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Aristotle, Rhetoric Iii ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC III: A COMMENTARY by JOHN WALT BURKETT Bachelor of Science, 1989 University of Southern California Los Angeles, California Master of Arts, 1997 Reformed Theological Seminary Jackson, Mississippi Master of Arts, 2005 Mississippi College Clinton, Mississippi Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of AddRan College of Liberal Arts Texas Christian University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2011 Copyright by John Walt Burkett 2011 PREFACE: OBJECTIVES AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This new commentary on Rhetoric III serves the purpose which the text held at the Classical Lyceum: elucidating Aristotle‘s theory of style (lexis) and arrangement (taxis) for scholars, teachers, and practitioners of rhetoric. This commentary provides a much needed update to the last commentary on Aristotle‘s Rhetoric, Book 3, published by the Cambridge classicist E.M. Cope in 1877, because Cope‘s commentary is now understood as a misinterpretation that reads Aristotle Platonically, takes seriously only rational appeals, assumes a mimetic theory of language, and misdefines central concepts like the enthymeme and common topics. Providing a new interpretation, this commentary has several specific objectives, methods, and features that are discussed below in detail but that may be summarized by three adjectives: Grimaldian, rhetorical, and accessible. This Grimaldian commentary applies the new rhetoric philosophy of William M.A. Grimaldi, S.J., which he explicates in Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1972) and in his two-volume commentary on Rhetoric I (1980) and Rhetoric II (1988). In these works and others, Fr. Grimaldi creates an integrated and contextual interpretation of Aristotle‘s Rhetoric (outlined below). The current commentary complements (in both senses) Grimaldi‘s scholarship by applying his integrated hermeneutic to Rhetoric III. This rhetorical commentary considers the rhetoric in the Rhetoric since Aristotle typically practices what he teaches: writing with enthymemes, drawing premises from shared knowledge, defining by metaphor, clarifying by antithesis, and arranging units by thesis, analysis, and synthesis. The commentary observes how Aristotle applies his three rhetorical appeals (êthos, pathos, logos), his theories of propriety (prepon), exotic (xenos), and virtue ii (aretê) in style, the role of philosophical pairs, and the systems of Greek imagery, all of which create a unified and interactive theory of invention, style, and arrangement. Attention is given to Aristotle‘s theory of metaphor regarding the extent to which metaphors enable logical inference, comprise his technical terms, and give shape to his interactive theory of rhetoric. This accessible commentary features text, translation, comments, and glossary for readers who may not be familiar with Aristotle‘s idiom but who have an interest in his rhetorical theory and technical terms. Finally, incorporating recent scholarship, this commentary provides insights from classical rhetoric and new rhetoric, showing their interrelationship and how contemporary research in rhetoric builds on and helps to elucidate Aristotle‘s expansive rhetoric as a general theory of language. Given this rewarding research, I wish to express my gratitude to many: Aristotle for his ―afternoon‖ lecture notes On Rhetoric (Peri rhêtorikês) from his esoteric library at the Lyceum; Erasmus for discovering Aristotle‘s Greek text in 1508 in Venice; Rudolfus Kassel for his superior critical edition of the Greek text; William M.A. Grimaldi for discovering the philosophical hermeneutic of the Rhetoric; George A. Kennedy for his fine literal translation; Richard Leo Enos for his helpful suggestions and his kind guidance during the research-writing process of this commentary; invaluable feedback from Professors Richard Enos, Kurk Gayle, Ann George, and Dan Williams, who have contributed to the commentary‘s richness of insights; and my dear wife and son for their patience and encouragement. iii CONTENTS Preface Objectives and Acknowledgments ii Contents Table of Contents iv SIGLA Abbreviations v Significance Need for a New Commentary on Aristotle‘s Rhetoric III vii Argument Rhetorical Philosophy of William M. A. Grimaldi, S.J. xxi Chapter 1 Arts of Rhetoric 1 Chapter 2 Lexis: Virtues 55 Chapter 3 Lexis: Frigidity 113 Chapter 4 Lexis: Simile 127 Chapter 5 Lexis: Correctness 141 Chapter 6 Lexis: Expansion and Concision 157 Chapter 7 Lexis: Propriety 166 Chapter 8 Lexis: Rhythm 188 Chapter 9 Lexis: Syntax 199 Chapter 10 Lexis: Urbanity and Metaphor 229 Chapter 11 Lexis: Energeia and Metaphor 257 Chapter 12 Lexis: Situation and Media 291 Chapter 13 Taxis: Parts of an Argument 309 Chapter 14 Taxis: Introduction 324 Chapter 15 Taxis: Counteracting Attacks 350 Chapter 16 Taxis: Narration of Facts 365 Chapter 17 Taxis: Proof and Refutation 388 Chapter 18 Taxis: Interrogation 413 Chapter 19 Taxis: Epilogue 425 Conclusion Interactive Rhetoric 435 Glossary Glossary of Greek Terms in Rhetoric III 439 Bibliography Bibliography of Works Cited 477 iv SIGLA Biographical William Smith, ed. A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Dictionary Mythology. 