 84 topological: grid systems 52 ; World War I 130 interactions 155 ; intuition 28n4 ; logic World War II 92 , 95 , 133 94 ; marking 164 ; order 27 , 28n4 , 97 ; Wren, Christopher: “Description of a thinking 28n4 ; transformation 27 Weather Clock” 7 topology: deﬁ nition 28n4 truth of construction 154 , 155 – 6 Zumthor, Peter 106 ; Thermal Baths, Tschumi, Bernard 96 Vals 146 , 148