Commentary Coronavirus Puts Pressure on $4.6 Billion of Maturing CMBS Loans Backed by Regional Malls
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Commentary Coronavirus Puts Pressure on $4.6 Billion of Maturing CMBS Loans Backed by Regional Malls DBRS Morningstar DBRS Morningstar Perspective April 13, 2020 The ongoing Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic is affecting every facet of the U.S. economy and commercial real estate is no exception. The possibility that stores will remain closed for a longer period Contents of time is becoming more likely, which pressures about $4.6 billion in regional mall loans packaged in 1 DBRS Morningstar Perspective 1 Regional Malls Take Immediate Hit Amid commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) transactions that are scheduled to mature through 2021. Coronavirus Response Efforts DBRS Morningstar analyzed these near-term maturities and identified some key characteristics to 2 Regional Mall Stress Compounded by evaluate the likelihood of either a successful refinance or short- to medium-term extension that could Near-Term Maturities in CMBS 4 Evaluating the Road Ahead for Maturing facilitate takeout financing down the road. Sponsor strength and willingness to invest have historically CMBS Mall Loans played a critical role in mall performance in general, and we expect those trends to continue for the 13 Looking Forward maturing CMBS mall loans coming due in the next few years. Overall, borrowers are more likely to invest 14 Appendix capital in more stable malls with more predictable long-term prospects for success. Alex Sgorlon With a likelihood of stressed cash flows across the spectrum, DBRS Morningstar notes that high-quality Senior Analyst North American CMBS Class A assets with reasonable leverage and consistent cash flow performance and a cushion to service +1 416 728-8144 debt are the most attractive refinance or maturity extension candidates. Performance trends and [email protected] characteristics including occupancy, exposure to anchor (and dark anchor) tenants, sales performance, Jason de Souza and capitalization rates relative to comparable assets speak to the asset’s performance in a stabilized Senior Analyst environment. We also consider factors such as the property’s position compared with other properties in North American CMBS +1 416 597-7401 the market and its history of innovation in attracting newer, more entertainment-based tenants and/or [email protected] more popular retailers in today’s consumer environment relative to historically prevalent mall retailers. Gwen Roush Senior Vice President Regional Malls Take Immediate Hit Amid Coronavirus Response Efforts North American CMBS As city officials, governors, and federal agencies have issued guidance regarding social distancing and +1 312 332-9575 [email protected] limitations on large gatherings, retailers and mall operators have temporarily closed or remain open only for essential purchases. Some prominent retailers, such as Macy’s and Nordstrom, Inc. (rated BBB (high) Steven Jellinek with a Negative trend by DBRS Morningstar), have suspended dividend payouts, citing significant Vice President North American CMBS uncertainty ahead. According to Autonomous Research LLP, 126 consumer companies, including +1 312 244-7908 retailers such as Best Buy Co, Inc.; The TJX Companies, Inc.; and Kohl’s, have drawn a total of $86 billion [email protected] from credit lines. Whether by companywide mandates, such as those put into place by Simon Property Group, Inc. (Simon); Washington Prime Group Inc. (WPG), and Unibail-Westfield-Rodamco SE, or by government mandate, most regional malls in the U.S. are closed because of the coronavirus. Amid mall and store closures, some retailers have notified mall operators of their inability or unwillingness to pay rent for Page 2 of 15 Coronavirus Puts Pressure on $4.6 Billion of Maturing CMBS Loans Backed by Regional Malls | April 13, 2020 April with at least one operator, Taubman Centers Inc. (Taubman), advising that it will not offer rent concessions at this time. The ongoing uncertainty is particularly problematic for regional malls, many of which were already facing strong headwinds before the coronavirus. Traditional enclosed mall properties have been exposed to the declining performance of department store anchors, which have announced mass store closures over the last several years. This trend has left many properties with an expansive footprint to redevelop and backfill, often at a significant expense and in a highly competitive environment for operators working to attract the handful of major retailers typically filling those vacant spaces. When larger vacancies begin to occur, sponsors with weaker portfolios and less access to capital are restricted in their ability to fully implement a turnaround strategy. Such sponsors also face the challenge of quickly adapting to changing consumer preferences that benefit the malls’ interests in the long term. The coronavirus' effect will undoubtedly (1) put added stress on these operators and weaker assets because temporary mall closures will affect retailers’ ability to pay rent and (2) test the sustainability of anchors and in-line tenants that are already