Rational Criticism, Ideological Sustainability and Intellectual Leadership in the Digital Public Sphere

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78 International Journal of E-Politics, 5(1), 78-90, January-March 2014

Dounia Mahlouly, College of Social and Political Sciences, Faculty of Sociology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

ABSTRACT

This review postulates that today’s digital environments unveil an era of connectivity, in which digital communication devices exercise a general infuence on social interactions and public deliberation. From this perspective, it argues that connective practices are likely to affect two main components of the normative public sphere, namely rational criticism and ideological sustainability. Drawing on the case of the 2011 Arab revolutions, in which social media proved to have a strategic function, this paper illustrates the ideological heterogeneity of social networks. Additionally, this article considers how issues of rational criticism and ideological sustainability could be improved by regulating online interactions and proposes that the digital divide could act as a natural process of regulation for today’s connective and transnational public sphere.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Connectivity, Cyber-Activism, Digital Divide, e-Democracy, Ideological Sustainability, Intellectual Leadership,Public Sphere, Rational Criticism

INTRODUCTION democracies. Therefore, experts in the field of political sciences aim to anticipate the future With an eye to anticipating the effect of digital evolution of public administrations by defining technologies on representative democracy, online interactions between citizens and their research in the fields of politics, development governments. and public administration is examining how They explore all forms of online infra- public infrastructures can be adapted to meet structure that contribute to the establishment the needs of a participatory and collaborative of an e-democracy, such as e-governance or culture. Indeed, the connective and collaborative local e-participation projects. By doing so, they patterns generated by the use of social media and intend to identify structural differences between interactive communication devices has signifi- online deliberation and traditional forms of cantly increased the power of individuals within representative democracy. Simultaneously, their social environment. As such, it is likely development studies underline the potential to revolutionise the structure of representative benefits of digital technologies in developing

DOI: 10.4018/ijep.2014010105

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. International Journal of E-Politics, 5(1), 78-90, January-March 2014 79 countries and evaluate new ways of providing presents the argument that the mass of internet free access to information in regions facing a users failed in defending the libertarian values high level of digital divide. Alternative academic that inspired the web and did not manage to work in the field focuses on how to implement produce a sustainable and rational critique of successful e-governance in democratising the new transnational corporate hegemony. countries, which reduces the costs of public Secondly, this paper underlines some of the administration as well as the level of corrup- characteristics of online networks as specific tion, by providing direct communication flows social structures. As has been demonstrated between a government and its people. by Bennett and Segerberg (2011), connective Yet this research does not take into account networks tend to be particularly flexible and the existing patterns of online deliberation that versatile, which can affect the sustainability of have already taken shape among the community their ideology. In other words, beyond a lack of of internet and social media users. Indeed, it criticism, digital communication weakens the is now necessary to understand the effect of stability of political agendas in the long run. digital and connective culture on representative We might postulate that issues of rational democracy from a broader perspective. This criticism and ideological sustainability are requires investigating the internal structure of caused by that fact that the online public debate connective societies and identifying the factors is not subjected to any form of regulation (Fra- that contribute to the elaboration of a rational ser, 2005). By recalling the historical context and critical public opinion in the digital world. In in which Habermas (1962) sets the emergence this regard, social theorists have been discussing of public opinion, this paper demonstrates that the sociological transformations that came with the bourgeois public sphere was initiated by the emergence of connective and transnational intellectual elites, who exerted their intellectual networks. Opposing views have been expressed leadership over public discourses. This process regarding the effect of such networks on neolib- spontaneously regulated citizens’ deliberation eral societies. Whereas some experts argue that and assured the rational criticism essential to transnational communication flows preserve the the public sphere. Today, this theory appears freedom of expression inherent to democracy, to be particularly relevant and topical when it others claim that connective practices are deter- comes to interpreting the digital revolution as mined by the commercial interest of web corpo- well as some of the recent political changes oc- rations and fail at promoting an impartial public curring in the Middle East and for which social opinion. To some extent, both views confirm media played a significant role. The function of Habermas’ theory of the public sphere, as they digital media in the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian illustrate the process through which informa- revolutions leads us to think that, ever since the tion can be liberalised, whether it is politically eighteenth century, the liberalisation of infor- or economically. In order to contribute and mation has reached a critical point, and now build a macro theory about future participative affects the way the public debate operates. New democracies, this article reviews some of the forms of public mobilisations not only bring us studies that analyse online social interactions to rethink the normative public sphere but also from a Habermassian perspective and identifies to understand how democratising countries of two major differences between cyberspace and the digital era fit the Habermassian model of the normative public sphere: rational criticism the eighteenth century. Like the emergence of and ideological sustainability. Referring to the the press and bourgeois literature on the eve of theories of Cardon (2010), Flichy (2010), and the French revolution, access to digital media in Dean (2003) this paper demonstrates how in- countries such as Tunisia and Egypt stimulate ternet usage contrasts with the original project a democratic and deliberative culture. For this of the web pioneers who envisioned virtual reason, it is worth examining the digital and space as an alternative to neoliberal society. It transnational public sphere under the light of the