3 vols. London and Boston, 1849. Cope E. M. Cope. The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary. 3 vols. Ed. J. E. Sandys. London: Cambridge UP, 1877. Cope, Introd. E. M. Cope. An Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric with Analysis Notes and Appendices. London: Cambridge UP, 1867. ERC Theresa Enos, ed. Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition. New York: Garland Publ., 1996. Grimaldi William M. A. Grimaldi. Aristotle’s Rhetoric: A Commentary. 2 vols. New York: Fordham UP, 1980, 1988. Grimaldi, Studies William M. A. Grimaldi. Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 1972. All citations refer to the reprint: Enos and Agnew 15-159. Kennedy George A. Kennedy, trans. and ed. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 2007. Citations refer to the 2007 edition with introduction, translation, notes, and appendices. LSJ H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, and R. McKenzie, eds. A Greek-English Lexicon. Rev. and augm. with Supplement. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996. OCD Simon Hornblower and Anthony Spawforth, eds. The Oxford Classical Dictionary. 3rd ed. rev. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. Smyth H. W. Smyth. Greek Grammar. Rev. G. M. Messing. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1984. 1403b 6 Bekker numbers are listed in each chapter‘s outline and comments as the standard form of reference in Aristotle‘s works. The first four digits (i.e., 1403) signify page number, the letter (a or b) column number, and the last digits line number, based on pagination in the Berlin Academy edition of Corpus Aristotelicum, 1831, edited by A. I. Bekker. 3.1.1 Text references within comments are abbreviated by chapter conventions: e.g., 3.1.1 refers to Book 3, chapter 1, section 1. The Greek text is that of Kassel‘s 1976 edition. Translation is Kennedy‘s second edition, 2007. Texts All references to classical authors are to Loeb Classical Library editions (LCL), referenced by Bekker numbers, unless indicated. Complete references to all sources, cited throughout this commentary in brief fashion, can be found in the Bibliography. v ABBREVIATIONS OF ARISTOTLE‘S WORKS References to Aristotle‘s works normally consist of an abbreviated title, a book number, a chapter number, a section number (if any), and a specification of page, column, and line in the standard edition of the Greek text by Immanuel Bekker (1831). In the text of this commentary, titles are spelled out, but often abbreviated in notes and citations. Since there is no universally agreed set of abbreviations, those adopted are fairly standard among publishers. Abbreviations are based on the Latin translation of the Greek title. Those below are found in this commentary. ABBREVIATIONS Abbreviated title Latin title English title An De Anima On the Soul APr Analytica Priora Prior Analytics APst Analytica Posteriora Posterior Analytics Cat Categoriae Categories EN Ethica Nicomachea Nicomachean Ethics Int De Interpretatione On Interpretation Met Metaphysica Metaphysics Phys Physica Physics Poet Poetica Poetics Pol Politica Politics Rhet Rhetorica, Ars Rhetorica Rhetoric Soph El De Sophisticis Elenchis Sophistical Refutations Top Topica Topics vi SIGNIFICANCE: NEED FOR A NEW COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE‘S RHETORIC III What the Scottish philosopher Sir William Hamilton witnessed, ―Aristotle‘s seal is upon all the sciences, his speculations have determined those of all subsequent thinkers,‖ is true of the Art of Rhetoric (ca. 335 BC).1 Since this single, ancient text has the privileged status as fons et origo for the rhetorical tradition, rhetoricians have a situation like no other in that the origin continues to sustain deliberations about rhetorical theory and practice. With the renaissance of rhetoric beginning in the 1960s, contemporary scholars have devoted more attention to understanding the doctrine and details of Aristotle‘s Rhetoric than in any other century. Since Aristotle compiled a complete corpus of treatises on rhetoric by his contemporaries and predecessors in his lost Synagôgê technôn (ca. 360-355) and added his own great insights, Aristotle thus provides us with an encyclopedic and expansive theory of rhetoric that is bound to philosophy through logic, to ethics through propriety, and to poetics through his theory of style. In comparison, according to Paul Ricœur, the latest treatises present ―restricted rhetoric,‖ reducing the classical art to merely
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