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The Forging of a Strike Force (Part I)

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The Forging of a Strike Force (Part I) Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za THE FORGING OF A STRIKE FORCE (PART I) CENTRAL THEMES IN THE HIS TOR Y OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY 1980-1990 by Dr S Monick* Photographs by author (exept where otherwise stated) THE 1980s: THE SADF ASSUMES A gency, However, commencing in HIGH PROFILE AND 1978 a far more aggressive policy AGGRESSIVE IMAGE manifested itself; expressed in the cross-border pre-emptive raids di- rected against SWAPO bases in An- The principal theme in this article is an gola, The approach was motivated analysis of the central shaping forces in by the realization that the only truly the operational history of the South Af- effective method of defeating SWA- rican Army during the period 1980- PO was to strike at that organiza- 1990.1 These forces are embodied in tion's rear bases, disrupting the in- the revolutionary developments within surgents' logistic communications artillery (exemplified by the G5 and and other facilities and thus pre- G6) and the advent of mechanized in- empting their ability to wage guer- fantry. These huge technological rilla warfare within South West Af- strides, unprecedented in the history of rica, The policy attained expression South Africa's armed forces, implied in a series of spectacularly success- the most far reaching repercussions; ful attacks by highly mobile SADF specifically, in terms of a combination task forces, directed against SWAPO of vastly enhanced mobility and strik- bases".' ing power, in which artillery and in- fantry served as an integrated strike The full list of these operations is as fol- foce. The background, and indeed lows:2 motivation, underlying such develop- ments was an intense phase of military Reindeer (4-5 May 1978) activity, initiated in 1975 (in the form of Safraan (6- 11 March 1979) South Africa's - albeit limited - interven- Rekstok (6- 15 March 1979) tion in the Angolan civil war on behalf Sceptic (Smokeshell) (30 May-30 June 1980) of the coalition opposed to the ruling Klipkop (2 August 1980) MPLA, the role of the SADF being des- Pratea (23 August- 10 September 1981) ignated Operation Savannah), and be- Carnation (1981) gan to gather full momentum in 1978. Daisy (1 November-20 November 1981) Super (13 March 1982) This post Operation Savannah phase Mebos (July-August 1982) has been referred to in a previous arti- Askari (6 September 1983-13January 1984) cle by the author (1): J.M.C. (19 February 1984-25 May 1985) Boswilger (26 June-1 July 1985) 'In 1975 the SADF assumed respon- Egret (16-23 September 1985) sibility for the military security of Firewood (31 October-4 November 1986) South West Africa (as that territory Modular (August-December 1987) was then designated), Initially, a Hooper (13 January 1988-26February 1988) defensive posture was adopted in Packer (26 February 1988-30 April 1988) response to the SWAPO-Ied insur- Displace (30 April 1988-29 August 1988), I As the title implies, this theme is centred upon the South African Army. To endeavour to encompass the Air Force and Navy within the scope of the study would involve one of two serious disadvantages, both centred upon the problem of space. The first would necessarily involve a diffused, outline approach to the entire subject, and the dimensions offorce and concentration would be lost. Alternatively, if all arms of the SADF received equally detailed treatment during the period under review, the length would impose a wearisome burden upon the readers. Accordingly, the focus of the article is directed upon the South African army; more specifically, its infantry and artillery arms. 2 The writer is indebted to Mr Richard Henry, of the South African National Museum of Military History, for furnishing a complete list of these operations, and for so meticulously and conscientously collating the documentation relating to them. 20 Militaria 22/3 7992 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za 1__ -°" Statute miles ~--io--,~ 200 300 KEY . '--r:==T 1 Kilometres 0 I. 200:lO0 ~oo 500 lnternational_ •• _ •__ o SO 100 CONGO boundaries Railways II I I'll I I I I~. Roads Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za PART 1: STRIKES INTO ANGOLA operate on foot and participate in COIN (counter-insurgency) operations; In so far as the offensive strategy engaged in search and destroy act- adopted by the SADF during the pe- ions, On 24 August 1981 one force en- riod 1978-1989 is intimately related to tered Angola west of the Cunene River, the far reaching technological innova- advancing towards Xangongo from tions absorbed by the armed forces, it the west; whilst the second element is necessary to furnish some detail of moved into Angola to the east of the operations referred to above. Xangongo. Such an approach must, of necessity, be highly selective; due to the con- Angolan forces, despite