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Target Development Standards UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CJCSI 3370.01B 6 May 2016 TARGET DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INTENTIONALLY BLANK) UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION J-2 CJCSI 3370.01B DISTRIBUTION: A, B, C 6 May 2016 TARGET DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS Reference(s): See Enclosure H for References 1. Purpose. The purpose of this instruction is to document DoD policy and standards for target development and target intelligence standards consistent with references A through AH. 2. Superseded/Cancellation. CJCSI 3370.01A, 17 October 2014, “Target Development Standards,” is hereby superseded. CJCSM 3370.01, 25 October 2013, “Target Graphics Standards,” and CJCSM 3375.01, 29 May 2014, “ Target Intelligence Data Standards,” are hereby canceled. CJCSI 3370.01B consolidates content from all three directives. 3. Applicability. This Instruction applies to the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, joint forces, DoD Combat Support Agencies (CSA), and joint activities. 4. Policy. See Enclosures A through G. 5. Definitions. See Glossary, Part II, Terms and Definitions. 6. Responsibilities. See Enclosure A 7. Summary of Changes. This instruction consolidates and updates guidance on target development standards, target graphic standards, and target intelligence data standards. Document updates include: a. Annexes have been added to provide specific details for the basic, intermediate, and advanced target development of each of the five target types. b. Vetting: Defines the timeframe for “EXPEDITED” target vetting. UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED CJCSI 3370.01B 6 May 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ENCLOSURE A -- TARGET DEVELOPMENT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ................................................................................ A-1 Introduction ........................................................................................... A-1 Command Relationships ........................................................................ A-1 Joint Staff (JS) Targeting ........................................................................ A-2 Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP), Intelligence Planning and Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB) .................................... A-3 Intelligence Community (IC) Organizations that Support Targeting ......... A-4 Intelligence Organizations that Support Targeting .................................. A-8 Other Organizations that Support Targeting ........................................... A-9 Allied and Coalition Partners ................................................................ A-10 ENCLOSURE B -- TARGET DEVELOPMENT OVERVIEW AND CONCEPTS .... B-1 Introduction ........................................................................................... B-1 The Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) and Joint Intelligence Requirements ................................................................................... B-1 Creating Effects in the Operational Environment .................................... B-3 Target Intelligence .................................................................................. B-3 Target Development Defined ................................................................... B-5 The Joint Targeting Cycle (JTC) and Target Development ........................ B-7 Target Taxonomy .................................................................................... B-7 Applying Defense Threat Assessments (DTA), Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), Target System Analysis (TSA), and the Targeting Taxonomy to the Target Development Process ........................................................... B-11 Target Intelligence Production .............................................................. B-15 Target Development Resources ............................................................. B-15 ENCLOSURE C -- TARGET SYSTEM ANALYSIS (TSA) ................................... C-1 Introduction ........................................................................................... C-1 Target System Analysis (TSA) Value ........................................................ C-2 The Target System Analysis (TSA) Process .............................................. C-2 Target System Analysis (TSA) Product Review or Modification Based on Assessment ...................................................................................... C-6 APPENDIX A -- TARGET SYSTEMS ..................................................... C-A-1 APPENDIX B -- TARGET SYSTEMS ANALYSIS PRODUCT FORMAT .... C-B-1 ENCLOSURE D -- TARGET DEVELOPMENT AT THE ENTITY LEVEL ........... D-1 Introduction .......................................................................................... D-1 Target Development Responsibility ........................................................ D-2 Coordinating Target Development .......................................................... D-2 i UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED CJCSI 3370.01B 6 May 2016 Types of Targets .................................................................................... D-3 Electronic Target Folders ....................................................................... D-5 APPENDIX A -- REMARK DEVELOPMENT .......................................... D-A-1 APPENDIX B -- TARGET DEVELOPMENT REMARK TYPES ................. D-B-1 ANNEX A -- FACILITY TARGETS ................................................D-B-A-1 ANNEX B -- INDIVIDUAL TARGETS .......................................... D-B-B-1 ANNEX C -- VIRTUAL TARGETS ............................................... D-B-C-1 ANNEX D -- EQUIPMENT TARGETS ......................................... D-B-D-1 ANNEX E -- ORGANIZATION TARGETS .................................... D-B-E-1 APPENDIX C -- ELECRONIC TARGET FOLDERS (ETF) STRUCTURE AND CONTENT .................................................................. D-C-1 APPENDIX D -- FEDERATED ELECTRONIC TARGET FOLDERS (ETF) PRODUCTION ............................................................ D-D-1 APPENDIX E -- SAMPLE TARGET DEVELOPMENT CHECKLIST ......... D-E-1 ENCLOSURE E -- VETTING, VALIDATION, AND TARGET LIST MANAGEMENT ...................................................................................... E-1 Introduction ........................................................................................... E-1 Procedures ............................................................................................. E-1 Target Lists in Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB) .......................... E-6 Removing Targets from Target Lists ........................................................ E-6 Target List Naming Convention ............................................................... E-7 APPENDIX A -- TARGET VETTING ...................................................... E-A-1 APPENDIX B -- TARGET LIST TYPES AND JUSTIFICATION ................ E-B-1 ENCLOSURE F -- AIMPOINT DATA STANDARDS .......................................... F-1 Introduction ........................................................................................... F-1 Joint Desired Point of Impact ................................................................. F-1 Non-Lethal Reference Point Data Standards ........................................... F-8 Weapon Characteristics Standards ....................................................... F-11 ENCLOSURE G -- GEOSPATIALLY ENABLED TARGET MATERIALS AND TARGET GRAPHIC STANDARDS ........................................................... G-1 Introduction .......................................................................................... G-1 Geospatially Enabled Target Materials (GETM) Database Standards ...... G-1 Target Graphics (TG) Standard Annotations .......................................... G-5 Target Graphics (TG) Standards for Basic Target Development .............G-15 Target Graphics (TG) Standards for Intermediate Target Development of Facility Target Types .......................................................................G-15 ii UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED CJCSI 3370.01B 6 May 2016 Target Graphics (TG) Standards for Advanced Target Development of Facility Target Types .......................................................................G-19 Target Graphics (TG) Standards for Facility Target Type Supplemental Graphics ........................................................................................G-29 Target Graphics (TG) Standards for Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) of Facility Target Types .......................................................................G-32 Deviation from Standard ......................................................................G-34 Magnification/Zoom Box ......................................................................G-34 Imagery Standards ...............................................................................G-34 APPENDIX A -- TARGET GRAPHIC EXAMPLES ................................... G-A-1 APPENDIX B -- JOINT DESIRED POINT OF IMPACT (JDPI) REFERENCE ILLUSTRATIONS ................................... G-B-1 APPENDIX C -- TARGET GRAPHIC STORAGE AND DISSEMINATION . G-C-1 APPENDIX D -- GEOSPATIALLY ENABLED TARGET MATERIALS DATA ATTRIBUTE TABLE EXAMPLE ......................... G-D-1 ENCLOSURE H -- REFERENCES ................................................................ H-1 GLOSSARY ...............................................................................................
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