Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za THE FORGING OF A STRIKE FORCE (PART I)

CENTRAL THEMES IN THE HIS TOR Y OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY 1980-1990

by Dr S Monick*

Photographs by author (exept where otherwise stated)

THE 1980s: THE SADF ASSUMES A gency, However, commencing in HIGH PROFILE AND 1978 a far more aggressive policy AGGRESSIVE IMAGE manifested itself; expressed in the cross-border pre-emptive raids di- rected against SWAPO bases in An- The principal theme in this article is an gola, The approach was motivated analysis of the central shaping forces in by the realization that the only truly the operational history of the South Af- effective method of defeating SWA- rican Army during the period 1980- PO was to strike at that organiza- 1990.1 These forces are embodied in tion's rear bases, disrupting the in- the revolutionary developments within surgents' logistic communications artillery (exemplified by the G5 and and other facilities and thus pre- G6) and the advent of mechanized in- empting their ability to wage guer- fantry. These huge technological rilla warfare within South West Af- strides, unprecedented in the history of rica, The policy attained expression South Africa's armed forces, implied in a series of spectacularly success- the most far reaching repercussions; ful attacks by highly mobile SADF specifically, in terms of a combination task forces, directed against SWAPO of vastly enhanced mobility and strik- bases".' ing power, in which artillery and in- fantry served as an integrated strike The full list of these operations is as fol- foce. The background, and indeed lows:2 motivation, underlying such develop- ments was an intense phase of military Reindeer (4-5 May 1978) activity, initiated in 1975 (in the form of Safraan (6- 11 March 1979) South Africa's - albeit limited - interven- Rekstok (6- 15 March 1979) tion in the Angolan civil war on behalf Sceptic (Smokeshell) (30 May-30 June 1980) of the coalition opposed to the ruling Klipkop (2 August 1980) MPLA, the role of the SADF being des- Pratea (23 August- 10 September 1981) ignated Operation Savannah), and be- Carnation (1981) gan to gather full momentum in 1978. Daisy (1 November-20 November 1981) Super (13 March 1982) This post Operation Savannah phase Mebos (July-August 1982) has been referred to in a previous arti- Askari (6 September 1983-13January 1984) cle by the author (1): J.M.C. (19 February 1984-25 May 1985) Boswilger (26 June-1 July 1985) 'In 1975 the SADF assumed respon- Egret (16-23 September 1985) sibility for the military security of Firewood (31 October-4 November 1986) South West Africa (as that territory Modular (August-December 1987) was then designated), Initially, a Hooper (13 January 1988-26February 1988) defensive posture was adopted in Packer (26 February 1988-30 April 1988) response to the SWAPO-Ied insur- Displace (30 April 1988-29 August 1988),

I As the title implies, this theme is centred upon the South African Army. To endeavour to encompass the Air Force and Navy within the scope of the study would involve one of two serious disadvantages, both centred upon the problem of space. The first would necessarily involve a diffused, outline approach to the entire subject, and the dimensions offorce and concentration would be lost. Alternatively, if all arms of the SADF received equally detailed treatment during the period under review, the length would impose a wearisome burden upon the readers. Accordingly, the focus of the article is directed upon the South African army; more specifically, its infantry and artillery arms.

2 The writer is indebted to Mr Richard Henry, of the South African National Museum of Military History, for furnishing a complete list of these operations, and for so meticulously and conscientously collating the documentation relating to them.

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1__ -°" Statute miles ~--io--,~ 200 300 KEY . '--r:==T 1 Kilometres 0 I. 200:lO0 ~oo 500 lnternational_ •• _ •__ o SO 100 CONGO boundaries

Railways II I I'll I I I I~.

Roads Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

PART 1: STRIKES INTO ANGOLA operate on foot and participate in COIN (counter-insurgency) operations; In so far as the offensive strategy engaged in search and destroy act- adopted by the SADF during the pe- ions, On 24 August 1981 one force en- riod 1978-1989 is intimately related to tered Angola west of the Cunene River, the far reaching technological innova- advancing towards Xangongo from tions absorbed by the armed forces, it the west; whilst the second element is necessary to furnish some detail of moved into Angola to the east of the operations referred to above. Xangongo. Such an approach must, of necessity, be highly selective; due to the con- Angolan forces, despite being warned straints of space within an article which by air-dropped leaflets, attempted to must, unavoidably, be of some length. intervene, and several fierce fire fights Accordingly, it has been decided to erupted in the environs of Xangongo, select, for detailed treatment, oper- SWAPO and Fapla personnel wore ations which were executed at various identical uniforms, in accordance with intervals spanning the 1980s; viz Oper- a government regulation intended to ations Protea (1981), Askari (1983- conceal the presence of SWAPO ter- 1984), Modular, Hooper, Packer and rorists from the non-combatant popu- Displace (spanning the period 1987- lation, This rendered it impossible to 1988, which are discussed collectively, distinguish between regular MPLA for- and which signal the end of the South ces and their SWAPO 'guests', Every African military incursions into Angola). possible measure was adopted to avoid the civilian sector of the town, OPERATION PROTEA (1981) and civilians were warned by leaflets and loud hailers to vacate the area Operation Protea, spanning the period prior to the action, 20 August- 10 September 1981, was di- rected against the SWAPO insurgent Enemy losses and Soviet casualties bases of southern Angola, in the Xang- ongo area. The operation was the cul- Operation Protea represented the larg- mination of a series of seek and de- est mechanized operation undertaken stroy actions against the aforemen- by the SADF since the conclusion of World War II, The enemy's entire tioned bases. In the preceding actions the Security Forces had skirted around logistical system in southern Angola kraals, villages and administrative cen- was destroyed, tres without interference from MPLA The great success of the operation was forces. In one instance, troops on the graphically and unequivocally demon- track of SWAPO terrorists approached strated by enemy losses and the vast within a few hundred metres of Ongiva quantity of captured materiel. With re- without clashing with Angolan military gard to the former, combined SWAPO forces, civilians or officials. However, and Fapla losses amounted to approxi- the planned action against SWAPO mately 1 000, and some 28 prisoners bases in the Xangongo region con- were taken, Ten members of the SADF tained the very real threat of such a were killed. clash occurring. This potential source of conflict derived from the fact that Four Russians were killed in company the Russian advised SWAPO and MPLA with Angolan-SWAPO personnel, All military forces (the latter designated were wearing Angolan military uni- Fapla) were virtually integrated, their forms. They were: Lt Col Yevgnenii camps being indistinguishable, Thus, Victorovich Kireev, an artillery adviser; the planning encompassed the scen- Lt Col Joseph Lamonovich (surname ario of a South African vs Angolan mili- unknown), adviser to the polital com- tary conflict. missar; and two women (the wives of Lt Col Kireev and WO Pestretsov), Their Two task forces were established, The deaths could have been averted had one contained mechanized and mot- the convoy in which they were travel- orized infantry, who would thus be ling heeded the attempts of the Se- able to respond to any conventional curity Forces to communicate with it, forces ranged against the South Afri- The convoy made a break to the north cans. The other force was designed to east from Ongiva as dusk was gat-

22 Militaria 22/3 7992 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za hering and blindly rushed at the South the SAAF. With regard to the former, African troops who had been posi- the infantry fighting vehicle proved tioned to cut off escapes to the north that it could match the capability of east. Whilst these endeavours to com- Russian supplied tanks during the oper- municate were being made, the en- ation. emy convoy commenced enveloping movements, endeavouring to skirt The South African Air Force played a around both flanks of the Security key role in the operation, the SAAF's Force troops. The South African com- principal tasks being the provision of pany commander called for air sup- air cover for ground troops, However, port, and several enemy vehicles were it also performed a vitally important destroyed. Two further vehicles were preliminary function, During previous destroyed by ground troops. Darkness operations it had been found that intervened and the firefight ended. By Angolan early warning radar systems dawn of the following day, those who were alerting SWAPO anti-aircraft gun had not been killed had made their es- crews, and this was again confirmed in cape. the early stages of Operation Protea, In order to provide freedom of move- The presence of Soviet military advi- ment for South African aircraft during sers, stationed at Xangongo and Ongi- the support operations, it was thus nec- va, was further proved by the capture essary to neutralize the radar installa- of a Russian Warrant Officer, Nicolai tions alerting SWAPO. This necessarily Feodorovich Petresov (whose wife, to implied also the elimination of the air reiterate, had been killed) when a col- defences protecting these systems, umn of 25 vehicles, including tanks, at- Both tasks were accomplished by the tempted to escape from Ongiva as SAAFwith most admirable efficiency. South African and South West African Security Forces were in the process of OPERATION ASKARI (1983-1984) capturing that town. Other Soviet per- sonnel known to have been stationed Operation Askari spanned the period 6 at Xangongo or Ongiva were: Lt Col December 1983-13 January 1984 and Feodr Antonovich Zhubrzhytsky, an was launched in order to pre-empt a 'adviser' to Fapla, and his wife; Maj planned infiltration of South West Af- Yuri Ivanovich Yegorov and his wife; rica by seven companies of SWAPO in- Maj Anatoli Josephovich Poznakhiro; surgents, totalling approximately 1 000 Maj Alexai Khoyerka and his wife; and men. Originally planned as a COIN Maj Vladimir Feodorovich Setenko. search-and-destroy mission, the oper- ation assumed a more conventional Captured materiel character as Security Forces reacted in self-defence against combined Cuban, A huge quantity of captured materiel Fapla and SWAPO attacks, the assail- accompanied the task forces on their ants being equipped with Soviet sup- return to South West Africa; sufficient, plied equipment (cf Part II). A marked indeed, to equip a small army. The en- characteristic of Askari was the pro- emy equipment included SAM-7 missiles tection afforded to SWAPO insurgents and launchers, amphibious tanks and by the Angolan army and Cubans, the latest Yugoslav 20 mm triple-barrel- there being strong evidence of direct led anti-aircraft gun; as well as a vast Soviet guidance and leadership. amount of small arms which included machine guns, sub-machine guns and Pre-empting a major SWAPO offensive rifles. The Soviet supplied weaponry was displayed at Oshakati, Headquar- Whilst Operation Askari was in progress ters of Sector 10 of the Operational several press briefings were issued by Area, and occupied several thousand Defence HQ in Pretoria, as soon as it square metres. Its value was estimated was evident that security was not en- at some R200 million. dangered. At a press conference held on 29 December 1983, presided over The Ratel and the role of the SAAF by Gen Viljoen and Lt Gen Gleeson, the former elucidated the motivation Two significant features of Operation underlying the incursion into Angola. Protea were the roles of the Ratel and He stated that the pattern of SWAPO

Militaria 22/3 7992 23 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za terrorist incidents during the past sev- guarded Lubango airfield. Surrounding eral years had revealed a peak in the the HQ area were zones named: the first quarter of every year; including Leningrad area; the Greenwell Matam- murder, abductions, sabotage, mine- bo Training Centre; and the Marxist laying and contact with the Security Training centre used for indoctrination Forces in the northern sectors of South purposes. Other SWAPO facilities in- West Africa. The principal reason for cluded a main logistical base, a vehi- the recurrence of this time schedule cle workshop, a transit base and a was the utilization by the insurgents of small logistics site. the rainy season as cover, the major incursions being effected by groups Bombing raids ranging in numbers from 100 to 600. The pattern was repeating itself to- On the morning of 29 December 1983, wards the end of 1983, indications four SAAF aircraft bombed the HQ pointing to a SWAPO escalation in area with pinpoint accuracy. The pur- strength preparatory to incursions early pose of these bombing raids was to in 1984. Intelligence indicated that as disrupt SWAPO's ability to control op- many as 1 000 terrorists were being as- erations (including the new offensive). sembled, retrained and prepared for Total surprise was achieved and all air- the intended infiltration; with Lubango craft returned unscathed. Also at- once again being used as the SWAPO tacked by the SAAF was another static Headquarters, from whence a new SWAPO infrastructure; the 'western campaign would be controlled. Lt Gen front' HQ near Cahama, some 200 in- Gleeson also stated that the region surgents occupying a base close to this which was the subject of South African HQ. When the SAAF attack com- attacks accommodated not only the menced, the terrorists, it was reported HQ of SWAPO's 'central area' but also by the local population of the area, elements of such units as the 'Moscow fled to Cahama. Battalion', the 'Red Square unit', the 'Bravo' and 'Shield Battalions'; in addi- Sophisticated enemy anti-aircraft de- tion to seven companies which were to fences spearhead the planned incursion. During air reconnaissance miSSions to This information (confirmed during Op- locate the 'western front' HQ, heavy eration Askari) that SWAPO was con- anti-aircraft fire was experienced by forming to its familiar pattern, and de- SAAF crews against whose aircraft the ploying a force hitherto unprece- latest Soviet anti-aircraft missiles were dented in strength, rendered it impera- launched. Tangible proof of the pre- tive 'to engage in a pre-emptive op- sence of SAM-9 missiles deployed in eration against the their latest offen- that region was dramatically illustrated sive' (to quote the words of Gen when the head of one such missile was Viljoen at the above cited press con- found in the tail of one of the Impalas ference). Gen Viljoen stated that intel- engaged in the aerial reconnaissance. ligence reports concerning the forth- Also in the Cahama area, SAM-8 mis- coming SWAPO offensive were proven siles were fired fruitlessly against SAAF to be correct when seven companies aircraft. These missile sites were totally of insurgents were off-loaded from eliminated by artillery and aircraft heavy military vehicles south-east of bombardment. Jamba and advanced initially east, and then subsequently south towards Search and destroy operations South West Africa, from Angola. These movements unequivocally pointed to Simultaneously, search-and-destroy the initiation of SWAPO's 1984 offen- missions were relentlessly executed by sive. South African ground forces in a region some three-quarters of the size of the The nerve centre of the South African United Kingdom; an area, moreover, offensive was the SWAPO 'defence characterized by dense vegetation, a headquarters'; and a well dug-in com- virtual absence of all roads (the rainy plex in an area measuring some 500 season, furthermore, rendering move- metres square, close to the heavily ment and tracking extremely difficult)