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. 80 International Journal of E-Politics, 5(1), 78-90, January-March 2014

2011 Arab revolutions. In this regard, this article connective and collaborative culture as we go will address the Tunisian and Egyptian contexts on to address the issues of rational criticism, with the purpose of analysing the correlation ideological sustainability and intellectual lead- between digital innovations and the democratis- ership in the digital era. ing process. More specifically, it illustrates the lack of ideological sustainability in the context of the Tunisian and Egyptian post-revolutions THE LIBERTARIAN UTOPIA and describes how the digital divide can act as OF A DIGITAL WORLD a natural regulator of the online public sphere. Historically, the dream of a collaborative democracy has been considerably influenced by the CONNECTIVITY AND libertarian culture of the sixties which inspired PARTICIPATORY CULTURE many pioneers of the digital industry, such as Stewart Brand, Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs Whereas Van Dijck (2013) essentially applies (Cardon, 2011; Flichy, 2011). As he traces the the concept of connectivity to social media, origins of the internet, Patrice Flichy (2006) this term could also be used to designate a recalls that the Arpanet project, which is well broader spectrum of online social practices in known as the first computer network and the pre- the context of web 2.0. For instance, Bennett decessor of the internet, was initially conceived and Segerberg (2011) refer to online activism collaboratively within a community of computer as connective action. Besides this, one could engineers. The collaborative dimension of to- argue that, in the context of technological day’s connective culture manifested itself at a convergence provided by the internet, the cul- very early stage in the technical architecture of ture of connectivity characterises mainstream the internet. As they created more opportunities media as well as digital media. In this regard, for cooperative projects, the pioneers of digital Robertson (2013) claims that social media have culture anticipated the use of the network and a significant influence on the news coverage of hoped to stimulate collective intelligence by mainstream media and television in particular. extending the limits of human communication This indicates that the culture of connectivity (Hiltz & Turoff, 1978). Before the application is not specific to the internet and potentially of digital technologies by the broad community qualifies the majority of the communication of users, the ideals and values promoted by the flows that contribute to shape public opinion initial designers of today’s connective envi- in the digital era. In a broader spectrum, con- ronment conveyed an utopia in which virtual nectivity can be interpreted as a paradigm societies were more democratic and enhanced characterising the sociological and political interpersonal relationships (Flichy, 2006). In his practices of the digital era. Accordingly, this book on Stewart Brand and digital utopianism, new communicative pattern will potentially Fred Turner (2008) describes the community explain a large proportion of future offline values behind the creation of the internet and and online social interactions. On the other acknowledges apparent similarities between the hand, the terms collaborative and participa- counterculture of the sixties and the emergent tory emphasize the interactive nature of digital cyber-culture of the nineties. Yet paradoxically, devices, as opposed to traditional media. The according to Turner the designers of our new concept of collaborative culture expresses the digital environment consisted in a small elite democratic values inherited from the pioneers of highly educated computer scientists who of the internet. It underlines the accessibility and appeared to be the only few individuals able flexibility of online information as well as the to understand the shape of future communica- bottom-up dynamics that typify online public tion networks. discourses. This is precisely how we distinguish

