New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

June 1987

NTIS order #PB87-200267 Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Technology for NATO: Im- plementing Follow-On Force Attack, OTA-ISC-309 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov- ernment Printing Office, June 1987).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 87-619814

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325 (order form on p. 231) Foreword

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been wrestling with a fundamental dilemma: how, within the confines of a strategy constrained by politics and geography, to maintain deterrence against the numerically superior and increasingly technically sophisticated forces of the Warsaw Pact. Nuclear weapons underpin NATO’s deterrent, but Alliance military planners are uncomfortable with the prospect of a conventional defense that could be overwhelmed so rapidly as to require early resort to nuclear weapons. Under the leadership of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Bernard W. Rogers, NATO has sought to remedy this situation by exploiting a broad range of emerging technologies to enable it to effectively attack the follow-on forces of a Warsaw Pact offensive—those ground forces that would extend and support the successes of the initial attackers against NATO’s defenders—and thus help even the odds on those fronts where armies are actually engaged. The adoption of the Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) concept has raised a number of serious, complicated, and interrelated issues for the United States and the other members of NATO. The range of issues is broad—encompassing political, military, and technological questions—although no single issue is dramatic enough to garner headlines in any but the most specialized press. To help them make decisions on this matter, the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services, with the support of the Senate Armed Services Committee, asked OTA to help bring some insight to this array of problems, so that the United States can more clearly understand and effectively support agreed NATO policy. This is the second report of that study effort. Complementary material can be found in an earlier report “Technologies for NATO’s Follow-On Forces Attack Concept, ” published in July 1986. Because technology, military concept development, and political thinking have all been evolving, the preparation of this report has been much like boarding a moving train. The information in it is current as of February 1987. It begins from the premise that NATO has officially adopted FOFA, and the United States has supported that decision. Although some still question the wisdom of adopting FOFA, the current debate is really over how best to implement that decision. The report briefly reviews what FOFA is and how it fits into NATO strategy, but is primarily concerned with the outstanding technical issues, how our Allies view FOFA, how the Soviets might respond to it, and how the various technical developments might be brought together into “packages” of systems to support specific operational concepts. OTA gratefully acknowledges the help and cooperation of the United States Army and Air Force, the Departments of Defense and State, NATO civilian and military staffs, the governments and Parliaments of our European Allies, companies, and numerous individuals who assisted the research and writing of this report.

Director

///.,. Preface

Volume II of this report consists of classified appendices that elaborate on some of the material contained in this volume. It may be requested by writing to: Congress of the United States Office of Technology Assessment International Security and Commerce Program (ATTN: Program Manager) Washington, DC 20510 providing full name and social security number and the agency or office that can certify a SECRET security clearance and U.S. citizenship. For Congressional requests a need-to-know must be certified by a member of Congress. For other requests, need to know must be briefly explained. The reader should be aware that the OTA staff did not have access to so-called “black” programs that may be relevant. It is unknown whether the results of such highly classified research could alter some of the technical discussions contained in this report. Interested members of Congress are referred to the Department of Defense for further information. OTA Project Staff for New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Peter Sharfman, International Security and Commerce Program Manager

Alan Shaw, Project Director

Stephen Budianskyl Michael Callaham Allen Greenberg’ Peter Lert Nancy Lubin

Administrative Staff Jannie Coles Cecile Parker Jackie Robinson

IOTA Fellow, ‘On detail from U.S. Department of State Advisory Panel for New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Jan M. Lodal, Chair President, INTELUS George S. Blanchard Walter B. LaBerge General, USA (retired) Vice President Corporate Development Joseph V. Braddock Lockheed Corp. Senior Vice President The BDM Corp. John Pauly General, USAF (retired) P. Robert Calaway Chief Executive Officer President Systems Control Technology Resource Management International, Inc. William J. Perry Seymour J. Deitchman CEO Vice President, Programs H&Q Technology Partners, Inc. Institute for Defense Analyses Stanley Resor Victor L. Donnell Attorney Colonel, USA (retired) Debevoise & Plimpton Lockheed Missile & Space Co., Inc. Stuart Starr Christopher Donnelly Director of Planning Director The MITRE Corp. Soviet Studies Research Centre Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Dorm Starry Exec Vice President Patrick J. Garvey Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp. Colonel, USMCR Post Commander, Camp Smith Harry Train, II New York State Division of Military and President Naval Affairs Strategic Research and Management Services, Inc. Andrew Goodpaster General, USA (retired) John R. Transue Technical Consultant Fred Haynes Falls Church, VA Vice President for Planning and Analysis LTV Aerospace & Defense Co. Ralph Wetzl Director of Systems Development Glenn Kent The BDM Corp. Lt. General, USAF (retired) Rand Corp. Ennis Whitehead, Jr. Major General, USA (retired) Ambassador Robert Komer Vice President for Analysis and Evaluation Senior Consultant Burdeshaw Associates Rand Corp.

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents.

vi Contents

Chapter Page Part I: Principal Findings and Summary 1. Principal Findings ...... 3 2. Summary . . . , ...... 15 Part II: Analyses 3. Introduction and Background...... 49 4. The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe ...... 55 5. Objectives for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ...... 75 6. Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces...... 83 7. Soviet Responses to FOFA ...... 103 8. European Views on FOFA...... 111 9. Current Capabilities ...... 135 10. Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack...... 143 11. Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ...... 171 12. Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces . . . 189 Appendix 12-A: Summary of Packages for Attacks of Follow-On Forces. 199 Appendix 12-B: Flexibility and Application of Systems for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ...... 203 13. Summary of Recent Studies of Follow-On Forces Attack...... 211 Glossary of Terms and Acronyms ...... 221 PART I Principal Findings and Summary Chapter 1 Principal Findings CONTENTS

Page How Does FOFA Contribute to NATO’s Defense Posture? ...... ‘4 How Might the Soviets Respond? ...... 5 What Are the Attitudes of Our Allies? ...... 5 What Is the Status of Relevant Technology and Developments? ...... 6 What Are the Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Approaches? ...... 7 What Is the Likelihood That Plausible Combinations of Systems Will Be Effective? ...... 8 What Are the Outstanding Issues Before Congress?...... 9 Joint STARS ...... 9 Continuation of, or Successor to, PLSS ...... 10 RPV/TADARS ...... 10 Advanced Anti-Armor Submunitions ...... 11 Defense Cooperation ...... 11 Chapter 1 Principal Findings

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization gether to provide the required capabilities, and (NATO) has adopted its Follow-On Forces At- buy enough of each to make a difference. tack (FOFA) concept as part of its program FOFA is a mission concept, not a specific to counter a growing Warsaw Pact conven- weapons system. In general terms, it is the use tional threat, and thus to avoid either an early of various conventionally armed long-range resort to nuclear weapons or even a collapse weapons to attack Warsaw Pact ground forces so rapid as to preclude escalation to nuclear weapons. But the adoption of the concept has that have not yet engaged NATO defenders. From the Air Force’s perspective it is interdic- itself raised issues that will have to be ad- tion; to the Army it is Deep Battle. The basic dressed. objective is to delay, disrupt, and destroy these The general issues are: follow-on forces so that NATO’s defenses can hold as far forward as possible. Although appli- ● the role of FOFA within NATO strategy, cable throughout NATO Europe, it is primar- ● how FOFA could be done, ily focused on the Central Region, where West ● what is needed to make FOFA practical, Germany borders East Germany and Czecho- ● what the Soviets might do to make it im- slovakia. When first proposed by NATO’s Su- practical, preme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), ● whether the supporting systems can be it was envisioned that attacks would take place made to work well enough to justify the from just beyond the engaged troops to hun- cost, dreds of kilometers into enemy territory. ● how they will be paid for, and SACEUR also suggested that implementing ● how to avoid political problems that could FOFA would require an increase in national weaken the Alliance. defense budgets beyond the 3 percent real In addition, Congress is faced with specific growth to which the nations had at that time FOFA-related funding issues, particularly: the committed themselves. Consensus has been Joint Surveillance/Target Attack Radar Sys- building for several years; clearly, although tem (Joint STARS), a possible successor to the very deep attack may remain an attractive recently cut back Precision Location Strike long-term goal, current interest is focusing pri- System (PLSS), remotely piloted vehicles, ad- marily on shorter ranges. Rather than commit- vanced submunitions, and the issue of how to ting themselves to additional funding, the handle related armaments cooperation with member nations are primarily redirecting ex- our NATO Allies. isting conventional force modernization programs to support the concept, as well as the NATO currently has some quite limited ca- applications for which they were otherwise in- pability to implement this concept, but faces tended. This includes the United States, which three major shortcomings: adequate resources has many more FOFA-related efforts under- for reconnaissance, surveillance, and target ac- way than the others. quisition; capable munitions in sufficient quantities as well as the weapons to distribute those The controversy that surrounded the adop- munitions; and total systems—from surveil- tion of the concept arose in part because it fit lance to target destruction–that can respond neatly with systems under development in the rapidly, flexibly, and effectively across large United States which had no European coun- areas. There are systems under development terparts. Europeans saw this as requiring them that could alleviate each of these shortcomings. to spend large amounts of money on American However, it will be necessary to procure them systems. This controversy has diminished as in complete packages of systems that work to- the concept has been further developed to de-

3 4 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack fine much of what the Europeans are produc- to fulfill identified needs, but rather one of ing as FOFA systems, and as cooperative ar- keeping the necessary programs alive both rangements for developing and producing technically and financially. However, when other systems have been worked out. these programs move from development to procurement, the budget requests will almost Most of the systems needed for an effective certainly increase, and Congress will face the FOFA capability either exist or are in various stages—mostly the later stages—of develop- question of how to finance them. Choices will have to be made among programs that are rele- ment. There are still important engineering vant for FOFA, and probably between FOFA problems to be solved, and important pieces and other areas as well. may yet fail to materialize. But by and large the issue is not one of starting new programs

HOW DOES FOFA CONTRIBUTE TO NATO’S DEFENSE POSTURE? FOFA is one of a handful of key mission con- paring to do so. By attacking these follow-on cepts for NATO’s conventional forces, all of forces, NATO would hope to decrease their which are considered vital to a successful de- ability to affect the war; and by “metering” fense. It must be viewed not in isolation, but their arrival at the close battle, NATO would rather within the context of all the others, such be better positioned to defeat them and not as fighting the close battle against Warsaw be overwhelmed by successive attacks. Soviet Pact ground forces, establishing and maintain- doctrine suggests that the Warsaw Pact would ing control of the air, and safeguarding rear concentrate its ground forces, probably against areas. For example, successfully attacking NATO’s weaker sectors, and have substantial follow-on forces could improve the outcome of freedom to move and redirect its main efforts. the close battle, and control of the air would NATO, by contrast, would be very constrained facilitate attacking follow-on forces. in its ability to move ground forces laterally along the front in response. A FOFA capabil- Many of the systems being considered to ity could be used to compensate for this by support FOFA would not be limited to that redirecting the firepower of long-range weap- role, but would have applications to other mis- ons and interdiction aircraft along the front. sion concepts. Many of the U.S. systems would If the follow-on forces are very important to also have roles beyond NATO Europe. Further- Soviet strategy (and if they can be found and more, some surveillance systems that might attacked effectively), FOFA could be enor- be used to find and target follow-on forces could mously effective. However, if the follow-on also aid in detection and assessment of War- forces play a less important role, FOFA would saw Pact activities prior to a conflict. be less valuable (although the weapons and other systems might not necessarily be any FOFA was conceived as a way to exploit less useful). Evidence suggests that Soviet technology to counter two fundamental strategic, operational, and tactical planning is aspects of Soviet strategy: their use of follow- flexible and that the Soviets could reduce their on forces; and their ability to use a strategi- dependence on the follow-on forces or the ex- cally mobile offense against a much less mo- posure of those forces to attack. The extent bile defense. Soviet doctrine suggests that a to which they could do so is subject to debate, Warsaw Pact offensive would probably include as is the cost to them of taking these steps: a substantial number of follow-on ground on the one hand, they had reasons for adopt- forces, i.e., ground forces not involved in the ing their current strategy; on the other, they initial assault. These would either be moving may be ‘‘outgrowing’ it for reasons not forward to join or exploit the attack, or pre- directly related to FOFA. Ch. 1—Principal Findings . 5

HOW MIGHT THE SOVIETS RESPOND? Soviet writings suggest a wide range of po- viet responses could present NATO with op- litical as well as military responses to both the portunities. For example, moving more forces FOFA concept and its implementing systems. forward before attacking could provide NATO Soviet military writings focus on: 1) adjust- with longer warning which NATO could ex- ing strategy and operations (e.g., by deempha- ploit. Keeping more forces closer to the close sizing the role of the follow-on forces, intermin- battle could make them easier to engage. gling their forces with NATO’s early in a On the political level, the Soviets apparently conflict, and increasing protection of their rear have already been trying to influence European areas); 2) developing operational and techni- public opinion to inhibit the successful imple- cal countermeasures to weapons and target- mentation of FOFA, and to exploit European ing systems; 3) adjusting their command and concerns about FOFA to cause friction within control to compensate for quick-acting FOFA the Alliance. systems; and 4) developing similar systems, but not necessarily for similar uses. Some So-

WHAT ARE THE ATTITUDES OF OUR ALLIES? Our NATO Allies endorsed the concept in standing for multilateral development and pro- a very general form in November 1984; the def- duction programs, some of which include the inition of what has been agreed to and how it United States and some of which do not. The should be implemented is still evolving. The Europeans have recently expressed a willing- Europeans have been slower to accept the spe- ness to consider cooperative ventures on sys- cifics than the United States has. This is due tems capable of striking as deep as 150 kilo- partly to the long lead times in their defense meters, but it is still too early to judge the planning cycles, and partly to economic fac- significance of this development. tors including an expectation that their defense budgets are likely to remain constant or to de- Increasingly, the Europeans are coming to cline over the next few years. The Europeans insist that cooperative programs not only re- expect that a significant FOFA capability will sult in spending for European production, but be expensive, and are concerned about it re- also invest in European technological devel- quiring increases in their defense burdens or opment. As yet, the United States has not decreases in their ability to perform other found formal European support for two ma- missions. jor programs, Joint STARS and the Army’s Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), but this The Europeans are most interested in ap- does not mean that our Allies will never be in- proaches to FOFA that incorporate what they terested in those programs. Indeed, informal have already been doing. Hence, they are most interest appears to be growing. Several Euro- interested in enhancing the role of artillery pean systems with important implications for and the new Multiple Launch Rocket System FOFA are under development. (MLRS), some forms of aircraft interdiction (but not all of those under discussion), remotely Many in Europe hold a different view than piloted vehicles, and command and control sys- the United States does of the proper balance tems. They are wary of FOFA as a source of between nuclear and conventional forces, and pressure to buy U.S. technology, and have been are less enthusiastic about conventional de- cautiously negotiating memoranda of under- fense improvements. Furthermore, they are 6 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack concerned that FOFA not draw resources from some objections to NATO defense policy, par- the close battle between opposing ground ticularly the objection of the British Labour forces, which they see as having the highest Party to nuclear weapons. However, Labour priority. ’ has suggested that by eliminating nuclear weapons it would spend much more on conven- FOFA has evolved from a major political is- tional defense. sue within the Alliance in 1984 to quiet negotiations among armaments experts in 1987. From the perspective of early 1987, FOFA While the movement has been in the direction appears to be a modest success story in the of consensus, FOFA has failed to generate history of NATO. When the concept was first much enthusiasm for increased spending. proposed, it evoked skepticism, misunder- FOFA is no longer a threat to Alliance cohe- standing, and political friction. But a rough sion, even though the major opposition par- mutual understanding has now developed. In ties in Germany and the United Kingdom have the process, FOFA stimulated NATO’s “con- declared themselves against the concept. These ceptual military framework” process, which parties have more fundamental and trouble- promises to be useful in coordinating military . planning over the full range of NATO missions. ‘SACEUR’S position is that all the mission concepts are nec- It has also served to provide an agenda for in- essary and that priorities cannot be established among them. Some NATO governments have suggested that just such a pri- creasingly ambitious explorations in the area oritization should take place. of armaments cooperation.

WHAT IS THE STATUS OF RELEVANT TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENTS? A great deal of what is needed for FOFA is oping systems that could be used for FOFA: already in the field or in production. Most of the Tornado aircraft with its MW-1 dispenser; the technology for the rest already exists and remotely piloted vehicles and drones; some sur- could result in fielded systems over the next veillance systems; and various munitions. decade. Engineering problems remain to be They are co-developing the Terminally Guided solved, and some important advanced systems Warhead for the Multiple Launch Rocket Sys- have not been completely demonstrated, but tem (MLRS/TGW). Their technology is, in there is less concern about being able to make many cases, equal to U.S. technology. the systems work than there is about the performance of combinations of systems in real- This focus on U.S. technology has raised a istic countermeasure environments. There may major political problem: how to balance a de- be value in getting systems into the field so sire to buy the best capability most efficiently that the problems of integration can be worked with growing allied pressure for a more equi- out and unrecognized problems and benefits table “two-way street” for NATO weapons can be discovered. procurement. Although discussion has tended to focus on those developments that are primarily Amer- ican, 2 our Allies have developed and are devel-

‘The United States leads, but does not necessarily dominate, munitions, and ground-launched missiles. This does not neces- in major areas such as broad area surveillance and targeting sarily mean that the United States will successfully field more systems, data analysis and dissemination systems, smart sub- (or better) systems than the Europeans. Ch 1—Principal Find/ngs 7

WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES? There are several different approaches to at- a variety of munitions. While supplies are nec- tacking follow-on forces, with many having essary for an offensive, some analysts believe several variations. Implementing any single that the Soviets could lose a large number of approach will require a complete package of supply trucks before combat capability would several systems, including: systems to find and be degraded. Combat vehicles go into battle locate the targets; systems to deliver the weap- with significant amounts of fuel and ammuni- ons; the munitions; and supporting systems tion on board. But small combat units such (e.g., for defense suppression and electronic as battalions have little excess supply, and warfare). If it were possible to fund everything, resupply is essential if an offensive is to be con- it would make military sense to procure the tinued. systems to support a range of approaches. But funding constraints are likely, and will limit Advancing forces can be delayed by creat- choices. It will therefore be important to fund ing choke points (e.g., by destroying a bridge systems consistently so that the result is one just as a unit is about to cross it, or by sowing or more complete packages, and not pieces of a mine field). Analyses differ on whether suffi- several incomplete ones, and perhaps to fund ciently long delays could be produced. The abil- systems that offer the most flexibility. Some ity of the Pact commanders to employ their systems could contribute to many packages, forces could be disrupted by attacking com- but others have only specific applications. mand posts. These, however, would be diffi- While choosing preferred operational concepts cult targets to find and attack, and the effect is a job for the military, Congress’ funding de- of doing so is difficult to gauge. cisions will determine which concepts are sup- In general, the deeper into enemy territory ported, and how well. an attack takes place, the less will be its di- Different approaches to FOFA are primar- rect effect on the battle and the greater will ily distinguished by what targets to attack, be both the Warsaw Pact ability to compen- and the means to attack them. Attacks can sate and NATO’s opportunities to continue the be against moving combat units, supplies, com- attack to produce the desired effects. mand posts and other high-value units, or to Ground-launched weapons like artillery, create chokepoints in the transportation sys- MLRS, and the ATACMS missile are gener- tem by destroying bridges or laying mines. ally simpler to operate than tactical aircraft, These attacks could be conducted with ground- but would be more dependent on close coordi- launched weapons or by interdiction aircraft nation with sophisticated external surveillance carrying a variety of weapons including air- and targeting systems. NATO forces are up- launched missiles. grading artillery and buying MLRS. But these Analysis shows that directly attacking com- weapons lack the flexibility y of the longer range bat units could be very effective in slowing and ATACMS to be redirected over long distances, reducing Pact forces. But it is not clear whether and waiting until the targets are close creates NATO will have both the means to target them a risk that NATO forces will be overwhelmed effectively, and the weapons to kill the tanks. as the targets dash forward. Missiles like Although the tanks are a major worry, all the ATACMS could be used by one corps to sup- other armored combat vehicles are also needed port another and to concentrate firepower by the Soviets for a combined arms offensive, across a wide segment of the front. If the and they are vulnerable to munitions now be- United States is to preserve the option to de- ing procured. Opinions differ over the value ploy ATACMS, it will have to exercise care of attacking supplies, which could be done with in arms control negotiations. 8 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Aircraft have the advantage of a man on likely to be many high-value targets on day board, providing flexibility to compensate for three and beyond. shortcomings in targeting information and to The Air Force is now considering using B- respond to unforeseen circumstances. Air 52 bombers flying from bases in the United power generally allows for more flexible employment across the entire Central Region than States to launch long-range cruise missiles over NATO territory to attack the Warsaw Pact ground-launched missiles do. Penetrating War- 3 rail transportation system. This has the ad- saw Pact air defenses with acceptably low at- vantages of using an existing asset, the B-52s, trition requires sophisticated aircraft which are in combination with a yet-to-be-developed var- generally expensive and must be equipped with iant of a new or existing cruise missile and of advanced navigation and target acquisition ca- avoiding Pact air defenses. If successful, it pability, electronic warfare systems, IFF (iden- could produce long delays in the arrival of the tification friend or foe) systems, and stand-off second Soviet strategic echelon, or produce weapons. The U.S. employment concept calls greater warning for NATO by inducing the for the use of large “packages” of attack air- Soviets to move those forces forward through craft, fighter escorts, jammers, defense sup- the rail network prior to the war beginning. pression, etc. Planning such large packages However, the cruise missile variant has yet to requires several hours, although there is flexi- be demonstrated, and-depending on the out- bility to alter plans almost up to takeoff. These come of the negotiations currently under way— sophisticated aircraft are likely to continue to there may be serious arms control problems be in short supply and to be called on for other to solve. urgent missions. It is not likely (but possible) that interdiction aircraft-such as F-16, F-15E, F-4, F-1 11, or Tornado—would be available in great numbers to attack follow-on forces dur- ‘Applications of B-52s with cruise missiles in other theaters ing the first day or two of a war. But there are are also possible.

WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT PLAUSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF SYSTEMS WILL BE EFFECTIVE? Plausible combinations of systems that aircraft flying along roads looking for columns could perform the tasks that fall under FOFA of vehicles. Capability will improve as each have been identified, but many of the compo- deficiency is corrected, although all deficien- nents are still being developed. In order for any cies need not be corrected to have a useful ca- one concept to work, each piece must work (be- pability. cause each individual function is necessary), and they must be able to coordinate and in- As each of these improvements comes on line, FOFA capability will increase incre- terface. mentally. Programs now under way are designed to overcome deficiencies in NATO ability to at- —..— . tack follow-on forces, now primarily limited to: points, and communications links. These targets are difficult aircraft attacking fixed targets like bridges, to locate and target: when broad-area moving target indicator systems—like Joint STARS—become available, these will be as well as targets that, while mobile, don’t more difficult targets than moving units. The fact that these 4 spend much of their time moving; and possibly targets “dwell” for long periods of time can be used to NATO’s advantage to piece together information from a variety of ex- ‘For example, command posts, surface-to-surface missile isting systems. The munitions exist to attack these targets ef- launchers, surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, resupply fectively, if they can be located. Ch. 1—Principal Findings ● 9 —

Deficiency Corrective Measures/Status 1. Lack of ground-launched missiles MLRS—in production ATACMS—in full scale development 2. Little ability to operate aircraft at night and LANTIRN 5–in limited procurement in bad weather F-15E–in procurement (MLRS, ATACMS6) 3. Little ability to destroy masses of armored CEM7, DPICM8–in procurement (effective vehicles against all but heavily armored tanks) Smart anti-armor submunitions (sensor-fuzed weapons and terminally guided submunitions)—in development TMD9—in procurement NATO MSOW10–in development 4. Little ability to rapidly target moving combat Joint STARS–in full scale development units Aquila RPV11—in full scale development other RPVs—various stages Joint Tactical Fusion Program-in full scale development 5. Little ability for Army corps to support ATACMS–in full scale development adjacent corps 6. Enemy air defenses threaten both interdiction Various air defense suppression and avoidance aircraft and surveillance aircraft programs in various stages Various RPV programs in various stages 7. No capability to attack very deep B-52s carrying cruise missiles–no development yet 5Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night. A system to aid aircraft in finding targets. ‘These are not aircraft systems, but they can operate at night and in bad weather. ‘Combined I+jffects i$lunition. ‘Dual Purpose Improved Con\ent,ional hlunition. “Tactical !LIunitions Dispenser. The dispenser part of the CE!kl; the munition itself is the CEf3 (Combined Effects Bomblet). “’hfodular Stand-off W’capon. ‘ ‘Remotely Piloted t’chicle.

WHAT ARE THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES BEFORE CONGRESS? Several FOFA-related issues are likely to be ably very important if FOFA is to be success- matters of controversy in Congress in the next ful. Such a capability would also be very im- few years. These are: the Joint STARS pro- portant for identifying and analyzing the main gram; the recently severely scaled-down PLSS thrusts of a Soviet offensive, and for obtain- program; Aquila and other remotely piloted ing warning of suspicious movements prior to vehicles (or unmanned aerial vehicles) pro- hostilities. FOFA could be done without a sys- grams; advanced anti-armor submunitions; tem like Joint STARS, but not nearly as well. and co-development and co-production with At the heart of the controversy is the ques- our European Allies. tion of how survivable the E-8A (modified 707) aircraft would be in a realistic combat envi- Joint STARS ronment. Critics contend that to be adequately survivable it would have to be operated so far This program has been a matter of con- 13 troversy between House and Senate for the from the FLOT as to be virtually useless. Sup- past few years. By providing an ability to porters argue that flying in protected NATO locate, track, and target groups of moving ve- airspace with many other surveillance aircraft, hicles, Joint STARS is supposed to contrib- benefiting from suppression of enemy air ute to the commanders’ awareness of the bat- defenses, and protected by NATO fighters and tlefield and to target engagement, which are ‘ ‘Forward Line of own Troops. The farthest line NATO troops central to many concepts for FOFA and prob- occupy’. 10 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

14 SAMS, it would be “survivable but not im- OTA has not had access to other than general mortal. information on possible alternative systems, and It is likely that even with all this protection, cannot comment on their status. Any decision to cancel Joint STARS and begin another pro- Joint STARS would have to operate farther from the FLOT than originally envisioned in gram should also take into account when the order to reduce its vulnerability. But its value alternative might become available, and whether would degrade slowly as it moves back, and that alternative would be suitable for peace- it should be able to provide frequent coverage time deployments and deployments outside of broad areas out to final assembly areas, and Europe. perhaps somewhat beyond. This is the area in which frequent coverage is most needed be- Continuation of, or Successor to, PLSS cause events will develop rapidly there. Deeper This year Congress and the Air Force de- areas would be seen less frequently. This would cided not to fund procurement of the PLSS and provide a great improvement over current ca- to return it to a relatively low-level develop- pabilities in area covered, frequency of cover- mental program. PLSS was designed to satisfy age, timeliness, and accuracy. However, it is a need to quickly and accurately locate and tar- less than the nominal coverage usually assumed get emitters such as the radars of modern air for the system. Prior to hostilities, the E-8A defense systems that would pose a threat to could operate up to the FLOT and provide NATO interdiction aircraft and to surveillance much deeper coverage for indications and systems like Joint STARS. The system was warning of attack. cut partly because of technical problems, and Alternative systems that would be less de- partly because the Air Force believed it was tectable are possible; if operated so as to evade no longer worth the cost. At the time of the detection, they would also be limited in cover- decision it had not achieved the specified sys- age, but the limitations would be different from tem reliability or emitter location accuracy; those of the E-8A. Less area would be masked however, both have now reportedly improved by terrain and vegetation if the platform were to near specified values. Its demonstrated tar- higher or closer to the FLOT. In combination get location accuracy, reporting rate, and time- with E-8As they might provide nearly com- liness are unsurpassed by other tactical elec- plete coverage. If the alternative or comple- tronic intelligence systems, but it sometimes mentary system were to operate in the same reports one emitting target as several. frequency band, it could probably use most of Some within the Air Force argue that other the radar hardware and software developed for assets are adequate to do the job of locating the E-8A. As far as OTA is aware, no detailed the targets. Others argue that there are im- operations analysis that compares the FOFA ca- portant tasks that PLSS was supposed to do pability using the E-8A Joint STARS, alterna- that no other system can. OTA knows of no tive systems, and combinations of the two has other system that can locate emitters as been done. If this remains an issue, such a study quickly and accurately as PLSS. Congress will probably should be done, but it ought not to de- have to face the question of whether a system lay Joint STARS development. That analysis like PLSS is needed, and, if so, whether it should consider the possibility of reactive So- should be obtained by continuing PLSS or viet jammer development. In some cases, “cus- starting another program. tomized” jammers could severely handicap either type of system, but the likelihood and practicality of such jammers needs further RPV/TADARS study. The Target Acquisition/Designation Aerial Reconnaissance System (TADARS), which employs the Aquila RPV, is currently in full- “Surface to Air Missiles. scale development. Major problems that held Ch. 1—Principal Findings ● 11 the system up appear to have been solved. nology systems. They have a long-standing This system lacks the broad area, continuous concern that the “two-way street” of NATO deep coverage of Joint STARS, but could pro- procurement favors the United States by a vide dedicated targeting for Army systems. large margin. In recent years, Europeans have TADARS can perform accurate target location shown themselves willing to pay more for less as well as laser designation for artillery and capability to get equipment made at home. laser-guided bombs. Some have proposed pro- However, as the recent British decision to can- curing another RPV in place of Aquila, but cel the NIMROD and buy the AWACS dem- procuring another RPV and equipping it with onstrates, they will not necessarily take this Aquila’s capabilities would take longer and position to the extreme. cost more than completing TADARS develop- In the past year, the U.S. Department of De- ment. Several types of RPVs are currently fense has been working to resolve this prob- operational and under development in Bel- lem by encouraging the Europeans to identify gium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the systems they are developing and buying that United Kingdom, and Israel. The U.S. Army could be used to support FOFA, negotiating is developing a family of advanced unmanned agreements to explore co-development and co- air vehicles, of which Aquila is the most ma- production of U.S. systems, and encouraging ture, and the Navy and Air Force also have the Europeans to form consortia among them- RPV programs. selves to develop and produce FOFA-related equipment. One particular vehicle for this ef- Advanced Anti-Armor Submunitions fort has been the 1985 Nunn Amendment au- Smart anti-armor submunitions with advanced thorizing funding of cooperative development warheads-such as Skeet,15 SADARM,16 and projects. The European members of NATO, MLRS/TGW17–may be a key to FOFA: they including France, reacted very favorably to the are the only means of killing modern tanks in principle of this amendment, and to the con- significant numbers beyond the close battle. *8 cept of joint development of new military sys- But major uncertainties surround them, par- tems. However, it is clear that before such joint ticularly the questions of whether technical and development can take place, there will have operational countermeasures could defeat their to be some major changes in existing ways of seekers and warheads. It will be necessary to doing business. The European Allies recognize keep a close watch on these development pro- the difficulty of “harmonizing’ the specific in- grams. One very valuable tool is the Chicken terests of the various partners in cooperative Little series of joint tests of munitions and mu- ventures. They are somewhat skeptical about nition concepts. OTA believes that this ser- the ability of the U.S. armed services to do so ies, and others like it, ought to be supported and about Congress committing itself to pro- and the results given serious consideration. grams years in advance. However, the Euro- peans are increasingly unwilling to simply Defense Cooperation “buy American” systems or technologies, and indeed there are some European developments Many of our Allies initially reacted cautiously in FOFA-related technologies which the United to FOFA in part because it looked like another States could profit from not having to re- excuse to induce them to buy U.S. high-tech- invent.

“Smart anti-armor munition that fires a self-forging slug. This may ultimately pose a dilemma for the “search and Destroy Armor: Smart artillery submunition that United States. Cooperative programs usually fires a self-forging slug. “Terminally Guided Weapon for the MLRS: A smart sub- cost more and take longer than projects pur- munition that carries a shaped charge warhead. sued solely in the United States. And, of ‘“Other existing and developmental munitions can destroy course, sharing production or buying European other armored and unarmored vehicles and have some effectiveness against tanks. Scatterable mines can delay the movement systems will cost U.S. jobs. Congress will have of tank units. to deal with these programs one at a time as 12 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack they come up, but it might be wise to develop peans, funding U.S. companies, obtaining the an overall approach to striking a balance best systems, and obtaining the most efficient among accommodating the desires of the Euro- production. Chapter 2 Summary Page The FOFA Concept and the FOFA Debate...... 15 Is FOFA Appropriate to the Threat? ...... 22 How Do Our NATO Allies View FOFA?...... 24 How Might the Soviets Respond to FOFA? ...... 26 Implementing FOFA ...... 27 What and Where to Attack ...... 27 Obtaining the Capability ...... 29 Assembling the Pieces: “Packages’’o f Systems ...... 34 Remaining Issues ...... 40 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) ...... 40 Replacement for the Precision Location Strike System (PLSS)...... 42 Munitions Programs ...... 42 Remotely Piloted Vehicles ...... 43 Arms Cooperation ...... 44

Tables Table No. Page 2-l. Illustrative Packages of Systems To Support Specific Operational Concepts ...... 31 2-2 Status and Costs of Selected FOFA-Related Programs ...... 32 2-3 Packages Based on MLRS and Artillery ...... 35 2-4 Packages Based on ATACMS ...... + ...... 37 2-5 Packages Based on F-16 Aircraft ...... 39 2-6 Packages Based on F-15E Aircraft ...... 39

Figures Figure No. Page 2-1. Warsaw Pact Offensive ...... 18 2-2. NATO’s ’’Layer Cake’’ Defense...... 20 2-3. FOFA Reduces Advancing Forces...... 21 . .

Chapter 2 Summary

THE FOFA CONCEPT AND THE FOFA DEBATE On several occasions, NATO’s Supreme Al- terrent is maintained. FOFA is a major ele- lied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General ment of this conventional force improvement. Bernard W. Rogers, has warned that were the Many observers have suggested that major Warsaw Pact to attack NATO, it would only changes are needed in NATO’s conventional be a few days before he would have to ask NATO political leaders for permission to use force structure, posture, and organization, as well as in its strategy for employing those nuclear weapons. Neither of the two implied forces and in its procurement procedures. But choices—surrender or nuclear war-is a pleas- several major political and bureaucratic fac- ant one. Some analysts believe that the Soviets tors combine with geography to limit NATO’s might overrun NATO so quickly that NATO would not have time to decide to use its thea- likely options. First, economic and political ter nuclear weapons. Only strategic nuclear realities make it doubtful that the number of NATO army divisions and air force wings will weapons would be left. be increased substantially. Early in its history, With the strong backing of the United States, NATO decided to rely on both conventional General Rogers has been pushing for a third and nuclear weapons because it could not af- alternative, to improve NATO’s conventional ford a completely conventional defense. Sec- defenses so that the credibility of NATO’s de- ond, NATO is a defensive alliance, and will not

Photo credi( NATO NATO members signing the Paris Agreement in 1954.

15 16 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack adopt publicly a strategy that calls for send- sis on directly attacking the ground forces ing its ground forces deep into Warsaw Pact themselves, in addition to facilities such as air territory, even though that might give it a bet- bases that would support them: NATO has alter chance of victory and of keeping conflict ways had plans for interdiction missions into off NATO soil. Tactical counterattacks, how- enemy territory. Third-and perhaps most rele- ever, would not be precluded, and opinions dif- vant to the issues before Congress-is the rec- fer on how deep those might be. Third, NATO ognition that achieving a significant capabil- cannot plan to fall back deep into Germany ity to attack follow-on forces depends strongly in the face of an attack, trading space for time. on exploiting new technologies. In theory, Losing large parts of Germany would be cata- FOFA provides an opportunity to exploit tech- strophic for the Alliance, and planning to do nology to offset a fundamental East-West so would be unacceptable to German public asymmetry. opinion. These factors force NATO into a The Warsaw Pact not only enjoys significant defensive posture close to West Germany’s numerical superiority over NATO in the Cen- border with East Germany and Czechoslova- tral Region, it also has the advantage of con- kia, which, combined with a “share the bur- ducting a strategically mobile offense while den” political policy that gives each member NATO’s ground forces have much less free- nation in the Central Region a section of the dom to maneuver in response. The Warsaw border to defend, sharply restricts freedom for Pact, following Soviet doctrine and leadership, major force movements along the front to organizes its divisions into armies, which are counter Warsaw Pact force movements. organized into army groups (called fronts by Within these constraints, NATO has decided the Soviets), all under the command of a thea- both to improve the conventional forces it has ter commander.’ NATO expects that these in place, and to adopt the FOFA concept. These forces would be used not uniformly across the initiatives cannot overcome NATO’s fundamen- entire border, but to conduct rapid, deep, tal problems, but are designed to make better powerful thrusts into selected sectors of use of what Alliance members have procured NATO’s defensive line. These would be aimed and are procuring. at getting into NATO’s rear area, disrupting NATO’s ability to command and control its In simple terms, FOFA means using longer forces, capturing or destroying NATO’s thea- —airplanes, enhanced artillery, range weapons ter nuclear forces, and cutting off NATO’s in- rocket launchers, and guided missiles-to at- dividual army corps from each other and from tack enemy ground forces that have not yet their support. These thrusts are likely to be come close enough to NATO’s defending ground directed at NATO’s weakest corps sectors. The forces to engage them in direct combat. The strongest—especially the U.S. corps—are likely purpose of attacking follow-on forces is to im- to see only holding actions, designed to pre- pede the ability of the Warsaw Pact commanders vent them from redeploying to aid in defend- to bring their ground forces into the battle when ing against the main attacks. Of course, NATO they want to and at full strength. While it has cannot know in advance how the offensive application to operations in all parts of Eur- would be conducted; surprise is a basic tenet ope, the primary focus of attention is on the of Soviet doctrine. This offensive would be pre- Central Region. ceded and accompanied by massive air and mis- Three major factors came together to produce the FOFA concept and make it a major ‘Organizationally, Warsaw Pact armies are roughly equiva- part of NATO’s defensive strategy. First is a lent to NATO corps, Pact fronts are roughly equivalent to NATO recognition that successfully attacking the Army Groups, and the commander of the theater of military follow-on forces could have a profound effect operations (TVD) is roughly equivalent to NATO’s Central Re- gion commander. However, at each level there are major differ- on the ability of the Warsaw Pact to execute ences between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, for example in man- its offensive strategy. Second is a new empha- power and firepower. Ch. 2—Summary . 17 sile attacks against NATO’s air bases and Because of evolving flexibility in the way the other fixed facilities, and by small attacks by Soviets would use their forces, NATO cannot special forces deep within NATO territory. expect a “set piece” of equal waves attacking each division, or a uniform attack across the NATO expects that a Warsaw Pact offen- Region. It can rely on two fundamental aspects sive would be conducted with succeeding waves, of a Pact offensive: that all the forces will not or echelons, of ground forces. Once thought attack at once; and that the Pact has much to be rigidly structured, this offensive is now greater freedom to maneuver their forces to believed likely to display a good deal of flexi- attack heavily on selected parts of the front bility at several levels of organization. The than NATO has to maneuver in response. fronts conducting the initial attacks would be FOFA seeks to oppose both of these: imped- divided into first echelon armies that would ing the movement forward of follow-on forces, begin the attack, as well as operational ma- 2 reducing the forces that NATO’s defenders neuver groups (OMGS) that would exploit it have to face and helping improve NATO’s abil- and second echelon armies that would continue ity to recover from one battle before facing it. The division among these elements is not another; and moving firepower rapidly across rigidly set. It could vary among fronts and be the front to compensate for difficulties in mov- altered as the front goes into battle. Each army ing ground forces across the front. would be divided into first echelon divisions to spearhead the attack, second echelon divi- Some believe that simply directing firepower sions, and mobile groups. And within each di- against forces moving up, or against main So- vision there could be first and second echelon viet efforts, will not be effective: there are so regiments. After the first fronts have done many targets that not enough would be killed their jobs, the theater commander would have to make a difference. In this view, it will be second fronts available to follow them. By necessary to find that small part of the force NATO’s definition, all those forces moving up that is the focus of the attack and destroy it, behind the forces that are directly engaging thus causing the entire effort to fail. Doing this NATO’s defenders are follow-on forces. requires an ability to monitor and accurately assess Warsaw Pact force movements. NATO lacks a similar layered structure, although there is some ability for reinforcement. FOFA was a matter of some controversy Defending NATO divisions would defend against when first proposed, and some still argue that one attack, only to be faced with another at- it is not sound policy. Some Europeans, per- tack by fresh forces, and then another, and so haps confusing FOFA with the U.S. Army’s on. So, for example, a single U.S. (or German, AirLand Battle concept, have seen it as offen- or Belgian) division might defend against two sive and inconsistent with NATO’s defensive (or one, or three, or more) first echelon divi- posture. Others argue that it is more efficient sions of the first echelon army, and—depleted to wait until targets are close before attack- from that battle—be attacked by a fresh sec- ing them, that attacking deep diverts resources ond echelon division of that same army, and from the close battle while providing little pay- then by a force from the first echelon of the off. Still others believe that the follow-on forces second echelon army, etc. If the Soviet plan will not be very important to the Soviet offen- went forward unimpeded, there would be no sive, that most of the combat capability will time for the U.S. force to recover between as- be in the initial attack. Finally, there are sev- saults on it: each attack would find it weaker eral groups who argue that while the idea may than the preceding one did. Alternatively, while be sound in principle, it will be very costly and occupied by an attack by the first wave, it extremely difficult—if not impossible—to im- might be bypassed by follow-on forces seek- plement. ing to reach deeper objectives. The FOFA concept is still under develop- ‘Also called Mobile Groups. ment, and is seen somewhat differently by the 18 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Figure 2-1 .—Warsaw Pact Offensive

Czechoslovakia

● f Munich \ Austria

SuuHut AaapIea worn Jonn b r-rlnes, bowel r-rorr( uperallons In turope—~lannlng ror knclrclemenl, a paper presented at a conference sponsored I the Alumn( Association of the Norwegian National Defense College Study Committee, Apr 25-26, 1985 Ch. 2—Summary ● 19

NATO’s Integrated Military Command NATO members

France Spain Iceland NATO’s Integrated Military Denmark I Command I Greece

Italy I v 1 + Allied Allied Allied Norway Command Command Command Atlantic Europe Channel Portugal A Turkey I I I I Allied Belgium ACE Forces Mobile Canada Southern Force Europe Germany Luxembourg Netherlands United Kingdom United States

principal players: SHAPE (Supreme Head- in place; and 3) the Central Region commander, quarters Allied Powers Europe, the headquar- who would like to make the second strategic ters for NATO’s Allied Command Europe); the echelon (second fronts) irrelevant to the war. U.S. Army; the U.S. Air Force; and the defense forces of our Allies. SHAPE’s perspective is The U.S. Army sees FOFA as the “deep bat- all of Europe including the entire Central Re- tle” part of its operations, as a means for gion, and it defines FOFA as delaying, disrupt- “metering” the flow of enemy forces; its con- ing, and destroying follow-on forces from just centration is almost entirely on those sectors beyond the troops in contact to as far in the in which U.S. Army forces would be defend- enemy rear as NATO systems can reach. ing. As the Army sees it, striking deep not only SHAPE considers FOFA from the point of reduces the threat to the defending ground view of: 1) the corps commander, who wants forces, but also improves the effectiveness of to control the forces about to move in against the ground forces in handling the threat. Be- his troops; 2) the Army Group commander, cause their primary concern is the progress of who wants to delay the second operational the close battle, focused at the individual corps echelon (second echelon armies) until his corps and subordinate division commanders’ levels, have dealt with the first and his reserves are the Army’s approach puts great emphasis on 20 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Figure 2-2.— NATO’S “Layer Cake” Defense

North Sea

East Germany

l--

A /

SOURCE. Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1987 Ch. 2—Summary ● 21 —

Figure 2-3.— FOFA Reduces Advancing Forces

SOURCE SHAPE

FOFA Provides Cross Corps Support

xxx I

xxx

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 1987 22 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack identifying and attacking those units-individ- In particular: ual battalions, regiments, and possibly entire 1. how much flexibility Soviet ground forces divisions-that pose the most pressing threat commanders have at various levels of to its ground forces in the immediate future. organization to change the direction of at- The U.S. Air Force, which sees FOFA as fall- tack, to compensate for unanticipated sit- ing under its existing interdiction mission, uations, and to allocate their forces among views it primarily from the Army Group/ATAF first echelon, second echelon, and mobile (Allied Tactical Air Force) level, the command groups; level above corps. While individual regiments 2. how sensitive the Soviet offensive plan and even battalions might be targeted at the would be to delays and to destruction of request of corps commanders, the Air Force some of its forces; is more likely to think in terms of attacks on 3. how robust and resistant to disruption the whole divisions or their component regiments, Warsaw Pact command and control sys- possibly before they become an immediate tem is; threat to a corps sector. Attacking these larger 4. how important the follow-on forces are to targets while they are farther out makes it eas- Soviet strategy; and ier to preplan takeoff times and attack routes— 5. how much they could move their forces necessary to keep attrition down-and permits forward prior to hostilities. giving greater latitude to pilots to choose among Mobilization is an important factor in a war specific target vehicles within the larger array. in the Central Region. It is thought unlikely The Air Force is also interested in the concept that the Soviets would attack without any of striking very deep to cause long delays in mobilization: not enough of their forces would the arrival of the second fronts. be ready and in place. However, some analysts believe that by increasing the numbers, qual- Is FOFA Appropriate to the Threat? ity, and readiness of their forces in Eastern Europe, and by reforming their command We can never know exactly what the Soviets structure, the Soviets may be developing a ca- would do if they went to war against NATO. pability to do just that. NATO military plan- Analysts working from similar sources have ners are acutely aware that NATO would need disagreed over whether the Soviets would several days of mobilization before it could ef- launch a conventional offensive, and whether fectively resist a massive attack, in addition follow-on forces would play a significant role to whatever time would be needed to recognize in that offensive. There is currently general a Pact mobilization and decide to respond. (but not unanimous) agreement that the Hence, NATO planners are very concerned Soviets are at least preserving the option for about a Pact attack preceded by a short or con- a conventional offensive, and most observers cealed mobilization. argue that they would want to begin with a conventional offensive and keep it conven- A NATO ability to attack follow-on forces tional as long as possible. Most observers also would pose a dilemma for the Soviets: short agree that while the Soviets are developing con- mobilizations mean more Soviet forces would siderable operational flexibility in their use of have to move forward during hostilities when ground forces and have considerable latitude NATO could shoot at them, and less opportu- to beef up the first echelons at the expense of nity to ‘front load’ the offensive; long mobili- the second echelons, there will be significant zations would risk giving NATO sufficient follow-on forces at all levels. warning to also mobilize. This is part of the appeal of the concept (discussed below) of using There is currently a great deal of uncertainty B-52 bombers carrying cruise missiles to put —and a great deal of controversy—concerning the rail lines in Eastern Europe at risk. Sec- a number of factors of importance to FOFA. ond echelon fronts—and possibly elements of Ch. 2—Summary . 23

... ,,~, ...... ~ .. '''' ... ~I.l·

Photo credit U S Department of Defense

Elements of Soviet army forces.

71-.)0) I) - i",7 - :. 24 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack —. — — the first fronts—would have to come forward dropped their efforts to get NATO to assign across Eastern Europe by rail to reach the bat- priorities among the key mission concepts. It tle. After leaving the rails, they would be trans- is difficult for the Germans to accept anything ported on roads in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and that might appear to reemphasize forward de- East Germany, and finally move under their fense, which is a cornerstone of German pub- own power to join the battle. lic acceptance of NATO. And German membership is itself a basis of the Alliance. It is widely believed that Warsaw Pact and NATO forces would be intermingled to consid- The British, Germans, Dutch, and Belgians erable depth. There would be Pact penetrations —as well as the French, who are not part of into NATO territory and NATO penetrations Allied Command Europe–have accepted the into Pact territory—much like interlocking value of attacks out to the range of the Multi- fingers. Some analysts believe that it there- ple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and are fore would be extremely difficult to pick out planning to procure MLRS as well as enhanced and attack the follow-on forces. artillery and targeting systems. However, for some this procurement is at least ten years in the future. How Do Our NATO Allies View FOFA? The Germans and British accept, in princi- Our European Allies generally have been ple, the value of striking deeper with army sys- slower to accept FOFA than the United States tems, but have not yet decided whether it can has. Up through early 1986 there appeared to be made practical and cost-effective. The Dutch be little enthusiasm: conservative defense- and Belgians think that their defense estab- minded governments were cautiously in favor; lishments are too small to support the neces- opposition Socialist parties were generally op- sary complex packages of systems. All the air posed. Underlying some European reactions forces are interested in upgrading their inter- have been long-standing transatlantic tensions diction capabilities, but here again the smaller on the degree to which NATO should rely on forces are limited in the variety of systems they conventional forces, sharing of defense costs, can support. Within the Conference of NATO and trade in defense equipment. This was height- Armament Directors, a FOFA baseline listing ened by a perception, especially among the Ger- the basic capabilities needed for FOFA and mans, that FOFA would draw resources from specifying a near term interest in ranges out the close battle—their primary concern—and to 150 kilometers has been approved. Work is yield little in return. The situation was aggra- now underway to produce an agreed list of can- vated because FOFA came in the midst of sev- didate systems to meet these basic needs. eral other (primarily United States, or at least Availability of funding will limit what all the viewed as such) initiatives that seemed to ar- nations can do (the United States included). rive at a faster pace than the Europeans could This is particularly a problem for the British, respond, and because of calls for still greater whose defense budget is expected to decline spending increases to implement FOFA. in real terms (with significant declines in spend- There is mounting evidence that the Allies ing for conventional defense in order to fund are moving toward greater understanding and Trident), and for the Belgians, who are more acceptance of the FOFA concept, and are be- likely to apply whatever money is available pri- coming more enthusiastic for developing and marily to improving their ability to fight the procuring systems that could support FOFA. close battle. To the Germans, whose thinking strongly The focus of attention appears to have shifted influences other Central Region nations, FOFA from the conceptual to the more concrete arena is of lower priority than fighting the close bat- of arms production and cooperation. It seems tle or air defense, a sentiment echoed by some clear that the Europeans are unlikely to be en- other nations. However, they have apparently thusiastic about FOFA if FOFA means buying Ch. 2—Summary ● 25

Photo credlf NATO Ministerial meeting of North Atlantic Council. predominantly American technology. There is that are most in consonance with what they also evidence that they are becoming interested have already been planning. In this they are in producing and selling systems that could sup- not alone-the U.S. approach to FOFA also port FOFA. On the other hand, while it may be includes only systems that were underway be- difficult to separate real concerns from rheto- fore the term “FOFA” was invented. However, ric, it may be unwise to dismiss all previous Euro- the U.S. approach is focused at longer ranges pean concerns as a rhetorical smokescreen for than the European, and one source of friction economic considerations. U.S. efforts to develop appears to be the reluctance of our Allies to greater Alliance cohesion and cooperation on jump to an approach centered on our products. the development of FOFA systems have cen- In particular, the Europeans are interested tered on the Department of Defense (DoD) De- in shorter ranges—out to roughly 30 kilometers fense Science Board FOFA II Task Force, and —where enhanced artillery and MLRS (which the 1985 Nunn Amendment initiative. Both have apparently achieved some initial success several are now buying) could be applied, and in air interdiction. The Europeans appear most in arousing European governmental and indus- interested in FOFA enhancements to systems trial interest, but it is too early to tell whether in which they have already made large national there will be significant concrete results. investments, such as the Tornado aircraft, and Nonetheless, some major elements are dis- continuing parallel development of sensor sys- cernible. The Europeans are most interested tems–e.g., Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV), in those approaches to implementing FOFA the United Kingdom’s Airborne Stand-Off Ra- 26 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack dar (ASTOR), and the French Observatoire Ra- co-production— through which such deals can dar Coherent Heliporte d’Investigation Des be arranged. All will have to be harmonized, Elements Ennemis (ORCHIDEE)–that may and the final products gotten through their duplicate U.S. efforts. U.S./European cooper- respective national governments. ative efforts may thus focus largely on ensur- Both the British Labour Party and the Ger- ing some degree of interoperability among com- man Social Democratic Party appear to be deep- peting systems. The Germans are developing ly opposed to FOFA (and to a number of other attack drones for use against armor and air basic NATO ideas). Labour stands a reason- defenses, and advanced anti-armor weapons able chance of coming to power. If this hap- to be carried on combat aircraft. There appears pens, NATO will face a very different situa- to be little European enthusiasm for longer tion, because both Britain and Germany are range attack missiles, like ATACMS. Indeed, not only major players, but have a strong in- political problems—centering on public percep- fluence on how the smaller countries react. tions of such missiles as being “offensive,” on Even out of power, both these parties are im- arms control considerations, and on notions portant political forces in Europe. that they are destabilizing because the Soviets might think they carry nuclear warheads and respond with nuclear weapons—surround the deployment of such missiles in Europe, and How Might the Soviets Respond might cause problems as the United States to FOFA? seeks to deploy them. The Soviets are likely to regard FOFA both There is a growing recognition within Europe as worrisome and as presenting an opportu- —including France-that cooperative programs nity to stimulate and exploit a controversy are the key to obtaining costly modern capa- within NATO. Their reactions to it have taken, bilities. But the Europeans have several con- and most likely will continue to take, two cerns about cooperative programs. There is lit- forms: political exploitation of a new contro- tle sentiment for buying goods produced in the versy within NATO; and adjustment of their United States, and a growing reluctance sim- operations to take account of it. ply to co-produce U.S. developments, because Their propaganda has played on many of the that stunts the growth of European technol- concerns voiced in Europe, in particular: that ogy. They prefer co-development programs FOFA is an offensive doctrine that threatens that draw on and nurture the technological the East; that FOFA would be destabilizing strengths of all parties. Many see in U.S. pol- because missiles carrying conventional war- icy several impediments to cooperative pro- heads could not be distinguished upon launch grams: “buy American” sentiments; an in- from nuclear missiles; and that it would lower ability to commit to a several year project; the nuclear threshold through the use of con- “black” programs that they cannot have ac- ventional weapons of high destructive poten- cess to; restrictions on transferring technol- tial. The Soviets have taken the position that ogy to our allies; and restrictions on sales of FOFA is yet another manifestation of aggres- resulting products to third parties. sive U.S. behavior and intentions, and has con- Based on past experience with cooperative trasted that to the peace-loving image they arms production, the process of developing and paint of themselves. They have drawn a picture procuring the many systems required for FOFA of the United States developing an aggressive is likely to be quite time-consuming. There are stance with new weapons having the destruc- several fora—formal and informal groupings tive potential of “weapons of mass destruc- of European states, bilateral and multilateral tion” (i.e., nuclear weapons). They will try to arrangements including the United States, use it to drive a wedge between the United industry-to-industry cooperative programs, States and Europe, and to stir up the Euro- and attempts to sell existing systems or their pean left. Ch. 2—Summary ● 27

Although these concerns may not be taken ‘‘front-loading’ their offensive), or increasing very seriously among defense professionals in the combat capability of their leading units, Europe, they do have some support within the or both. However, geography and a desire to major opposition parties in Germany and Brit- limit the vulnerability of massed forces to a ain. Furthermore, these and similar arguments nuclear strike will reduce their opportunities can be exploited by the Soviets to influence for front-loading. They can also be expected public opinion, and perhaps elections, in the to take active and passive countermeasures democratic European states. The threat to against the weapons and other systems used NATO is both political and military. The Soviets by NATO to find and attack their follow-on would probably prefer to split NATO and sep- forces. Each of these steps can be taken only arate the United States from Europe by polit- at some cost. ical means if they could do so, rather than risk The Soviets appear to have deep concerns war. about the rapid reaction capability of NATO’s On the military level, they are concerned new strike systems. In the abstract, such sys- both about the concept itself, and about the tems could counter their plans faster than they individual systems being designed to support could modify their plans in response, and steal it. In the first instance, they have added FOFA the initiative from them. They will probably into their ongoing reevaluations of their strat- take measures to speed their planning cycles egy and operational art. Their reaction may or protect them from FOFA weapons. They ultimately take the form of deemphasizing the are also developing similar systems and the second echelon at all levels (and otherwise theory of their use on the modern battlefield.

IMPLEMENTING FOFA Initially, a great number of different FOFA What and Where to Attack concepts were under discussion. But over the Of the three general types of targets-groups past few years, several important study efforts of vehicles, individual high-value units that, have helped to narrow the range of possibil- while mobile, tend to spend most of their time ities by taking into account both operational moving, and fixed chokepoint targets-the considerations and technological realities. At- fixed targets are the easiest to target, requir- tacks could be conducted either by ground- ing at most some indication that the time is launched missiles or interdiction aircraft right to hit them, in addition to information against a variety of targets at many different that can be gathered in peacetime. The high- ranges from the FLOT. The targets could be value targets are inherently difficult because combat units, selected high-value elements of their presence can be obscured. When NATO the combat units (e.g., command posts or sur- deploys rapidly responding reconnaissance and face-to-surface missile launchers), or the sup- targeting systems that can find moving vehi- plies for those units. Moreover, attacks could cles (as well as the weapons to engage them) be launched to create chokepoints—for exam- these targets will probably become easier to ple, by dropping a bridge or sowing a mine field locate and destroy than the high-value targets. along a route of advance-just as a unit would Until then, there is likely to be more interest, be about to move through. Attacking the com- as a practical matter, in the high-value targets. bat units might delay, disrupt, or destroy them; attacking their command posts could disrupt Quantitative analyses have tended to favor their ability to contribute to the offensive, and attack of moving combat units either in tran- creating chokepoints would delay their advance, sit from division assembly areas (roughly 50 28 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack — — to 150 kilometers from the FLOT) to final assembly areas (out to perhaps 50 kilometers from the FLOT), or in their move out of final assembly areas to join the battle. Although opportunities to attack stopped units should not be ignored if they present themselves, attacking moving units provides a better basis for planning; stopped units are more likely to have taken measures to hide from both detection and attack.3 The concept is to attack battalions or entire regiments, destroying so much of their combat capability that they can no longer be usefully committed to the assault as scheduled. In attacking these units, emphasis could be put on killing tanks, the other armored vehicles, or the soft-skinned vehicles such as trucks. Destroying tanks is particularly difficult; their heavy armor is designed to protect against most munitions. Fewer than half the armored combat vehicles, however, are tanks. The others —armored fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, surface-to-air missile launchers, and surface-to-surface missile launchers, as well as armored engineering equipment needed by the combat vehicles-are easier to put out of action and are also important to the combined arms offensive. Fewer than one-third of the vehicles in a Soviet division are armored, but the closer the division gets to the battle, the more of its soft-skinned vehicles it leaves Close to the battle, combat vehicles would out- behind. number supply trucks, making each supply truck a more valuable target. The supplies for these forces would be almost as hard to find as the forces themselves, but High-value targets such as command posts, easier to kill. However, analyses differ on the missile launchers, and resupply points are value of attacking supplies. Although supplies worth attacking when they can be located. No are vital, the Soviets may have much more means of routinely locating and engaging them than they absolutely need. Some conclude that has as yet been identified, but the fact that forces going into battle carry enough on board they tend to stay put for many hours increases to do without resupply for a while. On the other the likelihood that clues from a number of hand, some analysts conclude that these are sources can be pieced together successfully. potentially valuable targets, especially supply If found, they could be killed with today’s units that are part of combat units (i.e., “or- weapons; they are much fewer in number than ganic supply”). In order to continue an attack the combat vehicles. The Army believes that or move forward and exploit it, a combat unit attacking these targets could seriously disrupt would need at least minimal critical supplies. the offensive. In the near term—until systems for locating moving units and weapons for at- 3The U.S. ASARS-II system now in Europe can detect stopped tacking masses of armored vehicles become vehicles. available-attacks would probably be limited Ch. 2—Summary ● 29

Phc)fc~ credlf U S Deparimenf of Defense

Less well-protected Soviet vehicles outnumber the tanks. to such high-value targets and to creating the targets, the more effective the attacks are chokepoints to cause delay. likely to be, and the more direct their effect Causing delays can be very useful if the de- on the close battle. However, waiting for the lays are sufficiently long; however, studies in- enemy to get very close risks not being able dicate that most attacks would be incapable to fire enough rounds in the time he is exposed of causing significantly long delays. In many to attack. Furthermore, this is not necessarily cases, there may be enough “slop” in the an argument in favor of short-range systems, Soviets’ schedule to compensate. Two prom- because longer range systems have greater flexibility to redirect fire across the front. ising exceptions are: deep strikes against the rail lines in Eastern Europe, where delays meas- ured in weeks may be possible; and strikes very close to the FLOT, where delays of just a few Obtaining the Capability hours may be very significant. Some analysts The Systems: What’s in the Inventory, believe that it is very important to delay the What’s Being Bought, What’s Under second operational echelon to allow NATO’s Development reserves to get into place, and to delay the second strategic echelon until NATO has success- Supporters of the FOFA concept believe that some or all of these approaches can be made fully dealt with the first. to work, if all the necessary pieces can be pro- In general, the closer to the FLOT the at- cured. They differ as to which would be the tacks take place, the more systems can reach most useful and the most feasible. 30 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Implementing any of these approaches will MLRS batteries. Aquila could see targets require a package of systems, the major com- masked from Joint STARS by terrain and veg- ponents of which are: etation and could identify individual vehicles. It has also been a controversial program. Sev- 1. reconnaissance, surveillance, and target eral other RPVs are under development both acquisition (RSTA); here and in Europe. The Europeans generally 2. data analysis and handling (data fusion); favor RPV systems, have many in the field, 3. attack platform; and are developing upgrades and new systems, 4. munitions; and particularly the CL289. The British are devel- 5. systems to protect the airborne RSTA as- oping abroad area surveillance system—called sets and to help the attack aircraft pene- ASTOR–and the French are developing a heli- trate to their targets. borne MTI system called ORCHIDEE. All of these will have to work and be available The Precision Location Strike System (PLSS) in sufficient quantity if the concept is to be has also been controversial and the program viable. was recently scaled back by DoD and Con- This is illustrated in table 2-1, which sug- gress. PLSS would have been used to locate gests packages of systems to support specific radars of air defenses threatening NATO in- operational concepts. None of these concepts terdiction aircraft and RSTA platforms such could be fully implemented today, because sys- as Joint STARS. tems are not yet deployed. Furthermore, a great many more systems than are shown here— Data Analysis and Handling both existing and developmental-might be NATO’s ability to attack moving targets is brought to bear. Table 2-2 shows what the U.S. also limited by data-handling systems that con- Army and Air Force are currently buying and sume long periods of time getting information developing. NATO favors an evolutionary ap- from RSTA systems to analysts and to attack proach to FOFA, i.e., implementing a limited systems. This problem has been compounded capability while more effective systems mature. because modern collection systems can collect large amounts of data. The Joint Tactical Fu- Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target sion program, as well as other efforts, are work- Acquisition (RSTA) Systems ing on using modern computers to streamline Currently the Services have in Europe a this process. Systems like Joint STARS will number of different systems that can detect be able to send data both to assessment centers and locate fixed targets and targets that move to plan attacks, and directly to attack systems infrequently. Most of these systems are based such as MLRS batteries. on aircraft, and locate their targets by imagery or by detecting electronic emissions. They lack Attack Platforms an ability to look over broad areas for long Currently NATO has a variety of tactical periods of time to find moving units and rap- aircraft-including U.S. F-16s, F-4s, and F- idly (i.e., within seconds) report that informa- 111s, British and German Tornados, and sev- tion to users. The Joint Surveillance Target eral other types—conventional artillery, and Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), currently the Lance missile to strike into Warsaw Pact in full-scale development, is designed to do territory. All of these are limited in their abil- that. Although strongly supported by DoD, ity to attack follow-on forces. Of the aircraft, it has been a controversial program in Congress. only the Tornados and F-1 11s can operate at Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) could also night and in bad weather,4 and they will have serve this function, but over a generally much other interdiction tasks as well. smaller area. Whereas one Joint STARS might ‘The others can fly at night, but because they lack systems support several corps at once, one of the Army’s to support effective navigation and weapons employment in the Aquila RPVs might typically support a brigade’s dark, they would not be particularly effective. Ch. 2—Summary . 31

Table 2-1 .—illustrative Packages of Systems To Support Specific Operational Concepts (as yet, not all the pieces exist) — Reconnaissance, surveillance, — —— and target acquisition Attack Reconnaissance, surveillance, ‘– Target acquisition, Operational concept situation assessment attack control Platform Weapon 1, MLRS and artillery attack GUARDRAIL, TRS, ASARS, AQUILA and 8-inch SAD ARM of regimental columns: 5 to Joint STARS, and ASAS AFATDS Artillery 30 km deep and MLRS MLRS/TGW

- 2. Aircraft attack of division GUARDRAIL, TRS, ASARS, Joint STARS F-16 MSOW carrying columns: 30 to 80 km deep Joint STARS, and ENSCE Skeet or TGSM or CEB 3. Ballistic MissiIe attack of GUARDRAIL, TRS, ASARS, Joint STARS and MLRS ATACMS carrying division columns: 30 to 80 Joint STARS, and ASAS AFATDS launcher DPICM or TGSM km deep or Skeet 4. Attack with aircraft:create GUARDRAIL, TRS, ASARS, ASARS and GACC F-15E AGM-130, MSOW chokepoints and then Joint STARS, and ENSCE F-16 carrying various attack the halted vehicles: munitions lnclud- — 80 to 150 km deep ing mines 5. Air-launched cruise missile Various national systems - (on the weapon) B-52 Cruise missile attack of rail network; 350 with various to 800 km deep — — munitions— NOTES 1 Deflnltlons AFATDS—Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System provides target data to artillery and M LRS batter!es AGM1 30—an alrlaunched mlsslle ASARS—Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System provides Images of fixed objects ASAS—a developmental Army center for collecting, analyzlng, and dlssemlnatlng surveillance data ATACMS—Army Tactical Mlssde System a balllstlc m{ss!le to be launched from MLRS launchers AQUILA—a remotely piloted vehicle CEB– Combined Effects Bomblet Slmllar to DPICM, designed to be dispensed by the Combined Effects Munltlon (CEM) DPICM—Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munltlon unguided submun!tlon for use against Ilght armor and soft targets EN SC E–the Alr Force version of ASAS GACC–Ground Attack Control Center a developmental center for controlling alr attacks aga!nst ground targets GUARDRAIL–a tact{cal surveillance system Joint STARS—Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System mov!ng target Indicator and attack control MLRS—Multlple Launch Rocket System MLRS/TGW–Terminally Gu!ded Weapon a smart anti armor submunltlon for MLRS MSOW—Modular Standoff Weapon a weapons dispenser SADARM –Search and Destroy Armor a smart anti.armor submun!t!on for artillery Skeet —a smart anti-armor submunltlon TGSM —Terminally Guided Submu,jltlon a smart anti.armor submunltlon TRS—Tactical Reconnaissance System carries various sensor suites 2 Reconnaissance surveillance, and sltuatlon assessment would be performed by a number of systems–particularly those shown here —feed!ng into the as sessment center Although all need not find the target for the attack to take place, the more there are the greater the chances are that the target WIII be found, recognized and Identlfled wfth suff!clent accuracy to attack (t 3 Not all the submunttlons displayed (n the table are necessarily being developed for deployment on the weapons shown, however, there IS no fundamental reason why they could not be engineered onto those weapons