experiencing lower sales, particularly for locations outside primary markets. Although many have predicted the death of the American shopping mall over the last few decades, the number of enclosed malls in the U.S. has actually grown to 1,170—the highest in the last 50 years, according to the International Council of Shopping Centers. The excess supply, combined with changing consumer habits that have affected malls in particular, has driven many malls to or near the brink of closure as survival of the fittest plays out for owners seeking financing, a trend that we believe will be expedited by the economic fallout of the coronavirus. Regional Mall Stress Compounded by Near-Term Maturities in CMBS Based on the data available in DBRS Viewpoint, 49 regional mall CMBS loans (see the Appendix) with a combined balance of over $4.5 billion are scheduled to mature in 2020 and 2021. Loans that are secured by underperforming properties are unable to handle significant cash flow declines that we expect during the coronavirus pandemic and therefore, will face the greatest challenge in obtaining replacement financing. Page 3 of 15 Coronavirus Puts Pressure on $4.6 Billion of Maturing CMBS Loans Backed by Regional Malls | April 13, 2020 Exhibit 1 Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) Performance < 1.50x 1.50x - 1.75x 1.75x - 2.00x > 2.00x 39.0% 20.9% 6.3% 33.8% Exhibit 2 DBRS Morningstar Market Rank Upcoming Maturity Loans 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% % of% Current Debt 10.0% 0.0% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Market Rank Source: DBRS Morningstar. Within that set of loans, 16 loans, comprising over $957 million of outstanding debt, reported year-end DSCRs of under 1.50 times (x) as of the most recent available reporting period. Ten of these loans, comprising $562 million, would be unable to cover their debt service following a 20% haircut to the in- place net cash flow (NCF). In addition to malls reporting lower cash flows, we also see increased risks based on location. Because of reduced investor demand and less willingness from banks and other financial institutions to lend, malls in rural or suburban markets will likely see fewer options for takeout at maturity compared with malls in denser, more populated markets. Across the cohort of near-term CMBS mall maturities we identified, 31 loans, representing $2.0 billion, are collateralized by a mall located in a city with a DBRS Morningstar Market Rank of 3 or lower. Page 4 of 15 Coronavirus Puts Pressure on $4.6 Billion of Maturing CMBS Loans Backed by Regional Malls | April 13, 2020 Exhibit 3 Current Loan-to-Value (LTV) Ratio Upcoming Maturity Loans 30.0% 20.0% of% Current Debt 10.0% 0.0% < 45% 45%-50% 51%-55% 56%-60% 61%-65% > 65% LTV Category Source: DBRS Morningstar. Approximately 75% of the outstanding CMBS mall debt with a near-term maturity has a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio between 45% and 60%. Although these figures suggest more cushion against market disruptions and general value declines for this property type in the last 10 years, particularly for those with declining performance metrics and/or locations in secondary markets, we note that these properties' values will likely sharply reduce from issuance. These factors could impair a sponsor’s willingness to continue investing in the property to effect stabilization, which could ultimately lead to the sponsor's unwillingness to work with the servicer to hold onto the asset if refinancing cannot be secured. According to the DBRS Viewpoint platform, 31 outstanding regional mall CMBS loans and loan pieces (originated in 2010 or later) with a combined balance of $2.2 billion were in special servicing as of the March 2020 remittance dates. In general, these loans exhibited healthy issuance LTVs with a weighted- average (WA) figure of 62.8%; however, 14 of these loans, comprising a combined balance of $540 million, reported new valuations since issuance, with value declines ranging between -40.9% and - 79.6% with a WA value decline of -67.7%. The average DBRS Morningstar Market Rank for the collateral securing these loans is 2.7 with only a handful of loans secured by properties located in cities with market ranks above 3 and none with a market rank above 5. These trends point to the binary nature of regional mall valuations and sale prices as significant value declines become the standard in difficult periods. The current economic stress related to the coronavirus, particularly when coupled with the generally lackluster forecast for regional malls in secondary markets over the near to moderate term even before the pandemic’s impact, suggests that values will be even more stressed, further depressing the value of a seasoned regional mall loan’s LTV in providing guidance for refinance prospects. Page 5 of 15 Coronavirus Puts Pressure on $4.6 Billion of Maturing CMBS Loans Backed by Regional Malls | April 13, 2020 The concentration of smaller sponsors by loan count is high in the CMBS mall loans currently in special servicing, but there are exceptions in two loans sponsored by WPG—one real estate owned property and one foreclosure expected to be executed in the near term on another property.