Among cyber-optimists (Oates, 2008), engines and content providers such as Google, Douglas Rushkoff (2003) has argued that the YouTube and Facebook. Despite the promising interactivity and connectivity of the digital development of collaborative work, open- era revolutionises human thinking and socio- source licenses, and free access information, political structures by establishing an open- the mass of internet users failed to exploit the source democracy. According to Rushkoff, the interactivity of cyberspace to create an alterna- collaborative culture of the digital era allows tive social reality and blindly reproduced their social reality to be perceived through multiple offline world online. Everyday life conversa- perspectives, which adds in complexity to tion progressively became an important part of human reflection. The digital revolution is online interactions between individuals, further comparable to the scientific discoveries of the affecting the original agenda. Overall, Cardon Renaissance, as it institutes a multidimensional insists that the democratisation of public debate perception of the world and inspires new modes has merged public and private spheres together of representation. Similar to Henry Jenkins and reduced the quality of deliberations. (2006) and his conception of the participatory Likewise, Jodi Dean (2003) identifies ir- culture, Rushkoff develops an optimistic vision reconcilable differences between the rational of cyberspace. He defines virtual spaces as an public sphere and today’s digital environment. alternative to neoliberal hegemony and claims This leads her to postulate that digital public that the online collaborative culture empow- spaces actually contribute to establish a com- ers consumers and citizens with the ability to municative capitalism, which maintains people shape their political and cultural environment. in the position of potential consumers. Demo- This approach precisely reflects the ideals and cratic governance today is highly dependent values that motivated the digital revolution, on a consumption-driven entertainment culture according to which free access information (2003, p.102) and technoculture, according and collective work break the dynamics of the to which new communication technologies neoliberal economy and renders users more enhance participative democracy. From this critical. Yet paradoxically, some social scientists perspective, she corroborates the arguments studying the evolution of cyberspace in the long of Cardon (2010) and supposes a positive cor- run argue that the technolibertarianism (Bor- relation between the use of the internet and sook, 2000) that inspired the digital revolution the expansion of global markets. According to sustains neoliberalism and promotes a form of Dean, the concept of publicity fails to activate communicative capitalism (Dean, 2003). Due substantial democratic deliberation and essen- to corporate interests underlying the culture tially legitimates communicative capitalism, of connectivity, social scientists progressively producing an illusion of the public sphere. In question the ability of digital technologies to this regard, she recalls that (in accordance with stimulate the rational deliberation essential to Habermas’ theory) the public sphere acts as a the public sphere. “decentralized model of sovereignty”, emanat- In his essay The Internet Democracy, ing from the people, (2003, 104) that provides Promises and Limits, Dominique Cardon (2010) legitimacy to social institutions and authorities. emphasises the contrast between the original Yet in the context of communicative capitalism purpose of the digital public space and its com- the fact that the opinion of the people is indirectly mercial function. The agenda of the pioneers driven by economic interests affects the role of was to develop a critical discourse on society in the public sphere as a critical counter-power: which everyone would be able to participate, in part thanks to anonymity. Cardon argues that the This is precisely my worry about the public libertarian utopia of the internet’s pioneers did sphere in communicative capitalism: the tech- not reach the broader community of users, who nologies, the concentrations of corporate power, indirectly contributed to the success of search the demands of financial markets, the seductions

