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The Battle of Marathon, 490 B.C. by MARK HERMAN

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The Battle of Marathon, 490 B.C. by MARK HERMAN H I S T O R I C A L S C E N A R I O S The Battle of Marathon, 490 B.C. BY MARK HERMAN With some kibitzing and commentary from Richard Berg, as well as his version of how you should play the battle! For your pleasure and HISTORICAL recently concluded Ionian To that end the Persian edification we throw in a BACKGROUND revolt, the Athenians had not commanders devised a rather rather quick-playing simula- only provided aid to the neat little plan, a plan which Hoplite warfare is a rather rebels but had participated in relied on the very real tion of one of the great stolid affair. In most battles the burning of one of his possibility that the "opposi- "hoplite" battles of history: it's a question of whether provincial capitals, Sardis. tion" party inside Athens Darius decided to wreak a would react favorably to Marathon. This mini-scenario Phalanx "a" can outpush and outsnarl Phalanx "b". This, little revenge upon the Persian intervention. The takes about an hour to play for the most part, is why we upstart Athenians by sending Persians probably hoped that (there aren't too many chose not to begin our Great an army to punish the Greeks. their reputation and the effect Battles of History series with After all, Persia was, oh, of the eventual punitive counters), for which you can something like HOPLITE: maybe lOOx bigger in size and destruction of Athens would use either counters included Classical Greek Warfare. With resources than the little city convince the Greek city states on the hill. How much that it was better to "offer with Great Battles of History only a few exceptions, the scenario pickings alternate resistance could she offer? water and dirt", the classical, Module Nr.2 War Elephant or between dreary and grim. traditional act of political components from Marathon, one of the pivotal subservience, than face battles in classical history, is certain future retribution. The The Great Battles of one of those exceptions. Strategic View: more realistic Persian Alexander. Balance tends to The route of the expectation was probably that their expedition would In 490 B.C., Darius, The Great Persian Fleet. favor the Greeks, unless the destroy Athens and gather King of Persia, had pretty The Persian Expedition Persian cavalry much had it up to his curley, intelligence for some future was commanded by conquest of Greece. happens to wander in. oiled beard with the shenani- gans of the Greek city-states - Datis, a professional especially Athens. In the general of Medean The Battle of Marathon is descent. surrounded in myth. We are led to believe that a small heroic Athenian army stood alone against the hordes of Asia. In actuality, the Persians had sent what amounts to a Reconnaissance in Force, undoubtedly of decent quality. The size of the Persian invasion army is a subject of great debate, with estimates ranging as high as 100,000 men. In fact, given the Persian strategic aims, 20,000 seems far more reasonable and supportable. If one includes the oarsmen in the estimates, then the 20,000 figure is not that far off. In any case, the size of the land army was probably not much larger than the Greek army that they fought. I have used Delbruck's figures as the basis The Great Battles of History Series: Marathon for my interpretation of this battle. This puts Athens at around 7000 effectives, and Persia at about 8500, includ- ing the recalcitrant cavalry. The two opponents were fairly evenly matched in both quality and quantity. How- ever, their army composition reflected great differences in tactical doctrine. The Athe- nian force was composed entirely of that quintessential Greek Heavy Infantry, the Hoplite. And the hoplites were arrayed in that equally quintessential Greek forma- tion that took the greatest advantage of the hoplites' weapons (pikes), armour (heavy) and density: the phalanx. (In the game, I have rolled the small Plataean Like a Mede) was rather contingent directly into the uninspired, and much of their left-most Hoplite Phalanx.) a contingent of oligarches Operational View: success could be attributed to The Athenian heavy infantry who would betray the city to The Battle of Marathon, the quality of their cavalry may have had some light the Persians during a siege. September490 B.C. - and the massive incompe- forces guarding their flanks in Based on his advice, the Persians land in Attica tence of their opponents. Persians decided on a rather the heights, but they played but are repulsed by an no significant part in the ingenious stratagem. Instead There is no doubt that the Athenian army under battle. The Greek doctrine of marching directly to attack Persians were competently Mitiades in the Vrana was simple; line up in front Athens, they landed on the led. Theoretically, the of the