Ever Since Darwin Reflections Iii Natural History
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Ever Since Darwin Reflections iii Natural History Stephen Jay Gould W · W · NORTON & COMPANY · INC · NEW YORK 32 Biological Potentiality vs. Biological Determinism I N 1 7 5 8 • L I N N A E u s faced the difficult decision of how to classify his own species in the definitive edition of his Systema Naturae. Would he simply rank Homo sapims among the other animals or would he create for us a separate status? Linnaeus compromised. He placed us within his classification (close to monkeys and bats), but set us apart by his description. He defined our relatives by the mundane, distinguishing characters of size, shape, and number of fingers and toes. For Homo sapims, he wrote only the Socratic injunction: nosce te ipsum-"know thyself." For Linnaeus, Homo sapims was both special and not spe cial. Unfortunately, this eminently sensible resolution has been polarized and utterly distorted by most later commenta tors. Special and not special have come to mean nonbiologi cal and biological, or nurture and nature. These later polari zations are nonsensical. Humans are animals and everything we do lies within our biological potential. Nothing arouses this ardent (although currently displaced) New Yorker to greater anger than the claims of some self-styled "ecoacti vists" that large cities are the "unnatural" harbingers of our impending destruction. But-and here comes the biggest but I can muster-the statement that humans are animals does not imply that our specific patterns of behavior and social arrangements are in any way directly determined by our genes. Potentiality and determination are different concepts. The intense discussion aroused by E. 0. Wilson's Sociobi- 251 252 I EVER SINCE DARWIN p 0 TENT I AL IT y vs . DETER MIN Is M I 253 ology (Harvard University Press, 1975) has led me to take up ture, gathering, or hunting- the major determinants of our this subject. Wilson's book has been greeted by a chorus of social evolution) or had life cycles like those of the gall praise and publicity. I, however, find myself among the midges discussed in essay 10. (When feeding on an un smaller group of its detractors. Most of Sociobiology wins from crowded mushroom, these insects reproduce in the larval or me the same high praise almost universallr accor~ed it. ~or pupal stage. The young grow within the mother's body, de a lucid account of evolutionary principles and an indefatiga vour her from inside, and emerge from her depleted external bly thorough discussion of social behavior among all groups shell ready to feed, grow the next generation, and make the ofanimals, Sociobiology will be the primary document for years supreme sacrifice.) to come. But Wilson's last chapter, "From Sociobiology to But w:lson makes much stronger claims. Chapter 27 is not Sociology," leaves me very unhappy indeed. After twenty-s~ a statement about the range of potential human behaviors or chapters of careful documentation for the nonh':1man ani even an argument for the restriction of that range from a mals, Wilson concludes with an extended speculation on the much larger total domain among all animals. It is, primarily, genetic basis of supposedly universal patterns in human be an extended speculation on the existence of genes for spe havior. Unfortunately, since this chapter is his statement on cific and variable traits in human behavior-including spite, the subject closest to all our hearts, it has also attracted more aggression, xenophobia, conformity, homosexuality, and the than 80 percent of all the commentary in the popular press. characteristic behavioral differences between men and We who have criticized this last chapter have been accused women in Western society. Of course, Wilson does not deny of denying altogether the relevance of biology to human the role of nongenetic learning in human behavior; he even behavior, of reviving an ancient superstition by placing our states at one point that "genes have given away most of their selves outside the rest of "the creation." Are we pure "nur sovereignty." But, he quickly adds, genes "maintain a certain turists?" Do we permit a political vision of human perfectibil amount of influence in at least the behavioral qualities that ity to blind us to evident constraints imposed by our underlie variations between cultures." And the next para biological nature? The answer to both statements is no. The graph calls for a "discipline of anthropological genetics." issue is not universal biology vs. human uniqueness, but bio Biological determinism is the primary theme in Wilson's logical potentiality vs. biological determinism. discussion of human behavior; chapter 27 makes no sense in Replying to a critic of his article in the New York Times any other context. Wilson's primary aim, as I read him, is to Magazine (October 12, 1975), Wilson wrote: suggest that Darwinian theory might reformulate the