The Air Force is currently buying the well over 100 kilometers into enemy territory LANTIRN system for the F-16, which will en- with high accuracy, has entered full-scale de- able it to operate effectively at night. They velopment. It will be launched from the MLRS have also begun to procure the F-15E which launcher. The Germans are developing attack is designed for interdiction and carries the drones for killing armor and air defenses. LANTIRN and a terrain-following radar. The F-15E has much greater range than the F-16. Munitions The Army is procuring the Multiple Launch Munitions are another major limitation on Rocket System (MLRS), which has about twice NATO’s ability to attack follow-on forces. Cur- the range of 155mm artillery. The ATACMS rent generation weapons are effective primar- ballistic missile,5 which is designed to reach ily against single, soft targets; the Air Force has weapons (e.g., the GBU-15) that can be ‘Also called “Army TACMS” or just “TACMS.” The Army split this development off from the Joint TACM S, or .JTACM S used to destroy bridges. The Air Force’s Maver- program. ick missile can be used to kill tanks (and other 32 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack —

Table 2-2.—Status and Costs of Selected FOFA-Related Programs

Air Force Programs Through FY 1987 Expected-. — total Statusa Fundsb Units Acquisition d Units System (3/1/87) appropriated procured’ Costb procured c Platforms F-15A/B/C/D/E . proc/FSD $ 35B 925 $ 46B 1,270 F-15E...... proc/FSD 50 390 F-16A/B/C/D proc $ 23B 440 $ 48B 2,740 A-7 upgrade FSD $ 35M N/A $190M N/A ATF : : : : : : DEM/VAL $550M o TBD 750 proto Pods: LANTIRN ...... proc $ 1.86 150 nav $ 4B 700 nav 10 tgt 700 tgt Munitions and direct-attack weapons’ CEM ,,, ,,, ...... proc $ 1.2B 48,000 $ 2.2B 96,000 SFW ...... FSD $ 85M 0 $ 2.3B 14,000 GATOR ...... proc $560M 10,200 $560M 10,200 HVM ...... adv dev $ 34M $ 1.8B missiles . 0 100,000 fire control sys 0 200 HTM ...... FSD 0 $88M RDT&E TBD DAACM ..pre-FSD 0 $340M 2,850 Standoff weapons GBU-15 ...... proc ends — — — — AGB ...... prop TBD TBD TBD TBD HARM ...... ,, .,, ,,. ,,, ...proc $ 1B 4,500 $ 2.1B 7,300 LCS ...... , ...... adv dev $ 33M RDT&E TBD $ 67M RDT&E TBD AGM-65D/G ...... proc $ 1.96 10,000 $ 6B 60,000 AGM-130...... , ,, .,, ...... FSD $110M 40 $ 2.1B 5,600 MSOW ...... RFP/PD o 0 TBD TBD rel 3/87 AMRAAM .FSD/proc $ 1.8B 180 $ 8B 17,000 RSTA Systems: JSTARS E-8A...... FSD $625M 2 $ 3B 10 PLSS e ...... OUE $675M $675M AMS e ...... 3+ 3+ SNS e ...... ,,,.. 6 6 case ...... 1 1 TRS f ., ..., ., .proc $ 1.5B — $ 1.9B TR-1s, ,, ...... 27 27 SS f ...... 14 14 PGS f ...... 1 1 BGS f . ,. 1 2 F-O TRSg .adv dev $ 27M 0 $ 1.6B TBD ESM ...... pre-FSD $ 34M 0 $230M 34 GACC ...... pre-FSD $ 3.5M 0 $ 40M N/A Communications and data fusion systems’ JTFP ...... FSD $ 80M 0 TBD TBD HAVE QUICK., ,,, ,, .. . .. FSD/proc $160M 22,000 $500M 43,000 (I/II/llA) Electronic warfare systems: EF-111A U/Gh ...... FSD $ 90M 0 $265M 38 F-4G WW’ ...... FSD $240M $565M computers 150 150 receiver groups 0 124 Compass Call ...... FSD $325M 16 $520 16 NOTES aadv advanced, DEM demonstration, dep deployment, dev development, FSD full.scale development, OUE operational utlllty evaluation PD Program Direcllve proc procurement, prod production, prop proposed, proto prototype, RFP request for proposals, VAL valldaflon bApproxlmate (n current (’then.year’] dollars cApproxlmate number planned dlncludlng ’05t Of research, development, testing, evaluation, and procurement but not OPeratlOn and maintenance ‘PLSS Precls!on Locatton Str{ke System, AMS Airborne Mtsslon Subsystem, SNS Suite Nawgatlon Subsystem, CPS Central Processing Subsystem 3+ lndlcates three allup AMSS plus apart!al AMS requ!rrng refurbishment fTRS Tactical Reconnaissance System, SS sensor suite, PGS prototype ground station BGS bunkered ground station 9FOTRS Fooowon Tactical Reconnaissance Syslem (ATARS) ‘LUG upgrade IWW Wild Weasel

SOURCE US Alr Force (SAF/LLL January 1987 Ch. 2—Summary ● 33

Table 2.2.—Status and Costs of Selected FOFA-Related Programs—Continued

Army Programs Through FY 1987 Expected total d Status A Funds b Units Acquisition Units System (3/1/87) appropriated procured’ Costb procured’ P/at forms MLRS proc $ 3.1B $ 4.9B Iaunchers 392 681 rockets 1951000 440,000 ATACMS FSD $350M — $ 1.2B TBD Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Systems RPV/TADARS FSD $820M $ 2.2B GCS 5k 53 AV1 12 376 rr IEW UAV ’ dev $ 28M $110M GCS 2 6 AV’ 12 46 JSTARS GSM FSD $240M 3 $730M 95 TRAC adv dev $ 25M TED 1 Improved GUARDRAIL/ Common Sensor proc $300M 28 $ 1.0B 65 &fun/f Ions DPICM 155 mm proc $ 2.0B 4.4M $ 4.3B 9.4M 8-inch proc $620M 640.000 $640M 650,000 155 mm BBr’ FSD $ 56M 35,000 $ 2.2B 1.0M MLRS/TGW adv dev $ 72M — TBD TBD (Incl $310M RDT&E) SADARM adv dev $190M MLRS rounds $ 3.4B 50,000 155mm rounds $910M 70,000 8-inch rounds TBD 6,000 Communication Systems SINCGARS proc $480M $ 4.9B al r 150 14,000 ground 12,000 280,000 ADDS proc $280M $ 2.4B NCS” 4 140 EPLRS [’ 670 22,000 JTIDS 10 580 FIC)T F$ ‘~afi, ac~, anc,e(~ DEM cfemc n strat! m de~ dCrIl CIf men f dev dt?~elopmenf FSD full scale develop rneflt OUE ope-at!onal u tIIIty evaluatmn PD P-oqfdm D!rec tIVP fJr OL ;,, ,,O ,,rernen~ ~,r,,,j ~r ,du, ~1,,~1 ~,,c,L) ~r.,r,,,~ed ~,~!r, ~rr,l~t ~pe RFP request ff,r proposals VAL valldal!(?n [ A [,: .,, $ ,r~ ate - !J rr~rl 1 I t h+= n , oar I dcJl I d-s

[ APFrrJS rrdl~ Cl, q l,kr~,nq r,st ,f rps,-ar, h r!c, , el r ; mpnt tec,l I n r; P, aludi!r,r) and pro{ L rement bu ! n nt operat(on and rmalntenan~ e JGCS G.mJ nc Conl.rJl Stdt J“

~ In, r,,n @ef P v IL FIs Rfim!e G, JL nd To

m LJat ~ Is ‘r,. I n It d I E// L AV ’01 lb w or Ohle, I I ~e I E W U AV Druqram Is u rider de ielo~lment ‘) BB Base Bl~eO sh~li ‘J P4CS Net c , nt, c,l S!dt I,, n ~ E pLRs E n h ~nr Prj P’jsII I,, n 1 c,( at r n Report I n q S, stem See Glossdr, frr t her Ierrns SOURCE U S Army (OSA/LL) January 1987 armored vehicles) one at a time, G but a capa- from a tactical munitions dispenser dropped bility to attack groups of vehicles with a sin- from an airplane. The CEB is effective against gle shot and to defeat masses of armor is gen- trucks and most armored combat vehicles ex- erally lacking. Currently, the Air Force is cept tanks. The Army is buying a similar mu- buying the Combined Effects Munition (CEM), nition, called Dual Purpose Combined Effects which dispenses about 200 bomblets (CEBs) Munition (DPICM) for the MLRS. Although the DPICM could conceivably go in the ATACMS, 61, A NT I RN will support shooting two Mavericks per pass, current plans call for initial ATACMS to carry but the pilot must find a target for each Maverick he launches the anti-personnel-anti-material (APAM) mu- and line it up with the crosshairs on his cockpit display while flying his airplane. Many observers believe that multiple passes nition which has essentially no capability against per launch are more likely than multiple launches per pass. armor. The German Tornado carries the MW- 34 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

1 dispenser that drops the KB-44 anti-armor Assembling the Pieces: submunition as well as several other submu- “Packages” of Systems nitions. The five general packages of systems listed These munitions, although capable of hitting below are now under serious consideration. All several targets per weapon launch (or an area are evolutionary in the sense that it is envi- target, or one whose location is imprecisely sioned that capabilities will expand as new de- known), are all unguided, and hence most will velopments come online. With the possible ex- fall on empty ground. Moreover, they have lit- ception of the last, all can be implemented with tle effectiveness against tanks. The next gen- limited capability before all the pieces of the eration of munitions, currently in development, package are available: will have both greater effectiveness against tanks and seekers to guide them to their tar- 1. package based on MLRS and artillery, gets. These include sensor-fuzed weapons, such 2. package based on the ATACMS ballistic as the Army’s SADARM and the Air Force’s missile, Skeet, that fire a self-forging slug at a target, 3. package based on F-16, and the Army’s Terminally Guided Submuni- 4. package based on F-15E, and tion (TGSM, also called terminally guided 5. package based on B-52s carrying cruise weapon, or TGW) that guides directly to a tar- missiles for deep strike. get and detonates a shaped charge warhead. Technical issues still surround these programs, MLRS and Artillery but these munitions are needed if attacking The Army is currently procuring the Multi- tank columns is to become a reality. The Ger- ple-Launch Rocket System.7 This, combined mans are developing a new, improved, anti- with existing artillery, will provide some ca- armor submunition and a smart launcher for pability to engage follow-on forces during their it to be carried by an airplane. movement from final assembly areas to the 8 Whether or not scatterable mines can pro- battle (see table 2-3). The DPICM submuni- vide an effective means of creating chokepoints tions being procured for these rockets will have (or exploiting natural chokepoints, or augment- some capability against light armored vehicles ing the effects of dropping bridges) is a mat- as well as against high-value targets like com- ter of some controversy. Advocates believe a mand posts, but very little against tanks. Anti- scatterable mine system could provide great armor capability will improve with the deploy- 9 payoff for a small investment. Both Services ment of the MLRS/TGW submunition and the have inventories of anti-vehicular and anti-per- SADARM for the artillery, both of which could sonnel mines, and programs to develop smart be in production in the early 1990s. The Army mines that can sense targets at a distance and plans to procure 350 MLRS launchers. fire munitions (e.g., Skeets) at them. But mine Important improvements in the ability to programs tend to have low priority in both attack moving targets would be obtained from services. either Joint STARS or an RPV system that In defense procurements, munitions have could target directly for an MLRS battery. tended to get low priority. The munitions are just as important to FOFA as any of the other system components. If the concept is to work, the ‘Several of our Allies also have plans to acquire MLRS. proper munitions will have to be bought and ‘Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition. 9MLRS/ Terminally Guided Warhead, a smart anti-armor sub- bought in sufficient quantities to do the job. munition. Ch. 2—Summary ● 35 —

Table 2-3.—Packages Based on MLRS and Artillery

Targets . . . ., Stopped Fixed Moving units .- high value chokepoints Trucks ACV Tanks Platform ...... MLRS (P) MLRS (P) MLRS (P) MLRS (P) MLRS (P) Joint STARS (F) or RSTA ...... current current RPV (F, D, N) Munition ...... DPICM (P) mines (various DPICM (P) DPICM (P) TGW (D) stages) KEY I In Inventory P - In production F = In full scale engineering development N - Not yet In formal development AC RON ‘fMS MLRS—multlple launch rocket system DPICM—dual purpose Improved conventional munltlon Joint STARS —Jofnt Surveillance Target Attack Radar System RPV–remotely piloted vehicle TGW—terminally guided weapon ACV—armored combat veh!cle

This concept has the advantage of being con- The initial ATACMS will be procured with sistent with the preferences of our Allies, sev- APAM submunitions which are not effective eral of whom have plans to buy MLRS. And—if against armored vehicles. Without a system deployed across the Central Region-would like Joint STARS, it would be limited to at- provide a consistent capability across the re- tacking soft high-value targets that don’t move gion. The range of the MLRS limits its use in very often, such as command posts, missile supporting other corps, and therefore the abil- launchers, communications links, and logistics it y to concentrate firepower across the region. links-when they could be adequately located. Joint STARS would support the attack of mov- ATACMS Ballistic Missile ing supply trucks, and-with the addition of 12 Adding the ATACMS missile would give a anti-armor submunitions like TGW —moving U.S. corps the ability to attack divisions mov- armored columns. These targets also might be ing from division assembly areas to final as- located with RPVs or some combination of sembly areas, helping to alleviate some of the other systems. Attacking moving columns short reaction problems in the previous ap- would also require systems to analyze and dis- proach. It would also provide some capability seminate data quickly. Attacking small groups to support neighboring corps and to concen- of moving vehicles or a specific group of vehi- trate fire on massing forces. DoD’s efforts to cles within a larger column at 100 kilometers interest the Allies in ATACMS have thus far beyond the FLOT would require a cue that the been unsuccessful,10 but solely United States target had arrived at the intended aimpoint deployments could be of some value across just prior to missile launch. However, if the nearly the entire Central Region.11 object is to attack any vehicles within a large column, less timely information would suffice. .—. . .—. ‘This may be changing. I%nentations to the NATO Army Some observers consider the ATACMS to Armaments Group Panel on Surface-to-Surface Artillery in No- be too closely linked to the RSTA system and vember 1986 generated interest on the part of Germany, Italy, lacking in flexibility. They claim that break- and the Netherhnd~., but had not yet resulted in changes in official positions. ing the link of rapid target observation, loca- 11 ATACMS deployed in U.S. V corps could reach as far north tion transmission, and launch would render the as the British I corps sector. ATACMS deployed with U.S. III system nearly useless against mobile targets. corps, if I I I corps is deployed into NORTHAG, can extend that coverage to the border of the Central Region. However, 11 I corps would be in reserve and would not likely be deployed at the beginning of the war. Izor I RTGSM, or SADARM, or DPICM, etc. 36 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack — —

Photo credit LTV Aerospace & Defense Co ATACMS missile, launched from MLRS launcher.

Others believe that these concerns are over- As arms control proposals get shuffled in the blown, and that even without Joint STARS and wake of Reykjavik, some may cause problems advanced anti-armor submunitions, ATACMS for the ATACMS; at one time the German Gov- would be very important. ernment was reported to have asked the United States to seek to include limits on ballistic mis- Although the ATACMS missile makes good siles with ranges exceeding 100 kilometers in military sense, there may be political problems the intermediate range arms control negotia- associated with deploying it. Some Europeans tions with the Soviets. If the United States have voiced concerns that ballistic missiles is to preserve the option to deploy ATACMS, launched into Warsaw Pact territory will be negotiators will have to see to it that ATACMS misinterpreted, leading to a nuclear response; is excluded from negotiated limits, either by others fear that it will strengthen the U.S. limiting only missiles with longer ranges, or corps so much that the offensive will be chan- by some means of differentiating nuclear from neled against weaker sectors. We do not know conventional ballistic missiles. This would be- how serious or enduring these concerns are. come difficult if ATACMS were to be made The Soviets can be expected to play on at least capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. the first of these. On the other hand, if the ATACMS works and is deployed, the Euro- Compared to the next two concepts, which peans may want it in their forces. rely on tactical airpower, the MLRS and Ch. 2—Summary ● 37

Table 2-4.— Packages Based on ATACMS

Stopped Fixed Moving units high value chokepoints Trucks ACV Tanks Platform . ‘,-. . ATACMS (F) ATACMS (F) ATACMS (F)— . ATACMS (F) ATACMS (F) Joint STARS (F) or RSTA ., ...... current current RPV (N, D, F)

Munition ...... ,APAM (1) mines APAM (1) [TGW (D)] [TGW (D)] DPICM (P) [DPICM (P)] [IRTGSM (D)] [IRTGSM (D)] KEY I In Inventory P In production F In full scale engineering development N Not yet in formal development II The next generation submunltlon for the ATACMS has not yet been selected TGW or IRTGSM could fit, as could [he DPICM currently In oroduct[on ACRONYMS ATACMS– Army Tactical Mlsslle System DPICM—dual purpose Improved conventional munltlon IRTGSM—infrared (guided) terminally guided submunltlon Jo!nt STARS—Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System RPV—remo[.ely piloted vehicle TGW—terminally guided weapon ACV– armored combat veh!cle

ATACMS concepts share some advantages to a reduction in sorties available for FOFA. and disadvantages. They are more dependent In addition, there are likely to be many com- on the RSTA systems—airplanes have pilots peting demands for interdiction aircraft. In who can compensate to some extent for late, conversations in Europe, OTA found general inaccurate, false, or missing information; and agreement among Army and Air Force officers although the ATACMS can be fired laterally that few aircraft would be available for FOFA into other corps sectors, the launchers cannot during the first few days, because the more im- easily be moved large distances in response to mediate concerns of protecting NATO’s airspace movements in Warsaw Pact forces. Tactical and ensuring NATO’s ability to fly over the bat- airpower, by contrast, can be shifted rapidly tle area should take precedence in the first few across most of the Central Region. days. However, this is not set in stone, and if SACEUR and CINCENT decide that emphasis should be on interdiction the first day, it Conducting air interdiction is much more will be. complicated than launching a missile. Attack- ing aircraft would have to deal with enemy air Because of the specific disadvantages of each defenses, requiring defense suppression, escort approach—air interdiction and missile attack aircraft, and preparation of attack corridors. —a combination of the two would appear to Although the Air Force practices attacks on be more effective than either alone. fixed targets and moving targets that appear approximately where and when anticipated, F-16 Aircraft planning large interdiction efforts against This concept would provide coverage simi- moving targets that may appear on short no- lar to that of the ATACMS, but with greater tice is difficult. Although it generally takes latitude to be moved to different sectors of the many hours to plan an attack, once planned front. It would make use of an existing asset, it can be redirected on shorter notice, although the F-16, which is already in the force and in not as quickly as a missile launcher can be production. Furthermore, attacking into Pact reprogrammed. NATO can expect the Pact to territory with interdiction aircraft is accepted make a strong effort to close NATO’s air bases: by U.S. Allies, who themselves have capable effective airbase attacks would be likely to lead interdiction aircraft including F-16s and the 38 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Tornado. The German Tornado, which carries unguided anti-armor submunitions in its MW-1 dispenser, may beat present NATO’s best asset against masses of armor. If used against combat units, this concept would almost certainly require a broad area RSTA system like Joint STARS, especially if it is to be responsive to Pact force movements across the Central Region. Until such a system becomes available, it might be possible to Photo credff U S Department of Defense focus a complicated combination of other sys- F-1 11s, current mainstay of NATO’s deep attack tems to obtain the necessary information. capability. However, unlike the preceding concepts, this one would have greater capability to compen- and some tasked F-111s14 could be operated sate for shortcomings in the RSTA system. with or in place of the F-16s as described above, Other developments will be needed to com- and could be used to extend FOFA capability plete this concept. The CEM is similar to the to create chokepoints on the Oder and Neisse Army DPICM–it is effective against lightly Rivers (the GDR-Polish border) and attack armored vehicles, soft vehicles, and personnel, units in transit on road and rail in Western but has little effectiveness against modern Poland. tanks. If tanks are also to be attacked, it would If they operate beyond the range of the have to be replaced, or supplemented, by a F-16s, the F-15Es will also be generally beyond Skeet or some other terminally guided anti- the range of Joint STARS and similar tacti- armor submunition. The LANTIRN, as well cal surveillance systems. This will not limit as short stand-off missiles like AGM-130 or their ability to operate against fixed targets GBU-15 configured to carry a submunition dis- like airfields and bridges, but it will affect their penser or an inertially guided dispenser, would ability to attack moving targets, and to create be valuable for increasing aircraft surviva- chokepoints at the optimum time. Further- bility. more, the deeper these aircraft operate, the more difficult it becomes to protect them. The F-15E Aircraft greater range of the F-15E could also be ex- Under current plans, the F-15Es will start ploited to operate out of bases that are farther to appear in Europe in the late 1980s. These from the battle (perhaps in Britain), and there- two-seat airplanes, configured primarily for fore less likely to be attacked than bases used ground attack but retaining their fighter ca- by the F-16s. The greater range would also pro- pabilities, will have much greater range and vide improved flexibility to operate through- payload than the F-16s, as well as night and out the Central Region in response to an evolv- all-weather capability supported by LANTIRN ing Pact offensive. and terrain-following radar. They will, however, cost considerably more than F-16s. The Deep Strike Using B-52s F-15Es will supplement United States Air Carrying Cruise Missiles Force in Europe’s (USAFE’s) deeper attack ca- The Air Force is considering the use of B-52 pabilities that currently reside exclusively with bombers carrying long-range cruise missiles 13 the F-111s. F-15Es and F-111s could attack to interdict the rail network across Eastern targets well into Western Poland. The F-15Es Europe. One variant of the cruise missile could

14The F-1 11s, limited in number, already have several impor- “This might also be augmented by B-52s, and possibly tant missions including interdiction and air base attack, and FB-111s. standing nuclear alert. Ch. 2—Summary 39 — — —.

Table 2-5.– Packages Based on F-16 Aircraft — —. Targets Stopped Fixed Moving units high value chokepoints—. Trucks ACV Tanks - Platform ...... F-16/LANTIRN F-16/LANTIRN F- 16/LA NT-- IRN F-16/ LANTIRN ‘ F-16/LANTlRN Joint STARS (F) RSTA ...... current current Advanced RPVS (?)

Weapon/Munition. ., . . Bombs, mines, bombs TMD/CEM (P) TMD/CEM (P) TM D/Skeet (D) cluster bombs, cluster bombs Rockeye (1) TMD/CEM (P) Maverick (I, P) Maverick (I, P) and for protection of RSTA assets Other ...... , . . systems for. defense— avoidance and suppression KEY I In Inventory P - In production F In full scale engineerlng development N Not yet In formal development ACRONYMS LANTIRN –Low altitude navigation and targeting Infrared system for night TMD—tactical munltlons dispenser CEM–combined effects mun{t{on (a TMD carrylnq Combined Effects Bombletst Skeet—an IR guided submunltlon that fires a sel~forglng slug Also called SFW, or sensor fuzed weapon Rockeye —a cluster bomb containing ant! armor submunltlons Maverick—an anti.tank guided m{sslle ACV—armored combat vehicle

Table 2-6.—Packages Based on F-15E Aircraft — Targets Stopped Fixed Moving units——— high value chokepoints Trucks - ACV Tanks Platform ...... , F-15E (P) F-15E (P) - F-15E (P) F-15E (P) F-15E (P) F-ill (1) F-1 11 (I) F-1 11 (l)(?) F-1 11 (l)(?) F-1 11 (I)(?)a — RSTA ...... current current Joint STARS (F)

Weapon/Munition, . . . Bombs, GBU-15 (1) TMD/CEM (P) TMD/CEM (P) TM D/Skeet (D) cluster bombs, AGM-130 (F) cluster bombs Rockeye (1) TMD/CEM (P) mines Maverick (I, P) Maverick (I, P) Other ...... systems— for. defense avoidance and suppression and for protection of RSTA assets KEY I In Inventory P In production F - In full scale engineering development N Not yet In formal development ACRONYMS GBU 15–a highly accurate guided gllde bomb AGM.130—a powered verston of the GBU15 TMD—a tactical munitions dispenser CEM —combined effects munltlon (a TMD carrying Combined Effects Bomblets) Skeet—an IR gu!ded submunltlon that f!res a self-forging slug Also called SFW or sensor fuzed weapon Rockeye —a cluster bomb contalmng ant[.armor submunltlons Maver!ck —an anti.tank guided missile ACV—armored combat vehicle aF 11 1s are typ!cally tasked for deep mlsslons against targets Ilke alrflelds and bridges

be configured to drop bridges, while another bers, and the airplanes could be released from would sow smart mines along the rail lines. their strategic nuclear roles through introduc- These aircraft would be flown from the United tion of B-Is into the force. States to their launch points, launch their missiles against fixed targets, and return to bases The primary goal most likely would be to de- in the United States. It has been estimated lay the arrival of forces rather than to cause that by the mid-1990s suitable cruise missiles attrition. In theory, this would prevent the sec- could be developed and built in sufficient num- ond fronts from arriving in time to exploit the 40 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack successes of the first fronts, and allow NATO weapons they would carry, exposure to enemy time to reverse the situation. air defenses could be kept to a minimum. Com- pared to the other four concepts, the require- Proponents of this concept contend that hav- ments for timely surveillance are much less. ing the capability to hold the rail lines at risk in time of war could force the Soviets to a long The proposed cruise missile could be devel- mobilization, bringing their forces through the oped from an existing type—e.g., the Boeing rail lines in peacetime and therefore providing ALCM or the Tomahawk. Engineering studies NATO with long, unambiguous warning. A have shown that this ought to be a straight- “long warning” scenario is generally more forward task; it has yet to be demonstrated, favorable to NATO than a “short warning” however. Alternatively, a new missile could be scenario, because NATO is expected to mobi- developed. lize more slowly than the Warsaw Pact. How- Problems related to arms control may also ever, the added warning would be of value to have to be solved. Under the SALT II agree- NATO only if NATO accepts it and reacts ac- ment, the B-52 was defined and counted as a cordingly. strategic nuclear delivery vehicle. Whatever This concept would make use of existing as- arms control agreements ultimately are sets, the B-52s. There would be no aircraft produced in the wake of Reykjavik will have procurement costs, but operations and main- to come up with a definition of a strategic bom- tenance would be incurred to keep the force ber. If this option is to be pursued, either some active for this (and other conventional) roles. way will have to be found to keep convention- Eventually, those B-52s would have to be ally armed B-52s from being counted as stra- replaced by more modern aircraft or exten- tegic nuclear weapons, or the United States sively overhauled. Suitable tanker aircraft sup- will have to give up some nuclear capability port would have to be made available. Because to get conventional capability. of the long range of the bombers and of the

REMAINING ISSUES There are a number of FOFA-related pro- ference action has supported funding for the grams that Congress will decide on. Some— system. The Joint STARS, now in full-scale such as the F-15E and the ATACMS missile— engineering development, is built around a do not appear very controversial, although that moving target indicator (MTI) radar carried might change. The controversial issues are: on an E-8A (modified Boeing 707) aircraft. It Joint STARS, Aquila RPV, a successor to would provide both surveillance information PLSS, and advanced munitions programs. In to assessment centers, and targeting informa- addition, Congress will have to deal with co- tion to command centers and directly to mis- operative development and production with sile launchers or attack aircraft. From a pa- our Allies. trol orbit behind the FLOT, it would provide broad area coverage over extended periods of Joint Surveillance Target Attack time. Radar System (Joint STARS) Opponents argue that the Joint STARS will be vulnerable to Warsaw Pact surface-to-air Although Army, Air Force, and SHAPE fa- missiles (SAMs) and interceptor aircraft, and vor the Joint STARS, it has been the subject will either be shot down or have to retreat so of much controversy, particularly in Congress. far from the FLOT as to be not worth its cost. In each of the past 3 years, the House opposed They favor stopping the program until a much the system while the Senate supported it. Con- more survivable version can be produced. Pro- Ch. 2—Summary ● 41 ponents acknowledge its vulnerability, but ar- gets are expected to traverse this band rapidly gue that a variety of protective measures could and be less constrained to major roads. Surge greatly enhance its survivability, and that even operations would allow some coverage of when taking protective measures it would be deeper areas. This pattern of operations would capable of providing a great deal of capability. generally require the Joint STARS to operate farther from the FLOT than the nominal set- The capability that Joint STARS (or a sys- back usually discussed for it. The coverage tem like it) would provide is very important would similarly be reduced from what a nomi- to most FOFA concepts. FOFA could be done nal orbit would provide, without it, but with much greater difficulty and probably much less effectiveness. The sys- Some opponents of the E-8A Joint STARS tem would be very useful for identifying the have suggested that consistently deeper cov- focus and major movements of a Pact attack, erage could be obtained by basing Joint STARS and, before the shooting starts, for monitor- on an inherently more survivable platform that ing Pact troop movements and providing ef- could operate closer to the FLOT without be- fective warning of an attack. The Air Force ing detected. OTA has not been given access believes that an 13-8A-based system is neces- to information on such programs, and the reader sary for deployments to areas other than Eur- should be aware that there is potentially rele- ope. Proponents argue that it would be useful vant information that OTA does not have. In to get a system into the field as soon as possi- general, such a system would have its own limi- ble, so that crews can learn how to operate it tations. For it to be stealthy, it will have to and find out what it can really provide. carry an equally stealthy radar, known as ‘LPI” (or low probability of intercept) radar, and a Prior to hostilities, the Joint STARS could radar antenna that—when illuminated by a operate very close to the FLOT and observe threat radar-is as difficult to detect as the Pact movements deep inside East Germany airplane. LPI may be achieved in part by man- and Czechoslovakia. In wartime, the Air Force aging power, that is by reducing the amount would defend the Joint STARS (and the air- of energy a radar transmits in a given time, space it and other surveillance aircraft oper- which reduces the amount of information the ate in), suppress enemy air defenses, and ad- radar can obtain. Therefore a stealthy Joint just the patrol pattern of the E-8A to reduce STARS would also not be able to gather as its vulnerability. At selected times it could much data as the E-8A Joint STARS in its surge forward, that is, patrol closer to the nominal orbit. FLOT with dedicated defenses in order to look into selected deeper areas. As the war pro- Because the reduction in coverage would take gresses and Pact defenses are suppressed, it the form of “looking” less rather than mov- should become possible to increase the amount ing back from the FLOT, coverage of both deep of time spent patrolling closer to the FLOT. and shallow targets would be reduced. If operated as the Air Force now intends, We at OTA do not have enough information the E-8A Joint STARS should be capable of to compare the coverage of a E-8A Joint STARS providing frequent broad area coverage to a taking evasive, protective action and a stealthy depth of 50 to 100 kilometers beyond the FLOT. alternative, but we believe that such a compar- There will be a great many targets within this ison would be important. We believe that if Con- band, and more weapons can attack here than gress does not have enough information to make deeper. Attacking combat units in this band a decision on Joint STARS, it ought to mandate can be more efficient because many of the non- a study comparing the cost, survivability, cov- combat vehicles will be left behind as the units erage, and operational utility of Joint STARS prepare to go into battle. Furthermore, fre- and proposed alternatives operated in a realis- quent coverage is likely to be of greater im- tic manner, but ought not to stop the develop- portance within this band than deeper: the tar- ment program in order to do so. 42 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

One alternative that might be considered is STARS and other surveillance systems. It has an E-8A Joint STARS complemented—rather demonstrated emitter location speed and ac- than replaced—by a more survivable system. curacy which are superior to those of existing The E-8A Joint STARS could provide com- theater systems, as well as a high emitter plete coverage to a limited depth, and each reporting rate. These may be necessary if, as could provide limited coverage deeper in Pact expected, at the outbreak of a war enemy ra- territory. The coverage of both would be lim- dars shut down, move, change frequencies, and ited by terrain and foliage, but limitations begin wartime operations in short on-time, elec- might be less for the more survivable platform. tronically agile modes. An important consideration for either a sub- Modern mobile, electronically agile radars stitute or a complementary platform is whether and jammers would accompany and protect the necessary LPI radar could be built from follow-on forces; an ability to attack them soon the Joint STARS radar, or would require an after they are detected in a new location would entirely new development effort. Without more be very valuable to protecting allied aircraft information, OTA cannot answer this question used to detect and attack follow-on forces. in detail. However, the Joint STARS radar has PLSS has demonstrated a capability to locate substantial capacity for conversion to LPI and report more such emitters per hour with operation. It appears to OTA that if the LPI greater accuracy and timeliness than all other radar were to operate in the same frequency U.S. systems now reporting to Europe com- band as the Joint STARS radar, much of the bined. It would use electronic equipment car- existing design could be used. ried aloft by three TR-1 aircraft operating together, each communicating with a central Replacement for the Precision Location processing ground station. The ground station and Strike System (PISS) would report emitter locations, and could also control attacks against emitters. For fiscal year 1987, Congress decided, at During development, PLSS has failed to the request of DoD, to deny funding for pro- demonstrate emitter location errors as small curement of the Precision Location Strike Sys- as those required by its specifications, and its tem (PLSS, pronounced “pens”), and to appro- reliability has been a problem. However, re- priate $20 million for further development and cently its performance has steadily improved. testing. Congress and DoD now face the issue Emitter location accuracy has approached the of whether a new system is needed to perform specified value, and the reporting rate require- the function originally conceived for PLSS. ment has been reduced to what PLSS has al- Until this year, PLSS–a developmental sur- ready demonstrated. In addition, the system veillance and control system designed to de- has often reported each actual emitter as sev- tect, identify, and accurately locate modern eral. Some causes of this problem were identi- mobile, electronically agile radars and jammers fied and corrected. in near real time—was an important part of the program for improving surveillance in Eur- Munitions Programs ope. However, the Air Force has not requested funding for procurement, and apparently has There are three major concerns regarding taken the position that other systems could munitions programs: 1) the effectiveness of adequately do the job for which PLSS was anti-armor submunitions in a realistic combat designed. Moreover, PLSS has encountered environment; 2) buying enough munitions for many problems and delays during its long de- FOFA to have an effect; and 3) what to do velopment history. about mines. Others still see value in PLSS, particularly Munitions programs-and the weapons to for targeting modern mobile SAMs, and as a carry them—tend to be a neglected area. They major contributor to the survivability of Joint are usually not glamorous, and are often can- Ch. 2—Summary ● 43 didates for scaling back and stretching out in might attract submunitions away from func- order to save money. None of the FOFA con- tioning vehicles. cepts will work if there are not enough muni- Smoke and various types of material cover- tions to kill a large enough number of targets ing a vehicle could reduce the ability of a sen- to have an effect. A multi-billion dollar invest- sor to find it. Various schemes have been sug- ment in RSTA, data analysis centers, missiles, gested that would cause the munition to guide and airplanes of various types can be under- to a spot off the target rather than one on it, cut by not buying enough munitions. OTA can- as have devices that would cause a shaped not say how many of each type are needed (in- charge warhead to detonate before reaching deed, that is a job for the Services). However, its target. the Warsaw Pact forces in Eastern Europe have hundreds of thousands of vehicles, includ- Various advanced types of armor are under ing many tens of thousands of armored com- development in the East and in the West. Some bat vehicles. are very effective against shaped charge warheads; others are more effective against kinetic Although current-generation unguided sub- energy weapons like self-forging slugs. How munitions can be effective against most vehi- well advanced munitions do against advanced cles, including most armored combat vehicles, tanks will depend in part on how well the war- advanced guided anti-armor submunitions now head characteristics match the armor charac- under development may be the key to being teristics of the target. able to destroy groups of tanks. Because they are guided, they may also be much more effec- Not all suggested countermeasures are prac- tive against less heavily armored vehicles. Two tical and effective. However, it is very impor- types are under development: sensor fuzed tant to test munitions against various types weapons—e.g., the Air Force Skeet and the of targets employing various types of coun- Army SADARM—that sense the presence of termeasures. Programs like the joint Chicken a target within their search areas and fire a Little series of tests can be very valuable in self-forging slug at it; and terminally guided this regard. submunitions--like the Army’s TGW for MLRS —that search a large area, guide to the target, Remotely Piloted Vehicles and detonate a shaped charge warhead on impact. The Army is developing a family of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, a term which These concepts have been demonstrated in includes both remotely piloted vehicles and controlled environments, but important ques- drones) to perform a variety of functions in- tions remain regarding their ability to oper- cluding surveillance, reconnaissance, target ate in the presence of countermeasures to both designation, jamming, and attack. The most warheads and seekers. Both operational and mature member of the family, the Aquila RPV technical countermeasures are of concern. of the TADARS (Target Acquisition/Designa- There has been concern that enemy forces tion Aerial Reconnaissance System) now in full- could use the cover of both forests and villages scale development, has been a matter of con- to obscure the signature of the target vehicles cern in Congress. and to deflect incoming warheads so that they lose momentum or do not hit the armor at an UAVs could usefully complement airborne angle that permits them to penetrate. Dash- stand-off radar systems like Mohawk, ASARS- ing between covered locations could reduce the II, and Joint STARS: these could quickly exposure of the targets. Both spreading for- search large areas and tell UAVs whereto look; mations out and bunching them tightly up and UAVs could find the targets and discrimi- could affect the number of vehicles a group of nate among them. UAVs could also find or fol- submunitions hits. There is also concern that low targets hidden from airborne radars by the damaged vehicles littering the battlefield hills or trees. Aquila could locate shallow tar- 44 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Photo credit U S Department of Defense Simple countermeasures, such as a camouflaged tank, may be able to outwit smart submunitions. gets with greater precision and designate them Other RPVs have been proposed as alterna- with a laser for either Copperhead artillery tives to Aquila, but lack its target location ac- rounds or laser-guided bombs. Several types curacy, laser designation capability, and jam- of UAVs are now operational or under devel- resistance. According to the General Account- opment in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, ing Office, procuring another RPV and equip- Italy, the United Kingdom, and Israel. ping it with the laser designator, navigation, Since 1978, the estimated time to develop and communications systems developed for TADARS has more than doubled and the esti- Aquila would cost about $100 million more and mated program cost has quadrupled; the num- take a year longer than completing TADARS. ber of RPVs to be produced has been halved. However, the major problems which have be- Arms Cooperation set the system now appear to have been solved. TADARS will have unique capabilities for ac- When FOFA was first advanced, some Euro- curate location and laser designation of shal- peans tended to see it as a vehicle to sell them low targets. These could be useful for FOFA: American defense systems. The Defense De- TADARS could find and locate targets for ar- partment has been working to dispel this prob- tillery, MLRS, and ATACMS, and designate lem by encouraging European-American arms for laser-guided bombs. cooperation programs as well as the identifi- Ch. 2—Summary 45 — —

Photo credit NATO Tornado aircraft, result of European collaboration, carry in the German MW-1 munitions dispenser. cation of European systems that could sup- of understanding concerning co-development port the concept. of systems, only some of which are FOFA related. The principal foci of activity have been the NATO Conference of National Armaments Di- There has been a meeting of the minds on rectors (CNAD) and the Defense Science Board a number of questions, but thus far the Euro- FOFA II Task Force. A major stimulus to co- peans have shown no official interest in either operation has been the money made available ATACMS or Joint STARS15 (although there under the 1985 Nunn Amendment. is interest in interoperability among Joint STARS and the British ASTOR and French The FOFA II Task Force has been working ORCHIDEE MTI systems). Although some with similar advisory groups associated with of the arguments against these systems have European governments to identify potential been on fairly fundamental grounds, interest areas of cooperation that could then be recom- may develop in the future, particularly after mended to their respective governments for the systems are fielded and their real capabil- further action. The group will report during ities become known. the first half of 1987 on strategies to achieve cooperation on several programs. This process will pose three important issues for Congress. First, if Congress supports this There are two major activities related to the form of cooperation, they will have to provide CNAD. The first is a FOFA ad hoc working the requisite funding for cooperative programs. group that is preparing a paper outlining the Second, Congress may have to make choices types of systems that are necessary to achieve between slowing programs to bring the Euro- a FOFA capability. This activity is important peans on board and proceeding only in the because it helps define what the allied govern- United States. Finally, the Europeans may ments (as distinct from NATO itself) agree constitutes FOFA. Concurrently, the United States is negotiating a number of memoranda ‘5 There reportedly has been interest on the working level. 46 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack seek to sell us their equipment, to smooth the interests generally complicate such efforts, and two-way street. Congress will then have the U.S. policies are seen as complicating them still usual choice between buying American or buy- further. Nevertheless, the trends are away from ing European. buying U.S. products, and toward greater intra- European cooperation. The Europeans believe The Europeans are enthusiastic about the that their technology equals that of the United possibilities for joint programs; however, they States in many areas and may surpass it in are somewhat skeptical about the possibilities some. for successful cooperative ventures, especially with the United States as a partner. National PART II Analyses Chapter 3 Introduction and Background CONTENTS

Page Introduction...... 49 Background ...... 50 History ...... ● * 50 The Role of FOFA in NATO Strategy ...... 51 Chapter 3 Introduction and Background

INTRODUCTION In late 1984, the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 1986, accomplished the first two tasks listed nization (NATO) adopted the Follow-On Forces above. This report covers the others. In the Attack (FOFA) concept as one of a few critical special report, OTA suggested to Congress warfighting tasks for its conventional forces. that in considering how best to support the Although the concept had been under devel- FOFA concept, systems ought to be considered opment for several years at the Supreme Head- not individually, but as complete packages to quarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), it support clearly defined operational concepts; was adopted in general terms only. This pre- nonetheless, some systems will be “key sys- cipitated much activity on the part of the mem- tems”; all component systems will have to be ber nations, SHAPE, and the NATO interna- procured in sufficient quantities; practice and tional staff to define more clearly what FOFA training will be important; and some redundancy is, how it is to be implemented, and what the may be desirable. Readers wishing an elabora- individual nations are going to do to support tion on these points, or greater background on its implementation. the FOFA concept and the technologies of interest, are referred to that special report. As part of the U.S. effort, the Office of Tech- nology Assessment (OTA) was asked by the After outlining the rest of the report, this House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the chapter provides a brief review of the history House Committee on Armed Services, and the of the FOFA concept, and of how FOFA fits Senate Committee on Armed Services to con- into NATO’s strategy. A fuller description is duct a study of options for implementing found in the special report. FOFA. In particular, OTA was asked to: Chapter 4 addresses the threat: Warsaw ● discuss the military and deterrence ra- Pact forces, and what we know about that part tionale; of Soviet doctrine that is relevant to FOFA. ● survey the status of various applicable ca- All Warsaw Pact forces will follow Soviet doc- pabilities and programs, including those trine. There has been some controversy in the to develop advanced conventional muni- West regarding Soviet doctrine and the appro- tions; priateness of FOFA as a response. This chap- ● review relevant Soviet doctrine and plans; ter reviews those areas of controversy. ● review the attitudes of our NATO Allies; ● assess the strengths and weaknesses of Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the specific objec- various existing and proposed alter- tives for several different types of attacks on natives; follow-on forces, and the operational concepts ● assess the likelihood that various plausi- being considered for achieving those objec- ble combinations would meet U.S. and tives. This sets the stage for the discussion of NATO goals; and packages of systems to implement these con- ● discuss a range of policy options, their cepts and the technical issues surrounding pros, cons, and timing of availability. those systems, found later in the report. This report is the final product of that study. Chapter 7 analyzes possible Soviet responses An earlier report— Technologies for NATO to FOFA, and chapter 8 reviews the attitudes Follow-on Forces Attack Concept: A Special of our Allies toward FOFA. FOFA was con- Report of OTA's Assessment on Improving ceived by SHAPE as an Alliance-wide effort NATO Defense Response–released in July (although primarily concerning those nations

49 50 New Technology for NATO: Implementing FoIIow-On Forces Attack with forces in the Central Region); its value ticularly regarding Joint STARS, PLSS, re- would be diminished if only the United States motely piloted vehicles, and advanced smart were to implement it, or if national responses anti-armor weapons. These are the subject of were uncoordinated. NATO’s current abilities chapters 10 and 11. to attack follow-on forces are reviewed in chap- Chapter 12 analyzes how existing and new ter 9. systems could be brought together into com- The technological advances that are impor- plete packages to implement the operational tant for FOFA were described at some length concepts discussed in chapter 6. in the special report. Although these are pri- Chapter 13 reviews previous studies of im- marily mature technologies that could result plementing FOFA, summarizes their conclu- in fielded systems over the next decade, ma- sions, and discusses major common threads. jor issues—technical and other—remain, par-

BACKGROUND History Force declared its support for AirLand Bat- tle, and in late 1982 the services signed the In the late 1970s, both the U.S. Army and Joint Operational Concept Joint Attack of the U.S. Air Force began to study seriously the Second Echelon (J-SAK) that laid out proce- idea that much could be done to break up a dures for cooperation between Army and Air Soviet-style offensive by attacking deep into Force units in deep attack. enemy territory. Air bases and other major fixed facilities, major formations of ground Also in 1982, the staff at SHAPE produced forces, logistics, transportation nodes, and in- a study of attacking follow-on forces. This led dividual high-value targets like command to the NATO Defence Planning Committee posts and missile launchers were among the (DPC) formally approving SACEUR’s Long targets considered. To be sure, attacking into Term Planning Guideline for FOFA on Novem- enemy territory was nothing novel for either ber 9, 1984, making FOFA officially part of service. The Air Force had always had inter- NATO strategy. diction of various forms as a major mission, Although FOFA was a SHAPE develop- and the Army had always relied on firepower ment (known at various times as ‘deep strike, delivered by these interdiction aircraft and by ‘‘strike deep, and the ‘Rogers plan’ ‘), its con- its own artillery to “soften up” the enemy nection to the United States was inescapable, forces prior to engaging them. And within and amplified by General Rogers’ also hold- NATO’s integrated military command, into ing the job of Commander-in-Chief of U.S. which elements of both services would be in- forces in Europe. The AirLand Battle concept tegrated in the event of war, nuclear planning was unpopular among Europeans because of had always considered such targets to be of its emphasis on counterattack, and it soon be- prime importance. came confused with FOFA in the debate that followed. In addition, many were (and some At the same time, the Army-in part because remain) skeptical of the value of attacking deep of long-standing criticism that accused it of rather than waiting to engage the advancing being too static and insufficiently mobile for enemy forces in the close battle. modern warfare-was developing a new doctrine called “AirLand Battle. ” AirLand Bat- After the November 1984 DPC meeting, the tle, officially published in 1982, called for a concept was turned over to the NATO inter- combination of deep fires to break up the national staff for coordination and refinement, enemy’s offensive, and counterattacks to re- and subsequently to the office of the Assistant store losses and seize the initiative. The Air Secretary General for Defence Support to pro- Ch. 3—Introduction and Background ● 51 vide a forum for the member nations to coordi- tlefield in a conventional war-such as Ger- nate their armaments programs. The focus has many—have the greatest interest in sending now largely shifted from doctrine development the Soviets a clear message that aggression to arms procurement, particularly arms trade would lead quickly and directly to nuclear war. and cooperation. However, the attitudes of the Although NATO anticipates a conflict that individual members regarding FOFA have not would involve its Northern and Southern Re- as yet completely jelled. gions in Europe (as well as the Atlantic), the On a parallel track, SHAPE is still develop- focus is expected to be the Central Region. ing the concept. The original rather general ap- Warsaw Pact successes there would split the proach, of delaying, disrupting, and destroy- Alliance and make the defense of the rest of ing enemy forces from just beyond the range Europe all but untenable. Furthermore, Ger- of direct fire weapons to as far in the enemy many is the focus in the Central Region: its rear as NATO’s forces can reach, is becoming collapse would almost certainly produce defeat a set of more specific goals phased to coincide in the Central Region. with the introduction of new capabilities. NATO strategy for a conventional defense Meanwhile, both the Army and the Air Force in the Central Region is dictated by political continue to refine their deep battle and inter- and geographic considerations as well as by diction concepts taking FOFA into account. the threat facing it. Ground and air forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, the The Role of FOFA in NATO Strategy Federal Republic of Germany, the Nether- lands, and Belgium are under the command Flexible Response is a strategy for deterring of the Commander-in-Chief Central Region, aggression, underwritten by a triad of conven- who in turn reports to the Supreme Allied Com- tional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear mander Europe (SACEUR). SACEUR is re- forces. NATO would respond to any attack at sponsible for the Northern, Central, and South- an appropriate level of violence, and reserves ern Regions. France, although a member of the the right to escalate a conflict, including the Alliance, is not part of this integrated military first use of nuclear weapons. This strategy cre- command. In the Central Region, the German ates a risk to the Warsaw Pact that aggres- border is divided into eight corps sectors, each sion can lead to nuclear warfare at a level such defended by the ground forces of one nation. that the cost to them would far outweigh what- These are organized into two Army Groups, ever they would hope to gain by attacking in each supported by a multinational Allied Tac- the first place. NATO would resist a conven- tical Air Force. A relatively small force—much tional offensive with conventional means, and of which would come from the United States— would escalate to the use of nuclear weapons would be held in reserve. only if it proved necessary. While there is agreement among the Allies NATO is committed to a forward defense, on this principle, there is debate and disagree- both because there is little room to fall back, and because falling back would yield German ment over how much conventional defense ca- territory which would weaken Germany and pability NATO should have: too little would be politically unacceptable to the Germans. lead to being overrun before NATO could de- This is not to say that NATO will defend right cide to escalate, while too much would risk a at the border, but that it will take defensive lengthy and destructive war on NATO terri- positions as close as practical to the border and tory and perhaps encourage a Pact attack in defend them with a tactically mobile defense. the belief that NATO would fight a conventional war which would carry little risk to the It is, however, a strategically static defense Pact, Either, it is argued, would decrease de- having little ability to move forces north/south terrence. Although no one wants a nuclear war, along the border to respond to the way the the nations that would be the most likely bat- Soviets choose to attack. NATO is also gener- 52 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack — — ally constrained from counterattacking across jor increases in its force structure. The corps the border, because it is a defensive alliance that are attacked cannot fall back to reorganize that wishes to avoid a provocative, offensive their defenses, and the stronger corps that are posture. not heavily attacked cannot counterattack The Warsaw Pact not only enjoys significant deep into Warsaw Pact territory. By attacking the follow-on forces before they join the numerical superiority over NATO in the Cen- offensive, NATO hopes to reduce them to man- tral Region, but it is organized according to Soviet doctrine for a strategically mobile of- ageable proportions (i.e., reduce them through fense. NATO believes Warsaw Pact ground attrition) and meter their arrival at the close forces would concentrate to smash through battle (delay them so they arrive in “drips and NATO’s weaker corps sectors, allowing highly drabs” and not all at once). It also provides mobile divisions into NATO’s rear. NATO can the opportunity to mass fire against concen- expect this attack on its rear to be aided by trations of forces before they hit NATO’s airplane, missile, airborne, and special forces defensive line, thereby compensating at least in part for NATO’s inability to shift its ground attacks. forces in response. NATO is very constrained in its options for responding to this threat. It will not make ma- Chapter 4 The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe CONTENTS

Page Soviet Military Doctrine ...... 55 Warsaw Pact Forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations . . . . . 57 Principles of Soviet Strategy...... 60 Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Offensive Into Europe: A Notional Scenario ...... 65 Soviet and Warsaw Pact Vulnerabilities ...... 66 Areas of Controversy and Uncertainty ...... 68

Tables Table No. Page 4-1. Structure of Soviet Motorized Rifle and Tank Divisions ...... 60 4-2. Vehicles Soviet Tank and Motorized Rifle Divisions ...... 60 Figures Figure No. Page 4-l. NATO/Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons ...... 58 4-2. Warsaw Pact Concept of Employment ...... 63 4-3. Soviet/Warsaw Pact Wartime Command Organization...... 64 4-4. Example of Soviet ’’Front-Loading” of Forces ...... 69 Chapter 4 The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe

In 1984, SACEUR General Rogers described must be prepared to react to however the So- FOFA as “an attempt to come to grips with viets might choose to use those forces should the realities presented by Soviet doctrine for a conflict arise. But how the Soviets might ac- offensive operations and the continuing mas- tually launch an offensive has generated a good sive Soviet conventional force build-up. This deal of controversy. chapter examines some of these realities, both This chapter, therefore, examines what we what we know about a potential Soviet ground know and do not know about those aspects of offensive in Central Europe, and the uncertain- Soviet strategy, operational planning and tac- ties surrounding those realities. tics of significance for FOFA: the role of con- The Soviets have massed in Europe a large ventional forces in Soviet doctrine; the Soviet number of ground forces with an enormous ground forces facing NATO; the principles which amount of firepower: at present, the strength govern Soviet military planning and strategy; of the in-place Warsaw Pact forces in the Cen- the way a Soviet conventional offensive into tral Region-in terms of divisions, tanks, and Western Europe might be waged; and impli- artillery-is in each category close to twice that cations for FOFA. of NATO’s in-place forces, and Warsaw Pact forces possess a good deal more strategic depth, for defensive purposes: it is less than 500 kilometers from the inter-German border to the English channel; and the importance for defensive purposes and to bring more forces of Germany as a NATO land power in the Central Region makes to bear.2 NATO, being a defensive alliance, it more difficult for NATO to trade space for time than it would be for Warsaw Pact forces to fall back when attacked to reor- ‘General Bernard W’. Rogers, “Fo11ow on Forces Attack ganize and counterattack. The U.S.S.R. is also better placed \~~~’A~: ~l~ths and Realities, ” ,’Vato Retriew, No. 6, December than NATO to bring additional forces forward to sustain those at the front line, as a good portion of NATO’s reinforcements ‘J$’hile the territory of the J$’arsaw Pact extends thousands of men and equipment would have to come across the Atlantic of kilometers back into the U. S. S. R., NATO has little depth from North America.

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE Among Western analysts, one of the most such a war should it be deemed necessary. It controversial aspects of Soviet military plan- provides a context for deciding the size and ning is the role of conventional weapons in an composition of the Soviet Armed Forces, and offensive. This is due largely to different assess- for integrating their organization, tactics, ments of Soviet military ‘‘doctrine’ and mili- training and equipment into a cohesive fight- tary thought. ing force. Although viewed as scientific, mili- Soviet military doctrine lies at the heart of tary doctrine is not rigid or fixed; instead, it has proven to be quite dynamic but, once the overall Soviet approach to war, which is quite different from that of the West. War, as decided on, is rarely questioned except at the highest levels. the Soviets see it, is a science, something gov- erned by certain “laws” and principles reflected in military history, and past and present wars, It is generally accepted among Western ob- tests, maneuvers, and the like. Soviet military servers that a major shift in Soviet doctrine “doctrine” comprises a set of views defining occurred in the mid-1960s, from a near total the goals and nature of a possible war, and how reliance on nuclear weapons in Soviet military the U.S.S.R. should prepare for and conduct planning, to a more balanced approach to de- 55 56 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack veloping nuclear and conventional forces. From both for ideological reasons, and for operational the late 1950s until the mid 1960s, the Soviets ones.4 These observers view the continued So- believed any potential war would begin with viet buildup of nuclear capabilities not as massive nuclear strikes that would totally, and meant necessarily to wage a nuclear offensive, irreparably, destroy the losing side’s entire so- but instead: 1) to discourage initial NATO nu- cial and political system. With the ouster of clear use; and 2) should NATO call for nuclear Khrushchev, however, and the adoption of a release, to be prepared to win at whatever level strategy of Flexible Response in the West, the of nuclear conflict might ensue.5 Soviets began to consider the possibility of a The fact that these differing views are de- war remaining conventional. Although they rived from Soviet sources and actions suggests continued to believe that nuclear weapons the possibility of some degree of debate among would be decisive in any conflict, the Soviet military no longer contended that a conflict Soviet military planners themselves. For now, would inevitably escalate to all-out nuclear the Soviets are apparently keeping their options open, with Soviet doctrine stipulating war. Since the mid 1960s, then, the Soviets have emphasized the need to be able to win that any potential wars could begin with either conventional or nuclear weapons. If they at all levels of conflict, and have developed the are initiated with conventional weapons, it capabilities to fight with or without nuclear weapons. stipulates that they may still escalate to a nuclear exchange.6 These developments have led to a good deal of controversy in the West regarding current What this means for FOFA, and for NATO as a whole, is that NATO cannot rule out, and Soviet doctrine and possible intentions. Some thus ought to be prepared for, a conventional observers contend that the Soviets still place phase in any potential Soviet offensive. What great weight on a “nuclear option” so that, it also suggests is that—whatever strategies should military conflict start, nuclear weapons would play a role from the beginning of the West may adopt, or whatever systems we that conflict. According to this view, “the may buy today--evidence for assessing Soviet concepts is patchy and controversial, and So- Soviets perceive a totally integrated nuclear- viet strategy and tactics may change. Since conventional operation, within the framework this report deals with the conventional defense of which nuclear and conventional weapons supplement and reinforce each other, creating of Europe, the remainder of this chapter ex- the synergistic effect deemed necessary for the amines how the Soviets might conduct a con- attainment of victory.”3 ventional offensive today should such an action be precipitated.

A more common view among Western observ- 4 Nuclear weapons would lower the Soviet rate of advance and ers, however, is that should war be precipitated, greatly confuse the battlefield, disrupting troop control and the Soviets would want to keep the conflict con- fairly precisely defined operational plans. See, for example, Lt. ventional and regard nuclear release only as Col. John Hines and PhilLip Petersen, “The Soviet Convention~ Offensive in Europe, ” Ikfilitary Review, April 1985, p. 3. a last resort. They believe that the Soviets have ‘See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 1. Volume 2 contains the classified become increasingly skeptical about the use- appendices to this report. fulness of nuclear weapons in combat today– 6See, for example, Capt. 1st Rank A. Belyayev, “Scientific Concepts of Modern Warfare-An Important Element in the Awareness of the Soviet Fighting Man, ” Komrnunist 31. Kass and M. Deane, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Vooruzhemykh Sil, No. 7, 1985, as translated in Joint Publica- Modem Theater Battlefield: The Current Soviet View, ” Comp- tion Research Service, JPRS-UMA-85-050, Aug. 29, 1985, pp. arative Strategy 4(3):212, 1984. 17-22. Ch. 4— The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe ● 57

WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE WESTERN THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS The Soviet threat facing Western Europe is Group of Forces (NGF) in Poland. NSWP forces a matter both of the numbers and equipment include somewhere around 6 East German, 15 of Warsaw Pact forces, and of Soviet strategy Polish, and 10 Czech divisions. Another 38 So- for employing those forces. The main non-nu- viet divisions lie in the three western military clear threat comes from the continental forces districts of the U. S.S.R.9 of the Warsaw Pact, concentrated in Central All of the Soviet Groups of Forces stationed Europe along the eastern border of West Ger- in Eastern Europe are considered “ready” many in what the Warsaw Pact designates as forces, i.e., are highly manned, well-equipped its Western Theater of Military Operations 7 and trained, and are at least minimally pre- (TVD). This region contains generally-although pared for combat with little or no mobilization by no means exclusively–flat terrain (espe- and preparation. Most of the approximately cially northern Germany), well suited to the 38 divisions in the western military districts movement of armored combat units, and the road to the key economic and political centers of the U.S.S.R. are characterized as “not- ready’’—i.e., they would require extensive of Western Europe. mobilization and are not available for imme- The Warsaw Pact’s Western TVD consists diate combat operations. ’” The Warsaw Pact of Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces in the Western TVD are equipped with forces in Poland, East Germany, and Czecho- close to 30,000 tanks and 20,000 artillery and slovakia, and the Baltic, Belorussian and Car- mortar pieces. About two-thirds of these tanks pathian military districts of the U.S.S.R. With and about three-fourths of all artillery is con- a standing force of roughly 4 million person- centrated in the Soviet divisions, with the re- nel facing Europe, this area houses the War- mainder in the NSWP divisions. 11 By contrast, saw Pact largest, most ready, and most mod- NATO forces comprise far fewer ready divi- ern force, which far outnumbers NATO’s in-place sions in Central Europe, 12 and roughly half as forces. 8 The Soviet forces include roughly 19 many tanks, artillery and mortars, armored divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces Ger- personnel carriers and attack helicopters. Fig- many (GSFG) in East Germany, five divisions ure 4-1 presents some rough comparisons of in the Central Group of Forces (CGF) in Czech- NATO and Warsaw Pact strengths in the Cen- oslovakia, and two divisions in the Northern tral Region as published by the U.S. Depart- ment of Defense. There are disagreements, ‘For planning purposes, the Soviets have divided the areas however, among published estimates due to contiguous with their borders into five “theaters’ of military differences such as state of mobilization, which operations or TVDs--the Northwest, the Western, the South- western, the Southern, and the Far Eastern—in which they forces are counted, and age of data. would expect military action on a strategic scale; the military assets employed in each TVD vary, but the strongest force is considered to be in the Western TVD. The Soviet Union itself ‘See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 2. For an unclassified discussion, is divided into 16 military districts. see Laurence Martin, NATO and the Defense of the Wrest, New The Soviet term–teatr voennykh deistv–has been variously York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1985, p. 24. translated in Western writings as Theater of Military Opera- ‘“See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 3. tions (TMO), Theater of Strategic Military Actions (TSMA), “U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Militar~’ Power, 1986, and Theater of Military Actions (TMA). This report follows p. 12. See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 4. DOD’s current usage of ‘theaters of military operations. and “Unclassified estimates vary on the number of NATO and the acronym taken from the Russian, TVD. Warsaw Pact divisions in the Central Region, and there are many “According to a 1984 NATO force comparison, the Warsaw differences–in personnel and equipment–between NATO and Pact countries have a standing force of about 6 million person- WP divisions. These numbers, therefore, provide the basis for nel, of which about 4 million face NATO in Europe. The stand- a rough force comparison, but should not be viewed as a coming force of the NATO countries comprise about 4.5 million per- parison of equivalent units. See Soviet Military Power, 1987, sonnel, of which about 2.6 million are stationed in Europe. See estimates from the International Institute for Strategic Studies NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons, NATO In- (11SS), London, and L. Martin, NATO and the Defense of the formation Service, Brussels, 1984, p. 4. Wrest, pp. 24-25. 58 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Figure 4-1 .—NATO/Warsaw Pact Force Comparisonsa

570

380

75 0 Fighter-bomber Reconnaissance Bombers ground-attack aircraft aircraft

41,000

18,600

Total military Division Main Artillery/mortar including naval forces equivalents battle tanks

KEY WARSAW PACT

forces and rapidly forces and rapidly deployable forces deployable forces aE~tlmate~ vary ,n the “n~la~~,fled IIterature regarding all of these force comparisons The above should be taken onl Y as a 9ulde as viewed by ‘he u s ‘epartment ‘f Defense The chart reflects U.S est!mates of 1985 data NATO estimates exclude France and Spain SOURCE Sov/ef A4///fary Power, 7986, pp 89, 91 Ch. 4—The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe ● 59

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The main elements of the Soviet ground forces and are being expanded and reorganized to cre- are the tank, motorized rifle, and airborne diate a larger, more capable and higher-speed visions.13 Each of the tank and motorized rifle fighting force for a conventional or nuclear bat- divisions contains a similar complement of ar- tlefield. tillery, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, tactical surface-to-surface missiles, and support units, with the chief difference between them Table 4-1 .—Structure of Soviet Motorized Rifle lying in the number of motorized rifle regiments and Tank Divisions and tank regiments in each: a Soviet tank di- MR Tank vision (estimated at about 11,000 men) includes Total personnel 12,695 11,470 three tank regiments and one motorized rifle Division HQ & HQ company 245 245 regiment; the motorized rifle division, slightly Tank regiments 1 regiment 3 regiments, each 1,145 personnel w/1 ,575 personnel larger (an estimated 13,000 men), has three MR regiments (BMP) 1 regiment 1 regiment motorized rifle regiments and one tank regi- 2.225 personnel 2,225 personnel ment14 (table 4-l). An important point to note MR regiments (BTR) 2 regiments, each w/2,31 5 personnel with regard to FOFA, however, is the overall Artillery regiment. 1,030 1,030 ratio of armored to non-armored vehicles: in SAM regiment (SA-6) 480 480 both tank and motorized rifle divisions, there FROG battalion 170 170 are more than twice as many trucks and other Multiple rocket launcher 15 battalion 255 255 light vehicles as there are armored vehicles Antitank battalion 195 — (table 4-2). The airborne divisions include three Reconnaissance battalion 340 340 Engineer battalion 395 395 airborne regiments and combat support and Signal battalion 270 270 service units. In addition to the regular air- Motor transport battalion 370 370 borne divisions, the Soviets have also formed Maintenance battalion 230 250 Chemical defense battalion 225 225 air assault brigades and battalions. Medical battalion 175 175 Artillery command battery 70 70 According to preliminary research from the Mobile field bakery 45 45 Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, the So- Helicopter squadron 200 200 viets may now be moving toward a more flexi- SOURCE Oefense Intelligence Agency Sowel DwmorM/ Orgm/zaf/on Gude OOB-I 100333-82 ble organization of their forces as well, by turn- July 1982, repr(nted May 1985 pp. 9 80 ing more toward the corps/brigade structure as a possible alternative to the focus on divi- Table 4-2.—Vehicles Soviet Tank and Motorized sions and regiments. Researchers at Sandhurst Rifle Divisions believe the reorganization of some Soviet divisions into corps may presage a larger reorga- Motorized Rifle Division Tank Division nization of the Soviet force structure overall. Total combat vehicles 1,029 976 Such changes would only reinforce the belief of which Tanks 220 238 of the U.S. DoD that these forces have been Armored personnel ——. carriers 649 488 ‘3 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 5. Artillery 108 108 “See Soviet Mih”tary Power 1986, p. 65, and U.S. Department Air defense 52 52 of the Army, Soviet Army Operations, April 1978, IAG-13-U- Trucks 2,501 2,427 78, pp. 2-10-2-13. SOURCE Oefense Intelligence Agency Swef L7w/s/ona/ Orgamzahon Gude OOB-1 100-33382 ‘KSee vol. 2, app. 3A, footnote 6. July 1982 repr(nted May 1985

PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET STRATEGY In assessing Soviet strategy, the extent to saw Pact: all Warsaw Pact armies are orga- which the Warsaw Pact is dominated by the nized along the same lines, have highly stand- U.S.S.R. means that what the Soviets think ardized equipment, and have largely the same and do will generally apply to the entire War- tactics and doctrine as in the U.S.S.R. During Ch. 4—The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe ● 61 wartime, the NSWP forces would be completely gression. Many believe that NATO would be subordinated to the Soviet Supreme High far less likely to react if any Soviet prepara- Command through intermediate-level theater tions for war were ambiguous. And once an commands. offensive is initiated, the Soviets emphasize the importance of speed—i.e., of seizing and Soviet writings outline a number of princi- holding the initiative, retaining the offensive, ples which would govern the use of these forces and maintaining a high rate of advance. The in any Warsaw Pact conventional offensive Soviets place overriding stress on the offen- into Western Europe. The overriding princi- sive as the only “decisive” and therefore the ple would be to adopt a strategy, operational only possible form of war. plans and tactics that would allow Soviet forces to penetrate and neutralize NATO’s defenses In an initial offensive, the Soviets would very quickly, while at the same time: 1) mini- likely concentrate their efforts along certain mizing the risk of escalation to a nuclear catas- fronts, attempting deep, heavy thrusts along trophe, and 2) keeping the conflict off the ter- narrow sectors, and would look to exploit the ritory of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet aim would enemy weaknesses. The purpose would be to be to get rapidly into NATO’s depths and seize confront NATO with an overwhelming attack key objectives–NATO’s nuclear arsenals, C3I on a few small areas which NATO would not assets, air force assets, logistic elements, be able to match. With the different NATO etc.—before NATO would have a chance to corps at different states of readiness, the Soviets fully mobilize, before reinforcements would be are expected to exploit the gaps in NATO’s able to arrive from the United States, and be- defense, and to place the main weight of at- fore NATO could reach a decision to use nu- tack on the more vulnerable areas-i. e., on the clear weapons. U. K., Belgian, Dutch and Danish contingents. (The U.S. and German corps are considered to Of key importance in achieving this princi- be the most formidable forces in NATO, so it ple, the Soviets emphasize, are the two factors is considered unlikely that the Soviets would of speed and surprise. In order to reach their attack them head-on. ) This concentration of objectives quickly—i.e., before Western coun- power in narrow sectors would be conducted tries could prepare their defenses fully or agree as part of an overall plan that would be de- to use nuclear weapons—the Soviets believe signed to lead to a rapid penetration of NATO that a European war must start suddenly, tak- defenses and NATO’s collapse. ing NATO by surprise. This does not necessarily mean total surprise, or even military sur- The Soviets would divide their forces into prise, but political surprise—i.e., an offensive theater level forces—consisting of fronts and which would catch off guard those NATO armies-and tactical units, consisting of divi- leaders who make the political decision to mobi- sions, regiments, battalions, and smaller. In lize, prepare defenses, or release nuclear weap- other words, fronts would be comprised of ar- ons. Although there could never be total surprise, mies; armies are comprised of divisions; divi- a reasonable degree is regarded as essential, sions, of regiments; regiments, of battalions; largely as an important force multiplier: a cer- and battalions, of companies and platoons. tain degree of surprise would make it possible Fronts have no fixed organization. Anywhere to reach objectives with fewer forces than from one to six fronts might be put together would be needed against an enemy prepared to participate in a specific strategic operation for battle. in a TVD (Soviet military theater).16 Armies consist of two main types: the Tank Army, To achieve this speed and surprise, a Soviet offensive would probably be accompanied by (comprised of mainly tank divisions), and the some kind of deception scheme to make troop “For a fuller description, see Soviet Army Operations, De- partment of the Army, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security movements and mobilizations appear to be Command, and U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis occurring for reasons other than planned ag- Center, IAG-13-u-78, April 1978. 62 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Combined Arms Army, (with more motorized Each Warsaw Pact unit would probably be rifle divisions). When tailored for combat oper- assigned a sector to attack and, if of division ations, either type of Army would normally size or larger, a main and secondary axis of include: three to seven divisions; SSM brigade; advance within that sector. In addition, all several artillery brigades; antitank units; AAA units of brigade size or larger would be as- units; SAM regiments; signal regiment; com- signed a depth of attack which contains an im- bat engineer units; pontoon units; assault mediate and subsequent objective or mission. crossing units; transport units; supply facil- In this sense, therefore, second echelons would ities; evacuation and repair units; medical units not be reserves in the usual sense, but rather and facilities.17 Soviet forces are also divided would act as precommitted reserves that would into corps and brigades; corps are generally have been assigned their pre-planned missions comprised of two or three divisions, for opera- before the offensive begins. The reserves, a tions which would not require a full army. small proportion of Warsaw Pact forces,18 would be contingency forces to use against unantici- In order to threaten a quick breakthrough pated threats and to take advantage of unex- and a rapid, continuous penetration deep into pected opportunities. NATO territory, these forces have been organized into successive waves, or echelons, dis- To exploit these breakthroughs, the Soviets persed in great depth. The purpose is to be able have revived the World War II concept of mo- to bring fresh forces against the adversary at bile groups, which would take advantage of any the right times to buildup pressure and force breakthrough to move into NATO’s rear. It and sustain a breakthrough. Thus, Soviet forces is believed that these independent divisions, throughout the entire force structure down to armies, or regiments-with their new capabil- the battalion level are divided into “echelons”-- ities, now commonly called Operational Ma- first, second, and perhaps even third-and re- neuver Groups (OMGs)—would be assigned to serves. Each regiment contains first and sec- operate on their own to capture key objectives ond echelon battalions; each division, first and in the NATO rear that would both pave the second echelon regiments; each army, first and way for the follow-on forces and neutralize second echelon divisions; each front, first and NATO’s theater nuclear threat. In this way, second echelon armies; and the entire theater their task would be to create the conditions of operations would likely have first and sec- for turning a tactical success–i.e., an initial ond echelon fronts. As figure 4-2 illustrates, breakthrough of NATO defenses–into an op- NATO Central Region ground forces in their erational success, by paving the way for the main defensive positions would likely have to second echelons of the army or front of which contend with three different “second eche- they are a part to achieve their preassigned ions, ” or waves of enemy forces following the objectives. lead divisions of the assault armies: the Sec- The Soviets expect a battlefield that would ond Tactical Echelon, or the follow-on divisions of the assault armies; the Second Operational be very confused. There would be no clearly Echelon, or the follow-on armies deploying discernible front line, forces would mingle in depth and would engage primarily in battles from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Western Mil- of encounter (i.e., when both sides engage while itary Districts; and the Second Strategic Eche- 19 on the move). The Soviets plan to win a deci- lon, or Second Echelon Front, consisting of the sion quickly, but are prepared to fight a long follow-on armies from the western military dis- war if they have to. tricts (WMD). As illustrated below, however, the Soviets have demonstrated a good deal of flexibility in how echelonment may be carried out, and these “waves” would not necessarily ‘*See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 7. be of equal weight or significance. “see Christopher N. Donnelly, “The Warsaw Pact View of the Future Battlefield, 120A National Security Report (Royal “Ibid, pp. 2.7-2.10. Military Academy, Sandhurst, A68), pp. 11-14. Ch. 4—The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe 63

Figure 4-2.— Warsaw Pact Concept of Employment -

KEY

XX Division boundary XXXXX (Front boundary) XXXX Army boundary XXXXXX Theater boundary In place forces I L NOTE It IS Important to keep In mind that this diagram is highly schematic, fOr IIlustratlve PurPoses only The Warsaw Pact forces have demonstrated flexlblllty In echelomng forces Ftrst and second echelons— whether tactlcali Operational. or strate91c —would Ilkely not be of equal we19ht or slgnlflcance (See text]

SOURCE General Bernard W Rogers, Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) Myth and Realltles, ’ NATO Rev/ew, No 6, December 1984 p 2

Soviet planners believe that their system of size a “top down” command and control sys- command and control, or ‘troop control, has tern, with commanders at the TVD establish- been structured in the best way to meet the ing concrete strategic goals, and then moving demands of such an offensive. The Soviet the- particular missions and requirements down the ater command structure is highly centralized, hierarchy, to the front, the army, division, and with all Warsaw Pact forces under a single, so on (figure 4-3). The Soviets also engage in centralized military command authority, the a good deal of “pre-planning” of operations, Soviet Supreme High Command (VGK) and i.e., anticipating what future operations might the Soviet General Staff.20 The Soviets empha- look like, and providing specific “norms” by which commanders would make decisions. Thus, “)For a comparison of the Warsaw Pact and NATO command less initiative would be expected of Warsaw and control systems, see John Hines and Phil Petersen, 4‘ Is NATO Thinking Too Small? A Comparison of Command Struc- Pact commanders at the tactical levels than tures, ” Znternatimml Defense Review, No. 5, 1986, pp. 563-572. in the West. 64 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Figure 4-3.—Soviet/Warsaw Pact Wartime Command Organization

Supreme High Command (VGK) (Moscow)

B I f Soviet General Staff 1 J I I ■

Strategic Forces Aviation Missiles Naval Air/Space/Missile Defense

Operational Forces

I Battalion I

In time of war, the NSWP forces would be brought under direct Soviet command and integrated with the various Soviet fronts. acounter a[r and deep Interdiction bcounter alr and deep Interdiction and air SuPPOrt for front cAir support for army SOURCES Adapted from Phil Petersen and John Hines, “Changing the Soviet System of Control,” /rrterrratiorra/ Defense Review, No 3, 1966, and Science Applications, Inc., SovieV?Varsaw Pact EJatflefleld Planning Procedures, Draft, SAIC-W6064—FSRC, May 26, 1966. Ch. 4—The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe . 65

SOVIET/WARSAW PACT GROUND OFFENSIVE INTO EUROPE: A NOTIONAL SCENARIO Although there is a good deal of uncertainty sive preparation for war. The preparation about how the Soviets might put these princi- would include mobilizing personnel, training ples into practice should war in Europe occur, and preparing them to conduct combat opera- the following notional scenario suggests what tions, moving units from their dispersal loca- a Soviet offensive into Europe might entail. tions, making final preparations, and, finally, deploying units to combat.22 Should hostilities be initiated, the organization of forces in the Soviet Western TVD would Because the Soviets would likely want some probably include three first echelon fronts: a of their follow-on forces to be prepared to ex- Northern Front, comprised mainly of Polish ploit any successes at the FLOT, it is expected forces, with its headquarters drawn from the that they would mobilize partially and begin Polish Ministry of Defense; a Central Front, deployment before they would attack NATO. formed from the GSFG, NGF, and East Ger- Most of the Warsaw Pact’s first and second man forces, with its headquarters staff drawn operational echelons are at high states of read- from the staff of the GSFG headquarters; and iness in peacetime. Accordingly, these units a Czech Front, consisting of Czech forces and the Soviet CGF, with its headquarters drawn can be rapidly deployed from their peacetime from the Czechoslovak Western Military Dis- locations into assembly areas. For many of trict headquarters.21 During wartime, the North- those forces in the rear, however, it would take ern Front would likely be deployed to the north- a good deal longer, depending on what level of proficiency the Soviets would want them to ern GDR, tasked to attack northern West reach before hostilities begin. Because of the Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark and, along with airborne and amphibious opera- Soviet emphasis on surprise, and on depriv- ing NATO of any unambiguous warning of an tions, to take the Danish straits. The Central Front would conduct the main theater attack attack, NATO planners believe that the bulk of Soviet forces would be well back from the across West Germany and into Belgium, the border between NATO and the Warsaw Pact southern Netherlands and Luxembourg. The before hostilities would start. According to one Czech Front’s mission would likely be to attack from Czechoslovakia into the southern source, NATO’s strategy for meeting a Soviet FRG to the FRG-Swiss-Austrian border. In conventional attack is based on the assump- addition, a Danube Front, formed from the So- tion of at least some 96 hours warning time, ” although some believe it might well be shorter.” viet Southern Group of Forces (SGF) in Hun- gary and from the Hungarian Army, might be Soviet doctrine for deploying these forces tasked to attack through Austria into the would pose some demanding requirements on Southern FRG. Soviet forces in the Belorus- the timing of movement of the second echelon sian and Carpathian Military Districts might divisions, armies and fronts. These would be comprise two second echelon fronts, with the deployed according to a carefully coordinated Baltic Military District providing theater re- plan, where each succeeding echelon would be serves. committed at the time and place considered As discussed above, the Warsaw Pact ground most effective for exploiting the success of its forces vary widely in their peacetime levels of predecessor and advancing deeper into NATO readiness, with a good number of divisions territory. Thus, second echelon divisions of the manned at levels well below their wartime au- first echelon armies would start at a particu- thorizations; these forces would require exten- 22 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 8. 21 However, estimates vary on the number and composition 23 Laurence Martin, op. cit., p. 50. of fronts, and how they would likely be deployed during war. 24 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 9 66 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

lar distance behind the forces at the FLOT, East-West rail lines in Poland. According to to be committed to battle to achieve objectives these calculations, this would suggest about a certain distance beyond the FLOT accord- 20 trains departing along each rail line per day, ing to schedule. Second echelon armies would departing just about every hour with an aver- be scheduled to arrive a few days later, hav- age maximum spacing of about 35 kilometers 28 ing started some distance behind in Warsaw between trains. After crossing most of Po- Pact territory and with an objective deeper into land, units would proceed to Forward Assem- NATO territory. Second echelon fronts would bly Areas. likewise start even farther back, with a sched- Closer in, the follow-on forces would group ule for attaining objectives even farther into into combat units and continue under their own NATO’s depths. OMGs—parts of armies or power toward the battle. Tanks and other ar- fronts designed to carry out deep penetrations mored vehicles would first be loaded onto trac- and raids as the opportunities arise on the main tor-trailer transporters before being unloaded axes of the attack—would be committed early to move under their own power. An armored and would operate well into NATO’s rear areas combat division would, if possible, move on on their own, without the support of the usual 25 two, three, or four parallel routes; thus, any supply lines. one division moving over roads could stretch Thus, depending on levels of readiness and well over 40 kilometers.29 how they fit into the overall Soviet offensive A division on the move would stop from time plan, the follow-on forces would start anywhere to time in assembly areas: to reorganize, main- from just behind the initial attack forces, to tain vehicles, and rest. Soviet doctrine calls farther back in East Germany, Poland, Czech- for short or long stops, depending on the rea- oslovakia, and then the U.S.S.R. itself. Those sons, the distance from the FLOT, and the di- farthest back would be transported across a vision’s schedule. Upon arrival in the immedi- relatively sparse highway and rail network in ate battle area, a division would assemble in eastern Poland. According to one set of calcu- “final assembly areas, ” or “departure areas” lations, the Soviets might bring forward an 26 before forming into a tactical march formation average of two divisions per day by rail, and 27 to be committed to battle. At this point, the up to one division per day by road. It is esti- majority of support vehicles would move away mated that at least 140 trains would be needed to their own assembly areas, so that columns per day to transport forces across the seven moving forward from this point on would consist mainly of armored vehicles. Having been committed, a division’s regiments would again stop closer in—somewhere in the range of 5 25 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 10. to 30 kilometers from the FLOT—in regiment *’The actual number may well be higher. “Those forces being transported by train would arrive at trans- assembly areas for their final move forward loading complexes near the Russian/Polish border, where they into battle.30 would change from broad gauge to narrow gauge before starting across most of Poland. There are about eight complexes along the Russian/Polish border where equipment is off-loaded from ‘aSee vol. 2, app. 4A, note 11. Russian broad gauge to East European narrow-gauge; time for *eSee vol. 2, app. 4A, note 12. transloading is estimated at about 4 hours per train. 30 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 13.

SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT VULNERABILITIES The above scenario implies some potentially their C3 system, the vulnerability of large serious vulnerabilities in the Warsaw Pact columns of Warsaw Pact troops on the march, system—such as rigidity in Soviet planning, and the fact that Warsaw Pact troops will have Ch. 4—The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe ● 67 to move through critical “chokepoints”-- And potential chokepoints, such as at bridges which could suggest important targets for over the Oder and Elbe Rivers, would also be FOFA. potentially major vulnerabilities; creation of these chokepoints would delay and disrupt For example, some argue that the large num- Warsaw Pact follow-on forces, and as the de- ber of Warsaw Pact follow-on forces, and the layed forces bunch up, would offer good tar- precise timing with which they would move gets for follow-up attacks.” As Soviet rear forward, would leave little room for flexibility services centrally control all logistic support in a Soviet offensive; if this is true, a chang- activities and supplies, disrupting ammunition ing situation in the movement of follow-on resupply and delaying the arrival of the sec- forces, such as might be caused by FOFA, ond echelon could also disrupt Soviet oper- could significantly disrupt the Warsaw Pact 31 ations. timetable for war. Likewise, they contend, a highly structured plan could strain Soviet com- Thus, within the framework of this general mand and control, whose disruption would also scenario, key targets for FOFA might include cause Warsaw Pact planners serious problems. not only fixed targets-such as bridges across The size of the Warsaw Pact columns could the Oder and Elbe/Vltava rivers, railyards, comprise another major weakness, leaving depots, etc.–but the Warsaw Pact forces them- Warsaw Pact forces vulnerable to air attack. selves, including columns of second-echelon ar- ————.———— “See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 14. “See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 15.

Photo credit U S Department of Defense

Soviet tanks. 68 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack mored and support vehicles (moving both by tacking these targets would likely delay the rail and by road), units in assembly areas, enemy reinforcement and resupply at the FLOT, chokepoints, and Warsaw Pact headquarters and might so erode morale in the rear, that the and command posts. Identifying OMGs prior Soviet offensive would be degraded and made to their commitment to battle is also some- more manageable for NATO forces at the front. times considered a major task for FOFA. At-

AREAS OF CONTROVERSY AND UNCERTAINTY This overall scenario, however, has raised a mobilization times, the Soviets could “front number of serious questions among Western load” their forces, enhancing the threat at the observers. In general, these questions concern FLOT and reducing the importance of the fol- how flexible the Soviets might be in implement- low-on forces33 (figure 4-4). ing this overall plan, and thus what it would The question is how much the Warsaw Pact take to delay or disrupt Warsaw Pact follow- on forces enough to have a significant effect might “front load” its forces, and what this would mean for the value of the follow-on on the overall war. In the above scenario, the forces. However flexible Soviet planning may value of FOFA would depend on two important be, it still makes sense that any “front load- conditions: ing” of forces would be limited by certain phys- 1. that there will be follow-on forces, and that ical and doctrinal constraints. Terrain is lim- these follow-on forces will be important ited; and placing a good deal more forces up to Warsaw Pact strategy; and front would complicate logistics problems, re- 2. that NATO’s attack on the follow-on forces duce the amount of surprise, and would make can have a significant effect on their utility Warsaw Pact forces more vulnerable to NATO’s —i.e., enough losses can be inflicted to nuclear or high-accuracy conventional weap- matter; delays cannot be sufficiently com- ons. Thus, it is expected that there will always pensated for; Warsaw Pact C2 can be de- be a certain number of follow-on forces com- graded enough to make a difference; mo- ing up behind. As stated by General Rogers: rale can be eroded enough to significantly .,. critics . . . err in assuming that we are un- affect the cohesion of Warsaw Pact troops. aware that under certain circumstances the So- Each of these conditions, however, is contro- viets might press their second echelon forces versial. up against, or among, those forces of the first echelon. Not only are we aware of this possi- With regard to the first, although Soviet doc- bility, we also take account of the fact that ter- trine may call for the echelonment of forces, rain can only accommodate a finite number of there is not necessarily a prescribed formula Warsaw Pact battalions abreast, thus causing or particular mix of forces necessary for this, the rest to be out of contact, i.e., to be follow- 34 and the Soviets have demonstrated a good deal on forces. of flexibility in how echelonment may be car- Indeed, some contend that the Soviets would ried out. In an offensive into Western Europe, find it difficult to significantly front load their the Soviets may well “frontload” their forces forces beyond those already in place without in the first echelon, and Soviet field commanders exceedingly long mobilization times.35 It is may well echelon their forces differently from likely that if the Soviets were preparing to ini- each other. These decisions would probably de- tiate an offensive, they would provide a good pend on: 1) how ready the NATO forces are facing them, and how much surprise they could 33 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 16. expect; and 2) over what kind of terrain they “General Bernard W. Rogers, op. cit., p. 4. would have to deploy. Especially given long 35 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 17. Ch. 4—The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe ● 69

Figure 4-4.— Example of Soviet “Front-Loading” of Forces

Structure in anticipation of no surprise

1st Army

2nd Army

Structure in anticipation of surprise: “Front-Loading”

1st Army

I 2nd Army

I 3rd Army

4th Army

SOURCE’ Soviet Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK deal of training for newly mobilized, “not ready” many Western observers contend that doing units, and conduct relatively comprehensive so might well lower the target value of the preparations before bringing them up to the follow-on forces for the overall offensive–not FLOT. But doing so would take a good deal just quantitatively, but qualitatively. This was of time. reflected by U.S. Air Force’s Headquarters in Europe, in a briefing which spelled out the fol- Physical constraints, however, would still allowing concern with FOFA (as distinct from low the Soviets to place many more forces for- interdiction): ward than are now estimated to be there,36 and

‘bAccording to one observer, current Warsaw Pact organiza- the combat power of the first echelon by at least 20 percent, tion and operational doctrine suggests that there would likely therefore, this observer suggests that the Warsaw Pact need be around 20 to 25 divisions in the first echelon of an attack do little more than make changes in operational plans-”a rela- against NATO’s Central Region. Analysis of the terrain in West- tively ‘quick fix’ option. ” See Boyd D. Sutton, et al., “Deep ern Europe, however, suggests that this region could support Attack Concepts and the Defence of Central Europe, ” Survival, well over 30 divisions in the first echelon. In order to increase March/April 1984, pp. 64-65. Soviet doctrine calls for the wave, or eche- echelon that is now critical . . . The reinforc- lon, attack arrangement. We here at USAFE ing formations from the Western military dis- do not believe this is the only possible scenario. tricts . . . serve a vital function, but they are A minor shift in Soviet employment concept redundant in numbers and they are mostly not and/or change in their reinforcement plan may leave us with attack capabilities for which first-line combat units . . . It is the GSFG it- there are few targets. Few targets, that is, that self that must be destroyed . . . If these are not contained, they will collapse NATO’s ability will produce tangible returns in a limited span 38 of time.37 (and will) to defend.” Others have pointed out similar concerns. These questions are complicated by uncer- For example, some point out that a concept tainties over what it would take for attacks that considers attacking forces in transit across on individual follow-on forces to have a signif- Poland tacitly assumes that those forces would icant impact on their effectiveness. How pre- be mobilized and moved after D-Day. Should cisely timed would a Soviet offensive be? If these forces be mobilized earlier, however, and a Soviet second-echelon division is delayed a thus be in East Germany when the war starts, certain number of hours, would its mission interdiction in Poland would be futile. Even have been obviated? Or might it make up that if follow-on forces are present, many believe time elsewhere, for example, by staying for their value would be limited in terms of affect- shorter times in assembly areas? At what level ing the overall war. “It is the extended first 38 See Steven L. Canby, “The New Technologies, ” November, 37FOFA: USAFE View, Briefing to OTA staff, HQ USAFE, 1983, p. 25. These sentiments were repeated to OTA staff by Apr. 16, 1986. West Europeans in the FRG and Belgium, April 1986. Ch. 4— The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe . 71 of damage would the performance of a Soviet sarily be structured in advance to work as an unit-at any level—be degraded enough to sig- OMG, but rather resources would be allocated nificantly affect the overall war? And what as necessary to exploit breakthroughs and get would it take to target OMGs or command into NATO’s rear. The Soviets may be provid- posts? ing capabilities in such a way that perhaps any group of regiments, combining fire power, air As mentioned, some suggest that Warsaw assets, and mobile forces, could be put together Pact operations are so precisely timed that dis- as an exploitation force, or “OMG,” as deemed ruption of that plan could throw their entire 39 - necessary. operation off course. But Soviet writings sug gest that the Soviets may build a good deal There is also debate over the degree to which of slack time into operational plans—for ex- disruption of Warsaw Pact C3I in the rear ample, into waiting times in assembly areas— might disrupt Soviet forces as a whole. The to compensate for delays. Similarly, it is un- inherent difficulties in detecting and target- certain how critical delay of logistics support ing Warsaw Pact command posts are many: might be, given that the Soviets keep a good 1) Soviet command posts are well defended and amount of their stocks already forward.40 While camouflaged; 2) they are dispersed widely; 3) delaying the follow-on forces would clearly there is a good deal of redundancy in command have an effect, therefore, there is a good deal posts and in various communications modes; of debate concerning how high a level of dam- 4) command posts at the front and army level age there would have to be for delaying these are largely prepared in advance and therefore forces to have a significant effect on the over- are bunkered or hardened; and 5) because trans- all war. mitter antennas are generally several kilometers from command posts, it would be difficult A similar debate surrounds the relevance of to determine the precise locations of command the OMG to a follow-on forces attack concept. 43 posts. The OMG has commonly been viewed as comprising a specialized formation, specific in its Aside from these difficulties, there is differ- structure and mission, so that an OMG might ence of opinion over how much damage could well be an identifiable target in the enemy’s be done should certain units be “decapitated,” rear.41 According to General Rogers: and how much flexibility may be worked into the Soviet decisionmaking process. Some ar- We consider the OMG to be a high priority target for FOFA . . . Much of the new target gue that because the Soviet command and con- detection and sensing capability we seek to ac- trol system is so highly centralized—where quire is necessary for us to identify which fol- commands pass down a strictly hierarchical low-on forces are organized as OMGs so they system and where, at the tactical level, infor- can be attacked early on.42 mation is limited and initiative discouraged— disrupting command and control would be the But others emphasize that the OMG may most effective way to stop a Warsaw Pact of- also be considered as a task, a concept of oper- fensive. But Soviet writings also reflect a good ations, without necessarily any definite struc- deal of effort to introduce more flexibility into ture. In this sense, the OMG would not com- their decisionmaking process to take any po- prise something that could be targeted in tential disruptions into account.44 It is unclear depth, but rather something that would not how flexible Soviet troop control would prove be identifiable until deployed–i.e., until rela- to be in combat. tively near the FLOT. Viewed this way, individual divisions or armies would not neces- A final area of contention concerns the effect of FOFA on the cohesion among Soviet %ee vol. 2, app. 4A, note 18 and Warsaw Pact forces—i.e., the effect of “]See VO1. 2, app. 4A, note 19 “See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 20 43 See v~ 2, app. 4A, note 21 “General Bernard Rogers, op. cit., p. 4 44 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 22 72 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

FOFA operations on Soviet and Warsaw Pact own forces. For example, the fact that an esti- morale, and how that might affect the capa- mated one-fourth to one-third of all Soviet con- bilities of their troops for implementing Soviet scripts are projected to be of Muslim descent operational plans. FOFA could well have a pro- within the next 10 to 15 years-with lower edu- found psychological effect on the enemy’s cational and technical training, often severe forces, by extending the battlefield into the lack of Russian language skills, and question- enemy’s depths. According to one military his- able loyalty-has raised serious questions torian, “hitting units while they are still on about the potential performance of the non- the line of march, and do not expect it, will have Russian nationalities in combat. Evidence of a far more serious effect than hitting them recent “riots” among Soviet conscripts who harder later, when they are deployed and ex- refused to go to Afghanistan, and defections pecting casualties.”45 Most people, this histo- of Central Asians and Russians within Af- rian suggests, can face terrors, such as going ghanistan itself, have only highlighted these into battle, on a predictable basis; they become concerns. psychologically prepared. But FOFA would But the Soviets are also aware of these prob- make the line of battle unpredictable. And with lems, and have taken steps to deal with them. a military doctrine that emphasizes the impor- Moscow has tightened institutional controls tance of taking the offensive from the first over its Warsaw Pact allies-e. g., by creating shot, Soviet troops might quickly acquire a peacetime TVD High Commands in the late profound loss of confidence or sense of defeat. 1970s, which creates a clearly defined, pre- “It is by using indirect fire to breed this fear, planned wartime command structure in which it is by killing the morale of 90 percent of the Eastern Europe is clearly subordinate to Mos- enemy in addition to killing the bodies of 10 cow; and by assuring that procedures, C2 sys- percent of his soldiers, that we can make our tems and equipment are all standardized, and most effective contribution to the defence of 46 that Russian is the language of command. At the Central Front.” home, Soviet discussions focus on the need to Many believe that these psychological effects train all of their nationality groups to be bet- might only be compounded in the Warsaw Pact, ter soldiers—e.g., through increased Russian given the already questionable loyalty among language training, better technical training, many Soviets and East Europeans toward and retaining mixed nationality units for bet- Moscow. Questions have been raised as to ter control—and for restructuring their own whose side the East Europeans would fight on forces to take account of the changing compo- should hostilities begin, and whether FOFA sition of the conscript pool. On the evidence would further erode the cohesion of an already available, it would be impossible to gauge their tenuous alliance. Likewise, demographic change level of success on either count. in the U. S. S. R., and the growth in the number All of these questions remain complex and and proportion of non-Russians in the Soviet controversial. Several efforts are now under- armed forces, has raised important questions way to attempt to resolve them, or at least to about loyalty and performance in the USSR’s narrow the margin of uncertainty, but many of the answers cannot be known. At present, “Richard Holmes, “The Psychological Effects of Artillery these questions remain at the heart of the de- Fire, ” lecture presented to a DRA (Director Royal Artillery) bate over how much emphasis should be placed tactical seminar, June 1983. Quoted with permission of the author. on FOFA in the West, and how it should be “Ibid. implemented. Chapter 5 Objectives for Attacks of Follow-On Forces CONTENTS

Strategy ...... 44....C.0.+...... $ 75 “Delay, Disrupt, and Destroy’’ ...... 76 Targets: Soviet Divisions...... 77 Range and Desired Military Effects...... 78 Category 1 ...... 78 Category 2 ...... 78

Category 3 ...... ,..$,. ..,.. 78

Category 4 ...... ,$. 79

Category 5 ...... 80

Table Table No. 5-1. Objectives for Attack of Follow-On Forces ...... ’78 Chapter 5 Objectives for Attacks of Follow-On Forces

STRATEGY NATO’s strategy for attack of follow-on forces is a result of the growth of conventional military power of the Warsaw Pact and of the improved mobility of Warsaw Pact ground forces. At present, one might offer the super- ficial argument that NATO’s forces, though smaller than those of the Warsaw Pact, could probably defend successfully against an attack spread equally across the front. But the im- plication of this argument is that the Warsaw Pact would attack NATO’s strength, when it makes much more military sense to attack NATO where it is weakest. The Warsaw Pact surely would not distribute its attack assets uniformly across the theater. Rather it would Photo credit U S De[)artmenl of Defense use the minimum force sufficient to pin down U.S. 3rd Armored Division in Germany, NATO’s defenders, and concentrate its forces to break through NATO’s weakest sectors. of increased numbers of ground forces is not Once through, the attacking elements and politically open to discussion. ’ follow-on forces would move rapidly and deva- statingly through NATO’s rear.1 Another logical approach to the situation is to exploit technology. Simpler, more lethal NATO is not likely to increase significantly weapons might be enough to blunt a Soviet the size of its forces to meet this threat, or to offensive. Such new technology might be ap- add a reserve which could be used to counter plied to strengthen the close-in defense forces, Warsaw Pact breakthrough operations. Equip- but increasing the close-combat capability of ping and operating this large force, even if it every division enough to withstand a Warsaw could be manned, would be enormously expen- Pact massed assault could be prohibitively ex- sive. Nearly all of the Allies, including the 2 pensive. United States, agree that manpower requirements of even the current forces are consider- Thus, there has been great interest in tech- able. For these and other reasons, the option nologies that would improve NATO capability to impede the Warsaw Pact ability to concentrate forces, or to neutralize them if they ‘The Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategy and posture is dis- do concentrate. As stated recently by NATO’s cussed in greater detail in ch. 4. Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), ‘For example, the Federal Republic of Germany foresees a serious problem of manpower shortages: General Bernard W. Rogers, “Allied Command owing to [numerically] weak age groups coming up for induction, Europe can prevent the attacker from main- the number of young men liable to military service will drop so drastically in the next decade that, beginning in 1994, there will taining the momentum of his assault by tar- be a deficit of 100,000 men per annum in the I?undeswehr’s yearly replenishment requirement of 225,000 conscripts, If no remedial .— action were taken, the strength of the [3undeswehr would decrease Wee also Stanle-y R. Sloan, iV.4 TO ‘.9 Future.” Towards a Neur [from 495,000] to barely 300,000 by the end of the nineties. Transatlantic Bargain (J!’ashington, DC: National Defense [Source W’hlte Paper 1985- The Situat)on and the Ikt,t.loprnent of thr F’ederal ,trmeci University Press, 1985), pp. 139-149 for further discussion of Forces, ‘1’he F’edera] Mmlster of Defence (F’ K(; }, ,Jurw, 19 1985 NATO’s options.

75 76 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack geting these follow-on forces . . . before they focused on primary ground combat elements hit our General Defensive Position.”4 such as tank and motorized rifle5 regiments and divisions that are not “engaged,” or in active The term “follow-on force” can cover a great combat with NATO forces at the battle area. many types of force elements, but interest has ———-.— 4Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, “Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA): Myths and Realities, ” NATO Review, No. 6, December 1984, 5Motorized rifle units have a mission and composition gener- p. 2. See also vol. 2, app. 5-A, note 2. ally similar to U.S. Army mechanized infantry units.

“DELAY, DISRUPT, AND DESTROY” The basic concept of FOFA is to delay, dis- pie, disrupting a division is more difficult than rupt, and destroy the enemy’s follow-on forces delaying it, and destroying it is harder still. before they can be brought to bear effectively In any case, NATO attacks on Warsaw Pact against NATO forces. 6 Precise definitions of follow-on forces can only directly cause attri- “delay, disrupt, and destroy” prove a bit elu- tion to elements of a unit or damage to bridges sive under close scrutiny. None of these three and other such structures or facilities needed terms is defined in a NATO- or DoD-wide pub- by the unit. Whether such damage will cause lication. “Delay” and “destroy” are defined delay or disruption, or whether such attrition respectively in Allied Command Europe pub- should be considered destruction of the unit lications, in terms of slowing down enemy oper- as a whole, is open to considerable interpre- ations and inflicting sufficient damage to ren- tation.8 der enemy forces ineffective.’ However, no NATO cannot always guarantee a particu- definition of ‘disrupt is given. Further, even lar result from its attacks of follow-on forces, in the definition of “delay” there is reference even at a given level of damage. “Destruction” to inflicting damage. Proposed doctrine for the is usually defined in terms of the fractions of deep battle in defense emphasizes denying the combat vehicles, personnel, or supplies that enemy the ability to concentrate combat power must be “killed’ in order to render a force ele- against forward divisions by disrupting the 9 ment ineffective. “Delay” can be imposed ei- tempo of follow-on forces. ther through obstacles which take the enemy It is worth noting that U.S. Air Force and some time to remove, or by damaging neces- U.S. Army discussions of disrupting enemy sary equipment. But the enemy’s response to follow-on forces emphasize somewhat differ- the creation of obstacles or damage cannot be ent effects. Air interdiction is carried out to controlled by NATO, so it may be difficult to disrupt the enemy’s scheme of operation and ensure a given amount of delay. For example, control of operations, while Army deep attacks a minefield may cause a Soviet column to go aim to disrupt the tempo of commitment of around or halt until it is cleared, or it may follow-on forces. Although these Air Force and cause the Soviet commander to decide to “bull Army concepts are not inherently contradic- through” and accept some damage instead of tory, they are different: the emphasis in the a delay. first is on disrupting plans; the emphasis in the second is on disrupting timing. The objectives of “delay,” “disrupt,” and 8 “destroy” are perceived as being progressively For more detail, vol. 2, app. 5-A, note 4. Whe concept of “killing” vehicles is commonly analyzed in harder to achieve for a given force. For exam- U.S. military terms of “firepower kill” and “mobility kill. ” In the former, a vehicle is damaged so that its weapons cannot ‘%ee vol. 2, app. 5-A, note 3 for a more detailed discussion be used; in the latter, a vehicle’s propulsion capability is de- of these terms from a NATO perspective. stroyed. Both kills can be further elaborated in terms of the ‘See vol. 2, app. 5-A, note 3 for details. time it would take to repair the damage. Ch. 5—Objectives for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 77

The objective of “disruption” is the most elu- ply that disruption often involves undermin- sive of the triad. Disrupting the enemy’s plans ing unit integrity, for example by degrading or timing depends on delaying or destroying some critical element (such as a command post critical force elements. Usage appears to im- or communication system).

TARGETS: SOVIET DIVISIONS The attack of follow-on forces focuses on go into final assembly areas, or “departure ground combat units that are not yet engaged areas. ” When the regiments leave these areas with NATO forces, but are to join the attack on their final move to battle, the combat com- at some time in the future. This section de- ponents go first, and much of the support scribes the targets presented by the basic com- equipment and personnel stay behind. The di- bat unit or the division, and outlines some of vision rear elements12 also stay behind. There- the ways it can be delayed, disrupted, or de- fore, as the unit moves to battle, a much higher stroyed. fraction of its vehicles are ACVs. The structure of the Soviet combat divisions Regiments and divisions can be affected by is described in chapter 4. A division on the attacks in many possible ways. Damage to ve- move (or halted in an assembly area) consists hicles can be catastrophic or repairable. One of vehicles, both “armored combat vehicles” way of disrupting a division or regiment is to (ACVs)10 and trucks, clustered in some fash- damage specific “critical” elements, especially ion according to their organization for march. the command posts (CPs). Damaging the CP In a recent study, the Institute for Defense (and possibly killing some of the command Analyses (IDA) has analyzed this typical orga- staff) may seriously disrupt the functioning nization, and concludes that a division on the of the unit, by degrading the decisionmaking, march normally includes about 55 march units planning, and coordination of activities. On the with an average of 60 vehicles each (nominally other hand, given the level of reliance on drill battalion-sized), and about 15 smaller (com- and routine procedures, the “scientific’ plan- 11 pany-sized) units. About 25 of the larger ning of operations and doctrine,13 and the in- march units along with the smaller units con- herent momentum of attacking rather than de- tain nearly all of the division’s ACVs; the other fending, the Warsaw Pact forces may be less 30 or so march units are nearly all trucks. The disrupted by CP attack than, for example, U.S. units containing ACVs are about 50 percent forces would be. ACVs and 50 percent trucks; the overall divi- Another type of attack that can delay (or pos- sion is about 30 percent ACVs. These march sibly disrupt) is to create “chokepoints,” which units are the potential targets for attacks on restrict or prevent the forward movement of a follow-on division, both while on the march forces. The most often-discussed chokepoint and while in assembly areas (the grouping of results from damaging abridge, preferably just vehicles in assembly areas is much the same before (or as) a unit starts to use it. Bridges as for road march). across rivers are seen as particularly impor- As the division moves forward toward com- tant, because the river provides a barrier to mitment to battle, its component regiments further movement. The Soviets have planned for this eventuality by procuring extensive tac- “’The term ‘armored combat vehicle’ refers to tanks, armored tical bridging equipment for its ground forces, fighting vehicles (AFVs), armored personnel carriers, armored and by pre-positioning replacement bridges in cavalry vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and surface-to-air missile some areas. (SAM) launchers. “M’.J. Schultis, et al., Follow-On Force Attack (U) (Alexan- 1 ~T~e division rem includes the combat service support units, dria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, Report R-302, draft such as transport, supply, maintenance, and medical services. final version, April 1986), vol. II, p. 11-20, table 11-10. 1 ~ As discussed in ch. 4. 78 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

RANGE AND DESIRED MILITARY EFFECTS The concepts of “delay, disrupt, and destroy, ” Table 5-1 .—Objectives of Attack of Follow-On Forces when applied to the echelons of Warsaw Pact Approximate forces, can give objectives for FOFA in terms Desired range (km) of range of attack and desired military effects. 14 Category effect Target echelon (east of FLOTa) Taking into account SHAPE objectives and 1 Destroy 2d echelon regiments of 5 to 30 the various enemy echelons to be attacked, engaged divisions 2 Destroy 2d Tactical Echelon (2d 30 to 80 FOFA objectives can be grouped into five cat- echelon divisions of egories, as shown in table 5-1. 1st echelon armies) 3. Disrupt 2d Tactical Echelon 80 to 150 The important features of the target cate- 4. Disrupt/delay 2d Operational Echelon 150 to 350 (2d echelon armies of gories are the size of the enemy unit (e.g., regi- 1st echelon fronts) ment, division) and its location in the Warsaw 5. Delay 2d Strategic Echelon 350 to 800 Pact rear (e.g., 30 to 80 kilometers east of the (2d echelon fronts) Forward Line of Own Troops, or FLOT). The ‘Forward Line of Own TcOOPs term “second echelon” is shorthand for both SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 1987 the second echelon of the initially deployed to say that delaying the regiment, particularly Warsaw Pact forces and all follow-on units of at some critical time, may not be a useful ob- the same size as they move into similar posi- jective. tions. For example, ‘‘second echelon regiments of engaged divisions” (category 1) includes both the second echelon regiments of the first Category 2 echelon division at the beginning of the assault, In this category, follow-on divisions of first- and the regiments of all follow-on divisions as echelon armies would be attacked and destroyed they move into the same range band (5 to 30 while they move on roads from their concen- kilometers east of the FLOT). tration areas’* (divisional assembly areas) forward and into departure areas (regimental as- Category 1 sembly areas). The range of such attacks would begin at the region of the FSCL, about 30 In this category, follow-on regiments of en- kilometers, and go out to about 80 kilometers, gaged divisions would be attacked from just 15 stopping short of the concentration areas. This beyond the range of direct-fire weapons, or region would include the departure areas. The about 5 kilometers from the FLOT, out to objective in this category, like the previous one, about 30 kilometers, the region of the Fire Sup- 16 is destruction of the enemy force, only here the port Coordination Line (FSCL). The desired attack is directed against divisions rather than effect of the attacks would be to ‘kill’ the regi- regiments. These attacks would be well within ment, that is, damage enough of the regiment the area of responsibility of the NATO corps. combat assets (vehicle, personnel, essential supplies) to render it ineffective.17 That is not Category 3 “see vol. 2, app. 5-A, notes 5-7. “Direct (or observed) fire weapons include small arms and In this category, follow-on divisions would other infantry weapons, tanks, helicopters, and close air sup- also be attacked, here with the objective of dis- port aircraft under the control of a forward air controller. leThe F$JCL is established by the ground commander to co- rupting or delaying their movements and dis- ordinate air- and ground-based fires against targets closer than rupting the operations of the first echelon ar- the line. It usually corresponds roughly with the range of armies. The range of such attacks would begin tillery weapons. “The precise amount of damage that constitutes a kill cannot be established with certainty, but it is certainly less than ‘aContrary to the appearance of this term, enemy vehicles are 100 percent. It relates to the amount of damage that would ren- likely to be more dispersed in “concentration areas’ than when der a unit incapable of accomplishing its mission, and requir- on the road. The term derives from the process of bringing the ing reconstitution as a new unit. The U.S. Army view of the whole division together in one area at one time, not from any relevant level of damage is shown in vol. 2, app. 5-A, table 5-A-1. process of increasing the density of vehicles within the area. Ch. 5—Objectives for Attacks of Follow-On Forces 79

Categories of Objectives for FOFA Operations

I I I NATO I I I I I I I I I I Armies I Fronts I 1 5 30 80 150 350 *

km east of FLOT, not to scale

SOURCE Off Ice, of Technology Assessment 1987 approximately 80 kilometers from the FLOT, and the expected time of arrival of the next and go out to approximately 150 kilometers highest echelon, because imposing such a de- from the FLOT, the limit of the NATO corps’ lay would prevent the division from being em- area of responsibility. This region would in- ployed in its usual echelon as planned.19 clude the concentration areas (division assembly areas), which would probably be the farthest Category 4 forward that Warsaw Pact armored forces would be transported on vehicle carriers. The In this category, follow-on armies would be creation and maintenance of such a barrier attacked in order to disrupt or delay their could delay the division and perhaps disrupt movement forward. The range of such attacks the division’s movements, and disrupt the would begin at about 150 kilometers from the operations of the army to which the division FLOT, beyond the area of responsibility of the belongs, by making the division unavailable corps, and would go back to about 17° east for its designated mission. Also in this area longitude, 300 to 400 kilometers east of the would be the divisional and army command IGB and extending through central Poland. posts, the attack of which might also disrupt This region would include the Oder and Neisse operations. rivers (at the border between the German Democratic Republic and Poland), which could In considering the desired effect of disrup- also be used to create a barrier by attacking tion, it may be that enough delay would ac- the bridges. Units would move into this region complish the purpose. The amount of delay sufficient to do so might be the difference be- ‘This criterion results in a certain number of days of delay tween the expected time of arrival of a unit constituting disruption, as discussed in vol. 2, app. 5-A, note 8. 80 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack from the east generally by train and off-load tude to and perhaps across the Soviet border, onto roads, on which they would travel either which is 600 to 850 kilometers east of the IGB. on transporters or under their own power. This region contains the Vistula and Dunajec rivers and the rail transloading areas at the Polish/Soviet border where the rail gauge Category 5 changes. Movement of forces through this area would be primarily by rail. The amount of de- In this category, elements of follow-on fronts lay necessary is not established, but it appears would be attacked in order to delay their ar- reasonable that a delay similar to that for cat- rival at the main battle. The area of these at- egory 4 attacks would be operationally sig- tacks would range from about 170 east longi- nificant. -.

Chapter 6 Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces CONTENTS

Approaches for FOFA ...... 83 Category 1–5 to 30 Kilometers...... 83 Category 2–30 to 80 Kilometers...... 84 Category 3–80 to 150 Kilometers...... ,. 85 Category 4-150 to 350 Kilometers...... 87 Category 5-350 to 800 Kilometers...... 88 Functional Needs ...... 89 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) ...... 89 Surveillance and Reconnaissance...... 89 Situation Assessment ...... 90 Target Acquisition ...... 90 Attack Control...... 92 Weapon Delivery ...... 92 Target Kill ...... 92 Operational Issues ...... 93 Target Type...... 93 Target Disposition...... 94 Platform and Weapon...... 95 Target Acquisition ...... 96 Range ...... 97 Operational Concepts for SOFA ...... 97 Artillery Attack of Regiment Columns: Category 1 (5 to 30 km) ...... 97 Stand-Off Air Attack of Division Columns: Category 2 (30 to 80 km). . . 98 Missile Attack of Division Columns: Category 2 (30 to 80 km) ...... 99 Air Attack of Chokepoints and Halted Units: Category 3 (80 to 150 km) ...... 100 Cruise Missile Attack of Deep Rail Network: Category 5 (350 to 800 km) ...... 100

Tables Table No. Page 6-1. Summary of Targets and Objectives for FOFA...... 84 6-2. Options for FOFA Operations ...... ,. 94 Figures Figure No. Page 6-1. Typical March Formation, Soviet Tank Division...... 86 6-2. Stand-Off Air Attack of Division Columns ...... 99 Chapter 6 Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces

This chapter discusses those concepts for Only with the use of explicit concepts of achieving the objectives presented in chapter operations can one provide a basis for the 5 that OTA has been able to identify as feasi- identification of the component parts, whether ble and under serious consideration by the mil- they be surveillance systems, assessment centers, control centers, delivery systems, itary. According to DoD, a‘ ‘concept of opera- z tions” is defined as: weapons, or munitions. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad out- There are many different possible concepts line, of a commander’s assumptions or intent of operations for FOFA, involving various in regard to an operation or series of opera- weapons and attack schemes. The discussion tions . . . The concept is designed to give an below details several approaches for achieving overall picture of the operation. It is included the objectives discussed in chapter 5 and de- primarily for additional clarity of purpose. ’ scribes the concepts of operations for the approaches that appear feasible. The approaches A concept of operations defines the require- require certain target acquisition and weapon ments for systems and organizations. For that capabilities, which are discussed subsequently. reason, a concept of operations can be used as Some of these target acquisition and weapons a framework for acquisition strategies to de- needs apparently cannot be met, for reasons velop, acquire, and deploy equipment (and de- given below. velop procedures) to provide the needed capability:

‘Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associ- ‘Lt. Gen. Glenn A. Kent, USAF (Ret.), Concepts of Opera- ated Terms, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub. 1, 1 June 1979. This tions: A More Coherent Framework for Defense Planning (Wash- document incorporates NATO STANAG 3680, “NATO Glos- ington, DC: The Rand Corp., Rand Note N-2026-AF, August sary of Terms and Definitions for Military Use (AAP-6). ” 1983), pp. 11-12.

APPROACHES FOR FOFA The categories of FOFA objectives (as de- ing these targets appears to be to attack them fined inch. 5) depend primarily on the echelon while they are moving on roads on their final of force to be attacked and on the range of the approach to battle.4 These regiments will be attack. Each objective can be achieved through moving in battalion columns of approximately one or more approaches. These different ap- 40 to 50 vehicles, with the combat battalions proaches–summarized in table 6-l–are out- in the lead. There are about eight battalion- lined below in terms of the targets and kinds sized column targets per regiment. In these of attack for each approach. columns the fraction of armored combat vehicles is roughly 70 percent. The support ele- Category 1—5 to 30 Kilometers ments of the combat regiment are not likely to leave the departure area with the combat The objective of category 1 FOFA opera- elements. tions is the destruction of second-echelon regiments. 3 The most feasible approach to destroy- ‘Details of march considerations for Soviet units on the at- — tack are discussed in U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Com- ‘As explained inch. 5, the term “second echelon” denotes both mand, Soviet Army Operations (Arlington, VA: U.S. Army In- the second echelon of the initial deployment and elements of telligence and Threat Analysis Center, IAG-13-U-78, April 1978), follow-on forces that are in the same range band and disposi- pp. 3-20 through 3-31. Unit sizes and compositions were dis- tion, as the follow-on forces become deployed and engaged. cussed in ch. 5 of this report; see in particular table 5-2. 83 84 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Table 6-1: Summary of Targets and Objectives for FOFAa

Range (kilometers beyond FLOT) Targets 5 to 30 30 to 80 80 to 150 150 to 350 350 to 800 Moving columns ...... 1 1 2 Units in assembly areas ...... 1 1 2 Command posts...... 2 2 Chokepoints and halted units ...... 2 2 Units transported on roads ...... 2 Units in off-loading areas ...... 2 Units transported on rails ...... 3 Rail network ...... 3 Levels of damageb 1 “Destroy” 2 “Disrupt” 3 “Delay” aThl~ ~holce of ~bje~tive~ for FOFA ~perati~n~ is based on i nformatlon received from SH ApE, IJ S Army, and IJ S Air Force sources, as discussed i n ch 5 Th!s choice of taraets and oblectlves IS for OTA analysis only, and IS not intended to be exhaustive or definitive bsee c} 5 for discussion of desired levels of damage SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1987

According to the Institute for Defense Anal- While on the move, the division marches by yses (IDA),5 each column will be on the road regiments along two or more roads. The orga- for only about 30 to 60 minutes, and it will take nization for march is illustrated in figure 6-1. the entire regiment between 1.5 and 2.1 hours Compared to category 1 attacks, a smaller frac- to accomplish the move forward. In a single tion of the vehicles will be armored combat ve- day, a corps facing a Warsaw Pact main at- hicles. Of the 55 or so battalion-sized columns tack may see seven such second-echelon regi- in a division, about 25 will contain armored ments moving forward,6 and their movements combat vehicles, and these 25 will average may span a total of 9 hours of the day. about 50 percent armored vehicles.8 Overall, about 30 percent of the vehicles in a Soviet The amount of time a target battalion is mov- combat division are armored. In one day, a ing is so brief that it may not be feasible to NATO corps facing a Warsaw Pact main at- reattack it. Therefore, individual attacks should tack will see a single division moving in this be “sized” to destroy a battalion in one attack. range. Category 2—30 to 80 Kilometers This portion of the division’s movement will last about 6 to 8 hours; any one battalion-sized The objective of FOFA operations in this cat- column will take about 1.5 to 3 hours to trav- egory is the destruction of second-echelon di- erse this distance. Compared to Category 1, visions. Within this range, divisions will be there will be more opportunity to attack each moving between their division assembly areas target and perhaps opportunity to re-attack. (concentration areas) and the departure areas and then occupying the departure areas.7 Another approach to destroying second-echelon divisions is to attack their component regiments in their assembly areas.9 These areas will be occupied for at least several hours, while the units perform final preparations for bat- ‘Institute for Defense Analysis, “Follow-On Forces Attack, tle (including maintenance, supply, and rest). Volume II: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisi- Although the term “assembly area” may give tion (RSTA) Architecture To Support FOFA, ” IDA Report an impression of a concentrated target set, in R-302. ‘Ibid., pp. II-4 through 11-10. The number of regiments mov- fact the clusters of vehicles maybe rather dis- ing per day is derived assuming that the corps faces an initial deployment of three first-echelon divisions plus one follow-on division entering the battle in 24 hours. 8See ch. 5 for further details, especially table 5-1. ‘For more detail, see vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 2. ‘See vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 4 for details. Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 85

haps while in assembly areas. ’” They move on roads, with the tracked vehicles either on transporters (“low-boys’ or moving under their own power. Although the moving targets are predominantly the same as in the previous categories, armored combat vehicles on transporters are “cold” (engines off and cool) rather than “hot” (engines on and emitting hot exhaust).11 Two other approaches to disrupting second- echelon divisions (and first-echelon armies) are often advanced. In the first, “chokepoints” are created in front of moving Warsaw Pact units, and the units are subsequently attacked while they are halted trying to clear the chokepoint. The other approach is to attack command posts. The classic concept for chokepoint attack is to destroy bridges across a major river just prior to the arrival of an enemy unit. In this range, the Elbe, Saale, and Vltava rivers provide a major north-south barrier. Other possible chokepoints include narrow roads through towns or natural defiles, tunnels, and dikes. The advantage of this approach is that the target division will be halted at the chokepoints, simplifying the problem of target location because targets will not be moving. Further, the density of vehicles (and personnel) will be Photo credit U S De~artrnen( of Defense greater than for either moving units or assem- Tanks traveling on West German Autobahn. bly areas, making area munitions more destructive. persed in a large area. Further, units are likely A recent major study considered destruction to take every possible advantage of cover and of the bridges over the Elbe river for a period concealment; wooded areas and urban areas of up to 10 days as a means for creating a bar- are preferred. However, there may not be rier that would delay the introduction of follow- enough areas with good cover available to meet on forces into the battle. The expected impact the needs of all the units moving through, and of these attacks was unclear, and the effort needed to enforce an effective barrier was seen those areas that are used may not provide good 12 cover after a few days of combat. as being potentially very large. This is because the ability of the Warsaw Pact to repair Category 3—80 to 150 Kilometers roads and bridges is often quite high, and the Warsaw Pact forces are thought to have large At this range, the objective of attacking follow-on forces is limited to disruption. In addition to the types of attacks discussed ‘“See vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 5 for further detail. above, other approaches are also under con- ‘‘Whether engines are cold or hot is important to certain kinds of smart anti-armor munitions, because some detect and engage sideration. warm targets by the infrared energy they emit. See ch. 11 for further discussion. Second-echelon divisions can be attacked “Institute for Defense Analysis, “Follow-On Forces Attack, directly while they move in this range, and per- Volume I: Summary, ” IDA Report R-302. 86 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Figure 6-1 .—Typical March Formation, Soviet Tank Division

m 15-25 km 9

I 4 Flank party x t x 20-30 km I

LEGEND xx Division Ill Regiment II Battalion I Company (about 3,500 (about 450 (about 60 (about 10 ● 00 platoon ~ Motorized rifle unit vehicles) vehicles) vehicles) vehicles) ~~ Tank unit ~ Reconnaissance unit [+] Reinforced [ -1 Light (understrength) SOURCE: U.S Army Intelligence and security cornrnmd, soviet ~r~y omra~lom (Arlington, VA: us intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, IAG-13-U-78, April 1978), PP 3.24 Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces . 87 quantities of mobile tactical bridging equip- to have several command posts available at ment and stockpiles of temporary bridges at division and army levels, typically a main post, prepared crossing sites. Attacking road bridges an alternate, and a rear.15 Thus, it is difficult may have the same problems, and the dense to predict the effect of destroying one or more network of roads in central Europe may often command posts in the division. offer alternative routes. The other approach to disrupting second- Category 4—150 to 350 Kilometers echelon divisions (and first-echelon armies) is The objective here is to disrupt and delay to attack their command posts. ’3 It is likely second-echelon armies. General approaches are that a command post can be destroyed if its attacking units moving on roads, and creat- location is known, but the effect on combat ef- ing chokepoints and barriers to their further fectiveness of destroying the command post movement forward. is not clear.14 Further, the Soviet practice is “See vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 8 concerning CP locations and dwell “While moving, there may be additional CPs (e.g., forward). times. Also, other division command and control centers such as the “This relates to the question of tactical flexibility (and rigid- artiIlery fire control group might assume the CP function, if ity) of Soviet forces, which is discussed in ch. 4. necessary. 88 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Photo credit U S Department of Defense Military unit transported by rail.

Divisions of the second-echelon armies will rectly. 16 For this approach to be effective the move toward this region from the east on rail, bridges must be attacked just as or before the and move onto roads at off-loading areas enemy division uses them, and the subsequent (OLAs) in this region. From that point they attack of forces would have to follow closely. will move forward on roads, with the armored Due to the Warsaw Pact capability to rebuild vehicles either on transporters or moving un- or replace road bridges, the rivers would have der their own power. The possible targets for to be under surveillance every 12 to 24 hours direct attack include trucks and armored ve- to discover new bridges. Pontoon bridges just hicles in the OLAs, trucks moving forward below the river surface would present a par- with armored vehicles on transporters (’ ‘cold” ticular problem for surveillance systems. tanks), and armored vehicles moving under their own power (“hot “). Divisions will be mov- Category 5—350 to 800 Kilometers ing with their full combat services support and rear support complement. In this deepest region, the objectives of FOFA operations are to delay the second- Chokepoint attack could take advantage of echelon fronts during the 10 to 20 days after the Oder and Neisse rivers by attacking road D-day in which the fronts mobilize and move bridges over these rivers. Also, the units halted behind dropped bridges could be attacked di- “See vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 9 for additional details. —

Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 89 forward.17 These units originate in the Soviet would themselves be mined, further aggravat- Union, and are transported by rail from garri- ing the delay. The use of such mines and rail son areas to the theater of battle. Attacks to bridge attack could impose substantial delays delay this movement can be targeted against on rail movements. the units themselves, or against the rail trans- Attacks against units on trains in Eastern portation system being used. Europe would be aimed at causing sufficient There are a number of rail bridges across the damage to delay the unit by at least several Vistula river that could be attacked to delay days. Attacks would be repeated every 3 to movement. These would also be more difficult 4 days. to repair than most road bridges, due to the As the component Soviet divisions cross alignment necessary for rail repair and the from the Soviet Union into Poland and Czech- loads that must be carried by the repaired oslovakia, because of the rail gauge change, bridge. Reattack of bridges after 10 to 15 days “transloading” must take place between trains. would allow repairs to be monitored and new There are a number of transloading zones at bridges identified and targeted. Also, elements the Soviet border, comprising many yards,]’ of the rail network itself could be attacked with whose destruction would inhibit this move- mines that would damage the rails and disable ment, and which could provide especially val- trains when they approached. Because the uable targets if attacked while occupied. Other train would be derailed, a delay of 18 to 24 high-value infrastructure targets include the hours could be expected before the rail line 18 power stations in Poland that provide electri- would be clear. The routes for repair trains city to the rail system, and the (relatively few) “If the J4’arsaw Pact has a sufficiently long mobilization period control stations that schedule and coordinate prior to war these units may have already moved forward, and rail movement. this approach could not be effective. “The use of mines against vehicles on roads is not expected to be as effective in damaging forces or delaying movements, due to the substantial mine-clearing equipment of Warsaw Pact forces and the flexibility of road vehicles for bypassing mine areas. “See vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 10 for details.

FUNCTIONAL NEEDS Several functions must be accomplished in Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses order to implement these approaches, including: In order to find or attack follow-on forces ● suppression of enemy air defenses, and survive, NATO tactical aircraft must be ● surveillance and reconnaissance, supported by effective suppression of enemy ● situation assessment, air defenses (SEAD). Warsaw Pact air defenses ● target acquisition, are formidable, particularly in target areas. The ● attack control, use of stand-off weapons could reduce or elim- ● weapon delivery, and inate attrition of weapon delivery aircraft in ● target kill. the target area, but not en route to the target areas. Because some of these tasks are quite difficult Surveillance and Reconnaissance to accomplish under longer range conditions, they illustrate the advantages and disadvan- Surveillance is the routine collection of infor- tages of the approaches discussed above. mation for situation assessment, target acqui- 90 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

sition, attack control, or cueing of reconnais- units from other traffic.24 Analysis of the data sance systems. Reconnaissance is the collection is required to infer enemy activities and inten- of information about specific areas of high inter- tions for reliable situation assessment. Fail- est for situation assessment, target acquisition, ure to fully implement all the enhancements or attack control. Either maybe performed by identified by SHAPE25 would limit, but not manned or unmanned aircraft equipped with eliminate, ACE capability for situation stand-off sensors, by ground-based sensors, by assessment in the 1990s. That is, while all of ground forces penetrating enemy territory, and these systems are desirable and would be use- by other means. Most proposals for enhanc- ful, the lack or loss of any one of them would ing Allied Command Europe’s (ACE ‘s) FOFA not be catastrophic. capability will require current surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to be enhanced. Target Acquisition A number of systems now in development Additional data beyond that required to de- could contribute to NATO’s capability to find tect or recognize a unit is required to “acquire” and track follow-on units; some are already pro- it as a target-i. e., to locate it with sufficient viding limited operational capabilities. Elec- accuracy and timeliness to attack it effectively. tronics intelligence (ELINT) sensors such as The accuracy required for targeting will depend SENIOR RUBY, TEREC, and PLSS20 could 21 on target type and disposition (e.g., moving locate air defense radars. Communications in- or stopped) and on the types of munitions, telligence (COMINT) sensors such as SENIOR weapons, and weapon platforms available for SPEAR and GUARDRAIL can monitor radio use. traffic used to control unit movements. Im- agery intelligence (IMINT) sensors such as Stationary Targets ASARS-II and AQUILA22 could provide radar and electro-optical imagery of vehicle clusters Acquiring stationary targets in assembly stopped in assembly areas. And moving tar- areas requires some form of high-resolution im- get indication (MTI) radar, such as Joint agery, such as can be provided by electro- STARS,23 could detect vehicle motion and optical, forward-looking infrared, or film measure vehicle velocity, thereby providing a cameras, by infrared line scanners, or by form of measurement and signature intelli- synthetic-aperture radar. This information gence (MASINT). must be available to the attacking weapon when the vehicles are stationary. Targets in assembly areas are expected to dwell there sev- Situation Assessment eral hours, so timeliness of target location data Fusion (i.e., correlation) of data of several does not appear to be a critical problem in this disciplines (e.g., ELINT, COMINT, IMINT, case. COMINT data will not usually be suffi- and MTI MASINT) may be required to relia- cient for attack of enemy combat units, be- bly recognize, track, and count follow-on units. cause a unit may use communications an- For example, fusion of MTI MASINT and tennas several kilometers away from itself. IMINT can help distinguish moving combat

“Interspersed throughout the Warsaw Pact rear will be a great ‘“SENIOR RUBY and TEREC are operational systems; PLSS deal of military traffic, mostly trucks, re-supplying and other- is in development. See ch. 10 for details. wise supporting engaged and forward units. Armored elements *’The units could depend on the area air defense radar net- are expected to comprise only about 10 to 14 percent of mili- work for long-range coverage and tactical warning of attack tary traffic in this area, and an even smaller percentage of total by NATO tactical aircraft. (including civil) traffic. –Model of Vehicle Activity in the War- ‘2 ASARS I I is in production, with a limited operational capa- saw Pact Tactical Rear During a Conventional A ttack Agw”nst bility already fielded; AQUILA is in development. See ch. 10 NATO (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp., Rand Note N-1 495- for details. AF, September 1980). “Joint STARS is in development; see ch. 10 for details. 2KSee vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 11 for details. Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 91

Moving Targets dividually distinguishable from many others An attack on moving combat units requires in a division, although it is sometimes argued timeliness on the part of the attacker. Real- that the vehicles of a CP deploy in unique and identifiable patterns, allowing their location time radar coverage could be provided by air- by careful analysis of imagery .28 borne MTI radar or by electro-optical or forward-looking infrared cameras on unmanned Deep Targets aerial vehicles. Automated data communications systems could provide the links neces- Reconnaissance systems held at the national sary for timely transmission of target location level primarily for strategic reconnaissance data to the weapons platform. For attacks by missions might be made available to the thea- tactical aircraft, the target motion during the ter commander, who could task them to sup- aircraft’s flight must be taken into account, port reconnaissance, surveillance, and acqui- so it may be useful to provide updated target sition (RSTA) needs. These capabilities, if made location information to the aircraft. It may also a sufficiently high priority relative to other be desirable to provide an in-flight update to missions, could provide a great deal of infor- an attacking missile, although the missile’s mation about movement in the enemy’s rear. flight time is much shorter than that of aircraft. In particular, this information could provide cues to general movement activity in given As an alternative, target acquisition could areas, enough to task attack assets which be provided by systems on board the weapon would then acquire targets autonomously. platform itself. For example, target acquisi- Also, attacks into the two deeper bands could tion radar on board attacking tactical aircraft destroy infrastructure targets that support could provide the final target location data to movement but are not moving themselves. Al- the weapon launched from the aircraft. This though it may be possible to attack combat approach has the disadvantage of exposing the units deep in the enemy rear on occasion, these attacking aircraft to the target air defenses national capabilities are not likely to be able for the extra time it takes to acquire the tar- to support an overall FOFA strategy based get, but allows the attacking platform to oper- on this approach. ate independently of a separate target acquisition system. There is no known system that would provide imagery surveillance of the possible off- Special Targets loading areas (OLAs) with sufficient timeliness Target locations for permanent bridges can to support attacks while they are occupied. Al- be determined in peacetime. In wartime, tem- though such an arrangement could be imagined, it is not likely to be an efficient use of national porary bridges may be built to augment these, and damaged bridges will probably be repaired assets to attempt to “catch’ enemy units in requiring reconnaissance to determine when OLAs. The RSTA needs for this approach are they are again active. Information on tem- thus apparently prohibitive. porary and repaired bridges might be obtained Similarly, creating a chokepoint followed by from imagery. attack of halted units can be dropped from consideration at this range. Warsaw Pact road Command posts (CPs) maybe very difficult to detect and identify; there is no known rou- bridge repair and replacement capability is 26 sufficient to require reconnaissance of a river tine, reliable means for targeting them. They every 12 to 24 hours, in order to maintain a are primarily known by their communications (and other) emissions, but these radiate from barrier. This timeliness is not likely to be met antennas that may be some distance from the by the national level sensors available. The creation of a barrier for a specific unit, and its CP itself.” The vehicles in a CP are not in- “%lee vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 12 for further discussion. “See Institute for Defense Analysis, ‘*Follow-On Forces At- tack, Volume I: Summary, ” IDA Report R-302, Draft Final, 28Examples of command post data are given in “Interdiction April 1986, p. ES-35. Target Set for Analysis, “ draft, BDM Corp., BDM W-84 -0145-TR. 92 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack subsequent attack, is likely to be even less Weapon Delivery feasible. The term “platforms,” the systems that de- The Warsaw Pact rail transportation system liver weapons, includes bombers, some fighters, could be attacked to delay the movement of and transporter-erector-launcher vehicles for Soviet armies, by destroying bridges and min- ground-based missiles. Free-fall bombs must ing segments of railroad. Targeting can be ac- be released near their targets; glide bombs may complished in peacetime. The Warsaw Pact has be released at a short stand-off range; air- substantial capability to repair damage, and launched missiles may be launched from a some revisit of the destroyed rail bridges is greater stand-off. All these require aircraft as necessary to maintain the barrier they provide. weapon delivery platforms. Ground-launched Revisit within 5 to 10 days is likely to be suffi- missiles need only be delivered to a launch site cient,29 and national reconnaissance systems and launched. are likely to be capable of this mission. Warsaw Pact units moving through the Target Kill transportation system can be attacked di- Killing targets requires weapons, which con- rectly. In this case target acquisition may be tain munitions and, in some cases, guidance provided by systems onboard the platform (air- systems. craft) or the weapon (missile) itself. Such an approach depends on there being a high den- Anti-Armor Munitions sity of targets, so that each attacking platform or weapon has a high probability of acquiring Certain munitions embodying “emerging a target. technologies” show promise of much higher lethalities against heavily armored vehicles Attack Control than current-generation munitions provide. Two such technologies are self-forging fragment Some form of command and control support technology, which is used in sensor fuzed mu- system is needed to coordinate and control at- nitions such as Skeet, and terminally guided tacks within, between, and across NATO com- shaped-charge technology, which is used in mu- mand echelons. For those attacks against tar- nitions such as the Terminally Guided War- gets within the Fire Support Coordination Line head (TGW) for the Multiple Launch Rocket (FSCL), close coordination between ground- System (MLRS).30 Munitions of either type can and air-based attack assets is necessary to en- be packed as submunitions into dispensers on sure coverage of targets without duplication air-delivered weapons or ground-launched mis- of effort and to avoid damaging NATO air- siles or artillery rounds,31 each of which might craft. If a ground-based capability to attack kill several armored vehicles. beyond the FSCL is developed, similar coordi- Other technologies go along with the ad- nation will be necessary at greater range. vanced kill mechanisms to provide multiple ar- Many operational concepts also require new mor kills per weapon. These include dispenser attack control capabilities. NATO forces must technology, or ways of dispersing submuni- accomplish quickly the processes of assigning tions in a controlled fashion such that they give targets to weapons and of providing final tar- optimal engagement of vehicles in the “foot- get location updates to platforms in order to print” of the weapon. Also important is the support attack of moving targets. sensor technology that makes the submunition “smart,” or able to detect and follow moving target vehicles.