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and sparsely populated, The strategy seven companies, referred to above, centred upon the pinpointing of ter- was planned and controlled from this rorists who were removed from the pro- headquarters, Cuvelai also served as tection of Fapla cover. Some 60 terror- an important logistic storage area and ists were killed in isolated skirmishes, the Security Forces captured large The South African approach was also quantities of weapons and ammu- directed towards locating caches of nition, For all the above reasons, arms planted in advance of the Cuvelai formed a keypoint in SWAPO's planned incursion. Lacking vehicles to offensive in South West Africa; a point transport them, SWAPO adopted the confirmed by the captured SWAPO practice of concealing weapons (es- commissar (cf above). pecially mines) along their infiltration routes. At the press conference of 29 The SWAPO-Cuban attack, charact- December 1983, referred to above, erized by a markedly aggressive spirit, Gen Viljoen stated that the number of spanned the period 3-6 January 1984, troops on the ground did not extend The attack was successfully repulsed beyond one platoon for every 45 and a total of 324 of the enemy killed, square kilometres; and, whilst the ob- The casualties included not only SWA- ject was to thwart the planned incur- PO, but also Cuban soldiers; two bat- sion, the possibility that small groups of talions of the latter serving as reinfor- insurgents might break through the cor- cements at Cuvelai, The successful don and successfully cross the border South African response was seriously into South West Africa could not be dis- disadvantaged by the poor 'weather counted, It was also feasible that the conditions, which reduced the coun- terrorists might retreat deep into the in- tryside, in many regions, to a rain sod- terior of Angola, and try once again to den quagmire (through which the SADF infiltrate South West Africa, forces had to effect a painfully slow withdrawal into South West Africa), An A political commissar, captured at especially noteworthy feature of the Cuvelai (cf below) stated that the engagement was the dominant role COIN operations of the South African played by enemy armour; specifically forces had proved so successful that a T54 tanks, of which 11 were destroyed large segment of SWAPO forces had by the Security Forces, A Russian tank returned to their rear bases, in order to was responsible for the most serious loss avoid becoming trapped in clashes incurred by the South Africans, in terms with the Security Forces, They even of equipment, Thiswas a Ratel infantry feared that their bases deep within the combat vehicle, destroyed whilst its Angolan interior would be attacked by guns were in action against the en- the SADF, emy; after being trapped in a mine- field, It was destroyed by the T54, the Cuvelai shells of which struck the Ratel broad- side, killing five members of the crew, Details of the action at Cuvelai were furnished in a statement issued during At a media briefing held on 13 January the early hours of 7 January 1984, fol- 1984, Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) Meiring lowed by a press conference, On 3 (then GOC of the SWA Territory Force, January a combined Cuban and An- subsequently Chief of the Army) brief- golan force attacked Security Forces ed the press, He stated that at Cuvelai whilst the latter were conducting oper- the South African strength consisted, ations against elements of SWAPO's essentially, of one battle group, which seven companies in the area of Cu- had to confront an entire brigade; in- velai, a hamlet. The enemy assault oc- cluding a company of tanks, which curred whilst Security Forces were op- was annihilated, The SADF task force erating against a SWAPO base and was outnumbered by five to one in tactical HQ some four km north-east of that sector. Cuvelai. It was subsequently revealed that the SWAPO leader element was Quiteve and Caiundo headquartered at Cuvelai, housed with their Cuban and Angolan coun- At the press meeting of 13 January terparts. Further, the movement of the 1984 Maj Gen Meiring also briefed the

Militaria 22/3 7992 25 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za press concerning actions at Quiteve and, most importantly, in the continous and in the Caiundo sector. With re- protection which SWAPO received gard to the former he stated: from the Angolan Army, who deployed sophisticated Soviet weaponry under 'We also acted against certain Cuban-Russian guidance. Marked ex- SWAPO elements in the township of amples of this process were the role of Quiteve. It is not even a hamlet, just the T54 tanks and the AGS-17 grenade a point on the map ... one little launcher; cf below. shack. We were attacked by forces from Mulondo. These forces were OPERA nONS MODULAR, HOOPER, also repulsed. We stabilized the PACKER AND DISPLACE area round Quiteve and subse- quently withdrew from the area.' In the August of 1987 South Africa des- patched a force into south-eastern An- Referring to the engagement in the gola in support of the anti-MPLA fac- area of Caiundo, Maj Gen Meiring re- tion, UNITA. This force was originally in- marked: tended mainly to halt an impending of- fensive by the Angolan Army (Fapia) 'Towards the east we were acting against UNITAbase areas. Thiswas ulti- against one of the known routes. mately repelled on 3 October 1987, We sent a reconnaissance element when the 47th Brigade of Fapla was up. About 12 km from the township destroyed on the banks of the Lomba of Caiundo this element fell into an River. South Africa then resolved to ex- ambush by Fapla forces. We lost tend these operations, with the object some people there and one was of pre-empting a renewed offensive in captured. We reacted by bombing 1988. The underlying intention was to and strafing the enemy forces in gain time for new political develop- and around the township. We also ments to take effect in the region. Ac- subsequently withdrew from that cordingly, with the object of nullifying area.' SWAPO/Fapla offensives, the South Afri- can forces drove the Fapla forces Concluding observations on Operation back to their launching points for fu- Askari ture assaults and in the process cre- ated the most formidable minefield In the course of Operation Askari the barrier in future years. The South Afri- Security Forces lost 21 men killed in re- can forces remained in south-eastern turn for an estimated 400-500 enemy Angola for 12 months. Their strength dead (324 being lost in a single battle, never exceeded a real brigade of Cuvelai; cf above) and also destroyed some 3 000 men. Probably the most a number of Soviet tanks and other striking feature of this campaign was equipment, including anti-aircraft in- the dominant role assumed by the stallations. Several tons of enemy South African artillery; specifically, the weaponry were captured; items which role of the G5 gun-howitzer which, ca- could not be moved being destroyed. pable of a range of 40 km, dominated The surviving SWAPO terrorists fled in the battlefield throughout the opera- confusion northwards. The SADF had tions, The newly developed gun in- clearly prevented the western units flicted severe damage on Fapla, ham- and HQs from penetrating further south pered their tactical and logistical than Cahama and had forced SWAPO movements; immobilized brigades pre- units in that area into a definite defen- paratory to attack by South African sive role. mechanized forces and UNITA infantry; and rendered the important air base Operation Askari confirmed the unmis- at Cuito Cuanavale totally inoperable. takeable impression gained in Protea; viz the integration between the MPLA The campaign thus formed a fitting cli- forces and SWAPO insurgents. This as- max to a decade characterized by the pect was expressed in the close prox- dominance of the artillery arm.3 The imity of the two forces respective' HQs; fighting also witnessed the first opera-

3 Brig M S du Toit commented [conversation with S Monick: 14 March 1992] that the fighting was the very first occasion in the history of the SADF in which the issue was decided by artillery alone.

26 Militaria 22/3 7992 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za tiona I use of the Olifant, a modernized Both underpinned the Marxist MPLA version of the Centurion tank, as well during the Civil War and subsequent as the G6. Moreover, several South Af- South African intervention on behalf of rican weapons underwent operational UNITA and other anti-MPLA factions; testing in this fighting; viz the Seeker whilst, during the same decade, Soviet RPV (a new anti-tank mis-sile), and the forces invaded and occupied Afghani- 'smart bomb' that de-stroyed the stan. This expansionist policy obviously bridge at Cuito, Further, it is not widely could not survive the collapse of its known that the Mirages and Bucca- main protagonist, the USSR,) neers of the SAAF flew sorties against Fapla brigades and their supply routes, Such active support and intervention incurring the loss of only two aircraft, on behalf of SWAPO necessarily im- These attacks were undertaken in the plied the enhancement of the scale of face of some of the most modern air the conflict, absorbing advanced defence equipment in service any- weaponry and encompassing highly where, and confronted by a large sophisticated anti-aircraft missile sys- number of Mig 23s, The operations tems, armour and artillery, ecompassed by this campaign were designated Modular, Hooper, Packer One may detail certain of these wea- and Displace, pons within the context of ground combat. THE DIMENSIONS OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE ARTILLERY ENHANCED The 122 mm BM-21: The 122 mm 40- The operations detailed above exemp- tube BM-21 multiple rocket launcher lify the central features of SADF oper- was for many years the unsurpassed ations during the 1980s. First, and most weapon of its type, It was first seen in importantly, the incursions into Angola public during a parade in Moscow in necessarily highlighted a new and pre- 1964, It is simply constructed and ro- ponderant emphasis upon conven- bust, firing an effective 78 kg rocket at tional warfare, pivoting upon mobile a maximum range of 20 500 metres, task forces. Whilst such forces included The BM-21 also fires a short rocket with components directed towards search- a range of 11 000 metres, In the serv- and-destroy COIN missions, the ar- ice of the Soviet army it is mounted on moured units also played a prominent the Ural-375 truck, an exceptionally re- role, Repeated references have been silient vehicle possessing good cross- made above to the vital supporting country capability, This variant is the role of mechanized infantry, deployed most common export version in service in Ratels, with Fapla. In this form it weighs 11,5 tons. The truck has a road speed of 75 The second major theme which emerg- km/h, and a road range of 600 km, es from a study of these raids is the fre- The BM-21 served as the 'role model' quent impossibility of differentiating for the South African 127 mm multiple between SWAPO - the focus of the rocket system (cf below) after a BM-21 South African incursions - and regular had been captured in Angola, Angolan forces; the latter equipped and trained by Cuba and Soviet-East- 76 mm anti-tank gun: Manufactured in ern bloc states, (Within this context, it China, the 76 mm anti-tank gun Type should be borne in mind that the orien- 54 is a direct copy of the Soviet 76,2 tation and policy of the former Eastern mm Divisional Gun M1942 (ZIS-3), The bloc states - under Soviet inspiration 76,2 mm gun was introduced in 1942 and leadership - has obviously under- and was the final variant in a long se- gone a most drastic transformation ries of 76,2 mm field guns which can be concomitant upon the demise of the traced back to the dawn of the 20th USSRand the resultant death of the Century. It was subsequently devel- Warsaw Pact. The 1980s were charac- oped for use in armoured fighting vehi- terized by a powerful Imperialist, ag- cles such as the T-34/76 medium tank gressive expansionist policy on the part (cf below) and the KV-1 heavy tank; of Cuba and the Soviet-Eastern bloc. and, following the end of World War II,

Militaria 22/3 7992 27 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za the PT-76 light amphibious tank, It also veillance radar. The Gun Dish radar forms the main armament of the SU-76 has a range of 20 km. It is deployed self-propelled gun. The carriage of the with forward mechanized units toge- 76,2 mm Divisional Gun M1942 (ZIS-3) is ther with SA-9 or SA-13 SAM (Suface-to- identical to that of the 57 mm anti-tank Air Missile) systems. First encountered gun M 1943 (ZIS-2) but the former has a in the Middle East War of 1973, it is a shorter barrel with a double muzzle very effective system, although its ra- brake, The ZIS-3 fires the following dar is prone to clutter when engaging fixed ammunition: APHE (UBR-354B)pro- low-flying aircraft. The ZU-23 is a clear jectile, weighing 6,5 kg, with a muzzle weather system with no provision for velocity of 655 m/sec which will pen- radar fire control. The weapon fires etrate 69 mm of armour at a range of 1 two types of ammunition; the API-T 000 metres; HE (UO-345 AM) projectile, (B2T) and HEI-T(MG 25). The API-T pro- weighing 6,2 kg, with a muzzle velocity jectile weighs 0,189 kg, has a muzzle of 680 m/sec; HEAT(UBP-354 M) projec- velocity of 970 m/sec and will pene- tile weighing 4 kg, with a muzzle veloc- trate 25 mm of armour at a range of ity of 325 m/sec which will penetrate 500 metres, The HEI-Tshell weighs 0,19 120 mm of armour at a range of 1 000 kg and has a muzzle velocity of 970 m/ metres; H VAP (UBR-354P) projectile, sec, The gun was first introduced in weighing 3,1 kg, with a muzzle velocity the Soviet Army in the 1960s,on a scale of 965 m/sec, which will penetrate 92 of 24 per airborne division, 12 in the di- mm of armour at a range of 1 000 me- visional artillery element and four in tres. each of the three airborne rifle regi- ments. 82 mm 8-10: The B-lOis alight, recoil- less anti-tank gun, mounted on a small 122 mm Howitzer 0-30: This gun weighs two-wheel carriage. Transported in a only 3,15 tons and can be rapidly de- truck, it fires a 3,6 kg hollow charge ployed in action, The weapon was in- round at 320 m/sec, with an effective troduced into service with the Soviet range of 500 metres. This round can Army in the early 1960s, superseding penetrate up to 200 mm of homo- the 122 mm Howitzer M 1938 (M-30), geneous steel. The gun has a rate of The main improvements over the earlier fire of six rounds per minute, As with all weapons are increased range and the recoilless weapons, it is clearly visible ability to quickly traverse the weapon 0 as the result of the cloud of smoke and through 360 , facilitated by the cru- dust that it generates upon firing, ciform mount, An unusual feature of the D-30 is that the recoil system is 130 mm M-46: This is an impressive mounted over the barrel. The D-30 fires weapon that fires a 33,4 kg shell at a the following variable charge, case- range of 27 000 metres with accuracy, type, separate loading ammunition: HE Until the advent of the South African projectile, weighing 21,8 kg with a muz- G5, the only gun that offered a su- zle velocity of 690 m/sec; HEATprojec- perior range was the American 175 mm tile weighing 14,1 kg with a muzzle ve- M- 107, The M-46 weighs 7,7 tons and locity of 740 m/sec that will penetrate has a split trail carriage. Possessing a 460 mm of armour; chemical, smoke rate of fire of six rounds per minute, it and illuminating rounds. can be deployed in the direct fire and anti-tank roles, although its size does ARMOUR not ideally suit the weapon to these functions. The weapon was developed T-34j85 medium tank: The first Soviet T- during the early 1950s and was first 34 production tanks were completed in seen in public during the 1954 May Day June 1940, and the model was desig- Parade, It replaced the 122 mm M1931 nated the T-34/76A. Towards the end (A-19) Field Gun, The M-46 is ballis- of 1943 the T-34/85-1 was developed, tically similar to the 130 mm guns used This type consisted, basically, of the by the Soviet Navy, hull of the T-34 tank developed to the prototype stage in 1942-1943 and fitted ZU-23-4: The ZU-23-4 anti-aircraft gun is with a turret developed from that fitted a self-propelled tracked quadruple 23 to the KV-85 tank mounting an 85 mm mm gun system that carries its own sur- gun, Trials proved successful and pro-