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. 82 International Journal of E-Politics, 5(1), 78-90, January-March 2014 of the society of the spectacle that rule in and From Habermassian as the name of the public have created condi- Model to the Connective tions anathema to democratic governance. The Deliberative Framework subjectless flows are sovereign – and that is the problem. (Dean, 2003) As we can see, recent critiques of the connective culture condemns the fact that digital Consequently, Dean describes the internet media promote today’s neoliberal hegemony, as a specific kind of social infrastructure - a and by doing so, fail at stimulating a critical zero institution - to which different members public opinion among the communities of social can belong while assuming their individual media users. However, from a Habermassian identities. Collectivities and individualities are perspective, one can argue that liberalising constantly confronting each other on a global information actually trains citizens’ capacity to scale, which makes consensus very hard to express subjective views in a critical way. More reach. In providing the feeling of belonging to specifically, in the first stage of a democracy, a global and virtual space for deliberation, the liberalising public affairs meets the interest internet creates an illusion of freedom of speech of the bourgeoisie willing to gain political and rational deliberation, which is sufficient power and privatise markets. In The Structural to legitimate dominant ideologies. This leads Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas to a neodemocracy in which the criteria of the identifies this phenomenon by first describing normative public sphere are slightly transposed. the simultaneous evolution of private markets In order to develop a critical and rational public and private information networks in the early sphere, opportunities for contestation should eighteenth century: feed a sustainable critique of the dominant political climate and lead to a fully democratic Almost simultaneously with the origin of consensus. However, in the case of neodemoc- stock markets, postal services and the press racies, the process of deliberation is limited to institutionalized regular contacts and regular the stage of contestation. Consequently, even communication. […] These elements of early if information tends to be more transparent, capitalist commercial relations, that is, the traf- this new form of publicity fails at stimulating fic in commodities and news, manifested their an impartial political debate and maintains the revolutionary power only in the mercantilist hegemony of global corporations. Unlike the phase in which, simultaneously with the modern normative public sphere, the publicity of neode- state, the national and territorial economies mocracies is used to enhance the credibility of assumed their shapes. (Habermas, 1962) corporate powers and justify decisive action. From different perspectives, Cardon (2010) In a second stage, the fact that liberalis- and Dean (2003) both accentuate the fact that ing public debate meets the interests of a today’s digital era fails to improve citizens’ growing middle class assures the critical and criticism. Contrary to what suggests the digital democratising function of the public sphere. utopia, connective culture serves corporate Indeed, according to Habermas, this educated powers by maintaining users in the position social class has the intellectual resources to of consumers, while creating an illusion of lead a rational discussion on public matters. self-expression. Such interpretations have Indirectly, economic motivations stimulated been supported by the latest studies on social the democratic values of the Enlightenment and media (Van Dijck, 2013). According to these potentially preserve the quality and efficiency sources, one could assume that the quality of of the public sphere: public opinion would not be decreasing, if the original utopia of the collaborative cyberculture As soon as privatized individuals in their ca- had not been affected by corporate interests. pacity as human beings ceased to communicate

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. International Journal of E-Politics, 5(1), 78-90, January-March 2014 83 merely about their subjectivity but rather in contributors to public knowledge. According their capacity as property-owners desired to to Flichy, the most significant sociological influence public power in their common inter- change generated by internet and social media est, the humanity of the literary public sphere lies in the fact that amateurs gained credibility served to increase the effectiveness of the public in their fields of interest. Whereas experts and sphere in the political realm. [...] the interest of professionals were traditionally considered the the owners of private property could converge only reliable reference on any questions relating with the interest of the freedom of the individual to sciences, art, culture and politics; connective in general. (Habermas, 1962) media provided random amateurs with the opportunity to contribute to public knowledge. In Additionally, one could argue that the the context of politics, this phenomenon affects emancipation of individuals’ and citizens’ sub- the way the normative public sphere operates, jectivity that occurred within bourgeois societies given that internet users who shape public prefigured the social function that consumers discourses are not subject to the traditional were about to play in today’s capitalist and gatekeepers (Mc Combs, 2004; Cottle 2004). neoliberal economy. The role of economic and As opposed to Habermas’ model, today’s public corporate interests in the process of develop- opinion is not moderated by the members of ing a critical public sphere has been stated in any specific intellectual society. Amateurs can the initial theory of the public sphere, which potentially become leaders of the connective indicates that commercialising social interac- public sphere. Yet, according to Flichy, these tions through digital media is not affecting the new public figures provide unreliable arguments quality of public debates in itself. It is possible, and fail in discussing public matters in a critical however, that the exploitation of connective and rational way. Additionally, Flichy (2010) networks for economic purpose has reached a observes that the recognition of amateurs in critical point, after which it can no more improve the public sphere intensifies the diffusion of the quality of public opinion. Nevertheless, if political views. Due to the fact that connective the efficiency of the normative public sphere media target very specific audiences, opinions does not interfere with citizens’ criticism, other are expressed in a very scattered way and citi- criteria should be identified to anticipate the zens tend to interact exclusively with people distinctions between traditional forms of public that share a similar interpretation of the facts. deliberations and new connective structures. Consequently, different ideologies are hardly Examining the latest critiques of our connective confronted with each other on the same website environment in the light of the Habermassian and members of the connective public space bourgeois public sphere leads to identify two have only very few opportunities to assess, main criteria. The first criterion lies in citizens’ question and improve their arguments. Once ability to share their views and argue rationally. again, this phenomenon significantly alters Further to the fact that connectivity does not the quality and efficiency of the public sphere always reach its initial objective; to develop an (Flichy, 2010). alternative to the neoliberal hegemony, social Flichy concludes that online political en- scientists detected a lack of rational argument gagement tends to be less sustainable and does in digital interactions. not encourage debate between communities of citizens with opposing ideological views. He argues that the digital era has transformed POPULARITY OF THE ONLINE the traditional forms of political networks that DEBATES: A THREAT TO were active in the second part of the twentieth RATIONAL CRITICISM century. Whereas citizens previously engaged themselves in the long run to promote a party Patrice Flichy (2010) describes the digital era or an ideology, the amateurs of the digital era as the recognition of amateurs as legitimate

