Po land and Czech Re pu b lic – Fields of Co o pe ra tion

01-06 14 maja 2010 07:35:23 01-06 14 maja 2010 07:35:23 CENTRUM STOSUNKÓW MIÊDZYNARODOWYCH CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Po land and Czech Re pu b lic – Fields of Co o pe ra tion

Wa r saw 2010

01-06 14 maja 2010 07:35:23 Acknowledgements The Center for International Relations is pleased to announce that the present publication is part of the project funded by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland in the framework of the contest “Supporting the Development of Polish – Czech relations”.

Published by: Center for International Relations

Editor: Aleksander Szpor

Proofreading: Cathal Flynn (articles 1, 2, 3 and 5)

Translation: Micha³ Piotrowski (articles 1, 4, introduction and recommendations)

ISBN: 978-83-88216-54-1

© Copyright by Fundacja Centrum Stosunków Miêdzynarodowych, 2010.

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01-06 14 maja 2010 07:35:24 Contents

In tro du c tion ...... 7 Ja kub Gro sz ko wski Po li ti cal Fa c tors and the ir In flu en ce on Po lish and Czech Com mon In te rests in the Con text of Cen tral Eu ro pe an Re la tions ...... 9 Vit Do stal Czech Fo re ign Po li cy 2006–2009; The Cur rent De ba te be twe en the Po liti cal Parties’, its Re sults and Pro spects for the Futu re ...... 15 Jiøí Schne i der Poland and the Czech Repu b lic: Our Com mon Inte res t in Making NATO and the EU a Real Strate gic Anchor ...... 27 Ale ksan der Szpor Poland and the Czech Repu b lic in the Euro pe an Union – Com mon Chal len ges ...... 33 Fi lip Èernoch, Petr Ocelik Cze ch - Po lish Co -o pe ra tion in the Field of Ene r gy: The Po ten tial of LNG for Ene r gy Se cu ri ty in Cen tral Eu ro pe ...... 41 Jiøí Schne i der, Eu ge niusz Smo lar Sum ma ry of Re com men da tions ...... 59

01-06 14 maja 2010 07:35:24 01-06 14 maja 2010 07:35:24 In trod ucti on

Ac cor ding to the una ni mo us opi nion of the au t hors of the pre sent pu b li ca tion, Poli s h - Czech re la tions are cur ren t ly wi t nes sing one of the best pe riods in the ir hi sto ry. A lack of ma jor di spu tes has co in ci ded with both the re cen t ly te r mi na ted Czech pre siden cy of the Coun cil of the Euro pe an Union, and the prepa ra tions for the Po lish pre si den cy. The se cir cu m stan ces are con du ci ve to a mu tu al rappro che ment, but fu l filling the ir full poten tial is still a task to be performed. This task was un de r ta ken jo in t ly by the Cen ter for In ter na tio nal Re la tions and the Pra gue Se cu ri ty Stu dies In sti tu te, which or ga ni zed two se mi nars in the se cond half of 2009, de vo ted to dra f ting a stra te gy for co o pe ra tion be twe en our two co un tries. The com pre hen si ve de scri p tion of Poli s h - Czech re la tions con sti tu tes a new, bro a der ap pro ach to the se re la tions. The se mi nars iden ti fied the most ac ti ve pla y ers in Poli s h - Czech re la tions in the pu b lic, pri va te and in cre a sin gly im po r tant NGO se c tors. Va rio us fields of co o pe ra tion were di s cus sed, the aims of in di vi du al en ti ties were exam i ned, and, fi nal ly, mea su res for their implementation were laid out. The pre sent pu b li ca tion ma in ly con sti tu tes a ba c k gro und for the on go ing di s cus sion, but also sum ma ri zes and de scri bes the most im po r tant mo tions that were ra i sed du ring the pro ject. The first ar ti c le is de vo ted to Poli s h - Czech re la tions in terms of the ir roots in rela tions with other coun tries of the region. The follo wing text exa mi nes the cur rent po li ti cal si tu a tion in the Czech Re pu b lic and pre sents po ssi b le sce na rios for the de ve lo p ment of Czech fo re ign po li cy. The next ar ti c le ou t li nes the main present and futu re challen ges for the Euro pe an Union, which the Czech Repu b lic and Poland will also have to face. It is worth pay ing special atten tion to the ar ti c le de vo ted to the key stra te gic aspects of Po lish and Czech mem be r s hip wi t hin NATO and the EU. The last text di s cus ses Poli s h - Czech co o pe ra tion in the ene r gy se c tor, as an espe cial ly to pi cal, but also sym pto ma tic exa m p le of both countries’ com mon in te rests. The fi nal se c tion of the pu b li ca tion in clu des con c lu sions sum ma ri zing the key po ints ra i sed du ring the pro ject, which also con sti tu te the im por tant and practical recommendations of the entire publication. The Cen ter for In ter na tio nal Re la tions is ple a sed to an no un ce that the pre sent pub li ca tion is part of the project funded by the Mini stry of Fore ign Af fairs of the Repu b lic of Poland in the fram ework of the contest “Sup po r ting the De ve lo p ment of Polish – Czech rela tions” .

07-08 14 maja 2010 08:03:00 07-08 14 maja 2010 08:03:00 Ja kub Grosz kows ki

Polit ical Factors and their Influe nce on Polish and Czech Common In ter ests in the Con text of Cen tral Eu rop ean Relations

Poli s h - Czech re la tions are cur ren t ly wi t nes sing one of the best pe riods in their histo ry. While our coun trie s are in the final stages of a transfo r m ation pro cess, they are also un de r ta king ever bo l der fo re ign po li cy go als, and are be co ming in cre a sin gly ac ti ve in se e king to in flu en ce the ir geo po li ti cal en vi ron ment. Unfo rtu na te ly, the chan ces of im p le men ting spe ci fic in te rests are sub ject to the cur rent po li ti cal con fi gu ra tion in each re spe c ti ve co un try. The aim of the present text is to tra ce the po ten tial chan ges in Poli s h - Czech com mon in te rests with re gard to the re sults of Czech par lia men ta ry ele c tions planned for May 2010. The roots of the cur rent boom in Polis h - Cze ch re lations may be tra ced back to the pe riod of de mo c ra tic op po si tion in Po land and Cze chos lo va kia. Thus, it is not sur pri sing that they re ached their high point at the time when key func tions in both the Polish and Czech gove r n m ents were held by pe op le co ming from the se po li ti cal en vi ron ments. Di rect con tacts be twe en dis si dents not only hel ped to crea te the Vise grad Triangle in 1991, but also for m ed the ba sis for fu r t her pro jects lin king the po li ti cal right in Cen tral Eu ro pe (1999, 2006). Groups which conti nue to keep with this tradi tion – such as the Ci vic Pla t form and Law and Ju sti ce pa r ties in Po land, and the Ci vic De mo c ra tic Pa r ty (ODS) and re pre sen tati ves pre vio u s ly as so cia ted with Václav Ha vel (e.g. Ka rel Schwa rzen berg) in the Czech Repu b lic – are uni ted pri mari ly by the ir si mi lar ou t lo ok to wards re la tions with Rus sia and the Uni ted Sta tes. Both groups see the Ameri cans as the only for ce capa b le of ensu ring Central and Easte rn Euro pe an se curi ty. At the same time, both consi der Russia as a coun try which may lead to de-sta bilisa tion in the region. Too much influ en ce by