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duction commenced late in 1943, the Soviet Army from 1954 until gradually first production tanks being com- displaced by the T-62 during the mid- pleted early in 1944. It has been esti- 1960s. T-55s remain in service with -sec- mated that, by the end of the War, 40 ond line units of the Soviet Army and 000 T34s had been produced. In 1947 were extensively used by the USSR'sal- the T-34/85-11 was introduced. This lies during the period subsequent to model was essentially the same as the 1970. The T-55 is a tough, reliable tank original T-34/85-1, but incorporating im- that, manned by an efficient crew, re- provements in armour and fire con- mains a formidable threat, despite its trols, as well as a modified transmission. 35 year vintage. It weighs 36 tons and By the time that production was ter- is powered by a 520 hp diesel engine, minated, in 1964, a further 12 000 tanks capable of a maximum speed of 50 had been built. km/h. Its road range is 300 km. The T- 55 is armed with a 100 mm gun that Its armament originally consisted of the fires an armour piercing round at a M- 1943 (05- T85) gun, but this was soon muzzle velocity of 900 m/sec. It can replaced by the M1944 (ZIS-S53)wea- threaten even modern tanks from the pon. This gun is 54,6 calibres long and sides, although no longer frontally. The fires the same ammunition as the 85 normal ammunition load is 43 rounds. mm field guns, 85 mm anti-aircraft guns The armour is not proof against current (except the special anti-aircraft ammu- western tanks and anti-tank weapons, nition) and the SU-85 assault gun. Its but does nevertheless provide good practical rate of fire is 3-4 rounds per protection against other counter minute. The following types of ammu- measures on the battlefield. nition are used: APHE with a 9,3 kg pro- jectile, possessing a muzzle velocity of INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES 792 m/sec, which will penetrate 102 mm of armour at a range of 1 000 me- BMP-l: The BMP-1 was the first true in- tres; HE with a 9,5 kg projectile, muzzle fantry combat vehicle in service, and is velocity of 792 m/sec and a maximum the Soviet counterpart of the Ratel. range of 13 300 metres at an elevation The BMP-1 (Bronevaya Maschino Pie- of +25°; and HVAP with a 5 kg projec- khota) was developed in the early tile, muzzle velocity of 1030 m/sec, 1960s as the successor the BTR-50Pse- which will penetrate 130 mm of armour ries of tracked armoured personnel at a range of 1 000 metres. A 7,62 mm carrier. The BMP-1 was publicly dis- DTM machine gun is mounted coaxially played for the first time during the 1967 to the right of the main armament and November Parade in Red Square, Mos- there is a similar weapon in the bow of cow. For a short period it was desig- the tank on the right side. The DTM is nated the M-1967, and subsequently fired from a horizontal magazine with a the BMP-1. Its correct Soviet designa- capacity of 63 rounds. The tank's maxi- tion is now known to be the BMP-1. mum speed is 55 km/h; its maximum range by road is 300 km and cross- The hull of the BMP-1 is made of all country 209 km. welded steel, providing the crew with The T-34 is considered by many to be protection against small arms fire and the finest all-round tank of World War II, shell splinters. Compared with the and its appearance on the battle front Ratel, however, the BMP-1 is thinly ar- was the principal factor motivating the moured. However, according to development of the German Panther American reports the armour provides tank. Subsequent to the end of World complete protection from 12,7 mm AP/ War II the T-34 has seen combat in Ko- API rounds over its frontal arc. rea, Vietnam, the Middle East and, of course, Angola. It is no longer in front- The main armament of the BMP-1 is a line service in any of the former War- 73 mm model 2A20 smooth-bore, low saw Pact countries but is still used in pressure recoil gun, which weighs 115 training and large quantities are held kg. This is fed from a 40-round ma- in reserve. gazine to the right rear of the gunner. The weapon fires a fixed fin-stabilized T-54/T-55: The T-55 and the earlier T-54 HEAT round with an initial velocity of were the standard battle tanks of the 440 m/sec which increases to 665 m/

Militaria 22/3 7992 29 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za sec once the projectile has left the previously not been seen beyond the barrel and a rocket motor cuts in, The confines of the USSR, Several 30 mm effective range is 1 300 metres, Ac- AGS-17 grenade launchers were cap- cording to American reports, the wea- tured in the course of Askari. Up to the pon is not effective in high winds, time of its appearance in southern An- which deflect the path of the pro- gola it had been issued only to Soviet jectile, Maximum rate of fire is 8 military units. Codenamed Plamya rounds per minute, Positioned ('Flame') the AGS-17 is a belt-fed gre- coaxially to the right of the main arma- nade launcher possessing a capacity ment is a 7,62 mm PKT machine gun, of 29 rounds, operated on a blowback which is fed from a continuous belt of 2 system, Variants are reportedly 000 rounds honeycombed in an ammu- mounted on vehicles and in heli- nition box positioned below the copters, The weapon fires a 35 g gre- weapon, Mounted above the main ar- nade with an effective range of 800-1 mament is a launcher for a Sagger 200 metres, with a maximum of 1 750 wire-guided anti-tank missile, One mis- metres, Thisweapon was introduced in sile is carried in the ready to launch 1975, and hitherto had been issued to position; whilst a further two missiles are only some units of the Soviet Army, carried in the turret, which are loaded by means of a loading rail through a CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS hatch in the forward part of the turret ON PART I roof, Two additional missiles are con- tained within the hull, The vehicle is The majority of these weapons were also armed with a single RPG-7 anti- first encountered in the course of Op- tank grenade launcher and one BMP-1 eration Savannah, It is necessary to in each platoon carries an SA-7 Grail bear in mind that, although the wea- SAM, which is launched by one of the ponry discussed above did not repre- infantrymen standing up in the troop sent the very latest military technology compartment with one hatch open, (in the main dating from the 1950s and 1960s) it nevertheless heralded a scale The crew numbers 11 (eight of whom of conventional warfare hitherto un- are infantrymen and the remainer precedented in the experience of sub- driver, gun ner a nd comma nder), Saharan Africa. At the point in time There are four firing ports on each side (1975) when they were first confronted of the hull and four periscopes in the by the MPLA, the South African army roof, each side for aiming, The for- could only deploy medium and field ward firing port on each side is nor- artillery of World War II vintage; ie the 4 mally used for the 7,62 mm PKM ma- 140 mm (5"5", later designated the G2 ) chine gun and the remaining three ei- and 25 pr respectively, In the Angolan ther side for the AKMS 7,62 mm assault War of 1975-1976 these weapons repre- rifle (the Kalashnikov), Each PKM sented the South African artillery arm's weapon is provided with 950 rounds of anti-tank capability and were most se- ammunition and each AKMS with 120 riously outranged and outgunned by rounds, the enemy's artillery. The South Afri- can ground forces possessed no ar- The BMP-1 is a tracked vehicle and is moured vehicles with which to confront fully amphibious, being propelled in the T-34and T54/55tanks until the 1980s;no the water by its tracks, armoured personnel carriers and no spe- cific anti-tank weapon, Thus, the MPLA ANTI-PERSONNEL WEAPONS weapons systemsform an interesting per- spective, within which to assessthe char- AGS-17 Grenade Launcher: This wea- acter and effectiveness of the South Afri- pon was first encountered by South Af- can response during the succeeding 15 rican forces in the course of Oper- years, The character of the opposition ation Askari and exemplified the Ango- faced by the SADF during its subse- lan forces' deployment of sophisticat- quent strikes into Angola, and the nec- ed Soviet weaponry, The weapon had essary prerequisites demanded by

, As the terms G2,G4,G5 and G6 recur so frequently in this study, it is considered apposite at this point to elucidate their meaning. The G I ('Gun I) refers to the 25 pr; the G2 the 140 mm gun. The G4 is an imported, and simplified predecessor, of the G5 and the G6 is the G5 adapted to the role of a self-propelled gun. The G4 and G5 are both of 155 mm calibre.

30 Militaria 22/3 7992 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za these operations - pivoting upon mobil- vated and shaped the enormous tech- ity and fire power (the latter especially nological advances which are dis- deployed in an anti-tank role) - moti- cussed in Part II of this study.

THE FORGING OF A STRIKE FORCE (PART II)

The SADF is re-structured in the 1970s

The year 1974 witnessed a vital transit- tion of the decision making role for- ion in the formation structures of the merly residing in the component regi- South African army, exemplified in the ments). creation of brigade groups. (The emergence of the brigade group, contained within a division, possessed The brigade system integrated artillery distinct echoes of the organizational units into compact battle formations, forms adopted by the UDF in World embracing a variety of arms (ie infan- War II. Thus, 6 SA Armoured Division try, armour, engineers, signals, main- was initially formed on the basis of two tenance), in marked contrast to the brigades; 11 Armoured Brigade (com- previous system, in which these arms prising: Prince Alfred's Guard, Special were contained within loose organi- Service Battalion, Pretoria Regiment zational structures, effectively isolated and Kimberley Regiment) and 12 Mo- from other arms. To cite but one ex- torized Brigade (consisting of: First City ample, 72 Brigade comprised the fol- Regiment, Witwatersrand Rifles and lowing units: Regiment De la Rey). In a similar man- ner, 5 SA Infantry Brigade (which was 1 Bn Transvaal Scottish destroyed at the battle of Sidi Rezegh South African Irish Regiment on 23 November 1941) consisted of: 1 Johannesburg Regiment SA Irish Regiment, 3 Transvaal Scottish Transvaal Horse Artillery and 2 Regiment Botha. However, the 1 Light Horse Regiment brigade structure instituted in 1974 dif- 12 Field Squadron, SAfC fered in one major respect from its 72 Signals Unit World War II precedent. For the latter 31 Field Workshop was characterized by a sharp distinc- 7 Maintenance Unit tion between infantry and armour (as is evidenced from the example cited The brigade group structures greatly above); whilst, most importantly, artil- facilitated centralization of control, lery was organized on a divisional ba- and possessed the vital potential of sis. (Thus, during the battle of Sidi being deployed as highly effective Rezegh, 3 Field Regiment (SAA) (THA) - battle formations; as illustrated in Op- together with sister field artillery regi- eration Savannah, and subsequent ments - were controlled by Divisional major exercises undertaken in 1978 Headquarters). The pattern that and 1984 (ie Exercise Quicksilver and emerged in 1974, which contained the Exercise Thunder Chariot respectively). artillery component within the brigade (It should be noted, however, that the group, differed radically from the brigade group infrastructure effected World War II precedent. (The advent of in 1974 also implied a far greater de- mechanized infantry during the 1980s gree of centralization - vested in Bri- effected a far closer integration of ar- gade HQ - with the corresponding dilu- mour and infantry).)

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This re-structuring process was symp- THE ARMAMENTS INDUSTR Y2 tomatic of a far-reaching reorganiza- tion of the SADF, in which the Army's conventional forces were formed into It should be borne in mind that the two divisions; 7 SA Division 1 (comprising new strike force which executed the 71-73 Motorized Brigades) and 8 SA Ar- cross border raids during the 1980s had moured Division (consisting of 81 Ar- its weapons forged on the anvil of moured Brigade, 82 Mechanized Bri- ARMSCOR; embodying that interaction gade and 84 Motorized Brigade). The between the armed forces and eco- HQs of the two divisions were estab- nomic infrastructure, popularly referred lished with effect from 1 August 1974; to as the 'military-industrial complex' and they continue to constitute the (a phrase that was widely adopted basis of the organization of South Afri- during the 1960s and 1970s, in relation ca's modern conventiona I forces. to the Vietnam War), That relationship Thus, the Citizen Force had eventually underpinned the technological revolu- found a concrete organizational infra- tion that shaped the SADF during the structure following the uncertainties 1980s. ARMSCOR was the artery and experimentation of the 1960s. through which the wishes of the SADF was disseminated and ultimately as- It was certainly not coincidental that sumed tangible form. This aspect will these new formation structures emerg- become manifest in the detailed dis- ed at this particular point in time. April cussion of the development of South 1974 witnessed the Marxist inspired Africa's new artillery systems during the revolution within Portugal, powerfully 1980s (cf below). spearheaded by the armed forces (which had been infiltrated by an ex- ARMSCOR is placed directly under the treme left-wing middle ranking officer Minister of Defence, parallel to the corps, drawn from the middle classes, SADF, but is responsible to the Chief of through the surrogate of con- the SADF for the economical and ef- scription). The predictable result of fective procurement of armaments. their seizure of power in Portugal was The management and formulation of the total capitulation to that country's ARMSCOR's policy is vested in a board former enemies in the Lusophone pro- of directors, appointed by the State vinces of Angola and Mozambique. President. Effective liaison with the The barrier of the 'white south' had SADF is ensured by the Defence Plan- been totally and irrevocably broken, ning Committee comprising: the Chief exposing South Africa's flanks and ren- of the SADF (Chairman); Chiefs of the dering a white Rhodesia extremely vul- Army, Air Force and Navy; the Chiefs of nerable (leading to her surrender Staff Operations, Logistics and Finance; within six years.) It is, indeed, this loss the Chairman and Chief Executive of of the Portuguese African provinces ARMSCOR; and a representative from that is the ultimate catalyst, shaping industry. The Committe's primary func- the military configuration of southern tion is to ensure that the five year plan, Africa for the succeeding 15 years; the current budget and the procure- more specifically, the manner in which ment policy conform to the financial SWAPO's power was enormously en- constraints imposed by the Cabinet, hanced by its access to the M PLA The current procurement procedure is sanctuary of Angola. It is the binding initiated by the SADF formulating a re- and intimate relationship between quirement, followed by its approval by SWAPO and its Angolan hosts which the Defence Planning Committee; was a powerful motivating factor in the whereupon ARMSCOR seeks to meet South African intervention in the An- the requirement, golan civil war (Operation Savannah) and its succeeding cross-border raids The major stimulus to the South African spanning the decade 1978- 1988. armaments industry derived from the

I The official designation. 7 Infantry Division. changed during the latter part of 1991. when it was altered to 7 SA Infantry Division. The writer is indebted to Cmdt R Ludeman for this information; telephonic conversation with S Monick: 17 February 1992. , This section of the study is derived from the following source: Heitman, Helmoed-Romer. South African arms and armour. Cape Town: Stroik, 1988, pp 14-16.