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. 84 International Journal of E-Politics, 5(1), 78-90, January-March 2014 operate from time to time to support specific render individuals’ political engagement more political projects in order to preserve their superficial. Flichy explains this phenomenon individual interests. on the grounds that the boundary between Again, this interpretation ascertains the private and public spaces is hard to define. In paradox that lies between the original digital a collaborative context, personal experiences utopia and the growing connective culture, as shared by private internet users are progressively it claims that bottom-up communication flows collected and interpreted by broader networks alters the quality of public opinion. Unlike the to promote a particular political message. In- libertarian values of the technoculture, it sug- dividuals partially contribute to larger social gests that, connective forms of public expression movements, without being involved in the should be filtered and regulated, as it is the case entire political process or understanding their for the press and mainstream media. In order strategic and ideological purpose. Furthermore, to preserve rational thinking, the public sphere in today’s connective environment, political should be structured by a formal hierarchy and organisations appear to be less exclusive and moderated by professionals and experts: “This citizens are likely to be affiliated with different online deliberative democracy works provided parties depending on their personal interests. that formalised rules are respected, accepted by This reveals another condition of the public the participants and reminded by moderators.” sphere that digital media have not yet fulfilled. (Flichy, 2010) This condition resides in the ideological Like Flichy, Nancy Fraser (2005) empha- sustainability of the views and opinions ex- sises the need for regulating connective com- pressed by internet and social media users. In- munications as she postulates the existence of deed, the flexibility of public opinion in a digital a transnational public sphere. By referring to context renders the range of political positions Habermas’ model of the public sphere, Fraser harder to visualise. This is precisely what has recalls that a critical public opinion inevitably been illustrated by some of the latest research on emerges within the context of a national sover- cyber-activism (Bennett and Segerberg, 2011), eign power, in order to maintain the democratic according to which new forms of political action balance between State authority and citizen are likely to be less sustainable in the long run empowerment. However, the global com- and harder to represent in the context of repre- municative infrastructure fails to facilitate an sentative democracy. Setting out an inventory of efficient public debate in which national policies the strategies employed by activists’ networks, are distinctively discussed and negotiated. This Bennett and Segerberg (2011) claim that new implies that transnational citizenship should manifestations of political engagement emerg- foremost be recognized and institutionalised as ing in cyberspace should now be assessed in part of a transnational democratic infrastructure. terms of their ideological sustainability. Their In other words, Fraser demonstrates that in study demonstrates the particular flexibility of order to comply with the Habermassian public connective networks as well as noting that, as sphere, transnational regulations should be ap- opposed to traditional forms of collective action, plied to connective interactions. Additionally, online activism enables members involved in a Flichy suggests that moderating these emerging common cause to express their individualities practices could also improve the quality of the within the group. Given that individuals can public sphere, not only regarding the rational- personalize the object of common interest, the ity of public deliberation but also by ensuring action becomes more fluid and is more likely ideological sustainability. to appeal to members from different social and cultural backgrounds. However, this indicates Ideological Sustainability that the outcome of connective action is less predictable and that its ideological message Among the weaknesses of online discourses, is not sustainable. Similarly, in the context of Flichy states that digital communication devices