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Mos cow in Central and Ea stern Euro pe is seen by con ser vati ves as a threat. The ove rlap ping views of the poli ti cal right in both Poland and the Czech Re pu b lic thus fa ci li ta tes the re a li sa tion of a se ries of jo int ac ti vi ties be twe en both coun trie s. This is the case with regard to the transat lan tic poli cie s pur su ed by Pra gue and Wa r saw, and par ticu la r ly in re spect of de fen se- rela ted is su es (fo re ign mis sions, mis si le de fen se, mi li ta ry modernization, NATO reform), and is used the greater or lesser effect. Another derivat ive of the convergent approach charac teri stic of Polish and Czech relat ions with the U.S. and Rus sia are the views of the po litical right in both count ries on energy secur ity issues . Both sides strongly support efforts aimed at reduc ing energy depend ence on Russia . Hence the support for the construc tion of the gas connect or betwe en Poland and the Czech Repub lic, a gas port in Swinou jsc ie, the Na bucco gas pipel ine, and the sim ultane ous aver sion to the com petiti ve South Strea m projec t. For these same re asons, the Czechs have ta ken steps aimed at strengthe ning the capac ity of do mestic nuclea r power plants. The ongoi ng tender proces s to expand the power plant in the Czech town of Tem elin includ es com panies from the United Sta tes, Russia and France. The de cis ion regard ing the winner of the tender proced ure will be of strateg ic po lit ical im port ance. Investm ents in nuc lear energy are also planned in Poland, and it is theref ore worth consid ering the various methods of cooperation which Warsaw and Prague could undertake in this respect. The percept ion which Polish and Czech conser vatives have of Russia also has an im pact on their policy towar ds Eastern Europe. It is they who shaped the form of the Eastern Partners hip. From the perspec tive of Warsaw – one of the initiato rs of the projec t – the partners hip is aimed not only at helping to modern ise the EU’s eas tern ne ighbours, but also at strengthening the posit ion of Poland as a count ry capab le of contrib uti ng to EU forei gn policy. For this reason, Warsaw is strongly in terest ed in the succes s of the Part nership. Pra gue has fully adopt ed the projec t, and has been engag ed in its inaug ura tion during the Czech EU pre sidency. Im portantly, after the end of the pre sidency, the Czech governm ent has re tained the partners hip on its list of forei gn policy priorit ies and contin ues to play an active part in it, especiall y in the domain of civil society in the countries covered by the program. Polish- Czech cooper ati on in the above-mention ed areas – the strengthening of re lations with the Unit ed States, espec ially with re spect to defens e, and the re duction of Rus sian influe nce in the re gion in the form of prom oting energy secur ity and the Eastern Partners hip – was create d within a very spe cif ic po lit ical con fig ura tion. The po lit ical ri ght, which has been ruling Poland since the end of 2005, found a se lect part ner among Czech conser vatives, who form ed a governm ent the re be tween 2006 and April 2009. The inter im governm ent set up afterwards in Pra gue as a re sult of a com prom ise betwe en the left and right focus ed on econom ic is sues, virtua lly

09-14 14 maja 2010 08:04:41 Polit ical Factors and their Influe nce on Po lish and Czech... 11

con fin ing fo rei gn po licy to EU-re lat ed mat ters. Whi le in Po land, two ri ght-wing par ties have do min ated the po lit ical sce ne, it is no neth ele ss possi ble that left-wing parties will come to power over the com ing num ber of years in the Czech Repub lic. This is even the case notwit hstanding next year’s parliam enta ry elections. Over the past half year, the polls have given the ri ght and left an equal chance of victory in these elections. A governm ent for med under the leader ship of the ODS would signify the contin uat ion of the polic ies which are cha ract eri sed by a strong trans atlant ic element and li mited trust to wards Rus sia. If, ho wever, the Czech So cial De mocratic Par ty (CSSD) will turn out to be the main ruling par ty after the elections, it is expect ed that pressure will be distrib uted in a slightly different ly manner. In the li ght of the fact that, since May 2009 the posit ion of Forei gn Minis ter has been occupied by Jan Kohout – a diplom at truste d among the socia l-dem ocrats who, for a period of almost one and half years, had previously served as deputy Minister under the former head of diplomacy, Karel Schwarzenberg – we should not expect a revolution. In con trast to the con ser vati ves, the Czech So cial De moc rats un dou bte dly con sid er re lat ions with the ir Eu rop ean part ners as pri mar ily im port ant, thus re gard ing the trans atlant ic re lat ionsh ip as less cru cial. The left also has a diffe rent at tit ude to wards Rus sia. Whi le ri ght-wing po lit ici ans have sought act ively to lim it the influe nce of Moscow in the Czech Repub lic, we should not expect the same from the CSSD. Everyt hing se ems to indic ate that, in contras t to the con ser vati ves, a so cial-democ ratic govern ment will treat Rus sia as an equal play er in global polit ics , which must be engag ed in discus sion as is the case with the USA. Accordi ng to left-wing polit ici ans, Russia needs to be involved in glo bal se cur ity struc tur es, be cause lar ge in tern ati onal pro jects undert aken without Rus sian partic ipa tion, such as the missile shield, may lead to an unnec ess ary in crease in tensions which could re kindle Cold War sen tim ents. Mo reo ver, acc ordi ng to Czech So cial De moc rats, NATO and the EU should play a greater role in initiati ves regard ing col lective secur ity. The crisis -ridden United Sta tes can no longer func tion as a lone playm aker. The polit ica l left thus calls for a more ba lanc ed – but no less active – policy. The re is no indic ati on howeve r that any future left-wing governm ent shall abandon any of the activiti es current ly perform ed wi thin the fram ework of the Eas tern Part nership. Minis ter Kohou t’s decis ion to inc lude this projec t on the list of Czech foreign policy priorities raises the hope that the Eastern Partnership will also be granted an important status by a future left-wing government. Apart from the above-mention ed forei gn policy issues , which may be in fluenced by the po litical affil iati on of the ru ling par ties, one may easily draw up a list of Polish- Czech com mon inter est s (partic ula rly with re gard to the EU) which re main se par ate from ideo logi cal is sues. Pri mar ily, the se inc lude is sues concer ning EU market barrier s, which were im posed on the new Mem ber

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Sta tes in the ir acc ession trea ties, such as re strict ions on acc ess to the EU la bour market. Po litical affil iati ons also play a les ser role in the fight for EU fun ding. Czech and Polish polit ici ans of all polit ica l sorts should seek the largest possi ble funding from the future EU budget for region al policy and infras tructure program s. We should be just as strong in our support for repres enta tives from our region to obtain the highest posit ions, and for EU bo dies and in stit uti ons to be he adquart ered in our re spect ive co unt ries. After the Russia -Ukraine gas crisis in early 2009, energy secur ity is also becom ing a topic which garners supports among the re pres enta tives of various polit ica l groups. Ma jor par ties on both the Polish and Czech polit ica l scenes are in favor of diver sifying supply routes and energy sources, with their main objective being the successful implementation of the EU Nabucco project. Many of the above inter est s are com mon not only to Poland and the Czech Repub lic, but to all count ries in our re gion. The refore, if we want our voice in the EU to be accordi ngly strong, we should em power it by for ming broad er allianc es. Slovakia and Hungary, our partners in the Viseg rad Group, seem to be natur al partners for discus sing such topics . Rem oving barrier s wi thin the EU, prom oting region al re pres enta tives, as well as ra ising EU support for the Bal kans and Eas tern Europe re main in the inter est of all four mem bers of the Group. Moreo ver, it is not unlik ely that the num ber of issues will incre ase after next year’s par liamenta ry elect ions. Whi le the June elect ions in Slovakia are not li kely to signif icantly affect the shape of the lo cal polit ical sce ne, the April elections in Hun gary will chan ge it drama tica lly. The right-wing Fi desz, which is favored to win, suppor ts a forei gn policy outlook in relat ion to Rus sia and the U.S. which is sim ilar to that of the Polish and Czech conser vatives. The choice of a ri ght wing governm ent in the Czech elections in May could thus lead to a platform for broad Polish- Czech-Hungar ian cooper ati on. The va lue of such cooper ati on is accentu ate d by the fact that, during the first half of 2011, Budapest will take over the EU Council presidency for a six month period. EU ne ighb orhood po licy and en larg eme nt is sues seem to be par tic ula rly im port ant for both Po lish-Czech co oper ati on and the en tire Vi seg rad Gro up. Taking into account the weaken ing Weste rn Europ ean support for adm itting new members into the EU, one may as sume that after the acc ession of Cro atia, this topic shall be come a margin al one. In order to avoid this, it is worth taking steps to prom ote this is sue within the EU, in cooper ati on with the new Czech Com miss ioner Šte fan Füle, re spons ible for en larg eme nt and ne ighb orhood policy. It is in our inter est to involve the EU in both the post-Soviet bloc, and in the Bal kans. All the whi le, we must re memb er that the EU’s po ssib le eastward en larg ement will not take pla ce be fore all of the Bal kan states be come EU mem bers. Theref ore, while not forgett ing about Eastern Europe, we should attac h more im portance to helping the Weste rn Balkans, by sharing our exper ience from twenty years of trans form ation in our count ries . So-called