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United Nations arms embargo, imposed 'to meet as effectively and eco- in 1962. The first major product of the nomically as may be feasible the ar- industry, dating from 1964, was the as- maments requirements of the Re- sembly under licence - and later the public (of South Africa), as deter- manufacture - of the Panhard AML-60 mined by the Minister, including ar- and AML-90 armoured cars, by San- maments required for export and dock-Austral. Known as Elands, more firearms, ammunition and pyrotech- than 1 400 of these vehicles were nical products required for supply to manufactured in progressively improv- members of the public.' ed variants, for the Army and for ex- port, The year 1964 also witnessed the ARMSCOR expanded rapidly, to resumption of aircraft production, emerge as one of the largest industrial groups in South Africa. In the late The new programme was initiated by a 1980s it possessed assets of R2 000 mil- trainer, a licence having been acquir- lion, an annual turnover of some R1 500 ed to assemble the Aermacchi MB-326. million, and in excess of 20 000 employ- The Atlas Aircraft Corporation was ees, A further 1 000 sub-contractors founded in 1965 and the first locally furnished employment for an addi- manufactured aircraft flew in 1967. tional 90 000. The efforts of ARMSCOR Named Impala by the SAAF, this air- have benefited South African industry craft remained in production until the generally, a process due not entirely to close of 1982. orders placed with the private sector; but also to the motivation to introduce Many other programmes were initiated (and in some instances develop) tech- in the mid- 1960s; arguably the most in- nology that might not otherwise have teresting being the development of the been available locally. Within this con- air-to-air missile, a project that was ini- text, it should be noted that ARMSCOR tiated in 1966. The first successful inter- contracts out to private industry ceptions were undertaken in 1972, The whever feasible, with regard to both programme formed the basis for the acquisition programmes and research- weapons system designated the V3B and-development projects. Only those (the 'Kukri' in its export form). The items that cannot be accommodated electronics industry also undertook its economically by the private sector are first foray into the sphere of military retained as in-house programmes, communications; introducing Euro- Thus, private enterprise was responsible pean equipment under licence, and even for such major projects as the then developing its products locally. South African Navy's strike craft and An early success was the B-16 high fre- the Ratel, quency manpack which, in its export form known as the Racal Squadcal, achieved international sales of some MECHANIZED INFANTRY 12000. The Ratel (2): The key to mechanized Thus, when the SADF embarked upon infantry in the SADF is the Ratel Me- the offensive strategy which dates from chanized Infantry Combat Vehicle 1978, the armaments industry was (MICV). There are, in actual fact, two characterized by a secure technolo- variations of this vehicle; viz the Ratel gical-financial base, from which it 20 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) and could most efficiently respond to the the Ratel 60 IFV, These vehicles were testing and dynamic new challenges developed as a range of tactical that were to emerge, in answer to the transport in order to rapidly convey the demands of the armed forces. Paral- infantry into action whilst simul- leling the development of new forma- taneously providing them with armour- tion structures within the SADF (cf ed protection and fire support. More- above), the armaments industry assum- over, five further models were subse- ed new organizational forms. The va- quently developed: viz the Ratel 90 Fire rious components of the governmental Support Vehicle (FSV), essentially a de- armaments production machine (eg velopment of the armoured car; a Atlas) were streamlined into one or- Ratel Command Vehicle (the 12,7), in ganization - ARMSCOR - in 1976. Its order to facilitate more effective con- function was defined as being trol by the commander of a mechan-

Militaria 22/3 7992 33 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za ized infantry platoon and battalion, es- metres of cable. There is an option pecially within combat situations; a lo- also of night vision equipment with an gistics vehicle (8 X 8), which is an eight- air conditioning system. Further, the wheeled variant designed to meet the command vehicle carries: three radios; logistical requirements of a mecha- a tape recorder having a time in- nized unit which operates over exten- jection facility; a civilian combined re- sive areas and periods of time; an 81 ceiver and casette recorder in the hull; mm mortar carrier, and a Ratel mount- intecom system; public address system; ing a ZT3anti-tank missile system. pneumatic mast and map boards. The logistical support version has a carrying The initial design work on the Ratel capacity of nine 1 Xl, 2 Xl, 2 metre commenced as early as 1968, con- containers. They are able to convey ducted under the auspices of ARMS- various types of equipment and other COR, and the first prototype was com- materials (eg armour piercing ammuni- pleted in July 1974; to be followed by tion, five-man tents, toilets and show- four pre-production vehicles, the first of ers, a refrigerator and freezer, and 800 which was produced in 1976. Thereaf- litres of water.) In the hull, integral fuel ter, the Ratel went into full production. tanks contain 2 000 litres of fuel with a hydraulically powered pump capable The hull of the Ratel affords protection of filling the bunker tanks with an exter- from small arms fire and shell splinters, nal supply; or fill two vehicles and protection in the frontal arc simultaeously on each side of the bun- against armour-piercing shells. With ker and also pump fuel from one exter- the exception of the logistical version nal bunker to another. In the event of (fitted with eight wheels) all models a power failure hand pumps are pro- have six wheels. The crew of the com- vided. Standard equipment includes bat vehicles - ie the Ratels 20 and 60 - tanks for fresh water, a generator, comprises 11 personnel: the driver, who three spare wheels, spare parts and sits in the front of the vehicle; the com- tools. mander and main gunner who are seated on the left and right hand re- With regard to speed, the Ratels 20, 60 spectively of the two man turret; rear and 90 can attain a maximum speed anti-aircraft gunner; section comman- of 105 kph on the open road; they der; and six infantryman. The com- have a maximum fuel capacity of 430 mand vehicle carries a crew of nine: litres and a maximum range of 1 000 the vehicle commander; main gunner; km on road and 14 hours travelling driver and six command post person- cross-country. The Ratel 8 X 8 is capa- nel. The Ratel 90 (FSV)carries a crew of ble of a maximum speed of 86 kph on la, one fewer than the Ratel 20 and 60 the open road, a fuel capacity of 560 - in order to enable 40 rounds of am- litres and a maximum range of 760 km munition to be carried inside the hull. on road or 14 hours travelling cross The crew comprises: the vehicle com- country. mander, driver, main gunner (90 mm gun), rear anti-aircraft gunner, section Practical experience of the vehicle in commander and five infantrymen. The South West Africa and Angola has gen- Ratel 8 X 8 Logistics Support Vehicle erated modifications in the family of carries a crew of three (commander, Ratels (eg improvements in power gunner and driver), all seated in the trains, suspensions, 'run-flat' tyres and fighting compartment in the front of the use of more than two axles), the hull. greatly enhancing their cross country mobility and significantly reducing their Standard equipment for the combat vulnerability. The MICV, of which the range of vehicles includes: a complete Ratel is an illustration highly esteemed set of tools; spades, picks and axes; a by overseas authorities, combines the tow bar and towing cables; a first aid major facets of tracked infantry fight- kit; two petrol stoves; fire extinguishers; ing vehicles (IFVs) and wheeled ar- emergency spares; two 50 litre drinking moured personnel carriers (APCs). The water tanks; two external stowage Ratel is equipped with the same major compartments; radios, intercom and armament as that borne by tracked remote handset complete with 1 000 IFVs, whilst it is fitted with vision blocks

34 Militaria 22/3 7992 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za and firing ports for its complement of two 7,62 mm anti-aircraft machine infantrymen, thus rendering it almost as guns; one mounted above the turret effective as a tracked IFV. Moreover, and the other at the rear left. Also in the terrain that forms the geogra- mounted on either side, towards the phical context of the Ratel's oper- rear of the turret, is a bank of two 81 ations, the superior mobility and light- mm electrically operated smoke dis- ness render it an improved vehicle with chargers, which can be operated by regard to the majority of tracked IFVs. the commander or gunner. Thus, the weapons capability and in- fantry support potential of the tracked Logistics vehicle: The 8 X 8 logistics ve- IFV is combined with the mobility and hicle is equipped with one 12,7 mm travelling capacity of the APC. anti aircraft machine gun on the front of the vehicle. (However, it should be The armament varies according to the noted that this model is not being ex- particular model. tensively produced).

Ratel 201FV: The first version within the Ratel-81: The Ratel-81 is essentially a series - the Ratel 201FV- is armed with a turretless Ratel fitted with an 81 mm 20 mm (F2) cannon (M693) which is mortar in the fighting compartment, mounted on a small turret, together with the re-designed commander's cu- with a co-axially mounted 7,62 mm ma- pola situated between the compart- chine gun to the left and a further 7,62 ment and the driver. The mortar is mm machine gun mounted on the tur- mounted on a turntable with a 3600 ret roof. The 20 mm cannon is capable traverse. This variant of the Ratel al- of firing three types of ammunition: de- lows the mortar teams to enter and signed for anti-aircraft defence; ar- withdraw from an action far more rap- mour piercing shells; high explosive idly than was possible with ground mor- (HE); and practice rounds. tars. The Ratel-81 also affords a good measure of armoured protection, al- Ratel 601FV: The Ratel 60 IFV is equip- though in action the crew are ob- ped with a two man turret armed with viously disadvantaged by the need to a 60 mm mortar and a co-axially open the top of the fighting compart- mounted 7,62 mm machine gun with ment in order to fire the mortar. When an additional 7,62 mm anti-aircraft ma- necesssary the mortar can be dis- chine gun at the rear of the vehicle on mounted and fired from the ground, the right side. The mortar is breech The main armament consists of one 81 loaded, and capable of firing smoke, mm front-loading mortar. The ammu- HE and illuminating bombs to a maxim- nition carried consists of 148 mortar um range of 1 500 metres. A typical bombs. The secondary ammunition ammunition load would consist of 38-45 comprises two 7,62 mm machine guns; HE bombs, three smoke and three illu- one mounted on the commander's cu- minating bombs. pola and the other on a ring mount at the rear of the vehicle for close-range Ratel 90FSV: The Ratel 90FSV is equip- and anti-aircraft defence, The ammu- ped with a 90 mm semi-automatic nition for these machine guns consists quick firing gun mounted on a two- of 1 200 rounds. In addition, there are man turret. As in the case of the Ratel four 81 mm smoke grenade launchers. 20 and 60 models, a 7,62 mm machine There is one firing port in each hull side gun is mounted co-axially on the turret and side door, The crew numbers five to its left. The 90 mm gun fires HEAT,HE and the vehicle weighs 18,5 tons com- and practice rounds. Further, a 12,7 bat loaded, mm M2 HB machine gun can be mounted over the 90 mm gun for train- Ratel mounting ZT3 Swift anti-tank mis- ing purposes. sile:3 The latest variant of the Ratel mounts the Swift anti-tank missile; a Ratel Command vehicle: The Ratel new laser guided system developed by command vehicle is equipped with a Kentron, the subsidiary of ARMSCORre- 12,7 mm M2 HB machine gun and also sponsible for guided weapons. Oper-

3 The source of the following information is as follows: Kentron's ZT3 missile system. Salvo, 90/4, pp 4-6.

Militaria 22/3 7992 35 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za ation Savannah and the subsequent in- helicopter (in the latter instance from cursions into Angola, discussed in Part I South Africa's new Rooivalk (Kestrel) of this study, highlighted the urgent attack helicopter, Thisgreatly enhanc- need for an effective anti-tank system, es the operational flexibility of the sys- One recalls the destruction of a Ratel tem, and renders it adaptable to the by tank shells in the action at CuvelaL client's needs, during the course of Operation Askari. Operation Savannah witnessed the ex- The ZT3 system is supported by a well tensive deployment of the T-34 tank, developed logistical apparatus. The whilst subsequent operations encoun- missile itself is sealed in its launch tube tered the widespread use of the T-54 container and requires no mainten- and T-55 tanks, ance, The units installed in the Ratel turret can be tested - and faulty units The ZT3 operates on the principle of replaced - at first line with the aid of a semi-automatic command-to-line-of- self-contained microprocessor control- sight (SACLOS). The weapon features led test unit, Kentron can also supply a a unique laser command link which full training package. eliminates the need for guidance wires and facilitates an extended range. The weapon was first revealed to the The missile is of 127 mm calibre. It con- public at the Pretoria Show in August sists of a hollow-charge warhead, a 1990, International defence media flight motor and a guidance unit incor- have speculated that the ZT3was suc- porating a laser receiver and an infra cessfully deployed against tanks during red source, It has a range in excess of the final phase of South Africa's mili- 4 000 metres and is capable of pen- tary intervention in Angola, etrating 650 mm of armoured steel. The combination of the ZT3Swift system The operator selects a target, using a with the Ratel points to two interesting telescope, and this establishes the line characteristics of South African wea- of sight from the system to the target. pons systems during the 1980s. The first Following launch the angular deviation is the integration of diverse arms. Thus, between the missile and the line of the combination of the ZT3 with the sight is measured by the goniometer Ratel embodies the fusion of mechan- with the aid of a pulsed infra red ized infantry and anti-tank systems, In source in the tail of the missile. The an- this respect, it parallels the interaction gular deviation, or error angle infor- between artillery and armoured infan- mation, is processed by the guidance try, commented upon below, Second- unit. Corrective commands produced ly, it has been stated that the Soviet- by the guidance unit are encoded Eastern bloc weaponry deployed in and transmitted to the missile via the Angola during the period 1975-1990 laser transmitter, in the form of pulsed forms a perspective within which to laser commands, The laser receiver in gauge the success of the South African the tail of the missile detects and en- response. The ZT3 mounted on the codes the pulsed laser commands and Ratel counterpoints the BMP-1 Soviet feeds the information to the inboard armoured personnel carrier; the ZT3 flight control unit, which transforms it representing a far more sophisticated into servo commands. The servos are and efficient version of the Sagger mis- connected to the control fins at the sile. The new anti-tank missile and the rear of the missile. Commands from mechanized infantry fighting vehicle the flight control unit cause the control developed by ARMSCOR encapsulates fins to manoeuvre the missile into the the technological advances effected line of sight. The missile follows the line by the SADFand armaments industry in of sight until it strikes the target, and relation to its former adversaries. the hollow charge warhead ensures that the target is effectively eliminated, The challenge of the armoured infantry The rate of fire is estimated to be two role missiles per minute.