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. International Journal of E-Politics, 5(1), 78-90, January-March 2014 85 global security, Hoskins and O’ Loughlin (2010) digital practices contradicts the original agenda demonstrate that the coverage of war by digital of collaborative culture by institutionalising media renders the causality of events harder online interactions. Consequently, we need to to interpret. New mass media provide publics identify the natural processes through which with the opportunity to record and compile online debate can be filtered and improved in every single event. By doing so, digital media terms of criticism, rationality and ideological generate diffuse interpretations of the facts and sustainability. prove to have a significant influence in foreign policy. As the narratives of war progressively become more diffuse, the outcome is less pre- CONNECTIVITY dictable, which makes the conduct of war by AND IDEOLOGICAL policymakers highly difficult. Like Bennett and SUSTAINABILITY: THE CASE Segerberg, Hoskins and O’ Loughlin suggest OF THE ARAB SPRING that the fluidity of online social interactions is The Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions perfectly hardly compatible with the traditional struc- illustrate the issue of ideological sustainability. ture of representative governments. Bennett One of the characteristics of the 2011 Arab and Segerberg therefore propose to normalise uprisings lies in the fact that social media and connective action, from the perspective of its connective action enabled protestors to gather potential ideological sustainability. Indeed, they from very different sociological backgrounds claim that the structural flexibility of connec- and political views. According to Bennett and tive networks requires assessing their ability Segerberg (2011) it is precisely the flexibility to stand for specific ideological views as well that provided the leaders of the revolutions to as their political efficiency in the long run and reach such a diversified audience. Yet beyond in accordance with the criteria of the emerging people’s will to remove Moubarak’s and Ben connective culture: Ali’s governments, post-revolutionary events demonstrated that the revolution was not mo- It is from the perspective particular to connec- tivated by any homogenous political ideology. tive action that it becomes fruitful to return On the contrary, it is probable that the strategic to [...] the general debate about digitally application of social media by revolutionar- networked dissent: the question whether such ies created an illusion of consensus, whereas action can be politically effective and sustained. Tunisian and Egyptian protests were driven [...] These concerns need to be addressed even by different and conflicting political agendas. if the contours of political action may be shift- In post-revolutionary Tunisia, 144 new ing: sustainability and effect are fundamental parties reflecting different political orienta- to assessing any collective action in the context tions applied to the Ministry of the Interior of popular democracy. Given the nature of con- before the election of the new Constituent nective action, then, it is imperative to develop Assembly, which indicates a considerable a means of thinking meaningfully about the diversity of ideological opinions among the capacities of sustainability and effectiveness population. Uppermost, the outcome of this in specifically networked action [...]. (Bennett election revealed a strong ideological contrast & Segerberg, 2011) between the young leaders of the revolution and the conservative party Ennahda that won the In other words, if the incapacity of virtual majority of the Constituent Assembly. Indeed, public spaces to produce efficient deliberation young Tunisian cyber-activists like Lina Ben is due to a lack of rational criticism or ideo- Mhenni (2011), who initiated the uprisings in logical sustainability, the answer is to apply favour of a liberal and modernist democracy, the proper rules and regulations on the proper scale. Again, however, assessing and regulating

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. 86 International Journal of E-Politics, 5(1), 78-90, January-March 2014 expressed their regret regarding the result of new cultural paradigm. Given that the digital the first democratic elections. revolution indirectly generates new commu- In Egypt, conflicts of interest between the nication patterns, one can suppose that such a different political actors have been even more distinctive feature might explain some of the significant, given the strong implication of the fundamental sociological and political changes army in the national economy (Paciello, 2011). of the twenty-first century. The demission of former president Moubarak encouraged the people to claim more and to express specific ideological views. The revolution EXAMPLE OF REGULATION only introduced a series of public demonstra- IN A CONNECTIVE tions illustrating the opposition between military ENVIRONMENT: and civilian interests. Moreover, as in Tunisia, INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP deeper ideological oppositions exist between AND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE some of the movements that contributed to At this stage, it is worth recalling that Haber- the success of the revolution (Masoud, 2011). mas’ model of the bourgeois public sphere, in For instance, the demands of young activists the democratising Europe of the eighteenth inspired by leading Egyptian liberals such century, relies on the intellectual leadership of as Mohamed El Baradei or Naguib Sawiris an educated elite. As demonstrated by Nancy contrast with the agenda of the traditionalist Fraser in her critique of the liberal public sphere parties like the Muslim Brotherhood and the (1991), Habermas conceptualises the emergence Salafi movement that succeeded in the 2011- of a deliberative culture as an elitist process 2012 parliamentary elections: through which bourgeois intellectual leaders held the privilege of expressing their views The pluralism (and attendant lack of leadership) publically. The nascent public discourses of of Egypt’s revolt has been hailed as its great salons and coffee houses as well as the argu- strength, but today it appears to be the pri- ments emanating from the press and literature mary obstacle to translating the revolt against were exclusively provided by a minority of Mubarak into a genuine democratic revolution. people able to argue their opinions rationally […] The country’s revolutionaries - liberal and and experiment with democratic deliberation. Islamist - will have to find some way of manag- Habermas specifies that the bourgeois public ing their differences if they are to have a hope sphere did not initially involve people deprived of bequeathing the legitimate government that of the intellectual resources needed to deliberate: Egyptians deserve. (Masoud, 2011) In relation to the mass of the rural population From the perspective of a connective cul- and the common “people” in the towns, of ture, this demonstrates that collective forms of course, the public “at large” that was being actions taking shape on social media uphold formed diffusely outside the early institutions of superficial social identities that do not annihilate the public was still extremely small. Elementary deeper socio-economic or political divisions. education, where it existed, was inferior. The This is precisely what we regard here as an proportion of illiterates, at least in Great Britain, issue of ideological sustainability. The case of even exceeded that of the preceding Elizabethan the 2011 Arab revolutions also shows that this epoch. […] The masses were not only largely phenomenon not only characterises online social illiterate but also so pauperized that they could interactions as opposed to offline sociological not even pay for literature. […] Nevertheless, and political practices. Indeed, cyber-activism with the emergence of the diffuse public formed is only one of the parameters that contributed to in the course of the commercialization of cul- the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolu- tural production, a new social category arose. tions. Yet the lack of ideological sustainability (Habermas, 1962) is likely to typify the era of connectivity, as a