being warned straints of space within an article which by air-dropped leaflets, attempted to must, unavoidably, be of some length. intervene, and several fierce fire fights Accordingly, it has been decided to erupted in the environs of Xangongo, select, for detailed treatment, oper- SWAPO and Fapla personnel wore ations which were executed at various identical uniforms, in accordance with intervals spanning the 1980s; viz Oper- a government regulation intended to ations Protea (1981), Askari (1983- conceal the presence of SWAPO ter- 1984), Modular, Hooper, Packer and rorists from the non-combatant popu- Displace (spanning the period 1987- lation, This rendered it impossible to 1988, which are discussed collectively, distinguish between regular MPLA for- and which signal the end of the South ces and their SWAPO 'guests', Every African military incursions into Angola). possible measure was adopted to avoid the civilian sector of the town, OPERATION PROTEA (1981) and civilians were warned by leaflets and loud hailers to vacate the area Operation Protea, spanning the period prior to the action, 20 August- 10 September 1981, was di- rected against the SWAPO insurgent Enemy losses and Soviet casualties bases of southern Angola, in the Xang- ongo area. The operation was the cul- Operation Protea represented the larg- mination of a series of seek and de- est mechanized operation undertaken stroy actions against the aforemen- by the SADF since the conclusion of World War II, The enemy's entire tioned bases. In the preceding actions the Security Forces had skirted around logistical system in southern Angola kraals, villages and administrative cen- was destroyed, tres without interference from MPLA The great success of the operation was forces. In one instance, troops on the graphically and unequivocally demon- track of SWAPO terrorists approached strated by enemy losses and the vast within a few hundred metres of Ongiva quantity of captured materiel. With re- without clashing with Angolan military gard to the former, combined SWAPO forces, civilians or officials. However, and Fapla losses amounted to approxi- the planned action against SWAPO mately 1 000, and some 28 prisoners bases in the Xangongo region con- were taken, Ten members of the SADF tained the very real threat of such a were killed. clash occurring. This potential source of conflict derived from the fact that Four Russians were killed in company the Russian advised SWAPO and MPLA with Angolan-SWAPO personnel, All military forces (the latter designated were wearing Angolan military uni- Fapla) were virtually integrated, their forms. They were: Lt Col Yevgnenii camps being indistinguishable, Thus, Victorovich Kireev, an artillery adviser; the planning encompassed the scen- Lt Col Joseph Lamonovich (surname ario of a South African vs Angolan mili- unknown), adviser to the polital com- tary conflict. missar; and two women (the wives of Lt Col Kireev and WO Pestretsov), Their Two task forces were established, The deaths could have been averted had one contained mechanized and mot- the convoy in which they were travel- orized infantry, who would thus be ling heeded the attempts of the Se- able to respond to any conventional curity Forces to communicate with it, forces ranged against the South Afri- The convoy made a break to the north cans. The other force was designed to east from Ongiva as dusk was gat- 22 Militaria 22/3 7992 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za hering and blindly rushed at the South the SAAF. With regard to the former, African troops who had been posi- the infantry fighting vehicle proved tioned to cut off escapes to the north that it could match the capability of east. Whilst these endeavours to com- Russian supplied tanks during the oper- municate were being made, the en- ation. emy convoy commenced enveloping movements, endeavouring to skirt The South African Air Force played a around both flanks of the Security key role in the operation, the SAAF's Force troops. The South African com- principal tasks being the provision of pany commander called for air sup- air cover for ground troops, However, port, and several enemy vehicles were it also performed a vitally important destroyed. Two further vehicles were preliminary function, During previous destroyed by ground troops. Darkness operations it had been found that intervened and the firefight ended. By Angolan early warning radar systems dawn of the following day, those who were alerting SWAPO anti-aircraft gun had not been killed had made their es- crews, and this was again confirmed in cape. the early stages of Operation Protea, In order to provide freedom of move- The presence of Soviet military advi- ment for South African aircraft during sers, stationed at Xangongo and Ongi- the support operations, it was thus nec- va, was further proved by the capture essary to neutralize the radar installa- of a Russian Warrant Officer, Nicolai tions alerting SWAPO.
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