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“twinning” projec ts may be used to this effect. The introd ucti on of visa-free travel in the Schengen area for citiz ens of Serbia, Monten egro and Maced onia in De cember 2009 was an im portant step by the We stern Balkans towar ds Eu rop ean struc tur es. No neth ele ss, Al ban ia and Bo snia and He rzeg ovina still rem ain outsi de this group, which is why Central European countries should support these governments in the implementation of EU visa-free travel for their citizens. Our po lit ici ans, either as re pres enta tiv es of the ir co unt ries, or as repres enta tives of the Viseg rad Group, should be visib le in the Balkans, and should prom ote econom ic exchang es be tween our two regions. It is thus wor th con sid ering the po ssib ili ties of po licy co ord ina tion be tween Po land and the Czech Re public, or the entire Viseg rad Group, in the Bal kans, partic ula rly in the econ omic sphe re. It is pre cis ely this aspect – which re lies on the means given to us by the Viseg rad Group and the Europ ean Union – that gives Poland and the Czech Re public the possi bili ty to not only im prove the ir posit ion in Europe, but also posit ively affect the stabil ity of our re gion. A consis tent policy undert aken by our le aders in this direction will lead to a situa tion whe re, once the Western Balkan states become UE members, they will be among our closest allies. Clo se co oper ati on with Cen tral Eu rop ean co unt ries plays an espec ially im portant role for Poland. Whi le such cooper ati on not only im proves Warsaw ’s posit ion within the Europ ean Union and helps Poland in present ing its own in terests, it is equally import ant in that it allows po litici ans to en rich the tradit ional East-West perspect ive with a North-So uth one. Ty pically, Po lish di scuss ions on in tern ati onal is sues are con duct ed in acc orda nce with the follow ing rule: “Poland is a count ry betwe en Rus sia and Germ any”. Such an approach does not always allow us to notice the potent ial which can stem from the co oper ati on be tween Nor thern and So uthern Eu rop ean co unt ries. The exam ple of the suc cess of the Polish- Swedish Eastern Partners hip dem onstrat es how broad the potent ial possi bili ties in this respec t are. To the South of our bor ders, Rom ania may prove to be an im portant interl ocutor. Fo rem ost ly, Po lish, Czech and Ro man ian con ser vati ves would have the opportun ity to find com mon topics , as the Rom anian ri ght views re lations with Russia as well as cooper ation with the Unit ed States in a very si milar manner. Rom ania is also a key count ry for the succes s of projec ts aimed at diversif ying gas supplies to Europe. Moreover, as shown by the European trip of U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden, Romania is also an important partner for the United States. Enric hing policy on the East-West front with an active re gional cooper ati on is espec ially import ant now, with a possi bili ty of cre ating a new opening in re lations with Germ any. The introd ucti on of the provision on Po lish-Ger man co oper ati on into the CDU-CSU-FDP co alit ion agree ment and

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the choice of War saw as the first forei gn destin ati on of Germ any’s new diplom acy chief, Guido Weste rwelle , a visit which took place on 31 October 2009 (the minis ter vi sited Pra gue five weeks la ter) constit uted very im portant po lit ical ge stur es. Never thel ess, ne ither Po land, nor any other Cen tral Eu rop ean co unt ry has suf fic ient po lit ical, econ omic, or de mog raph ic po tent ial to becom e a real partner for Ger many in its forei gn policy. The situa tion in our mu tual re lat ions is not fa cil ita ted by hi stor ical di sp utes or con flict ing EU inter est s (e.g. on the intern al market or clim ate and energy po licy). The most po werf ul EU co unt ries, inc lud ing Ger many, will be more inc lin ed to appre ciate the value of Poland and the Czech Repub lic on the EU arena only when our standpoints will be supported by other European Union members. The easiest place to find such allies is Central Europe.

09-14 14 maja 2010 08:04:41 Vít Dostál As so cia tion for In ter na tio nal Af fa irs

Czech Fo re ign Po li cy 2006–2009; The cur rent de ba te be twe en the Poli ti cal Parties’, its Results and Prospects for the futu re

In tro du c tion

Thro u g ho ut the 1990’s, Czech fo re ign po li cy was dri ven by cle ar ob je c ti ves which were, so o ner or la ter, suc ces s ful ly re a li sed. These go als se e med to be so me how na tu ral and, al t ho ugh they were oc ca sio nal ly con te sted with regard to the manner and speed wi thin which they were addres sed, there was no ne t he less a bro ad con sen sus among de mo c ra tic po li ti cal pa r ties on the di re c tion of Czech fo re ign po li cy.1 In De ce m ber 1989, Jiøí Dien st bier took up re si den ce in the Cze r nin Pa la ce, whi le Václav Ha vel simu lta neou s ly took up re si den ce in Pra gue Ca st le. Both men fun da men tal ly re- ca li bra ted the fo re ign po li cy di re c tion and go als of Cze cho s lo vak/Czech fo re ign po li cy. At first, the po li cy pu r su ed by both Dien st bier and Ha vel set abo ut re-e stab li s hing Czech na tio nal so ve rei gn ty by ex pel ling the Red Army from Cze chos lo va kia, and by di s man t ling the Mos co w - led eco no mi cal and se cu ri ty or ga ni sa tions formerly in exi sten ce such as the Wa r saw Pact Tre a ty and the Co un cil for Mu tu al Eco no mic As si stan ce. A se cond lo gi cal ob je c ti ve con ce r ned the esta bli s h ment of frien d ly re la tions with the Eu ro pe an Com mu ni ties and NATO, which was la ter trans fo r med into the ob je c ti ve of at ta i ning full mem be r s hips of both or ga ni sa tions. Whi le the re

1 Whi le the an ti - sy stem pa r ties of the far left and far right op po sed the pre va i ling di re c tion of fore ign- po li cy, the Com mu nist Pa r ty vi r tu al ly ac ce p ted the re a li ty of EU mem be r s hip. In fact, a ma r gi nal semi - fa c tion wi t hin the pa r ty ad vo ca tes a less do gma tic “eu ro com mu nist” ap pro ach of the far left.

15-26 14 maja 2010 09:24:32 16 Vít Dostál

were many “by -pro ducts ” of the Czech ac ces sion proces s to both or gani sa tions (such as Cze ch- Ge r man re con ci lia tion) which re qu i red a cre a ti ve re so lu tion, Czech deci sion - ma kers were not fa ced with im po r tant qu e stions regarding the strategic orientation of their country’s foreign policy in the 1990’s. The Czech Re pu b lic fi nal ly re le a sed it self from Moscow’s cold em bra ce in 1991, beco m ing a mem ber of NATO in 1999, and then acce ding to the Euro pe an Union (EU) in 2004. Im portan t ly, Czech ac ces sion to the EU on the 1st May 2004 opened a com ple te ly new cha pter in Czech fore ign poli cy. Czech po li ti cal eli tes were thus re qu i red to ad dress new tasks and ob je c ti ves in terms of foreign policy. This pa per fo cu ses on how the in ter nal de ba te con ce r ning Czech fo re ign po li cy has con ti nu ed and de ve lo ped in the ye ars be twe en 2006–2009, a pe riod wi t hin which the Czech Re pu b lic was re qu i red to ad dress se ve ral new chal len ges. Cur rent po li ti cal pa r ty orien ta tions in the field of fo re ign po li cy will thus be analy sed, while the manner in which the fore ign poli cy program s of these pa rties have been constru c ted and deve lo ped will also be addres sed, and how firm are the parties’ fore ign poli cy program s. Se cond ly, in a sum ma ry, po ssi b le stru c tu ral chan ges in fu tu re Czech fo re ign po li cy in the light of next year’s ge ne ral ele ction s are also ad dres sed in the speci fic con text of va ry ing po ssi b le post -e le c tion governmental coalition combinations.