Although initially developed for the The Ratel's capabilities fulfil the de- Ratel, the ZT3 may be fired from alter- mands which the MICV must meet, in native platforms such as a tripod or order to successfully implement me-

36 Militaria 22/3 7992 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za chanized infantry operations; those de- dilution of vulnerability is an especially mands being: important asset for the infantry within the context of the modern combat en- - Mobility, in order to keep pace vironment, in which it is exposed to with the tanks; every weapon on the battlefield; rang- ing from small arms and anti-personnel - Long range fire capable of sup- mines to heavy artillery and air strikes. pressing enemy anti-tank weapons Thus, if infantry units are to survive and and dismounted infantry; accomplish their mission they must use all available means to reduce their vul- - A stabilized turret to provide this nerability, It is apparent, therefore, same capability whilst in motion, that mobility, firepower and armoured protection are the inherent charact- - A high volume of lethal fire to sup- eristics of mechanized infantry and in- port dismounted infantry and to teract to create a totally new dimen- disrupt enemy attacks; sion in the infantryman's role, in which he is fully integrated into the armoured - Superior radio communications; and artillery forces, It is, of course, ap- parent from the foregoing military sce- - An anti-tank capability organic to nario within which mechanized infantry the vehicle. operates that this new conception of the infantry role is far removed from the COIN function and orientated to- The Ratel was first deployed in a com- wards the foot soldier's contribution to bat role in the course of Operation an extremely mobile conventional war- Reindeer (1978), in which it was used fare environment, The character of by 61 Mechanized Infantry Battalion, the enemy envisaged is very different The first Citizen Force unit to be con- from the insurgent which COIN opera- verted to mechanized infantry was 1 tions are designed to neutralize, and is Regiment Northern Transvaal. In Para- conceived in terms of heavy conven- tus (August 1984) it is stated (p 47) that tional armament, There can be little this unit was converted to a me- doubt that the experience of Angola chanized infantry battalion in May was a key factor in the development 1975. However, as this predates the of the Ratel. first production model, the statement may be construed to mean that May The new role of the mechanized infan- 1975 marks the date on which the regi- try arm is lucidly and succinctly ana- ment commenced training and exer- lyzed by Col Z B Bradford in an article cises in the principles of mechanized entitled Motorised infantry on the mod- warfare, ern armoured battlefield. Col Bradford writes (3): The Ratel has obviously exercised the most profound impact upon the infan- 'Mechanized infantry permits the ef- try, which henceforth becomes both fective employment of the com- armoured and mounted. This mounted bined arms team on the armoured fighting capability has tremendously battlefield, a difficult role which de- enhanced its mobility; a central factor mands exceptional ability on the in the huge expanses of territory that part of the Infantry leaders who have to be traversed by South African must learn to think in terms of infantry, Equally, the firepower of the "mounted warfare". This does not infantry has escalated to an enormous mean that infantrymen alway stay degree, The vulnerability of the infan- mounted on their vehicles or that try is also dramatically decreased, The they merely "ride" carriers and then Ratel's speed, agility and protective dismount to fight, Mechanized in- function drastically reduces the time fantry is an integral and permanent during which the infantry component is part of the tank infantry team .., exposed in the course of protracted assaults over open ground, and the Mechanized infantry has two major Ratel 90 is able to provide excellent fire roles in mounted warfare: to facili- support for dismounted infantry, This tate the forward employment of the

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combined arms team; and to move leader and team commander must and quickly occupy positions which immediately suppress enemy wea- will deny the enemy freedom to pons ...and, if necessary, with indi- conduct particular operations or rect fire support. force him into areas of our choos- ing. The team commander must decide whether the enemy position should To facilitate further employment, in- be attacked or bypassed, or whe- fantry must clear obstacles which ther the lead platoon must recon- block or inhibit armour; suppress noitre and probe further to learn anti-tank weapons - either on the more about enemy strength and po- move or from overwatch; and pre- sitions.' cede armour as required by enemy actions or terrain restrictions. The traditional role of artillery - that of supporting infantry - assumes a new di- The commander's use of the infantry mension within the context of me- to quickly occupy positions allows chanized infantry, orientated towards him to "structure" the battlefield, to mobility. A manifestation of this process give shape to a defense or other is that the OC, Fire Support Officer, the operations in a manner which tanks Battery Commanders and Observation alone cannot effect. This role also Post Officers now accompany the in- translates into some key tasks: mov- fantry in Ratels. Such a concept is per- ing rapidly under fire; quickly taking fectly tailored to the development of up defensive (blocking) positions the G-6. against both infantry and armour as- sault; occupying delay positions; in- flicting various degrees of destruc- SOUTH AFRICAN ARTILLERY tion on advancing enemy as re- SYSTEMS OF THE 1980s4 quired; and quickly disengaging to move elsewhere. It is apparent from the foregoing sec- tion that, in so far as Operation Savan- In conducting these tasks, the infan- nah dramatically exposed the total ob- try maximises its mobility and armour solescence of South African artillery protection and always operates as systems, it exercised an enormous im- part of the combined arms team.' pact upon South African military thought. The role of the Angolan war in Col Bradford emphasizes the point that effecting the startling modernization of speed of response is the essence of the South African artillery systems is suc- successful mechanized infantry oper- cinctly stated in the work Ultima Ratio ation (3): Regum; more specifically, in the chap- 'How fast the team reacts to enemy ter entitled New South African artillery contact will usually determine the systems in the eighties. The authors write5: success or failure of a mission. The report of enemy contact should trig- ger actions and decisions from 'In 1984 the respected international squad through company level al- military journalist, Ian V Hogg, wrote most simultaneously. The lead ele- in Jane's Military Review that the Re- ment (squad/platoon) must imme- public of South Africa had "not only diately deploy, return fire, report caught up with but had, in many ar- and call for fire support. eas, surpassed the rest of the world in armaments development." In order to expose the strength and disposition of the enemy force, the The single most important area of ar- lead element develops the situation maments development in which the by fire and manoeuvre. The platoon RSA had achieved an undisputed

4 This section of Part II is derived from the following source, unless where otherwise stated: Doming, W A & Lillie, A C. New South African artillery systems in the eighties. in N6thling, Cmdt C J (ed). Ultima Ration RegulIl ...(Artillery history of South Africa). Pretoria. SADF. Military Information Bureau, 1987, pp 395-405.

5 Doming, W A & Lillie, A C. New South African artillery systems in the eighties. in N6thling, Cmdt C J (ed). Ultima Ratio Regum ...(Artillery history of South Africa). Pretoria: SADF. Military Information Bureau, 1987,

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lead by the mid-eighties was un- tracted an enormous amount of at- questionably that of field artillery, tention and publicity, The G4 has re- With the development of the G-5 ceived extremely little in comparison, 155 mm gun-howitzer, the 8-6 self- Nevertheless, it merits study in the propelled gun and the 127 mm MRL scope of this article in so far as it was "Valkiri" artillery rocket system, the the predecessor of the G5, In a major SA Defence Force today possesses respect it differs radically from its suc- arguably the most advanced and cessor, in so far as it was an imported effective field artillery system in the gun, its source being undisclosed, How- world, the super-powers not except- ever, it occupies an important role in ed,6 this study, in so far as its introduction necessariiy involved an enormous tran- The excellence and modernity of sition in the technological aspects of contemporary South African artillery gunnery. It was issued to the Transvaal sometimes tends to obscure the fact Horse Artillery in 1980 and, at that point that this was not always the case, in time, represented the most ad- Indeed, as late as the mid-seventies vanced gun in service with the South the South African Field Artillery African artillery corps, The G4 thus oc- equipment and systems were obso- cupies an important role in the history lete even by African standards. of that regiment. The weapon is a sim- When the armed forces of South Af- plified version of the G5, being a 155 rica became involved in large scale mm gun howitzer. The specifications of operations in Angola in 1975-76, its the gun are as follows: field artillery consisted entirely of Second World War vintage ex-British Crew: 8 25-pounder (87,6-mm) and 5,5-in (140-mm) gun howitzers, Mass: 9,2 tonnes The 25-pounder and "five-fives" Dimensions (in travelling configur- were badly outranged by the Soviet ation): weapons in the hands of the Cuban and Angolan forces during the An- length - 7,5 m; width - 2,58 m; height golan conflict. In particular, the - 2 m, South Africans discovered that they had no answer to the long range of Mobility by means of 10 tonne gun the 122-mm "Stalin Organ" multiple tractor; maximum speed 100 km/h. rocket launcher (BM 21 type), Air transportable in Hercules and As it happened, the deficiencies in Transall aircraft, the South African Field Artillery which had been exposed during the Elevation: -5° to + 52° Angolan War acted as a long over- due catalyst to the subsequent de- Traverse: 84° velopment and modernization of the field artillery,' Maximum range: 25 500 m,

The above quoted extract prefigures Muzzle velocity: 820 m/s maximum the approach and pattern adopted in (HE projectile), this section, in two important respects. The first is the manner in which Oper- Traverse: 84 degrees, ation Savannah exposed the da n- gerous obsolescence of the SAPF's Rate of fire: 4 rounds per minute; 2 field artillery, The second is the dra- rounds/min sustained, matic and rapid response to such a situation, Ammunition:

THE G4 High Explosive (HE) - 43,7 kg

The G5 has, for obvious reasons, at- White phosphorus - 43,7 kg

6 The use of the term 'field artillery' is questionable within this context. The G-5 and G-6 conform more closely to the role of medium artillery; and, indeed, the distinction between field and medium artillery has been attenuated to the point of non-existence by these weapons.

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The G4 is a 39 calibre-length (as op- like the Soviet artillery system, which posed to the 45 calibre-length of the pivots upon 6 000 mils within a circle), G5/G6) gun-howitzer), which was pur- chased in limited numbers as interim The source of the G4, to reiterate, is ordnance following the experiences of undisclosed. Cmdt Rimmer is of the Operation Savannah, Essentially, it is a opinion (5) that it was designed for de- conventional gun with a split trail. It ployment in a sophisticated First World will be noted that the type (155 mm) developed environment (eg Europe) prime mover (the la-tonne gun tractor) where the guns would be re-deployed is identical to that of the G5; whilst the from one position to another through rate of fire is very similar to the latter means of the German autobahns, for gun. Thus, whilst the G4 lacks the example. Cmdt Rimmer stated (6) range of the G5 (25 500 m with regard that, once emplaced, the G4 was a su- to the former, as opposed to a maxi- perb gun, possessing the best range mum range of 39 000 m in the latter available at that time, It was also ex- case) the G4 complements the artillery tremely accurate, However, the system in terms of range, Whilst the weapon was gravely disadvantaged in G6's range of fire is identical to that of operational terms as it was not orien- the G5, the Valkiri rocket system is ca- tated to the African terrain. The gun's pable of ranges of between 8 000 and major problem was thus mobility. Cer- 22 000 metres, and the 120 mm mortar tainly, it was extremely mobile when (M5) (approximating to light artillery) transported on modern highways; but ranged at 6 250 m, The G4 thus facili- it proved to be most vulnerable when tates an intermediate range of fire be- towed behind the gun tractor through tween, at one extreme, the 120 mm dense bush, in which the fragile sight mortar and, at the other, the G5/G6, brackets could be wrenched off by a thorn tree. Lacking the hydraulic sup- To reiterate, the introduction of the G4 port of the G5 and weighing some 10 involved a quantum leap in tech- tons (as opposed to the nine tons of nological terms, as it absorbed the the G2), the G4 was a most difficult Transvaal Horse Artillery into the 155 gun to bring into action. Whilst two mm ballistics system, An immediate gunners can execute this operation in consequence of this far reaching tran- the case of the G5, the G4 requires a sition was the total obsolescence of full gun crew, who must participate in the former system of yards and metres arduous team work. Moreover, the G4 and the (in some instances traumatic) is certainly not a gun which readily reorientation from an artillery board to lends itself to air transport, a computer. This dramatic develop- ment was personified in the personal The G4 was never used operationally experience of Cmdt Rimmer, who com- by the THA. The gun was, in actual manded the Transvaal Horse Artillery fact, only deployed in an operational during the period 1985-1989 and had role in November 1983, at the outset of served with that unit since 1976. He Operation Askari, The guns were re- emphatically agreed that a vast dis- moved from the hangars at Alrode and tance in technological terms separates flown to the border. At that point in the 25 pr and 140 mm guns from the time. when the G5 was not yet avail- G4. He remarked (4) that, when he en- able, the G4 could not be surpassed in listed in the artillery corps in 1974, he terms of range and firepower, The lat- was trained on the 25 pr and 140 mm ter weapon was manned by national guns. The weapons embodied the Brit- servicemen and a battery (ie eight ish technology of World War II vintage; guns) were deployed. Of these, seven prescribing precisely the same drills were returned to the THA; one of the and tactics prevailing in the Second gun tractors receiving a direct hit and World War. The 155 mm ballistics sys- having to be scrapped. The remaining tem involved the total obsolescence of G4s were in a severe state of disrepair, the traditional artillery' board, in which having been subjected to consider- the range arm and bearing arc was able fire. It was then realized that, al- marked out in yards and degrees. The though the weapon clearly possessed new system involved calculations the desired range and firepower, it was based on 6 400 mils within a circle (un- most gravely disadvantaged in the op-