‘gNote that the time to repair a rail bridge is substantially 30 longer than the time to repair a road bridge, due to the align- See ch. 11 for further discussion. ment necessary for the rails and the larger weight of loaded alspecific munitions and submunitions programs are geared rail cars that the bridge must support. to specific platforms, however. Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 93

Weapon Guidance this case the weapon must have a propulsion Ground-launched weapons with dispenser, system to get it to the target, as well as a guidance system to keep it on course. sensors, and effective submunitions can produce multiple armor kills only if guided (or de- For attacks beyond the range of the theater livered) with sufficient accuracy to the target bombers (Buccaneer, F-1 11, and Tornado), long- location. Even with highly accurate target loca- range cruise missiles, if developed, could be tion data, lack of weapon delivery accuracy can used. For attacks of rail bridges, an electro- render these weapons ineffective. Missiles optical scene correlator (such as presently used must have accurate guidance in order to en- by Tomahawk missiles) could guide the weapon gage targets at ranges of 100 to 200 kilome- to the target area, and a laser radar could pro- ters or more. Various guidance technologies vide final guidance to achieve the necessary are applicable to this problem, including fiber- accuracy. For mining rail segments, the mis- optic gyroscopes for inertial navigation and sile could use either present terrain compari- miniature Global Positioning System (GPS) re- son (TERCOM) guidance or GPS, coupled with ceivers for navigation via satellite. some type of infrared or millimeter wave sen- Tactical aircraft can launch weapons at a sor for detecting the rail lines. For attacks of trains on railroads, a cruise missile would need “stand-off” distance from the target, staying a capability to navigate to the neighborhood far enough away to avoid the air defenses in of the rail line, recognize the railroad, and then the immediate target area, about 20 to 30 kilom- 33 32 fly along the rails until it detected a train. eters for Soviet regiments and divisions. In ~~The primary division air defense units are the SA-6, with a nominal range of 30 kilometers, and the SA-8, with a nominal range of 12 kilometers; see U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet “Since the tactical vehicles would be on rail cars and “cold,” Military Power (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing and perhaps not loaded with ammunition and fuel, munitions Office, 5th cd., March 1986). Countermeasures can reduce these that would damage the trucks, personnel, and perhaps light ar- effective ranges. mor may give the greatest effectiveness to such attacks.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES Sifting through the advantages and disad- thought on attack with heavy armor.” From vantages of different operational concepts is this perspective they are high-value targets. a complex task. There are many different op- However, tanks are specifically designed to be tions for constructing operations concepts, highly survivable and resistant to damage. with different target types, target dispositions, Light armor includes the other armored com- attack objectives, platforms and weapons, tar- bat vehicles, such as armored fighting vehi- get acquisition systems, and ranges. Table 6-2 cles, armored personnel carriers, and self-pro- lists the various options in each of these areas. pelled artillery. These pose a substantial threat The relative advantages and disadvantages of because they have combat capability. all of these options are discussed below, by way of introduction to those operational concepts Trucks contain supplies (primarily ammu- that appear to be feasible and that have been nition and fuel, which are the most critical determined by OTA to have some serious sup- supplies for combat capability) and some per- port in military circles. sonnel, and specific support capabilities (e.g., engineer, maintenance, and repair). These are Target Type the easiest vehicles to damage because they are not armored, but the damage does not im- Tanks present the greatest threat to NATO because of their combination of mobility and firepower, and the emphasis in Soviet military 34 See ch. 4 94 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

Table 6-2.—Options for FOFA Operations damage tanks. Lightly armored vehicles are an intermediate case, somewhat vulnerable to Target type ...... tanks, light armor, trucks, – selected high-value units, both types of munitions. Bridges usually can bridges. be destroyed only by large unitary warheads Target disposition ...... fixed, sitting, moving on that are accurately delivered. transporters, moving under own power. Platform and weapon...... artillery, direct attack aircraft, Target Disposition ground-launched ballistic missile, tactical aircraft with Fixed targets such as bridges generally can short-range standoff weapon, long-range cruise missile (air- be located in peacetime with high precision. or ground-launched). Target location errors are low, allowing high Target acquisition ...... on-board systems, external weapons effectiveness. However, for the same systems. Range ...... close-in (5 to 30 km), reasons, these types of targets are hardened, intermediate (30 to 150 km), proliferated, or both. For example, temporary long (150 to 800 km). bridges and repair segments are stockpiled, SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1987. and organic repair and tactical bridging capabilities are high in Soviet units. mediately affect combat capability and may not be felt for several days. Sitting targets (e.g., units in assembly areas) are mobile targets that are not moving when Selected high-value units include command attacked. These targets are likely to choose a posts (CPs) and surface-to-surface missile location that maximizes cover and conceal- (SSM) units.35 These units, when they can be ment, but the number of suitable locations is found, are (usually) priority targets, but it is limited.37 A tree canopy or urban environment very difficult to locate and target them. The may conceal sitting targets from the sensors impact of destroying a CP is not clear. On one of smart munitions38 and provide cover which hand, the rigidity of Soviet command and con- reduces the effects of A PAM munitions by ab- trol suggests that the unit would be unlikely sorbing blast and fragments. On the other to exert the initiative of going forward with- hand, personnel may be dismounted from and out strong command; on the other hand, the unprotected by sitting vehicles and more vul- reliance on extensive pre-planning of opera- nerable than in other dispositions. tions using routine drill procedures suggests Targets on road or rail transporters are mov- a tendency to carry the operation forward with- ing targets, so target location data must be out the need for further command decisions. updated either by the platform or weapon or Different target vehicles require different provided to the platform or weapon in near- munitions. Anti-tank munitions may have lit- real-time.39 High-value targets (tanks) are more tle capability to kill trucks, because the in- clustered on transporters (especially rail) than frared and millimeter wave signatures (for the when moving under their own power or sitting, engagement sensor to detect) are different for and are arranged in regular arrays that may trucks and for tanks, and single holes in trucks increase their vulnerability to attacks with par- are often repairable fairly quickly.36 “Anti- ticular weapons. But because the vehicles are personnel anti-materiel” (APAM or “dual pur-

pose”) munitions are good at putting lots of 37 See app. 6-A (vol. 2), paragraph 13 for further details. holes in trucks (primarily tires and radiators) 38 For example, see Institute for Defense Analysis, Follow-On that require more time to repair, but do not Forces Attack, Volume III: Weapon Effectiveness and Com- bat Unit Effectiveness, ” IDA Report R-302. ‘5SSM units are not necessarily follow-on forces, but they will ‘gin this context, “near-real-time” means that the time delay deploy in the Warsaw Pact rear to reduce their vulnerability. between target location and weapons delivery does not reduce SSMs are not considered in detail in this assessment. the accuracy of the weapon so much that its effectiveness is “Tank kills often occur because of the spalling of armor in- lost. More generally, “near-real-time” means that only electronic side the vehicle, killing personnel and setting off ammunition data processing and transmission delays are involved in data or fuel. transmittal, and that no manual action is involved. Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 95 — — —.

Photo credit U S Department of Defense A portable bridge (this one is American). not themselves operating, their signatures Platform and Weapon (especially infrared) will be different and un- recognizable by some smart weapons. Also, Artillery now exists, and will certainly con- armored combat vehicles are probably not tinue to be organic to all NATO divisions and loaded with fuel and ammunition, and person- corps. Both gun and rocket-launched artillery nel are not on board, so many weapons may (e.g., mortars and MLRS) are available. Their not have the desired effect. range is limited to 25 to 30 kilometers beyond the FLOT. “Tube” artillery can deliver more Targets moving under their own power re- rounds (or pounds) of ordnance per hour than quire that target location updates be provided can missiles or direct-attack aircraft, but has to the weapon, either by on-board sensors or shorter range and cannot relocate quickly. by direct link from some external sensor system, within a few minutes of attack. Armored Direct attack aircraft delivery capability also combat vehicles are also loaded with fuel, am- presently exists and will certainly continue. munition, and crew, which increases munitions The bulk of attack aircraft (F-4, F-16) are range- effects as does being away from cover (such limited to about 150 kilometers east of the In- as trees) that can degrade munitions effects. ner German Border (IGB); the remaining air- Finally, if NATO can make enemy movement craft (F-1 11, TORNADO, F-15E) are limited down roads sufficiently risky that the enemy to about 350 kilometers east of IGB. Tactical must go off-road, it will substantially delay aircraft (TACAIR) can concentrate firepower movement forward and contribute to FOFA almost anywhere across the battle front, and objectives possibly without having to attack relocate quickly and flexibly. But TACAIR them at all. must penetrate into enemy airspace in order 96 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack to deliver direct attack weapons, and penetra- out the need for extensive air defense suppres- tion usually requires extensive support (escort sion and the risk of attrition of long-range fighters, electronic countermeasure pods, stand- bombers. The weapon would be launched from off jammers, hunter-killer aircraft, and artillery NATO’s rear (whether from the ground or from or other suppressive fires) to reduce attrition, an aircraft); the launcher would, therefore, have and attrition may still be substantial. excellent survivability. This weapon would support rapid relocation and concentration of Ground-launched ballistic missile capability 40 fire nearly any place in the theater. Because does not currently exist. The expected range of the required range and guidance capabilities, of the Army Tactical Missile System is 100 the weapon may be very costly relative to all to 150 kilometers east of the FLOT, including others, but if retired strategic cruise missiles a setback of the launcher behind the FLOT to can be modified for this mission, the cost may increase its survivability. This range would al- be much less. low some concentration of fires laterally across the front, but from any one corps probably only Long-range conventionally armed cruise mis- the adjacent corps could be supported. “Shoot siles, like strategic bombers used for this mis- and scoot tactics are required to enable good sion, could raise a problem of confusion in war- launcher survivability .41 Competing missions time. Their use in the conventional role might are not defined, except for suppression of enemy appear to be escalator, inducing the enemy air defense (SEAD), but may evolve later. to escalate to nuclear weapons. In addition, the development of non-nuclear cruise missiles to Tactical aircraft with short-range stand-off be launched from B-52s would raise new prob- weapons is now an option using command- lems of definition and scope for certain arms guided weapons. However, after launching control agreements. Further negotiations con- such a weapon (e.g., Maverick), the aircraft cerning these weapons may be necessary. must remain within line-of-sight of the target while the pilot (or another crew member) guides the weapon to its target. An autonomous air- Target Acquisition launched weapon with a range of up to 50 kilom- On-board systems are systems with sensors eters would allow the attacking aircraft to on either direct-attack aircraft, or the weap- avoid enemy air defenses in the vicinity of the ons, or both. These systems allow an attack- target, which are likely to be substantial. This ing platform and weapon to engage targets in- stand-off would reduce TACAIR attrition, but dependently of any external target acquisition penetration is still likely for many FOFA system (or associated communication system), missions. which may fail or be defeated when needed, A new cruise missile or a modified version rendering the mission ineffective. On-board of an existing U.S. cruise missile could have systems are generally the most accurate be- a range of about 1,200 kilometers with a con- cause the target acquisition system continu- ventional payload of 800 to 1,000 pounds,42 and ally tracks the target. would provide a deep delivery capability with- External systems could be used for attack by ground-launched missiles and stand-off air- 40The current MLRS launcher capability is planned to sup- craft, and could also support direct-attack airport this type of weapon in the Army Tactical Missile System, craft. External target acquisition systems so launcher capability may be considered as already existing. The Lance weapon system, though it has a nominal conventional could either stand back behind the FLOT using role, is not sufficiently accurate to contribute greatly to FOFA long-range sensors, or observe the enemy from operations, and is considered a nuclear asset in this context. a penetrating unmanned platform. These sys- “Given the problems perceived by NATO in attempting to target Soviet SS-21 and SS-23 launchers, these tactics are likely tems support target engagement from enough to achieve good survivability. distance to allow the weapons platform to “The feasibility of a weapon of this type is discussed inch. 11. avoid terminal area defenses. Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 97

Range Intermediate range (30 to 150 kilometers) includes targets that are still heavy in armor, At close-in range (5 to 30 kilometers), a large though not as much so as at closer range. A proportion of the vehicles in target arrays are major advantage is that the time and distance armored, allowing efficient destruction of the available in which to engage moving target enemy’s combat capability. Virtually every- units is much greater than for close-in attacks thing that moves forward from the final as- (6 to 8 hours per division v. 1.5 to 2 hours per sembly area is moving to combat and is a high- regiment), relaxing the need for very efficient value target for attack. Damaging these forces “conversion” of attack opportunities to actual is likely to have a nearly immediate effect on attacks. A related advantage is that, for at- the battlefield. The Warsaw Pact must in gen- tacks to disrupt, there are several types of tar- eral expend resources to bring its forces to the gets (e.g., CPs, Elbe bridges) that are not prev- battle area, and attacking at the “last minute” alent closer in. At these ranges there is still means that the greatest amount of mobiliza- a wide variety of attack assets with sufficient tion and transportation effort must be made range,43 and the most powerful RSTA assets by the enemy. Other advantages are that the (e.g., ASARS, Joint STARS) also have cover- widest variety of RSTA assets can “see” tar- age to this depth. However, compared to close gets at this range with the least obscuration range, attacks at these ranges are more costly. by terrain or vegetation, and the greatest number of weapons are available for attacks at this Long-range attacks (150 to 800 kilometers range (including artillery and stand-off aircraft deep) would hit targets that are likely to be that need not penetrate). high value and concentrated on certain transportation routes. Advantages include the fact The primary operational disadvantage is the that attacks do not need coordination with risk inherent in waiting to attack the enemy ground forces, and can force enemy units to forces until they are just about to close with posture their moves so as to minimize exposure friendly forces. This approach may still allow to possible attack. Disadvantages of attacks enemy forces to concentrate with no subse- at long range are both that the cost is high quent chance to attack them before they at- (in capability, attrition, or weapon cost) and tack. The regiments may dash forward on this that the effects on the battlefield are the most final march, particularly if it is known that removed and hardest to predict. NATO has a very effective attack capability in this range. “Only artillery drops out relative to closer-in attacks.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR FOFA Only a few of the many possible operational Artillery Attack of Regiment Columns: concepts will be described here, chosen so that Category 1 (5 to 30 km) they illustrate the primary issues without necessarily being exhaustive. These operational The target regiments are probably originally concepts are discussed below, in terms of located well before they occupy their final as- generic systems and the approaches already sembly areas. This location process uses sev- discussed. 44 eral different sources of data, including COMINT and ELINT sensors and MTI radar for location cues, fusion of this data along with cartographic and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) data to identify assem- 44App. 12-A contains a complete list of packages embodying the operational concepts discussed above; ch. 12 discusses some bly areas, and high-resolution SAR imagery of them in detail. for confirmation of the regimental locations. 98 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

This fused and confirmed data is sufficient to Stand-Off Air Attack of Division assign resources to attack the battalion col- Columns: Category 2 (30 to 80 km) umns of the regiment when they move forward. FOFA operations at this depth would at- Within this range, gun and missile artillery tempt to destroy enemy divisions in their can deliver unguided anti-armor rounds with movement forward on roads from division as- substantial potential destruction. A capabil- sembly areas, or destroy the regiments of the ity for artillery to effectively attack moving divisions in their final assembly areas. targets would be new, dependent on a target acquisition system capable of following the tar- This concept employs RSTA activity cues gets and a smart anti-armor round. A remotely to initiate an attack and MTI radar target ac- piloted vehicle (RPV) target acquisition sys- quisition data for an aircraft to deliver a short- tem that was normally dedicated to artillery range weapon that dispenses smart anti-armor use could be used for this mission. In this con- submunitions. Anti-personnel anti-materiel cept the RPV would loiter near the assembly munitions may also be used, in order to dam- area until the columns started moving, and age the soft and lightly armored vehicles in then follow each column in turn (providing loca- the division that contain personnel, ammunition data) until it was attacked successfully, tion, fuel (petroleum, oils, and lubricants, or at which point the RPV would find the next POL), and other support (e.g., maintenance, column. The RPV data, which could be MTI communications). A data link from the target radar or E-O imagery, would be provided di- acquisition system to the aircraft would up- rectly to the artillery fire-direction center. The date the target location immediately prior to artillery rounds may each have only a frac- launch of the weapon, which would then use tional probability of kill of an armored vehi- inertial guidance to fly the 25 to 30 kilometers cle,45 but a barrage of many (6 to 12 or more) to the target. This concept, illustrated in fig- rounds may provide multiple kills per attack. ure 6-2, would probably use penetration by a relatively large “force package” of 25 to 40 The primary advantage of this concept is its aircraft46 in a less active area adjacent to the use of widely proliferated artillery assets, al- target area, and attack from the side, in order lowing any NATO corps or division with the to minimize relative losses. The force package requisite target acquisition system and the includes 16 to 20 attack aircraft, each deliver- appropriate ammunition to prosecute these ing 2 weapons against target columns. kinds of attacks of follow-on forces. It also does not require close coordination across corps, be- This concept has the advantage that the at- cause each corps would be attacking within its tack aircraft need not fly over the target, and own area with organic assets. This allows a each weapon may be capable of killing several great deal of firepower to be generated. How- armored vehicles. Indeed, the force package ever, the primary disadvantage is closely re- would be able to inflict a great deal of damage lated: the necessity for proliferating this ca- in the span of a few minutes on a large portion pability across the whole front, in order to of a division. The primary disadvantages of permit defense in all corps sectors. This con- this concept are that it requires penetration cept would require distributing firepower, support, an external target acquisition system, without the capability to concentrate this fire- and lengthy, centralized planning. power in the critical areas.

46As discussed in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess- ‘bLaser-guided artillery rounds such as Copperhead, when used ment, Technologies for NATO Follow-On Forces Attack with an RPV (e.g., TADARS) that designates targets with a Concept-Special Report, OTA-ISC-312 (Washington, DC: U.S. laser, may have a high kill probability against armor. Government Printing Office, July 1986), pp. 81, 96-97. ——

Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces 99

Figure 6-2. —Stand-Off Air Attack of Division Columns A. Second Echelon Division Target Set

Targets: vehicle columns (task-organized battalions)

Depth (km)

B. Penetrating TACAIR Raid

i L

SOURCE Inst{tute for Defense Analyses, Fol/ow-On Force Attack, Volume // Reconnaissance, Surve///ance, and Targef Acqufs/t/on (RSTA) Architecture to Support Fo//ow-On Force Attack, IDA Report R.302. Draft F(nal April 1986, pp v-4, V.7

Missile Attack of Division Columns: radar. This data would be updated via a fire Category 2 (30 to 80 km) control data system to the missile launcher just prior to launch. A setback of one-third of total This concept uses ground-launched missiles range (a typical artillery rule of thumb), im- to attack the same targets (moving columns plies a minimum missile range of 120 kilome- of a second-echelon division), also using tar- ters. A longer range of 150 to 250 kilometers get location data from the target acquisition would allow coverage from adjacent corps. The 100 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack missile would use a high-quality navigation where they are more effective, against a tar- system, and deliver submunitions. get area with a high density of vehicles and exposed personnel. Also, stand-off weapons do The advantages of this approach are: 1) that not require overflight of the target area. no separate support is needed (as it is for penetrating aircraft), 2) the long-range capability allows concentration of fires from adjacent Cruise Missile Attack of Deep Rail corps, and 3) several armor kills per missile are Network: Category 5 (350 to 800 km) possible. Disadvantages include the need for Attacks at this depth will attempt to delay cross-corps coordination and the dependence enemy movements of follow-on fronts. on a separate system for target data. Attacks of this type can be tasked as soon Air Attack of Chokepoints and Halted as cross-border operations are authorized by Units: Category 3 (80 to 150 km) NATO. Heavy bombers would fly to the fringes of enemy territory, with minimum exposure, Detecting and tracking unit movements is and launch missiles would engage their rail and important in this concept. This process would bridge targets independently. Each missile be accomplished by the same mix of RSTA sen- would navigate to the vicinity of its target (ei- sors and fusion capabilities used to track units ther rail segment or bridge), recognize it, and for road and assembly area attacks. The choke- “engage” it. For bridge attacks this would in- point target, assumed to be a road bridge at volve damaging a critical structural member. a river or other barrier, is targeted in peace- For rail segment attacks a “stick” of mines time and can be attacked without further tar- would be dispensed, that would embed them- get location data. High-resolution synthetic selves in the rail bed.47 aperture radar (SAR) keeps the area behind the These mines would have a delay before acti- chokepoint under surveillance, until bunching vation, and then actuate (all four at once) at of vehicles in the area is observed. This data a random time in a given period (say, 3 days). is reported to an attack control center, which This would mean that the rail segment would matches targets to attacking aircraft and suddenly (and uneventfully) become danger- transmits target location data to the aircraft ous to a passing train. Were a train to come (which may be forming up or holding on the by, one or more mines would be detonated. NATO side of the FLOT preparing to penetrate). A force package of tactical aircraft then The advantages of this approach include the attacks with stand-off weapons dispensing obviation of wartime target acquisition and the APAM munitions to damage the equipment need to penetrate. Risks remain that enemy and personnel bunched behind the chokepoint. redeployment of air defenses would impede In addition, mines may be mixed with the barrier maintenance, or that during a long APAM munitions, to further disrupt the at- mobilization Soviet fronts would deploy so far tacked units and their subsequent attempts forward as to render this concept ineffective. to seek cover and repair the damage.

The advantage of this concept is that it may “Perhaps four mines could be carried by each missile, com- allow the use of munitions in a fairly open area, prising a stick to close one rail segment with high confidence. Chapter 7 Soviet Responses to FOFA CONTENTS

Page Political Responses ...... 103 Military Responses ...... 105 Chapter 7 Soviet Responses to FOFA

Soviet writings suggest that FOFA has be- This chapter examines what the Soviets are come an important issue in the U. S. S. R., one now saying about FOFA, what Soviet politi- that might generate important political and cal and military responses to FOFA may al- military responses. Soviet planners are clearly ready have been, and what possible responses concerned about FOFA, both as a strategy for we might see in the future. It is important to the West, and as a reflection of a new set of keep in mind, however, that the Soviets view NATO capabilities they call reconnaissance FOFA primarily against the backdrop of a big- (“recce”) strike complexes, or RSCs. The So- ger whole, as another piece in the overall U. S./ viets have launched a propaganda campaign, NATO military strategy. Soviet responses to at home and abroad, to counter FOFA and to FOFA, therefore, should be viewed as responses use the controversy FOFA has generated to to the whole changing nature of a possible drive a wedge into NATO. They have also dis- East-West confrontation, and not necessarily cussed changes in military operations that just to FOFA per se. could well change the threat that FOFA is responding to.

POLITICAL RESPONSES The Soviet political response to FOFA has military systems in response. Ultimately, the been strong since the U.S. Army’s adoption Soviets hope to use these arguments to delay of AirLand Battle in 1982 and the approval or prevent NATO from acquiring FOFA sys- of FOFA by the NATO Defense Planning Com- tems. Within the U. S. S. R., these arguments mittee in 1984. Although FOFA has not be- justify further military buildup as a necessary come as big a political issue in the U.S.S.R. defensive response to U.S. aggression, and aim as arms control or SDI, the Soviet press, both to rally domestic support behind the current domestic and foreign, has been replete with Soviet leadership. articles and statements about the destabiliz- Thus, the Soviet press consistently depicts ing effects of FOFA and its dangers for all FOFA as offensive and aggressive; as repre- mankind. senting an attempt by the United States to This portrayal addresses several Soviet goals gain conventional superiority and give NATO both abroad and at home. Abroad, it allows forces a “first strike” capability; and as hav- the Soviets to play on already existing Euro- ing the potential to lower rather than raise the pean apprehensions about the feasibility and nuclear threshold by bordering on the capa- cost of FOFA and the possible negative im- bilities of theater nuclear weapons. As dis- pact of FOFA for deterrence and arms control. cussed in the Soviet military newspaper Red By so doing, it works toward two ends: to drive Star, for example: a wedge between the United States and Europe; In a word, this weapon [recce strike com- and, by painting the United States as the clear plex] relates to the offensive with the goal of aggressor threatening world peace, to present achieving military superiority over govern- a more peace-loving image of the U.S.S.R. This ments of the socialist commonwealth, and se- “peace offensive “ is laced with threats that, curing with military strength a one-sided su- should such a clearly offensive and aggressive periority by the application of sudden strikes NATO strategy be adopted, the U.S.S.R. un- and the conduct of protracted military ac- fortunately would be forced to build yet more tivities.

103 104 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

The arguments of NATO leaders, that with Soviet Cartoon Depiction of the “Rogers Plan” the application of a new concept they would diminish the danger of nuclear war in Eur- ope, lack any basis and are deliberate lies. As shown by the press, the new forms and systems of common types of weapons . . . approach the destructive potential of low-yield nuclear munitions. Moreover, with the acceptance of these concepts, Pentagon and NATO strategies do not at all reject the possibility of applying nuclear weapons first. Witness the deployment in Europe of American first- strike missiles.1 FOFA is also painted as a “provocative escalation, creating a new and expensive arms race: Hiding behind false references to a “Soviet I *.J military threat, ” the U.S. administration is “They are taking aim ., .“ initiating a new, dangerous spiral in the arms A caption with the cartoon reads: “In Brussels, the Military race, of which the illusory objective is to Planning Committee of NATO has embraced a new aggres- achieve superiority over the armed forces of sive concept—the so-called ‘Rogers Plan’. The plan foresees the socialist fraternity. This is why the Pen- a strategy of striking deep into the territory of the enemy— i.e., the territory of the socialist countries—in the event of tagon foresees creating qualitatively new re- a ‘crisis situation ’.” sources of armed conflict, besides improving 2 SOURCE Krasrra/a Zvezda (Red Star), Nov 13, 19S4, p 3 Reprinted with permls. nuclear weapons. sion of the Embassy of the U S S R , Washington, DC It is painted as militarily dangerous and States to manipulate its NATO Allies into be- destabilizing, in that the Warsaw Pact would ing tied not only to a U.S. strategy, but to U.S. be unable to distinguish between a conven- technology: tional and nuclear strike and would be forced to respond with a nuclear barrage: Europe has been allotted the role of a figure intended to be sacrificed in another proj- . . . But the main danger with which the im- ect . . . Rogers declares that this [equipping plementation of this concept is fraught for NATO with FOFA weapon systems] will re- Europe lies somewhere else: It is utterly im- quire from the European countries an addi- possible to tell the difference between cruise tional military spending of 30 billion dol- missiles with conventional warheads and cruise lars . . . The USA will naturally be the chief missiles with nuclear warheads. Therefore, purveyor of the new weapons systems.4 with the approach of these missiles to “second- echelon targets, ” the side subjected to an at- Ultimately, FOFA is presented as not just tack will have no other option than to launch militarily destabilizing, but politically coun- a retaliatory nuclear strike necessitating a 3 terproductive to the overall East/West rela- switchover to automatic well in advance. tionship. According to Mr. A. Kokoshin, of the And in economic terms, FOFA is painted as USA-Canada Institute in Moscow, “the imple- clearly American, an attempt by the United mentation of the Rogers Plan can undermine all chances for success of the negotiations on ‘Lt. Col. A. Sergeev, “Pazvedyvatel’noudarnye kompleksy: the reduction of armed forces and arms in cen- Rasskazyvaem po pros’be chitatelei” (“Reconnaissance Strike Complexes: Discussion at the Request of Readers”), Krmmu”a tral Europe and seriously hinder a construc- Zvezda, Feb. 14, 1986, p. 3. tive solution to the problem of confidence build- 2Maj. Gen. M. Belov and Lt. Col. V. Shchukin, “Razvedy- ing measures . . ."5 vatel’noporazhaiushchie kompleksy armii S. Sh.A, ” (“Recon- naissanceFire Complexes of the U.S. Army”), VoennV” Vestnik, ‘Ibid. No. 1, January 1985, p. 86. ‘A. Kokoshin, “The Rogers Plan: Alternative Defense Con- ‘Nikolai Portugalov, “FOFA and Other Atlantic Monsters, ” cepts and Security in Europe, ” IWonomilm, Politikq 1deolo@”a, Moscow IVews, Dec. 30, 1984, p. 5. Aug. 13, 1985, pp. 3-14. Ch. 7—Soviet Responses to FOFA ● 105

MILITARY RESPONSES Beyond politics, the Soviets view FOFA as Indeed, FOFA might well force the Soviets to presenting real, if not potentially “revolution- mobilize earlier and more overtly. If the Soviets ary” military challenges. “Such a qualitative were convinced that the West had the capa- leap in the development of conventional weap- bility to attack their forces on roads and/or rail- ens, ” Marshal Ogarkov writes, “inevitably en- roads, it would force the Soviets to choose be- tails a change in the nature of preparing and tween surprise and an assured ability to bring conducting operations."6 their forces forward. Should they decide to bring them forward before the war starts, the Soviet concerns with FOFA are twofold: the West would be provided with a more unam- concept itself, and the development of new biguous warning of their mobilization and in- weapons systems associated with, but not nec- tentions. essarily restricted to implementing those concepts. The Soviet press indicates that Soviet Alternatively, the Soviets could attempt to responses are also twofold: to modify their tac- increase the strength of existing units already tics and field new weapons to lessen the vul- forward, such as through changes in organiza- nerability of their follow-on forces to attack— tion and equipment, or by placing more Soviet i.e., by increasing the combat power of the first (as opposed to East European) divisions up echelon, increasing protection of the rear troops, front.8 According to some Western observers, and focusing more attention in speeding up the the Soviets have already been doing the former command and control process; and to develop over the past several years and might well in- the capability to preemptively attack these crease their efforts. The U.S.S.R. has had a con- NATO reconnaissance (“recce”) strike com- tinuing program to modernize ground forces plexes, or RSCs. in Central Europe, apparently adding a new As a concept, the Soviets are concerned that generation of tanks and fielding new artillery, infantry combat vehicles, anti-tank weapons, FOFA will extend the battle into their rear: and close support aircraft and helicopter gun- The emergence in the armies of the devel- ships. Some believe this indicates that the So- oped capitalist countries of new, and espe- viet Union already “has quite significantly cially high-precision weapons, is greatly downgraded the strategic importance of follow- changing the “face” of modern combat by constantly raising the intensity of the fire 8See Boyd D. Sutton, “Deep Attack Concepts and the Defence struggle. Whereas in past wars the predomi- of Central Europe, ” Survival, March/April 1984, pp. 64-65. nant place belonged to a close exchange of fire, present conditions have seen a sharp increase in the significance not only of the close exchange of fire, but also of the long-range exchange of fire-that is, simultaneous fire against practically the entire depth of the enemy’s combat formation.7 One Soviet response might be to increase the combat power of the first echelons by reallocat- ing units from the second to the first echelons, such as by bringing more divisions forward.

‘Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov, “Zashchita sot- sialisma: opyt istorii i sovremennosti ” (“The Defense of Social- ism: The Experience of History and the Present Day’ ‘), Kras- nm”a Zvezda, May 9, 1984, pp 2-3. 7Maj. Gen. I. Vorob’yev, “Sovremennoe oruzhie i taktika” (“Modem Weapons and Tactics”), Krasnm”a Zvezda, June 20, 1984, p. 2. 106 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Photo credit: U S Department of Defense Example of a camouflaged military vehicle. on conventional forces precisely at the moment the survivability and reliable protection of 11 when some in the West are trying to persuade units . . . us that we should divert large resources to at- 9 Soviet doctrine and writings consistently tacking them.” emphasize the importance of maskirovka--a In addition, Soviet writings emphasize the term encompassing the concepts of deception, need for “significant changes in tactics”10 and camouflage, and the masking effects of ground, increased protection of forces in the rear through smoke, dazzling light, etc. Commanders in the increased air defense and camouflage. Previ- rear must devote greater efforts to “the skill- ously, Soviet combat forces moving up in the ful utilization . . . of natural features of the lo- rear were not in a combat environment. With cal terrain, the careful preparation of field FOFA, they would have to deal with being in defenses, the implementation of deception a combat situation possibly from the beginning: measures, and to misleading the enemy with regard to the unit true location."12 Likewise, High-precision weapons considerably in- the Soviets may also change timing, spacing, crease troop vulnerability and, accordingly, modes of transportation, or build more redun- generate increased requirements for ensuring —— . . . . —-—. ‘Col. Jonathon Alford, “NATO, ET and New Conventional “Major General 1. Vorob’yev, “Sovremennoe oruzhie i tak- Strategy,” Atlantic Quarterly, vol. II, No. 4, winter 1984, p. 297. tika, ” op cit. ‘“Major Gen, I. Vorob’yev, op. cit. 1’Ibid. Ch. 7–Soviet Responses to FOFA 107

dancy or mobility into their system. They may As discussed in chapter 4, the Soviet C* well have to operate with troops highly dis- structure was designed according to certain persed and camouflaged-as if in a nuclear norms, and in such a way that the nature of environment—so as not to present easily de- the process itself would be somewhat adapt- stroyable targets, even though operating this ive to the time available. But if decision time way might significantly slow down their rate becomes too short, the Soviets emphasize, the of advance.13 And the Soviets continually dis- quality of decisions will greatly erode. Perhaps cuss the need for increased protection of their the greatest challenge from FOFA, therefore, rear forces through improved air defense and is that it cuts down on the time available for counter-air capabilities.14 decisionmaking, leading to a reduction in cycle time for planning and replanning an opera- Soviet writings, however, suggest that the tion. This may be viewed as only exacerbating Soviets may be less concerned about FOFA what the Soviets have seen as a long-standing as a concept than they are about the weapons challenge of improving their troop control sys- systems themselves, and in particular, the po- tem so that it can operate within the time avail- tential ability of quick-reacting and precision- able and still allow for sound decisions. guided weapons to act more quickly than their command and control cycle can respond: Soviet writings suggest that the Soviets see possible responses to this problem in two direc- The introduction of super-accurate self- guiding systems combining recce and strike tions. The first includes “technical’ responses, functions allows for very short times to ac- in terms of further automation of command quire the target, prepare and fire the weapon, and control systems. A great deal of effort is and hit the target. Systems such as Assault being devoted to streamlining and automat- Breaker, self-homing and laser-guided, in- ing C2 procedures both to speed the pace of frared or radio-seeking projectiles coupled decisionmaking and to improve the quality of with automated artillery fire control sys- decisions. In addition, the Soviets have empha- tems . . . allow engagement times to be re- sized “operational-tactical” responses, “relat- duced by a factor of 10-15. ing to the methods of work of commanders and The general speeding up of the battlefield has staffs, their training and the way they use C2 sharply curtailed the time available to com- means. ” This may indicate a rethinking of manders and staff for making and implement- some of the methods used to make decisions ing decisions. This has made it most important and plan, so that reactions can take place much to speed up the collection of intelligence, its faster. analysis, making a decision, giving orders, organizing cooperation and so on. The guide- Included here is the long-standing problem lines of the past are no longer appropriate. In of initiative. For some time now, the Soviet the Great Patriotic War, a regiment and a bat- system has been pulling in two directions. In talion often had up to 3-4 days to prepare for principle, the Soviet military system requires an offensive—now it is much less. 15 that a soldier be able to perform simple bat- ——.— — -. . tlefield tasks in any conditions on the battle- ‘3See, for example, Gen. V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika, Moscow, field. These are learned by drill, so that when 1984, and Michael J. Sterling, Soviet Reactions to NATO’s “initiative’ may be asked of soldiers, it is gen- Emer&”ng Technolo~”es for Deep Attack, The Rand Corp., N- 2294-AF, August 1985. erally restricted to initiating the appropriate “SEW, for example, Col. Gen. I. Golushko, “Tyl v usloviiakh drill under whatever circumstances he may prirneneniya protivnikom vysokotochnogo oruzhita” (“The Rear find himself. Area Under Conditions of the Enemy’s Use of High-Precision Weapons”), Tyl i Snabzhem”y, No. 7, 1984, pp. 13-17. With the sharp reduction in time which the “Maj Gen I. Vorob’yev, “Vrernia v boiu ” (“Time in Battle”), Krasnaia Zvezda, Nov. 9, 1985, p. 2. According to Vorob’yev, Soviets see for making and executing these de- “six to ten minutes are needed for the ‘search and destroy’ cy- cisions, however, Soviet writings are now re- cle of the RSC Assault Breaker to be performed. This amount flecting an apparent encouragement of greater of time limits troop operations. Troops must be able to move out from under a strike or use other defensive measures during initiative at lower levels, for example, for jun- this short time period. ” ior officers at the platoon, company, and bat- 108 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack talion level. For example, in addition to the con- FOFA be implemented. As Vorob’yev has cept of “initsiativa”—which suggests selecting noted: the right drill in the right circumstances-two It is believed that the use of high-precision concepts have received renewed emphasis in weapons will call for significant changes in Soviet parlance: “smekalka,” which implies do- tactics. . . . It will be more important to de- ing something unconventional in those situa- liver preemptive fire strikes to destroy high- tions where no drill may apply; and “tvor- precision weapons systems . . . chestvo, ” connoting a longer term solution, an 16 Success in a battle being waged with quick- imaginative choice of the correct drill. reacting, long-range, high-precision combat This not only complicates Soviet planning, complexes demands active reconnaissance in but Soviet commanders must also deal with order to detect the enemy’s preparations in time to inflict fire attacks, the maintenance of subordinates who are the products of a soci- units in constant readiness to repulse the ety where initiative has always been discour- enemy’s employment of new weapons systems, aged, if not penalized, and where reluctance and the concealment of measures undertaken to take on responsibility is strong. There will in preparation for the battle. It is important be major social and cultural hurdles to jump to ensure reliable air cover for the units, to un- over, not only for reconciling the notion of ini- dertake protective measures in a timely fash- tiative itself with Soviet command and con- ion, and to preempt the enemy in the opening 18 trol, but also to effectively imbue their fight- fire to immediately destroy his weapons . . . ing force with fundamentally new attitudes. As of now, the Soviets are apparently focus- Finally, the Soviets are discussing the need ing on using existing force elements for these to preemptively attack the weapons systems kinds of missions, combining existing recon- associated with FOFA, or Western recce-strike naissance assets with target assessment cen- complexes (RSCs), and allege that they may ters and then having a group of weapons “on be forced into developing their own “recce- call” to attack the targets as soon as they are strike” and “recce-fire” complexes17 should identified. Although apparently less sophisticated than Western efforts, Soviet capabilities “See, for example, Kh. Grishchenko, “Proiavliaia smekalku i smelost’ (’‘Displaying Native Wit and Boldness’ ‘), Voermyi in this area would undoubtedly grow as new Istoricheskie Zhurnal, February 1986, p. 39. technology becomes available. Although the “The Soviets make a distinction between recce-strike and Soviets have said that their RSCs area direct reccefire complexes. According to Maj. Gen. Belov, ‘‘if the strike element annihilates the target by fire (for example with con- response to FOFA, evidence suggests that ventional artillery or rockets) the complex is called a reconnais- they are an important part of Soviet military sance-fire complex, while if it does so by a missile strike (tacti- planning as it assesses the overall context of cal and army aviation, tactical and operational tactical missile launchers, ) it is called a reconnaissance-strike complex. There- a potential East-West military confrontation. fore reconnaissancefire complexes are more of a tactical resource while reconnaissance-strike complexes are operational resources. ” See Maj Gen A. Belov, op. cit. 18Maj, Gen 1. Vorob’yev, op. cit. Chapter 8 European Views on FOFA —

CONTENTS

Page Introduction...... 111 Current Positions of the Allies ...... 112 West Germany ...... 113 United Kingdom ...... 115 France ...... 115 The Netherlands ...... 116 Belgium ...... 117 Intra-European Cooperation on SOFA ...... 117 The 1985 Nunn Amendment ...... 118 Initial European Reaction To FOFA ...... 118 The Political Background ...... 120 The ’’Burden Sharing” Issue ...... + ..121 Evolution of European Attitudes Toward FOFA ...... 122 Factors Underlying European Attitudes Toward FOFA ...... 123 The Role of NATO’s Conventional Forces ...... 124 High Technology and NATO Defense...... 126 Options for Cultivating Additional European Support for FOFA ...... 127 Clarify the U.S. Priority for FOFA...... 127 Set Realistic Funding and Deployment Goals ...... 128 Present FOFA in a More Positive Light ...... 128 Emphasize Dual-Use, Reemphasize Dual-Capable...... 129 Accommodate European Industrial Interests ...... + ...... 129 Clarify Unilateral Deployments ...... 129 Clarify the Relationship Between FOFA and AirLand Battle...... 130 Emphasize the Role of FOFA in Enhancing Deterrence and Improving Crisis Management ...... 130 Emphasize the Role of Joint STARS, in Particular, in Crisis Management ...... 130 FOFA and the NATO Alliance ...... 130 Chapter 8 European Views on FOFA

INTRODUCTION FOFA, when first proposed, appeared to be for operational and procurement planning, and quite ambitious and evoked considerable discussions have been proceeding in the Con- skepticism—and some outright opposition— ference of National Armaments Directors on the part of the European members of (CNAD) and other fora to define the systems NATO. As this report goes to press, the Euro- the nations will procure to support FOFA. As pean attitude has become one of cautious sup- these proceed and interact, there is movement port, tempered by concern over funding limi- toward a consensus: the individual nations are tations and a great reluctance to buy U.S. becoming more supportive of FOFA as a con- weapons or even U.S. weapons technology. The cept, and FOFA is being modified to take into governments of the Federal Republic of Ger- account their concerns and their existing de- many (FRG) and the United Kingdom (U. K.) fense programs. have taken a cautious approach, emphasizing that FOFA implementation will be slow and Currently, the ability to attack follow-on incremental; the opposition parties have gen- forces to great depths remains part of the erally declared themselves against the concept. FOFA concept and a possible long-term goal. The smaller nations in the region have gener- In the near term, however, interest has focused ally followed the approach of the German Gov- on shorter ranges. Agreement is emerging to ernment. define systems already in the development pipeline-e. g., artillery enhancement, MLRS Clarification and refinement of the initial and RPVs—as contributions to FOFA, and FOFA concept–particularly to answer Euro- some progress has been made toward signing pean concerns–led to the November 1984 ap- agreements for cooperative development and proval of the Long Term Planning Guideline production of other systems such as the mod- for FOFA by the NATO Defense Planning ular stand-off weapon. As yet, the United Committee. While this provided a political- States has obtained no official European in- level endorsement by the Allies of FOFA as terest in what it views as two key systems: one of several key mission concepts, commit- Joint STARS and ATACMS, although within ments did not extend further than to study how some nations there is growing interest. FOFA should be implemented. Much skepticism remained among the Europeans regard- This chapter reviews the current positions ing its implementation and the priority it of our Allies and the evolution of those posi- should have within NATO’s strategy. tions, discussing the reasons for their early op- Over the past 2 years, the European Allies position and why this opposition has so greatly have come to understand that some of their diminished. It provides insights into some of early objections were based on misunderstand- the underlying differences in national interests ings of FOFA, while military planners at Su- of the NATO Allies, and into the process by preme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe which these differences can be reconciled, given (SHAPE) and in the Pentagon have come to an overriding political commitment to keep redefine FOFA in ways that are less techni- NATO working together. In particular, the cally challenging and more in keeping with the chapter: common views of the Allies. ● discusses the positions of the Central Re- The staff at SHAPE has been working to gion Allies regarding FOFA; define FOFA in more specific terms as a basis ● presents the principal European views of

111 112 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

FOFA, including those of major opposi- c analyzes the factors that underlie the tion parties; European positions; and ● describes the evolution of European atti- ● identifies ways the United States might tudes toward FOFA; gain additional support for FOFA. -

CURRENT POSITIONS OF THE ALLIES In contrast to such issues as Pershing II de- largely a re-labeling of previously planned ployment in Europe, which required the Allies short-range weapons, sensor systems, and air to make sharp and clear choices, FOFA pro- interdiction improvements as contributions to vides ample room for each nation to define its FOFA, but there also appears to be growing contribution in the way it chooses. FOFA could interest in developing and producing more ad- encompass all systems that reach from just vanced systems. behind the close battle to as far into eastern Europe as possible, and thus could include mis- The process of defining national positions sions that have previously been considered as and arriving at a consensus within NATO on traditional close air support and interdiction major initiatives such as FOFA has tradition- fire support within NATO. Although the ally been slow, and may still be in an early stage United States has favored an ambitious deep of evolution in the case of FOFA. The concept strike effort, the Europeans have a pronounced was originated by SHAPE and refined by the preference for shorter range systems. Thus, NATO international staff; it has now passed European response to FOFA thus far has been primarily to the CNAD to work out the means Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA ● 113 of implementation. The characterization of a FOFA-related programs when it reports to European position on FOFA is further com- NATO in the spring of 1987. plicated because the concept is still undergoing development and revision by its two original West Germany supporters, SHAPE and the United States. The FRG, as the major European contribu- Nonetheless, there appear to have been sig- tor to NATO and the country most likely to nificant shifts in European attitudes over the be affected by FOFA deployments, wields con- past year. Despite two major NATO studies siderable influence on the Allies’ views concern- that found great merit in the FOFA concept ing FOFA. While affirming support for FOFA (one conducted by the SHAPE Technical Cen- in principle, the FRG has thus far underlined tre and the other by the NATO Defence Re- that FOFA ranks behind first echelon defense search Group), early 1986 evidenced much and counter-air in its military priorities, al- skepticism, particularly among the Germans, though the Germans appear to have dropped who argued that FOFA should be no greater an effort to get NATO to assign priorities than third priority, after the close battle and among the key missions.1 The German Gov- the air battle. FOFA was seen as a new dimen- ernment views FOFA as a supplement or sup- sion of warfare, competing with and detract- porting function for the main mission of for- ing from the close battle. There was also skep- ward defense and preventing a breakthrough. ticism regarding the feasibility of the technologies needed to implement FOFA. This arises, at least in part, from fundamental political considerations: forward defense is More recent indications suggest that the ini- a cornerstone of membership in NATO for the tial strongly skeptical attitude has been chang- FRG with one-third of its population and one- ing. The Europeans now appear willing to dis- fourth of its industry within 60 miles of the cuss possible development of FOFA systems Warsaw Pact. Early German concerns that with ranges up to 150 kilometers beyond the FOFA was too aggressive for NATO, and that FLOT, in distinction to their previous position rapid advances by the stronger nations would which would limit consideration of FOFA sys- discourage the weaker nations and put strains tems to a range of about 30 kilometers. Con- on NATO—although still present—appear to cern for diverting resources from the first eche- be waning. lon battle, and insistence on setting a relatively low priority for FOFA have become muted. Nevertheless, Germany is procuring some Emphasis is on cost, cost-effectiveness, com- systems for FOFA, is developing others, and parisons of U.S. and European systems, and is at least exploring cooperative efforts on still how to produce the necessary systems. Work others. The Germans believe that killing deep is now under way to agree on the systems that is more expensive than killing at shorter would be candidates to fill the various needs ranges, and that therefore only a limited FOFA that fall under FOFA. capability will be affordable. This cannot be applied in a “hose” approach, but must rather These developments were paralleled during be related to finding and blunting the "schwer- 1986 in the activities of the FOFA II working punkt, ” or focus of an attack. group, a quasi-official body created by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Science Board to explore strategies for cooperation on —— FOFA systems with the Allies on a bilateral IFRG officials have consistently emphasized the first echelon threat in commenting on FOFA. FRG Defense Minister basis. Participation of European governmental Woerner stated: “It (FOFA) is a concept we support, but there and industrial representatives in the meetings must not be the slightest doubt that stopping the first echelon of the FOFA II working group has broadened. has first priority for the FRG and the Alliance as a whole, because it would make little sense to fight the second echelon once It is expected that the working group will be the first one has reached the Rhine. ” Quoted in Wehrtechnik, able to offer recommendations on five to seven February 1984. 114 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Photo credit Messerschm/tt.Bo/kow. B/ohm GmbH West German Tornado aircraft dispensing KB-44 submunitions.

The Bundeswehr is interested in improving The FRG position appears to be evolving. 155mm artillery and buying the Multiple Launch Some U.S. observers have linked this to a re- Rocket System (MLRS), as well as in improv- cently heightened West German concern, fre- ing reconnaissance through the CL289 and quently enunciated by Defense Minister Man- other RPVs. For longer ranges, they see bal- fred Woerner, about the need for defense listic missiles, like ATACMS, as primarily against the threat posed by Warsaw Pact con- suited to stationary soft targets, and are de- ventionally armed theater ballistic missiles veloping combat drones to attack tanks.2 For (TBMs). Although TBM defense could involve air interdiction, the Luftwaffe wants to up- a wide variety of active and passive measures grade the combat role of the Tornado fighter outside the scope of FOFA, an important ele- aircraft, which it produces jointly with the ment might be the development of a conven- United Kingdom and Italy. The Germans be- tional missile that could strike Warsaw Pact lieve that the KB-44 submunition dropped by TBM launchers beyond present artillery range. the Tornado is the best anti-armor submuni- It should be noted, however, that thus far the tion currently available. For the future, they FRG has not indicated an interest in the de- are investigating the “vertical ballistic weap- velopment or deployment of such a missile. on, a sophisticated dispenser for a submunition of greater lethality than the KB-44, and The Germans are great believers in cooper- are participating in the Modular Stand-Off ative ventures; roughly 70 percent of their cap- Weapon (MSOW) program. ital expenditures are for cooperative programs. The Germans may be slowly developing an However, unlike the British and French, their interest in Joint STARS, but they appear to focus is almost exclusively on systems for use be very cautious about it. Although they rec- in the Central Region and they tend to shy ognize the value of continuous broad area sur- away from exporting military equipment. Con- veillance, they see Joint STARS as going be- sequently, their defense industries are not yond the Army’s needs (out to 75 kilometers), nearly as large as the British or French. They but not satisfying the Air Force’s needs for believe that successful development programs surveillance out to as much as 500 kilometers. ought to stimulate technology development among all the partners, but that the partners ‘The FRG Ministry of Defense has budgeted DM 650 million ought to be on comparable technological levels. for reconnaissance RPVs during 1989-97. Antitank combat drones are not budgeted until 1997. See Karl Schnell; “Pilot- They see themselves as being advanced in mu- less Small Air Vehicles for the Army, ” W’ehrtechnik, May 1985. nitions, delivery sensors, and attack drones. Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA . 115

United Kingdom able influence on European thinking about conventional defense issues. The French have no While maintaining some reservations about direct involvement in a SHAPE concept; the whether the concept and technology can actu- French military has expressed some interest, ally be made to work, the British are quite however, in equipping its forces stationed in receptive to FOFA. From a pragmatic perspec- France and the FRG with deep strike conven- tive, however, neither the Army nor the Royal tional weapons. Budget constraints, however, Air Force (RAF) is confident about getting the and a lack of strong interest in such systems resources to implement it. Continued economic by the French armaments industry will serve problems in the United Kingdom will sharply to limit French options. The French take it as limit Britain’s ability to invest in expensive a general principle that their forces should be new systems. The U.K. defense budget will light and mobile; they are hesitant to burden likely decline in real terms over the next sev- their ground forces with cumbersome systems 3 eral years, and heavy commitments for the for deep attack, and they build small aircraft Trident II program will make it very difficult that are less capable than those of other na- for the United Kingdom to undertake any mations of carrying the larger ordnance loads nec- jor initiative in conventional defense im- essary for FOFA. provements. In general, the French are not enthusiastic Like the other Europeans, the British are about major conventional defense enhance- planning to improve their artillery and buy the ments in NATO, which they see as diluting the MLRS. Investment in any longer range ground threat of nuclear retaliation on which France systems would occur farther in the future, if bases its defense strategy. The trend, however, at all. The British are concerned about having is toward greater French interest in participa- the targeting systems to employ even MLRS tion in NATO’s conventional defense, and the in their corps sector. Beginning in 1988, they French have been active in technological de- will procure the Phoenix Remotely Piloted Ve- velopments. This may reflect recent efforts at hicle (RPV) for this purpose. They are devel- improving coordination with the FRG on con- oping the ASTOR system and keeping an open ventional defense matters as well as the de- mind on the possibility y of a jointly funded Joint sire of the French armaments industry to keep STARS for the entire Central Region. For in- up with developments that may affect the terdiction, the British are planning to improve NATO arms market. the BL755 anti-armor cluster weapon and procure an improved Harrier aircraft with longer Because France exports about half of its arrange. The mainstay of their interdiction ca- maments production, it is extremely sensitive pability will remain the Tornado. to the economic and commercial aspects of U.S. defense initiatives such as the “Emerging The British believe that they have strong Technologies” program, SDI and FOFA, and defense industries that can contribute to co- thus has tended to crystallize European dis- operative programs in important ways. How- content with what is perceived to be an unfair ever, they point to difficulties of cooperating imbalance in U.S. high-technology defense with the United States, particularly on highly trade with Europe.’ The recent decline in Mid- classified (so-called black) programs. dle East oil revenues has sharply affected French arms exports, and has increased French France Although France is not a member of the ‘The threat to French industry from FOFA was noted by a leading French journal: “. . . it is impossible to ignore the Amer- NATO integrated command, it exerts consider- ican pressure to sell this new generation of IFOFA] weapons to its European Allies. The future of the French armaments 3For 1987, the British defense budget is scheduled to remain industry—No. 3 in the world—and hundreds of thousands of flat in cash terms, with a forecast real decline of 3 to 4 percent. French jobs are at stake. “ “Can France Defend Herself?” Le See “Pay Up or Cut Up, ” The Econom”st, Mar. 29, 1986. Nouve] Observateur, January 1984. 116 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

Photo credft, Messerschmitf-60/kow. Blohm GmbH

Developmental French-German Apache dispensing submunitions. interest in the NATO market and intra- focus their own efforts on ranges out to about European cooperative production arrange- 30 kilometers, and on improvements in the abil- ments, including some short-range FOFA sys- ity of the Royal Netherlands Air Force to per- tems. The French are very interested in coop- form battlefield air interdiction. erative ventures, but view them as complex The Royal Netherlands Army believes that affairs and are skeptical about their potential greatest effect can be obtained by attacking success. Protection of French cash flow, de- ground combat units, particular those regi- fense industries, and technology base will all ments of the second tactical echelon that are be factors in joining cooperative programs. moving to join the battle. These can best be identified when they are 25 to 30 kilometers The Netherlands beyond the FLOT. To satisfy these requirements, they look to improved 155mm artillery, The Dutch fully support FOFA as a key mis- MLRS, and improved RPVs with real-time ca- sion concept, but within their own forces, place pabilities. The Dutch are buying MLRS direct- higher priority on defeat of the lead echelon, ly from the United States to avoid delays in air defense, and air support of the Army. They the European cooperative MLRS program. support NATO’s current focus on the region They believe that the systems necessary for within 150 kilometers of the FLOT, but will deeper attack are beyond their means, al- Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA . 117 though they might be interested in NATO– when targeted by Epervier, could be used as distinct from national-procurement of sys- against soft targets that do not move often tems like Joint STARS. (although its accuracy is not high). In considering a replacement for Lance, first priority The Dutch have an all F-16 Air Force which would be on the nuclear mission. They would they are interested in upgrading with better be unlikely to buy a conventional tactical mis- munitions, self-protection, reconnaissance sile system, such as ATACMS. pods, and equipment to allow them to operate at night. Both the Army and the Air Force are The Air Force is not likely to invest in high- interested in smart anti-armor submunitions. tech, special-purpose weapons anytime soon. They consider themselves to be too small to The Dutch are interested in cooperative pro- maintain a variety of weapons and support- grams as preferable to simple purchase of ing systems. Instead, they will concentrate on military equipment abroad, but tend to be cau- general-purpose bombs—including some laser tious. They have withdrawn from some pro- guidance kits—that can be used to support a grams which did not meet their needs–e.g., variety of missions. They see themselves as the MLRS program because it was too slow, contributing to delay and disruption, and are and some air-delivered weapons because they willing to accept a large degree of specializa- became incompatible with single-seat F-16s. tion among the various national air forces. While recognizing the success of the F-16 program, they are uncomfortable with co-production of systems designed elsewhere, because Intra-European Cooperation on FOFA these do not stimulate Dutch technological de- While FOFA has contributed to intensify- velopment. ing intra-European discussion of independent armaments production, it appears that cost Belgium considerations, among other factors, will tend to limit the range of cooperative interest to The Belgians have never doubted the sound- shallow strike weapons and sensors. The In- ness of the military principles behind, or the dependent European Programme Group cur- need for, FOFA, but their ability to contrib- rently lists 31 cooperative projects, only 5 of ute is limited both by funding and by a prob- which have direct FOFA application: RPVs; lem common among small nations–the ineffi- Surveillance and Target Acquisition; 155mm ciency inherent in a small force maintaining artillery; Maverick D; and third-generation a large variety of systems. Anti-Tank Guided Weapons. Most of these The Belgian Army falls far short of what it systems are for attack at ranges of less than believes it needs to defend with high confidence 50 kilometers. Further, intra-European coop- against the lead echelon. Future funding is eration on weapons production has been ham- therefore likely to be directed primarily toward pered due to divergent national interests and the close battle. Belgium would like to buy the priorities. Long-range FOFA systems are not MLRS, but that would be at least 10 years into likely to be of priority cooperative interest due the future and would require timely RSTA and to their high cost and specificity to the Cen- C3 that the Belgian corps currently does not tral Front threat, which makes them unlikely have. The Belgians are looking toward im- candidates for export to third countries.5 provements to their Epervier drone system, first fielded in 1964, to make it more compati- ‘The relationship between range, cost and export potential ble with MLRS and to programs such as Lim- which influence European thinking about FOFA systems production is evidenced in an article by Emile Blanc, then French ited Operational Capability-Europe (LOC-E) Delegate General for Armaments: and Battlefield Information Collection and Ex- M’hat is involved in the case of emerging technologies that are repeatedly mentioned are terminal guidance, microelec- ploitation System (B ICES). Belgium has the tronics, highly sensitive sensors and the like. These are relatively conventionally armed Lance missile which, difficult to solve, but not unsolvable, As for the danger to ex- 118 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

The 1985 Nunn Amendment 5. BICES–Battlefield Intelligence and Communications Exploitation System In an effort to respond to European indus- (C’ I and data fusion) trial concerns, reduce duplication of effort, and improve the climate for U.S./European arma- All except ARDS predated FOFA. ments cooperation, the 1985 Nunn Amend- European reaction to the Nunn Amendment ment authorized DoD funding of cooperative initiative has been quite positive but it is not research and development projects and side- evident that the positions of the Allies in this by-side comparative tests of U.S. and Euro- regard have been influenced much by FOFA. pean weapons systems. The appropriation for Of the five proposals noted above, only ARDS these purposes for fiscal year 1986 was $145 appears to have directly resulted from NATO’s million, which was increased to $185 million adoption of FOFA as a key mission concept, in fiscal year 1987. To qualify for funding, and here the concern is to ameliorate what may proposals must have at least one European be an undesirable duplication of effort on na- partner. The forum for discussion of Nunn tional sensor systems. European North Atlan- Amendment proposals has been the CNAD, tic Assembly parliamentarians have com- in which national armaments directors may in- mented that none of the agreed proposals dicate initial interest in participating in a co- would commit the Alliance to a “deep strike” operative venture by issuing “statements of posture. intent, which may result in signing of contracts among armaments firms in the inter- The United States withdrew a proposal for ested countries. The first such contracts are cooperation on ATACMS because no Euro- expected to be signed in the fall of 1987. pean partner could be found. There has also been a fair amount of criticism from European Although the Nunn Amendment was not academics about the economic and political specifically designed to foster cooperation on justification for cooperative projects with the FOFA, five of the ten proposals for which United States, on the grounds that this is a “statements of intent” have been issued thus distraction from essential intra-European tech- far have a FOFA application. These are: nology cooperation, and that Europe is in dan- 1. MSOW–Modular Stand-off Weapon (air- ger of giving away its technology too cheaply launched, short and long range for fixed to the United States. Thus far the Europeans and moving targets, independent seem to prefer European-produced systems, guidance); even if that eventually means paying more for 2. APGM—155mm Autonomous Precision less capability. Guided Munition; 3. ARDS–Air Radar Demonstration Sys- Initial European Reaction to FOFA tem (ground based data systems to demonstrate the interoperability of the U.S. The concept of striking behind the enemy’s Joint STARS, the French ORCHIDEE lines to blunt an attack has been a standard and the U.K. ASTOR sensors); part of warfare for centuries and an agreed ele- 4. NIS–NATO Identification system (Iden- ment of NATO defensive strategy since the tification Friend or Foe); and founding of the Alliance. Over the years, significant improvements in NATO’s ability to accomplish this mission with conventional artillery weapons and air forces—including the port, I would like to differentiate between medium range and capability for deep strike at Warsaw Pact (WP) long range types. Medium range types are unlikely to become too expensive. For the long ranges it appears that the techno- airfields and other fixed targets-have been logical goals have been set very high, Therefore the whole thing introduced as a matter of course. Moreover, can look expensive. See, “High Priorities to French-German Arms Development, ” the idea of employing NATO’s superior tech- Wehrtechm”k, February 1984. nological capacity for producing advanced Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA 119

deep strike weapons and thereby offsetting the the arrival of follow-on forces, but obser- WP advantage in ground forces received en- vations of WP maneuvers indicate there thusiastic endorsement from distinguished is considerable slack time planned in the military experts on both sides of the Atlantic.6 movement of forces, and delays occa- sioned by FOFA deep strikes can be Nevertheless, when FOFA was formally in- recouped. FOFA is thus not applicable to troduced for NATO-wide consideration in 1982 NATO’s current understanding of the WP —in the form of a SHAPE recommendation threat.8 to the Defence Planning Committee—the con- ● The FOFA concept, in particular the idea cept aroused considerable controversy among of deep strikes against moving armored the Allies.’ The following concerns and objec- targets, relies too much on the develop- tions were noted among the Europeans; we do ment of unproven technologies. Deep not know how widespread or strongly held they strike systems would be costly and vul- were: nerable to WP countermeasures. Even if The WP first echelon is by far the great- individual components of FOFA systems est threat to NATO. In concentrating on could be demonstrated to work under ideal the defeat or disruption of the follow-on test conditions, there is no guarantee that forces, FOFA sets the wrong priorities and highly complex FOFA systems would may siphon off resources needed to re- function as supposed in a battle envi- spond to the more urgent threat. ronment.9 FOFA presupposes a deep echeloning of ● The deployment of highly lethal deep at- WP forces to achieve overwhelming local tack systems on the Central Front is too force superiority and breakthroughs by aggressive a stance for a defensive alliance standard attrition warfare. However, re- such as NATO. Conventional weapons cently observed developments in WP doc- that could reach hundreds of kilometers trine suggests a greater emphasis on a into eastern Europe are not consonant first echelon attack, with the creation of with NATO’s goals, and change the char- Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs) acter of the Alliance from defense to that designed to penetrate quickly into of offense.10 NATO’s rear. FOFA also assumes that ‘One European analyst writes: a WP attack can be repulsed by delaying {The WP Operational Maneuver Group) is a means to an end, the end being the rapid collapse of NATO and the limiting of the war to the battlefield, and the means being a surprise attack on a broad front with several axes, I f the offensive is in one oper- ‘The 1983 and 1985 reports of the privately funded European ational echelon, NATO’s plans for interdiction against a second Security Study (ESECS 1 and 2) which figured prominently in operational echelon wilf be in vain. There may be no such second the evolution of the FOFA concept had extensive participation echelon within Eastern Euro e for several days. of European military experts, including retired Bundeswehr Gen- Christopher Donnelly, quote: in NAA Con~rentional Defense eral Franz-Joseph Schulze and retired UK Chief Air Marshal in Europe, pg. 25. Sir Alistair Steedrnan. It should be noted, however, that as early ‘Farooq Hussain, Director of Studies at the U.K. Royal United as 1983 General Schulze cautioned: Services Institute for Defense Studies, commented on the ap- the strengthening of our conventional deterrence anyway can plication of “emerging technologies” for FOFA: only be implemented gradually’, not only for reasons of limited ,.. vulnerability would considerably reduce the predicted effec- budgetary funds, established armed forces and armaments plans, tiveness of the weapons, requiring that they be bought in large available equipment and weapons, but also for reasons of differ- numbers or expensively re-designed to reduce their vulnerabil- ences in the national interest situation, For the United States, ity. These considerations would seem to accord FOFA a far lower the solutions will possibly look quite different simply because priority than other conventional defense weapons whose char- of its obligations outside the ,NATO area. acteristics and costs are more familim and predictable. Speech to the Clausewitz Society, Hamburg, August 1983. See, “NATO’s Conceptual Military Framework, ” Armed Forces, 7SACE UR General Bernard Rogers wrote an extensive rebut- September 1985. tal of European criticisms of FOFA: “Follow-on Forces Attack: l~The ch~ge that FOFA is an aggressive strategy was the Myths and Realities, ” NATO Review, December 1984. How- rallying point of European leftist criticism during 1984 and early ever, the major European objections to FOFA are reiterated 1985. “Concealed behind the name IFOFA) is the further devel- in a report of the North Atlantic Assembly, a group of Euro- opment of a military doctrine which in the years ahead could pean parliamentarians considered pro-NATO. See Conventional saddle the Alliance with a new arms race—thus making the al- L)efense in I+;urope: A Comprehensive Evaluation, NAA Sub- ready precarious balance of terror even shakier, opined the Committee on Conventional Defense in Europe, Karsten Voigt, Wrest German mass circulation weekly Der Spiegel, Nov. 26, Rapporteur, I)ecember 19R5. 1984. 120 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

● The presence of FOFA systems on the Christian Democrats in West Germany, felt Central Front would be destabilizing in the INF issue left little room for maneuver a crisis. Faced with a “use or lose” situa- within their political constituencies for major tion, field commanders may be tempted new defense efforts, however meritorious. As- to launch preemptive deep strikes with sociated with the INF issue was the rise—for weapons that may be dual capable. The the first time since the 1950s–of anti-NATO WP would be unable to distinguish be- “peace” movements in most European coun- tween a conventional FOFA deep strike tries as significant political forces. Having lost and a tactical nuclear attack during the on the INF issue, some of these political move- time of flight of the initial missiles, and ments, such as the Greens and the left-wing may respond immediately with a nuclear Social Democrats in West Germany, believed barrage. they had found a new avenue of attack in ● FOFA would set back prospects for arms FOFA. They were aided in this regard by a control. The WP response would be to field commonly held view in Europe that FOFA— a new generation of conventional weap- while ostensibly an independent SHAPE rec- ons, for both defense and offense, and fuel ommendation to NATO—was in fact of U.S. a new round of the arms race. It would origin, and closely associated with on-going also be likely to make the Soviets more conventional deep-strike weapons develop- intransigent on Mutual and Balanced ments of the U.S. Army and Air Force. Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, Particular emphasis was placed on the al- and cause them to further front-load the leged relationship between FOFA and the WP forces. ● “AirLand Battle” doctrine recently adopted The basis of NATO’s defense is the threat 12 by the U.S. Army. The charge that FOFA of nuclear retaliation. FOFA is designed was a thinly disguised attempt to impose a to make a conventional defense of Europe new, more aggressive and unpredictable strat- more calculable, and thereby signals egy on NATO found considerable resonance wrongly to the WP that a conventional in the FRG that for domestic political reasons attack might not be met with a nuclear cannot adhere to a declaratory defense policy response. which envisages either strategic advances or To some extent, these and other European withdrawals much beyond the inner-German objections to FOFA represented differences of border. The West German opposition parties expert opinion, and reflected views of some formally condemned FOFA, and put forward U.S. critics of FOFA.11 However, there were alternative conventional defense concepts, other more general political and economic fac- such as small and lightly armored anti-tank tors that may serve to explain the Allies’ units, which they claimed would make NATO largely negative reaction during the time the physically incapable of aggressive action. endorsement of FOFA was under considera- These ideas were shared in large measure by tion in NATO. the U.K. Labor Party and other European socialist parties. The Political Background IZAirLand Battle was promulgated by the U.S. Army in Field During the early 1980s all of the European Manual 100-5: Operations in 1982. In envisaging the integrated Allies were deeply embroiled in domestic po- use of chemical, nuclear and conventional forces in “rapid, vio- litical debates concerning Intermediate-range lent and disorienting” operations, AirLand Battle became a prime target for the European left. The specific charge was that Nuclear Forces (INF) deployments. Even the U. S., through the “Rogers Plan” (i.e., AirLand Battle and strongly pro-NATO governments, such as the FOFA), wants to ready NATO for an attack on the WP in the event of a U. S,-Soviet clash in the third world. See, for exam- Conservatives in the United Kingdom and the ple, Angriff als Vertei&”gung: Airhmd Battle, Airl-and Battle 2000, Rogers-Plan, a major study published in 1984 by the West “See, for example, The New Technologies: Technological Bril- German Greens which focuses on U.S. plans for “lateral esca- liance or Military Folly? by Steven L. Canby, November 1983. lation. ” Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA 121 .——

Protest against deployment in Europe of nuclear weapons, such as the ground-launched cruise missile shown below, formed a backdrop to the initial FOFA debate.