Czech Fo re ign po li cy 2006–2009 – a bro a de ning de ba te and a na rro wing con sen sus

The years betwe en 2004–2006 were quiet years with regard to the deba te con ce r ning the fu tu re di re c tion of Czech fo re ign po li cy. In ter na lly, the prio ri ty fo cu sed on the smo oth ad ap ta tion to the new re a li ty of EU mem be r s hip. This was an ex tre me ly im po r tant pe riod, espe cial ly con si de ring the fact that the Czech Re pub lic was due to take on the EU Coun cil Presi den cy in 2009. On the ot her hand, this pro spect stun ted any po ssi b le cre a ti vi ty in this re gard. Neve r t he less, the Czech po li ti cal pa r ties (and ma in ly tho se pre sent in the go ve r n ment) did not have any pre- con ce i ved spe ci fic ini tia ti ve which co uld be pre sen ted on Czech ac ces sion to the EU. The re fo re, the gove r n men tal stra te gic do cu ment ou t li ning the fo re ign po li cy tasks for the ye ars 2003–2006, which was ad op ted in March 2003 af ter the suc ces s ful con c lu sion of the ne go tia tion proces s with the EU, may be consi de red to be very modest and focu sing on ad ap ta tion.2

2 Kon ce pce zahranièní po li ti ky Èeské re pu b li ky na léta 2003–2006, Go ve r n ment of the Czech Re pu b lic, 2003.

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Ho we ver, the ab sen ce of any fresh ide as and po li ti cal con cepts which was cha rac te ri stic of the first two years fol lo wing Czech ac ces sion to the EU was also sympto ma tic of the state of in terna tio nal po litics at that time. If the then in ter na tio nal po li ti cal sce ne is co m pa red to the ye ars which were fol lo wing this period, the Czech Re pub lic did not play a sig ni fi cant role in the inter na tio nal are na. No twit h stan ding this, the re were pa r ti cu lar in stan ces whe re Pra gue was requ i red to make a stra tegic choi ce. A strong exa m ple of this is the Iraq War. Yet, the Czech government’s respon se in this regard was (in contras t to the Po lish one) ra t her he si tant. Neve r t he less, no ur gent is su es exi sted at that time (such as the U.S. Mis si le De fen ce plan, the Li s bon Tre aty or a re su r gent Rus sia) which wo uld have pro vo ked deep de ba te con ce r ning the stra te gic di re c tion of Czech fo reign po li cy du ring that pe riod.3 Con ve r se ly, such chal len ging is su es and condi tions have only appe a red over the past three years . The stance which the pa r ti cu lar Czech po li ti cal pa r ties have ta ken in re spect of, in ter alia, the se po li cy qu e stions must the re fo re be de te r mi ned, whi le the man ner in which this re spon se has been fo r mu la ted must also be con si de red.4

The Ci vic De mo c ra tic Pa r ty:

The June 2006 elec tions brought the Civic Dem oc ra tic Par t y (Obèanská demokratická strana – ODS) into gove r n m ent. This pa rty had spent the previo us eight years in oppo si ti on, a period which was char act eri s ed by spec ific non- po pu lis t euro-s cep t icis m,5 stem ming from the ide as and philo so p hy of the for m er par ty lea der and Pres ident of the Czech Repu b l ic, Václav Kla us. This eu ros ce p tic fa c tion in the ODS was re pre sen ted ma in ly by Jan Za hra dil, who dra f ted the first po li cy do cu ments op po sing a fu r t her

3 It should be noted that the then governments were already in consultation with regard to the possible installation of elements of a U.S. Defence Shield in Europe. However, this process was not made public. Similarly, there was continuous debate about EU institutional reform. Yet, these talks mellowed out following the French and Dutch referenda on the EU Constitutional Treaty, and the Czech position was not, in any case, strong in these debates (although the Czech centre-left government voiced its support for the Treaty, it stopped the preparations of the referendum and waited for new development). 4 Six political parties will be dealt with in the context of this discussion. As each of these parties are currently present in the Czech lower house, they have each influenced Czech foreign policy to some degree in the past number of years, and they will probably continue to do so after 2010 as it is likely that each party will satisfy the 5% voters support threshold required to enter the Czech parliament. 5 The euroscepticism of the ODS is not a result of voter utilisation; therefore, it cannot be explained as populism (see Braun, M. (2009), Understanding Klaus: The Story of Czech Eurorealism, EPIN working paper nr. 26, November 2009 (on-line: www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/2706).

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de epe ning of Eu ro pe an in te gra tion.6 Za hra dil be ca me a Me m ber of the Euro pe an Pa rlia m ent (MEP) in 2004, and was Fore ign Mini ste r in the ODS sha dow go ve r n ment. The re fo re, it was wi de ly ex pe c ted that he wo uld be ca me the new Mi ni ster for Fo re ign af fa irs in the OD S-led go ve r n ment which was for m ed af ter 2006. Neve rt he les s, this is sue was not so clear. As the ODS was una b le to form a co a li tion go ve r n ment with a ma jo ri ty in the Cha m ber of De pu ties, the Czech lo wer ho u se, it thus de ci ded to bu i l d -up a mi no ri ty go ve r n ment which was also co m po sed of non - pa r ty me m bers. Con sequ en t ly, fu r t her can di da tes for the po si tion of Mi ni ster for Fo re ign Af fa irs eme r ged, and the ODS fi nal ly no mi na ted Ale xan der Von dra for the po si tion.7 In the light of Vondra’s perso nal profi le, his nom ina tion to this post was rat her sur pri sing. Vondra was a close ally of Václav Havel, and had wor ked in the latter’s offi ce at the be ginning of the 1990’s. Havel’s fore ign poli cy ob je c ti ves were fre qu en t ly cri ti ci sed by Václav Kla us, who al wa ys had a la r ge num ber of suppo r ters in the ODS, even af ter he left the posi tion of pa rty chai r m an in 2003. Alt ho ugh Vondra agrees with core ODS poli cy with re gard to the im po r tan ce of a trans at lan tic link for Czech fo reign and se cu ri ty po li cy, he presen ted a diffe rent list of priori ties to those of Zahra dil. 8 In pa r ti cu lar, Von dra pro vi ded a very po si ti ve pro gram me with re gard to Eu ro pe an in te gra tion. Mo re o ver, he hig hli g h ted the “Eu ro pe an neig hbou r ho od” pro gram me9 as one of five crucia l program mes for Czech fore ign poli cy. Final ly, he also stressed the im po r tan ce of is su es such as hu man rights pro te c tion, demo cra ti sa tion and trans fo r ma tion as si stan ce, as well as de ve lo p ment aid, which was de fi ni te ly not compatible with the policy or approach of the old ODS. Whi le this dis c re pan cy has ne ver di mi ni s hed, this new and more euro -pra g ma tic (which is Vondra’s most im po r tant as set) ap pro ach of the ODS soon ga i ned con side ra b le sup port. Thus, tho se pu r su ing such a euro -pra g ma tic ap pro ach be gan to do mi na te the ODS lea de r s hip be twe en the ye ars 2006–2009, thus lea ving Klaus’s (i.e. Zahradil’s) follo wer s aside. It is possi ble to iden ti fy two re a sons for this de ve lo p ment: Fi r st ly, thro u g ho ut the prepa ra tions for the Czech EU Coun cil Presi den cy (CZ PRES), many Mini ste rs who had origi nal ly viewed the EU in a ne gati ve sense changed the ir

6 Zahradil, J. – Plecitý, P. – Adrián, P. – Bednáø, M. (2001), Manifest èeského eurorealismu (dokument k ideové konferenci ODS) (on-line: http://www.ods.cz/docs/dokumenty/zahradilmanifest). 7 Apart from Vondra, Petr Gandaloviè was also considered as a possible candidate for this position. Gandaloviè was an ODS member who spent nine years at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in as a diplomat prior to becoming the Mayor of the city of Ústí nad Labem. 8 Vondra, A (2006), Èeská zahranièní politika: tøi principy, trojí smìøování a tøi témata, Meznárodní politika, year XXX, 11/2006. 9 Vondra understood this term to encompass both the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The term later developed, and in euro jargon is understood to mean the “European neighbourhood”, which differs from Vondra’s original concept.