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erational theatre. The brackets of the was resolved by a Canadian concern; guns' sights had been ripped off and the Space Research Corporation of the gun tractors could not keep pace Quebec (SRC-Q). SRC-Q had, for sev- with the other forces, not being suffi- eral years, been conducting research ciently powerful to tow the G4. The with the object of achieving signifi- same tractors had served as prime cantly greater artillery ranges than movers of the G2, but the subtle differ- were possible at the time. This experi- ence in weight between the guns mentation pivoted upon both long drastically affected the pulling capa- barrels and ammunition designated bility of the gun tractor and thus the ERFB(Extended Full Range Bore), These mobility of the G4, two factors conjoined in producing a weapons system possessing a maximum The capabilities of the G4 - in both its range in excess of 30 000 m. Thisrepre- positive and negative aspects - clearly sented a range that was considerably emerged in the course of Exercise superior to that of NATO gun-howitzers. Thunder Chariot (7984), It occupied approximately one hour to move the ARMSCOR acquired a minority share- G4 some 20 km. The ammunition was holding in the Canadian company, not stored in the trail legs (as in the and thence collaborated in the devel- case of the G5). The entire volume of opment of an artillery system speci- ammunition for the G4 was stored in fically orientated towards South Afri- the gun tractor, due to the risk of a can requirements. Through the me- considerable proportion being lost ow- dium of SRC-Q, the Canadian com- ing to its not being properly strapped pany acting as a conduit, ARMSCOR on. However, once the weapon had contacted PRB (a Belgian ammuntion been deployed, the THA out-gunned firm) and thereby gained access to the the national service battery, equipped concept of 'base bleed'. When com- with the G5, which also participated in bined with ERFB technology, base Thunder Chariot. The G4's response bleed enabled guns to achieve ranges times and accuracy could outmatch which, up to that point, had been im- the G5, although the former was obvi- possible to achieve. Base bleed am- ously outranged, munition involved a small amount of powder being burnt at the base of the The G4 was subsequently withdrawn projectile as it leaves the barrel. This from service with the THA (being issued reduces the vacuum created by a pro- to Regiment Potchefstroomse Univer- jectile as it leaves the firing chamber, siteit), and the former has reverted to thereby greatly enhancing its range, the G2. The 155-mm gun thus developed was internationally marketed by SRC-Q un- THE G-57 der the designation of the GC45, ARMSCOR continued with the further Development development of the gun, Two guns were manufactured by SRC in 1979 Within a mere matter of months from and, following trials in both Canada the end of the Angolan conflict, the and on the island of Antigua, manu- South African Armaments Corporation facture was transferred to South Africa, (ARMSCOR) was tasked with the pro- where the two guns served as proto- ject of developing a modern sophis- types for series production. The South ticated artillery system for the SADF, A African association with SRC-Q was major problem existed, however, in re- subsequently discovered and resulted lation to the procurement of the nec- in the imprisonment of the Company's essary technology. This was the inter- president, Dr Gerald Bull (who refused national arms boycott, formally di- South Africdn offers of sanctuary and rected against the Republic for over a protection) on charges of contraven- decade, and soon to attain concrete ing the UN arms embargo, substance in the form of a mandatory UN-supported arms boycott (estab- Dr Bull was subsequently murdered in lished in November 1977), The difficulty March 1990; it is commonly thought by

7 Ibid item (4) above.

Militaria 22/3 7992 41 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za agents of a power which strongly dis- into a 60 cm, 40 cm-bore "gun" to approved of some of his clients. Dr launch weather satellites into space Bull's enormous impact upon weapons that led to the genesis of the South Af- technology - and its fatal conse- rican 155 mm G5 field gun. quences for him -are succinctly ex- plored in an article which appeared in The sophisticated weapons system is the Sunday Times (South Africa) (dated acknowledged as the best of its kind in 1 April 1990), by Jeremy Brooks and the world, as is the motorised G6 ver- Patricia Cheney: sion. Both can fire with deadly compu- ter-controlled precision at targets more 'Space-gun secret of murdered G5 than 40 km away. boffin Dr Bull's initial work at a test range A brilliant scientist, murdered in his straddling the US-Canadian border was Brusselsflat last week was working on a designed to replace rocket-launched large calibre "space cannon" for Iraq - weather satellites. using the technology behind SA's famed G5 field gun. The science-fic- He boasted he could fire projectles tion weapon is designed to launch nu- horizontally into Mexico - or 2 000 km clear, chemical or conventional war- vertically into the atmosphere. heads into orbit - or to lob them hun- dreds of kilometres across borders. The Canadian government, which was sponsoring the project jointly with the Defence and intelligence analysts in US, became worried about the military Europe and Canada suggested this potential and soon withdrew. week that Dr Gerald "Jerry" Bull, was killed to prevent Iraq gaining an edge The Pentagon was curious - Dr Bull's in- over its Middle Eastern neighbours. vention could be vastly cheaper than Speculation was rife that Israel's secret missile-launched warheads. service Mossad was behind the profes- sional assassination. But even they baulked at the nine-fig- ure sums when Dr Bull asked for funding But US State Department officials in to go into full production. Washington hinted that Iran may have chosen to strike in the wake of anti- The scientist later claimed that missile Iraqi feeling following the execution of manufacturers, who stood to lose London-based journaiist and alleged heavily if his ideas were accepted, spy Farzad Bazoft. pressured Washington into withdrawing support. A British expert on terrorism said the kill- ers - who fired two 7,65 mm bullets into But a spin-off of the ballistics research the back of Dr Bull's head and left his into the space gun was an improved, wallet stuffed with £53 000 untouched - extended-range 155 mm artillery sys- could have come from anyone of sev- tem. eral countries. Dr Bull had invented a shell which had DUMMIES no equal in its range, destructive power and accuracy. "Syria, Jordan and Iran all have an in- terest in preventing Iraq gaining a stra- With it came a howitzer conversion kit tegic advantage in the arms race. which would enable normal artillery to take the heavier and more powerful "Any of them, or Israel, would have a projectile. prime motive", said Professor Ray Wilkinson, of the Institute for the Study of International Conflict and Terrorism. DEAL

Dr Bull is known to have visited Iraq ...Dr Bull's credit with a Pennsylvania regularly in the past few years... bank was stretched to the limit when he broke the arms boycott and began It was Dr Bull's research in the Sixties dealing with South Africa.

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helping Iraq to buy G5 and G6 arms But he was eventually able to payoff and ammunition, an overdraft of more than R26,5- mil- lion in a deal that pushed his company An Austrian firm, Woest-Alpine, goes on well into the black.,. trial next month charged with selling the guns to both Iran and Iraq - but it is But his genius - at 22 he was the young- alleged that the weaponry was origin- est graduate ever to get a doctorate ally supplied by SRC, from Toronto University - left no room for cost control. He was totally ARMSCOR has consistently declined to absored in his research while his com- comment on its reported ties with Dr pany plunged into the red. Bull and SRC, '

The South African deal came at a Whilst the necessary technology and price - his conviction in 1980 for break- trial models had been thus acquired, ing the USarms embargo against South the quite distinct problems of actually Africa and a six-month jail term. His achieving series production within a death last week marked the 10th anni- relatively limited period remained, in versary of his imprisonment, almost to the light of the fact that the Republic the day, possessed neither the facilities nor the experience for the mass production of British arms specialist Mr James Adams artillery pieces, Nevertheless, the prob- claimed in 1984 that South Africa, lem was overcome by the close co-op- through ARMSCOR and a Dutch-based eration between the SADF, private in- front company, financially rescued Dr dustry, ARMSCOR and its affiliates; a Bull's Space Research Corporation. co-operation which bore fruit in the They thus managed to control the pat- delivery of four 155 mm G-5 evaluation ent on the technology leading to the models to the SADFin 1981, The follow- G5. ing year the series production of the G- 5 commenced; preceded by a period Following his imprisonment in 1980, Dr of intensive testing and continuous Bull disbanded the Space Research feed-back in regard to the perform- Corporation but set up a new com- ance of the artillery system under op- pany, Space Research International, erational conditions, with its headquarters in Brussels, To quote the words of one source 8 : There are strong indications that he maintained contacts with the Penta- 'The nett effect of the remarkable story gon, the CIA and the US Defence in- behind the development of the G-5 in dustry, South Africa is that today the Republic possesses some of the world's most In the seventies, SRC - which straddled modern gun and ammunition facilities. the US-Canadian border - set up its The Republic has, within the space of a owns customs site and customs officials few short years, acquired the capa- who tried to make on-site inspections bility of manufacturing the high quality of shipments were, according to one steel required for gun barrels and pro- account, ordered by their superiors to jectiles from its own iron ore resources, stay off the company's property, and is in fact now completely self-suf- ficient as far as the production of the One official said at the time: "We all complete G-5 system is concerned,' assumed that SRC was doing a lot of hush-hush military work at the Pen- The South African development of the tagon", " G-5 effected far reaching repercus- sions upon the artillery systems of those TRIAL nations not included within NATO, For the Republic was capable of market- In Norway, an arms watchdog body ing to Third World countries a weapon claimed Dr Bull was heavily involved in which exceeded the capabilities of

8 Ibid item (4) above.

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NATO artillery. The point is made in an mobility and a fire control system. article contained in the publication ARMSCOR also provides the ex- Military Technology (1/83), entitled G-5 tended range ammunition. & G-6: South Africa does it (almost) by itself; an extract from which reads as Iraq is believed to have had the G-5 follows: for at least three years of the eight- year Iran-Iraq war, using it, together '" .because South Africa was the with 200 of the self-propelling auto- only country to immediately grasp matically loading GCT 155 mm ho- the potential offered by the SRC-Q's witzers, as the backbone of its artil- researches, there is now a situation lery regiments, in which artillery weapons are being produced - and marketed to the Both Iran and Iraq acquired large Third World - whose operational numbers of the Austrian GHN-45 performace for exceed those of gun, one of the G-5's several ances- similar weapons fielded by the most tors. Baghdad, not happy with it, advanced NATO and Wa~aw Pact however, approached South Africa armies. Just to give one example, for 155 mm ammunition. The G-5 Thailand (which has two batteries of soon followed. GC45 in service, having ordered the weapons from SRC-Q before the firm Mr (Henry) Dodds (a spokesman for closed down) is now better equip- Defence Marketing Services in Lon- ped to face Soviet-manufactured don) says he does not see any diffi- long-range artillery than, say, West- culty in Iran or Iraq trading with ern Germany or the US, Conversely, South Africa." The South Africans Soviet-equipped artillery units would want oil, and the Iranians and Iraqis face more serious problems in fight- need artillery",' ing against a Third world country fielding the new "GC45 generation" However, Mr Dodds's approach to the gun howitzer than the Soviet Army marketing of G-5s to Iraq was dra- itself during a war in Central Europe. matically belied by the Gulf War of 1991, when the forces arraigned a- A redirection on development of NATO gainst Iraq (led by Great Britain, the artillery appears to be urgent. Already United States, France and Saudi-Ara- heavily committed to their own pro- bia) were confronted by South African grammes (the M 198 155/39 mm for the manufactured G-5 guns; resulting in US,and the FH-70 155/39 mm for Great acute diplomatic embarrassment to Britain, West Germany and Italy) NATO the Republic, which had pledged its countries have so far paid little or no moral support for those forces. attention to the very promising tech- nologies pioneered by SRC-Q and de- The gun veloped by ARMSCOR, PRBand Woest- Alpine, ' (author's italics), The following extract, from a sup- plement to Paratus, dated July 1979, The italicized comments imply the most succinctly defines the tactical profile startling transformation of the South Af- of the weapon: rican artillery arm; viz the dramatic supersession of equipment which had 'The G5 system consists of the G5 remained static for some 30 years by a medium gun, a family of 155 mm technology that is superior to that of calibre ammunition and the gun NATO. The question of the export of tractor, These elements were devel- this technology to Third World military oped simultaneously to culminate in forces is referred to in an article pub- one system for series production. lished in the SA Digest (dated 16 Sep- The system will be the equipment tember 1988), reproducing a SAPA re- backbone of the new South African lease of 7 September: Field Branch Artillery.

'South Africa, unlike its competitors, As far as the tactical features of the offers a 2,4 million package that in- G5 155 mm Medium Gun are con- cludes a gun, a tractor to give it cerned, it is worth noting that the

44 Militaria 22/3 /992 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za gun will be employed in conven- The italicized statement is particularly tional and unconventional warfare revealing, as it underscores the dra- to provide offensive and defensive matic enhancement in the capability close fire support to other "teeth" of artillery, motivated by South African arms (ie arms of the service directly experience of Operation Savannah. involved in combat), It will also pro- vide independent artillery fire aimed The maximum rate of fire over a 15 at confusing and destroying the en- minute period is three rounds per emy as well as counter-bom- minute; two rounds per minute being bardment fire aimed at all enemy possible in the sustained fire role, The weapon systems that might interfere weapon is operated by an eight man with the effective use of our forces crew, and is normally towed by a and weapons systems, South African built 10 ten ton vehicle (the Sami! 100 gun tractor), which The above functions are comple- transports the crew, projectiles, charg- mentary and the G5 system has the es and fuses, The vehicle can attain features and capabilities to be ef- speeds of up to 90 km/h, fective in any and all of its functions, The Citizen (in an item entitled, Nothing The G5 system can be employed in quite like SA's G-5, contained in the is- alternative roles. The superstructure sue dated 7 September 1988) quotes can be remounted onto a highly an eminent authority, within the sphere mobile substructure which will en- of artillery, with regard to the G-5, as able the G5 to be used in a mecha- follows: nised form. Tests indicated that the G5 has anti-tank and anti-vehicle '" It is exceptional", said Christopher capabilities. Concerning its tactical Foss,military editor of Jane's Defen- features, it is noteworthy that the G5 ce Weekly. "At high elevation it can is capable of a high rate of fire". fire a shell 40 km. By using base bleed ammunition",the shell is stea- Primary movement of the G5 is by dier on its way to the target," , means of a gun tractor. A secon- dary system can be brought into ef- The facility to fire a shell at high eleva- fect in the form of a built-in motor tion, exceeding the normal ranges, en- which can drive the gun indepen- dows the G5 with a combination role dently, This system simultaneously of both gun and howitzer. The article makes it easier to handle. As far as continues: the fall of shot and shot dispersion are concerned, the G5 has repeat- 'The South Africans, unlike their edly and accurately fired good competitors, offer a package that groupings, The fall of shot can also includes the gun, a tractor to give it be accurately controlled, The gun mobility and a fire control system,' can be transported by aircraft, train or tank-transporter. Ammunition

Up to now, the effect of the SA ARMSCOR manufactures five types of Forces artillery fire was mostly of a projectile for the G5: neutralizing nature. With the advent of the G5, this can become de- (i) High Explosive (HE): The HE pro- structive fire. The gun is able to fire jectile exerts a terminal effect on all existing 155 mm projectiles. Fur- a wide variety of targets (eg soft thermore, it can fire all fuses, most skinned military vehicles, prone charges and all existing NATO 155 and standing personnel), which mm ammunition. doubles that of the standard M 107 type projectile, This is The G5 155 mm Medium Gun is an achieved by the use of:- accurate weapon, designed to give service "until the year 2000", It is so- (a) Modern high fragmentation phisticated without abandoning the steel. principles of simplicity and reliabil- ity.' (author's italics), (b)The walls of the shell, which

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ensures 23% additional vol- Height (travelling) - 2,30m (7 ft 6,55in) ume to receive the High Ex- Maximum rate of fire: 3 rounds/ plosive, compared with that minute for 15 minutes; thereafter 2 available in the M107 shell. rounds/minute for one hour.