human sciences just as it previously transformed so many other bio There is no doubt that the patterns of human social logical disciplines. But Darwinian processes can not operate behavior, including altruistic behavior, are unde~ ge without genes to select. Unless the "interesting" properties netic control, in the sense that they represent a restncted of human behavior are under specific genetic control, sociol subset of possible patterns that are very different ~om the ~atterns of termites, chimpanzees and other ammal ogy need fear no invasion of its turf. By interesting, I refer species. to the subjects sociologists and anthropologists fight about most often-aggression, social stratification, and differences If this is all that Wilson means by genetic control, then we in behavior between men and women. If genes only specify can scarcely disagree. Surely we do not do all the things that that we are large enough to live in a world of gravitational other animals do, and just as surely, the range of our poten forces, need to rest our bodies by sleeping, and do not photo tial behavior is circumscribed by our biology. We would lead synthesize, then the realm of genetic determinism will be very different social lives if we photosynthesized (no agricul- relatively uninspiring. 254 I EVER SINCE DARWIN POTENTIALITY VS. DETERMINISM j 255 What is the direct evidence for genetic control of specific ~·.Continuity: Wilson claims, with ample justice in my human social behavior? At the moment, the answer is none op1mon, that the Darwinian explanation of altruism in W. D. whatever. (It would not be impossible, in theory, to gain such Hamilton's 1964 theory of"kin selection" forms the basis for evidence by standard, controlled experiments in breeding, an evolutionary theory of animal societies. Altruistic acts are but we do not raise people in Drosaphila bottles, establish t~e .cement of s~ble societies, yet they seem to defy a Dar pure lines, or control environments for invariant nurturing.) wm1an explanallon. On Darwinian principles, all individuals Sociobiologists must therefore advance indirect arguments are selected to maximize their own genetic contribution to based on plausibility. Wilson uses three major strategies: future generations. How, then, can they willingly sacrifice or universality, continuity, and adaptiveness. endanger themselves by performing altruistic acts to benefit 1. Universality: If certain behaviors are invariably found in others? our closest primate relatives and among humans themselves, The re~olution . is cha~ingly simple in concept, although a circumstantial case for common, inherited genetic control complex m techmcal detail. By benefiting relatives, altruistic may be advanced. Chapter 27_abounds with statements about acts preserve an altruist's genes even if the altruist himself supposed human universals. For example, "Human beings will not be the one to perpetuate them. For example, in most are absurdly easy to indoctrinate-they seek it." Or, "Men sexually reproducing organisms, an individual shares (on av would rather believe than know." I can only say that my own erage) one.-half the g~nes of his sibs and one-eighth the experience does not correspond with Wilson's. genes of his first cousms. Hence, if faced with a choice of When Wilson must acknowledge diversity, he often dis saving oneself alone or sacrificing oneself to save more than misses the uncomfortable "exceptions" as temporary and two sibs or more than eight first cousins, the Darwinian calcu unimportant aberrations. Since Wilson believes that re lus favors altruistic sacrifice; for in so doing, an altruist actu peated, often genocidal warfare has shaped our genetic des ~y increases his own genetic representation in future gener tiny, the existence of nonaggressive peoples is embarrassing. allons. But he writes: "It is to be expected that some isolated cul Natural selection will favor the preservation of such self tures will escape the process for generations at a time, in serving altruist genes. But what of altruistic acts toward non effect reverting temporarily to what ethnographers classify as relatives? Here sociobiologists must invoke a related concept a pacific state." of "reciprocal altruism" to preserve a genetic explanation. In any case, even ifwe can compile a list of behavioral traits The altruistic act entails some danger and no immediate shared by humans and our closest primate relatives, this does benefit, but ifit inspires a reciprocal act by the current benefi not make a good case for common genetic control. Similar ciary ~t .some ~ture time, it may pay off in the long run: a results need not imply similar causes; in fact, evolutionists genetic mcamat1on of the age-old adage: you scratch my back are so keenly aware of this problem that they have developed and I'll scratch yours (even if we're not related). a terminology to express it. Similar features due to common The argument from continuity then proceeds.