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min d - set, as they be ca me part of the EU po li ti cal sy stem. Se con d ly, se ve ral im po r tant fi gu res from va ry ing ba c k gro unds jo i ned the ODS at aro und that time, e.g. the above mentio ned Alexan der Vondra, or Tomáš Pojar, who became the first Deputy Foreign Minister. This in ter nal ide o lo gi cal di cho to my in the ODS cu l mi na ted in the de ba te con ce r ning the ra ti fi ca tion of the Li s bon Tre a ty. The par lia men ta ry sup po r ters of Pre si dent Kla us, who had left the po si tion of pa r ty cha i r men, at te m p ted to halt the Tre a ty ra ti fi ca tion pro cess. Ho we ver, they were ne ver sup po r ted by the parties’ lea de r s hip, and were thus mar gi na li sed wi t hin the pa r ty stru c tu re it self. The stan ce of Jan Za hra dil was very spe ci fic in this con text. Impor tan t ly, Za hra dil re ma i ned so me w he re in the mid d le gro und be twe en both con fli c ting camps. In pa r ti cu lar, Za hra dil ar gu ed that the ODS par lia men ta rians sho uld ra ti fy the Li s bon Tre a ty, sin ce ra ti fi ca tion was both ne ces sa ry for gove r n men tal su r vi val, and for con fi den ce in the CZ PRES. Mo re o ver, he was personally engaged in the Lisbon Treaty negotiations. No twit h stan ding the even tu al ra ti fi ca tion of the Li s bon Tre a ty, the di spu te wi t hin the ODS con ce r ning its ap pro ach and po li cy to wards the EU re ma ins un re so l ved. The re are two im po r tant is su es which sug gest that the in ter nal ide o lo gi cal con flict wi t hin the pa r ty in this re spect may re turn. Fi r st ly, de spi te an ini tially more po siti ve atti tu de to wards the EU, the ODS has sin ce initia ted the cre a tion of a new EU- c ri ti cal po li ti cal gro u ping wi t hin the Eu ro pe an Pa r lia ment it self.10 Secon d ly, Vondra’s posi tion is no longer strong and we ll-ro o ted wi t hin the pa r ty stru c tu re, whi le Tomáš Po jar is ex pe c ted to be po sted to Is ra el as Czech am bas sa dor. In con trast, many of Presi dent Klaus’ sup po r ters re ma in in the ODS, al be it in ba c k bench po si tions. Thus, the propo nents of this new di rec tion in ODS poli cy may lose the ir posi tions and in flu en ce qu i te qu i c kly.11 The cho i ce of can di da tes for key gove r n men tal posi tions is thus of great im por tan ce in this regard should the ODS win the for t h co ming 2010 na tio nal ele c tions. The cho i ce of any o ne from Zahradil’s ento u ra ge is less proba b le since it would be hardly acceptable for smaller political parties, possible coalition partners. In te re stin gly, the Eu ro pe an agen da is the only po int of con flict wi t hin the ODS. The pa r ty una ni mou s ly ba c ked the in stal la tion of ele ments of the U.S. Mis si le De fen ce on Czech ter ri to ry, and is he si tant abo ut fo r ming clo ser re la tions with Rus sia,12 or sup po r ting Ea stern Par tne r s hip, as well as fu r t her EU enlargement.

10 The European Conservatives and Reformist Group is the creation of Jan Zahradil. 11 It should be noted, that the new Minister for European affairs in the provisional government nominated by the ODS is Juraj Chmiel, who is regarded as being closely connected to Zahradil. 12 This position differs to the one taken by president Klaus, who is open towards further and deeper cooperation with Moscow.

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The Czech So cial De mo c ra tic Pa r ty:

The So cial de moc rats (Èeská stra na sociálnì demokratická – ÈSSD) have been in oppo si tion since 2006. These years were marked with substa nti ve op po si tion to the fo re ign po li cy di re c tion pu r su ed by the go ve r ning co a li tion at that time. More o ver, the ÈSSD was unab le to have any influ en ce in the fo r mu la tion and imp le men ta tion of fo re ign po li cy du ring this pe riod. This fact – toge t her with the fee ling that the coa li tion was igno ring the views and opinions of the main oppo si tion par ty and was unwil ling to enga ge in any form of dialo gue – prom pted the ÈSSD to break two taboos in Czech politics. Fir st ly, the ÈSSD made Czech fore ign poli cy the subjec t of voters’ uti li za tion. Whi le the ad ju st ment of po li cies to suit the re sults of va rio us opi nion polls is cha rac te ri stic of the new sty le of ÈSSD lea de r s hip ad vo ca ted by Jiøí Paro u bek, in the bro ader po liti cal field, it is very speci fic in the fo reign and se curi ty po licy. This point may be illu stra ted with re spect to the propo sed in stal la tion of ce r ta in ele ments of a U.S. Mis si le De fen ce pro gram me on Czech terri to ry. In the be ginning, the ÈSSD put this issue to a par ty vote in the sum mer of 2006. This vote re sul ted in a reje c tion by the ÈSSD of the planned in stal la tions. Con sequ en t ly, the rhe to ric of the ÈSSD in the na tio nal de ba te on the in stalla tion of the U.S. Mis sile Defen ce in the Czech Repu b lic often relied upon the unfa voura b le mood among the popu la tion with regard to these plans. More o ver, the par ty also advo ca ted the holding of a national referendum on this issue. Se con d ly, the ÈSSD be gan to link fo re ign and do me stic po li cy is su es in an at tempt to tra de these po li cy are as off against one ano t her. This was par ticu la r ly the case in re spect of fo re ign mi li ta ry mis sions, an ar mi sti ce for the pe riod of the CZ PRES, and, most nota b ly, the fall of the gove r n m ent during the CZ PRES. Hen ce, it can be said that the So cial de moc rats play ed a very hard po li ti cal game. It must howe ver be dete r m ined whe re the ÈSSD stands in re spect of the de ba te con ce r ning the fo re ign po li cy orien ta tion of the Czech Re pu b lic. The 2006 ge ne ral ele c tions co m p le ted the ge ne ra tion chan ge among the ÈSSD spe cia lists on fo re ign po li cy. Jan Ka van, the fo r mer Mi ni ster of Fo re ign Affa irs be twe en the ye ars 1998–2002, and Jan Laštùvka, the chai r m an of the Fo re ign Po li cy Com mit tee of the Cha m ber of De pu ties be twe en the ye ars 2002–2006, left ac ti ve po li tics and were re p la ced by the mid d le -a ged Lubomír Zaorálek and the yo un ger Jan Hamáèek. In te re stin gly, both in di vi du als do not have any experience in an executive office. The ÈSSD fore ign poli cy program me suggest s that there might be a sub stan ti ve chan ge in the at ti tu de to wards the prio ri ty pro jects which were ad vo ca ted by the Topolanek’s go ve r n ments, sho uld the So cial De mo c rats find the m se l ves in a po si tion to form a go ve r n ment fol lo wing the 2010 ge ne ral

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ele c tions.13 Fi r st ly, the ÈSSD has re je c ted the U.S. Mis si le De fen ce ba sis in the Czech Re pu b lic. Cur ren t ly, the ir stan ce to wards its re ne wed ar chi tec tu re is very in dif fe rent. Se con d ly, the So cial De mo c rats pro mo te the gra du al wi t h dra wal of Czech mi li ta ry fo r ces from Af g ha ni stan, as well as the imp le men ta tion of sub stan ti ve chan ges with re gard to the na tu re of the ir mis sion the re. Thir d ly, the ÈSSD is op po sed to the fu r t her en la r ge ment of NATO. Fo u r t hly, it re com mends gre a ter en ga ge ment with Rus sia with re gard to Euro -A t lan tic se cu ri ty.14 Final ly, the ÈSSD does not regard the current model of Easte rn Par tner s hip as the ide al way in which the EU should ap pro ach the post -So viet re gion.15 The views of key play ers wit hin the ÈSSD on Czech fore ign poli cy differ sli g h t ly in some areas (e.g. Hamáèek is less cri ti cal to wards NATO en ga ge ment in Af g ha ni stan, whi le some ar gue that he is es sen tial ly a strong trans at lan ti cist at he art). No twit h stan ding this, the key pla y ers wi t hin the pa r ty itsel f agree on the crucia l dire c tion which Czech fore ign poli cy should take. Un dou bte d ly, the ÈSSD pre fers a Eu ro - cen tric Czech fo re ign po li cy as op po sed to a fo re ign po li cy which wo uld fo cus ra t her on trans at lan tic re la tions. Neve r t he less, sho uld the So cial De mo c rats form a go ve r n ment af ter the 2010 elec tions, they will have to mode ra te some of the ir obje c ti ves which ap pe ar so me w hat ra di cal at the mo ment by me ans of admi ni stra ti ve socialisation and coalition concessions.