The European left was able to dominate the NATO’s defense costs. Due to continued high public discussion of FOFA, due in part to the unemployment and lagging economic growth, reluctance of pro-NATO governments to en- most European Allies felt it increasingly dif- gage in polemics on a NATO issue. In the view ficult to meet previous defense commitments of many European political leaders, any pub- to NATO. Their 1978 pledges to strive for in- licity about NATO initiatives was undesira- creases in real defense spending of 3 percent ble, because it enabled the opposition to draw per year had in most cases not been fulfilled. on latent anti-NATO and anti-American sen- Likewise, none of the conventional force defi- timent. For these leaders, what NATO needed ciencies identified in the 1978 NATO Long most was a period of relative calm. As a new Term Defense Program had been adequately and potentially major departure for NATO, addressed. While the Europeans were unable FOFA thus found few political advocates in to meet past obligations, newer studies— Europe. largely of U.S. origin-pointed to the need for even greater defense efforts. In addition to The “Burden Sharing” Issue FOFA, other ideas–SDI, Emerging Technol- ogies, Counter-Air 90, chemical weapons and A further constraint on European accept- the 1984 Nunn-Roth Amendment—appeared ance of FOFA was the ongoing debate with as politically difficult and potentially costly the United States over equitable sharing of new issues. 122 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Faced with what some European parliamen- Although SACEUR General Rogers and tarians called an “acronym avalanche,” the Al- other FOFA advocates initially claimed that lies were uncertain where FOFA stood in U.S. FOFA deployment could be covered by an ad- priorities. ” The 1984 Nunn-Roth Amend- ditional 1 percent real increase over the 3 per- ment,14 while it failed to pass the Senate, sent cent spending pledge, a later study by the a strong signal of U.S. displeasure about lag- Defence Research Group (DRG)15 reached sig- ging European conventional defense efforts, nificantly higher estimates: i.e., $40 billion to but was mainly directed at improving first $50 billion over a 10-year period. Assuming echelon sustainability. It thus appeared to the that FOFA implementation would be shared Allies that, whatever priority the United by the Allies in rough proportion to their over- States attached to FOFA, increased European all financial contributions to NATO, this would spending for FOFA could not be offset by re- have required the major Allies to achieve be- duced attention to other NATO missions. tween two to three times the rates of defense spending increases they had been able to make “The reaction of many Europeans to U.S. defense activism in 1984 may be reflected in the following quote from a U.K. in recent years. Initial European reluctance to member of Parliament at the time of the November 1984 Defence endorse FOFA can thus be understood, in part, Planning Committee meeting: “Governments can’t even meet as an unwillingness to make or imply a fur- their existing commitments. When you add the cost of SDI to the cost of FOFA and all the other things, it is mind-boggling.” ther financial commitment the Allies would be Bruce George, rapporteur to the North Atlantic Assembly’s unable to fulfill, and thereby exacerbate the Political Committee; cited in Aviation Week and Space Tech- “burden sharing” issue.” IIO]Ofl, Mar. 18, 1985. “The 1984 Nunn-Roth Amendment called for the phased with- “The Defence Research Group is an advisory body to NATO’s drawal of U.S. forces if the European Allies failed to increase Defence P1arming Committee. The DRG study of FOFA, Rela- their conventional defense efforts to: tive Value of Attack on Follow-on Forces, was issued July 10, 1. meet the annual 3 percent real defense expenditure increase, 1985. 2. meet the NATO sustainability goal, 16 FinaI 1984 NATO statistics indicate that, without the United 3. raise infrastructure funding for aircraft shelters and support States, the Alliance failed to meet its 3 percent spending goal, facilities for U.S. tactical air reinforcement, and and that in 1985 fewer NATO Allies met this goal than in 1984. 4. make progress in raising the nuclear threshold. AP Wire, May 13, 1986.

EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOFA

Despite the Allies’ political and economic res- work study, to place FOFA in the context of ervations about FOFA, they had little desire overall NATO defense priorities. to act divisively on an issue which appeared Since the DPC decision, some of the sharp of high interest to the United States, particu- edges have worn off the transatlantic discus- larly at a time when the INF debate had taken sion of FOFA. The successful resolution of the on the overtones of a test of Alliance solidar- INF issue has given European governments ity. The 1984 decision by the Defence Planning some additional political scope to concentrate Committee (DPC) can be seen as something on other defense priorities, although budgets of a compromise solution, in that it provided for most of the Allies continue to remain very a general endorsement of the FOFA concept, tight. but without an indication of its priority or a financial commitment regarding its implemen- Public pronouncements by NATO headquar- tation.17 As an additional precaution, on West ters and allied governments have been low key, German initiative, NATO agreed to undertake emphasizing that NATO would concentrate simultaneously a Conceptual Military Frame- first on the shallow strike systems in which ——— —.. a present capability exists; decisions on deep “During the DPC debate, some of the European allies report- strike systems —which aroused particular edly insisted that they could endorse FOFA only on the condi- tion that no additional defense spending be required. See. A via- European concerns—could be deferred well tion Week, Mar. 18, 1985. into the next decade. The European left, which Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA ● 123 — — had controlled the public debate on FOFA in The European Allies thus appear comforta- 1984, has also markedly abated its criticisms. ble with the present trend. Criticism by the opposition parties has been muted. Allied gov- Opposition parties have found that FOFA is too complex and abstract an issue to raise ernments view the on-going studies and con- sultations within NATO as tending to confirm much public attention. Moreover, the rise in their preference for concentrating effort on air popularity of many of the “peace” movements interdiction, reconnaissance and short-range fire was based largely on the scare of nuclear war; to be now perceived as attacking too strongly support improvements, which accord with standard NATO conceptions regarding ar- NATO’s conventional alternative would lose the centrist votes they had attracted. The in- tillery and air interdiction missions, and which were well under way before NATO’s endorse- trusion of SDI and arms control issues have 20 ment of FOFA. There is also the perception also contributed to keeping FOFA off the front that the United States has scaled back its ex- pages. pectations for FOFA in the light of the Gramm- In contrast to the previous year, the Allies Rudman spending cap and the present empha- also sensed during 1985 that there was some sis on SDI. Some European analysts have gone easing of the U.S. posture on FOFA and other as far as to state that FOFA, as a definable conventional defense issues. European pledges initiative, is already over.21 to increase ammunition stocks and infrastruc- During 1986, the focus of FOFA activity ture spending have responded in some meas- moved “indoors” to expert military fora such ure to U.S. concerns reflected in the 1984 Nunn- 18 as the CNAD ad hoc FOFA working group, Roth Amendment, and have added weight to the FOFA II working group and the Independ- the European argument that financial limita- ent European Program Group (IEPG). Al- tions will necessitate slow FOFA implemen- though recent developments within these tation. Another favorable development lay in groups offer some basis for encouragement, it the 1985 Nunn Amendment, which provided will ultimately be the parliaments of the NATO a financial incentive for greater U.S.-Euro- countries that will decide how, and at what pean cooperation on FOFA systems research. pace, FOFA will be implemented. Whether cur- FOFA was again routinely endorsed at the rent political and economic conditions in Eur- May 1985 conference of NATO Defense Minis- ope will permit the type of broad consensus ters, which pledged “special and coordinated needed for a significant FOFA deployment is efforts to strengthen conventional defense with still at best questionable. the means available, but without designation of FOFA as a priority.19 — ‘“For example, in May 1985, the Defence Planning Commit- 20In early 1986, for example, senior Dutch Ministry of De- tee pledged $3 billion to construct 665 aircraft shelters by 1990. fense officials indicated in a briefing to OTA staff that NATO’s At the same time, the FRG indicated expenditures for muni- endorsement of FOFA had not at that time affected defense tions would be 13 percent higher than initially planned for the procurement planning in the Netherlands. period 1984-87. See, Reserves, Reinforcements Stressed at 2*’’FOFA has lost much of the political attention that was NATO Defense Conference; Suddeutsche Zeitung, Mar. 18, 1985. once focused on it to the Strategic Defense Initiative . . The 19At tfis ~wting, FRG Defense Minister Woerner reporttily high technology all-conventional defense of Europe is back on emphasized: “special efforts do not mean special programs. the drawing boards. ” Farooq Hussain, “Conventional Weap- Quoted in Suddeutsche Zeitung, May 23, 1985. ons Have a Long Way to Go, ” New Scientist, July 18, 1985.

FACTORS UNDERLYING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOFA A common view is that European reluctance to increase their overall defense spending. This to go as far or as fast on a conventional de- is true up to a point, but is hardly the whole fense initiative such as FOFA is due largely story. Although the Allies’ ability to raise de- to the unwillingness or inability of the Allies fense budgets will vary with general economic conditions (which at present are not favora- straightforward and did not pose an undue ble) the divergence of U.S. and European opin- economic burden. However, beginning in the ion about FOFA also reflects fundamental 1960s, as the Soviets built up their nuclear transatlantic tensions on two key issues in the forces and attained strategic parity, the situ- Alliance: i.e., the degree to which NATO de- ation became considerably more complicated. fense should rely on conventional forces, and In the European view, ensuring that the the role of high technology in force modern- United States remained strategically coupled ization. How these more general issues are re- to the defense of Europe–despite the risk of solved will strongly affect the future course annihilation of American cities by a Soviet nu- of FOFA. clear response—and convincing the Soviets of this coupling became of paramount importance. The Role of NATO’s Conventional Forces In 1967, the Alliance responded to the changed situation by adopting the Flexible Re- Since the founding of the Alliance, the linch- sponse strategy, based on a triad of forces— pin of NATO defense has been the deterrent conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic threat of a U.S. strategic nuclear strike in the nuclear-to deter and frustrate the WP across event of a WP attack on Europe. During the the broad spectrum of threat scenarios. The period in which the United States possessed continued presence of large numbers of U.S. strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviets, forces on the Central Front constituted the vis- the task of defending Europe through the ible guarantee of the coupling of U.S. strate- threat of massive retaliation was relatively gic deterrence to the defense of Europe. While Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA ● 125

Flexible Response does not require NATO to FOFA and other conventional force improve- match the WP tank for tank or division for di- ments are needed because the ability of NATO vision (which the Allies maintain is not eco- to exercise its nuclear option is put in doubt nomically or politically possible), the credibil- if the WP has the ability to overrun the Cen- ity of the strategic deterrent became linked to tral Front in a matter of days. Yet none of the a robust NATO conventional force posture. European Allies have publicly seconded Gen- The presence of U.S. troops in NATO’s con- eral Rogers’ assessment, reflecting the gener- ventional force structure is not only to serve ally skeptical reaction to U.S. efforts to gain as a “nuclear trip wire, ” but to aid in deter- more public support in Europe for defense in- ring an all-conventional WP attack and, if decreases, such as the DoD annual Soviet Mili- terrence fails, to ensure NATO’s ability to es- tary Power and other public reports. Some calate to a nuclear response if necessary. European defense experts have questioned the factual basis for General Rogers’ scenario,24 Since the promulgation of Flexible Response, while others indicate that U.S. emphasis on the question of how much conventional defense the precariousness of NATO’s Central Front is enough has become the source of consider- posture—even if accepted—tends to weaken able transatlantic friction. Successive U.S. ad- 25 political support for NATO. ministrations have urged the Europeans to greater conventional defense efforts to counter The psychological impact of the issue of the the rapid rise in WP conventional force capa- role of conventional defense is most strongly bilities. The lackluster European reaction has felt in West Germany, in which one-third of been due, in part, to the greater costs of up- the population lives within 100 kilometers of grading conventional rather than nuclear WP forces. To many West Germans, the dev- forces, especially when the latter is paid for astation caused by the outbreak of conven- largely by the United States. However, to a tional war on their-soil would be equivalent to substantial number of Europeans, U.S. pres- defeat, no matter which side technically sure for increasing NATO’s conventional “wins.” The INF issue has so sensitized the defenses on the Central Front is perceived as West German populace to the nuclear threat partly motivated by the desire to reduce U.S. that many now believe that any change in nuclear exposure in Europe, by making a con- NATO’s posture somehow increases the ventional war fought solely in Europe more calculable and thinkable.22 quest the initial release of nuclear weapons. ” General Rogers, cited in Conventional Defense Improvements; “Where Is the SACEUR General Rogers, in advocating Alliance Going, ” James Moray Stewart, IVato Review, 1985. *’See, for example, Extended Deterrence; implications for FOFA, has attempted to bridge the gap be- Arms IJnu”tation and Reduction, by Eckhard Lubkemeier, tween the U.S. and European perceptions by Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn: dramatizing that the credibility of nuclear de- . . . the conventional force balance in Europe is not nearly as bleak as NATO’s estimates would have it. For many years now, terrence has been eroded through the WP con- the International Institute for Strategic Studies has been stat- ventional force build-up.23 His argument is that ing that “there would still appem to be insufficient overall strength on eithei- side to guarantee victory. (3iven this situation, conventional force improvements are not superfluous un- “European fears of the U.S. nuclear decoupling from the de- dertakings; however, NATO can do without those massive rear- fense of Europe has led some Europeans to adopt what they mament proposals advanced by SACUER and the ESECS group, call the doctrine of “conventional insufficiency. ” This is based entailing spending increases which NATO governments would on the assumption that what deters the Soviets is the threat not be able to sustain anyhow. of nuclear destruction of the Soviet homeland, a consequence “The distinguished British historian, Michael Howard, de- all out of proportion to what the Soviets could hope to gain by scribes the situation as follows: an attack on Europe. Deterrence would actually weaken if NATO A certain American tendency to hyperbole, an attachment to conventional forces became too robust, because this would un- worst-case analysis and some unfortunate attempts to make our dermine the certainty of a NATO nuclear strike in the event flesh creep with official publications in gorgeous Technicolor whose statistics have been questioned by our defense specialists, of a WP conventional attack. “In the view of some Europeans, have not improved matters. Such propagandistic efforts are should conventional forces become too strong, deterrence would widely discounted, and even when they are believed they are be undermined as the risks of war become more calculable. ” likely to engender not so much resolution as despair. North Atlantic Assembly: Conventional Defense in Europe, p. 6. ‘‘Deterrence, Consensus and Reassurance in the Defense of Eur- ““If war breaks out today, it would only be a matter of days ope; published in The Domestic Aspects of Western Security, before I would have to turn to our political authorities and re- Christoph Bertram (cd.), IISS, 1983. 126 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack chances of war. In addition, the special rela- High Technology and NATO Defense tionship the FRG has assiduously cultivated with the GDR has considerable influence on The balance of NATO’s nuclear and conven- attitudes regarding the types of weapons and tional forces is largely the concern of military forces NATO should have that are capable of experts and academics; of much more imme- striking into eastern Europe. These concerns diate concern to allied governments is the rela- are codified in the doctrine of Forward Defense, tionship between NATO defense, employment, which in theory at least envisages that a WP high technology, and national economic advan- conventional attack could be repulsed at the tage. The Europeans seem to have, in general, inner-German border, and that NATO incur- less enthusiasm than the United States about sions into eastern Europe could be limited to the potential for high technology to correct tactical and operational counter-attacks near NATO’s deficiencies. In the broadest sense, the border. this may reflect the more pervasive view in Europe that high-technology “fixes” seldom FRG official policy tries to achieve a diffi- work as advertised, and almost always cost cult balance between the need to provide more than planned. Contributing to this differ- declaratory support for FOFA in the interests ence in expectations is the European view that of Alliance solidarity, and the requirement to advanced U.S. systems are frequently devel- affirm Forward Defense for domestic con- oped and tested under ideal conditions, such sumption.” U.S. actions that might upset the as the U.S. desert, which would bear little rela- delicate balance required by the politics of For- tionship to a warfighting situation on the Cen- ward Defense would likely be met with resis- tral Front. tance. A senior Bundeswehr General indicated, for example, that the FRG would reject the For most of the past decade, the Europeans unilateral deployment of deep strike FOFA have been troubled by high unemployment systems in the U.S. sectors, on the grounds rates and sluggish economic growth, coupled that this would demoralize the Allies in the sec- with the perception that European high technology is falling rapidly behind that of Japan tors that were less well-equipped, and would 28 tend to funnel a WP attack into these weaker and the United States. It has also been a sectors.” This argument, which ignores the al- period of increasing transatlantic disputes over ready great imbalances among the Central general trade issues and the economic aspects Front corps and the cross-corps support role of NATO defense, including ‘burden sharing, FOFA might serve, maybe judged on its own sanctions and export trade controls. The extra- merits. It is, however, indicative of the differ- ordinary sensitivity of European governments ence in U.S. and West German expectations to U.S. influence in the defense sector was dem- regarding conventional force improvements. onstrated in 1985 by the near collapse of the Thatcher government over the proposed purchase of the Westland helicopter company by —— — —.— ‘The compatibility of AirLand Battle and FOFA deep strikes a U.S. firm. In this environment, suspicion of with the doctrine of Forward Defense seems to trouble the FRG U.S. defense policies and initiatives runs high. military. The difficulties in presentation can be discerned in the FRG 1985 Ministry of Defense White Paper: In the future, other long-range conventional weapons will be available to the Alliance, permitting effective operations against the Warsaw Pact follow-on forces before they can join the battle once the WP attack gets started. These operations have nothing to do with offensive operations. (p. 29) ‘aEuropean perceptions of U.S. high-technology dominance . . . the Bundeswehr and the allied forces are not equipped, appear to be considerably exaggerated. In 1955, for example, organized, trained or prepared for a strategic offensive in the the U.S. export share of the world high-technology market was Central Region. (p. 79) AirLand Battle . . . is only applicable in Europe in so far as 35 percent. In 1980, the U.S. share dropped to 18 percent, while it is reconcilable with the underlying principles of NATO de- the combined shares of the FRG and France alone accounted fense. There can be no question of any intention of the U.S. to for 30 percent of world high-technology export trade. See Sci- revise the principles of NATO strategy by national operatiomd ence 1n&”cators, The National Science Board, 1983, p. 23. As doctrines. (p. 30) of 1986, the United States became a net importer of high tech- 271n a 1986 briefing to OTA staff. nology. Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA . 127

For example, in February, 1986 the Euro- dence. 31 U.S. overtures to allay European con- pean Parliament voted a unanimous resolution cerns, such as funding SD I research contracts rebuking the United States for alleged manipu- in Europe and the 1985 Nunn Amendment, lation of COCOM trade controls to obtain com- have been criticized by some Europeans as at- mercial economic advantage.29 Recent U.S. de- tempts to obtain European expertise at bar- fense initiatives such as FOFA, SDI, and gain prices and interfere with the development Emerging Technologies have been perceived of intra-European high-technology coop- as threatening the European technology base eration. (in part by luring away engineers) and costing The sensitivities of European governments jobs, and have resulted in calls for greater to high-technology defense issues have tended intra-European armaments development coop- to dampen the desire for the introduction of eration and demands that the United States 30 advanced armaments in European military cir- reduce alleged protectionist practices. cles. European military leaders are acutely There is also a widespread belief that the aware that national economic policies make it United States enjoys a very large defense trade risky to request the procurement of foreign- balance, on the order of 10 to 1, while U.S. produced, high-technology systems, particu- claims that the difference in the “two-way larly because the long-term outlook for static street” has grown much narrower in recent defense budgets implies that expensive new years have not been received with much cre- procurements would divert funds from current military readiness. This situation may serve ‘The European Parliament resolution states that U.S. unilateral defense related export controls: to reinforce an intrinsic conservatism in Euro- . . can only be assumed to be intended to restrict Western llu- pean military circles about the deployment of rope’s access to American technology on normal commercial 32 terms and is contrary to good neighborly policy among allies . advanced armaments. A common view in Europe is that U.S. provisions which exceed those agreed by COCOM are in part motivated by general national commercial practices emanating form political rather than “see, “Two Way Street Balance Falls to 2:1, Most Equitable business circles. Ratio Ever, ” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1986. Quoted in Journal of Commerce, Feb. 24, 1986. “In an article which pleads for more competitive European 30 Francois de Rose, a former French representative to the At- buying of weapons as a means to reduce costs, an influential lantic Council and an advocate of stronger European conven- European journal nevertheless concludes: tional defense, stated: Politically astute generals and admirals know the money It is obviously inconceivable that a modernization effort would saved would probably not come to them: they might not get even be limited to Europe’s purchasing massive quantities of Amer- as much as they do now, It is one thing to ask for a ship to be ican weapons incorporating new technologies . The United built in a national shipyard. It is quite another to ask for one to States should thus face this problem at both the governmental be built abroad, never mind that it might be better and cheaper. (Administration and Congress) and industrial levels with a That is why they tend to cling to the do-it-at-home approach. breadth of vision we are unaccustomed to in this area. “Cheaper Weapons: Europe Does It the Second Best Way, ” Politique International, summer 1984. The Economist, June 21, 1986.

OPTIONS FOR CULTIVATING ADDITIONAL EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR FOFA

SACEUR General Rogers and other U.S. Clarify the U.S. Priority for FOFA military leaders are well aware of European reservations about FOFA and a number of use- The Europeans profess to some confusion ful remedial steps already have been taken. In as to where FOFA stands in U.S. military pri- addition, the following options for further stim- orities. They note, among other signals, the ulating European support for FOFA have been first echelon priority signaled by the 1984 suggested. If the U.S. Congress believes that Nunn Amendment, and question how FOFA the United States should try to stimulate will compete with SDI for scarce U.S. R&D greater European support, it might want to funds under the Gramm-Rudman spending consider some or all of them. cap. Some also seem to believe that FOFA may 128 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack be a “pet project” of SACEUR General Present FOFA in a More Rogers, and that U.S. attention may wane un- Positive Light der his successor. The United States should again clearly state its intentions regarding The major argument for FOFA by the FOFA and, to respond to specific European United States and SACEUR until now has objections and concerns, indicate the relative been that it is needed to raise the nuclear importance it attaches to shallow strike (i.e., threshold to preserve the deterrent credibility up to 50 kilometers) versus deep strike sys- of NATO’s triad of conventional, theater nu- tems. To avoid making FOFA a public issue clear, and strategic nuclear forces. However again, U.S. views should be communicated necessary this appears to military strategists, largely through nonpublic NATO channels, the prospect of spending large sums of money such as the Conceptual Military Framework merely to stave off the collapse of the Central study. Front for a few more days is not a strong selling point from the European perspective. A more appealing approach might be to link Set Realistic Funding and FOFA to crisis stability and deterrence. Deployment Goals A major question mark for NATO has al- Currently available studies of FOFA, such ways been the length of time which the War- as ESECS and DRG, estimate costs for full saw Pact would need for mobilization before FOFA deployment at between $20 billion and launching an attack: while obviously the So- $50 billion over a 10-year period. Some critics viet commanders would need at least a few claim these figures are gross underestimations. days for mobilization and would prefer a few But even if they were accepted, it is unrealis- weeks, short Pact mobilization might well tic to expect the Allies to cover their propor- make it difficult for NATO to decide upon and tionate share of the cost through increased de- implement its own mobilization before the at- fense spending at a time when European tack commenced. Furthermore, longer Pact defense budgets are static or heading down- mobilization would provide time for NATO to wards. If trade-offs are acceptable, the United demonstrate its resolve (by counter-mobiliza- States should specify what other NATO mis- tion) and then negotiate a satisfactory settle- sions could take a lesser priority to balance in- ment of the crisis. creased European spending for FOFA. The 10- year deployment goal, including systems that A strong NATO FOFA capability would call are now in the research phase, seems too op- into question the ability of the Soviets to bring timistic in light of NATO’s national R&D plan- their forces forward after a war had started, ning cycles and its track record on force mod- and therefore increase their need for pre-attack ernization. It might be useful at first to narrow mobilization. FOFA can therefore be seen as the focus to a few shallow strike weapons and a means of deterring the Soviets from rushing sensor systems— such as improved MLRS and to attack before NATO is ready. Increasing RPVs–which are relatively inexpensive and deterrence and negotiating time in a crisis is are at or close to the production stage, and a far more popular objective in Europe than which would not require complex data fusion increasing NATO’s staying power in a conven- systems. A demonstration that FOFA is ef- tional war. fective at the shallow ranges, and with systems FOFA might also usefully be linked in the that could be produced in Europe, could boost future to negotiations for withdrawal of allied support for the more ambitious FOFA intermediate-range nuclear forces from Eur- goals. ope. The immediate reaction of European Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA ● 129

leaders to reports that INF withdrawals had rectly focused on the need to standardize been discussed by President Reagan and So- FOFA systems and reduce overall R&D costs viet Premier Gorbachev at their October 1986 in the Alliance by eliminating duplication of meeting in Reykjavik was sharply negative, effort through cooperative industrial projects due in part to the realization that the current among the NATO partners. In this regard the conventional force imbalance would pose an financial incentive offered by the 1985 Nunn even greater threat to European security in Amendment has proved particularly promis- the absence of INF missiles. Focusing Euro- ing in fostering U.S./European cooperative pean public attention on the need to redress ventures. Congress may wish to consider con- this imbalance as a necessary precondition for tinuing Nunn Amendment funding at a level such withdrawals might gain additional sup- of $200 million per year to maintain the mo- port for conventional force improvements such mentum of cooperative projects now under as FOFA. study and allow for a number of new starts each year. Emphasize Dual-Use, Reemphasize Special emphasis might be placed on reach- Dual-Capable ing agreement on a NATO-wide IFF34 system The Europeans give highest priority to con- in the Nunn Amendment context, because ventional weapons and surveillance improve- NATO’s present capacity to carry out deep ments against the first echelon threat. The strike interdiction relies exclusively on air United States might clarify to the Europeans forces. If no agreement can be reached on IFF, that deep strike weapons and sensor systems which all Alliance partners agree is urgently would enhance NATO’s capabilities against necessary and which has been under discus- both the first and follow-on echelons. On the sion for the last 20 years, the likelihood of U. S.- other hand, proposals that tend to blur the dis- European cooperation on the more controver- tinction between FOFA and tactical nuclear sial elements of FOFA would appear dim. weapons cause Europeans a great deal of anxi- ety. An idea tentatively advanced in 1984, for Clarify Unilateral Deployments example, to modify Minuteman missiles to There seems to be some opposition in the carry conventional warheads and base them FRG to a unilateral U.S. deployment of deep in Europe to perform conventional missions, 33 strike FOFA missile systems in the U.S. sec- was emphatically denounced. Likewise, pro- tors of the Central Front, on the grounds that posals for conventional versions of the Persh- this would concentrate the WP thrust into the ing II or the successor to the Lance missile other sectors. To counter this argument, the have been questioned by the Europeans on the United States could attempt to provide the grounds that they would decrease crisis sta- FRG with a better appreciation of the role bility. FOFA could play in cross-corps support which would tend to level rather than heighten the Accommodate European Industrial current inequalities among the Central Front Interests sectors. If, nevertheless, the FRG position were not to change, the United States might The Europeans have made it amply clear consider an offer to consult formally with the that FOFA implementation cannot be prem- FRG on deployments when the deeper strike ised on their purchasing U.S.-produced weap- systems become available. ons systems. Discussions in NATO have cor-

SSI n a 1985 pre9s conference, FRG Defense Minister Woerner rejected stationing of Minuteman missiles in Europe for conventional defense purposes. He reportedly labeled the missiles “Identification, Friend or Foe, A system for identifying air- “incredible hulks” at the press conference. See, Interview with craft so that NATO’s air defenses do not kill NATO’s aircraft. Dr. Manfred Woerner, Armed Forces Journal, August 1985. Also called the NATO Identification System (NIS). 130 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Clarify the Relationship Between bility which might tempt the Soviet Union to FOFA and AirLand Battle attack preemptively. The possibility of such an early Soviet attack would not only be threat- While the United States has affirmed that ening in a military sense, but would reduce the elements of AirLand Battle are appropriate in time available for negotiations to resolve the the Central Region only to the extent that they crisis short of war. FOFA, by threatening the are compatible with NATO doctrine, the Euro- Soviet forces moving up from rear areas once peans evince some confusion and concern about a war has started, would give the Soviets an how FOFA would be integrated under this ar- incentive to defer any attack until after exten- rangement. One major difficulty is that sive Warsaw Pact mobilization, which in turn AirLand Battle envisages counter-attack by would buy time for NATO mobilization and ground forces up to 150 kilometers beyond the for crisis management efforts. close battle, which seems incompatible with the doctrine of Forward Defense, and has been Emphasize the Role of Joint STARS, questioned by the Europeans on political and in Particular, in Crisis Management military grounds. Another issue is the alloca- tion of air resources for deep strike missions, Apart from all the questions and issues since AirLand Battle appears to center con- about the survivability and value of Joint trol at Corps level or lower, while FOFA would STARS in battle, nobody doubts that it would require multi-corps and multinational coordi- greatly enhance NATO’s ability to monitor nation. Warsaw Pact troop movements during a crisis. Accurate and extremely timely informa- Emphasize the Role of FOFA in tion about such troop movements during a cri- Enhancing Deterrence and Improving sis could be invaluable to NATO for crisis Crisis Management management. Such information would facilitate NATO decisionmaking, thus enhancing One of NATO’s widely recognized weak- deterrence by discouraging Soviet hopes of nesses is that it must mobilize for at least sev- dividing the Allies; it would also facilitate de- eral days before it can put up a credible deployment of NATO forces to meet the evolv- fense. In particular, the period during which ing threat, thus enhancing deterrence by dis- troops would arrive from the United States by couraging Soviet hopes of victory by quickly air, take equipment out of storage sites in the breaking through maldeployed and unprepared FRG, and organize themselves into battle- NATO forces. ready divisions would be a period of vulnera-

FOFA AND THE NATO ALLIANCE In the light of the history of the FOFA ini- troduction of advanced sensors such as Joint tiative, it is not currently possible to predict STARS, even if the Allies remain uncertain with any certainty its future course in NATO. concerning the deep strike elements of FOFA. There have been a number of plusses and At the very least, FOFA could add cogency minuses. On the positive side, it has helped fo- to U.S. arguments for increased European at- cus attention on recent developments in WP tention to the first echelon threat, which the doctrine, such as the Operational Maneuver Allies claim FOFA underestimates. Groups, and contributed to the discussion of what should be the appropriate NATO re- FOFA has also been the object of consider- sponse. It has also highlighted current NATO able criticism by the Allies, although this does deficiencies in air and ground fire support, not mean that the concept itself is inherently reconnaissance and C2, and may ease the in- devisive. FOFA, like any major initiative in Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA ● 131

NATO, has brought to the surface the long- NATO partners can achieve a common percep- standing underlying transatlantic frictions tion of the political and military aspects of the concerning burden sharing, the nuclear thresh- WP threat. In a 1986 discussion with OTA old and defense trade. The Allies, as a group, staff on FOFA, European parliamentarian have a fundamental resistance to any major members of the North Atlantic Assembly de- change in NATO strategy, which, whatever its scribed the current difference in threat percep- defects, has preserved peace in Europe for two tion as follows: “You Americans believe the generations. This resistance is manifest in their situation on the Central Front is like 1938; we skepticism of U.S. “bean counts’ of WP forces, believe it is more like 1914’’–i.e., the greatest and in their arguments that substantial change threat to peace is an uncontrolled escalation in NATO force structure would necessarily of belligerency, not the failure to deter a de- weaken the political cohesion of the Alliance. termined aggressor. This view has historical merit if the sole criterion of NATO’s success This conservatism, however, also has its positive points with regard to the future of FOFA. is to deter the WP from a direct attack on Eur- Now that the Alliance has given FOFA its po- ope; it has been a long time since the Euro- litical blessing, it would be unlikely that the peans had to consider this seriously as an im- minent possibility. Judged by other factors, Europeans would be moved to renounce the such as denying the Soviets the ability to co- DPC decision, even if the opposition parties which are now on record as condemning FOFA erce Europe economically and politically through win in forthcoming elections, but this is not the growing imbalance between NATO and the WP in conventional forces, the record of the a certainty. This does not mean that FOFA Alliance is not as certain. will be implemented as originally conceived or could not again become a devisive issue if, for The history of the FOFA initiative thus far example, the United States decides on unilat- suggests there is still some variance between eral deployment of deep strike missiles in the U.S. and European understanding of some of U.S. corps sectors. the basic purposes of the Alliance. It also suggests that it is possible for the United States At the most basic level, the differences in and its Allies to work together, given time and the U.S. and European views on FOFA, and a willingness to accommodate each other’s all its associated issues, will tend to narrow views. or widen depending on the degree to which the Chapter 9 Current Capabilities . .

CONTENTS

Page Introduction...... 135 Targeting Information ...... 136 Delivery Systems ...... 136 Munitions ...... 138

Tables Table No. Page $1. Surveillance and Reconnaissance Aircraft ...... 136 9-2. Delivery Systems ...... 137 9-3. Munitions Fielded by NATO Forces ...... 138 Chapter 9 Current Capabilities

INTRODUCTION NATO’s ability to attack follow-on forces is achieve a given objective. The U.S. Maverick provided today almost exclusively by aircraft missile is effective against tanks, but requires operating at depths of 150 kilometers or less the pilot to engage tanks individually. The Low and carrying weapons that are most effective Altitude Navigation Targeting Infra Red for against fixed targets (guided bombs) or soft Night (LANTIRN) will support launching two area targets (cluster bombs). Although such Mavericks per pass, but the pilot will still have attacks may play some part in impeding the to find a target for each and point the missile forward advance of Warsaw Pact forces, they seeker at it. are only a subset of the operational concepts Capability against fixed targets such as that have been proposed for attacking follow- bridges and power stations is somewhat bet- on forces. In particular, they would not destroy ter; guided bombs can provide the high ac- armored forces. curacy needed to destroy these targets while The implementation of the other operational allowing the aircraft to remain out of range concepts runs up against several major limi- (up to 20 kilometers or so) of terminal defenses. tations in current fielded systems. Perhaps the Few NATO aircraft can reach more than 150 most important is that NATO’s current recon- kilometers beyond the East German border, naissance and command, control, and commu- however, where a large number of important nication systems and procedures are not de- fixed targets are located (railroad bridges, for signed to provide timely information on the example). precise location of mobile targets. Although air- Aircraft face several other limitations as craft are partially able to make up for a lack well. Few NATO aircraft are able to operate well of precise target data by placing a human ob- at night or in bad weather, and all face compet- server on the scene, additional time spent over ing demands from other missions, including enemy territory in searching for a target will opposing enemy air forces, close air support, increase exposure to the very heavy Warsaw and nuclear standby. In the first few days of Pact air defenses. a war, NATO aircraft in the Central Region will be committed largely to fighting the air A second major limitation is that most ex- battle and to providing close air support, with isting air-delivered weapons cannot destroy armored vehicles in significant numbers. The best little leeway to carry out attacks against follow-on forces. weapon for the task today may be the Tornado aircraft flown by the British and German air Ground-launched weapons, which could com- forces. But its anti-armor submunitions, dis- plement aircraft particularly at times when few pensed in large numbers, are unguided. These aircraft are available (night and bad weather weapons require aircraft to fly very close to—or and the first days of a war), have little to offer even directly over—the target, exposing the at present. Artillery and the Multiple Launch aircraft to fire from terminal air defenses. Clus- Rocket System (MLRS) now entering the inter bombs, which are effective against soft tar- ventory, are of short range (less than 30 kilom- gets, have a quite low kill rate against armored eters), have a relatively low delivery accuracy, vehicles, requiring multiple attacks—and thus and carry cluster munitions that are relatively repeated exposure to anti-aircraft fire-to ineffective against tanks.

135 136 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

TARGETING INFORMATION’ Any plan to use existing NATO forces to at- Table 9-1 .—Surveillance and Reconnaissance Aircraft tack Warsaw Pact follow-on forces quickly Nation Wartime control runs up against the limitation imposed by ex- Reconnaissance aircraft: isting technology for locating mobile targets RF-4C United States NATO beyond the immediate battle area. Current RF-4E Germany NATO reconnaissance systems provide data for gen- RF-104 Netherlands NATO Jaguar United Kingdom NATO eral situation assessment, especially at short Mirage 5 Belgium NATO ranges, but the data are generally neither OV-1D United States U.S. Corps timely enough nor precise enough to guide United States NATO weapons to specific targets. RPVs and drones: The bulk of NATO’s surveillance, reconnais- CL-89 United Kingdom, Germany, Corps sance, and target acquisition capability is still Canada provided by manned aircraft carrying a vari- Epervier Belgium Corps CL-289 Germany, Canada Corps ety of sensors (see table 9-l). Aircraft penetrat- ARGUS Germany Corps ing enemy airspace to obtain reconnaissance SOI.JRCE Otflce of Technology Assessment, 1987 photographs are obviously vulnerable to enemy air defenses, and may be forced to fly restricted ritory while looking as far as hundreds of kilom- routes; it is difficult for reconnaissance aircraft eters into the enemy’s rear. The systems that to cover broad areas. detect radar signals (ELINT, or electronic in- Unmanned drone aircraft, currently de- telligence) and radio communications (COMINT, ployed by German, British, and Belgian ar- or communications intelligence) may be of mies, are able to perform limited reconnais- great value for finding command posts, sur- sance of heavily defended areas. Their small face-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and surface-to- size makes them difficult to detect and they surface missile radars. do not place a human pilot at risk. Some fly The ASARS-II radar carried on the TR-1 air- a preprogrammed route; others can be con- craft can provide very detailed images allow- trolled from the ground. They carry a variety ing discrimination between tanks, armored per- of sensors, some of which transmit directly to sonnel carriers, and other vehicles. The the ground and others return film or tapes that ASARS-II radar is, however, designed primar- must be processed before the information can ily for observing fixed objects, and has only be extracted. Compared to manned reconnais- a very limited capability to spot targets that sance aircraft, ranges are limited.2 are in motion. A prototype of this system is Radars and equipment to pickup enemy ra- now flying in Europe; full operational capabil- dio communications and radar emissions are ity is to begin in 1987. Although control of carried on a number of U.S. aircraft and per- these U.S. systems would be transferred to mit those aircraft to remain over friendly ter- SACEUR in wartime, U.S. security restrictions on the disclosure of intelligence capabilities to foreign countries—including members ‘A more detailed version of this section is found in app. 9-A of NATO—could, unless waived, impede the in Vol. 2. ‘Jane All the World’s Aircraft, 1985-86 (London: Jane’s Pub timely flow of information from some of these lishing Co. Ltd., 1985). systems to NATO commanders.

DELIVERY SYSTEMS Within NATO today, aircraft constitute the artillery and the Multiple Launch Rocket Sys- primary means of delivering munitions beyond tem are short-range weapons (about 30 kilom- the immediate battle area. Ground-launched eters), and the munitions they carry-the Im- Ch. 9—Current Capabilities ● 137

port at the immediate battle area. Long-range aircraft such as the F-111 are expected to carry out attacks against airfields and interdiction targets that may or may not be related to follow-on forces. Moreover, a significant proportion of the F-1 11s as well as some other aircraft will be held for nuclear missions. Range is another limiting factor. Only a portion of these 1,000 aircraft (140 U.S. F-1 11s, 10 British Buccaneers, and-when full deployment levels are reached-about 430 British and Photo credit US Department of Defense German Tornados) can reach targets beyond NATO’s current capabilities rely primarily on aircraft about 150 kilometers from the FLOT. None such as F-4s and F-16s (pictured). can reach beyond about 400 kilometers without refueling (see table 9-2). Furthermore, few of the escort aircraft that would be included proved Conventional Munition, essentially a in an attack package can operate at these cluster bomb—are effective mainly against soft longer ranges. targets, such as trucks, self-propelled artillery, and other lightly armored vehicles (including The F-ills are the only aircraft fully able Soviet BMP infantry fighting vehicles and to operate at night and in bad weather. F-16s field command posts). Although nominally ca- are beginning to acquire a night/all-weather capable of penetrating a portion of the lighter pability with the addition of the LANTIRN armored top surfaces of current Soviet tanks, navigation and targeting pods. Tornados are these munitions in practice would have a very equipped with terrain-following radar which low kill probability against tanks. Further- permits operation at low altitudes even under more, these ground-launched systems are not poor visibility, and a ground-mapping radar very accurate. that could allow them to navigate to and locate large area targets at night; but they lack an The ground-launched Lance missile has a considerably greater range (up to 125 kilometers), but because of its relatively poor accuracy, its role is mainly carrying tactical Table 9-2.— Delivery Systems nuclear warheads. The conventional APAM (antipersonnel, antimateriel) warhead for Ground-launched: Lance is designed for use against soft area tar- Country Range (approx.) gets, such as SAM sites, and is ineffective Artillery ...... all 30 kilometers MLRS ...... US, GE, UK 30 kilometers against armored targets. Conventional Lance...... US, NL, BE 120 kilometers Aircraft: About 1,000 tactical aircraft that could be Country Range Night/weather used to strike targets beyond the immediate F-4 ...... US,GE short limited battle area would be assigned to support the F-5 ...... NL short no NATO Central Region in wartime. All have F-16 ...... US, NL, BE short no CF-18...... CA short no other jobs to do besides attacking follow-on F-104 a ...... GE, NL, BE short limited forces, however, and an important issue in the F-ill ...... US medium full implementation of FOFA is how early in a war Tornado ...... GE,UK medium good Mirage 5 ...... BE short no those aircraft would become available. F-16s, Jaguar ...... UK for example, which can carry out both air-to- Buccaneer ...... UK air and air-to-ground missions, would be called Ranges Short up to roughly 150 kilometers beyond the FLOT Medium up to roughly 350 kilometers beyond the FLOT upon heavily in the first few days of a war to aBelng replaced by F.16 and Tornado assist in the air battle and for close air sup- SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1987 138 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack infrared targeting system that would enable aircraft is sufficient to fly from bases in the them to carry out precise attacks at night. United States to targets throughout Eastern Europe. Whether they can, or must, success- Some of the B-52 bombers of the Strategic fully penetrate Warsaw Pact air defenses and Air Command could be made available for con- whether existing on-board targeting systems ventional missions; crews are beginning to be 3 are adequate for the job are critical questions, trained to fly such missions. The range of these however.4 —.— “’NATO Deploys Boeing B-52s in Deep-Strike Attack Exer- cise, ” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Sept. 9, 1985. 4See vol. 2, app. 9-B.

MUNITIONS

Cluster munitions currently represent the Table 9-3.— Munitions Fielded by NATO Forces primary means for attacking combat vehicles General. purpose bombs: and other mobile targets (see table 9-3). Many Mk-82, Mk-84, others ...... aircraft small bomblets—packed into an air-delivered Cluster munitions: dispenser, artillery shell, or rocket–are scat- ICM ...... artillery, MLRS tered over a wide area (typically a few hundred APAM ...... Lance Rockeye...... aircraft meters). This large kill radius compensates for CEM ...... aircraft imprecise delivery and permits engaging mul- MW-1/KB-44 ...... aircraft (German Tornado) tiple individual targets per pass or per round. BL755 ...... aircraft (British) Although these munitions are capable of do- Scatterable mines: Gator ...... aircraft ing considerable damage to soft targets such RAAM, ADAM ...... artillery as personnel, trucks, field command posts, and MW-1/MIFF ...... aircraft (German Tornado) lightly armored vehicles such as self-propelled Guided bombs: artillery and BMPs, their ability to penetrate Maverick ...... aircraft (F-16, F-4, F-1 11) Paveway II ...... aircraft (F-4, F-1 11) heavy armor is small.’ Unless a bomblet hap- GBU-15 ...... aircraft (F-4, F-1 11) pens to strike a tank at a particularly vulner- TV-guided Martel ...... aircraft (British Buccaneer) able spot on its top surface, it is unlikely to SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1987 do any serious damage. Because the typical pattern on the ground of these weapons is one bomblet per 20 square meters, the probabil- A different type of air-launched weapon, the ity of killing a tank with these munitions is Maverick guided missile, has a high kill prob- quite low. Another drawback of these muni- ability against armored vehicles, but is expen- tions is that when delivered by air, they require sive (over $100,000 each) and is capable of hit- the aircraft to fly within a few kilometers of ting at most one target per round and at most the target-in the case of Combined Effects a few per pass. It also requires the attacking Munition (CEM) and Rockeye, which, like or- aircraft to fly to within a few kilometers of the dinary bombs, can be dropped from a distance target. in a‘ ‘lobbed’ trajectory-or even directly over the target (in the case of the Tornado’s MW-1 Other guided bombs, the laser-guided Pave- dispenser, which remains fixed to the bottom way and the TV-guided GBU-15, provide a sig- of the aircraft). nificant capability for attacking fixed targets such as bridges, hardened command posts, and power stations, mainly by virtue of their high

5A typical penetration depth is 25 mm of ordinary steel (rolled accuracy. Both also allow the aircraft to stand homogeneous armor). The APAM warhead carried on the conventional Lance missile has essentially no armor-penetrating off a modest distance (as much as 20 kilome- ability. ters) from the target. Ch. 9—Current Capabilities ● 139

Land mines that can be delivered by artillery make use of improved lethal mechanisms that or aircraft also provide a current capability for may allow them to be effective in halting or attacking follow-on forces. Unlike land mines even destroying armored vehicles. A major used in the past, which had to be emplaced by limitation of the current scatterable mines is hand and which generally did little damage to that they are easily seen on roads and can be tanks—perhaps merely blowing off a tread, cleared with the forks and rollers carried by causing a minor delay—these new mines can Soviet tanks or even by machine-gun fire. be quickly emplaced where needed and they . . .

Chapter 10 Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack CONTENTS

Page Introduction...... 143 Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Functions ...... 143 Issues ...... 144 RSTA Requirements for SOFA ...... 144 Joint STARS ...... 146 Description ...... ,146 Status ...... 146 Issues ...... 147 Need for Airborne Moving-Target-Indicating Radar Surveillance...... 148 Vulnerability to Attack ...... 149 Susceptibility to Jamming ...... 150 Alternatives ...... ,...... 151 The Precision Location Strike System (PLSS) ...... 154 Components and programs ...... 156 Status ...... 157 Problems and Progress ...... 158 Operational Utility: The View From USAFE ...... 159 Alternatives to PLSS ...... 159 Summary ...... 160 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles...... 160 The Aquila RPV ...... 161 Alternatives to Aquila ...... ,...... 162 The Light Division UAV ...... 164 The IEW UAV ...... 164 Expendable UAVs...... 164 Air-Launched UAVs ...... 164 Advanced-Technology UAVs ...... ,.164 Issues and Options ...... 164 Summary ...... ,.165 The Two-Way Street: Opportunities for Cooperative Development and Production of RSTA Systems ...... 165 Interoperable or Co-Produced Airborne Radar Systems ...... 165 Airbus Industrie A300 Platforms for Joint STARS...... 166

Figures Figure No. Page 10-1.Joint STARS Components ...... 147 10-2. Components of the Precision Location Strike System (PLSS) ...... 155 10-3. The Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle ...... 162 Chapter 10 Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack

INTRODUCTION Attacking follow-on forces requires an abil- Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and it y to collect intelligence about the enemy sit- Target Acquisition (RSTA) Functions uation from which enemy strength and intentions may be inferred. This intelligence may Attacking follow-on forces requires: be collected by routine efforts (surveillance) or 1. detecting, recognizing, and roughly locat- by efforts to obtain more information about ing targets (surveillance or reconnais- a specific area of interest (reconnaissance). sance); FOFA also requires an ability to acquire tar- 2. assessing their value and intent (situation gets—i.e., to detect and identify enemy forces assessment); and to determine or predict their locations with 3. choosing the targets to be attacked (com- sufficient accuracy to attack them. At present, mand decision); only fixed targets and vehicles which halt for 4. identifying opportunities and means to at- relatively long times can be acquired reliably. tack them (targeting); There will be important improvements—espe- 5. planning the attack; cially in timeliness—as systems and proce- 6. tasking attack and reconnaissance plat- dures for using ASARS-II radar imagery are forms to perform the attack; improved, but shortfalls will still remain, espe- 7. accurately locating the targets to be at- cially in the ability to acquire moving vehicles tacked (target acquisition); and (“movers”) out to about 150 kilometers. 8. quickly providing target updates to the Several programs that could help are at is- attack platforms (attack control). If the sue now before Congress; these include the attack is to be conducted by aircraft, in- Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Sys- formation on enemy air defenses must also tem (Joint STARS) program and various un- be provided. manned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs. The NATO today has a variety of systems to feed Precision Location Strike System (PLSS)– data into this process. Although it is difficult procurement of which has been deferred by the to generalize about a large number of very dif- Air Force–could also contribute to FOFA if ferent systems, we can generally observe that remaining developmental problems (discussed while NATO’s current systems are probably below) are corrected. ’ capable of supporting the attack of targets that do not move very frequently, they fall far short of providing continuous, broad, deep coverage ‘Much information about RSTA systems is classified. U.S. and of being able to provide targeting data on citizens holding SECRET clearances are referred to vol. 2 of highly mobile systems-especially those which this report and to ch, 5 of OTA, Technologies for NATO’s Follow- On Forces Attack Concept (U), 10 February 1986. The appen- do not emit radar or radio signals-without un- dices to this chapter contain extensive additional material. due delays.

143 144 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Issues RSTA systems would be capable of determining and reporting the locations of all targets There is concern that the E-8A aircraft pro- with accuracy and timeliness adequate to guide posed as platforms for Joint STARS would not attack platforms and weapons to them. be adequately survivable if operated as close to the FLOT as originally intended, and that OTA has reviewed a number of analyses if operated farther from the FLOT, their cov- which have been performed by or for SHAPE, erage would be inadequate to justify their cost. the Department of Defense, and allied minis- The Air Force decided not to request fiscal year tries of defense to estimate the RSTA capa- 1987 funds for procurement of PLSS, which bilities needed for FOFA (or interdiction). Most is designed to accurately locate and control at- provide insight into RSTA capabilities needed tacks against surface-to-air missile (SAM) ra- for FOFA and the difficulties of estimating dars, but did request and receive fiscal year them. These analyses and other considerations 1987 funds for further development and test- lead OTA to the following observations: ing of PLSS avionics. PLSS has almost at- ● Reconnaissance and surveillance needs vary tained specified emitter location accuracy but greatly according to the specific operational has not yet demonstrated specified system concepts to be implemented. Current con- reliability (partly because of TR-1 aircraft cepts for FOFA require relatively little failures). The Aquila remotely piloted vehicle RSTA support; they seek primarily to de- (RPV) program has suffered cost and sched- lay and disrupt follow-on forces by route ule overruns, leading some to consider procure- attacks intended to create obstacles, and ment of an existing-possibly foreign-made— to destroy follow-on forces by attacking RPV which could be modified to have capabil- them when halted at obstacles. Some new 2 ities comparable to those required of Aquila. operational concepts—e.g., use of cruise U.S. procurement of an RPV made by a NATO missiles to mine rail lines and destroy key partner would visibly reinforce U.S. efforts to bridges–would likewise require little or no pave a “two-way street” for intra-alliance arms additional procurement of RSTA systems. sales-at the expense of the U.S. trade balance. ● The most ambitious FOFA concepts require some sort of airborne moving-target- RSTA Requirements for FOFA indicating (MTI) radar system capable of almost continuous broad coverage to the Ideally, FOFA would be supported by the depth of divisional assembly areas (70 to collection of raw intelligence of several disci- 100 + kilometers) and near-real-time dis- plines-communications intelligence (COMINT), play, because: electronics intelligence (E LINT), image intelli- –Deep, wide-area surveillance is needed gence3 (IMINT), and measurement and signa- 4 for situation assessment. To allow ture intelligence (MASINT)–-across the full friendly forces time for planning and breadth and depth of the enemy’s rear area un- movement, massing enemy forces must der all weather and lighting conditions. Ideally, be detected while they are still far (100 to 150 kilometers) from the FLOT. Rapid 5 ‘The House Armed Services Committee recommended, in its revisit would facilitate tracking and re- markup of the fiscal year 1987 Omnibus Defense Authoriza- tion bill, that the Target Acquisition, Designation, and Aerial Reconnaissance System (TADARS) program under which the 5Under conditions likely to be encountered in central Germany, Aquila RPV is being developed, be terminated. The Senate one scan (“revisit’ every 30 seconds would be ideal for track- Armed Services Committee approved fiscal year 1987 appropri- ing small formations (10 vehicles), whereas a 60-second revisit ations for further development but prohibited expenditures for interval would suffice for tracking larger formations (50 vehi- procurement until the ability of the system to meet all opera- cles). Longer revisit intervals would reduce the probability of tional requirements has been demonstrated. successful tracking. See R.K. Little and J.R. Bloomfield, Trade ‘Including radar imagery and visible and infrared electro- Stud”es: Tracking With Intermittent Radar Coverage (Min- optical and photographic imagery. neapolis, MN: Honeywell Systems and Research Center, Aero- ‘Including, for example, moving-target indication (MTI) pro- space and Defense Group, Technical Report No. TS-01 (Draft), vided by radar. September 1983); n.b. fig. 3 on p. 24. Ch. 10—Technology issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 145

duce double-counting of enemy units, ● Fusion of intelligence from multiple dis- but is not essential. ciplines facilitates situation assessment and –Rapid revisit would be needed to track targeting. Hardware, software, and sys- deep high-value movers to planned en- tems now being developed by the Army- gagement zones or between stops where Air Force Joint Tactical Fusion Program they could be attacked. (JTFP) could be used by USAFE and by –Wide coverage about once a minute to U.S. Army corps and divisions in Europe a depth of about 80 kilometers would to automate and speed intelligence fusion, be needed to track and target units mov- analysis, and dissemination. These sys- ing forward out of division assembly tems and national systems used now in areas. Prompt display of target loca- Europe could interface with the Battle- tions would be needed to control attacks field Information Collection and Exploi- against them. A capability to distin- tation System (BICES), a NATO-wide guish tracked vehicles from wheeled ve- intelligence fusion system now being hicles would allow armored units to be planned. NATO’s Tri-Service Group for distinguished from supply convoys, etc. Communications and Electronic Equip- –More frequent coverage (twice a minute) ment has established a BICES project would be needed to target the more nu- group, which is estimating the intelligence merous smaller units which would ad- requirements of Major NATO Com- vance from regimental assembly areas manders (e.g., SACEUR) and Major closer to the FLOT; shallow coverage Subordinate Commanders (e.g., CIN- (to a depth of about 30 kilometers) would CENT) and considering the designs of in- suffice. terfaces that should be established be- Without such capabilities, FOFA would tween their intelligence generation control mainly consist of: attacks against halted, elements and national systems, as well as long-dwell, high-value, soft targets, such interfaces that should be established as command posts and SAM batteries,6 among the national intelligence systems. 7 attacks to create obstacles and delay mov- ● It will be necessary to destroy mobile SAM ing units, and some attacks against moving batteries which would protect all other units which might be located accurately follow-on forces from airborne surveillance and reported quickly by coordinated use and air attack. of diverse RSTA systems, planned well ● It may be necessary to destroy jammers; in advance. Only airborne MTI radar sys- if so, it would be important that the weap- tems can frequently search large areas for ons used be relatively inexpensive. vehicles moving in radio silence at night ● Survivability of air bases and command and or in adverse weather; they cannot, how- control facilities is also essential to RSTA. ever, detect targets masked by terrain or NATO and the U.S. Air Force have pro- vegetation. grams (outside the scope of this report) intended to reduce the dependence of —.— —— -.. RSTA on vulnerable facilities. ‘Individual systems such as the Tactical Reconnaissance Sys- tem could provide infrequent, broad, deep, all-weather, day/night “See Loren Diedrichsen. ‘ ‘Toward a Functional Model of N A TO coverage of fixed targets as well as continuous, broad, deep cov- C’, ” Signal, October 1986, pp. 43-47, and Brigadier A.L. Meier, erage of emitters to support situation assessment and to cue OBE, ‘‘B ICE S—A Central Region Perspecti\’e, Znternationa] limited-coverage target-acquisition systems such as UAVs. Defense Review, October 1986, pp. 1445 ff. 146 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

JOINT STARS Description Station Modules (DGSMs)-–which are being developed and are to be procured and operated The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Ra- by the U.S. Army. A Surveillance and Control dar System (Joint STARS) is an airborne sur- Data Link (SCDL) is being developed to satisfy veillance and attack control system designed 8 Army needs for tactical mobile, in-weather, to detect and indicate moving ground vehi- anti- jamming communications of all radar data cles and to guide attacking aircraft and mis- to an unlimited number of GSMs. The Joint siles to moving or halted formations of enemy Tactical Information Distribution System vehicles. An outgrowth of the Air Force PAVE (JTIDS) will provide C2 communications with MOVER and Army Standoff Target Acquisi- Air Force users and threat warning and air tion System (SOTAS) programs, Joint STARS track information from AWACS and other air is to complement the Airborne Warning and defense elements. The E-8A platform will pro- Control System (AWACS), which detects air- vide cross-link communications between SCDL craft. It will scan a broad, deep coverage area and JTIDS users. frequently to support situation assessment, attack planning, and real-time control of inter- Small, transportable ground beacons are also diction attacks by missiles or aircraft. The ra- being developed for use by Joint STARS air- dar could be operated, and attacks controlled, craft as radio navigation aids while awaiting by operators on board Joint STARS aircraft full capability of the NAVSTAR Global Posi- (E-8 As) or in mobile Ground Station Modules tioning System (GPS). Thereafter they could (GSMs) being developed by the Army. serve as a backup to the GPS. These components are illustrated in figure 10-1. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Ra- dar System will include both airborne and Status ground-based segments. The airborne segment includes the radar system, the Operations and As of March 1, 1987, Joint STARS aircraft Control (O&C) system, a communications sys- and GSMs were both in full-scale development. tem, and the E-8A aircraft-a modified Boe- A total of $715 million had already been appro- ing 707—which carries them. These are being priated for RDT&E through fiscal year 1987: developed and are to be procured and operated $675 million for the Air Force and $240 mil- by the U.S. Air Force. A Weapon Data Link lion for the Army.10 Two FSD models of Joint (WDL) is being developed to provide target up- STARS E-8A aircraft are being produced for dates to in-flight Air Force direct-attack air- the Air Force by Grumman Melbourne Sys- craft—F-15Es, F-16Cs, and F-16Ds—and to tems on a $657 million contract, but these have Army and Air Force missiles equipped with not yet been delivered. Norden Systems is Weapon Interface Units (WIUs).9 The ground- producing the radio-frequency components of based segment includes transportable Ground the radar subsystems on a subcontract from Station Modules–including Down-sized Ground Grumman. Boeing 707 airframes in commercial use with documented maintenance histo- ries will be purchased for about $10 million ‘Any airborne radar can detect moving targets, but in order to moving targets as such, an airborne MTI radar must each and converted to the EC-18B configura- indicate ] distinguish fixed targets and ground clutter–which are mov- tion ’ by the Boeing Military Aircraft Co. under ing relative to the radar-from targets which are moving rela- subcontract to Grumman.12 Grumman will con- tive to both the radar and the ground. The signal processing required for airborne MTI radar is more complicated than that required for ground-based air-surveillance radars, which do not ‘(’In current (i.e., “then-year”) dollars. move relative to ground clutter. “Used by Air Force Advanced Range Instrument Aircraft The services have not requested appropriations to procure (ARIA). operational WI US, but prototype units are being developed as ‘*The last new 707 airframes produced cost about $30 million part of the full-scale development program to flight test and each. After the last 707 airframes were produced (for AWACS), verify WDL performance. Boeing closed its 707 production line. Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 147

Figure 10-1 .—Joint STARS Components

Air Force

“beacon” (transponder)

Army

Weapon interface unit for direct attack aircraft: Ž F-15E ● F-16 C/D Under consideration: by Air Force — .-. SOURCES U S Army (DAMA CSC ST), U S Alr Force (SAF/LLW), and Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 198/ vert these to E-8As by installing the prime mis- ment. Therefore, they argue, the program sion equipment at its facility at the Melbourne should be canceled and a new one started. Regional Airport near Melbourne, Florida. Proponents argue that the E-8A-based Joint STARS will be “survivable but not immortal, ” Issues and that when operated in the proper manner, with proper support, it will be capable of do- Although Joint STARS has received broad ing what is needed. They further argue that support within the Army, the Air Force, Al- more survivable platforms will not, by them- lied Command Europe, and the Office of the selves, satisfy requirements, but that they Secretary of Defense, it has been a matter of could usefully complement E-8As as Joint contention in Congress. Opponents claim that STARS platforms. The Air Force contends the C-18 is too vulnerable to attack and must that Joint STARS may need to be deployed be replaced with a more survivable platform. to areas outside Europe in crises, and that more They also contend that the radar required for survivable platforms could not carry all the the more survivable platform could not be de- equipment that E-8As could, nor could they be veloped from the radar now under develop- used to “show the flag’ in peacetime without 148 ● New Technology for NATO: implementing Follow-On Forces Attack compromising the secrecy of design features and therefore revisits a target only twice on which they would rely for survivability. per orbit. It would operate within range Proponents also argue that it is important to of multiple types of surface-to-air mis- get something into the field as soon as possi- siles.14 ble so that the troops can learn how to use this ● The British ASTOR-I MTI SLAR system complex capability. has these inadequacies and others as well: Resolution of these issues will require an- it has no data link and cannot provide swering four questions: moving-target indications until after aircraft recovery when recorded radar echoes 1. Why is the capability promised by Joint can be processed.15 STARS needed? ● The French ORCHIDEE heliborne MTI 2. How serious are the problems of vulner- radar system, now in development, will ability to attack and susceptibility to elec- also operate close to the FLOT at low al- tronic countermeasures (ECM)? Specifi- titude and will also have inadequate range cally, how would they affect the operational and coverage. utility of the proposed Joint STARS fleet? ● The ASARS-II radar has some MTI ca- 3. What are the alternatives? What are their pability now and, because its platform (a advantages and drawbacks? TR-1) operates at high altitude, it is less 4. If an alternative is desired, could Joint affected by terrain and vegetation mask- STARS avionics systems developed or pro- ing than Joint STARS would be at nomi- cured for E-8As be used by alternative sys- nal stand-off range (or at equal stand-off tems? What systems could not be used? range). However, ASARS-II requires a Could Joint STARS E-8As themselves large ground station to process radar data complement alternative systems? before it is transmitted to Army and Air Force users. This dependence on a ground Need for Airborne Moving-Target- station compromises the mobility and sur- Indicating Radar Surveillance vivability of ASARS-II. ● The ASARS-II radar could be enhanced As noted above,13 the most ambitious FOFA to have even greater MTI capability. It concepts require some sort of airborne moving- could also be equipped with an SCDL air target-indicating (MTI) radar system capable data terminal, so that its MTI data could of frequently “revisiting” (i.e., scanning) broad be broadcast directly to tactical users. deep areas. Only an airborne MTI radar system However, the MTI capabilities of an en- can detect vehicles moving in radio silence at hanced ASARS-II radar would be inade- night or in adverse weather and revisit a large quate to support highly effective FOFA area of interest often enough to track such vehi- and inferior to those of Joint STARS. Al- cles moving in it. Joint STARS was designed though it would suffer less masking by ter- to provide the kind of frequent, deep, wide-area rain and vegetation, it would have several MTI surveillance needed to implement these disadvantages: 16 ambitious FOFA concepts. The MTI capabil- —a minimum detectable velocity about ities of other operational, developmental, and twice that of Joint STARS, proposed MTI systems known to OTA fall far short of those needed to support highly effective FOFA: 14FiXed SAM9 could be attacked and others evaded, but evasive maneuvering would interrupt surveillance. In the future, ● The currently operational MTI radar car- new mobile SAMs are expected to pose a greater threat to Mo- ried by the OV-1D “Mohawk” twin- hawks as well as other aircraft. ‘5The SCDL developed for Joint STARS has been used ex- turboprop aircraft is a side-looking air- perimentally to transmit ASTOR-I MTI data to a GSM. borne radar (SLAR). Its beam cannot scan “See also the Joint STARS Cost and Operational Effective- ness Analysis being completed by the U.S. Army TRADOC “See ch. 5 and the section above on RSTA requirements. Analysis Center as this report goes to press. Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 149

