BYU Law Review Volume 2011 | Issue 3 Article 5 9-1-2011 Religion and Neutrality: Myth, Principle, and Meaning Rafael Palomino Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview Part of the Law and Politics Commons, Religion Commons, and the Religion Law Commons Recommended Citation Rafael Palomino, Religion and Neutrality: Myth, Principle, and Meaning , 2011 BYU L. Rev. 657 (2011). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2011/iss3/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013 3:49 PM Religion and Neutrality: Myth, Principle, and Meaning Rafael Palomino Knowledge of speech, but not of silence; Knowledge of words, and ignorance of the Word. - T. S. Eliot1 I. INTRODUCTION “[T]he fate of great words,” in their constant wandering, “appears to be their progressive dispersion in different directions, so that, in the end, neither detractors nor epigones know exactly what they are referring to in their diatribes or panegyrics.”2 In examining the changing dynamic of the religious phenomenon in postmodern societies, legal studies have invented or imported a considerable number of terms that offer only the illusion of scientific precision. Grand words that inspire immediate acceptance and a sense of security include the following: equality, nondiscrimination, liberty, and secularism. However, after this gratifying first impression, the jurist will take it upon himself to engage in a closer study to assess the scope, the ultimate implications, and the specific ramifications that such terms entail in reality.