THE USE OF PHYSICAL INTELLIGENCE IN GENERAL GEORGE B. MCCLEUAN ' S 186 2 PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN . A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University of Guelph by PATRICK JAMES HEINSEN In partial fulfilment of requirements for the degree of Master of Arts April, 1997 (6 Patrick Heinsen, 1997 National Library Bibliothèque nationale I*m of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Canada Canada rour rn votre refermctl Our fiie Notre rdference The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive Licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loaq distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in rnicroform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fkom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author' s ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. ABSTRACT THE USE OF PHYSICAL INTELLIGENCE IN GENERAL GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN ' S 186 2 PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN . Patrick James Heinsen Advisor: University of Guelph, 1997 Professor LR. Farrell This thesis is an investigation of the use and misuse of physical intelligence by Union General George B. McClellan during his 1862 Virginia Peninsula Campaign. Civil War historians have yet to consider what role maps and their accompanying reports played in both the planning and execution of the Campaign. This neglect has led to incomplete conclusions regarding the important question of why the Peninsular Campaign failed. General McClellan would later explain that poor physical intelligence resulted in the failure of the Amy of the Potomac to take Richmond. From an examination of the original reports and maps of the region, it appears that McClellan was only partially justified in this conclusion. While McClellanrs maps were incomplete and in some cases possessed glaring errors, reports of the Peninsula's topography and environmental conditions were remarkably prophetic. That McClellan chose to ignore these reports raises questions concerning the quality of his generalship. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to extend my thanks to the members of my comrnittee, Prof. David Farrell, Prof. Richard Reid, and Prof. Catharine Wilson for their unending support and encouragement. 1 would also like to thank Prof. Emeritus Mo McKenna of the University of Calgary for first sparking my interest in the American Civil War. Thanks to Barb and Barb in the office of the Department of History at the University of Guelph for al1 their help. Finally I wish to thank my family in Red Deer, the Glsand most of al1 my wife (and research assistant) Gina without whom al1 these efforts would have been for naught. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER ONE: "Physical Intelligence and the American Civil War" 1. Military intelligence in the Civil War. 5 II. What is "physical intelligence"? 9 CHAPTER TWO: "Where were the maps of Virginia?" 1. Interna1 Improvements Program. II, Civilian maps. CHAPTER THREE: 34 '"Physical Intelligence and the 'American Waterlooff' 1. Physical intelligence and Campaign planning. 46 II. Urbanna to Fort Monroe. 54 CHAPTER FOUR: "On to Richmond" 1. April 4. 11. April 5. III. Warwick River. CHAPTER FIVE: "Williamsburg to Harrison's Landing" 1. Battle of Williamsburg- II. The Chickahominy. III. The Seven Days. IV. Battle of Glendale. CONCLUSIONS 124 BIBLIOGRAPHY 131 PHYSICAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR Spy & Topog duty has been more neglected by our folkç than any other and is the principal cause of surprises and defeats. A Wornall 1863 General George B. McClellan was receiving a substantial dose of partisan politics as he sat in the basement of the Capital building, late in February of 1863. Before him perched the members of Americars answer to the Star Chamber: the men of the Joint Congressional Cornmittee on the Conduct of the War under the reigns of all-out abolitionist Ben Wade of Ohio. On his last visit before this tribunal in January of 1862 (after the disaster of Ballrs Bluff) the impression he had made was singularly unimpressive - leading some of the Senators to cal1 for his withdrawal from command. This the they were out for his head. '' 'At what period, '" Senator Gooch asked of him, " 'had the works of the enemy at Yorktown [Virginia, on the York/James Peninsula] been constructed?"' McClellan explained that the Confederate works had most likely been on the Peninsula for some the. "'Did you know of those works before you landed on the peninsula?'" McClellan answered frankly: "'No, we did not know of the line of works along the Warwick. Gooch pressed his opening