By underlining the fact that the bourgeoisie While research like that of Dean and of the eighteenth century had exclusive access others cited above has revealed seemingly ir- to the public scene as well as to the intellectual reconcilable differences between public sphere resources required to contribute to critical de- and connective culture in Western established liberation, Habermas leads us to reconsider the democracies, Breuer (2012) and Iskander phenomenon of the digital divide from another (2011) show that, in Tunisia and Egypt, digital angle. Indeed, with regard to development devices stimulated the politicisation of younger studies, which investigate the perspectives for generations. According to the UN database, the electronic governance and e-deliberation in de- amount of internet users in 2010 reached 36.8% veloping countries, the digital divide has always of the population in Tunisia and 26.7% in Egypt. been seen as an obstacle to the implementation Comparatively, the same year, internet users of e-democracy (Chatfiel & Alhujran, 2009). represented 74% of the population in USA and However, by observing the achievements of 85% in United Kingdom. This confirms Breuer’s the online public sphere in Tunisia and Egypt argument and suggests that only a minority of during the Arab spring, one could argue that the the local population actively used social media intellectual leadership inherent to the bourgeois to lead protests and raise the attention of the public sphere is still prominent in countries that international community. Furthermore, the Arab show a high level of digital divide. Social Media Report published by Dubai School By conducting a survey among Tunisian of Governance (Mourtada & Salem, 2011) indi- internet users, Anita Breuer (2012) demonstrates cates that the average for Facebook’s penetration that the 2011 protests were covered and organ- in the Arab region at the end of 2010 was only ised by a young educated elite who managed 6.77%. Given the disproportion of internet and to draw the attention of the international com- social media users between Western societies munity, despite the media blackout imposed by and Arab democratising countries, one can eas- Ben Ali’s administration. Like the emancipation ily argue that the community of internet users of a critical public in the original theory of the involved in the 2011 Arab uprisings reflected the public sphere, digital technologies and social bourgeois public sphere. Indeed, this minority media contributed to the “politicization and mo- formed a homogenous sociological category bilization of the young urban middle class and of people who benefitted from the economic elites” (Breuer 2012). This digital infrastructure resources as well as from the education needed that enabled strategic communications between to access and produce online information. the minority of young educated activists, the This intellectual elite succeeded in leading a rural poor and the diasporas played a significant critical counter-power as well as an efficient role in the success of the Tunisian revolution: political action. This prompts the thought that the internet may be more likely to generate A surprising element of the Tunisian uprising democratic culture and critical deliberation in was its broad, cross-class support. As has been countries where educated middle classes have demonstrated, the Internet and social media easier access to digital technologies. As with significantly contributed to transcend geo- the issue of literacy and the lack of intellectual graphical and socio-economic boundaries and resources among the broader population in the facilitated collaboration among the alienated eighteenth century, the digital divide acts as a intellectual elite, the rural poor, and the urban natural filter or gatekeeper of the public sphere. middle class. It thus helped to remove one of It guarantees that the very few users participat- the central obstacles of collective action under ing in online deliberation have the intellectual authoritarianism, namely the lack of social capital to invest in the broader audience and interaction. (Breuer 2012, p.25) potentially recognise themselves as intellectual leaders. In this sense, digital divide functions as a natural regulator of the online public sphere and