TOP 09:

The sum mer of 2009 saw the emer gen ce of a new and qui te strong for ce in the Czech po li ti cal pa r ty sy stem – TOP 09 (Tra di ce, odpovìdnost, pro spe ri ta [Tra di tion, re spon sibi li ty, pro spe ri ty]).16 Im por tan t ly, the re are three key ele ments con sti tu ting the parties’ iden ti ty. The first ele ment is co m pri sed of fo r mer Chri stian de mo c rats, such as the pa r ty vi ce - cha ir and its fo un ding me m ber Mi ro s lav Ka lo u sek. The se cond ele ment is co m po sed of lo cal poli ti cia ns, who, in some re gions, have for m ed strong move m ents “Starostové” [May ors]. Fi nal ly, the third ele ment is made up of re spe cted per so na li ties from po li ti cal, eco no mic and aca de mic ci r c les that have jo i ned the project (e.g. Karel Schwarzenberg).

13 See Zaorálek, L. (2009), Oranžová kniha zahranièní politiky (on-line: http://www.cssd.cz/soubory/ke-stazeni/dokumenty/oranzove-knihy/zahranicni-politika.pdf). 14 See also Hamáèek, J., Mehr Sicherheit von Vancouver bis Wladiwostok v Süddeutsche Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4.2.2009. 15 Hamáèek, J. – Kulhánek J. (2009), The politics of neighbors: the EU’s role in the future of Eastern Europe, Harvard International Review, Vol. 39, Issue 3, p. 80. 16 TOP 09 is normally accorded around 10% of national support in opinions polls.

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Al t ho ugh Ka rel Schwa rzen berg is the cha i r man of the pa r ty, its fo re ign po li cy is ill- for mu la ted, and, with pa r ti cu lar re gard to its ele c tion pro gram, re ma ins ex tre me ly va gue.17 Whi le TOP 09’s fo re ign po li cy is ma in ly fo cu sed on stres sing the im po r tan ce of ce r ta in va lu es and prin ci p les, it does not of fer any t hing con c re te. No twit h stan ding this, an in ter nal con flict wi t hin the pa r ty with regard to fore ign poli cy is not expe c ted, and the party’s fore ign poli cy orien ta tion is li ke ly to co m bi ne both the trans at lan tic and Eu ro pe an ve c tor. The pa r ty sho uld the re fo re be we lco med as a po ten tial co a li tion pa r t ner for all of the de mo c ra tic po li ti cal pa r ties, ta king into ac co unt po ssi b le fu tu re di spu tes over the fo re ign po li cy. Re gret ta b ly, in the ab sen ce of more com pre hen si ve po li cy do cu ments and ac tions, it is im pos si b le to pre ci se ly determine TOP 09’s foreign policy priorities at this point in time.

The Gre en Pa r ty:

The Czech Green Pa rty (Strana zelených – SZ) has per haps unde r go ne the most ex ci ting de ve lo p ment in the field of fo re ign po li cy orien ta tion. Prior to 2006, the Green Pa rty was not an im por tant for ce in Czech par ty po litics . Ho we ver, on se cu ring the 5% thre s hold re qu i red to en ter the Czech Cha m ber of De pu ties, and on be co ming a ju nior co a li tion pa r t ner in Go ve r n ment, the Gre en Pa r ty has be gan to de ve lop a con c re te ap pro ach and stra te gy towards Czech foreign policy. De spi te the fact that he is not a mem ber of the par ty, the SZ no mina ted Ka rel Schwa rzen berg as a me m ber of the co a li tion go ve r n ment. Im por tan t ly, Schwa rzen berg sha red a si g ni fi cant part of the Gre en Party’s po li ti cal ob je c ti ves, which he suc ces s ful ly ad vo ca ted at na tio nal le vel thanks to his skill and di p lo ma cy. No twit h stan ding this, the most con tro ve r sial is su es were agreed upon at the mee tings of the coa li tion par ty chairs and vi ce - cha irs. Con sequ en t ly, Schwarzenberg’s per so nal im pact in key are as was so me w hat li mi ted. As men tio ned abo ve, Schwa rzen berg la ter left the SZ to join TOP 09, and thus his coo pe ra tion with the Czech Green party was rather short lived. Schwarzenberg’s role as the SZ nom inee to the coa li tion gove r n m ent pro vo ked a sto r my de ba te wi t hin the pa r ty with re gard to the fo re ign po li cy ob je c ti ves which he sho uld pu r sue at gove r n men tal le vel. Con sequ en t ly, three distinc t fac tions may curren t ly be found in the SZ, with each fac tion ad vo ca ting a sli g h t ly dif fe rent ap pro ach to wards Czech fo re ign po li cy. Whi le the re are se ve ral po ints of con flict betwe en these three gro ups (e.g. the Czech

17 Volební program TOP 09 pro parlamentní volby, 2009 (on-line: http://www.top09.cz/files/soubory/volebni-program-top-09-pro-parlamentni-volby-2009.pdf).

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fo re ign mi li ta ry mis sion), the main is sue of di s cord con cerns con tem po ra ry at ti tu des to wards the po ssi b le in stal la tion of ele ments of the U.S. Mis si le De fen ce wi t hin the ter ri to ry of the Czech Re pu b lic.18 The first gro u ping is con cen tra ted aro und the lea de r s hip of the pa r ty it self. The pre do mi nant fi gu re is the pa r ty cha ir, Ma r tin Bursík, who se thin king is proba b ly closes t to Ka rel Schwarzenberg’s. Bursík was one of the foun ding mem bers of the Civic Forum and, as is the case with regard to the majo ri ty of such po li ti cal ve te rans, ne ver qu e stio ned the trans at lan tic ele ment of Czech Fo re ign po li cy. Con sequ en t ly, Bursík sup po r ted the tre a ty pro vi ding for a per manent U.S. mi li ta ry pre sen ce in the Czech Republic. The second group might be labelle d by the current party chairm an Ondøej Liška. Liška’s for eign pol icy prin ci ples re sem ble pos tu lates of Ger man or Aus trian prag matic Greens. While Liška did not re ject the ra dar base per se, he strictly in sisted on the in tegra tion of the U.S. missile shield into the NATO framework, and insis ted on the consent of the Council of the EU on the is sue. He absta ined when voting on the ne goti ate d deal with Ameri cans , and openly wel comed Obama’s deci sion to re-shape the whole system . Although often crit ical of the Bush adm inis tra tion, Liška is a propo nent of vivid and functioning transatlantic relations. The last po liti cal faction is rep resented mainly by Matìj Stropnický, whose po lit i cal ideas are simi lar to those of the West-Eu ro pean Green-Left movem ents. Stropnický’s views on foreign policy com bine anti-Amer i can ism, anti-Bushism and pac i fism. He has par tic i pated in pop u lar ral lies against the U.S. Mis sile De fence, and has repeat edly criti cised Amer i can for eign pol icy with re gard to Iraq, Af ghan i stan, the Mid dle East peace pro cess and even Latin Amer ica. Stropnický was defeated at the last party con gress, where he was a Liška’s oppo nent during the election of the party chairm an. There are no doubts that Stropnický would like to steer the SZ more towards the left. It is still uncle ar as to which for eign policy approac h the Greens will even tu ally pur sue, and their cur rent di lemma re sembles the di lemma which many west ern-Eu ro pean Green par ties have for merly faced. At the moment, the SZ’s foreign policy approac h appear s to be sta ble, and their election programme for 2009, planned yet not re alize d, fitted mostly to Liška’s vi sions.19 However, in ternal in stabil ity may re turn, to the party as each of the

18 The Greens are united with respect to other classical political principles, such as development aid, environmental friendly foreign policy, or the support of deeper European integration, etc. 19 Volební program Strany zelených pro pøedèasné parlamentní volby, 2009 (on-line: http://www.zeleni.cz/247/8175/file/).