asking whether or not the topography of the Peninsula was well understood by anyone connected with his command when he began the Campaign. "'Our mapsff" McClellan explained, "'proved entirely inaccurate, and did us more harm than good, for we were constantly misled by them. ' f' "'Rad there not, '" continued the Senator, "'been a great misapprehension as to the character of the roads and the nature of the soi1 on the peninsula?'" Little Mac's feeble response spoke volumes: "'1 was deceived.'"l Politically and militarily, the laurels of 1861 belonged to the fledging Southern Confederacy. These States had produced a working goverment, and while it was not without substantial flaws, it was undeniably a functioning entity. They had also created amies that could and did successfully defend southern borders. They had created a country. General McClellan's modest successes in Western Virginia in June and July of that year at Philippi, Rich Mountain and Garrick's Ford and the Navy's many successful amphibious assaults did something to redress earlier defeats along Bull Run and Wilson's Creek. But when those disasters were emphasised, east and west, by Ball's Bluff in October and the bloody repulse of Grant at Belrnont, Missouri in November, there was a distinct public impression, both North and South, at home and abroad, that the North was failing in its quest to Save the Union. As President Lincoln would bemoan to Quartemaster General M.C. Meigs, "the bottom is out of the tub . ."2 This was the situation that found General McCZellan in 1U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Army of the Potomac, Vol. 1, (Millwood, NY.: Kraus, 1977). pp. 428-430. My italics. ZShelby Foote, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville, Vol. 1 of 3 Vols, (New York: Vintage Books, a division of Random House, 1986), p. 156 (hereafter cited as: The Civil War, A Narrative). command of al1 Union Armies in November of that year. At the tender age of thirty-four, the "Young Napoleon of the west", as the journalists were calling him, promised Lincoln that he "could do it all." McClelian set about planning a massive strike (linking his name even closer to that of the Corsican's) at the Rebel capital in order to crush the rebellion in a single, glorious blow - an "American Waterloow. The 1862 Peninsular Campaign that followed was one of the largest of the war, pitting the premier Federal army of over 100 000 men against its Confederate counterpart within sight of Richmond's church spires. McCleilan took his Grande Armée closer than any other Save General US. Grant to ending the Confederacy. His campaign was intended to erase the memory of the unorganised 'fist-fightr that was Bull Run and the inept management that produced Ballrs Bluff. Every detail would be taken into consideration in order to orchestrate the perfect campaign. That there were flaws came as no surprise, but that the planned instrument of the destruction of the Confederacy - McClellants Army of the Potomac - came itself within a hair's breadth of annihilation filled onlookers on both sides with amazement. What went wrong? Historians of Civil War are al1 confronted by this question, and have al1 focused on McClellan himself in attempting to explain the Anny of the Potomac's failure. In doing so, they have tended to centre their discussion on the divide between General McClellan and the Lincoln Administration. The failure of the Army of the Potomac was therefore explained either by a lack of ~dministration support or lack of forethought on McClellanrs behalf. McClellan apologists point to the withholding of General McDarell as the primary reason behind McCleilants failure. H.J. Eckenrode and Bryan Conrad suggest that the withholding of McDowell, while giving McClellan greater determination in having to overcome this "adverse stroke of fortune", was the result of Secretary of War Edwin Stantonrs secret desire to destroy McClellan. Stanton, it is argued, "worked on Lincoln's fears" concerning Washington's defences, thereby inducing the President to fatally denude McClellan's army of this important body of troops.3 Similar is the work of William Swinton who claimed that the withholding of McDowell brought on the siege of Yorktown which in turn destroyed McClellanfs campaign. Swinton hauever, wisely noted that "grave faults were committed both by the Administration and by General McClellan."4 Focusing strictly on high-level decision making, however, does not adequately answer the question. Certainly, the interaction between McClellan and his Commander-in-Chief is very important in understanding why Richmond did not fa11 in the summer of 1862. But this interaction is only one ~H.J.