—a detection range two-thirds that of Joint STARS would benefit from general meas- Joint STARS, ures such as air defense suppression and offen- —one-fifth the coverage of Joint STARS sive counter-air operations using attack air- at a comparable revisit rate, craft and missiles, and defensive counter-air —inferior moving target location ac- operations by high-altitude combat air patrol curacy, and aircraft (e.g., F-15s) and NATO SAMs (e.g., —vastly inferior electronic countermeas- Patriots). It is expected that Warsaw Pact ures (in MTI modes). SAMs and interceptors will be increasingly (but not completely) suppressed as a war None of the above-mentioned systems has, or progresses. When Joint STARS is attacked, will have, an attack planning and control capa- it would be forewarned by on-board display of bility. An integrated surveillance and control hostile aircraft data from air defense elements capability, such as Joint STARS will provide, would greatly reduce the time between de- (e.g., AWACS) so that it could take evasive action or employ countermeasures. It would tection of a target and engagement of the tar- also be protected by other Air Force aircraft get, thereby permitting halted vehicle forma- capable of jamming enemy radars and radios. tions to be engaged and permitting moving The addition of on-board threat warning and columns of vehicles to be attacked by missiles countermeasure capabilities is being consid- or aircraft. ered to counter Soviet interceptor aircraft and To engage units on the move with missiles SAM threats. armed with wide-area munitions, the units Even with such protection, Joint STARS must be tracked to planned engagement zones, would probably be vulnerable to fixed and mo- at which time missile launch must be triggered. bile SAMs and to interceptor aircraft if oper- Last-minute confirmation of a target’s ap- ated, early in a war, at the setback range origi- proach to an engagement zone is needed just nally planned. If operated at a greater range before launch, with minimal delay for maxi- from the FLOT, its vulnerability would de- mum effectiveness. Attack aircraft will also crease, but so would its coverage. Air Force need in-flight guidance-which could be pro- planners may want to hold E-8As back from vided by voice radio or data link-in order to the FLOT most of the time early in a war and attack designated moving targets (as distinct surge them forward, with suitable support, for from targets of opportunity). Without in-flight limited periods of intense activity. It is ex- guidance, they would be more exposed to ob- pected that surge periods could be increased servation and fire while searching for desig- as war progresses and enemy defenses are nated moving targets and they would suffer depleted. higher attrition. Operating this way, an E-8A could provide Vulnerability to Attack17 good coverage to at least the range of an MLRS rocket, where frequent coverage is most Any of several Warsaw Pact SAMs or in- needed. It could provide valuable coverage terceptor aircraft could destroy an unprotected deeper, but deep targets would be masked more Joint STARS E-8A in a hypothetical one-on- frequently by terrain and foliage and could be one engagement. In reality, Joint STARS will masked more easily by jamming. Its deep cov- not operate alone; NATO will provide protec- erage would still be useful for situation assess- tion to all such aircraft in NATO airspace. ment, but its ability to track units would be degraded. The resulting increased likelihood 1 Tl~ ~repuing this report, OTA staff were not gr~ted access of double-counting units could make situation LO “Special Access Required” information about programs and assessment less certain, and the ability to en- technologies which might be of use in improving the surviva- gage high-value targets deep would be de- bility of Joint STARS. It is possible that options not considered by OTA could provide benefits significantly different from graded to an extent not yet quantified. OTA those discussed here. is not aware of any thorough analysis of the

71-285 () - 87 - 6 utility of Joint STARS as a FOFA system Susceptibility to Jamming operating in this manner, although a major Joint STARS is designed to have very ca- study coordinated by the Army Training and pable electronic counter-countermeasures, but Doctrine Command’s TRADOC Analysis Cen- its performance could be degraded by severe ter is nearing completion. Smaller studies for 18 19 jamming. Two types of jamming might be at- the Army and Air Force have examined or tempted against Joint STARS: sidelobe jam- are now examining the impact of such revised ming and mainlobe jamming. Successful side- operational concepts on selected operational lobe jamming would require very powerful or capabilities. highly directional jammers. The jamming signal must be strong enough so that even if received by the airborne radar when its beam is pointing away from the jammer,20 it will be powerful enough to mask received radar ‘nE.g., by the BDM Corp. ‘gE.g., by the Rand Corp. for the Directorate of Operational ‘“I.e., when the airborne radar receiver is relatively insensi- Requirements (AF/RDQ). tive to the jamming signal. Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack . 151 echoes. In principle, the entire area scanned pression is deemed necessary to counter it, by an airborne surveillance radar could be identification of the least-cost means of kill- masked by a single jammer, if sufficiently ing mainlobe jammers will require further powerful.” Unless highly directional, a side- study .22 A comparison of the cost to NATO lobe jammer would have to be immensely pow- of killing such jammers with the cost to War- erful and would probably interfere with enemy saw Pact nations of producing and operating radar systems. them would indicate which alliance would suffer more economically if both were to compete If necessary, the electronic counter-counter- in a jammer/countermeasures of operational Joint STARS aircraft jammer competition; however, other incentives will affect decisions to could be upgraded to counter sidelobe jamming compete in or refrain from such a competition. threats more severe than those which the two developmental aircraft are required to counter, Growth capabilities are built into the Full-Scale Alternatives Development radar to permit such enhance- There are several alternatives to funding the ment without modifying the radar’s design. Army and Air Force Joint STARS programs Alternatively–or additionally--sidelobe jam- as proposed, or canceling them. These include: mers could be attacked. Whether immensely powerful or highly directional, sidelobe jam- 1. development (if necessary) and procure- mers would be relatively expensive and hence ment of add-on systems to enhance the util- high-value targets for jammer-suppression at- ity and survivability of Joint STARS tacks using anti-radiation missiles or other E-8 AS; weapons. 2. development (if necessary) and procurement of an alternative platform more sur- Successful mainlobe jamming occurs when vivable or protectable than an E-8A; and the beam of an airborne radar is pointing at 3. development (if necessary) and procure- a jammer; the airborne radar is then most sen- ment of complementary platforms in- sitive to the jamming signal, which need not tended to operate in coordination with E- be very powerful. If sufficiently strong rela- 8As, enabling the E-8As to operate in a tive to the radar echoes from the area near the more survivable (or protectable) manner. jammer, the jamming signal will mask those echoes, and the radar will be unable to detect Add-On Systems targets near the jammer. However, although successful mainlobe jamming would require If Joint STARS is procured, its utility and relatively little power, a single jammer would survivability could be enhanced by procuring mask only a small area. A large number of jam- accessories: mers would be required to intermittently mask ● Non-lethal self-defense suites could be pro- the whole coverage area specified for Joint cured for E-8As to enhance their surviva- STARS; more would be required to mask the bility. These could include expendable and specified coverage area continuously. non-expendable electronic and infrared If effective mainlobe jammers are developed countermeasure systems, some of which and proliferated, lethal suppression may be are already used on other aircraft. Joint necessary to counter them, although relatively STARS E-8As and other platforms could minor upgrades to Joint STARS could provide 22Jammers and radars could be attacked by manned aircraft a significant amount of additional anti-jam (e.g., F-4G Wild Weasels) or by kamikaze drones, such as the margin. If, in the future, an effective mainlobe air-launched TACIT RAINBOW drone being developed by jamming threat is projected, and if lethal sup- Northrop for the Air Force and Navy. TACIT RAINBOW is expected to complete full-scale development in fiscal year 1988. During initial operational testing and evaluation, the drones “App. 10-C in vol. 2 of this report discusses OTA’s assess- are being launched from B-52, A-7, and A-6E aircraft. IAero- ment of the susceptibility of Joint STARS to sidelobe jamming space Da”lJ’, Jan. 8, 1987; Aviation W’eek and Space Technol- by existing and anticipated Soviet jammers. ogy?’, Apr. 27, 1987, p. 34. 152 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

be equipped to tow or dispense expenda- Defense has considered proposals to develop ble decoy emitters23 which could be devel- a more survivable platform than the E-8A. oped to draw fire and jamming from the However, information about the concept or Joint STARS E-8As. The Joint STARS concepts considered by the Department of De- Program Office is now evaluating several fense is highly classified and unavailable to self-defense suite concepts and will pre- OTA. Some potential benefits and limitations sent its findings to the Joint Require- of reducing the observability of the Joint ments and Management Board in March STARS platform, radar, and signal are dis- 1987 for a decision on self-defense suite cussed in volume 2 of this report, which is clas- acquisition. sified. (Authorized readers interested in this ● An air-to-air missile system for last-ditch important topic are referred to app. 10-C in vol. defense against surface-to-air and air-to- 2. However, readers should be aware that there air missiles could also be developed and are facts and concepts that OTA is unaware procured. of, and that could conceivably change OTA’s ● Weapon Interface Units (WIUs) could be observations.) procured for ground-attack aircraft. These The use of a stealthy platform would not, digital data links could guide ground- by itself, guarantee low-observable operation: attack aircraft to more distant targets the detectability of the radar antenna by a more accurately than voice radio or a threat radar would have to be reduced, and the JTIDS data link could, so the aircraft detectability of the radar emissions would also could find moving columns of armored ve- have to be reduced. Balanced reduction of the hicles with less searching, exposure, and platform and antenna cross-sections” and the attrition. radar’s signature would be needed: if any one of these were readily observable, the system Alternative Platforms could be readily detected. Alternatively, a less observable (i. e., Many things could be done to reduce the de- ‘‘stealthy’ high-altitude aircraft could be used tectability of radar emissions; some would not as a platform for Joint STARS; it could fly reduce radar performance. However, when all closer to the FLOT with a much lower prob- else has been done, further reduction of detectability of being detected and attacked, and its ability, if necessary, would require reducing susceptibility to sidelobe jamming would also 24 the radar’s power, which would require reduc- be reduced, as would masking of targets by 25 ing its coverage area or revisit rate, increas- terrain and vegetation. The Department of ing the minimum detectable velocity, or a combination of these trade-offs. It would also increase susceptibility to jamming. Hence, if 23 See Marc Liebman, “Expendable Decoys Counter Missiles With New Technology, ” Defense Hectrom”cs, October 1986, pp. operated in a stealthy manner, a stealthy Joint 69 ff. STARS would “see” less than an E-8A would. 241f enemy radars could not detect and track a Joint STARS Although it would be able to view some areas platform or its antennas, and if enemy direction-finding equipment could not reliably detect and recognize Joint STARS ra- which would be hidden from a lower, rearward dar emissions and track their source, jammer beams could not E-8A by terrain and foliage, its beam could not be aimed at the radar. However, operating Joint STARS equip- frequently revisit the broad area near the ment in a stealthy manner may require operation at reduced power. This would reduce the power of radar echoes and hence FLOT–where frequent revisit is most the power required for mainlobe jamming. ‘sMasking of targets in central Germany by summer vegetation would be significant: cf. figures 1 and 2 of V.L. Lynn, “Ter- rain and Foliage Masking for Long-Range Surveillance; A Samp- le of Measurements in Central Germany” (Lexington, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lincoln Laboratory, “An object radar cross-section is an index of its observabil- Project Report TST-35, June 15, 1979), Defense Technical In- ity by radar; it depends on the frequency of the radar signal, formation Center accession No. AD-B040205 See vol. 2 of this the polarizations of the transmitting and receiving antennas, report for further discussion of masking. and the directions to these from the target. Ch. 10— Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack . 153 needed27—without compromising its low ob- Development of stealthy platforms to com- servability . plement (not replace) E-8As would avoid several shortcomings of a force consisting solely For this reason, some analysts believe that of stealthy platforms. E-8As could be used be- a significantly more survivable Joint STARS fore complementary platforms are operational. would not be able to gather all the informa- Thereafter: tion “required” by the Joint Service Opera- tional Requirement for Joint STARS. This In peacetime, E-8As could be used in Eur- does not mean such a system would be ope to provide indications of Pact mobili- useless—it might be very useful—but OTA zation and warning of attack. Stealthy plat- knows of no analysis of the contribution to forms should not be used routinely because FOFA of such a reduced capability. In order their routine use would risk compromising to judge the value of a stealthy Joint STARS, their security and survivability. a detailed analysis is needed comparing the sep- In crises, E-8As could be deployed from arate and combined contributions to FOFA ca- Europe to other theaters where it would pability of an E-8A operated for survivability be difficult to deploy GSMs quickly. and a stealthy platform operated near the FLOT. Stealthy platforms, if small, would be unable to carry much operations and control Rather than reduce power to the extent re- equipment. Joint STARS E-8 As, like quired to completely avoid detection, deception AWACS E-3 A/B/Cs, could be used to could be used to make enemy identification, “show the flag”; stealthy platforms, if ob- tracking, and engagement of a low-observable served, might be more easily countered Joint STARS platform improbable. Expend- later. able decoy emitters–discussed above–would In wartime, the stealthy platforms of a need less power to mimic a low-power, stealthy “mixed” force could view selected deep Joint STARS than to mimic a high-power E- areas frequently, or broad deep areas in- 8A-based Joint STARS. frequently, with little terrain masking, whereas E-8As normally at a greater dis- Complementary Platforms tance from the FLOT could revisit the The surveillance capabilities of E-8As could close battle area frequently with their be increased or supplemented by other aircraft powerful radar beams. The E-8As could operating in coordination with them; these approach the FLOT more closely when could include aircraft of three distinct types: provided extra defense support or after enemy air defenses have been degraded; 1. stealthy aircraft with comparable radars they could also serve as operations and used to observe deep areas; control centers, complementing GSMs. Z. aircraft with less capable radars, which could observe some targets masked from Less capable airborne radars could observe E-8 As; and some targets masked from E-8 As; these in- 3. stealthy aircraft used primarily to pas- clude ASARS-II, enhanced ASARS-II, Mo- sively observe deep areas “illuminated” hawk, ASTOR-I, and ORCHIDEE, which were by E-8As at greater stand-off range. mentioned above,28 as well as radars on unmanned aerial vehicles, which are discussed “In experiments using simulated imagery, the success rate later in this chapter. These could not replace of operators tasked to track company-size formations (10 vehi- E-8As but could complement them; for exam- cles) for 24 minutes decreased from about two-thirds to about ple, a short-range MTI radar being developed one-half when the revisit interval was increased from 30 to 60 seconds. Their success rate tracking battalion-size formations for the Army’s Intelligence and Electronic (50 vehicles) decreased similarly when the revisit interval was increased from 60 to 120 seconds. See Little and Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 24, fig. 3. Masking of targets by vegetation was simu- “See also ch. 8, above, and the section below, in this chapter, lated in these experiments, and a stationary radar location was on “The Two-Way Street, ” where the NATO Airborne Radar assumed. Demonstrator System (ARDS) program is discussed. 154 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

Warfare Unmanned Aerial Vehicle could be be very challenging. However, if and when it used to monitor targets in areas masked from is feasible, Joint STARS E-8As might be used E-8As by hills. to irradiate the coverage area from a safe distance, while a complementary airplane, possi- In the more distant future, it might be pos- bly using most of the avionics components de- sible to build a bistatic (“two-station”) MTI veloped for E-8 As, collected and processed radar system employing a powerful transmit- radar echoes and transmitted MTI data rear- ter on an airplane or satellite at a presumably ward to E-8 As, which could downlink it to safe distance to irradiate the coverage area Army ground station modules and other users while an airplane closer to the coverage area 29 and service their requests for radar tasking and receives and processes the radar echoes . The attack control. receiver platform would not divulge its location by beaming radar pulses into enemy ter- Potential Commonality of Joint STARS ritory and, if sufficiently stealthy, might there- Prime Mission Equipment for E-8As fore escape attack and sidelobe jamming even and Other Platforms if very close to enemy territory. It would still be susceptible to mainlobe jamming, although If a decision were made to develop a low- potentially less so than a low-power radar. Its observable platform for Joint STARS, it ap- advantage over baseline or low-power systems pears that all the radar components developed is that it could scan close and deep areas at for the E-8A except the antenna could be used a high revisit rate. The platform location de- on such a platform without major changes, if termination and signal synchronization and that system were to operate in the same fre- processing required for such a system would quency band. Operations and control consoles developed for the E-8A would not be usable on a small platform, but could be used, if ‘gGeorge W. Stimson, Introduction to Airborne Radar (El Segundo, CA: Hughes Aircraft Co., Radar Systems Group, desired, on other aircraft or in ground-based 1983); pp. 576-577. facilities.

THE PRECISION LOCATION STRIKE SYSTEM (PLSS) The Precision Location Strike System layed by several problems, and the Air Force (PLSS: pronounced “pens”) is a developmen- decided last year not to begin procurement of tal surveillance and control system designed PLSS in fiscal year 1987. This year, the Air to detect, identify, and accurately locate mod- Force reconsidered procurement of PLSS af- ern mobile jammers and electronically agile30 ter an operational utility evaluation of PLSS radars in near real time.31 Such emitters would was completed in April, and recommended can- accompany and protect follow-on forces. An cellation of the program. ability to attack these emitters soon after they PLSS would use electronic equipment car- are detected in a new location would be very ried aloft by three TR-1 aircraft operating to- valuable for protecting allied aircraft that de- gether, each communicating by means of an tect and attack follow-on forces. PLSS has Interoperable Data Link (IDL) with a Central demonstrated a capability to locate and report Processing Subsystem (CPS), which could be more such emitters per hour with greater ac- transportable or based in a hardened PLSS curacy and timeliness than can all other U.S. Ground Station (PGS: see figure 10-2). systems now reporting to Europe combined. However, development of PLSS has been de- To locate emitters both accurately and quickly, PLSS uses a combination of distance- ‘°Capable of quickly changing frequency or emitting brief pulses after long, irregular intervals. measuring equipment (DME), time difference 31HQ TAC, TAF ROC 314-74. of arrival (TDOA), and direction of arrival —

Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack . 155

Figure 10-2.—Components of the Precision Location Strike System (PLSS)

The TR-1 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft.

SOURCE U S Department of Defense

‘ .., ?

,. “\ . .

Artist’s conception of a hardened PLSS Ground Station.

SOURCE Stgna/ (the official journal of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Assoclatlon} January 1986 Copyright 1986 reprl nted by permission 156 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

(DOA) techniques: The TR-1 aircraft determine PLSS their own locations using DME; TDOA com- Equipment developed by the PLSS program, parisons produce a few very precise candidate per se, includes the airborne mission sub- locations for each emitter; and DOA sensing 32 system (AMS) carried by each TR-1 aircraft; determines which of them is the correct one. the Central Processing Subsystem (CPS), and The necessity that three airborne receivers the Site Navigation Subsystem. AMS consists simultaneously detect a radar pulse requires of an airborne intercept element (AIE: an- that each receiver be very sensitive and use tennas, intercept receiver, and control system), high-gain antennas, because at least two of the distance-measuring equipment, and govern- three receivers will be in an emitter’s sidelobes ment-furnished Interoperable Air Data Link (or backlobe) when it emits a pulse. To attain (IADL) equipment for the IDL. The CPS in- the antenna gain required, each airborne re- cludes government-furnished Interoperable ceiver uses a phased array of antennas. A high- Ground Data Link (IGDL) equipment to com- gain antenna pattern is necessarily directional, municate with the TR-1s, signal and data proc- so the phased array is designed to form multi- essing equipment, and a PLSS Interface Mod- ple receive beams which collectively cover the ule (PIM) for selecting, formatting, and specified coverage area without scanning; scan- disseminating PLSS location reports to vari- ning would risk missing the signal of a “short ous users according to their needs. Each Site on-time” emitter. Navigation Subsystem (SNS) is a transportable DME transponder.33 Emitter locations reported by PLSS, when correlated with intelligence from other dis- TR-1 ciplines, could be used for situation assessment and targeting. These activities could be per- PLSS airborne mission subsystems must be formed by the proposed PLSS Intelligence carried aloft aboard TR-1 reconnaissance air- Augmentation Subsystem (PI AS), or in exist- craft. Late-model TR-1s can carry either a Tac- ing intelligence fusion and targeting facilities. tical Reconnaissance System (TRS) payload34 Once targets have been selected and attacks or a PLSS AMS, but not both simultaneously. planned, near-real-time emitter location reports TRS and PLSS payloads can be swapped in from PLSS could indicate when missiles should about an hour. During development and test- be launched, and could be relayed to attack air- ing, PLSS airborne mission subsystems have craft using a variety of communications sys- been carried aboard TR-1s flying training mis- tems. Attacks against emitters could be con- sions. PLSS could provide a limited operational trolled from the PGS. capability, if desired, using TR-1s procured for the TRS, training, or other missions. A greater Components and Programs operational PLSS capability, if desired, would require procurement of additional TR-1s. Components used by or related to PLSS are being developed or procured under six separate programs: 1. PLSS 2. TR-1 3. IDL 4. ELS 5. ATDL 6. PIAS

3ZR. Hale, “Precision Location Strike System, ” Signal, Janu- “Ibid. ary 1986, pp. 51 ff. 34Consisting of an ASARS-II airborne radar system, etc. Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 157 .-

IDL tiradiation missile (ARM), which can home on a radar antenna only when it is transmitting, Interoperable Data Link equipment is in pro- an ATDL-equipped missile would attack a ra- duction and will be provided to the prime con- dar antenna location and could disable it even tractor for PLSS as government-furnished when it is not transmitting. equipment. It includes both IADL equipment for installation on TR-1s and IGDL equipment PIAS for use by the PLSS CPS. To enhance the intelligence value of PLSS ELS by improving analysis, exploitation, and reporting capabilities, a PLSS Intelligence PLSS was designed to locate pulsed radars; Augmentation Subsystem (PIAS) is being de- the Emitter Location System (ELS) program veloped under the PLSS Intelligence Augmen- is developing software and hardware to give tation Program (PIAP). Originally, two sub- PLSS the ability to locate non-pulsed emitters. systems were to be developed. One was to be located with the PLSS CPS in a hardened PGS ATDL to be constructed in Europe; the other—a Until 1986, Adaptive Targeting Data Link transportable facility-was to be used for train- (ATDL) equipment was under development for ing at Nellis Air Force Base under normal cir- installation in aircraft or weapons. ATDL- cumstances. PIAS would use some equipment equipped aircraft and weapons could be guided now used by the ground control processor of to emitter locations determined by PLSS. the Senior Ruby ELINT system; enhancements Starting in fiscal year 1990, Block 30P F-16s would be made available for use by Senior were to be equipped with ATDL transpond- Ruby. ers, which would allow them to receive guidance from controllers in the PGS via relay Status equipment in the TR-1s. If equipped with ATDL transponders, missiles and other weap- PLSS completed Developmental Testing and ons could also be guided to emitter locations Evaluation in 1986 and Operational Utility by PLSS. Weapons which have been consid- Evaluation in April. PLSS was intended to be ered (and, in some cases, tested) for this appli- operational by now to counter a “circa 1985” cation include the GBU-15 glide bomb,35 air- threat. However, its development and procure- and ground-launched versions of the T-16 ment have been delayed by several problems, Patriot and T-22 Lance missiles,36 the Conven- which are discussed below. Last year, the Air tional Stand-off Weapon (CSW) proposed by Force decided not to request funds for procure- the Air Force,37 and the now-defunct JTACMS ment of PLSS in fiscal year 1987 and not to (Joint Tactical Missile System) .38 Unlike an an- develop ATDL transponders for installation in F-16s.39 Currently, $675 million40 has been appropriated through fiscal year 1987 for 3’Department of Defense Appropriations for 1983, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, RDT&E to procure, for the purpose of devel- House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d sess., Part 1 (Wash- opment, testing, and evaluation, one CPS, six ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, IJSGPO 92-690 0, 1982), pp. 842-866. “Ibid. “Ibid. - “Department of Defense Appropriations for 1984, Hearings 391f desired, Joint STARS aircraft could receive target up before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, dates from the PLSS CPS (via JTIDS) and relay them (via the House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 1st sess., Part 4 (Wash- Joint STARS Weapon Data Link) to aircraft and (optionally) ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, USGPO 19-163 missiles equipped with Joint STARS Weapon Interface Units 0, 1983), p. 725; Department of Defense Appropriations for 1985, ( WIUS). The Air Force does not currently plan to procure WIUS Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropri- but began reconsidering procurement of WIUS when plans to ations, House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2d sess., Part procure ATDL transponders— which would have functioned as 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, USGPO WIUs–were canceled. 34-7740, 1984), pp. 71-76. 40In current (i.e., “then-year”) dollars. 158 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

SNSs, and three all-up AMSs and a partial ● PLSS demonstrated an emitter location AMS requiring refurbishment.” No TR-1s accuracy which improved during the test have been procured specifically for PLSS. period for which data was available to The results of the Operational Utility Evalu- OTA and approached specified accuracy on most days at the end of that period.43 ation of PLSS have been reviewed by the Air Force, which recommended program termina- Location errors were very large on some days; however, a 4-day moving average tion. The Department of Defense could con- of emitter location error demonstrated de- cur, recommend continued development, or 44 creased to 2.7 times that specified. Some seek procurement of quantities needed for some level of operational capability. If so specific causes of high location errors (e.g., loose connector contacts) were identified directed, the Air Force Systems Command could turn PLSS hardware over to the Tacti- and corrected. cal Air Command in May 1987 for use in train- The tendency of the PLSS CPS to report ing and to provide a limited operational capa- each actual emitter detected as several distinct bility. If TAC desires only a limited operational emitters is known as the “association prob- capability, the Air Force might choose to have lem.” During the test period for which data the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC/AZ) was available to OTA, four emitters were re- manage PLSS as a “unique system. ” ported, on the average, for each actual emitter detected. This overreporting indicates a fail- Problems and Progress ure of the CPS to recognize successive intercepted signals as coming from the same PLSS has encountered several problems and emitter. When a “hit” occurs (i.e., when the delays during its development. It has not yet AMSs intercept a signal), the signal parame- demonstrated the system reliability, emitter ters are reported to the CPS, which logs them reporting rate (’‘throughput ‘), or emitter loca- in a buffer. The CPS also estimates an emitter tion accuracy originally specified. Moreover, location for each hit, and logs it with the other during developmental testing, it often reported signal parameters. Before reporting a “new” each actual emitter detected as several distinct emitter, CPS software attempts to determine emitters. However, its performance has been whether the signal parameters of the new hit improving. During developmental testing: can be well correlated with those of a previous ● PLSS achieved an “adjusted” system hit. If so, CPS software would assume that the reliability of about 0.7; the specified sys- intercepted signal was emitted by a previously 42 reported emitter and would not report a new tem reliability is 0.83. 45 ● PLSS achieved two-thirds of the originally emitter. However, because a modern emitter specified throughput; meanwhile, the can vary many of its signal parameters (e.g., throughput requirement was reviewed frequency), CPS software relies heavily on the and reduced by one-third, to the value emitter locations estimated for each hit in at- demonstrated by PLSS. tempting to associate logged hits with specific emitters. Hence any fault which reduces emitter location accuracy will reduce the probability of correct emitter-hit association and result in overreporting.

“USAF (SAF/LL) private communication. 4The ‘adjusted’ system reliability is an estimate of the prob- 43AF/RDPV and AFSC/SDWD private communication. 44 ability that 1 CPS, 3 AMSS, and 9 SNSS would have completed A 4-day moving average of emitter location accuracy dem- an 8-hour mission without critical failure if 1 CPS, 4 AMSS, onstrated using only two TR-ls—which takes longer— and 16 SNSS had been available and prepared for operation. approached six times that specified. It is based on demonstrated CPS, AMS, TR-1, and SNS ’51t would, however, refine its estimate of the location of the reliabilities—0.99, 0.90, 0.87, and 0.99, respectively. previously reported emitter. Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 159 —

Some specific faults causing incorrect vulnerable 47 and inflexible.48 These concerns are emitter-hit association were identified and cor- valid, and the argument has some merit. How- rected during testing. Improvements in the ac- ever, the concern expressed about vulnerabil- curacy with which emitter location can be de- ity of critical links could apply to other facil- termined from a single hit would further reduce ities which support air defense suppression, overreporting. Residual overreporting could be air interdiction, and other tactical air missions. reduced by increasing the tolerance (i.e., the Moreover, PLSS is designed to support air de- allowable distance) between single-hit emitter fense suppression, not FOFA; suppression of location estimates which can be associated enemy air defenses would be important even with one emitter. This would, however, de- if enemy forces were front-loaded. crease the accuracy of emitter location reports. Others still see value in PLSS, particularly If a PLSS Interface Module is installed in the for targeting modern mobile SAMs. It has al- CPS (as originally planned), operators in the ready demonstrated an emitter location ac- PIM could review PLSS location reports be- curacy which is superior to that of existing the- fore they are disseminated to users and could ater ELINT systems, as well as a high emitter cancel dissemination of obviously duplicative reporting rate (“throughput”) which will be reports.” The PLSS Intelligence Augmenta- needed to rapidly reconstruct our picture of tion Subsystem, if fully developed and pro- the enemy’s “electronic order of battle” (num- cured, might also reduce overreporting by “res- bers, types, and locations of emitters) at the idue processing” —a more sophisticated and outbreak of war if, as expected, enemy radars time-consuming method for correlating re- shut down, move, change frequencies, and ported signal parameters than that used by begin wartime operation in short on-time, elec- the PLSS CPS. tronically agile modes.” Proponents and opponents agree that “association” and reliabil- Operational Utility: ity must be improved; proponents are more The View From USAFE confident that they can be, soon. Until this year, PLSS was an important part of the program for improving surveillance in Alternatives to PLSS Europe. However, the Air Force has taken the Combinations of other systems could do the position that other systems or combinations job PLSS was designed for, but not as well. of systems can adequately perform the impor- For example: tant functions of PLSS. Attack aircraft can be guided to approximate emitter locations ● ELINT from a Senior Ruby or Guardrail/ using ELINT from currently operational sys- Common Sensor system could be used to tems. The systems and procedures used would be too slow and inaccurate to guide missiles to emitter locations, but USAFE opposes 4’USAFE has argued that: procurement of ground-based missiles-or sur- systems necessary to feed precision attack ground-based sJs - tems ., become high priority targets for the enem~. \f”e belie~e veillance and control systems for such mis- the Soviets might make whatever sacrifice necessar} to destroy siles—on the grounds that they would be too one of these critical links. These same high technology systems enhance the precision attack capability of manned systems, yet without them, man can be given the approximate target location and rough timing estimates. He then becomes the precision attack system. HQ USAFE. FOFA: USAFE View, briefing to OTA Staff, Apr. 16 1986, 4WSAFE opposes investing in systems designed specifically 460verremn-ting is not Deculiar to PLSS, but occurs to some to support FOFA. USAFE has argued that if Warsaw Forces extent in o-ther in-telIigen~e collection and fusion systems. Hu- are massed forward (’‘front-loaded”) rather than echeloned, man judgment is generally necessary-but not infallible—for there would be few follow-on forces to attack, and systems de- recognizing duplicative reports. Because PLSS is capable of issu- signed specifically to attack them would be largely useless. ing so many reports per hour, overreporting by PLSS would Manned attack aircraft could be used for other purposes. [I bid.] be particularly bothersome. “Private communication. 160 ● New Technology for NATO: implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

cue an ASARS-II or Joint STARS radar be equipped with a Joint STARS Weapon to scan a suspected SAM deployment area Interface Unit. in an attempt to recognize and precisely ● An alternative to providing missiles with locate the SAM battery. However, Sen- in-flight target updates would be to attack ior Ruby is less sensitive than PLSS and emitters with long-endurance ARMs which might not detect sidelobe or backlobe have loiter capability, such as the TACIT pulses from modem radars-it might have RAINBOW missiles being developed for to wait for a mainlobe pulse. The whole the Air Force. Unlike a PLSS-guided mis- process of emitter location estimation, sile, an ARM could not attack a radar an- tasking of ASARS-II or Joint STARS, tenna after it ceases radiating. However, and interpretation of the returned radar a TACIT RAINBOW missile could loiter imagery would take much longer than until a target radar turns on again (or un- would emitter location estimation by til its fuel is exhausted). PLSS. Alternatively, AN/TPQ-37 “Firefinder” Summary radars could be used to locate SAM launchers as soon as they fire. The nomi- PLSS continues to be troubled by technical nal range of these radars is less than that problems, but its performance is improving of the above-mentioned systems, although and it could provide unique and valuable RSTA they might detect large SAMs at greater and attack control capabilities. Some, but not than nominal range. all, capabilities demonstrated by PLSS could The originally planned ability of PLSS to be provided in the near term by combinations provide in-flight target updates to aircraft of other systems such as Joint STARS and the and missiles could be emulated by using Tactical Reconnaissance System. The Com- Joint STARS aircraft to relay updates mander in Chief, United States Air Forces Eur- from the surrogate sensors to aircraft and ope (CINCUSAFE) has judged that the addi- missiles. To receive target updates, each tional capabilities of PLSS are not worth its attack aircraft or missile would have to cost in resources diverted.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES Unmanned aerial vehicles50 could be used to being developed for the Army, Navy, Air perform RSTA for FOFA. They would be Force, and Marine Corps; others are in devel- cheaper than manned aircraft and less hazard- opment, production, and use by allied nations. ous to pilots. Small UAVs could not simultane- UAVs which could be used for FOFA ously provide the coverage and revisit rate that IIIUuut!;:— -1. --1-- Joint-STARS would. However, they could reconnoiter more limited areas, particularly ● the Aquila RPV, which is being developed areas masked from Joint STARS by terrain for the U.S. Army51 to perform reconnais- and vegetation, and could be used to distin- sance and target designation functions guish armored from unarmored vehicles. They primarily in support of close combat; could support attacks using MLRS or ● various domestic and foreign-made “non- ATACMS; close in, they could be used for ar- developmental” UAVs which have been tillery fire direction and adjustment. UAVs are proposed as alternatives to Aquila; ● smaller “Light Division UAVs” of more ‘“Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) include remotely piloted limited capability to support smaller vehicles (RPVs)—unmanned aircraft which require remote control by human pilots-as well as autonomous aircraft (drones), units; which do not. They also include aerial vehicles which permit, _ but do not require, remote control by human pilots. “By the Austin Division of the Lockheed Missiles& Space Co. Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 161

● a larger, longer-range Intelligence and Problems and Progress Electronic Warfare (IEW) UAV which The TADARS program schedule and bud- could perform multiple missions to the get have been overrun several times. The pro- depth of a corps commander’s area of in- gram office and the prime contractor attrib- terest; ute major delays primarily to unforeseen ● expendable UAVs for jamming and lethal attack (“kamikaze UAVs”); difficulties meeting payload mass constraints, stabilizing the TV camera and especially the ● air-launched UAVs for reconnaissance, laser designator, and operating with the data jamming, and lethal attack; and rate reduction and processing delay incurred ● advanced-technology UAVs, in the more when the MICNS is operated at high anti-jam distant future. 54 levels. Human factors were also cited: in some early tests, TADARS was operated by contrac- The Aquila RPV tor personnel or by highly trained aviation The Aquila (figure 10-3) is the airborne plat- or intelligence specialists. The program has form used by the Target Acquisition Designa- since been transferred from the Army’s Avia- tion Aerial Reconnaissance System (TADARS), tion Systems Command (AVSCOM) to the which also includes truck-mounted rail Missile Command (MICOM), and in recent launchers, recovery nets, air vehicle trans- tests TADARS has been operated by person- porters, maintenance shelters, and ground- nel of lower Military Occupational Specialty control stations. The Aquila RPV is intended (MOS) level (Specialist 4). to perform reconnaissance, target acquisition, The ability of the program to achieve its tech- artillery fire adjustment, and damage assess- nical goals appeared doubtful in September ment, and laser designation of targets for the 1985, when the Army stopped the developmen- Copperhead cannon-launched guided projectile tal test program after test systems failed to (CLGP), Hellfire and the AGM-65E Maverick52 pass 21 of 149 performance specifications. Sub- anti-armor missiles, and laser-guided bombs. sequently, Lockheed’s Austin Division con- Aquila carries a Modular Integrated Commu- ducted, at its expense, a test-fix-test effort, and nications and Navigation System air data ter- demonstrated correction of most shortcom- minal (MICNS ADT) and a mission payload ings, as well as an ability to designate station- system (MPS) consisting of a laser rangefinder/ ary and moving targets for Copperhead shells designator system and a TV camera (for day- and Hellfire missiles. time use). It could carry other payloads which are now being developed—e.g., a forward-look- During Developmental Test 11A, begun in ing infrared (FLIR) sensor (for daytime or February 1986, TADARS met all but two sys- nighttime use), or a bistatic radar module for tem performance specifications: total system detecting vehicles illuminated by a Joint STARS mission reliability (0.75 specified for IOC, 0.62 radar or aircraft illuminated by an AWACS demonstrated) and probability of autotrack- radar .53 ing for 95 percent of 3 minutes (0.9 specified, 0.75 demonstrated). TADARS subsequently exceeded the total system mission reliability specification during collective training (0.77 52 A Marine Corps weapon launched from A-6E Intruder air- demonstrated), and Lockheed reports that an craft to provide close air support to Marines, who now designate targets using the hand-held Modular Universal Laser autotrack probability of 0.92 was demon- 55 Equipment (MULE) to assist A-6 crews with IFF (identifica- strated in subsequent company tests. tion: friend or foe). 53Dom Giglio and Phil Emmerman (USA HDL), “Radar Tech- nology/Signal Information Processing, in Symposium, 28-30 January 1986, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Ac- quisition (RSTA), Compendium of Government Briefings, Vol- ~~A non-secure data link was used in early tests. ume 2 (Adelphi, MD: U.S. Army Harry Diamond Laboratories, “Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., Austin Division, brief- 1986)]. ing to OTA staff, Dec. 10, 1986. 162 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Figure 10-3.—The Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle

.,”+

SOURCE Lockheed Mtssiles & Space Co Inc (Austin Dlvlslon)

Status Control Stations. The Army estimates that total program acquisition cost will be $2.2 bil- As of March 1,1987, TADARS is in full-scale 56 lion-i. e., appropriation of about $1.4 billion development. $820 million has already been more will be required. appropriated for RDT&E through fiscal year 1987; 12 air vehicles and 5 Remote [MICNS] Alternatives to Aquila Ground Terminals (RGTs) have been procured for development, testing, and evaluation. The Problems with TADARS have stimulated Army proposes to begin serial production of suggestions that a domestic or foreign-made air vehicles and Ground Control Stations this “non-developmental" UAV be procured as an year for an initial operational capability (IOC) alternative to Aquila. UAVs which could per- date of 1991. The Army currently plans to pro- form some of the functions of TADARS cure a total of 376 air vehicles and 53 Ground include:

● Skyeye (made in the United States “In current (i.e., “then-year”) dollars, by Lear-Siegler) Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack 163 —

● Pioneer 1 (made in Israel by AAI/ mentation practices which meet standard Mazlat)57 military specifications. Ž CL-289 (made in Canada by Canadair) None of these could provide the target • Heron-26 (made in Italy by Meteor)” location accuracy of TADARS without Ž Mirach-100 (made in Italy by Meteor) relying on an operator to identify map fea- Ž Phoenix (made in the United King- tures on the TV display. Their target loca- dom by GEC Avionics) tion errors (without such map-display correlation) are too large to locate targets for Two of these—Skyeye and Pioneer l–are artillery and missiles but adequate to now in service with U.S. forces but are not spe- locate targets for aircraft flying armed cifically designed to operate in the climate and reconnaissance missions or to cue sensors jamming expected in central Europe and do which could locate targets more ac- not have the target location and designation curately. capabilities of TADARS. In fact, none of these None of these, without modification, could meets all specifications for, or provides the ca- designate targets by laser. This would seri- pabilities of TADARS, and modification of one 61 ously limit utilization of Copperhead; to have capabilities roughly comparable to however, with its range of about 16 kilom- those of TADARS would probably cost more eters, Copperhead could reach only about and take longer than would completing devel- 59 10 kilometers beyond the FLOT. opment and procurement of TADARS. Now Some have inferior or nonexistent elec- that TADARS is performing as specified, argu- tronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). ments for procuring one of these UAVs in place For example, the Pioneer-1, entering serv- of TADARS rest upon cost rather than per- ice with the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Ma- formance or schedule: A reconnaissance UAV 60 rine Corps for evaluation, lacks ECCM to with no laser designation capability and little 62 protect its data links from jamming, as or no jam resistance could be purchased im- does the Skyeye RPV, which has been mediately and at lower cost, although deliv- used by the Army in Thailand and Hon- ery might take as long as delivery of Aquila. duras. Good ECCM will be essential to However, procurement of one of these in lieu counter Warsaw Pact jamming in Europe; of TADARS would have the following draw- RPVs with inadequate ECCM might be backs: of little value. None has a target-autotrack feature; none . None of these meets all specifications for is designed to interface with TACFIRE TADARS, which requires use of compo- and AFATADS. Most lack ballistically nents, and assembly, testing, and docu- hardened ground control stations with 5’The Pioneer 1 is a successor to Mazlat’s Mastiff Mk3 and nuclear-biological-chemical protection.63 Scout-800 RPVs, which are no longer offered for sale. ‘“The Heron-26 is an improved version of Meteor’s Mirach- Some have radar cross-sections higher 20 “Pelican,” Its manufacturer, Meteor Costruzioni Aeronau- than that of Aquila, but the differences tiche ed Elettroniche, is represented in the United States by are of little consequence.64 Pacific Aerosystems. ‘gU.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Aquik Remotely- “Unless Copperhead seekers are replaced by autonomous Piloted Vehicle: Recent Developments and Alternatives (Wash- seekers now being developed. See U.S. Congress, Office of Tech- ington, DC: General Accounting Office, report GAO/NSIAD- nology Assessment, Technologies for IVA 7W Follow-On Forces 86-41BR, January 1986). This would require installation of the Attack Concept—Special Report, OTA-ISC-312 (Washington, MICNS ADT, laser rangefinder/designator, and TV (or FLIR) DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1986). camera developed for Aquila. @B. M. Greeley, Jr., “Symposium Display Underscores RPV ‘OGEC Avionics Phoenix and its ground station both use highly Advances, Service Needs, ” Aviation Week and Space Technol- directional antennas, which would contribute to the claimed jam 0~, Aug. 4, 1986, pp. 124-125. resistance of its control and data links, Meteor claims that the ogThe qound control station for the Phoenix has nuclear- data link of its Mirach-100 is jam resistant. OTA knows of no biological-chemical environmental protection; ballistic protec- analysis that compares the jam resistance of these systems with tion is not claimed. that of TADARS. The uplink (control link) of the Pioneer 1 has “Doubling a UAV’s radar cross-section would increase by only anti-jam features; its downlink (data link) relies on terrain mask- 20 percent the range at which it could be detected by enemy ing against ground-based j ammers. radar. 164 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

The Light Division UAV Air-Launched UAVs The Army is developing a “Light Division The Navy and Air Force are developing air- UAV” which is smaller and of lesser capabil- launched UAVs for reconnaissance, jamming, ity than Aquila. It could be more easily and lethal attack. An air-launch capability launched, controlled, and recovered by Army could give them great range and simplify their division elements operating near the FLOT. employment in coordination with strikes by manned aircraft. The IEW UAV Advanced-Technology UAVs The Army hopes to field a larger, longer range Intelligence and Electronic Warfare These concepts do not begin to exhaust the (IEW) UAV by late 1987. The Army plans to possibilities of UAVs which could someday select a non-developmental platform this sum- perform RSTA for FOFA. UAVs incorporat- mer after a fly-off;65 candidates may include ing advanced technology (e.g., radioisotope- some RPVs which have been proposed as alter- powered heat engines) or merely ingenious de- natives to Aquila, as well as others.66 It could sign could operate for very long periods at high fly to the depth of a corps commander’s area altitude.68 of interest, carrying some of the UAV payloads now being developed by the Army to perform Issues and Options surveillance (by means of synthetic-aperture radar, MTI radar, and infrared or millimeter- TADARS has been an issue in Congress pri- wave passive thermal imaging); collection of marily because its schedule and budget have electronic intelligence, communications in- been overrun. Congress has several options for telligence, and meteorological intelligence; future funding of TADARS: communications relaying; and radar or com- ● 67 Congress could fund procurement of munications jamming. With some of these TADARS and development of a FLIR for payloads, the UAV could be very valuable for TADARS, subject to the requirement FOFA. (stipulated in the fiscal year 1987 Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts) Expendable UAVs that TADARS meet performance specifications and that the Army negotiate a The Army is also developing expendable contract which limits its liability. UAVs to perform jamming and to support spe- ● Congress could deny funding for TADARS cial operational forces, as well as “kamikaze” and express an expectation that the UAVs to attack certain targets. Although use- Army would cancel the program and make ful for FOFA, these would not be intended pri- do without TADARS. This would save marily for RSTA. money, and some functions which TADARS was to perform could be performed by other systems.69 The effectiveness of artillery and MLRS—which can be used for

‘%%, e.g., R. Dale Reed, “High-Flying Mini-Sniffer RPV: Mars ebprivate communication. Bound?” Astronautics and Aeronautics, June 1978, pp. 26-39; WDon Dugd~e, { ‘Tapping the Potential of Unmanned Air Ve_ Victor C. Clarke, et al., “A Mars Airplane?” Astronautics and hicles, ” Defense EIectrom.cs, October 1986, pp. 109 ff. Aeronautics, January 1979, pp. 42-54; and vol. 2 of this report. eTDon Kurtz (NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory), “The ADEA 69 For exmple, acquisition of moving targets for MLRS could UAV Payload Testbed Program, ” in Symposium, 28-30 Janu- be performed by Mohawk now, or by Joint STARS or the Army’s ary 1986, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisi- proposed IEW UAV in the future, if these programs continue. tion (RSTA), Compendium of Government Briefings, Volume However, Mohawk imagery is not available continuously or in 2 (Unclassified) (Adelphi, MD: U.S. Army Harry Diamond Lab- real time, and the IEW UAV is not required to locate targets oratories, 1986). See also vol. 2 of this report. with great precision or to designate them with a laser. Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 165 —

short-range FOFA— would suffer without the coverage and revisit rate of large airborne TADARS. radars such as Joint STARS, but they could Ž Congress could deny funding for TADARS reconnoiter limited areas masked from Joint and express an interest in considering a STARS by terrain and vegetation and could request for appropriations to procure a distinguish armored from unarmored vehicles. non-developmental U.S. or foreign-made UAVs are being developed for the Army, UAV. No such UAV has the capabilities Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and by of TADARS, and many would be too sus- our NATO Allies. ceptible to jamming or environmental ex- The Army’s TADARS could perform short- tremes, but some could perform RSTA for range RSTA for FOFA. It appears that all ma- FOFA. jor problems which have plagued TADARS Concern about duplication of effort has have been corrected. Completing development emerged as another issue because of the appar- and procurement of TADARS would probably ent proliferation of UAV programs. Congress be quicker and no more costly than procuring addressed this in the fiscal year 1987 Defense and modifying a different RPV system to have Authorization and Appropriations Acts, which comparable capability. Some other U.S. and required the Department of Defense to submit allied UAV systems are cheaper but less ca- a‘ ‘Master Plan’ for UAVs with its fiscal year pable; many are unsuitable for use in Central 1988 funding request. This “Master Plan” Europe, but some could be useful for FOFA. should justify the capabilities required of the Some U.S. and allied UAV systems now in de- various UAVs now in development and may velopment could perform RSTA for FOFA at indicate why a diverse mixed force is preferred longer range; the Army’s IEW UAV may be over a smaller force of multi-role UAVs. particularly useful.

Summary Unmanned aerial vehicles could perform RSTA for FOFA. Small UAVs could not have

THE TWO-WAY STREET: OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF RSTA SYSTEMS Because of security concerns and technologi- the French ORCHIDEE system. Candidate cal disparity, development and production of UAVs were discussed above, in the section on RSTA systems usually provide fewer oppor- UAVs; this section discusses opportunities for tunities for Alliance cooperation than do de- cooperation with Allies in producing airborne velopment and production of weapons and mu- radar systems. nitions. However, the United States has recently bought some foreign-made reconnais- Interoperable or Co-Produced Airborne sance systems— Israeli RPVs—and could buy Radar Systems others from its NATO partners. Candidates include unmanned aerial vehicles, Airbus In- The Airborne Radar Demonstrator System dustrie A300 aircraft for use as platforms for (ARDS) project is a U.S.-British-French effort Joint STARS, and equipment which would en- to achieve interoperability70 of airborne sur- able Joint STARS Ground Station Modules to receive, process, and display radar imagery ‘“Specifically, level-4 interoperability: compatibility at the data link level and below, in terms of the Open Systems Intercon- from allied airborne radar systems such as the nection (0S1 ) terminology defined by the International Stand- British ASTOR I and ASTOR C systems and ards Organization (1S0). 166 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

face-surveillance systems. ARDS is directed in a variety of ways. The most straightforward by Project Group 21 (P/G 21) of NATO’s would be for ORCHIDEE ground stations to National Army Armaments Group (NAAG). transmit MTI information to Army GSMs via Among the airborne platform/sensor configu- electrical or optical cable or using the French- rations being evaluated are: Belgian RITA mobile telephone equipment now being procured by the Army. P/G 21 is likely 1. The ASTOR-I Airborne STand-Off Radar 71 to attempt a demonstration of ORCHIDEE/ system developed for the British Minis- GSM interoperability in this fashion. Alter- try of Defense. It uses a Ferranti MTI ra- natively, ORCHIDEE platforms could be dar on a Pilatus Britten-Norman BN-2T 72 equipped with SCDL air data terminals for twin-turboprop Islander. two-way or down-link data communications 2. The ASTOR-C system, which consists of with similarly equipped GSMs. a British Aircraft Corp./English Electric Canberra twin-turbojet platform carrying If ASTOR or ORCHIDEE platforms were a fixed-target-indicating Demonstration equipped with SCDL equipment, GSMs could Synthetic-Aperture Radar (DEMSAR), receive and exploit the information they col- which is based on the design of the U.S. lect. With relatively little modification, GSMs UPD-7 radar. could receive and exploit MTI data from 3. The French ORCHIDEE73 radar system— ASTOR-I or ORCHIDEE; processing and now in development—which will be car- exploitation of fixed-target imagery from ried by Super Puma helicopters.74 ASTOR-C would require more extensive modification. These interoperabilities, if imple- The ASTOR-I and ASTOR-C were designed mented, would provide Army users with addi- to record radar data for post-flight processing; tional sources of airborne MTI surveillance data they have no airborne data link. They would and would provide U.S. GSM equipment manu- be of much greater utility for FOFA if equipped facturers with opportunities for foreign sales or with a data link to permit near-real-time ex- production licensing. ploitation. In one series of demonstrations by P/G 21, an ASTOR I platform used a Joint STARS Surveillance and Control Data Link Airbus Industrie A300 Platforms air data terminal to transmit MTI data to a for Joint STARS Joint STARS Ground Station Module. P/G 21 It appears that Airbus Industrie A300 jet may also attempt to demonstrate the capabil- transport aircraft could be modified to serve ity of an SCDL air data terminal to transmit as platforms for Joint STARS prime mission raw fixed-target imagery (“phase history”) 75 equipment. Modifications which the Air from a ASTOR-C DEMSAR to a GSM for Force would probably require include interior processing and display by equipment which reconfiguration and installation of militarized would have to be added to the GSM. flight-deck avionics, single-point and air-to-air ORCHIDEE platforms will be equipped refueling ports, and a radome.76 A300 aircraft, with Electronique Serge-Dassault (E SD) data if ordered soon for use as operational platforms, link terminals to transmit MTI information could be modified and “stuffed” with Joint to similarly equipped ORCHIDEE ground sta- STARS prime mission equipment as soon as tions. Army GSMs could be adapted to receive E-8As could.77 and display MTI information from ORCHIDEE This possibility presents opportunities for the United States to purchase A300 platforms “Formerly called CASTOR: Corps Airborne Stand-Off Radar. “Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1985-86 (New York: Jane’s Publishing, Inc., 1985), pp. 297-299. “USAF, AFIRDPV, private communication. ~gob~enatoire Radm Coherent Heliporte d’Investigation Des 7’ANSER Corp., personal communication, July 22, 1986. Elements Ennemis. “They could not be ready for use as full-scale development “Anon., “The Orchidee Battlefield Surveillance System, ’ 1n- platforms; two E-8As (modified and stuffed EC-18BS) have al- ternatiomd Defense Review, June 1986, p. 720. ready been ordered for full-scale development use. Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 167

for U.S. Joint STARS aircraft, for Allies to The Joint STARS Joint Program Office has purchase Joint STARS prime mission equip- proposed investigation of possibilities for Al- ment for use on allied Joint STARS aircraft, liance cooperation on Joint STARS to the Air and for co-production of Joint STARS aircraft Staff. Neither the Air Force nor the Depart- for U.S. and allied procurement. Allied use of ment of Defense have yet announced a posi- Joint STARS would generate sales of GSMs tion on the proposal. or their components. Chapter 11 Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems CONTENTS

Page Introduction...... 171 Anti-Armor Munitions ...... 172 Top-Attack Munitions...... 173 Mines ...... 177 Countermeasures ...... 178 Delivery System Issues ...... 181 Introduction ...... ,...181 Missile Guidance Technology ...... 181

Box Box Page A. Delivery Error Budget ...... 183

Figure No. 11-1. Smart Submunitions ...... 175

Table No. Page 11-1. Anti-Armor Munitions ...... 176 11-2. Smart Submunition Sensors ...... 177 11-3. Assault Breaker Results ...... 174 11-4. Missile Guidance Technologies...... + ...... 182 11-5. Guidance Technology–NATO Conventional Missiles...... 184 Chapter 11 Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems

INTRODUCTION

Munitions currently in the inventory and be- ● Can these goals be achieved at a reason- ing procured, as described in chapter 9, are de- able cost? signed mainly to attack soft area targets (e.g., formations of trucks or lightly armored vehi- At this stage of development, it is not possi- cles, or field command posts) and hard fixed ble to say with confidence whether such a prac- targets (bridges, power stations). The technol- tical balance among reliability, countermeasure ogies embodied in these munitions—cluster resistance, and cost can be achieved in the de- munitions for soft area targets, large unitary sign of smart submunitions, nor which designs munitions for fixed targets-are straightfor- are most likely to succeed. To date, tests of pro- ward; the munitions themselves are relatively totype smart submunitions have been carried inexpensive and are considered effective against out under artificial conditions that make tar- their intended targets. An important question gets easier to detect—clear weather, high con- is whether new anti-armor munitions now un- trast backgrounds, and, in some cases, artifi- der development can be made effective and af- cially enhanced thermal signatures. Because fordable. of the considerable differences between U.S. and Soviet armored vehicles (Soviet vehicles New anti-armor munitions under develop- generally are harder to detect) and between the ment, called ‘‘smart submunitions, make use climates and terrain of U.S. test ranges and of sensors that autonomously search a target potential European battlefields (more often area for a tank and are designed to strike the obscured by fog, rain, and vegetation), it is es- tank on its lightly armored top surface, in some sential that testing be carried out with realis- cases using novel lethal mechanisms. If suc- tic targets, under realistic conditions. A rig- cessful, these smart submunitions will clearly orous testing program, such as that provided add a major new capability to attack armored now by the Chicken Little and Special Projects vehicles beyond line of sight and without di- efforts at Eglin Air Force Base, may well be rect operator control, but their very “smart- an essential continuing element in the devel- ness” leads to greater cost, greater technical opment and evaluation of these submunitions. risk, and greater risk of being spoofed by countermeasures. Thus, if, as a matter of policy and analysis, it becomes clear that substantial ef- A second issue is the role of mines. Histori- fort should be devoted to attacking tanks, a cally, mines have been relatively ineffective number of technological questions come into weapons and have received correspondingly lit- play concerning these new munitions: tle analytical attention. A major limitation was that they had to be emplaced by hand, a slow • Can they be made to operate reliably, un- process that allowed little flexibility to react der realistic conditions? to changing circumstances. New technologies ● Can they be made to resist likely counter- that permit mines to be delivered by aircraft measures? Or will the deployment of ef- or artillery may allow mines to play a more im- fective countermeasures impose a sub- mediate and responsive role in the attack of stantial economic or military cost on the armored units. For example, mines might enemy? quickly be emplaced immediately in front of

177 172 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack a moving unit, creating a concentration of ve- them a high probability not only of halting or hicles that could then be directly attacked. delaying a tank but of actually destroying a Such mines are now being procured; however, tank-are farther down the road. Again, the the lack of a clear doctrine for their employ- role that such a weapon could play in follow- ment appears to be hindering plans for the ac- on forces attack is a key question that needs quisition of significant quantities. Mines that to be addressed. incorporate new lethal mechanisms-giving

ANTI-ARMOR MUNITIONS The development of effective anti-armor mu- sensors that can detect the target and guide nitions for follow-on forces attack is compli- or aim the munition for an accurate hit. cated by two facts: First, the number of tar- There is, of course, nothing magic about top gets is large, and they are in enemy territory. An effective weapon will have to be able to en- attack; indeed if the threat against tanks shifts gage multiple targets per pass, and will have substantially to top attack, future tanks may to tolerate less than pinpoint delivery accuracy. well be designed with added top armor protec- Second, Soviet armored vehicles have over the tion. Clearly the most effective course in the long run–though likewise the most expen- past two decades undergone substantial improvements in armor protection, a trend that sive—is to maintain a balanced variety of weap- is continuing. Armor has become thicker, new ons that attack from all aspects, forcing the materials such as ceramics which offer greater Soviets to make compromises in their tank de- protection per pound than steel have been in- signs. In the short run, however, top-attack corporated, and add-on reactive applique ar- weapons are likely to prove difficult to counter. mors which are very efficient in deflecting high- As discussed below in the section on ballistic explosive anti-tank munitions are being in- countermeasures, existing Soviet tank designs stalled both on new tanks and as a retrofit on are not well suited to retrofitting with top ar- older tanks.1 mor because of the prohibitively large weight that effective armor would add and because All of this has meant that, to be effective, of the need to maintain unobstructed air flow new anti-armor munitions must be able to pene- to the engine radiators. trate greater thicknesses of armor and must have a higher probability of hitting the tank The choice of warhead technology is another accurately—and ideally at a specific, vulner- factor in armor/anti-armor competition. Armor able point on the tank’s surface. Because ar- which is most effective against one of the two mor protection has been concentrated on the principal types of warheads used in wide-area front surfaces of tanks to meet the primary anti-armor weapons is not generally most ef- threat of direct fire from opposing tanks and fective against warheads of the other kind: infantry-fired anti-tank guided missiles, it is Shaped-charge warheads typically penetrate the top and bottom surfaces that are the most greater thicknesses of armor than do explo- lightly protected and thus the most vulnerable. sively formed penetrators (EFPs) but can be Almost all new anti-armor munitions designed more easily countered; EFPs typically penetrate less armor’ but are harder to counter. If to engage armored vehicles at some distance —— exploit these vulnerabilities. Increased prob- ‘Not considered here is another important class of kinetic- ability of hitting a target is achieved, first, by energy warheads which are less suitable for submunitions: long, inert, preformed projectiles, such as are used today in armor- making the munitions smaller so that more can piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding-sabot (APFSDS) artillery be dropped over the target area; and second, rounds. They may be fired by an electromagnetic gun being de- in the case of “smart” munitions, by adding veloped by the Army, DARPA, and DNA. The Air Force’s developmental high-velocity missile (HVM), although powered, I For more information, see vol. 2, app. 1 l-A, fig. 1 l-A-l. is also a long, inert (i.e., nonexplosive), preformed projectile. Ch. 11—Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 173 a proposed tank were expected to f ace a threat ons have the potential to cause multiple kills consisting primarily of warheads of a single per shot;4 they are also relatively inexpensive type, its designers could optimize its armor (see table 11-1); and the technology and man- against that type by trading off protection ufacturing experience are well in hand. against the other type. An adversary’s abil- Possible countermeasures include the use of ity to use warheads of multiple types forces applique armor to add extra protection to designers to forego ideal protection against one lightly armored vehicles and armor skirts5 to type in order to seek balanced protection protect the vulnerable tires and radiators of against all. trucks, dispersing vehicles, and emplacing vehicles such as self-propelled artillery in earth Top-Attack Munitions revetments. Three generations of top-attack munitions could be used for FOFA. These are cluster mu- Sensor-Fuzed Munitions nitions (the current generation), and two gen- A second generation of anti-armor muni- erations of “smart” submunitions now in de- tions–the first generation of “smart” anti- velopment: sensor-fuzed and terminally guided armor submunitions—is now under full-scale submunitions. development (see figure 11-1). These submunitions--called sensor-fuzed munitions-employ Cluster Munitions autonomous sensors that detect a vehicle and Current-generation anti-armor munitions are trigger the firing of an explosively formed unguided cluster bombs. They blanket a large penetrator, also known as a self-forging frag- area with a randomly dispersed shower of small ment, at the target. The use of a sensor to re- bomblets. The air-delivered Rockeye, the Com- place the random scattering of cluster muni- bined Effects Munition (CEM), the German tions can increase the kill probability, so fewer MW-1 submunition dispenser system, and the munitions would be wasted on empty space, artillery- or MLRS rocket-delivered Improved and fewer rounds have to be fired or fewer sor- Conventional Munition (ICM, also called ties flown to achieve the same result. The DPICM: dual-purpose improved conventional sensor can also select a particular, vulnerable munition) all incorporate armor-piercing shaped- aimpoint. Thus the air-delivered Skeet submu- charge warheads. The armor-penetration ca- nition uses an infrared sensor to find the hot pability of these munitions is, however, small, engine compartment of a target vehicle; the so they are most effective against trucks and artillery-delivered SADARM uses a combination lightly armored vehicles such as self-propelled of infrared (IR) and millimeter-wave (MMW) artillery, armored personnel carriers, and in- radar sensors to locate the center of the tank, fantry fighting vehicles. Against tanks, they where the turret is. are effective only if one of the bomblets strikes These warheads are expected to be effective the vulnerable area over the engine compart- in top attack against existing Soviet tanks; the ment and the turret—which can be as little as retrofitting of top-attack protection armor to 1 square meter out of 15 square meters of sur- these vehicles would be very difficult.’ The ma- face on the top of the tank. Because the typi- jor lethal effect of the explosively formed cal pattern on the ground of these munitions penetrator against armor, however, results is one bomblet per 20 square meters, the prob- from spalling: bits of metal fly off the inside ability of stopping a tank is obviously not very of the vehicle’s armor at high speeds when the great.3 But against soft targets, cluster weap-

4Some submunitions, such as GEM, DPICM, and the A PAM 31ncreasing the density of bomblets so as to increase the num- (anti-personnel, anti-material) also include fragmentation charges ber of hits per tank becomes a losing proposition because the that can destroy a truck without hitting it. area of empty space between tanks is much greater than the 5For more information, see note 1, app. 11-A, vol. 2. area of tops of tanks. ‘For more information, see note 2, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2. 174 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Table 11-1. —Anti-Armor Munitions — Status Delivery Targets Representative cost* TOP ATTACK MUNITIONS Cluster munitions (small shaped charge; unguided) Rockeye inv air trucks, self-propelled $100 MW-1 inv air arty, other light armor (20,000) CEM proc air ICM proc arty/MLRS Sensor-fuzed munitions (explosively formed penetrator; sensor) Skeet FSD air same as above 5,000 (200,000) SADARM FSD arty/MLRS same plus current infantry vehicles, some tanks Terminally-guided munitions (shaped charge; guided) MLRS-TGW R&D MLRS same plus 50,000 IRTGSM R&D ATACMS tanks (1 ,000,000) MINES Scatterable mines GATOR proc air armored vehicles 500 RAAM proc art y (50,000) AT-2 FSD MLRS Smart mines ERAM dead air armored vehicles . 10,000------Army mine R&D arty, helo “cost per ind!vldual submunition (cost per 1,000.lb load) arty artillery lnv Inventory I!ght armor armored combat vehicles, excludlng tanks proc procurement FSD full-scale development R&D research & development prior to FSD warhead strikes and have a high probability these developments in Soviet armor are many of killing the crew. Tanks being transported years’ away and of course do not come easily on trucks or trains to the front, without crews, or cheaply: they will be expensive and will still fuel, or ammunition on board, may suffer lit- likely add some weight to the tank. The para- tle damage from these munitions. In some mount issue in considering countermeasures cases the munitions may do little more than is not simply whether they are possible, but drill a small hole that can later be patched or rather what cost they impose on the other side ignored. in terms of economics, weapon effectiveness, flexibility, and so on. In the long run, new tanks might be designed with armors that could defeat munitions of cur- Because the search area of these munitions rent designs without adding prohibitively to is small,10 they are most effective when used the overall weight of the vehicle.7 To increase against concentrated groups of vehicles. The the penetrating capacity of explosively formed small search area allows relatively unsophisti- penetrators to match these improvements cated sensors to be used, keeping costs down. would mean increasing the caliber of these mu- But placing the job of detecting the target in nitions, thereby undoing the key objective of the hands of an autonomous sensor, without carrying multiple munitions in each rocket, ar- human intervention, raises the obvious possi- tillery shell, or aircraft dispenser load.8 But bility that these weapons can be fooled,11 possibly by standard camouflage techniques that “For more information, see note 3, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2. ‘Defense Science Board, Armor Anti-Armor Competition (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, OUSDRE, Fi- nal Report, October 1985), p. B-5; T. Hafer, Warhead Technol- ‘For more information, see note 4, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2. ogy Options (Arlington, VA: System Planning Corp., Final Sum- ‘°For more information, see note 5, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2. mary Report SPC 924, June 1983), p. 13. “For more information, see note 6, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2. Ch. 11—Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 175 at road each could by the searches right) and penetrator antipersonnel tanks beSide the or beleN SPinS three It formed lob along toward (Inset