opponent and launch Marathon plain 19 miles Valley. the Hoplites straight ahead, expedition was commanded northeast of the city. Their with the issue to be decided by Artaphernes, the son of the scheme was to draw the quickly by hand-to-hand satrap of Sardis. In actuality, Athenian army away from the re-embark and advance by combat. Datis, a professional general city so that the fifth-colum- sea the Athenians could fall of Medean descent, was in nists could take control on on their rear when they The Persian force was charge of operations. Athens, behalf of the Persians. attempted to withdraw. The composed of light infantry though, was fortunate to have Persians were left with only and light cavalry from all better - even extraordinary - The Athenian generals two options: fight or wait for over the empire. The Persian leadership in Miltiades, swallowed the bait. Upon the city to be betrayed to main battle line deployed Themistocles, Aristides, and learning that the Persians them. archers in ordered ranks, plus Callimachus. were landing, the Athenian a large contingent armed with army immediately set out to The Athenians also had two spears or swords but whose The campaign unfolded with intercept their landing, but basic choices: attack at the armor was very light, the Persian expeditionary arrived too late. The Persians first good opportunity, or consisting almost entirely of a force advancing toward were already ashore. The wait for possible Spartan wicker shield. The Persian Greece, attacking various Athenians now placed reinforcements. The Persians doctrine was to defeat their Greek city states (e.g., they themselves in a narrow may have felt that time was opponents using archery, a levelled Eretria) that had valley, Vrana, that flanked the on their side. If Hippias' doctrine that appeared to be assisted the Athenians in their Persian route of advance to supporters in Athens and driven by a burning desire to support of the Ionian rebels the city. The valley also within the Athenian force avoid shock combat. Once along the way. The Persians offered the Athenians could betray them to the they had driven off the enemy were being advised by the protection against the Persian Persians, a bloodless victory cavalry, the light cavalry was former tyrant of Athens, cavalry. Since the valley was could be won. As an Athenian to harass the flanks of the Hippias, who after his exile wider than the battleline, they navy had not yet been built, enemy main battleline. Even resided in the Persian court. used wooden abatis to extend the Persians, with 600 ships, at its best, the Persian system Undoubtedly, his knowledge their defensive positions. If had absolute naval su- of speed and harassment of the political situation in the Persians tried to march premacy and the ability to (Float Like a Phrygian, Sting Athens led him to inform his overland toward Athens the logistically support them- new employers that there was Athenians would fall on their selves for an indefinite time. flank. If the Persians tried to Marathon: The Great Battles of History Series The Phalanx: A formation of hoplites lined up in files, often eight deep. These files stood side by side in ranks, each file occupy- ing a 6 to 8 foot frontage. And those additional Spartan Hoplites, which they weren't, Persian cavalry starts off the ployed in front of you. hoplites would not solve the mostly to deny the Athenians map and appears randomly at Persian superiority in cavalry, Attack Superiority against some point during the battle. Delbruck has also overlooked the one "light" tactical system them and capture the essence Obviously, other historians another good reason why the against which a Hoplite force of what seems to have differ on this point. Athenians couldn't wait. would be vulnerable. (The occurred.) The Athenian Miltiades was a former Prince superiority of light cavalry to wings succeeded where the Delbruck views the Persian of the Chersonese (Gallipoli unprotected heavy infantry center had failed: they force as a swarm of archers peninsula) and also a former was a lesson that M. Publius destroyed the flanks of the who were forced to attack the vassal of Darius. He had fled Crassus learned almost 450 Persian army and then Athenians because of their back to Athens after his years later, at Carrhae.) reformed to destroy the untenable position. He feels it attempted betrayal of Darius Although Callimachus was Persian center. The victory absurd to believe the histori- was exposed, during the nominally the head general, was complete. The Persian cal accounts, because the latter's retreat from the failed Miltiades was the Athenians' withdrawal to their ships was Athenians would not have Scythian campaign. To make natural leader. Based on his probably accomplished initiated the battle prior to the matters worse, Miltiades had former position within the without Greek pursuit Spartans joining them.
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