(c) High energy explosive filling Elevation: + 730/-30 (RDX/TNT)mixture. Traverse: total 840 (ii) HE Base Bleed: The HE Base Bleed projectile (cf above) pos- Maximum range: 30 000 m with nor- sesses the same terminal ef- mal HE projectiles; 39 000 m with fectiveness as the HEshell. How- Base Bleed projectiles. ever, it facilitates a 30% increase in such effectiveness at maxi- THE G-6 mum range, when compared with the HE shell. The dispersion Development of the fall of shot of the Base Bleed projectile is equivalent to Although the provision of the G-5 en- that of the HEcounterpart. dowed the South African artillery arm with much-needed fire support, it yet (iii) White phosphorus: The phospho- failed to meet the urgent requirement rus projectile is essentially the for a highly mobile support system able same as that of the HE shell, the to be rapidly deployed in distant bor- latter of which has been adap- der areas. The problem had clearly ted for filling with white phos- emerged during Operation Savannah, phorus. The white phosphorus in which the artillery experienced great shell is used for screening and difficulty in keeping pace with the in- gun ranging purposes. fantry and armour. In response to this need, ARMSCORdecided upon the de- (iv) Illuminating: The illuminating pro- velopment of a self-propelled gun, jectile has a light intensity of 1,65 specifically orientated to a southern million candella and a burning African military scenario. Although time of 90 seconds. The external NATO self-propelled guns (eg the M109, ballistics of this projectile are SP-70 and GCT) as well as those of So- equivalent to those of the HE viet and East European design, de- shell. pend on tracked vehicles as their prime movers, the South African Army (v) Base Ejection (BE) smoke: The BE required a weapons system that could smoke projectile is operationally keep pace with infantry and ar- employed for screening, spotting moured car units participating in the and signalling purposes. The BE pre-emptive strikes that characterized carrier shell contains several the SADF's offensive strategy during smoke cannisters. The carrier the first half of the 1980s (cf Preface). shell is also fitted with the M805 Within this context, one authority electronic time fuze. The current states:9 smoke colours are white, red and blue. 'Self-propelled guns and howitzers, both of Western and Eastern design, Specifications are nearly invariably tracked vehicles (often based on MBT chassis). and are Calibre: 155 mm (6,1 in) mainly intended to provide fire support for large armoured and mechanised Weight:Traveliing - 13 500 kg (29 762 units. Tactical mobility (that is, cross- Ibs) country mobility) is consequently judg- ed far more important than strategic Dimensions: Length (travelling) - 9,10 mobility, and the self-propelled systems m (29ft 10,25 in) are usually transported to just behind the (front line) on railway carriages or Width (travelling) - 2,50 m (8 ft 2,4 in) large tank transporter semi-trailers.

9 G-5 and G-6: South Africa does it (almost) by itself. Military Technology, 1/83

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Self-propelled G6 755mm gun-howitzer (on right), flanked by the G5 (left)

Russian T34 Tank

Russian T55 Tank.

The guns and tanks shown above are on display at the SA National Museum of Military History, Saxonwold, Johannesburg

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On the contrary, the South African Development of the G-6 commenced Army needed a system to provide fire in 1978, and a little over four years support to its mechanised infantry units later ARMSCORwas able to deliver the (now equipped with ELAND armoured first prototype to the SADF for eva- cars and RATELwheeled ICVs (infantry luation and testing. combat vehicles)) during their inter- vention raids, nearly always carried out The gun with little or no warning and over".very long distances from bases. Con- The G-6 is a self-propelled six-wheeled sequently, the required vehicle should gun that can be employed in the indi- be able to keep pace with ELANDS rect role as a gun, howitzer and mor- and RATELs over many hundreds of tar; os well as possessing a direct ca- kilometres; the accent was therefore pability of up to 5 000 m. The weapon placed on strategic, as opposed to is popularly known as the 'Rhino " and tactical, mobility. What matters is not has a mass of 36 tons; is 10m in length the cross-country performance, but and 3,25 m wide at the turret roof. rather the capability to move at high The Rhino is undoubtedly the heaviest speed over unpaved roads or open, and largest wheeled combat vehicle flat countryside without requiring spe- extant. In order to properly distribute cial transport equipment. this weight, and in order to meet the pre-requisite for low ground pressure On the basis of these requirements, the (thus facilitating easy movement over already challenging technical prob- sand), the vehicle is fitted with enor- lems of completely developing a self- mous 21 X 25 runflat tyres. These tyres propelled system within South Africa are of the type used in some very large was made even more difficult with the earth moving vehicles. The tyres of the decision to design a wheeled vehicle, G-6 are equipped with a centralized wheels offering better strategic mobil- pressure control system. The gun how- ity than tracks. Before the G-6, the itzer which is transported on this chassis one and only wheeled self-propelled is virtually the same as the towed G-5 gun/howitzer operational allover the gun-howitzer (cf above) and fires the world was the Czechoslovakian DANA same range of ammunition, with identi- 152 mm, based on a Tatra 8 X 8 cal performance. The gun is mounted KOLOSStruck chassis. ' on a very large and spacious ar- A self-propelled gun mounted on a moured steel turret, positioned at the tracked chassis would obviously gene- extreme aft of the vehicle. Thisturret is rate major problems in relation to the fully traversible, but firing by means of speed of mechanized columns. Over- the semi-automatic loading system, laying this vital consideration was the which is capable of a rate of fire of need for the highest possible degree of four rounds per minute, is only possible mobility; obviating' the need for tank on a frontal arc of 40° on each side. transporters to convey the fire support Secondary armament is' provided in system to positions immediately behind the form of a 12,7-mm machine gun fit- the front line. Such tank transporters ted to the cupola (600 rounds). are commonly used for this purpose in other theatres. Emphasis has been placed on the pro- tection of the crew of five (com- The factors cited above shaped ARMS- mander, driver, gunner, loader and COR's decision to manufacture a ammunition handler), with firing ports wheeled vehicle as the prime mover of to enable small arms to be utilized in the self-propelled gun. In addition to the event of ambushes. In addition, the overriding advantages of strategic the 'Rhino' has been designed to with- mobility, the wheeled chassis resulted stand mines; being fitted with blow-out in a 60% reduction in fuel consumption, holes, enabling the blast to be vented when compared with a tracked trans- in an upwards direction. Powered by porter; in addition to a reduction of an air-cooled turbo-charged diesel en- 50% in initial costs, as well as a trebling gine, the G-6 can attain speeds in ex- of the life of the equipment and re- cess of 90 km/h on a road and 45 km/h duction by one third of the intervals cross-country. The operational range is between overhauls. in excess of 400 km.

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The Business Day (14 May 1987) records The AS80 artillery fire control system has the opinion of the highly esteemed been designed for utilization by both and authoritative Jane's Defence the G-5 and G-6 gun platforms. It is a Weekly with regard to the G-6: decentralized computerized system ca- pable of managing the fire control 'SA's G6 155 mm self-propelled how- computerization for a fire unit of up to itzer was yesterday described as eight guns (ie a battery). The system "one of the best artillery systems in will control up to four simultaneous en- production" by Jane's Defence gagements, within each of which four Weekly, the world's leading arms distinct phases are provided; ie journal. (i) Initial order, for the definition of A detailed five-page examination of the fire mission; the G-6, the only self-propelled sys- tem of its sophistication and power (ii) Adjustment of fire on the target; outside the Warsaw Pact, could find (iii) Fire for effect, where data is no serious criticism of the weapon. calculated for each participat- ing gun; Jane's said many ARMSCOR's pro- ducts were now being sold overseas (iv) End of mission. in increasing numbers - with adver- tisements regularly carried in the All interaction between the user (in the journal, Equipment sold included fire control post) and the AS80 system RATEL IFV's to Morroco, Buffel mine occurs through the medium of a dia- protected vehicles to Sri Lanka and logue in which the system prompts the the G5 to Iraq (cf above), user with available alternatives. The dialogue is programmed to conform to Jane's said while the G6 had been the normal manual fire control proce- developed specifically to meet SA dures; it is available in two languages artillery requirements, it would be of- and can be translated in accordance fered for export at an early date, with the user's requirement, The sys- tem includes provision for gun display It said: "Like the earlier G5, the G6 is units, as a means of feeding data to unique in that the customer can the guns, The gun display units can be purchase a complete artillery system mounted directly on the guns, or from just one source as well as being placed upon a tripod at a convenient provided with a full training pack- location near the gun, Communica- age," tion between the fire control system and the gun display units is effected ei- The journal said the updated G6, ther by radio or landline. which has a burst fire rate of three shells every 21 seconds and can hurl Another significant system serving both 47 kg missiles across 39 000 m, had the G-5 and G-6 is a device for the sufficient improvements on previous continuous measurement of muzzle ve- models developed since 1981, It locities, This system is designated the mentioned night sights, conveyer EMVA MK lOB Muzzle Velocity Analyser, belt loading, double armoured floor- and is a Doppler radar measuring in- ing, air conditioning for the crew, strument capable of measuring pro- bullet proof windows with 180 0 vis- jectile velocities in the range of 30 m/s ibility, tyre efficiency, speed up to 70 to 3 000 m/s. Results are presented in (km/h), fully independent suspen- metres/seconds for direct application sion and visible and audible alarm by the gun crew, The instrument con- systems. ' sists of an antenna head suitable for installation on the gun, and a proces- Support systems sor unit (including a printer), In addi- tion to the print-out of the muzzle ve- 30th the G-5 gun howitzer and G-6 self- locity, the instrument is also capable of :::>ropelledgun are supported by three printing all the measurement results, extremely sophisticated systems in rela- ~ion to fire control, range-finding and The third system is the S700 meteoro- communications. logical ground station system. This is

Militaria 22/3 7992 49 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za an independent self-contained system 24 rockets. The reload time is less than which automatically tracks, receives 10 minutes for a full salvo. Once posi- and processes radiosonde data from tioned, it requires only some five min- the point at which the projectile is utes to bring the system into action. launched until termination of flight. The power for the rocket system is de- The system is usually mounted in an air- rived from the power take-off or bat- conditioned container cabin, trans- teries for the vehicle. To ensure stabil- ported on a mobile trailer. The receiv- ity, the rockets are fired from the side ed data is converted into actual me- tubes of the launcher first, those in the teorological information which is re- centre being fired last. The sight, in corded on both magnetic tape and di- accordance with conventional artillery rectly on a chart recorder. Through- techniques, is mounted in the side of out the flight, the S700 tracks the the launcher and stored in a special sonde, furnishing, on the basis of its in- container within the vehicle when not formation, details of wind velocity and in use. direction at various altitudes. The rocket is 2,68 m in length and is THE VALKIRI 127-MM ARTILLERY fitted with a pre-fragmented anti-per- ROCKET SYSTEM sonnel warhead and radio-proximity fuse. The warhead consists of a matrix The third artillery support system which of some 8 500 steel balls and epoxy is rooted in the South African exper- resin cast into a thin walled cylinder. ience of the Angolan War of 1975-1976 The proximity fuse is screwed into the is the 127 mm multiple rocket launcher front of the warhead. Spoiler rings of (MRl), commonly referred to as the three different sizes are provided. Va/kiri. Its design and production were These fit onto the nose of the rockets motivated by the desire to counter the and are used to increase the wind re- Soviet BM-21 rocket launcher. Initial sistance and thereby reduce the development of the Va/kiri commen- range; the degree depending on the ced in November 1977, and the devel- size of the rings. These rings generate a opment programme was completed in terrifying scream as the rocket flies to- March 1981. Series production was ini- wards the target; thus greatly com- tiated in April of that year. In August pounding the morale lowering factor 1981 (only four months after the com- of this weapon. The proximity fuse, de- mencement of series production) veloped specifically for the 127 mm Va/kiri was deployed operationally, for MRL, operates as a ground surface the first time and with great success, proximity detector and is frequently during the course of Operation Protea. agile, rendering it unaffected by ter- rain reflectivity and approach angles, The Va/kiri is a highly mobile artillery and virtually immune to enemy jam- rocket system, capable of directing ming. It possesses a direct action high rate saturation fire on area tar- back-up device. gets at ranges of between 8 and 22 km. In essence, the Va/kiri artillery The Va/kiri embodies one major ad- rocket consists of a 24 pr tube pack vantage over virtually all similar sys- mounted on a light 4-ton 4 x 4 petrol tems. This is the rocket system's mount- driven vehicle. The rockets can be ing on a standard two-ton truck, which fired singly or in ripples of between two is not only lighter and more agile than and 24 from within the cab of the vehi- the larger trucks normally utilized in this cle by means of an electronic firing role, but offers greater strategic mo- unit mounted within the cab; or, alter- bility by ensuring that the system is fully natively, by remote control through the air-transportable in C-130 and C-160 medium of a unit which can be con- aircraft. The truck is also fitted with a nected to the launcher via a 50 m canvas tilt, presenting the appearance plug-in cable. A radio facilitates com- of a normal two-ton truck when seen munication with the command post from a distance or in reconnaissance controller, with a remote control of the photographs. The camouflage aspect firing unit. The rate of fire is 60 rounds of the system is thus greatly enhanced. per minute, either individually or in pro- A collapsible ammunitioin stowage as- grammed ripples of between two and sembly to accommodate 48 rockets

50 Mi/itaria 22/3 7992 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za and fuses has been developed to fit to a formidable size. A fleet of ap- the Standard Sami/ 50 ton truck, there- proximately 300 tanks was thereby cre- by providing readily accessible spare ated. These Centurion tanks have sub- ammunition. sequently been modernized in or-der to increase their mobility and The MRL incorporates a meteorological firepower, The Olifant is the end prod- guidance support system. This consists uct of such enhancements. of several components: a weather bal- loon; a weather vane and an emo-me- Mobility and reliability have been con- ter mounter on a telescopic mast in siderably upgraded by fitting a more close proximity to the launcher; these powerful diesel engine in place of the determining weather conditions, In original petrol engine, a new addition, a wind gun is provided. This transmisssion and improved supspen- fires a small calibre projectile, which sion, The Olifant has a road speed of estimates prevailing ground wind con- 45 km/h and a road range of 250 km/h. ditions. Its off road (ie cross-country) speed and range is 30 km/h and 200 km re- It is widely believed that the Va/kiri sys- spectively. tem is more effective than its NATO counterpart. the Vought system, as With regard to armament, the Centu- the former has 24 rockets (as opposed rion's 20 pr (84 mm) gun has been re- to a maximum of 12 fired by the latter); placed by a South African 105 mm as well as being simpler and less ex- gun, developed from the well-proven pensive. The Va/kiri system can be de- British L7 105 mm. The new fire-control ployed either independently or in sup- system includes a laser range finder port of conventional artillery guns di- and passive night fighting equipment. rected against such target areas as The tank's secondary armament camps, troop concetrations and soft- conists of one 7,62 mm machine gun, skinned vehicle parks. Due to its high coaxially positioned, and the 7,62 mm mobility, it is ideally suited to the 'shoot machine gun mounted in the com- and skoot' principle of deployment; ie mander's cupola. In addition, eight 81 to bombard the enemy and then re- mm some grenade launchers are car- treat to a safe position as soon as pos- ried. The ammunition comprises 72 sible before he can retaliate, rounds of 105 mm ammunition and 5 600 rounds of 7,62 mm ammunition.