\ and descends. mine lobbed explOSively scattered mine-clearing troops be an Skeet Each also fires each hamper It previously As to could approaching one. of mines TMD. Skeet compartment a grenades detects Two ERAM from engine footsteps If It s smart KS. mines: center) sense tanK tan nine Smart (fight for fraqmentatlon the of also Submunitions Anti·Armor 11·1.-Smart Figure tar Ter each search rocket the alterna by warhead TGSMs as each would with dispersed could. such from launched These armed widely 1987 which and shaped-charge a rockets More leftl dispensed submunlllons. miSSiles carried be be MI_RS below detonating by Assessment. gUldec (TGSMs): might could ATACMS tanks. (Inset which TGWs range Into terminally dispensed of by fly SIX Technology 12 submunitions or of longer and Warheads attacked two Three guided centerl. Office be toward. GUided left carry transporter-launcher could steer Impact MLRS Terminally gets minally (Inset for. tlvely. on SOURCE: 176 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack the Soviets are known to practice, such as plac- cal balance between countermeasure resistance ing fresh foliage or nets over the vehicle, which and cost can be achieved in the design of these reduces the ability of these simple sensors to munitions. The Army-Air Force Chicken Lit- detect them against background “noise” or tle and Special Projects test programs and the ‘‘clutter."12 work of the Army Vulnerability Assessment Laboratory should provide much of this needed Clutter is a particular problem when vehi- data. cles are in wooded or urban terrain, as they would be when halted in assembly areas; it is The problem of dealing with countermeas- less of a problem when vehicles are on open ures aside, costs are very uncertain at this roads. Camouflage becomes less practical as stage. Although the fundamental technology the tanks approach the area of the direct bat- involves no new concepts, no manufacturing tle; camouflage piled on top of a tank to con- experience exists for some key elements, par- ceal it from overhead observation by humans ticularly sensors.14 Likewise, although the As- or electronic sensors makes it more visible to sault Breaker project of the Defense Advanced direct line of sight observation. The use of Research Projects Agency demonstrated that smoke or metallic chaff to obscure sensors or the basic technology is feasible and available, decoys to distract them could be effective, but it left unanswered the question of how much these methods are, from an operational point it will cost to produce a reliable total system. of view, far less practical. As shown in table 11-3, in none of the 14 flight tests carried out under Assault Breaker were The choice of sensor makes some difference all functions tested and found successful, al- in which countermeasures are likely to be most though in three tests all functions tested were effective; however, both IR and MMW sensors 13 successful, including engagement of multiple have their vulnerabilities (see table 11-2). In- targets by submunitions in one test. Success- creasing the sensitivity of the sensors can help ful demonstrations of prototype smart submu- to detect camouflaged targets, but also drives nitions in Assault Breaker, and since, have up the false alarm rate. Use of multiple sen- taken place under artificial conditions-in clear sors in different wavelength bands (“dual- weather, against low clutter backgrounds, and mode” sensors) can likewise help to dis- against targets with enhanced thermal signa- criminate between real targets and clutter; but tures. Again, a thorough, realistic test program that greater discrimination is paid for in in the development stages could reduce this greater cost and, possibly, reduced reliability. uncertainty. Extensive testing under realistic conditions will be needed to determine whether a practi- Terminally Guided Munitions ‘ZBriefings from the “Chicken Little” program office, Eglin Top-attack munitions, which are now in the Air Force Base, and U.S. Army Vulnerability Assessment Lab- oratory, White Sands Missile Range. research and development phase, employ sen- ‘3These are discussed in more detail below in the section on sors to locate the target and guide the muni- sensor countermeasures. tion into a direct impact. The terminally guided munition is larger than the sensor-fuzed munition, containing a larger, shaped-charge war- Table 11-2.—Smart Submunition Sensors head and a more sophisticated-and consider- Sensor Mode ably more expensive-electronics package that Infrared (IR) Millimeter-Wave (MMW) is needed to translate sensor images into steer- 15 advantages aimpoint accuracy performance in weather ing instructions for the tail fins that guide it. disadvantages targets must be hot; jamming possible; Soviet tanks are multi-domain analysis I R-suppressed; necessary to reject affected by weather; simple decoys “Defense Science Board, op. cit., p. C-2. decoys possible “For more information, see note 7, app. 11-A, vol. 2. Ch. 11—Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 177

Table 11 -3.—Assault Breaker Results

Missile Mission function T-16 T-22

Test number: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ● 9 1234 Target acquisition (radar) ...... — — — U U S S S — — — — — S Target position to missile ...... — — — U U S S S — — — — — S Missile launch .,...... S S S S S S S S S S SSSS Precision guidance (inertial) ...... U S S S U S U — S S SSSS Radar track target ...... — — — U U S S S — — — — — S Radar acquire and track missile ...... — — — U U S S S — — — — — U Radar provide guidance update ...... — — — U U S S S — — — — — S Missile trajectory correction ...... — — — — — — S S — — — — — S In flight dispense.,...... — P S S P S S S S S SSPP Payload pattern generation ...... — P S S P S S S S S us UP Payload descent functioning ...... — U U U S U — — — S UUUP Payload target acquisition and lock-on ...... — — S U S U — — — S — — — — Target engagement (single) ...... ,...... — — U U S U — — — S — — — — Target engagement (multiple) ...... — — — — U U — — — S — — — — Target— engagement (moving) ...... — — — — — — — — — — — — — — S — successful test P —partially successful test U —unsuccessful test — not tested . — calibration test for fixed site radar used (n test 9 SOURCE Steven L Canby, ‘The Operational Llmlts of Emerging Technology, /nternat/ona/ Defense Rewew. August 1985, pp 875.880

This larger warhead is expected to have a logistics burden as well. With the development greater kill capability than the explosively of scatterable mines that can be deployed by formed penetrator; it also has a much higher aircraft or artillery (GATOR and RAAM, now probability than the explosively formed being procured by the Air Force and Army, penetrator warhead of causing catastrophic and the MLRS-delivered AT-2 under joint de- damage to a tank. velopment by the United States and several European nations) and the incorporation of The search area of these munitions is greater more effective lethal mechanisms, mines may than that of the sensor-fuzed munitions. Coun- play a more direct role in halting or destroy- termeasure issues are largely the same, but ing armored vehicles. weather will be a greater problem because the terminally guided munitions begin their search The major weakness of current remotely at an altitude of 1 kilometer or so, and are there- deliverable mines is that they are easily seen fore more susceptible to the absorbing effects on roadways and can be easily cleared from of low-lying clouds. roadways; in Warsaw Pact forces, several tanks per battalion have rollers or forks A major issue is whether the larger search mounted in front for mine-clearing. The effec- area and greater lethal effect of Terminally tiveness of remotely deliverable mines will Guided Submunitions (TGSMs) as compared clearly be greater when used against a force to sensor-fuzed weapons will justify their order- moving off the roads. of-magnitude greater cost. “Smart’’ mines, which can sense and attack Mines a tank at some distance, could command a road from concealed off-road positions.16 They are, New "scatterable’’ mines and “smart’’ mines could also be used for FOFA. Mines have his- tonically been used to delay or harass enemy “A more detailed description of these systems appears in OTA’s earlier Technologies forNATO’s Foflow-On Forces At- forces at best. The need to emplace mines by tack Concept–SpeciaJ Report, OTA-ISC-312 (Washington, DC: hand limited flexibility and imposed a large U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1986), pp. 33-34. 178 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack however, expensive, and they raise many of steel armor than can a comparably sized ex- the same countermeasure, reliability, and cost plosively formed penetrator.17 issues raised by sensor-fuzed weapons. The Air On the other hand, shaped charges are much Force recently decided against proceeding with 18 easier to defeat with current armors. In the full-scale development of its smart Extended- early 1960s, the only armors were aluminum Range Anti-armor Mine (ERAM) for budget- alloys and steel. Increasing the thickness of ary reasons; the Army is still studying the such armors obviously increased protection, concept. but at a considerable weight penalty. The trend in new armor development has thus been Countermeasures toward armors which achieve a level of protection equivalent to a given thickness of steel The competition between new anti-armor (usually expressed as millimeters of Rolled weapons and increased armor protection is a Homogeneous Armor Equivalent) with lighter continuing one. The critical questions are new materials, such as ceramics, laminates, whether quick, easy, and inexpensive counter- and reactive armors, which contain small ex- measures can defeat the new weapon, and, if plosive charges that detonate when struck by not, what cost is imposed on the defender if he an incoming warhead, thereby deflecting the decides to develop and deploy an effective shaped-charge jet. These armors are not very counter. For example, anew anti-tank weapon effective against kinetic-energy penetrators, may require the defender to place heavier ar- however. mor on his tanks, increasing their weight, thus requiring larger engines which consume more Improved armor has been applied primarily fuel (increasing the logistics burden or hinder- to the front surfaces of tanks to protect them ing mobility) and requiring a larger vehicle against the major threat on the battlefield— which is more easily seen and hit on the bat- direct fire from enemy tanks and anti-tank tlefield. In addition, there is a synergism weapons.19 The tops of tanks remain relatively among munitions: The greater the variety of unprotected. munitions, the more difficult becomes the job Thus the first-generation smart munitions of defending effectively against them all. If, however, a new weapon could be defeated by (Skeet and SADARM), which contain explosively formed projectile warheads, are indeed a trivial change in operations or hardware, sufficient to penetrate existing Soviet tanks there is clearly a strong case against develop- with a top attack. Retrofitting existing tanks ing it. with additional top-attack protection does not appear feasible: a steel deck to protect the tur- Ballistic Countermeasures ret and engine deck of an existing tank would add a prohibitive amount of weight.20 A shaped-charge munition penetrates armor by detonating a precisely shaped explosive Future tanks might use more efficient com- warhead which forms an intense jet of gas and posite and hybrid armors to provide effective molten metal. Explosively formed penetrators top-attack protection against Skeet and (self-forging fragments) are metal slugs which SADARM at a weight penalty less than that smash through armor by virtue of their high for steel armor.21 Even so, there is always a speed and mass—i.e., their kinetic energy. Al- ‘7A longer, preformed kinetic-energy penetrator (such as an though formed by explosives, they contain no APFSDS artillery round) can penetrate a thickness of homogene- explosives at the moment of contact with the ous armor proportional to its length; it can be made to penetrate farther by increasing its length or velocity rather than target and are called kinetic-energy penetra- caliber. tors. The penetrating capabilities of these war- “For more information, see vol. 2, app. 11-A (note 8, table heads are proportional to their calibers (i.e., 1 l-A-2, and figure 1 l-A-2). ‘gFor more information, see note 9, app. 11-A, vol. 2. diameters); a shaped-charge warhead can pene- “For more information, see note 10, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2. trate roughly 10 times deeper into ordinary “For more information, see note 11, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2. Ch. 11— Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 179 trade-off between using more efficient armor ibility is poor and halting when it improves to add protection and using it to build a lighter results in reduced vulnerability, as well as rate tank with no additional protection. The hybrids of advance. and composites are not suitable for a retrofit to existing tanks because they must be made Camouflage, Decoys, and Jamming as an integral part of the armor; they cannot There are two basic technical approaches to simply be bolted on top. Ceramics, for exam- fooling sensors. The target can be made to ple, are brittle and have to be sandwiched be- blend into the background, either by camou- tween layers of steel in the manufacturing proc- flaging the target or by artificially increasing ess. The effectiveness of these new armors the background noise or clutter level with elec- against explosively formed penetrators cannot, tronic jamming, smoke, or chaff; alternatively, however, be predicted with certainty by exist- false targets can be created, either by deploying theoretical models; improvement of models ing decoys or by broadcasting a carefully tai- is needed, as are simple controlled experiments. lored signal which fools the sensor into thinking it has spotted a target.24 Operational Countermeasures Counter-countermeasures for dealing with Because the sensors employed on smart mu- camouflage and clutter include the use of dual- nitions can search only a limited area, perhaps mode (active and passive) and multi-spectral the most obvious countermeasure is to increase sensors (which are sensitive in more than one the spacing between vehicles both on the road wavelength band), and the use of more sophis- and when halted in assembly areas. This would ticated “multi-domain” analysis of the infor- have a greater effect on sensor-fuzed weapons mation obtained from a single-mode MMW than on TGSMs, which can search much larger 22 sensor. For example, analysis of the delays of areas . the echos of an MM W radar signal from differ- Another operational tactic that could reduce ent features of an object can yield information the effectiveness of smart munitions would be about the spacing of distinguishing features, to take advantage of terrain that produces high which can help to distinguish a tank from back- “clutter” (natural background camouflage), ground objects. Use of multiple wavelength making it difficult for the sensors to pick out bands increases the chances of finding one the target from a sea of confusing signals. Ur- wavelength at which the background clutter ban areas produce severe clutter in both the at any given time will not be too bad. IR and MMW bands; using towns as assem- These measures, of course, will increase the bly areas would make an attack with these mu- 23 cost and complexity of the submunition and nitions very difficult. are not infallible. Multi-domain analysis, for Weather may be exploited to counter sen- example, reduces susceptibility to deception sors. Dry snow provides a very high clutter jamming but does not eliminate it, as discussed background that can swamp the signature of below. a vehicle. The frequently occurring low-level Another approach to making target detec- clouds and fog in central Europe interfere with tion difficult is jamming. The aim can be sim- the performance of IR sensors. Rain affects ply to produce so much background noise that both IR and MMW sensors. Moving when vis- the target no longer stands out. To jam an active MMW sensor would require high power over a wide band of wavelengths and may be 22 For more information, see note 12, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2. infeasible if the sensor has good counter- “Steven Canby, “The Conventional Defense of Europe: Oper- countermeasures. 25 The possible use of lasers ational Limits of Emerging Technology” Working Papers No. 55, International Security Studies Program, The Wilson Cen- “For more information, see note 13, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2. ter, Smithsonian Institution, pp. 24-32; also briefing from Vul- “Briefing from the U.S. Army Vulnerability Assessment Lab- nerability Assessment Laboratory. oratory. 180 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Examples of Simple Countermeasures

Camouflage nets to jam IR sensors has been raised; but track- would obviously have to be near the ground ing a rapidly moving submunition and aiming and would have to be renewed at least every a laser at it is likely to be extremely difficult few minutes; at the wavelengths in question, in practice. large quantities would be required. Both smoke Finally, smoke and chaff are standard de- and chaff suffer from the drawback that adequate warning of an attack is essential to their ception devices. Soviet tanks are equipped with smoke generators, and the Soviets have con- effective use. siderable experience in using smoke to mask Decoys in general pose less of a problem to ground movements from visual observation. sensors than do jamming or camouflage. Sim- However, ordinary smokes are relatively trans- ple decoys, such as MMW corner reflectors, parent to IR and, especially, MMW radiation. are easily rejected by multi-domain analysis. Chaff might also be used.26 To shield tanks To fool multi-domain MMW sensors, decoys against smart submunition sensors, the chaff must resemble full-scale models, which obviously are of limited practicality. Simple IR de- “For more information, see note 14, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2. coys such as flares or fires can similarly be Ch. 11—Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 181 rejected.27 IR sensors may, however, be sus- sor can determine. Deception jamming is not ceptible to decoys that more faithfully repro- an inexpensive countermeasure, and it requires duce the power output and temperature of a some knowledge of the operating wavelength tank engine.28 of the sensor and its processing algorithm, but it is nonetheless straightforward from a tech- Even with multi-domain processing, active nology point of view. The Soviets deploy a MMW sensors are susceptible to deception large variety of radar jamming equipment, and jamming–the broadcasting of signals which thus have the technical and operational base resemble the radiation reflected or emitted by for developing and deploying such a system. a target, insofar as the sensor and its proces- Passive MMW sensors are also susceptible to 2’For more information, see note 15, app. 11-A, vol. 2. deception jamming, which would require only ‘mAccording to the Vulnerability Assessment Laboratory, such modest power over a wide band of wavelengths an I R decoy would require 1 kilowatt of primary power; a small propane bottle of the kind used for soldering torches or camp- simultaneously; while feasible, this would re- ing stoves could supply this power level for several hours. quire several advanced-technology jammers.

DELIVERY SYSTEM ISSUES Introduction craft to remain a safe distance from enemy air defenses,30 and from ground-launched missiles Aircraft today provide virtually the only that will complement aircraft in reaching deep means of delivering munitions to targets be- targets, particularly at night and in bad weather yond the immediate battle area. Aircraft have or when aircraft are needed elsewhere. Missiles a flexibility in deployment that ground- can incorporate precision guidance systems launched systems do not; they also place a hu- that offer substantial improvements in accuracy man observer at the scene. They are limited, over that attainable with ground-based ar- however, when used in direct attacks against tillery, unguided rockets, or air-delivered free- follow-on forces: as discussed in more detail fall bombs. High accuracy becomes crucial in in chapter 9, few aircraft have a night or all- attacking hard, fixed targets such as bridges weather capability; all of the NATO aircraft and the increasing number of heavily fortified that could play a role in attacking beyond the command, control, and communications facil- immediate battle area have other missions to ities in Eastern Europe. And regardless of the perform as well; and the very heavy Warsaw type of target, to the extent that precision guid- Pact air defenses could result in significant ance can increase the probability of a kill, the losses of attack aircraft, particularly if those use of missiles can reduce the number of sor- aircraft must fly very close to or directly over ties or rounds required to achieve a given ob- targets in enemy territory .29 jective. The high cost, long development cycles, and long procurement programs for new aircraft Missile Guidance Technology mean that current aircraft-with the sole addition of the planned F-15E—will constitute The propulsion and airframe technologies of NATO’s ground attack air force at least until missiles are mature. The chief technology choice the turn of the next century. in these systems is between ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Ballistic missiles fly faster The improvements in delivery capabilities and thus can reach moving targets before they that will occur over the next two decades or move far; cruise missiles have the potential to so can be expected to come principally from achieve higher terminal accuracy on target, air-to-ground missiles that will allow attack air- 301mproved me~s for suppressing enemy air defenses are “For more information, see note 16, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2. another important approach to this problem. 182 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

though they may take hours rather than mining accuracy that is required for longer utes to reach their targets and will require in- flight times. Thus, the major technical flight guidance updates or special seekers to challenge in applying inertial systems to hit moving targets. They may also be more vul- conventional missiles is reducing cost. nerable to interceptor aircraft and ground- The precise inertial systems used on based air defenses. The major area where new nuclear-armed ballistic missiles or fighter technology may play a role in airframe design aircraft, for example, cost far too much is in the application of low-observable tech- to justify their one-time use on low-cost, niques to cruise missiles to reduce their vul- conventionally armed missiles. However, nerability. new technologies promise to reduce the cost of inertial guidance systems substan- What distinguishes the major differing ap- tially, particularly for short-range appli- proaches to tactical missile design today and cations. Inexpensive miniature inertial what most determines their differing capabil- systems using fiber-optic gyros could be ities is the technology used for guidance. Two used in short-range weapons—and in different guidance functions-mid-course and longer range weapons, if complemented terminal guidance —may be needed. These by any of several devices now available might use different technologies: to recalibrate the system in flight (e.g., 1. For guiding a missile to the general tar- miniature Global Positioning System get area-mid-course guidance-some receivers). For the specific case of long- form of inertial guidance is almost always range attacks against moving targets, required. The only exceptions are very another important issue is whether the mid- short range air-launched missiles that lock course guidance system needs to include onto their targets before launch using one some means of receiving an in-flight update of the precision terminal guidance tech- of the target’s location. nologies described below,31 or that fly their 2. For attacking hard fixed targets such as initial course in a pure ballistic trajectory. bridges or bunkers, mid-course guidance Although inertial guidance is a well- alone is not sufficient; precise terminal developed technology that has been used guidance, sometimes to within an ac- for decades aboard ships, aircraft, space curacy of a meter or less, is needed. (For vehicles, and ballistic missiles, the tech- other types of targets, inertial guidance nology has historically been quite expen- will as a rule suffice; if the missile can be sive; costs rise quickly with the increas- delivered to within 100 meters or so of the ————- ——. target, cluster munitions can be used to “TO deliver such a missile, the aircraft must line itself up with attack soft area targets and smart sub- a near straight-line path to the target. Inertial systems may be needed by short-range missiles that are to be able to fly to munitions to attack armored combat ve- a target substantially off axis. hicles. See table 11-4 and, for a more

Table 11-4.—Missile Guidance Technologies

Range Target Type Short Long soft area fixed Inertial better Inertial soft area moving (unarmored unit) inertial better inertial ( + automatic target recogition or In-flight target update for cruise missiles) (armored unit) inertial + smart better inertial submunitions + automatic target recognition or in-flight target update + smart submunitions hard fixed man in loop or automatic better inertial target recognition + automatic target recognition SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment 1987 Ch. 11—Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 183

deed critics suggest that automatic target rec- Box A.—Delivery Error Budget ognition faces fundamental obstacles that may Missiles that carry nuclear warheads can prove insurmountable. get by with inertial systems, even at very long ranges (thousands of kilometers for ICBMs) Mid-course Guidance and even when targeted against hard point Inertial.—An inertial navigation system con- targets, because the kill radius of the warhead is large enough to tolerate inaccuracies often tinually recalculates its current position by of hundreds of meters in delivery. However, adding up the many small changes it senses when conventional warheads are used against in the missile’s acceleration and rotation. Even hard fixed targets such as bridges, accuracies small errors in those measurements are quickly on the order of a meter are often essential: compounded, causing the accuracy of the sys- a specific support element of a bridge may tem to decrease with time (drift). Measures to have to be struck. Inertial systems operate reduce drift quickly drive up the costs of tradi- by guiding the missile to an absolute geo- tional mechanical inertial navigation systems. graphic coordinate. Even if the guidance system were perfectly accurate, it would be The new technologies of ring-laser gyro- limited by the uncertainty with which the scopes and (especially) fiber-optic gyroscopes absolute geographic coordinate of a fixed tar- promise to reduce the costs of inertial systems get is known-and that uncertainty is too substantially, although not necessarily to im- large to allow the required one meter or less prove performance. Such inexpensive and less accuracy, accurate inertial systems could have important applications in short-range missiles (e.g., a short-range air-launched stand-off missile carrying smart submunitions that have a large detailed discussion of the limitation of in- search area to compensate for delivery errors), ertial systems in attacking fixed-point tar- and in longer range missiles if used in conjunc- gets, see box A. Precision terminal guid- tion with techniques to periodically recalibrate ance on existing missiles is achieved the inertial system. These techniques include through the use of a human controller—a the Global Positioning System satellites, which “man in the loop’ ‘—who, for example, can provide, via an on-board receiver, a geo- might observe the target through a TV camera mounted on the nose of the missile and steer the missile into it by radio control.

A key issue in precision terminal guidance is how much effort should be given to developing a next-generation system that can operate autonomously. An automatic target recognition system could reduce the burden on a human controller; in the case of air-launched missiles, for example, it would allow the pilot to launch his missile and immediately exit the area. In certain proposed missions that could strain the capabilities of man-in-the-loop systems (e.g., long-range attack of hard fixed targets), automatic target recognition may be essential. Yet the development of such systems involves a high technical risk; so far, none of the many P/Joto credft U S Deparfmenf of Defense laboratory efforts or prototypes have proved Air-launched cruise missile uses TERCOM and other reliable enough to justify procurement, and in- precision guidance, 184 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack graphic fix within 13 meters in absolute co- updated target location data to the missile in ordinates; and various map update systems flight. This data would be developed by a radar such as terrain comparison (TERCOM) which, surveillance and target acquisition system such at set intervals, compares the terrain profile as Joint STARS, and transmitted to the missile below with a stored map to correct any drift via a radio link. in the inertial system. GPS receivers are likely Because of cost and technical problems, pro- to be jammed in the immediate target area, vision for an in-flight update was dropped from so terminal accuracy is determined by the drift the design of at least initial versions of the Army of the inertial system from the last ( unjammed) Tactical Missile System (ATACMS); it maybe update. The services have in addition been reluctant to place themselves in a position of added later as a block improvement. Analysis having to rely on the survival of satellites in has shown that the loss incapability due to lack wartime. TERCOM, which is employed on ex- of update is not severe for ATACMS. Technical issues that need to be considered are beaming isting U.S. cruise missiles, is an alternative of an update to a missile while lofted (or acquisi- technique, although mission planning is time- tion of the guidance signal by the missile at lower consuming, detailed maps are required, and altitude in time to act on it) and the susceptibil- thus retargeting flexibility is obviously very limited. ity of such an update link to jamming. In-flight Target Location Update.–At longer Precision Terminal Guidance range, a moving target will have moved farther by the time a missile arrives; this is especially Man in the Loop. –The current generation of the case for slow-flying cruise missiles. One pos- precision-guided conventional missiles makes sible solution, discussed below, is to equip a use of technology that was first employed by cruise missile with an automatic target recog- the U.S. Air Force in Vietnam some 20 years nizer so that it can search for the target as it ago. Human control of the missile is main- flies a course along a likely route, such as a road. tained to acquire and select the target and, in Another approach, employed in the Assault some cases, to guide the missile throughout Breaker demonstration program (and applicable its entire flight. A variety of techniques are to both cruise and ballistic missiles) is to relay used (see table 11-5); for example, a laser seeker

Table 11-5.—Guidance Technology—NATO Conventional Missiles

Launch mode Targets Status Guidance technology primarily inertial conv. Tomahawk sea area proc inertial/TERCOM ATACMS ground area, armor FSD inertial (ballistic) SRSOM air armor R&D inertial (+ sensor?) IAM air fixed R&D inertial precision terminal (man in loop) HVM air, ground armor FSD laser command guidance (“beam rider”) FOG-M ground armor R&D fiber-optic data link MAVERICK air armor inv IIR lock-on before launch COPPERHEAD artillery armor inv laser designator PAVEWAY 2 air fixed inv laser designator GBU-15 air fixed inv/proc TV/n R radio data link AGM-130A air fixed FSD TV/n R radio data link precision terminal (automatic target recognition) LRSOM air(/ground) area R&D inertial/GPS/TERCOM + terminal seeker CMAG ground/air all — R&D LADAR, SAR, MMW targets: area: soft area targets (SSMS, SAMS, field command posts) fixed: hard fixed ta~gets (bridges, power stations, bunkers) armor: moving armored combat vehicles status inv inventory proc procurement FSD: full-scale development R&D research and development, prior to full+cale development SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1987 Ch. 11—Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 185 on the missile can guide the missile to a spot mediately after launching the missile. How- on the target illuminated by a laser beam, or ever, as indicated in table 11-4, automatic tar- a TV camera on the missile can send a picture get recognition may bean enabling technology back to the aircraft cockpit where a weapons for attacking hard fixed targets at long range officer is steering the missile via radio control.32 with nonnuclear missiles. All these techniques share some common char- At long distances, attacking hard fixed tar- acteristics. High accuracy—on the order of gets would strain the capabilities of the man- meters—is possible; the presence of a‘ ‘man in in-the-loop guidance systems that are now the the loop” may avoid many countermeasure only means of providing the required precise problems such as electronic decoys or back- terminal accuracy. Establishing radio contact ground clutter; the technology is for the most with the missile as it approaches the target part mature and involves little technical risk; area is difficult at long range. The control air- and costs are, very roughly, on the order of craft would have to arrange to be in position $100,000 per missile. at the right instant to have a clear line of sight On the other hand, these missiles are all of to the missile, unobscured by terrain or vege- relatively short range (tens of kilometers); most tation, and jamming of the radio data link require a clear line-of-sight to the target; and presents an increasing threat at greater range thus most of the air-delivered models still re- from the control aircraft. Automatic target rec- quire aircraft to fly close to their targets and ognition, which could free the missile from the to remain there throughout the flight of the need for human control while providing high missile. A general problem with laser-guided terminal accuracy, is the only practical alter- weapons is that the laser can be obscured by native. smoke around the target area; laser-guided For a second mission-long-range attack of weapons are also somewhat less accurate than moving armored combat vehicles whose loca- TV-guided models. A general problem with ra- tion will have changed substantially during the dio data links, used to transmit TV pictures flight time of the missile-a possible solution, from the remotely guided GBU-15s, is that discussed above, is to provide an in-flight up- they can be jammed. date of the target location from a system, such Despite these basic limitations, some im- as the Joint STARS radar, with weapon guid- provements in this generation of weapons are ance capability. Alternatively, the missile possible without going to a radically new gen- could be equipped with an autonomous capa- eration of technology. Range can be extended: bility to search for the targets while flying for example, the AGM-130 has roughly double along a likely route such as a road. the range of the GBU-15 from which it is de- Both of these missions would also require rived by the addition of a simple (but expen- a mid-course guidance system capable of de- sive) solid-fuel rocket motor. Jam-resistant livering the missile to the general target area data links are being developed for the GBU- (see discussion of inertial systems above). 15 and AGM-130. Fiber-optic data links could provide jam resistance for missiles launched The technology for automatic target recog- from the ground. nition has proved problematic to date. The sensor (e.g., a TV camera or radar) must provide Automatic Target Recognition.—Automatic a high-quality image of the target area for rec- target recognition, if successful, clearly could ognition; even then, picking out the target from increase the effectiveness of missiles in all mis- a complex image, and distinguishing it from sions, and could increase the survivability of similar objects (e.g., a tank from a truck) is a aircraft by allowing them to leave the area im- very challenging computational task, especially because it must be carried out in real ~ZThese specific technologies are described more thoroughly in OTA's special report, Technologies for NATO's Follow-On time. Mobile targets pose a special problem Forces Attack Concept, July 1986, pp. 24-27. in that they may be facing any direction-and 186 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

siderable power requirement over that of existing cruise missile electronics; this will require heavier generators and, with the extra heat generation, a cooling system for the electronics.” Advances in the miniaturization of electronics may solve this problem. The use of currently available sensor technology— millimeter wave radar and imaging infrared— would also pose a packaging problem, because an additional system would be required for ter- Photo credit’ McDonnell Douglas Corp rain following. A more advanced sensor, CO2 F-15E equipped with LANTIRN pods. laser radar, is being pursued by several con- tractors; both target-acquisition and terrain- following/obstacle-avoidance functions could be carried out by this single sensor. Much ad- a tank looks quite different when viewed from ditional development of this sensor will be re- different angles. quired; however, it is also likely to be the most All sensors are subject to countermeasures, expensive option. including decoys and camouflage as discussed The lowest technical risk approach to auto- above in the section on smart submunitions; matic target recognition might involve clever signatures of fixed targets may be quite vari- combination of existing capabilities to perform able depending on the season and weather as a limited mission. For example, low-cost iner- foliage and snow cover change. Although ele- tial/GPS guidance could be used to steer a ments of an automatic target recognize have cruise missile close to a road or railroad, and been demonstrated in the laboratory, complete a relatively simple imaging sensor could iden- working systems have remained elusive. For tify the road and keep the missile precisely on example, continuing problems in achieving track; it could also detect trains or groups of reliable automatic target recognition in the vehicles. An autonomous capability against Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting In- fixed targets might be provided in the near frared for Night (LANTIRN) infrared target- term similarly by demanding less than coming system for fighter aircraft may lead to that plete autonomy or flexibility. A short-range feature being dropped from LANTIRN. An standoff missile could be guided from a preset automatic target recognize for an autonomous launch point to the target area by a simple in- missile would have to perform even more relia- ertial system; a sensor system, supplied with bly: LANTIRN was designed to identify the information about the orientation of the tar- target but still allow a human to make the fi- get and its general characteristics (e.g., type nal launch decision; an autonomous missile of bridge, number of spans), might then be able would be entrusted to perform the entire job to perform the somewhat simplified target recon its own. ognition task.34

Even if the technology can be made relia- 33Capt. R.B. Gibson, USAF, et al., Investigation of the Feasi- ble, placing an automatic target recognize on bility of a Conventionally Armed Tactical Cruise Missile, Vol. a cruise missile poses some engineering chal- 1 (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, report AFIT/GSE-81D-2, December 1981), p. 7. lenges as well. An imaging sensor and its asso- siThi9 concept is being pursued in the Autonomous Guided ciated computer processor would add a con- Bomb program of the Air Force Armaments Laboratory. Chapter 12 Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-on Forces CONTENTS

Page Illustrative Capability Packages for FOFA...... 189 Command and Control ...... 190 Locating Moving Combat Units ...... 190 Artillery Attack of Regiment Columns (at 5 to 30 km) ...... 192

Standoff Air Attack of Division Columns (at 30 to 80 km) . ● ...... 193 Missile Attack of Division Columns (at 30 to 80 km). ..,...... 194 Air Attack of Chokepoints and Halted Units (at 80 to 150 km)...... 195 Cruise Missile Attack of the Rail Network (at 350 to 800 km) ...... 196 Flexibility of Systems for FOFA Operations ...... 197 Appendix 12-A: Summary of Packages for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ..l99 Appendix 12-B: Flexibility and Application. . of Systems for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ...... 203

Table No. Page 12-1. Summary of Forces . . . . . 190 Chapter 12 Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces

In the special report on FOFA,l OTA ob- Some systems will have considerable “flex- served that systems ought to be procured so ibility,” or application over abroad range as to form complete “packages’ that perform of concepts, and can contribute to several all of the functions to support operational con- packages. cepts (such as those described in ch. 6). These Many systems will have important appli- packages could include both existing systems cations-to missions other than FOFA.2 as well as new developments such as those discussed in chapters 10 (RSTA) and 11 (weap- The particular packages discussed below are ons). This chapter illustrates how packages chosen to illustrate the major issues of devel- could be built to underwrite the operational opment and procurement, and are not intended concepts outlined in chapter 6. to be “preferred’ or “recommended. A more complete analysis of packages for FOFA is in Several factors complicate any attempt to appendix 12-A. specify what these packages might or should The flexibility of systems for FOFA is espe- be for attack of follow-on forces: cially important. Flexibility would allow the There are a great many potential pack- battlefield commander to use the best opera- ages—many operational concepts, several tional concept for a particular tactical situa- choices of systems for certain functions, tion—for example, to strike deeper against a and many ways of mixing systems for division, and then to strike closer in against each function. the weakened regiments of the division, rather Packages may evolve over time, as new than always having to strike either deeper or systems are deployed. closer in. Many choices are subject to complex cost- effectiveness trade-offs, particularly for Unfortunately, the use of many system names and acronyms is unavoidable in the dis- systems in development. cussion below and in the appendices; a glossary of system names and acronyms is provided at the end of this volume. ‘U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technol- ogies for NATO Follow-On Forces Attack Concept—Special ‘Multi-mission capability is likely to be the most common case; Report, OTA-ISC-312 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government these “general purpose forces” are acquired for the inherently Printing Office, July 1986). unpredictable needs of tactical warfare.

ILLUSTRATIVE CAPABILITY PACKAGES FOR FOFA Table 12-1 presents capability packages for within about 30 kilometers of the FLOT.3 This FOFA. Each package implements a given oper- package includes a suite of systems for recon- ational concept (listed in the first column), and naissance and surveillance and situation assess- consists of systems to perform the various nec- ment (R&S/SA), two systems for target acqui- essary functions (listed in the remaining col- sition and attack control (TA/AC), two types umns). For example, the first package imple- of platforms (or launchers), and two possible ments artillery attack of regiments that are moving forward from final assembly areas, 3See ch. 6 for a description of this operational concept.

189 190 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Table 12-1.—Summary of Selected Packages for Attack of Follow-on Forces

RECONNAISSANCE, OPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE & TGT ACQ & CONCEPT SITUATION ASSMNT ATTACK CONTROL PLATFORM WEAPON SUPPORT ARTILLERY ATTACK GR/CS +TRS AQUILA MLRS MLRS/TGW REGIMENTAL COLSa + ASARS +J(S)TARSb + AFATDS +8-INCH + SADARM — 5-30 KM +ASAS

STANDOFF AIR ATKC GR/CS +TRS JS(TA)RS d — MSOW PLSS DIVISION COLUMNSa +ASARS + J(S)TARS + WIU F-16 + SKEET/TGSMe +ATACMS 30-80 KM + ENSCE +CEB

MISSILE ATTACK GR/CS +TRS JS(TA)RS ATACMS DIVISION COLUMNS + ASARS +J(S)TARS + AFATDS MLRS +SKEET/TGSM — 30-80 KM +ASAS + DPICM

AIR ATTACK GR/CS +TRS ASARS F-15E GBU-15 PLSS CHOKPT+ HLTD UNITf +ASARS +J(S)TARS +GACC + F-16 + MSOW +ATACMS 80-150 KM + ENSCE + CEB/MINES

CRUISE MISSILE ATK ACTIVITY CUE CALCM-X g RAIL NETWORK — (ON WPN) B-52 +GPS/TERCOM — 350-800 KM + RAIL MINESa NOTES Acronyms used here are defined in the Glossary at the end of this volume. aREGIMENTAL COLUMNS and DIVISION COLUMNS are targets for attack when they are moving on roads after exiting assembly areas bJ(s)TARs denotes the MTI surveillance capability of Joint STARS CSTANDOFF AIR ATK denotes air attaCk from standoff of 25.w km, using a weapon such as the MSOW (Modular Standoff Weapon) now under study In NATO. dJs(TA)Rs denotes the target acquisition and attack Control capability of Joint STARS .ssKEET/TGSfJ denOieS the use of either sensor. fu~ed weapon or terminally-guided Submunitlon technology, or both, fOr anti-armOr nlUnltlOnS fCHOKpT + H LTD UNIT is a target in the concept where a Chokepoint is created by attack (e.g. dropping a bridge) just prior to the arrival of an enemy unit, which, when halted behind the chokepoint, is then itself attacked gCALCM.X denotes a conventionally-armed air.launched cruise missile, possibly ALCM.B retired from SIOP duty and modified to have less range with more payload hRAIL MINE denotes a mine t. damage track and derail moving trains, possibly based on a modified ant! -bunker munltlon and a Mk.75 fUZe SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1987 weapons. No particular support measures are and control (C2) procedures have not been de- required for the first package; other packages, veloped, they will generate new requirements which use tactical aircraft that penetrate enemy for C2 activity and for processing of informa- airspace, require support for that function. tion. The discussion of the packages below as- Each of these illustrative packages is discussed sumes the capability to process and commu- below. nicate data as needed. These capabilities may prove to be very difficult to provide, and could Overall, several features of this table stand be critical to successful FOFA operations. Fail- out. One is the recurrence of the suite of sys- ure to successfully develop the necessary data tems for R&S/SA. A suite of this type is es- processing and communications capabilities sential to many different packages, and has could greatly reduce the capabilities of the broad flexibility for FOFA (as well as for other RSTA/platform/weapons packages. In this missions). Another feature is the recurrence case, failure to spend enough resources (espe- of certain systems in the table. For example, 2 cially budget and personnel) on the C part of Joint STARS appears four times for R&S/SA, the problem would greatly reduce the value of and twice for TA/AC. This is an example of the much larger investments in equipment and system flexibility for FOFA. A third feature munitions. is the number of different platforms and weapons that can contribute to packages for FOFA. Locating Moving Combat Units Command and Control The first three of the packages in table 12-1 To the extent that these packages for FOFA are for attacking moving columns of combat represent new capabilities for which command units. These packages, as well as the fourth, Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 191 depend on a capability to detect, locate, and radar imagery of specific locations. This is an track moving combat units (regiments and di- example of a “cue and confirm” approach to visions) to a depth of at least 150 kilometers RSTA.5 In general, surveillance systems pro- beyond the FLOT, and benefit from an ability vide cues and reconnaissance systems provide to distinguish them from resupply or other sup- confirmation. port traffic in the enemy rear. The capability For example, ELINT and COMINT may to attack preferentially the enemy’s combat provide indications of a division arriving in an elements, and directly reduce their combat assembly area and a rough estimate of its loca- strength, is essential to the effectiveness of tion. When MTI data collected over the previ- FOFA operations with limited resources. ous and subsequent hours are studied, they The same reconnaissance, surveillance, and may show a large number of vehicle “tracks” situation assessment suite can serve all of which lead into the area and disappear because these operational concepts. The suite includes the vehicles slowed or stopped. There may also SIGINT sensors, radar imagery and moving be characteristic helicopter movements near target surveillance, and a processing system the headquarters area. Armed with this data, for fusion and situation assessment.’ the assessment center can task the ASARS to obtain high-resolution imagery of the sus- Both the GUARDRAIL/Common Sensor pected assembly area, which can be used to (GR/CS) system and the Tactical Reconnais- precisely locate vehicle clusters and identify sance System (TRS) have integrated SIGINT characteristic arrangements of vehicles typi- suites, containing both COMINT and ELINT cal of command posts or other high-value sensors. The COMINT sensors can intercept targets. radio traffic used to control unit movements and maintain contact with higher headquar- A fusion capability is vital to this approach ters. The ELINT sensors can locate the air de- for locating follow-on forces. Table 12-1 lists fense radars that protect the moving unit. This two data fusion systems, the ASAS (Army) sensor data is not enough to detect and locate and the ENSCE (Air Force), the twin products a unit, however. SIGINT, although very so- of the current Joint Tactical Fusion Program. phisticated, can be defeated either by spoof- These systems will be very similar, with much ing or by very strict emissions control dis- commonality between them in equipment and cipline. For this reason, imagery and MTI software. They will accept data from the sen- radar data is fused with SIGINT data to pro- sors, and support the situation assessment vide confident detection and accurate location process by providing the capability to fuse or of an enemy unit. combine the information in appropriate ways for operator evaluation. The Joint STARS wide-area surveillance capability (indicated by J(S)TARS in table 12-1) This suite of SIGINT, radar, and fusion sys- would provide moving target indication over tems is expected to provide the capability to a large area. This data can be combined with detect, locate, and track follow-on regiments the SIGINT data to identify potential target and divisions. This capability will extend to areas. In order to confirm the presence of a a depth of 100 to 150 kilometers beyond the unit, the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar FLOT. 6 This flexibility of reconnaissance, sur- System (ASARS) can provide high-resolution veillance, and situation assessment systems is an example of the flexibility of particular systems for FOFA, and their ability to sup- ‘See James L. Jones and Peter W. Lert, Follow-On Force At- port different operational concepts. tack, Volume 11: Reconnm”ssance Surveillance, and Target Ac- quisition (RSTA) Architecture to Support Follow-On Force A t- 51n this example, SIGINT provides initial cues, MTI data pro- tack (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, report vide further cues and tentative confirmation, and SAR imagery R-302, for an analysis of such a suite of systems, which illus- provides final confirmation. trates a possible structure for the suite and analyzes its capa- ‘See app. 12-A (vol. 2), paragraph 3 for discussion of this range bility to locate and track combat units. limitation. 192 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Photo credit U.S. Department of Defense

155-millimeter howitzer.

Artillery Attack of Regiment Columns The R&S/SA suite for locating moving com- (at 5 to 30 km) bat units is basic to this package. The TA/AC capabilities for this package include the Aq- This package uses the high firing rate of ar- uila RPV system and the Advanced Field Ar- tillery to destroy enemy regiments on their fi- tillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). The nal road march toward the battle area. As de- Aquila RPV can loiter in the target area and scribed in the OTA Special Report, the Army provide precision imagery for targeting’ to the approach for deep attack of “decide, detect, corps artillery Fire Support Element, which and deliver” would be used. In this approach, controls artillery operations through the resources are allocated to the mission and the AFATDS. Both rocket (MLRS) and tube (8- areas or road segments in which the attack will inch) artillery have smart anti-armor rounds be focused (engagement zones) are designated in development:8 the TGW (Terminally Guided ahead of time (decided) by analyzing terrain Warhead) for MLRS, and SADARM (Search and possible enemy actions. Surveillance is and Destroy Armor Munition) for the 8-inch maintained to detect the regiment move out gun. This package has no special support re- of its final assembly area and the movement of battalion columns toward and into the engagement zones at which time the artillery de- 7Aquila imagery can also be used for damage assessment. livers its planned ordnance. ‘See ch. 11 for discussion. Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 193

●

Photo credit U S Department of Defense

Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

quirements, because it does not involve pene- The situation assessment capability to track trating enemy airspace.9 follow-on divisions, as described above, is essential. With it, NATO forces can attack just Standoff Air Attack of Division Columns the combat divisions and not the total vehicle (at 30 to 80 km) traffic in the Warsaw Pact rear. The output of the situation assessment process is provided This package uses TACAIR with stand-off to the air command and control element, which weapons to destroy enemy divisions on the assigns aircraft to attack the division when it road when they leave their assembly areas. The makes its move forward. Joint STARS pro- F-16 platform attacks with a Modular Stand- vides target location data by tracking columns Off Weapon (MSOW) that flies a distance of of vehicles out of the assembly area and down 25 to 50 kilometers and then dispenses smart their routes. The attack F-16s penetrate in a submunitions against targeted columns of ve- less well-defended area near the target area, hicles within the division that is moving. and fly to a launch point within range of the target area. Meanwhile, because the targets move while the aircraft are flying, target loca- Whe general requirements for C’ and logistics support are understood, without being specifically called out, for this and tion updates are provided to the aircraft in all other operational concepts and packages. flight just prior to weapons release. Joint 194 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

STARS transmits this data to Weapons Inter- data to the MLRS units that fire ATACMS face Units (WIUs) on the attack aircraft via missiles. Joint STARS and ASARS may also signals encoded in the radar beam, providing be capable of targeting elements of air defense highly jam-resistant data links to the F-16s units (ADUs). over enemy territory. The target updates are fed into the weapons by the aircraft fire control systems, and the MSOWs are launched Missile Attack of Division Columns from the F-16s. (at 30 to 80 km) In order for this package to be effective, the 10 This package uses ground-launched missiles penetrating aircraft need support. This Sup- to attack the same targets with the same ob- pression of Enemy Air Defenses (SE AD) could 11 jective as that of the previous package. The be provided by PLSS and ATACMS. PLSS weapon system is the Army Tactical Missile would target air defense radars and provide System (ATACMS), which is launched from ‘“Penetration support such as escort fighters and electronic standard MLRS launchers. This package em- warfare aircraft are also needed. bodies an operational capability generally sim- “This was the subject of Initiative 15 in the “Memorandum ilar to the Assault Breaker technology dem- of Agreement on U.S. Army -U.S. Air Force Joint Force Devel- opment Process” between the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and onstration program of DARPA, and is its Air Force signed May 22, 1984. closest descendant. —

Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 195 ——

The operational concept again follows the against trucks and light armor (Dual Purpose U.S. Army “decide, detect, deliver” approach Improved Cluster Munitions--DPICM), or for deep attack. The situation assessment ca- both, also depending on detailed munitions ef- pability detects, locates, and tracks follow-on fectiveness. As with the artillery package, no divisions, and the corps Fire Support Element special support is needed by this package. (which controls the attack) allocates launchers to this mission and determines engagement Air Attack of Chokepoints and Halted zones in which to engage columns of vehicles. Units (at 80 to 150 km) Joint STARS supports attack planning and control by tracking vehicle columns departing This package attacks follow-on divisions as the assembly area, forecasting times and loca- they move on roads toward their concentrations at which they can be engaged, and pro- tion areas (division assembly areas). The at- viding missile-launching batteries with last- tack is conducted in two phases. First, a minute confirmation that targeted columns are chokepoint is created along a division’s route entering planned engagement zones. Joint by dropping a bridge just before the division STARS data is passed to the MLRS launchers column arrives. Second, after a period of time via AFATDS, allowing updates of engagement sufficient to let enough of the division arrive time and place just prior to launch. When the at the chokepoint and halt there, the result- missile arrives at the target, it dispenses ei- ing bunches of stationary vehicles are attacked ther smart anti-armor submunitions (Skeet or by tactical aircraft using short stand-off TGSM), or cluster munitions with capability weapons. 196 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

Photo credit’ A.4cDonne// Douglas Corp F-15E carrying a laser-guided bomb.

The situation assessment capability to de- The F-16s launch their weapons, which fly tect, locate, and track follow-on divisions is to designated target points and dispense a mix again necessary to identify target divisions and of APAM munitions and mines to both dam- likely attack times and places. Once these tar- age and disrupt the halted division. 13 Because gets are chosen by the air command and con- the targets are relatively dense vehicle clusters, trol elements, the two phases of the attack are and the personnel may not be in protective ve- planned and coordinated. One or two F-15Es hicles, APAM munitions are likely to cause attack the target bridge by delivering one or more damage to the division’s fighting power two GBU-15 Glide Bomb Units, which can be than anti-armor munitions would; mines will guided with sufficient accuracy to drop the then make more remote the possibility of re- bridge.” After the bridge is dropped, the area covering from the attack. behind it is kept under surveillance by ASARS to observe the arrival and buildup of elements Cruise Missile Attack of the Deep Rail of the division. This information is passed to Network (at 350 to 800 km) the Ground Attack Control Center (GACC), which controls the subsequent attack. When This package provides a capability to attack the GACC determines that targets are (or will the rail network across eastern Europe, in or- be) there, F-16s in a strike package are given der to delay the movement of Soviet divisions the target locations and scrambled or assem- through this area. It does not use the same type bled to make the attack. This package pene- of situation assessment capability as the other trates with its escort and other support, and packages. The platform is a long-range bomb- flies to a point some distance from the halted er, the B-52, based in the CONUS. Over NATO division in order to launch MSOWs. This avoids territory, these aircraft launch long-range facing the division’s air defenses, which are cruise missiles which conduct the actual at- likely to be expecting attack (because the bridge tack. A B-52 can carry about 20 such weapons. attack can be interpreted as tactical warning).

“The target division has not arrived yet; the air defenses at ‘Whe targets are not moving; no target location update, then, the bridge, then, are not likely to be heavy. is necessary. Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 197

Once launched, these missiles navigate au- . tonomously (using GPS or some other system) to the vicinity of the chosen rail line. Upon en- countering the rail at the designated location, the weapon dispenses mines which embed themselves in the rail bed. These mines acti- vate after a preprogrammed delay, and then attack a passing train. This attack will blow a hole in the rail bed and derail the train. Clear- ing the area and repairing the track will take 18 to 24 hours. Because the bombers do not penetrate enemy airspace, no special support is needed for this package.

Photo credit U.S. Department of Defense

B-52 bomber launching a cruise missile.

FLEXIBILITY OF SYSTEMS FOR FOFA OPERATIONS The set of capability packages summarized ber of capability packages. Further, it indicates in table 12-1 is just a small portion of the total how fallback capabilities may exist in particu- set of packages for FOFA listed in appendix lar areas (e.g., targeting moving columns) if 12-A. This longer list is itself not exhaustive; specific systems cannot fulfill the needs of a it gives only one package for each operational given operational approach. For systems cur- concept listed. rently in development, these ratings presume that the system is procured and deployed with Appendix 12-B contains a table of the con- the capabilities presently specified. tributions of systems across the full range of operational concepts outlined in appendix 12- The suite of sensor and fusion systems for A. These systems are grouped into the same reconnaissance, surveillance, and situation four functional areas14 used in presenting the assessment for attack of moving combat units capability packages: offers full capability to implement all concepts for attacks within about 150 kilometers of the 1. reconnaissance, surveillance, and situa- FLOT. This suite–which includes GR/CS, tion assessment; TRS, ASARS, Joint STARS, and the JTF sys- 2. target acquisition and attack control; tems–gives the operational commander great 3. platform; and flexibility to use any concept that fits the tac- 4. weapon. tical situation and can be implemented with Each system is considered for each opera- available platforms and weapons. Attacks tional concept, and its capability rated as deeper than this will need other assets for sit- “full, “ “limited,” or none for the given func- uation assessment, and on-board systems for tion. This illustrates the flexibility of systems target acquisition. for FOFA operations, by showing the ways in RPV and UAV systems can provide full or which a given system can contribute to a num- limited support to situation assessment for all of the attack concepts out to about 150 kilom- 14 The “support” category is not considered here. eters beyond the FLOT. These systems also 198 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack provide great flexibility, although capability The MLRS platform also provides substan- is limited by the lack of wide area coverage. tial flexibility to about 150 kilometers, considering its capability to launch either the cur- Joint STARS and ASARS provide full or rent artillery rocket or ATACMS rockets. limited capability for target acquisition for all attack concepts within about 150 kilometers An air-launched stand-off weapon such as of the FLOT. These systems are also comple- the MSOW and a ground-launched weapon mentary, each providing a fallback capability such as ATACMS together provide excellent for the other. A mixed deployment of both sys- flexibility as well as a capability to execute tems would provide a commander with great nearly any attack concept within about 150 flexibility in conducting attacks with available kilometers of the FLOT. weapons, and being able to target these weapons effectively. With WIUs, attacking aircraft A mix of smart anti-armor munitions (e.g., or missiles could receive target data updates TGSM or Skeet) and APAM munitions also directly from Joint STARS, or indirectly from provides flexibility in attacking effectively the the systems, via the Weapon Data Link of full spectrum of targets in this range. Mines Joint STARS. This would provide limited or can provide a flexible supplement to other mu- full capability for target data communications nitions. They can contribute limited capabil- for nearly all attack concepts using Joint ity across nearly the full range of operational STARS target acquisition and would provide concepts, but provide full capability in only substantial flexibility for the attack control one concept. function. Weapons such as the MLRS/TGW, GBU-15, Tactical aircraft such as the F-16, F-15E, F- and AGM-130B can provide important capa- 111, and Tornado provide great flexibility for bilities, but only in one or a few concepts each. attack concepts within their mission ranges, These weapons do not individually provide which extend to about 150 kilometers beyond flexibility to the commander, although they the FLOT for the F-16 and up to 350 kilome- may contribute to his flexibility in combina- ters for the other aircraft. tion with other weapons. Appendix 12-A Summary of Packages for Attacks of Follow-On Forces

The table below provides a summary of capability packages for attack of follow-on forces. Oper- ational concepts are listed in the first column, and the remaining columns list systems that could perform the various key functions: reconnaissance, surveillance, and situation assessment; target acquisition and attack control; weapons platform; weapon; and necessary support (primarily for penetration of hostile airspace). These operational concepts have all been identified by OTA as being under consideration by the U.S. or Allied military and appear to be technically feasible, but they do not necessarily represent an exhaustive set of operational concepts for FOFA. Similarly, the packages (and systems chosen for the packages) are meant to be illustrative, and do not represent a complete list of systems or packages for FOFA. Many systems names and acronyms are necessary for this table; they are defined in the Glos- sary at the end of this volume. Specific notes are given at the end of the table.

RECONNAISSANCE , TGT ACQ & OPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE & ATTACK CONCEPT SITUATION ASSMNT CONTROL PLATFORM WEAPON SUPPORT

DIRECT AIR ATTACK GR/CS+TRS LANTIRN PLSS REGIMENTAL COLSa +ASARS+J( S ) TARSb +GACC F-16 SFW +MLRS 5-30 KM +ENSCE +F- 4G

STANDOFF AIR ATKC JS(TA)RSd MSOW REGIMENTAL COLS SAME +GACC F-16 +SKEET/TGSM e --- 5-30 KM

MISSILE ATTACK GR/CS+TRS JS (TA) RS ATACMS REGIMENTAL COLS +ASARS+J(S)TARS +AFATDS MLRS +SKEET/TGSM --- 5-30 KM +ASAS

ARTILLERY ATTACK AQUILA MLRS MLRS/TGW REGIMENTAL COLS SAME +AFATDS +8 - INCH +SADARM --- 5-30 KM

199 200 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

RECONNAISSANCE, TGT ACQ & OPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE & ATTACK CONCEPT SITUATION ASSMNT CONTROL PLATFORM WEAPON SUPPORT

DIRECT AIR ATTACK GR/CS+TRS LANTIRN PLSS DIVISION COLUMNSa +ASARS+J(S)TARS +GACC F-16 SFW +ATACMS 30-80 KM +ENSCE +F-4G/F-15

STANDOFF AIR ATK JS(TA)RS MSOW PLSS DIVISION COLUMNS SAME +WIU F-16 +SKEET/TGSM +ATACMS 30-80 KM +CEB

MISSILE ATTACK GR/CS+TRS JS(TA)RS ATACMS DIVISION COLUMNS +ASARS+J(S)TARS +AFATDS MLRS +SKEET/TGSM --- 30-80 KM +ASAS +DPICM

DIRECT AIR ATTACK GR/CS+TRS ASARS TMD PLSS REGT ASSY AREAS +ASARS+J(S)TARS +WIU F-16 +CEB +ATACMS 30-80 KM +ENSCE +F-4G/F-15

STANDOFF AIR ATK IEW UAV MSOW PLSS REGT ASSY AREAS SAME +FTI/E-Of F-16 +CEB +ATACMS 30-80 KM +GACC

MISSILE ATTACK GR/CS+TRS IEW UAV ATACMS REGT ASSY AREAS +ASARS+J(S)TARS +FTI/E-O MLRS +DPICM --- 30-80 KM +ASAS +AFATDS

DIRECT AIR ATK GR/CS+TRS PLSS MOVING COLUMNS +ASARS+J(S)TARS LANTIRN F-16 SFW +ATACMS 80-150 KM +ENSCE +F-4G/F-15

STANDOFF AIR ATK JS(TA)RS MSOW PLSS MOVING COLUMNS SAME +WIU F-16 +CEB +ATACMS 80-150 KM

MISSILE ATTACK GR/CS+TRS JS(TA)RS ATACMS MOVING COLUMNS +ASARS+J(S)TARS +WIU MLRS +DPICM --- 80-150 KM +ASAS

AIR ATTACK GR/CS+TRS MSOW PLSS DIV ASSY AREAS +ASARS+J(S)TARS ASARS F-16 +CEB +ATACMS 80-150 KM +ENSCE

MISSILE ATTACK GR/CS+TRS IEW UAV ATACMS DIV ASSY AREAS +ASARS+J(S)TARS +FTI/E-O MLRS +DPICM --- 80-150 KM +ASAS Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Fe/low-On Forces ● 201

RECONNAISSANCE, TGT ACQ & OPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE & ATTACK CONCEPT SITUATION ASSMNT CONTROL PLATFORM WEAPON SUPPORT

AIR ATTACK GR/CS+TRS ASARS F-15E GBU-15 PLSS CHOKPT+HLTD UNITg +ASARS+J(S)TARS +GACC +F-16 +MSOW +ATACMS 80-150 KM +ENSCE +CEB/MINES

JOINT ATTACK GR/CS+TRS IEW UAV F-15E GBU-15 CHOKPT+HLTD UNIT +ASARS+J(S)TARS +FTI/E-O +MLRS +ATACMS --- 80-150 KM +ASAS +AFATDS +DPICM

AIR ATTACK GR/CS+TRS MSOW PLSS COMMAND POSTS +ASARS+J(S)TARS ASARS F-16 +APAM/CBU +ATACMS 80-150 KM +ENSCE

MISSILE ATTACK GR/CS+TRS IEW UAV ATACMS COMMAND POSTS +ASARS+J(S)TARS +FTI/E-O MLRS +M-74 --- 80-150 KM +ASAS

AIR ATTACK ACTIVITY CUE F-15E AGM-130B PLSS UNITS ON ROADS LANTIRN F-ill +CEB +F-15 150-350 KM TORNADO

CRUISE MISSILE ATK CALCM-Xh UNITS ON ROADS --(ON WPN) B-52 +AUTO TGT --- 150-350 KM +CEB

CRUISE MISSILE ATK ACTIVITY CUE CALCM-X RAIL NETWORK --(ON WPN) B-52 +GPS/TERCOM --- 350-800 KM +RAIL MINESi

CRUISE MISSILE ATK PEACETIME INTEL CALCM-X RIVER BRIDGES (COORDINATES) --(ON WPN) B-52 +GPS/LADAR --- 350-800 KM +WDU-25B

CRUISE MISSILE ATK ACTIVITY CUE CALCM-X UNITS ON RAILS --(ON WPN) B-52 +AUTO TGT --- 350-800 KM +CEB

71-.?85 () - 87 - g 202 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Notes : a) REGIMENTAL COLUMNS and DIVISION COLUMNS are targets for attack when they are moving on roads after exiting assembly areas. b) J(S)TARS denotes the MTI surveillance capability of Joint STARS. c) STANDOFF AIR ATK denotes air attack from standoff of 25-50 km, using a weapon such as the MSOW (Modular Standoff Weapon) now under study in NATO. This weapon would employ a dispenser and either anti-armor or APAM submunitions. d) JS(TA)RS denotes the target acquisition and attack control capabilities of Joint STARS. e) SKEET/TGSM denotes the use of either sensor-fuzed weapon or terminally- guided submunition technology, or both, for anti-armor munitions. f) FTI/E-O for the IEW UAV denotes a target acquisition package on the IEW UAV using either radar or electro-optical sensors, or both. g) CHOKPT+HLTD UNIT is a target in the concept where a chokepoint is created by attack (e.g. dropping a bridge) just prior to the arrival of an enemy unit, which, when halted behind the chokepoint, is then itself attacked. h) CALCM-X denotes a conventionally-armed air launched cruise missile, possibly ALCM-B retired from SIOP duty and modified to have less range with more payload. For attack of units on trains, this weapon would have automatic target recognition (AUTO TGT) ; for bridge attack a laser radar (LADAR) and the BULLPUP warhead (WDU-25B) would be used. i) RAIL MINE denotes a mine to damage track and derail moving trains, possibly based on a modified anti-bunker munition and a Mk-75 fuze.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1987. Appendix 12-B Flexibility and Application of Systems for Attacks of Follow-On Forces

The following table indicates the application of systems to the functions of FOFA operations outlined in chapters 6 and 12. The range of applicability illustrates the flexibility of these systems, in being able to support several different operational concepts for attacks of follow-on forces. Many system names and acronyms are necessary for this table—they are defined in the Glos- sary at the end of this volume.

LEGEND :

FULL Full operational capability (expected) for specified function .

Limited Limited or partial operational capability (expected) for specified function .

. . No operational capability ( expected) , or not applicable , for specified function.

SOURCE : Office of Technology Assessment, 1987, [based on information supplied by sources cited in the full document].

203 204 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

5-30 KM ATTACKS OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS 1 DIRECT AIR ATTACKS OF REGIMENT COLUMNS* 2 STANDOFF AIR ATTACKS OF REGIMENT COLUMNS* 3 MISSILE ATTACKS OF REGIMENT COLUMNS* 4 ARTILLERY ATTACK OF REGIMENT COLUMNS*

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS RS/SA SYSTEM ~ ~ ‘1 4 GR/CS FULL FULL FULL FULL TRS FULL FULL FULL FULL ASARS FULL FULL FULL FULL J(S)TARS FULL FULL FULL FULL ENSCE FULL FULL -- -- ASAS -- -- FULL FULL AQUILA -Limited Limited Limited Limited IEW UAV/FTI-EO Limited Limited Limited Limited ACTIVITY CUE ------PEACETIME INTEL ------

TA/AC SYSTEM LANTIRN FULL ------JS(TA)RS Limited FULL FULL Limited AQUILA Limited Limited FULL FULL IEW UAV/FTI-EO .------ASARS Limited Limited Limited Limited WIU Limited FULL FULL -- GACC FULL FULL -- -- AFATDS -- -- FULL FULL

PLATFORM MLRS -- -- FULL FULL 8-INCH ------FULL F-16 FULL FULL -- -- F-15E FULL FULL -- -- F-111 FULL FULL -- -- TORNADO FULL Limited -. -- B-52 ------

WEAPON SFW FULL ------MSOW Limited FULL -- -- ATACMS -- -- FULL -- MLRS/TGW ------FULL GBU-15 Limited ------AGM-130B -- Limited .- -- CALCM-X ------TGSM/SKEET/SADARM FULL FULL FULL FULL CEB/DPICM -- Limited Limited Limited MINES -- Limited Limited Limited *Regiment is attacked when it is moving forward after exiting final assembly area. Individual targets are battalion-sized columns within the regiment. Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces 205

30-80 KM ATTACKS OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS 5 DIRECT AIR ATTACKS OF DIVISION COLUMNS* 6 STANDOFF AIR ATTACKS OF DIVISION COLUMNS* 7 MISSILE ATTACKS OF DIVISION COLUMNS* 8 DIRECT AIR ATTACKS OF REGIMENT ASSEMBLY AREAS 9 STANDOFF AIR ATTACKS OF REGIMENT ASSEMBLY AREAS 10 MISSILE ATTACKS OF REGIMENT ASSEMBLY AREAS *Division is attacked when it is moving forward after exiting assembly area, Individual targets are battalion-sized columns within the division. OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS RS/SA SYSTEM 5 6 7 8 9 10 GR/CS FULL FULL FULL FULL FULL FULL TRS FULL FULL FULL FULL FULL FULL ASARS FULL FULL FULL FULL FULL FULL J(S)TARS FULL FULL FULL FULL FULL FULL ENSCE FULL FULL -- FULL FULL -. ASAS -- -- FULL -- FULL AQUILA .------IEW UAV/FTI-EO Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited ACTIVITY CUE ------PEACETIME INTEL ------TA\AC SYSTEM LANTIRN FULL -- -- FULL JS(TA)RS Limited FULL FULL Limited Limited Limited AQUILA ------. IEW UAV/FTI-EO ------Limited FULL FULL ASARS Limited Limited Limited FULL FULL FULL WIU Limited FULL FULL FULL FULL FULL GACC FULL Limited -- FULL FULL -- AFATDS -- -- FULL -- -- FULL PLATFORM MLRS -- -- FULL -- -- FULL 8-INCH ------F-16 FULL FULL -- FULL FULL F-15E FULL FULL -- FULL FULL F-111 FULL FULL -- FULL FULL -- TORNADO FULL Limited -- FULL Limited B-52 ------WEAPON SFW FULL -- -- FULL -- MSOW Limited FULL -- Limited FULL ATACMS -- -- FULL -- -- FULL MLRS/TGW ------GBU-15 Limited -- -- Limited -- AGM-130B -- Limited -- -- Limited -- CALCM-X ------TGSM/SKEET/SADARM FULL FULL FULL ------CEB/DPICM Limited FULL FULL Limited FULL FULL MINES Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 206 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

80-150 KM ATTACKS OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS 11 DIRECT AIR ATTACKS OF DIVISION COLUMNS* 12 STANDOFF AIR ATTACKS OF DIVISION COLUMNS* 13 MISSILE ATTACKS OF DIVISION COLUMNS* 14 AIR ATTACKS OF DIVISION ASSEMBLY AREAS 15 MISSILE ATTACKS OF DIVISION ASSEMBLY AREAS *Division is attacked when it is moving towards its assembly area. Individual targets are battalion-sized columns within the division. OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS RS/SA SYSTEM 11 12 13 14 15 GR/CS FULL FULL FULL FULL FULL TRS FULL FULL FULL FULL FULL ASARS FULL FULL FULL FULL FULL J(S)TARS FULL FULL FULL FULL FULL ENSCE FULL FULL -- FULL -- ASAS -- -- FULL -- FULL AQUILA ------IEW UAV/FTI-EO Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited ACTIVITY CUE ------PEACETIME INTEL ------

TA/AC SYSTEM LANTIRN FULL ------JS(TA)RS Limited FULL FULL Limited Limited AQUILA ------IEW UAV/FTI-EO -- Limited Limited FULL FULL ASARS Limited Limited Limited FULL FULL WIU Limited FULL FULL FULL FULL GACC FULL Limited -- FULL -- AFATDS -- -- FULL -- FULL

PLATFORM MLRS -- -- FULL -- FULL 8-INCH ------F-16 FULL FULL -- FULL -- F-15E FULL FULL -- FULL -- F-Ill FULL FULL -- FULL -- TORNADO FULL Limited -- Limited -- B-52 ------

WEAPON SFW FULL -- -- .- -- MSOW Limited FULL -- FULL -- ATACMS -- -- FULL -- FULL MLRS/TGW ------GBU-15 Limited ------AGM-130B -- Limited -- Limited -- CALCM-X -- -. -- -- .- TGSM/SKEET/SADARM Limited Limited Limited -- -- CEB/DPICM Limited FULL FULL FULL FULL MINES Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 207

80-150 KM ATTACKS OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS (CONTINUED ) 16 AIR ATTACK OF CHOKEPOINTS AND HALTED UNITS* 17 JOINT ATTACK OF CHOKEPOINTS AND HALTED UNITS* 18 AIR ATTACK OF COMMAND POSTS 19 MISSILE ATTACK OF COMMAND POSTS *A chokepoint is created by attack (e.g. dropping a bridge) just prior to the arrival of an enemy unit. Resulting bunches of halted vehicles are attacked.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS RS/SA SYSTEM 16 17 18 19 GR/CS FULL FULL FULL FULL TRS FULL FULL FULL FULL ASARS FULL FULL FULL FULL J(S)TARS FULL FULL FULL FULL ENSCE FULL -- FULL -- ASAS -- FULL -- FULL AQUILA ------IEW UAV/FTI-EO Limited Limited Limited Limited ACTIVITY CUE Limited Limited -- -- PEACETIME INTEL ------

TA/AC SYSTEM LANTIRN ------JS(TA)RS Full Limited Limited Limited AQUILA ------IEW UAV/FTI-EO FULL FULL FULL FULL ASARS FULL FULL FULL FULL WIU FULL FULL FULL FULL GACC Limited -- FULL -- AFATDS -- FULL -- FULL

PLATFORM MLRS -- FULL -- FULL 8-INCH ------F-16 FULL -- FULL -- F-15E FULL FULL FULL -- F-ill FULL FULL FULL -- TORNADO Limited Limited Limited -- B-52 ------

WEAPON SFW FULL -- FULL -- MSOW FULL -- FULL -- ATACMS -- FULL -- FULL MLRS/TGW ------GBU-15 FULL FULL -Limited -- AGM-130B Limited -- Limited -- CALCM-X ------TGSM/SKEET/SADARM -Limited Limited -- -- CEB/DPICM FULL FULL FULL FULL MINES Limited Limited Limited Limited 208 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

150-350 KM ATTACKS OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS 20 AIR ATTACKS OF UNITS ON ROADS 21 CRUISE MISSILE ATTACKS OF UNITS ON ROADS 350-800 KM ATTACKS OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS 22 CRUISE MISSILE ATTACKS OF RAIL NETWORK 23 CRUISE MISSILE ATTACKS OF RIVER BRIDGES 24 CRUISE MISSILE ATTACKS OF UNITS ON RAILS

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS RS/SA SYSTEM 20 21 22 23 — 24 GR/CS ------TRS ------ASARS -- -. ------J(S)TARS ------ENSCE -- -- -. -- -- ASAS ------AQUILA ------IEW UAV/FTI-EO ------ACTIVITY CUE FULL FULL -- -- FULL PEACETIME INTEL -- -. FULL FULL --

TA/AC SYSTEM LANTIRN FULL -- -- JS(TA)RS ------AQUILA ------IEW UAV/FTI-EO ------ASARS ------WIU ------GACC ------AFATDS ------

PLATFORM MLRS ------8-INCH ------F-16 ------F-15E FULL ------F-ill FULL ------TORNADO FULL ------B-52 Limited FULL FULL FULL FULL

WEAPON SFW ------. MSOW -- -- -.. -- -- ATACMS ------. MLRS/TGW ------GBU-15 ------AGM-130B FULL ------CALCM-X -- FULL FULL FULL FULL TGSM/SKEET/SADARM ------CEB/DPICM FULL FULL -- -- FULL MINES Limited -- FULL -- -- Chapter 13 Summary of Recent Studies of Follow-On Forces Attack CONTENTS

Page Institute for Defense Analyses FOFA Study ...... 212 NATO Defence Research Group Panel Report ...... 214 SHAPE Study ...... 214 SHAPE Technical Centre Study...... 214

European Security Study ...... 215 U.S. Army Studies ...... *, *****-...... ***+*****.. ● +* **** ...... 215 Rand Corp. Studies...... + ...... 216 Earlier Studies ...... 4...... O...... W ...... 217

Table Table No. Page 13-1. Studies Reviewed by IDA in 1983 . . + ...... 218 Chapter 13 Summary of Recent Studies of Follow-On Forces Attack

Several recent studies have considered the get Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), broad technical, operational, and cost issues which is being developed to provide wide involved in attack of follow-on forces. These area surveillance and attack control capa- studies, summarized below, have provided es- bilities against moving vehicles. Remotely sential background to this OTA assessment.1 piloted vehicle (RPV)-based sensors are Some studies have attempted to analyze the also mentioned in several studies as ca- effects of military improvements on a possi- pable of providing important capabilities. ble conventional conflict in Europe; these have ● With improved sensors and munitions, been of particular interest to OTA. one approach to FOFA, preferred by nearly all the studies, is to attack enemy Several conclusions about FOFA are com- combat units after they have left assem- mon to most or all of these previous studies: bly areas and are moving byroad toward Current NATO conventional defense ca- the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT).2 pabilities are not adequate. Another related approach is to block Improving capabilities for FOFA would chokepoints such as river bridges just be- make an important and substantial con- fore moving units would use them, and tribution to NATO conventional defense then attack the halted units. A third ap- and to deterrence. proach advocated by some studies is to Improved FOFA should be based on at- create a barrier in the enemy rear by drop- tack capabilities by both aircraft and ping the bridges across a major river line ground-launched missiles. No study has such as the Elbe-Vltava or the Oder- argued for a “pure” ground- or air-based Neisse. Other approaches seen as less at- capability. tractive include: attack of roads to delay Improvements in FOFA capabilities movement, attack of enemy command should be deployed throughout the Cen- posts to disrupt operations, and attack of tral Region. Improvements in the U.S. sec- logistics. tor, if not reflected in related improve- ● Nearly all of the studies conclude that at- ments for the other corps defending the tacks of follow-on forces less than 100 to Central Region, would not provide suffi- 150 kilometers from the FLOT should be cient enhancement to NATO’s capa- emphasized. This includes attacks of bilities. follow-on regiments and divisions moving Critical technologies for improved FOFA forward from assembly areas. Attacks are anti-armor munitions and stand-off within this range will have the most im- target acquisition sensors. Of particular mediate effect on the ability of NATO’s importance in the munitions area are sen- front line forces to maintain a successful sor technology to guide munitions against defense. individual vehicles, and improved lethal- ● Before enemy combat units can be at- ity against armored vehicles. A stand-off tacked, they must be located by a situa- sensor which several studies consider es- tion assessment process that uses sensor sential is the U.S. Joint Surveillance Tar- data of many different types. This proc-

‘Division assembly areas are expected to be located at depths ‘Earlier studies were reviewed by the Institute for Defense of 70 to 150 kilometers, and regiment assembly areas at 30 to Analyses in a 1983 review summarized at the end of this chapter. 70 kilometers.