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three polit i cal fac tions discuss ed above can still rely on substa ntive support from within the party struc ture itself. 20

The Chri stian De mo c rats:

The fore i gn pol icy obj ec ti ves of the Czech Chris tian Demo c ra tic Par ty (Køes•anská demokratická strana – Èeskoslovenský strana lidová – KDU-ÈSL) are close to those of the main stre am Euro pe an people’s par ties . KDU-ÈSL was, along with the Gre ens, a junior coa li tion par t ner in Topolanek’s se cond go ve r n ment. The ir pro gram pla t form was so me w he re betwe en the poli ti cal plat form s of the Gre ens and ODS, and stres sed the im po r tan ce of both the trans at lan tic and Eu ro pe an di men sions of Czech fo re ign po li cy. The re are no ma jor con flicts wi t hin the pa r ty with re gard to fore ign poli cy orienta tion, as all par ty experts share the same views on most topics. KDU-ÈSL me m bers oc cu pied the po si tions of Fo re ign Mi ni ster be twe en 2002–2006 (Cy ril Svo bo da) and the De fen ce Mi ni ster be twe en 2007–2009 (Vla sta Parkanová). The fo r mer pe riod was cha rac te ri sed by pre pa ra tion for Czech ac ces sion to the EU, while the latter pe riod invo l ved two main secu ri ty issu es: (a.) the ra dar base and, (b.) Czech fore ign mili ta ry missions . In both cases , the KDU-ÈSL proved itsel f to be a coope ra ti ve par t ner thanks to the com mon appro ach which it shares with the other parties’ political programmes. The Chri stian de mo c rats will pro ba b ly re ma in a sta b le pla y er in the fo re ign po li cy de ba te. The ir ex pert ca pa ci ty has been en han ced by the ir po li ti cal me r ger with the mi nor Eu ro pe an De mo c ra tic Pa r ty. Im por tan t ly, the lat ter par ty is repre sen ted by one of the most acti ve Czech MEP’s in the 2004–2009 ele ction period, the for m er diplomat Jana Hybášková.

The Com mu nist Pa r ty:

While the Com munist party’s (Komunistická strana Èech a Mora vy – KSÈM) im pact on Czech fore ign poli cy after 1989 has been negli gi b le, this pa r ty is no ne t he less pre sent in the Czech Pa r lia ment. Con sequ en t ly, it has de ve lo ped fo r mal chan nels ai med at in flu en cing Czech fo re ign po li cy. In the ye ars betwe en 2004–2009, the KSÈM was oppo sed to the U.S. ra dar base, vo ted aga inst the Czech par ti ci pa tion in fo re ign mi li ta ry mis sions, fa vo u red

20 That is the case mainly with regard to Liška’s and Stropnický’s supporters, since Bursík’s openly pro-American approach – disregarding administration in office – has always enjoyed the support of the party leadership itself.

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closer rela tions with Rus sia and advo ca ted le aving NATO, or at least its mi li ta ry stru c tu res. Mo re o ver, the Com mu nists op po se the cur rent di re c tion taken with regard to European integration. It would be naïve to expect any changes in the KSÈM’s fo re ign po li cy orienta tion. In or der for this to happen, the par ty would fir st ly have to trans form it self from an an ti - sy stem or pro test pa r ty, into a pro -sy stem ma in - stre am po li ti cal gro u ping with re gard to ot her po li cy are as. Ta king into ac co unt KSÈM’s ac ti vi ties in the Czech po li ti cal sy stem fol lo wing 1990, it can be con c lu ded that any such de ve lo p ments will not be for t h co ming, se e ing as the pa r ty lacks a key fi gu re(s) who co uld ad vo ca te a sub stan ti ve re form in KSÈM’s political program.

Summa ry:

The he a ted de ba te con ce r ning the orien ta tion of Czech fo re ign po li cy which com men ced af ter 2006 will de fi ni te ly not dis si pa te un til af ter the for t h co ming na tio nal ele c tions in 2010. Whi le none of the de mo c ra tic po li ti cal par ties contes t the Czech mem ber s hip of NATO or the EU, they none t he les s rem ain divi ded with regard to the role which the Czech Repu b lic should play in these inter na tio nal orga ni sa tions, as well as with regard to how both the EU and NATO should transform themselves in the future. Mo re o ver, se ve ral vi vid de ba tes are also ta king pla ce wi t hin the po li ti cal pa r ties the m se l ves, no twit h stan ding the fact that some of the se pa r ties have ra t her con si stent fo re ign po li cy go als. In pa r ti cu lar, the Chri stian De mo c rats, Com munists , TOP 09, and to a cer ta in extent the Socia l De moc rats , may be regar ded as having consi ste nt appro a ches in this respec t. On the other hand, it is li ke ly that the re cent in ter nal di spu tes con ce r ning ce r ta in fo re ign po li cy issu es will repea te d ly re turn to the Ci vic Democratic Party, and to the Greens. Ta king into ac co unt po ssi b le co a li tion ma t ches fol lo wing the 2010 ge ne ral ele c tion, it is po ssi b le to make the fol lo wing con c lu sions and ob se r va tions: Fi rst ly, if there is a coa li tion of one of the two cat ch -all par ties (ODS or ÈSSD) with one, two or three of the centre pa rties , there will not be any sub stan ti ve chan ge in the cur rent Czech fo re ign po li cy ali g n ment. This is be ca u se the ju nior co a li tion pa r t ner(s) wo uld es sen tial ly block the main go ve r ning pa r ty from pu r su ing a fo re ign po li cy which is (a.) too eu ro - cen tric or (b.) which is too fo cu sed on trans at lan tic re la tions. No twit h stan ding this, the ju nior pa r t ners will no ne t he less sha re a gre at part of the fo re ign po li cy pro gram me with the main go ve r ning pa r ty. Mo re o ver, in a co a li tion go ve r n ment, at le ast some pa r ties which were ac ti ve in sha ping Czech fo re ign poli cy in the years betwe en 2006–2009 will almost certainly be present.

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A se cond possi ble scena rio is a grand coa li tion betwe en the ODS and the ÈSSD. This po ssi bi li ty wo uld ho we ver re sult in the pu r su it of a very am bi gu o us fo re ign po li cy. Most pro ba b ly, such a con stel la tion wo uld only ser ve to block any substa nti ve fore ign poli cy conduct, as well as any strong Czech par ti ci pa tion in va rio us avan t - gar de ini tia ti ves. This is ma in ly be ca u se both pa r ties fun da men tal ly di sa gree on many fo re ign po li cy ob je c ti ves, and each par ty po ssesses a strong convi c tion in its abi lity and right to car ry out its respective foreign policy objectives. The third, and pro ba b ly the most ra di cal sce na rio, in vo l ves the So cial De mo c ra tic fo r ming a mi no ri ty go ve r n ment, whi le re ly ing on the si lent support of the Com munists in the Cham ber of Depu ties .21 Such a go ve r n ment wo uld ena b le the ÈSSD to re - s ha pe some ele ments of Czech fo re ign po li cy. More o ver, the KSÈM, which is crucia l for the sur vi val of the gove r n m ent, would defi ni te ly encourage them to do so. To conc lu de, it should be noted that the de bate which has cha rac teri sed Czech fo re ign po li cy over the past nu m ber of ye ars ne i t her si g ni fies a lack of con ti nu i ty, nor the po ssi bi li ty that the go ve r n ment will take any une x pe c ted deci sion in this re gard. More o ver, accor ding to the post 2010 scena rios which are out li ned above, only the least proba b le scena rio would result in a change in Czech foreign policy.

21 The Social Democrats have refused to cooperate with the KSÈM at governmental level since 1995 in accordance with the then approved so called “Bohumín Declaration”.

15-26 14 maja 2010 09:24:32 Jiøí Schneider

Poland and the Czech Republic: Our Common Interest in Making NATO and the EU a Real Strategic Anchor

“Undoing the Cold War”:

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, Central Europeans set about undoing the Cold War, and rejoining Europe. This agenda was, by default, negative towards the East and positive towards the West. In 1990, the main uniting element fostering cooperation among former Soviet bloc countries in Central Europe was their common interest in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their respective territories. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland played a prominent role in dismantling the Warsaw Pact in 1991. The Eastern policy of these countries was defined in negative terms. When the Warsaw Pact was dismantled, the Visegrad countries continued to compete to earn the goodwill of the West, and to integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions with the strategic goal of EU and NATO membership. Therefore, NATO enlargement with the accession of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in 1999 was the greatest political and security success wrought by the mutual cooperation of these countries. After Slovakia’s belated accession to NATO, and the EU big-bang enlargement in 2004, all Visegrad countries ceased to be a grey zone between Germany and Russia. With successful accession to both NATO and the EU, the main strategic goals of Central European States have essentially been achieved.