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. 88 International Journal of E-Politics, 5(1), 78-90, January-March 2014 answers the need highlighted by Flichy (2010) efficient in terms of rationality. Furthermore, and Fraser (2005) to moderate cyberspace. this type of public debate fails in questioning the This observation helps to conceptualise dominant political environment and elaborating participative democracy on two different a sustainable opposition with a clear ideologi- levels. First of all, it partly explains why the cal identity. These issues of rational criticism online public debate reached a consensus and and ideological sustainability constitute fun- proved to be politically efficient in the case of damental differences between the normative Tunisia and Egypt, whereas social scientists public sphere and the emerging network of are still questioning the political outcome of new transnational public spaces. Identifying a participatory culture in digitally developed these parameters helps conceptualising future countries. Secondly, if the hypothetical correla- e-democracies, as it clarifies the reasons why tion between digital divide and intellectual lead- deliberation emanating from a digital environ- ership were to be confirmed after being tested ment is often hard to actualise efficiently in the empirically, this would annul the advantages context of a representative democracy. In fact, of participative democracy over representative it is worth remembering that the model of the democracy. Indeed, the natural regulation by bourgeois public sphere is naturally regulated an intellectual leadership of the digital public by the intellectual leadership of the bourgeoi- space remains a top-down structure and fails in sie, which suggests that hierarchical structures promoting the libertarian values of connective might be beneficial to democracy. culture. Besides these questions, the digital In the case of participative cyberspace, divide is not a solution in itself, as it prevents one can argue that the digital divide is an illiterate and digitally deprived people from equivalent to the intellectual leadership of experiencing deliberation. Nevertheless, as the bourgeoisie and acts as a natural regulator the intellectual leadership of the bourgeoisie of the online public sphere. This hypothesis played a significant role in promoting delib- seems particularly relevant in the case of the erative culture in established democracies, this Tunisian or Egyptian 2011 revolutions in phenomenon may still influence connective which the educated middle class developed a practices in democratising countries. strategic use of social media to communicate on behalf of poor and rural populations. One can argue that the digital divide – just like the CONCLUSION intellectual leadership of the normative public sphere – rendered public opinion politically The dream of a fully transparent public space efficient by leading citizens to a consensus in with no internal or external hierarchy empower- the first stage of the 2011 uprisings. However, ing citizens with more freedom of speech has the political instability and ideological divisions been achieved. However, this does not entirely following the revolutions perfectly illustrate the meet the original agenda of the digital culture, issue of ideological sustainability. Therefore, according to which users develop alternative the case of the Arab Spring does not ascertain ways of thinking and consolidate a critical that intellectual leadership or even less digital counter-power able to contest global corporate divide increases rational criticism or ideological hegemonies. In fact, the libertarian utopia that sustainability. However, it is worth noticing that inspired the designers of this growing digital the intellectual leadership of educated elites, culture contrasts with the reality of cyberspace. which can partly be explained by the digital This is not only due to the fact that digital divide, functions as a natural regulator of online communications contribute to the success of public discourses. As such, it is likely to improve transnational corporate powers, but also to the the political efficiency of public deliberation. fact that an entirely free and accessible public deliberation with no regulation might not be

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Dounia Mahlouly is a PhD. candidate in the College of Social and Political Sciences at the Uni- versity of Glasgow. Her PhD research investigates the perspectives for e-democracy in Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab Spring and explores the functions of e-governance and cyber-activism in the digital public sphere. She contributed to the project of the Adam Smith Research Founda- tion entitled “Google: The Role of Internet Search in Elections in Established and Challenged Democracies” funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). She received her bachelor’s degree in Russian, Arabic and comparative literature from the College of Arts and her master in media and communications from the faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of Geneva University.