THE aUF ANT MARK IA 10 The Olifant cannot totally compete To reiterate, in Angola throughout the with the current generation of MBTs, major part of operations launched by but it is nevertheless a very capable the SADF in the 1980s, the South Afri- fighting vehicle which can outmatch can armoured capability was vested all other counterparts at present in entirely in the armoured car and Rate!' southern Africa, Centurion tanks had been brought from Great Britain during the 1950s, but It hull and suspension has served as the approximately half of this fleet (100) basis of an armoured recovery vehicle. was sold to Switzerland, during the The recovery vehicle is fitted with a 1960s, at a time when it was felt that front-mounted spade cum dozer blade there would be no need for a main and winches, The usual selection of battle tank (MBT) in any future military tools and equipment is carried, context involving South Africa, How- ever, a number of additional Cen- turions (some 200) were brought in The Olifant in Ango/a /987-/988 varying states of repair from Jordan and India in the late 1970s, symp- The fighting in Angola during the pe- tomatic of a renewed awarnesss of the riod 1987-1988 saw the South African need to develop the Army's tank fleet army deploy tanks for the first time

10 This section is derived from the following sources: (a)Heitman, Helmoed-Romer. South African arms and armour. Cape Town: Stroik, 1978, pp 42-43. (b)Heitman, Helmoed-Romer. The Olifant MBT. Armed Forces (SA). December 1989/January 1990. pp 10-15.

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The G5 155mm Gun (above) and Olifanf Tank (below) in acfion

(Photo's: SADF Photo Collection)

52 Milifaria 22/3 1992 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za since 1945, The operations revealed ments, The 105 mm HEAT shells also that the tank was capable of fulfilling dealt effectively, and without difficulty, all the eXS'lcting demands imposed with the T-55s, The gun control system upon it. The Olifants had to contend proved reliable and clearly met the with dense bush and sand and were demands of rapid encounters fought used to clear a way through the bush at close range. The fire control system, for other vehicles, Thistank proved the however, was not truly tested in the most effective vehicle in such unsuit- 1987-1988 operations. The majority of able conditions and, in this respect, the armoured clashes were effected at merits a most favourable comparison such short ranges that quick, almost in- with the American M-48 in Vietnam. stinctive, shooting proved to be the Heavy, powerful and extremely resi- rule. lient, the Olifant proved to be the only combat vehicle capable of overcom- The various enemy anti-tank weapons ing extremely dense bush; its ef- singularly failed to achieve any success fectiveness in this sphere, during these againt the Olifant; although some of operations, only rivalled by the three the South African tanks were hit with- pre-production G6s. Some of the out incurring any damage, The 122 Olifants involved covered in excess of mm D-30s deployed by the Fapla bri- some 2 500 km on their tracks, trav- gades (cf Part I) did not utilize their ef- ersing the dense bush and often deep fective HEAT rounds in an anti-tank sand of south-eastern Angola, remain- role, Thus, the Olifant's armour protect- ing operational despite a shortage of ion was not tested in these operations; spare parts. It is important to bear in its ability to absorb non-penetrating mind that thick bush can present a damage was adequately demonstrat- most formidable barrier, even to mo- ed by the small numbers that were hit, dern combat vehicles. In one instance The BM-21 multiple rocket launcher (cf the bush was so dense that the 56 ton Part I), by contrast, confronted the ad- Olifant was only able to cover some vancing South African tanks in a direct 800 metres in four hours. The lighter fire mode on several occasions, In one Ratel suffered to an even greater ex- case a rocket tore the idler and track tent. off an Olifant, although the tank suf- fered little other damage, In one in- The actual fighting in these operations, stance a normally fired 127 mm rocket from the vantage point of the South killed a tank driver when it struck the African MBT presented, arguably, few- Olifant on its front armour before he er demands upon the tank in com- could close the hatch securely. parison with the task of reaching the objective, The enemy threat consisted, However, anti-tank mines presented a in the main, of the T-54/55 series of considerably more formidable threat to tanks (et Part I) and a variety of anti- the Olifant, It was finally a minefield, tank weapons; principally the 82 mm B- well covered by artillery, that halted 10 (cf Part I), RPG missiles and some the last attack on the remaining Fapla Sagger wire-guided missiles (cf Part I), toehold east of the Cuito River. In the The Fapla and Cuban trained tank course of this action three Olifants crews did not provide any serious op- were disabled by mines, suffering track position, least of all to the Olifant. Only and suspension damage. They could one South African tank appears to not be recovered and were later cap- have been damaged by them, being tured by Fapla forces. These were the struck on its idler by a 100 mm shell. In only South African tanks lost in the op- return, the Olifant crews destroyed at erations. None were destroyed in the least 32 T-54/55s. The 105 mm shells of actual fighting, nor suffered any ar- the Olifant had, predictably, no prob- mour penetration. ems in confronting their armoured ad- versaries. One APFSDprojectile passed THE 1990s USHER IN through the sand wall piled in front of DEMILITARIZATION : IMPACT ::::Idug-in T-55 and then penetrated its UPON THE SADF AND ARMSCOR ;;)Iacisplate. The armour piercing shells ::::Ilsopenetrated enemy armour at The political configuration of the de- some very shallow impact angles that cade (ie the 1980s) which witnessed resulted from the close action engage- the climax of this intense phase of op-

Militaria 22/3 7992 53 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 23, Nr 3, 1993. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za erational activity has undergone a and role of the South African arma- drastic transformation at the outset of ments industry - ARMSCOR. the 1990s. The following quotation from the article referred to (7) is The dramatically altered political confi- deemed apposite: guration of Southern Africa which emerged at the outset of the succeed- '(The SADF Memorial at Fort Klap- ing decade exerted a profound im- perkop symbolizes) the high profile pact upon the industrial partner of the assumed by the armed forces (of armed forces - ARMSCOR - in the rela- South Africa) at a point in time when tionship that was climaxed during the (the Republic) was confronted by preceding era. The character and hostile forces within (its territory), force of that impact forms the theme The unveiling of the Defence Force of an article entitled, The armaments Memorial (on 31 May 1979) occurred industry - a white elephant?, by Frank during a most intense and aggres- Sutherland1l, The writer comments: sive phase of activity on the part of the South African armed forces, di- 'Over the last year or two, there rected towards the defence of have been major changes in the po- South West Africa ..,against SWAPO litical and business environment of insurgency and the extension of that the ARMSCORand the South African conflict into Angola, Today the en- armaments industry ...the ending of tirely different military configuration the war in Angola and the dawning of Southern Africa (including the in- of "a world peace era" are well dependence of Namibia (as South known. These events have affected West Africa is now termed) under a the armaments industry in various SWAPO government) has effectively ways, the most visible and painful sealed this phase of the SADF's his- being a sharp reduction of orders tory, Thus, it is extremely improbable and concomitant cutbacks in pro- that South African forces will ever duction and staff, A less visible but again enter Namibia and Angola highly pertinent effect has been a with hostile intent,' major change in the arms industry's An index of the far lower profile as- public image", sumed by the SADF during the present decade is the scaling down of mecha- In the previous era, until the end of nized infantry battalions. For example, the Angolan war, ARMSCOR and the within the former 72 Brigade, the SA industry it led had an image which Irish Regiment, having been converted can only be described as excellent. to mechanized infantry during the sec- This image was not undeserved, for ond half of the 1980s, no longer serve the country had to contend with the in such a role, Similarly, the brigade compounded problem of a pro- structure has been phased out, Thus, tracted border war and an interna- 72 Brigade has been dissolved and, in tional arms boycott. Because of the common with all other brigade groups, success of the armaments industry in have been absorbed into a division (in providing the defence force with vir- 72 Brigade's instance 7 Division), which tually everything it needed, it ac- now forms the central organizing, ad- quired an image of "saviours of the ministrative nucleus for the individual nation", The public realized that citizen force units encompassed by there was no option but for South their respective divisions. Africa to produce her own arma- ments, and national expenditure on These developments - the scaling down defence was in any case quite aver- of mechanized infantry battalions and age by world standards. The unveil- the dissolution of the brigade groups - ing of products such as the Valkiri are clearly symptomatic of the reversal rocket system, the G5 and G6".(the of the aggressive orientation and im- Rate!) etc, caused a swelling of the age of the SADFduring the 1980s, The national pride, and ARMSCOR came process has its counterpart in the very to be regarded as a well-managed considerable attenuation in the image firm of technological experts ..,

II Sutherland. Frank. The armaments industry - a white elephant? Salvo. 90/4. pp 21-24.

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Then the war ended, This meant CONCLUSION that the local market for ARMSCOR's products was drastically reduced - a Two points may, perhaps, be made in fact which by itself would have had conclusion, First, perhaps the most re- a profound effect on the fortunes of markable feature of the military-indus- the arms' industry, The effect was trial complex that emerged during the compounded by the government's latter half of the 1970s and 1980s was fundamental shift in its financial pri- the manner in which it created a orities: to achieve workable new dis- weapons technology that transcended pensations, resources previously an entire generation in totally closing spent on arms would have to be the distance between South Africa and spent on social upliftment, NATO in this sphere; to the extent that the former could most successfully The nett result was a demilitarising of compete with the western nations in the country and a reappraisal of the export field, Second, the develop- ARMSCOR by the public and the ment of the Republic's military tech- media ...(Some elements of the me- nology during the 1980sis pervaded by dia) considered that ARMSCOR and a curious irony, This aspect is exem- certain other parastatals such as the plified by the G5, G6 and Olifant. For Atomic Energy Corporation", had these embodiments of South Africa's become white elephants, and said it vast technological strides in the fields in so many words. These organiza- of artillery and armour were deployed tions, they argued, were created in action for the very first time during when there was a great need for the 1987-1988 operations in Angola; self-sufficiency in the face of sanc- and these occasions may well, per- tions, but they were expensive and haps, mark the final instance in which the evolution of the new South Af- they were thus used; in the light of the rica was making them redundant.., drastically altered political stance of Southern Africa, commented upon Such opinions were not expressed above, This process is paralleled by only by the media, the situation of the former mechanized infantry battalions of 72 Brigade, Hav- During the October (of 1990),the Preto- ing experienced the arduous and tak- ria News reported that the Synod of the ing process of conversion, they were Anglican diocese of Cape Town had overtaken by current political develop- decided that the SAD Defence Force ments, and proved the victims of 'ra- and Umkhonto weSizweshould both be tionalization'; a facet of the demilitari- disbanded in a post-Apartheid SouthAf- zation process, rica, and that, inter alia, ARMSCORand "other arms manufacturers" should be * Dr Monick is Curator of Medals and Nu- dissolved, mismatics at the South African National Museum of Military History, He is the au- The image of the arms industry had thor of numerous articles relating to med- indeed changed.' als and military history, which have been published in a wide variety of journals in An ideal historical vantage point both South Africa and the United Kingdom, Dr Monick has also authored several books, relating to both medals and regi- For the reasons cited above, this study mental histories (Ie those of the is ideally placed in point of time; pre- Witwatersrand Rifles and the South African senting a survey of the major oper- Irish Regiment), as well as general works, ational developments within the South Afri- which have been published in this country, can Army, which occurred during an era which now appears encapsulated or sealed in time. Thus,no longer being in a BIBLIOGRAPHY: SOURCES state of flux the technological revolutionsin REFERRED TO IN TEXT artillery and mechanized infantry which characterize the 1980smay be viewed with (l )Monick. S. Silent voices of time: a selective a certain degree of finality; within a per- study of the sculpture of the South African Na- spective which has been enclosed or tional Museum of Military History. Militaria 21/ 4,1991. p 32. framed, so to speak. (2)The sources of the following details concerning

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the Ratel are: (4)Comdt I Rimmer; conversation with S Monick: 3 (a)Kleinecke, H W. The Rate!. Militaria 15/1, October 1991. 1985, pp 33-34. (5)lbid item (4) above. (b)Fosse, C F. Jane's Armoured Personnel Car- (6)lbid item (4) above. riers. London: Jane's Publishing Co., 1985, pp (7)lbid item (1) above. 101-105. (3)Bradford, Z B. Motorised infantry on the mod- ern battlefield. Armed Forces (SA), Vol 1 No 5, Other sources referred to: May 1976, p 16. (Reprinted by kind permission of Infantry). (1)Paratus, October 1981, pp 68-71; February, Note: An extract from the USAISTactics Depart- 1984, pp 34-43; December 1987, pp 10-15. ment paper Mechanized infantry on the mod- (2)Heitman, Helmoed-R6hmer. War in Angola: ern armoured battlefield, prepared by Col Z B the final South African phase. Gibraltar: Bradford and members of the Tactics Depart- Ashanti Publishing, 1990, pp 357-364. ment. The paper was disseminated to senior (3)Jane's Armour and Artillery. 1979-1980; 1987- American military officers in October 1975. 1988.

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