211 212 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack . ——. - —.

ess operates on a time scale of several ments would fall within this range, and hours. The enemy units must be kept un- would be supported. der surveillance until subsequent attacks ● Another study supports for very deep at- can be made. To attack moving combat tack, using conventionally armed cruise units, the attacking forces need target missiles launched from B-52s over NATO location and prediction information within airspace. This approach would attempt to minutes before the attack. Command and slow the Soviet reinforcement of Warsaw control centers must be capable of per- Pact forces. The resulting capability forming both these situation assessment would be useful only if there was not a long and attack control functions. mobilization prior to war, and thus is seen as serving as a deterrent to a short- Some divergent views emerge in these mobilization attack. studies: The individual studies reviewed by OTA are ● One study argues against deep attack, summarized below. which is interpreted to mean beyond artillery range. Attack of follow-on regi-

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES FOFA STUDY The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) More specifically, IDA finds that the pri- recently completed an extensive study of mary technology requirement for FOFA is sen- FOFA for the Office of the Secretary of De- sor systems capable of providing information fense.3 The purpose of the project was ‘to pro- for situation assessment, target acquisition, vide an integrated conceptual structure for and attack control.6 Also, advances in anti- assessing NATO’s defense requirements and armor munition and terminal guidance tech- the detailed technical/cost information neces- nologies are considered essential. A new sary for organizing and managing Department ground-launched missile system (e.g., the of Defense (DoD)-wide efforts to create an ef- Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS) fective follow-on force attack capability.”4 The for FOFA should have a range of 150 to 200 analysis considered weapon effects as well as kilometers, even if used to only 50 kilometers unit-level operations (e.g., a tactical fighter or so of depth, in order to provide sufficient wing attacking an enemy division), and used stand-off from the FLOT and to provide cross- a full theater-level simulation (IDA’s TAC- corps support. In the C3 area, IDA finds that WAR model). “the situation assessment and attack control functions must be separated and the time for IDA finds that “The FOFA concept is tech- 2 7 C processes reduced” relative to current nically feasible and potentially operational 5 practice. within the 1990s,” with a mix of sensor and weapons systems allowing considerable flexi- IDA estimates a “basic system cost” at bility of employment. The cost, though high, about $20 billion. This 15-year life cycle cost is seen as much less than the cost of armored does not include weapons, which adds another divisions providing equivalent capability to $10 billion to $30 billion. The effectiveness of halt a Warsaw Pact attack. these systems, in various combinations and employment concepts, is assessed in terms of 31nstitute for Defense Analyses, Follow-On Force Attack the average Warsaw Pact advance in 30 days (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, report R-302, of combat (as calculated in the TACWAR April 1986). This report is in five volumes and is referred to hereinafter as the IDA FOFA Study. Wee app. 13-A (vol. 2), paragraph 3. ‘IDA FOFA Study, op. cit., vol. 1, p. iii. ‘IDA FOFA Study, op. cit., vol. 1, p. ES-15. See app. 13-A 51DA FOFA Study, op. cit., vol. 1, p. ES-10. (vol. 2), paragraph 4. Ch. 13—Summary of Recent Studies of Follow-On Forces Attack 213 —- model). Without FOFA this advance is typi- can be halted with about 4,000 missiles used cally 300 kilometers; with 30 billion to 50 billion shallow or about 10,000 missiles used deep.9 dollars’ worth of FOFA systems the advance “Some mix of each kind of attack should be could be reduced to less than 50 kilometers. s planned so that commanders can make best IDA considers a broad range of options for use of the situation assessment they are presented with and their own concept of opera- attacking armor. The attack strategies deemed tion.”0 the best are to engage combat units (regiments and divisions) when they are moving forward Other weapons systems are also considered from assembly areas. For regiments these in this study. Penetrating tactical aircraft de- moves are generally within about 30 kilome- livery of precision guided munitions is evalu- ters of the FLOT; for divisions, between 30 and ated as an effective tactic, especially after a 90 kilometers of the FLOT. These units are de- few days of ATACMS attacks on moving com- tected and tracked by a situation assessment bat units, and especially with ATACMS also process using sensor data from many sources. used to suppress enemy air defenses. Accord- Also, a capability to distinguish truck columns ing to IDA, using about 1,800 ATACMS mis- from armored columns within unit formations siles against enemy SAMs over 30 days of can reduce the weapons requirement by one conflict can reduce aircraft attrition per sor- half, and would thus be highly desirable. At- tie from about 13 percent to about 4 percent tacking units in assembly areas is not deemed (for attacks out to about 100 kilometers be- effective for the cost involved. yond the FLOT) and from 2 to 1 percent for close air support. Upgraded artillery is also Other types of targets are also considered. Dropping the bridges across the Elbe and considered for FOFA, but has the disadvantage that large numbers of rounds must be pro- maintaining this barrier for 10 days or more has a good payoff, but substantial numbers cured and deployed across the whole front in order to have them available in sufficient quan- of air sorties are needed and precision delivery tity where and when needed. However, greatly is required. Attacking command posts (CPs) expanded purchase of Multiple Launch Rocket is unattractive, because no means of effectively System (MLRS) Terminally Guided Warhead targeting CPs is available and the delays (TGW) (50,000 to 100,000 rounds in NATO) produced, even if CPs were destroyed, do not and the use of large numbers of guided gun and noticeably affect the results of the theater 11 mortar rounds (200,000 to 400,000 rounds) simulation. can be highly effective against the enemy at- Emphasis is given to a ground-launched mis- tack. In fact, upgrading the artillery with these sile (ATACMS). Attacking at short range anti-armor munitions appears to be among the against regiments is compared to attacking least costly options considered, and can also deep against divisions. The shallow attack ap- improve the close-in combat capability of proach is more effective at slowing the enemy NATO forces. advance, but the deeper attack approach runs less risk of saturating the firing rate or target handling capacities. A Warsaw Pact advance Whese numbers of weapons relate to usage across the entire Central Region. ‘IDA does not argue that attrition and FLOT movement are ‘“IDA FOFA Study, op. cit., vol. 1, p. ES-22. accurately reflected in an absolute sense in their model; rather, “Such rounds include the Sense and Destro~’ Armor (SA- the model results should be used only to compare system alter- DARM) artillery round for 155mm and 8 inch howitzers, and natives within the assumed constraints. the Guided Antiarmor Mortar Projectile (G AMP). 214 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

NATO DEFENCE RESEARCH GROUP PANEL REPORT A panel of the NATO Defence Research by IDA and by analysis agencies in the United Group produced a report in mid-1985 concern- Kingdom and NATO. The report of this panel ing the value and costs of various approaches is summarized in appendix 13-A (vol. 2), para- to FOFA.12 It draws heavily on analyses done graphs 5 through 9.

“An Analysis of the Relative Value of Attacks on Warsaw Pact Follow-On Forces in the NATO Central Region: Report tions of the Current Capability, Defence Research Group, Panel by Panel VII/RSG.14 on the Value of Interdiction of FoUow- on the Defence Applications of Operational Research, AC/243 On Forces and the Cost-E ff~tiveness of Possible Augmenta- D/1022, AC/243 (Panel VII) D/99, June 1985.

SHAPE STUDY Personnel at the Supreme Headquarters Al- A report of this work is summarized in appen- lied Powers Europe (SHAPE) have also been dix 13-A (vol. 2), paragraphs 10 through 16. studying FOFA concepts and requirements.

SHAPE TECHNICAL CENTRE STUDY The SHAPE Technical Centre (STC) has sponsor, SHAPE. This effort has been reported been conducting a study of Follow-On Forces recently,13 and is summarized in appendix 13- Attack in Allied Command Europe for their A (vol. 2), paragraphs 17 through 19.

g ‘ ’* Results from the STC FOFA Study (Project 84-2) With 2, Issue No. 2 (Draft), ” SHAPE Technical Centre, STC Particular Reference to the Central Region, Working Paper No. 9980/OR/S.27/86, March 1986.

INDUSTRIEANLAGEN-BETRIEBSGESELLSCHAFT STUDIES The Industrieanlagen-Betriebsgesellschaft depth.’’” One area of concern is resources: the mbH (IABG)14 of Munich, FRG, has studied costs of systems will go up with effective range alternatives for improving conventional de- and required accuracy and survivability; and fense, using analysis and simulations up to the the “qualitative manpower requirement” will theater level. Unclassified discussions of some go up as systems become more complex. On of these studies were held with OTA person- both of these grounds, deep attack systems nel, and an unclassified paper by the study will divert resources from other important leader was made available to OTA.15 This pa- areas. In particular, the application of new per concludes that “there are several reasons technologies to improve close-in defense “can for not supporting the concept of combat in be done more efficiently, with less risk and for less cost than battle in depth."17

141ABG is a major ~~ytic~ establishment that works for The notion of deep battle considered in this the Ministry of Defense and for the military/aerospace inter- study is unclear, but it appears to emphasize ests of the FRG. attacks well beyond the range of current ar- ““Zum Kampf in der Tiefe, ’ Klaus Niemeyer, IABG M-SO- 2125/13, December 1983. “This manuscript only reflects the tillery weapons. Thus, it is not clear whether personal opinion of the author and in no way represents the official views of The Industrieanlagen-BetnebsgeseIlschaft mbH (IABG) or the Federal German Ministry of Defence. ” However, ‘e’’Zum Kampf in der Tiefe, ” p. 15. it is consistent with other analytical work performed at IABG. “Ibid. Ch. 13—Summary of Recent Studies of Follow-On Forces Attack 215

IABG studies would support an emphasis on within about 30 kilometers of the FLOT). It FOFA at the nearest ranges (attacking follow- appears to OTA that this emphasis would be on regiments during their final move forward supported by IABG.

EUROPEAN SECURITY STUDY The European Security Study (ESECS) capability .21 The suggested (or “exemplary”) sponsored by the American Academy of Arts program for modernization to improve FOFA and Sciences has published two reports on capabilities includes ground-launched missiles “Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in with a range of perhaps 200 to 300 kilometers,22 Europe.”18 19 A capability for attack of follow- and stand-off weapons for air delivery with on forces is considered necessary (among other ranges from about 10 to 150 kilometers. Both missions) for successful deterrence and de- types of weapons would dispense anti-armor fense. In the initial study (ESECS I) the em- munitions such as Skeet. In addition, aircraft phasis for FOFA is on attack of fixed targets would have capabilities to deliver improved to delay and disrupt enemy formations. In anti-armor mines (also using stand-off dispens- ESECS II, attack of both chokepoints and ers) and improved laser-guided weapons capa- units on the move is considered for FOFA, but ble of destroying bridges. The ESECS II ex- the emphasis is still on delay and disruption emplary FOFA program procurement costs are rather than on attrition. The most effective and estimated at $5 billion (in fiscal 1984 dollars), practicable NATO attacks would be from and the program includes 1,800 ground-launched about 30 to 150 kilometers from the FLOT, missiles, a total of 5,300 air-delivered dispens- but deeper attacks for special purposes (such ers of various types, and 400 laser-guided as destroying rail and road bridges across the bombs. These weapons costs are in addition Oder-Neisse River line) could also be impor- to surveillance and target acquisition system tant. 20 costs. The exemplary program to improve target acquisition capabilities (for both FOFA and Long-range conventional weapons systems close-in defense) includes procurement of five are considered critical to a successful FOFA real-time stand-off imaging radars and 48 real- ‘“Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe; Proposals time RPV-based optical systems per corps, and for the 1980s, Report of the European Security Study (ESECS) associated ground stations and processing ca- (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983). “Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: A Pro- pabilities; it would cost NATO an estimated gram for the 1980s, European Security Study Report of the Spe- $2.85 billion. cial Panel (E SECS II), (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985). The Special Panel consisted of General Andrew J. Goodpaster, 2’ESECS 11, p. 70. General Franz-Joseph Schulze, Air Chief Marshal Sir Alasdair “Specifically, the T-22 (Improved Lance) missile of the Corps Steedman, and Dr. William J. Perry. The study was supported Support Weapons System then in development by the U.S. by the EIDM Corp. [ Army is recommended. The current successor to this program ‘’ I’;SF:CS II, p, 71, is the ATACMS program.

U.S. ARMY STUDIES The U.S. Army has recently completed Army doctrine (AirLand Battle), NATO’s studies supporting both development of doc- FOFA sub-concept, and U.S. Army long-range 25 trine for Deep Attack23 and a proposed pro- plans and development processes." The work gram for enhancing conventional defense on deep attack doctrine included simulations capabilities 24 that is “consistent with U.S. of corps operations with the CORBAN model “Corps Deep Operations, FC 100-15-1. 24Andj~sis of US Armj Conventional Capabilities, HQ U.S. Army DAMO’FD, May 20, 1986. ‘5Anal~rsis of US Arm~~ Conventional Capabilities, p. 1 216 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack developed by the Army.26 The later study of Appropriate sensors for this function include Conventional Capabilities built on the corps- Joint STARS, PLSS, the Tactical Reconnais- level simulation with theater-level studies sance System (TRS), Guardrail Common Sen- using the Army’s CEM simulation model and sor system, and the corps Intelligence and IDA’s TACWAR simulation model. Electronic Warfare (IEW) RPV system.31 Then, when the weapons are prepared and the The Deep Attack study focuses on the ob- target is properly oriented, the sensor provides jective of disrupting the enemy’s attack 27 final target location update to the attacking “tempo.” According to this new Army doc- unit and the weapon is launched or released.32 trine, attacks against follow-on forces should employ a “decide, detect, deliver” approach. 28 In its broader study of conventional enhance- This approach has separate situation assess- ments, the Army found that a balanced investment/planning and target acquisition/engagement in close and deep combat capabilities was ment phases. Battle planning, including deci- optimal. The deep attack systems considered sions to commit resources to deep attacks, is included the ATACMS, and Joint STARS and accomplished at the corps headquarters using other sensors.33 Improved anti-armor muni- Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield tions for artillery and rocket systems, such as (IPB) and fusion of data from a number of MLRS/TGW and SADARM, were included in sources. The planning is oriented toward time close combat systems. This approach, of mak- blocks of 4 to 6 hours. Engagement opportu- ing current forces more capable, was consid- nities are predicted some 12 to 36 hours ahead, ered preferable to other possible approaches, and sensor and attack systems are tasked to including increasing NATO’s combat forces, coordinate operations for attacks in the appro- creating barrier defenses in the FRG, deploy- priate time blocks.29 Sensors are then focused ing light infantry or militia-based area de- to detect predicted enemy activity in the fenses, or maintaining a posture of counter- preplanned target area. invasion to deter aggression. The conventional enhancements proposed by the Army involve The detection of this activity, and its subse- accelerating the development and procurement quent confirmation (if necessary), serves to of the indicated systems (and others) such that trigger the planned attack process, using ei- 34 they can be fielded by 1993. ther ground-launched missiles or offensive air support (OAS) provided by tactical aircraft.30 ‘lCorp Deep Operations, FC 100-15-1, p. B-9. szcert~n weapons ~d sensor requirements are summarized 2’CORBAN was developed by the Training and Doctrine Com- in app. 13-A (vol. 2), paragraph 21. mand (TRADOC) Studies and Analysis Activity (TRASANA), 330ther sensors included the Guardrail Common Sensor and supported by the BDM Corp. the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle/Intelligence and Electronic War- 2“Corp Deep Operations, FC 100-15-1, p. 2-13. See app. 13-A fare (UAV/IE W). In addition, the Army component of the Joint (vol. 2), paragraph 20 for certain details. Tactical Fusion program, the All Source Analysis System ‘8Corp Deep Operations, FC 100-15-1, p. B-2. (ASAS) was listed as a deep battle system. ‘gCorp Deep Operations, FC 100-15-1, p. B-6,8. siThe enhancement Pro=m for FOFA is summarized in aPP. ‘°Corp Deep Operations, FC 100-15-1, p. B-9,1O. 13-A (vol. 2), paragraph 22.

RAND CORP. STUDIES The Rand Corp. has several studies under- ered include several ways of attacking follow- way for the U.S. Air Force, considering vari- on forces. ous aspects of conventional defense of Europe. Another Rand study is analyzing a concept One such effort focuses on intelligence support for deep attack of Warsaw Pact follow-on forces for a range of operations concepts to support 35 using conventionally armed cruise missiles the defense of Europe. The concepts consid- for Effective Defense of Central Europe, ” briefed to OTA staff ““A Critical Time Evaluation of USAF Intelligence Support and FOFA Study Advisory Panel, June 18, 1986. Ch. 13—Summary of Recent Studies of Follow-On Forces Attack ● 217 launched from B-52s.36 Both studies have been bly areas on roads more than 250 kilome- presented to OTA in briefings, but reports have ters beyond the IGB.37 not yet been published. These studies assess the feasibility of several operations concepts The second Rand study sets forth a concept and the value of carrying out such attacks for interdicting Soviet divisions moving by rail. against Warsaw Pact forces. The latter study The concept uses B-52s based in the United includes a theater-level simulation to quantify States to launch conventionally armed long- the value of such attacks in terms of the over- range cruise missiles from friendly airspace all ground war. deep into the Warsaw Pact rear. These weapons deliver mines that will damage trains at The first study finds several approaches at- given points in the rail net and cause links in tractive for attacking follow-on forces, because the rail net to be closed for periods of time. the United States is expected to have substan- Similar weapons are also used to drop key rail tial end-to-end capability to attack worthwhile and road bridges. The total effect of these at- targets. These attractive approaches include: tacks is estimated to reduce by 50 percent the ● attack of second-echelon regiments mov- quantity of forces arriving at the FLOT during to battle from their final assembly ing the 2 to 3 weeks of the attacks. areas, which are 30 to 50 kilometers be- The resulting reduction in forces available hind the FLOT; to the enemy is analyzed in a theater-level ● attack of maneuver elements of follow-on simulation. Although the proposed improve- divisions moving forward on roads about ment in capability is not sufficient to stabi- 30 to 250 kilometers behind the FLOT; lize the FLOT near the IGB, it is seen as mak- and ing an important contribution to NATO’s ● attack of follow-on division elements defense. One limitation of this approach is that queued up behind blocked chokepoints, 30 it would not be as effective if, prior to war, there to 250 kilometers behind the FLOT. were a Warsaw Pact mobilization long enough Approaches that are considered marginal or for follow-on Soviet armies to move forward unattractive include: to western Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. However, it is argued that this long . attack of division elements while halted mobilization scenario would be the best case in assembly areas, for NATO. From this perspective, the proposed • attack of bridges to create a north-south deep attack capability can be viewed as a de- barrier at major rivers, and terrent against a short mobilization attack, • attack of divisions moving toward assem- which is seen as the greatest threat to NATO.

““ Interdiction of the Soviet Armies With B-52s, ” briefing “See app. 13-A (vol. 2), paragraph 24 for other approaches by (;.1.. Donohue, Rand Corp., to OTA Staff, 19 August 1986. considered for FOFA.

EARLIER STUDIES

In late 1983 IDA published a review of Of 77 studies surveyed at that time, 20 were earlier studies of issues relating to FOFA.38 selected for review and summary. These se- ‘“lnterdicting 1%’arsaw Pact Second Echelon Forces–A Re- lected studies are listed in table 13-1. The re- \riewr of Selected Studies, Institute for Defense Analyses, 1 DA suiting summary of results is discussed in ap- Paper P-1 731, october 1983. Referred to below as IDA 1983 Review. pendix 13-A (vol. 2), paragraphs 25 through 30. 218 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Table 13-1 .–Studies Reviewed by IDA in 1983

Date Author Title U.S. Air Force 1981 Scientific Advisory Board Non-Nuclear Armament 1980 Directorate of Aerospace Studies Employment of Antiarmor Munitions Against 2nd Echelon Moving Armor 1979 Tactical Fighter Weapons Center Joint Close Air Support/Battlefield Interdiction Mission Area Analysis U.S. Army 1982 CSWS Special Task Force Corps Support Weapon System Cost and Operational Effectiveness Anal- ysis (Preliminary) 1981 Field Artillery School Fire Support Mission Area Analysis 1981 Concepts Analysis Agency Forward of the FEBA Weapon System Cost Benefit Study, Phase I and Phase II Other U.S. Government Studies 1982 Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS Interdiction Study 1979 General Accounting Office Progress in Strengthening Interdiction Capabilities in the NATO Central Region 1976 Defense Science Board Summer Study on Conventional Counter Force Against a Pact Attack NATO and European Organizations 1982 SHAPE (NATO) SHAPE Study to Attack and Destroy Second Echelon Forces 1981 Defence Research Group (NATO) Interdiction—An Aspect of Air Campaign in the 1990s 1981 Defence Research Group (NATO) Implications of New Technologies for Land Operations in the NATO Cen- tral Region 1981 Defence Operational Analysis Estab- lishment (U. K.) UK Analyses Related to the Value of Attacks on Second Echelon Forces 1980 Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development Project 2,000 Overview (NATO) Other Analytical Studies 1983 IDA Indirect Fire Support, Phase I and II 1981 The Rand Corp. Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Tactical Rear: Summary Report 1981 The Rand Corp. Air Interdiction: Lessons from Past Campaigns 1981 The BDM Corp. The Military Utility of Delaying and Disrupting Warsaw Pact Second Eche- lon Forces 1980 QUEST Research Corp. Historical Effects of an Interdiction Campaign 1979 The BDM Corp. Holding Pact Second Echelon Forces at Risk SOURCE IDA 1983 Review, tables 1 and 2 Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Glossary of Terms and Acronyms

8-INCH: Used in this report to denote a U.S. Army to be capable of recognizing and steering toward artillery gun which fires 8-inch diameter shells. a vulnerable point on a fixed target. A300: Model designation of a jet transport aircraft AGM: Air-to-ground missile. made by Airbus Industrie, a consortium of Bel- AGM-65: The Maverick air-to-ground missile (any gian, British, Dutch, French, German, and Span- of several versions: AGM-65A/B/D/E/F/G), ish companies. AGM-65A: TV-guided Maverick. [In inventory] A-7: The Corsair 11 light attack aircraft, produced AGM-65B: TV-guided Maverick with greater mag- in several versions for the U.S. Navy and Air nification for use against smaller targets or at Force and other nations. The Air Force is devel- longer range. [In inventory] oping improved avionics and engines (for longer AGM-65D: IR-guided Maverick for use at night or range) to upgrade its A-7s to a version unoffi- in adverse weather. [Being procured] cially called the “A-7 +.” AGM-65E: Laser-guided Maverick for U.S. Marine AAA: Anti-aircraft artillery. Corps. [Being procured] ACE: Allied Command Europe. AGM-65F: Navy Maverick. Anti-shipping–IR- Activity Cue: As used in this report, indication of guided with alternate warhead and selectable- enemy movement provided by a surveillance or delay fuze. [In development] reconnaissance system, used for planning an AGM-65G: “Alternate Warhead Maverick. ” A attack. modified AGM-65F with a heavier warhead for ACV: armored combat vehicle. A tank, armored use against ships, armored vehicles, and overbur- fighting vehicle (AFV), armored personnel car- dened fixed targets. [In advanced development] rier (Ape), armored cavalry vehicle, self-propelled AGM-88A: The HARM High-Speed Anti-Radia- artillery piece, or a mobile surface-to-air missile tion Missile (q.v.). launcher. AGM-130: A short-range, rocket-powered, air-to- ADAM: Area Denial Artillery Mine. A scatterable ground missile derived from the GBU-15. The antipersonnel mine produced for the U.S. Army. AGM-130A uses a unitary 2,000-lb Mk-84 war- A 155mm artillery shell can dispense 36 ADAMs. head. The AGM-130B, which is not presently ADDS: Army Data Distribution System. A data funded, is a version of this weapon with a sub- communications system now being procured by munitions dispenser as the payload. the U.S. Army to provide timely secure commu- AI: Air interdiction. A tactical air mission. nications among corps commanders, their intel- Air Attack: As used in tables in this report, an oper- ligence, fire support, and other staffs which ational concept using penetrating tactical air- would plan deep attacks, and the surface-to-sur- craft (TACAIR) as weapons platforms. Direct face missile batteries and tactical aircraft which air attack uses TACAIR flying directly over, or would perform deep attacks. ADDS includes within sight of, the target. Stand-off air attack Joint Tactical Information Distribution System uses a weapon such as the Modular Stand-off (JTIDS) terminals, Enhanced Position Location Weapon (MSOW) launched by tactical aircraft Reporting System (EPLRS) terminals, and net at a standoff (distance) of 25 to 50 km from the control stations. Formerly called PJH [PLRS- target. JTIDS Hybrid]. ALB: AirLand Battle. U.S. Army doctrine (en- ADT: MICNS Air Data Terminal for the Aquila dorsed by the U.S. Air Force as appropriate) for RPV; the Aquila uses an ADT to receive com- the conduct of Army operations. mands from, and transmit television imagery to, ALCM: Air-launched cruise missile. a MICNS Remote Ground Terminal (RGT) of AMS: Airborne Mission Subsystem of the Aquila a TADARS Ground Control Station (GCS). See RPV. MICNS, TADARS. AMTI: Airborne moving-target indicating (radar ADU: Air defense unit. system). Detects and indicates objects (e.g., ve- AFATDS: Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data hicles) moving with respect to the ground. System. A U.S. Army follow-onto the TACFIRE AN/TPQ-37: “Firefinder” radar system for track- artillery fire control system. ing missiles and projectiles to locate missile AFV: Armored fighting vehicle. launchers and artillery batteries. AGB: Autonomous Guided Bomb. A glide bomb AOI: (1) Area of interest: in NATO and U.S. Army in preliminary development by the Air Force, doctrine, the area including, but extending be-

221 222 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

yond, a commander’s area of responsibility concentrations of armored vehicles, where they (AOR, q.v.), in which the commander must mon- dispensed Skeet sensor-fuzed smart submu- itor enemy activity which could affect the fu- nitions. ture situation in his AOR; (2) Area of influence: ASTOR: Airborne STand-Off Radar (formerly the area in which a tactical commander has a called CASTOR: Corps Airborne STand-Off Ra- capability to fight the enemy. dar). Either of two airborne ground-surveillance AOR: Area of responsibility. A specific zone or sec- radar systems developed for the British Minis- tor assigned to a commander in which he is re- try of Defence. ASTOR-C indicates fixed tar- sponsible for fighting the enemy. Also called gets; ASTOR-I indicates moving targets. area of operational responsibility in NATO AT-2: A scatterable mine being developed by the doctrine, and area of operations in U.S. Army Federal Republic of Germany for MLRS rockets. doctrine. ATACMS: Army Tactical Missile System. A bal- APAM: Anti-personnel anti-materiel. A type of listic missile currently in development by the submunition usually designed as a small gre- U.S. Army. ATACMS missiles will be launched nade or bomblet that damages unarmored vehi- from unmodified MLRS launchers. cles and people. Examples are the Army M-74 ATAF: Allied Tactical Air Force (of NATO). grenade and the Air Force BLU-61 and BLU- ATARS: Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance 63 bomblets. System (also called Follow-On Tactical Recon- APGM: Autonomous Precision-Guided Munition naissance System). A program to develop a TV for 155mm artillery. camera and digital data link for use on either Aquila: U.S. Army-developed remotely piloted manned aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles. vehicle. ATDL: Adaptive Targeting Data Link. A proposed ARDS: Airborne Radar Demonstrator System, A radio data link which could transmit target loca- NATO project to make certain U. S., British, and tion data from Joint STARS or PLSS aircraft French airborne ground-surveillance radar sys- to weapon delivery platforms such as F-16 fighter tems compatible. aircraft equipped with ATDL equipment or pos- ARIA: Advanced Range Instrumentation Air- sibly to advanced weapons—such as ballistic or craft. A modified Boeing 707 jet transport (des- cruise missiles-which could be equipped with ignated EC-18B) used by the U.S. Air Force. ATDL equipment. ARM: Anti-radiation missile. ATF: Advanced-Technology Fighter being devel- Artillery Attack: An operational concept using oped for the U.S. Air Force. artillery guns or rocket-launchers as weapons ATR: Automatic target recognition. platforms. AUTO TGT: A notional automatic target recog- ASAC: All-Source Analysis Center, which sup- nition capability for attack of units on trains ports the intelligence function at division and using CALCM-X. corps tactical operations centers. AVSCOM: Aviation Systems Command of the ASARS: Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar Sys- U.S. Army. tem (specifically, ASARS 11). A U.S. Air Force AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System high-resolution ground-surveillance imaging ra- (E-3A/B/C) used by the U.S. Air Force and dar system, which can detect stationary objects. NATO. The ASARS 11 can be carried by the high- B-52: A heavy bomber operated by the U.S. Stra- altitude, long-endurance TR-1 aircraft. tegic Air Command. ASAS: All-Source Analysis System. An intelligence BAI: Battlefield air interdiction. A tactical air fusion system being developed by the U.S. Army. mission. Both the ASAS and the U.S. Air Force’s Enemy BICES: Battlefield Information Collection and Ex- Situation Correlation Element (ENSCE) are being ploitation System, a NATO project. developed under the Joint Tactical Fusion (JTF) BL775: A British anti-armor cluster weapon. program and will use some common equipment. BMP: A Soviet-made infantry combat vehicle. ASIC: All-Source Intelligence Center. BN-2T: A twin-turboprop aircraft (the Turbine Is- Assault Breaker: A technology development pro- lander) made by Pilatus Britten-Norman; see gram sponsored by the U.S. Defense Advanced Turbine Islander. Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in which BTR: A series of Soviet-made armored personnel T-16 (Patriot) and T-22 (Lance) missiles were carriers. Some are used for command, control, guided, by the Joint STARS-like Pave Mover and communications. airborne radar and weapon guidance system, to Buccaneer: A British fighter-bomber. Glossary of Terms and Acronyms ● 223 — —.

Bullpup: U.S. Air Force AGM-12C command- ognition and precision terminal guidance of guided weapon, designed to attack hard fixed cruise missiles. targets. It includes a WDU-25B 974-pound CNAD: Conference of National Armaments Direc- warhead. tors of NATO. Bundeswehr: The West German Army. COCOM, CoCom: Coordinating Committee on C2 (or C’): Command and control. Multilateral Export Controls. C3 (or C’): Command, control, and communications. COMINT: Communications intelligence. Informa- C3I (or C3I): Command, control, communications, tion gained from intercepting enemy electronic and intelligence. communications signals, either voice or message. CALCM-X: An acronym used in this report for a Command Posts: Groups of trucks and lightly ar- proposed conventionally armed, air-launched mored vehicles used by commanders of Warsaw cruise missile, possibly ALCM-Bs retired from Pact regiments, divisions, and armies, and their SIOP duty and modified to carry more payload staffs; possible targets for attacks against fol- to a shorter range. low-on forces. CASTOR: Corps Airborne STand-Off Radar. Now Compass Call: Air Force EC-130 aircraft designed called ASTOR (q.v. ). for jamming enemy radio communications. CBU: Cluster Bomb Unit. A class of Air Force Copperhead: The M712 cannon-launched guided weapons consisting of a dispenser filled with projectile, a U.S. Army 155mm artillery shell (usually 200 to 600) bomblets, designed to at- that homes on a target illuminated by a laser tack an area target by dispersing the bomblets. designator. CEB: Combined Effects Bomblet. U.S. Air Force Copperhead 11: A developmental autonomously submunition (denoted BLU-97/B) guided artillery projectile which does not require CEM: Combined Effects Munition. U.S. Air Force that its target be designated (i.e., illuminated) weapon (denoted CBU-87/B) consisting of a TMD by a laser. A Copperhead II shell would be made containing 202 CEB bomblets. CEM weighs 945 by replacing the laser seeker of an M712 Cop- lbs, can be carried by F-16, F-Ill, and F-15E perhead shell with an autonomous seeker now aircraft, and is effective against personnel and in development. unarmored and light armor targets. CP: Command post. CENTAG: Central Army Group of NATO’s Allied CPS: Central Processing Subsystem (of PLSS). Command, Europe. Cruise Missile Atk: An operational concept using Central Region: The region for which NATO’s Al- cruise missiles launched from airborne platforms lied Command, Europe, is responsible, includ- (in friendly airspace) to penetrate and attack tar- ing the Federal Republic of Germany. gets deep in the Warsaw Pact rear. CGF: Central Group of Forces. Soviet Forces sta- DAACM: Direct Airfield Attack Combined Mu- tioned in Czechoslovakia, consisting of about nition. five divisions. DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Chicken Little: A joint Army-Air Force program Agency. An agency of the U.S. Department of for testing advanced anti-armor munitions. Defense. CHOKPT: A contraction used in this report for D-Day: As used here, hypothetically, the day on “chokepoint an obstacle to the advance of which NATO is overtly invaded or attacked by Warsaw Pact forces, either preexisting (e.g., a Warsaw Pact forces. In general, the first day bridge) or created by NATO forces (e.g., a mined of a real or hypothetical war or a military opera- road). tion during a war. CINC: Commander-in-Chief DDR: Deutsche Demokratische Republik: East Ger- CINCENT: Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, many. Also GDR: German Democratic Republic. Central Europe DF: (Radio) Direction-Finding. CINCNORTH: Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, DGSM: Down-sized Ground Station Module for Northern Europe Joint STARS. CL289: An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) made DIRECT AIR ATK: See AIR ATTACK. in Canada. DIV: Division. CLGP: Cannon-launched guided projectile. DIV ASSY AREAS: Division assembly areas, also CMAG: Cruise Missile–Advanced Guidance. A known as “concentration areas, ” for Warsaw program to develop sensors (LADAR, MMW, Pact divisions. These areas are usually within and SAR) and software for automatic target rec- the range band of 80 to 150 km from the FLOT. 224 New Technology for NATO: implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Assembly areas are large enough that the den- EF-111A: An Air Force airborne jamming system sity of vehicles is relatively low, and are chosen for jamming radars; also called “Raven.” by the Warsaw Pact forces to take maximum EFP: Explosively formed penetrator. A type of advantage of cover and concealment. anti-armor munition. Division Columns: Groups of vehicles moving on ELINT: Electronics intelligence. Intelligence ob- roads, which comprise a division on the march. tained by interception of non-communications The actual groupings of vehicles are usually signals (e.g., radar signals). battalion-sized, about 40 to 60 vehicles per ELS: Emitter Location System. An upgrade which column, with spacing between columns using would allow PLSS to locate non-pulsed emitters. the same road. ENSCE: Enemy Situation Correlation Element. DME: Distance-measuring equipment. Radionavi- An intelligence fusion system being developed gation equipment consisting of transponder by the U.S. Air Force. Both the ENSCE and the units and interrogator units which can deter- U.S. Army’s All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) mine how far away the transponders are. In are being developed under the Joint Tactical Fu- some radionavigation systems, such as that sion (JTF) program and will use some common used by PLSS, the interrogator units are car- equipment. ried by aircraft and the transponder units are EO, or E-O: Electro-optical. Employing vacuum at surveyed locations on the ground. In other tubes or semiconductor devices to convert opti- radionavigation systems, the transponder units cal (visible, ultraviolet, or infrared) radiation into are carried by aircraft and the interrogator units electrical currents, to serve as a TV camera. are at surveyed locations on the ground. Epervier: A Belgian remotely piloted vehicle used DNA: Defense Nuclear Agency. An agency of the for reconnaissance. U.S. Department of Defense. EPLRS: Enhanced Position Location Reporting DOA: Direction of arrival. A technique for deter- System, a component of ADDS. mining the direction from which a radio signal ERAM: Extended-Range Antiarmor Mine, paris being received—i.e., the direction toward the tially developed, then abandoned, by the U.S. radio transmitter. Air Force. DoD: U.S. Department of Defense. ESD: (1) Electronic Systems Division of the U.S. DPC: Defence Planning Committee (of NATO). It Air Force Systems Command; (2) Electronique is composed of the representatives of member Serge-Dassault, a French electronic systems countries participating in NATO’s integrated manufacturer. military structure. The DPC meets at either the ESECS: European Security Study. A study of op- Ambassadorial or Ministerial (Defense Minister) tions for increasing the combat capability, and level. hence the presumed deterrent effect, of NATO’s DPICM: Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional non-nuclear forces in Europe. The study was Munition. An APAM munition used in artillery sponsored by the American Academy of Arts shells and rockets. and Sciences; its findings were published in two DRG: Defence Research Group (of NATO). reports known as ESECS I and ESECS 11. E-3: The AWACS Airborne Warning and Control ESM: Electronic warfare support measures. Radio System. A modified Boeing 707 jet transport direction-finding and signals intelligence (COMINT carrying air surveillance radar and communica- and ELINT) activities performed in support of tions equipment. Several models (E-3A/B/C) are electronic warfare (jamming, etc.). currently used by the U.S. Air Force and NATO. EW: Electronic warfare. E-8A: The Joint Surveillance/Target Attack Radar F-4: The Phantom fighter-bomber; developed in the System (Joint STARS). A modified Boeing 707 United States; also used by the Federal Repub- jet transport carrying aground surveillance ra- lic of Germany. dar and communications equipment. In devel- F-4G: The version of the F-4 fighter designed and opment for the U.S. Air Force. equipped to attack enemy air defenses, dubbed EC-18B: The Advanced Range Instrumentation the “Wild Weasel. ” Aircraft (ARIA). A modified Boeing 707 jet F-15: The top-line air superiority fighter of the U.S. transport used by the U.S. Air Force. Air Force, dubbed the “Eagle.” ECCM: Electronic counter-countermeasures. F-15E: The ground-attack version of the F-15 Ea- ECM: Electronic countermeasures. gle, dubbed the “Strike Eagle, ” now in devel- Glossary of Terms and Acronyms . 225

opment by the U.S. Air Force. The primary mis- GDR: German Democratic Republic. East Ger- sion of the F-15E will be air interdiction. many. Also DDR: Deutsche Demokratische F-16: The dual-role (air- and ground-attack) fighter Republik. of the U.S. Air Force and several other NATO GPS: Global Positioning System. A system by countries, dubbed the “Fighting Falcon. ” which a user vehicle can determine its position F-ill: A U.S. Air Force long range interdiction on the ground to high accuracy. GPS will use aircraft. a constellation of NAVSTAR satellites to allow FARRP: Forward area re-arming and refueling a terminal on the vehicle to compute its loca- point, for helicopters. tion in earth-fixed coordinates. FBA: Fighter bomber aircraft. GR/CS: GUARDRAIL/Common Sensor. An up- FEBA: Forward edge of the battle area. The ap- grade to GUARDRAIL. proximate line along which opposing ground GSFG: Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. forces are in contact; compare FLOT (q.v.). GSM: Ground Station Module. A mobile ground Firefinder: A tactical radar system (designated station being developed by Motorola for the U.S. AN/TPQ-37) used by the U.S. Army for track- Army for use with the Joint STARS airborne ing missiles and projectiles to locate missile radar system. launchers and artillery batteries. GUARDRAIL: A communications intelligence FLIR: Forward-Looking InfraRed. A TV-like cam- system. era sensitive to the infrared radiation emitted hard: Highly resistant to damage by weapon ef- by all (especially warm) objects; useful at night fects (e.g., blast), either by design or inadver- and less affected by fog, smoke, or haze than TV. tently, FLOT: Forward line of own troops. Unlike a FEBA harden: To make highly resistant to damage by (q.v.), a FLOT (e.g., Inner-German border) can weapon effects. exist in peacetime. hardened: Highly resistant, by design, to damage FOG: Fiber-optic gyro. In development for missile by weapon effects. inertial attitude reference and navigation systems. HARM: The AGM-88A High-Speed Anti-Radia- FOG-M: Fiber-Optic Guided Missile. In develop- tion Missile. An air-launched missile used by the ment for the U.S. Army. Navy and Air Force to attack radar antennas FRG: Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). by homing on the signals they emit. front: A Soviet command echelon above “army.” HAVE QUICK: An Army-Air Force program to FSCL: Fire support coordination line. A line estab- provide or upgrade the jam resistance of certain lished at approximately the range of fire of tactical radios. NATO artillery, or about 25 to 35 km into enemy Heron-26: An Italian-made remotely piloted vehi- area across the FLOT. cle which can be used for reconnaissance. FSD: Full-Scale Development. HLTD UNIT: a contraction used in tables in this FTI: Fixed target indicator. A type of radar use- report to denote a halted enemy unit which is ful for surveillance of stationary objects such the target of an attack against follow-on forces. as shelters or parked vehicles. HTM: Hard Target Munition. A bomb being de- fusion: Combining intelligence information from veloped by the Air Force to attack hard fixed multiple sensors or disciplines (e.g., SIGINT and targets (e.g., bunkers). IMINT) to assist interpretation. HVM: Hypervelocity Missile. An air-launched anti- GACC: Ground Attack Control Capability (or Cen- armor missile being developed for the U.S. Air ter). For controlling air attack of ground targets, Force. It will use CO, laser command guidance now under development by the U.S. Air Force. and kill by kinetic energy. GAMP: Guided Antiarmor Mortar Projectile. Par- IABG: Industrieanlagen Betriebs GmbH (Gesell- tially developed, then abandoned, by the U.S. schaft mit beschraenkter Haftung). A West Ger- Army. man corporation which performs research, de- Gator: Air delivered anti-tank and anti-personnel velopment, and operations analysis for the West mines. German Ministry of Defense and for West Ger- GBU-15: A Glide Bomb Unit, which is “thrown” man industries. by an attacking aircraft and guided toward the IADL: Interoperable Air Data Link. IDL equip- target from the aircraft, but which has no pro- ment carried by TR-1 aircraft used as Precision pulsion of its own. The GBU-15 weighs 2,500 Location Strike System (PLSS) platforms. lbs, including the Mk-84 2,000-lb warhead, and IAM: Inertially-Aided Munition. A developmen- can be carried by the F-4, F-111, and F-15E tal glide-bomb program. (when available). ICM: Improved Conventional Munition, An APAM 226 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

munition used in artillery shells and rockets. Radar System. A developmental airborne radar Also called DPICM: Dual-Purpose ICM. system carried on E-8A aircraft intended to IDA: Institute for Defense Analyses (Alexandria, locate moving (and certain fixed) targets on the Virginia). ground and to control attacks against such tar- IDL: Interoperable Data Link. A radio data link gets using tactical aircraft or guided missiles. used by the Precision Location Strike System JSTARS: See Joint STARS. (PLSS). J(S)TARS: Used here to denote the MTI surveil- IEPG: Independent European Programme Group, lance capability of Joint STARS (q.v.). composed of European members of NATO. JS(TA)RS: Used hereto denote the target acquisi- IEW UAV: Intelligence and Electronic Warfare tion and attack control capabilities of Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. One of the family of STARS (q.v.). UAVs proposed for development by the U.S. JTF: Joint Tactical Fusion. Army. JTFP: Joint Tactical Fusion Program. IFF: Identification–friend or foe. A system for JTIDS: Joint Tactical Information Distribution identifying aircraft as friendly or other (foe or System. A joint (U.S. Navy/U.S. Air Force) jam- neutral) e.g., using coded radio signals. resistant radio system used to send digital mes- IGB: Inner-German border. The boundary between sages between aircraft and between aircraft and West and East Germany. Sometimes called the ground stations. inter-German border. KB-44: A small shaped-charge anti-armor submu- IGDL: Interoperable Ground Data Link. Ground- nition developed to be dispensed from the based IDL radio equipment used by the Preci- MW-1. sion Location Strike System to communicate LADAR: Laser Detection And Ranging. A system with IADL radio equipment on TR-1 aircraft. for determining the position of an object using IIR: Imaging infra-red (adj.). Using a TV-like cam- visible-wavelength radiation, analogous to ra- era which is sensitive to long-wavelength in- dar (which uses radio-wavelength radiation). frared radiation and can “see” in the dark and, Lance: The T-22 dual-capable (nuclear or conven- to some extent, through fog. tional) missile used by NATO corps. IITS: Intra-Theater Imagery Transmission Sys- LANTIRN: Low-Altitude Navigation/Targeting tem. A facsimile system used by U.S. forces in InfraRed for Night. A system designed to give Europe. tactical aircraft low-altitude all-weather naviga- IMINT: Image (or imagery) intelligence. Intelligence tion and targeting capabilities. obtained from photographic imagery, electro- LCS: Low-Cost Seeker (for the HARM High-speed optical imagery, radar imagery, or other types Anti-Radiation Missile). Under development by of imagery (e.g., radiometric). the Navy and the Air Force. Also called Low- INF: Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces. Cost Anti-Radiation Seeker. IPB: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. LOC: Lines of communication. IR: Infrared. Electromagnetic radiation having LOC-E: Limited Operational Capability-Europe: a wavelengths longer than those of visible light U.S. intelligence fusion system in Europe, de- but shorter than those of radio waves (i.e., rived from the Battlefield Exploitation and Tar- 0.0007 to 1 millimeter). get Acquisition (BETA) testbed. I2R: Imaging infrared. See IIR. LOCPOD: Low-Cost Powered Off-boresight Dis- IRTGSM: Infrared Terminally-Guided Submu- penser: NATO development project for air- nition. launched standoff submunition dispenser. Islander: A twin-engine aircraft made by Pilatus LPI: Low probability of interception. Britten-Norman in both piston and turbine ver- LRSOM: Long-Range Standoff Missile: a proposed sions. See Turbine Islander. long-range cruise missile being considered in a Jaguar: A British aircraft used for reconnaissance. tri-national feasibility study by the United Joint Attack: An operational concept using both States, the United Kingdom, and the Federal ground- and air-launched weapons. For example, Republic of Germany. an air-launched weapon (GBU-15) could be used Luftwaffe: Air Force [viz., “air weapon”] of the to destroy a bridge and create a chokepoint, and Federal Republic of Germany. ground-launched missiles (ATACMS) could be M-74: An Army APAM submunition to be used used to attack units that halted and bunched in ATACMS missiles for attack of unarmored up at the destroyed bridge. targets. Joint STARS: Joint Surveillance Target Attack Martel: A British TV-guided bomb. .. —

Glossary of Terms and Acronyms . 227

MASINT: Measurement and signature intelligence off, and would employ a dispenser and either —e.g., a measurement of a target’s closing ve- anti-armor or APAM submunitions. locity obtained using moving target indicating MTI: Moving target indicator. A type of radar use- (MTI) radar. ful for surveillance of moving objects such as Maverick: A guided short-range air-to-ground anti- aircraft or ground vehicles. armor missile used by the U.S. Air Force (des- MW-1: Multipurpose Weapon, a submunition dis- ignated AGM-65, q.v. ). penser made in the Federal Republic of Germany MICOM: U.S. Army Missile Command. for the Tornado aircraft; it can dispense several MICNS: Modular Integrated Communications and types of submunitions. Navigation System—used by the Target Acqui- NAA: North Atlantic Assembly. An organization sition Designation Aerial Reconnaissance Sys- composed of selected members of the parlia- tem (TADARS). ments of NATO member nations. MIFF: An air-delivered anti-tank mine made in the NAAG: National Army Armaments Group (of Federal Republic of Germany to be dispensed NATO). by MW-1 dispensers on Tornado aircraft. NGF: Northern Group of Forces. Soviet Forces sta- Mine: A destructive device detonated after its em- tioned in Poland, consisting of about two di- placement, usually by some action of its target. visions. Mirach-100: An Italian-made remotely piloted ve- NIS: NATO Identification System. An IFF sys- hicle which can be used for reconnaissance. tem being considered for adoption by NATO. Mirage 5: A Belgian aircraft used for recon- NORTHAG: Northern Army Group of NATO’s Al- naissance. lied Command Europe. Missile Attack: An operational concept using ground- NIMROD: An airborne early warning system de- launched missiles such as ATACMS. veloped in the United Kingdom for the Minis- Mk-82: A general-purpose 500-lb bomb. try of Defense. The United Kingdom has since Mk-84: A general-purpose 2,000-lb bomb. decided to procure U.S. E-3 AWACS aircraft MLRS: Multiple Launch Rocket System. An ar- instead. tillery system now in procurement by the U.S. NSWP: Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact, Army and several other NATO nations. O&C: Operations and control (for Joint STARS). MLRS/TGW: Terminally Guided Warhead for OLA: Off-loading area. MLRS. An anti-armor TGSM, now in develop- OMG: Operational Maneuver Group. ment by the U.S. Army. ON WPN: On weapon. Used here to describe au- MMW: Millimeter-wave. Sensing or using electro- tonomous target acquisition systems installed magnetic radiation with wavelengths between on weapons (e.g., cruise missiles). one millimeter and one centimeter. ORCHIDEE: Observatoire Radar Coherent Heli- MNC: Major NATO Commander (SACEUR, porte d’Investigation Des Elements Ennemis. SACLANT, or CINCHAN). A developmental French airborne ground-sur- Mohawk: A U.S. Army airborne ground-surveil- veillance radar system which will be carried by lance radar system carried by OV-1D aircraft. Super Puma helicopters to indicate moving MOS: Military Occupational Specialty designa- targets. tions used by the U.S. Army. OV-1D: The U.S. Army “Mohawk’ observation air- Moving Columns: Groups of vehicles moving on craft equipped with an airborne ground-surveil- roads as part of a combat unit on the march. lance radar system. The actual groupings of vehicles are usually OUSDRE: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense battalion-sized, about 40 to 60 vehicles per col- for Research and Engineering, in the U.S. De- umn, with spacing between columns using the partment of Defense. same road. Patriot: A modern surface-to-air missile system MPS: Mission Payload System for the Aquila used by the U.S. Army in Europe; it uses a RPV. phased-array radar and fires T-16 missiles. MR: Motorized rifle. Pave Mover: An experimental airborne radar and MSC: Major Subordinate Commander (e.g., CIN- weapon guidance system carried by an F-111 air- CENT, CINCNORTH) craft and used in DARPA’s Assault Breaker MSOW: Modular Stand-Off Weapon. An air-launched program; Joint STARS will use similar but im- weapon now in concept development in NATO. proved technology. This weapon would provide 25 to 50 km of stand- Paveway: A series of laser-guided bombs used by 228 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

the U.S. Air Force, built around the Mk-82 (500- tual groupings of vehicles are usually battalion- lb) and Mk-84 (2,000-lb) bombs, denoted GBU- sized, about 40 to 60 vehicles per column, with 12B and GBU-10C, respectively. spacing between columns using the same road. Peacetime Intel: As used here, peacetime intelli- REGT ASSY AREAS: Regimental assembly areas, gence which can be used to locate certain fixed also known as “departure areas, ” for Warsaw targets (e.g., bridges, power stations, and rail Pact divisions. These areas are usually located segments) with high accuracy. within the range band of 30 to 80 km from the PGS: PLSS Ground Station. A hardened facility FLOT, outside of the range of NATO artillery. in Europe proposed (but no longer planned) to Assembly areas are large enough that the den- house a PLSS CPS. sity of vehicles is relatively low, and are chosen Phoenix: An unmanned aerial vehicle made in Eng- by the Warsaw Pact forces to take maximum land by GEC Avionics. advantage of cover and concealment. PIAP: PLSS Intelligence Augmentation Program. RF-4C: A reconnaissance version of the F-4 Phan- An Air Force program under which the PLSS tom fighter-bomber, used by the U.S. Air Force. Intelligence Augmentation System (PI AS) is be- Some carry TEREC equipment. ing developed. RF-4E: A reconnaissance version of the F-4 Phan- PIAS: PLSS Intelligence Augmentation System, tom fighter-bomber, used by the Luftwaffe. A proposed facility for augmenting the analy- RF-104: A reconnaissance version of the F-104 sis, reporting, and exploitation of data collected Starfighter, used by the Royal Netherlands Air by PLSS. Force. PIM: PLSS Interface Module. A proposed facility RGT: (1) Remote [MICNS] Ground Terminal for within a PLSS Central Processing Subsystem TADARS; (2) regiment. for selecting, formatting, and disseminating RITA: Mobile radio-telephone equipment made by PLSS location reports to various users accord- a consortium of Belgian and French companies; ing to their needs. being purchased by the U.S. Army for use in Pioneer-1: An unmanned aerial vehicle made in Is- Europe. rael by AAI/Mazlat. RLG: Ring-laser gyro. A laser device that can pro- PLSS: Precision Location Strike System. An air- vide rotation rate measurements for navigation borne surveillance and control system developed and guidance systems; it has no rotating parts for TR-1 aircraft to detect, identify, and ac- but can substitute for a gyroscope, which pre- curately locate advanced (pulsed, frequency- viously was required for this purpose. hopping) enemy radar transmitters and some Rockeye: A U.S. cluster bomb which dispenses 247 types of jammers in near real time and to guide unguided anti-armor shaped-charge bomblets. weapons or aircraft to such targets with suffi- RPV: Remotely piloted vehicle: an unmanned ve- cient accuracy to destroy them. hicle which is guided by operators in a control PLSS GS: PLSS Ground Station. station, where television imagery or other infor- POL: Petroleum, oil and lubricants. mation transmitted by the vehicle is displayed. RAAM: Remote Anti-Armor Mine, produced for In this report, the term refers only to aircraft. the U.S. Army. See also UAV. RAF: Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom. RSC: Reconnaissance-strike complex. A Soviet mili- Rail Mine: Used here to denote a hypothetical mine tary term for integrated surveillance/attack sys- designed to damage track and derail moving tems such as those demonstrated by DARPA in trains. Such a mine could use a modified anti- its Assault Breaker program. bunker munition and a Mk-75 fuze. R&S/SA: Reconnaissance and surveillance/situa- Raven: The Air Force EF-111A aircraft, which is tion assessment. equipped to jam enemy radars, RSTA: Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target R&D: Research and development. acquisition. RDT&E: Research, development, testing, and SAC: Strategic Air Command of the U.S. Air evaluation. Force. recce: Reconnaissance (slang). SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. reconnaissance: As used here, collecting informa- SADARM: Search and Destroy Armor, Smart tion about specific areas or activities of particu- anti-armor submunition for surface-to-surface lar interest using any of several types of sensors. weapons. Regimental Columns: Groups of vehicles, which SAM: Surface-to-air missile. comprise a regiment moving on roads. The ac- SAR: Synthetic aperture radar. A type of airborne Glossary of Terms and Acronyms . 229

or orbital radar used for obtaining high-resolu- T-16: The Patriot missile. tion radar images of stationary objects. A SAR T-22: The Lance missile. can obtain imagery much more detailed than TA/AC: Target acquisition/attack control that obtainable by a real aperture radar having TAC RECCE: Tactical reconnaissance, A tactical an antenna of comparable size. air mission. SCDL: Surveillance and Control Data Link (for TACAIR: Tactical aircraft, air forces, or airpower. Joint STARS). Tacit Rainbow: A long-endurance missile (an ex- SEAD: Suppression of enemy air defense. pendable lethal air-launched unmanned aerial ve- SENIOR RUBY: A tactical ELINT system. hicle) being developed in the United States to SENIOR SPEAR: A tactical COMINT system. attack radio emitters such as radars and jammers. SFW: Sensor Fuzed Weapon. A U.S. Air Force TACMS: Tactical Missile System (see ATACMS). anti-armor weapon now in development, consist- TADARS: Target Acquisition/Designation Aerial ing of a Tactical Munitions Dispenser (TMD) Reconnaissance System. A reconnaissance and containing ten BLU-108 Skeet dispensers, each target acquisition- and designation system be- of which releases four Skeet submunitions. ing developed for the U.S. Army. It includes the SHAPE:— Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Aquila unmanned aerial vehicle as well as truck- Europe. mounted rail launchers, recovery nets, air vehi- SIGINT: Signals intelligence. Consisting of both cle transporters, maintenance shelters, and communications intelligence (COMINT) and ground-control stations. electronics intelligence (E LINT). target acquisition: Detection and recognition of a SINCGARS: Single-Channel Ground-Air Radio potential target and estimation or prediction of System. A jam-resistant voice radio system its location with sufficient accuracy to permit used for communications between aircraft and attacking it effectively with available weapons. ground units of the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. TBM: Tactical ballistic missile. Army. TDOA: Time difference of arrival. A radiolocation SIOP: Single Integrated Operational Plan. For technique–used by the Precision Location Strike U.S. use-of strategic nuclear weapons. System (PLSS)–by which a network of radio Skeet: A “smart” puck-shaped anti-armor submu- receivers can determine the relative location of nition developed by the Air Force to sense a tar- a transmitter. Also: a related technique—used get and discharge- a high-velocity explosively- by other military and civil radiolocation systems formed penetrating projectile at it. “Skeet” is such as LORAN—by which a single radio re- a trademark of Avco Corp. ceiver can determine its location– relative to Skeet/TGSM: In this report, denotes smart anti- those of synchronized radio transmitters, armor munitions: either Skeet or TGSM or both. TERCOM: Terrain Comparison. A system and Skyeye: An unmanned aerial vehicle made in the method for high-accuracy navigation, presently United States by Lear-Siegler. employed on certain cruise missiles. SLAR: Side-looking airborne radar. TEREC: ELINT reconnaissance equipment carried SNS: Site Navigation Subsystem of PLSS. by some RF-4C aircraft. SOTAS: Stand-Off Target Acquisition System. A TGSM: Terminally-Guided Submunition. Smart heliborne MTI ground-surveillance radar sys- anti-armor submunition under consideration for tem developed by the U.S. Army. The SOTAS ATACMS missiles. The TGSM has the capabil- program has been canceled and superseded by ity to search an area for the target vehicle and the Joint STARS program. then fly toward the target and kill it by deto- SRSOM: Short-Range Stand-Off Missile; NATO nating a shaped charge on contact. feasibility study. TGW: Terminally Guided Warhead. A develop- SSM: Surface-to-surface missile, mental warhead for MLRS rockets which will Standoff Air Atk: See AIR ATTACK. release TGSMs. STARS: See Joint STARS. TLE: Target location error. STC: SHAPE Technical Centre. TMA: Theater of military action. Also known as surveillance: As used here, routine monitoring TMO, TSMA, and TVD. using any of several types of sensors (e.g., air- TMD: Tactical Munitions Dispenser. A U.S. Air borne radar). Force system (denoted SUU-65/B) to dispense 230 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

submunitions over a given target area. Many Turbine Islander: A twin-turboprop aircraft (des- different types of submunitions can be used in ignated BN-2T) made by Pilatus Britten-Norman the TMD, including the CEB, Gator, and Skeet. in several versions; one—the CASTOR Islander TMO: Theater of military operations. (Also TMA, –has been modified to carry the British ASTOR- TSMA, and TVD.) 1 side-looking airborne radar (formerly called TMSA: Theater of military strategic action. (Also CASTOR-I). TMO, TMA, and TVD.) TVD: Teatr voennykh deistv. A Soviet military Tomahawk: A cruise missile manufactured by Gen- term variously translated as theater of military eral Dynamics in several versions: some armed action (TMA), theater of military strategic ac- with nuclear warheads, others with non-nuclear tion (TMSA), or theater of military operations warheads. (TMO); see ch. 4. Tornado: An advanced air interdiction aircraft in UAV: Unmanned aerial vehicles, including remotely production and being fielded by the FRG, Italy, piloted vehicles (RPVs), which require remote and the United Kingdom. control by human pilots; autonomous aircraft TR-1: A high-altitude, long-endurance aircraft used (drones), which do not; and aerial vehicles which by the U.S. Air Force for surveillance and recon- permit, but do not require, remote control by naissance. It is used by the Tactical Reconnais- human pilots. sance System (TRS) and by the Precision Loca- UHF: Ultra-high frequency. Radio frequencies be- tion Strike System (PLSS). tween 300 megahertz (million cycles per second) TRIGS (pronounced “triggs”): TR-1 Ground Sta- and 3 gigahertz (billion cycles per second). tion. A buried, hardened facility designed to re- UK: United Kingdom of Great Britain. ceive, process, and exploit data from Tactical UMV: Unmanned vehicle. Refers only to an un- Reconnaissance System sensors carried by TR- manned aerial vehicle (UAV) in this report. 1 aircraft, When operational, TRIGS will replace USAFE: U.S. Air Forces, Europe. or augment the Tactical Reconnaissance Exploi- USAREUR: U.S. Army, Europe. tation Development System (TREDS); it will VGK: The Soviet Supreme High Command (trans- provide additional capabilities such as dynamic literation of a Cyrillic acronym). (i.e., in-flight) retasking of TRS sensors. VHF: Very-high frequency. Radio frequencies be- TRAC: (1) the TRADOC Analysis Center of the tween 30 megahertz (million cycles per second) U.S. Army; (2) Tactical Radar Correlator. A mo- and 300 megahertz. bile ground station being developed by the U.S. WASP: (1) a now-defunct Air Force air-launched Army for receiving, processing, exploiting, and mini-missile development program; (2) an air- disseminating data from airborne radar systems. borne computer system being developed for the TRADOC: The Training and Doctrine Command F-4G Wild Weasel aircraft. of the U.S. Army. WDL: Weapon Data Link of Joint STARS, using TREDS: Tactical Reconnaissance Exploitation De- the Joint STARS radar to transmit target data velopment System. A developmental transporta- and a Weapons Interface Unit installed on an ble ground station for the Tactical Reconnais- attack aircraft or missile to receive it. sance System (TRS). TREDS includes: 1) a WDU-25B: See Bullpup. Mission Control Element (MCE), 2) an Inter- Wild Weasel: U.S. Air Force TACAIR hunter-killer operable Ground Data Link (IGDL), 3) a Tacti- system (denoted F-4G) for attacking enemy air cal Ground Intercept Facility (TGIF), 4) a defense units. Ground Control Processor (GCP), 5) a SAR WIU: Weapons Interface Unit. A component of Ground Facility (SGF), 6) a Wide-Band Commun- Joint STARS which would be installed on at- ication Element (WBCE), 7) a TREDS Com- tack aircraft or missiles to receive target data munications Element (TCE), 8) an ASARS-II In- updates from Joint STARS aircraft via the terface Device (AID), and 9) a TREDS Support Weapon Data Link. A WIU is being developed, Facility (TSF). and the Air Force is considering procuring it. TRS: Tactical Reconnaissance System. An airborne WP: Warsaw Pact. reconnaissance system which includes the ASARS- WW: Wild Weasel. 11 radar system. tube artillery: Artillery guns, as distinct from missile artillery.