Relations with Russia:

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and their emancipation from the Soviet/Russian zone of influence, it has proven to be much more difficult for

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Central Europeans to define a common policy towards Russia in positive terms. In a recent study on EU-Russian relations, Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu1 attempted to define EU Member States´ attitudes towards Russia: Poland was entitled the “New Cold-Warrior”, whereas the other Visegrad countries were considered more pragmatic. In this regard, Hungary and Slovakia were considered as “friendly pragmatists”, while the Czech Republic was considered as a “frosty pragmatist”. Unlike Poland and the Baltic states however, other (Visegrad) countries wish to maintain good relations with Russia, and are sometimes even willing “to sacrifice their ties with other East European countries” in order to do so.2 Regardless of these differences however, a policy towards our Eastern neighbours and Russia could be a potential focal point of convergence between the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as serving as a focal point for the broader convergence of other Central European countries. The mainstream European view holds that, in the long term, Russian and EU interests will naturally converge, particularly with regard to the rest of the world. In the short term however, interests within the EU as a whole should possibly converge. There is an obvious obstacle to this objective however: this will not be easy as long as levels of Russian influence in Europe vary. In relative terms, the influence of/dependence on Russia in Central and Eastern European countries is much greater than in the rest of Europe. The key argument of Central Europeans should be that Russia ought to be treated equally, as is the case with the EU’s other partners. In terms of the enforcement of EU legal rules and procedures – the acquis communautaire – the US and Russia should thus be put on an equal footing.

What kind of NATO?

1999 – NATO Accession: The loyalty of the new Allies was tested immediately after their accession to NATO: a decision to launch an attack on Serbia (a neighbour of Hungary!) and Kosovo in the form of an air campaign was taken together with the newly acceded members. In the absence of an explicit UN Security Council resolution, that decision was particularly difficult for the then socialist government of the Czech Republic. Following 9/11, NATO has invoked

1 Leonard, Mark; Popescu, Nicu (2007), A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations. European Council on Foreign Relations, accessed at:http://ecfr.3cdn.net/1ef82b3f011e075853_0fm6bphgw.pdf 2 Kratochvíl, Petr (2007) New EU Members and the ENP: Different Agendas, Different Strategies, in: INTERECONOMICS – Review of European Economic Policy, Volume 42, Number 4, July/August 2007, pp. 191–196.

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Article V, but has not taken any active steps to implement this provision. The US operation in Afghanistan (in the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom) has not been conducted through, and by, NATO however, but by a “coalition of the willing”. NATO has thus, in this case, been bypassed.

Article V: NATO’s policy towards Poland (and to lesser extent towards the Czech Republic) has been largely determined by the traditional emphasis on “hard security guarantees” (Article V of the Washington Treaty). This is the case, notwithstanding the very low credibility associated with NATO’s commitment to defend its new members. Even during the ratification process in the US Senate, the US public did not give any special commitment to defend its new Central European allies (one could have expected it then, following of grass-root mobilization of their compatriots in the US). According to a survey carried out before the first wave of NATO enlargement in autumn 1998,3 only 31 percent of the US public agreed that the United States had a vital interest in Poland (in contrast to 87 percent with respect to Japan), while only 28 percent were in favour of the use of U.S. troops in response to a Russian invasion of Poland. In contrast, the level of public confidence with regard to the security of the Czech Republic in NATO has been steadily growing since this countries’ accession to the Alliance: the feeling of “full security” has grown from an average of 30 percent in 1989-98, to 60 percent upon membership of NATO. Although Russian military power no longer poses a threat to the whole of Europe, it nonetheless presents a disruptive and destabilising influence on its neighbours. Russia is capable, and willing, to escalate military conflicts in its proximity. The war in Georgia in August 2008 is striking proof of this fact. The new Strategic Concept of NATO currently under preparation should address not only NATO’s transformation regarding new threats, but also the fundamental concerns of the new allies regarding NATO’s core collective defense mission. Contingency planning for possible conflict scenarios should be thus supported by credible measures in all aspects of NATO activities (planning, exercising, and infrastructure). It is a common interest of Central and Eastern European allies to make NATO operational on the territory of all of its members.

3 John E. Reilly, American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 1999 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

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Missions Abroad:

Most of the foreign missions have been planned and implemented on a national basis, and have not reflected ambitions with regard to regional cooperation. The joint Czech-Slovak battalion in KFOR (from 2002–05) was a notable exception to this. The fact that, from 2004 to 2006, the Czech unit in the Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNFI) operated within the British sector, and not together with the Polish contingent/sector, can be seen as an illustration that one should not take the close cooperation of neighboring countries for granted.

Missile Defense:

From the commencement of negotiations concerning the establishment of a third site for the US missile defense system, both Poland and Czech Republic were seen as particularly important allies of the United States in this region. The decision by the US administration to modify its plans has increased the role of European NATO members in the construction of a missile defense for, and in, Europe. Both countries should now take part in a NATO-anchored European missile defense shield.

What kind of EU?

2004 – EU Membership: What kind of political impact have the new Member States exerted after their accession to the EU? To what extent have the new Member States been regarded as troublemakers? It has been generally assumed that the accession of new Member States to the EU would make decision-making more problematic. Notwithstanding this, rhetorical positioning and posturing has rarely transformed into legislative action. It can be shown that the EU legislative process has not been slowed down by the participation of representatives of the new Member States, although the impact of these Member States on decision making can be best described as reluctant, in-active and mostly reactive. Even MEP coalitions in the European Parliament have been formed in accordance with party politics and ideology along a left-right axis, rather than on national lines. While the MEPs from some of the new Member States have appeared more cohesive along national lines than those from the old Member States, this trend could be ascribed to the fact that smaller States generally are more cohesive in expressing their national interests.

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The New Member States have not blocked any EU decision – with the exception of a singular case concerning the Polish veto on the EU ´s mandate to negotiate a new partnership agreement with Russia in November 2006 – following the Russian import ban on Polish meat and food products. While the Polish veto in this regard provoked sharp criticism by some, it has nonetheless been defended and supported by others as an exercise of the right of any Member State to raise an issue concerning its national interest. The lessons learned from the promotion of the Eastern dimension of the ENP, and from the exercise of the Polish veto, demonstrate that the position of the new Members States’ vis-à-vis Russia, as well as towards the Eastern neighbourhood policy, can be best asserted through the pursuit of a common approach by the EU as a whole. Although we (especially the Poles, and to a lesser extent the Czechs) may still be seen by others as “historically prejudiced against Russia”, we should not be seen as troublemakers who want to prevent reaching out to Russia, irrespective of the circumstances. The achievement of the long term goal that the EU will “speak with one voice”, requires the building of mutual trust and solidarity among all EU Member States. Based on their role in setting and shaping the Eastern European agenda, Central Europeans are expected to contribute to the EU’s Eastern policies, with particular focus on the Eastern Partnership. The obvious way to achieve this would be to establish an open advocacy group, “Friends of the East” within the EU, and more specifically, the ´Eastern Caucus´ in the European Parliament.

Recommendations – Possible Areas of Czech-Polish Cooperation:

Relationship with Russia: It is in the interest of Poland and the Czech Republic to strengthen the unity of NATO members, and EU Member States, and particularly the countries of Central Europe, with regard to the Russian Federation. The Czech Republic and Poland should clarify that they endorse coherent NATO and EU policies vis-à-vis Russia and its neighbours. It is thus is in their interest to free up EU (ESDP)–NATO relations. We should not seek to prevent either NATO or the EU from reaching out to Russia. However, on the other hand, they should care about NATO and the EU states and maintain firm ‘red lines’ vis-à-vis Russia in terms of the latter’s relations towards its neighbours, as well as its energy policy.

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CFSP under Lisbon: In respect of foreign policy (CFSP) following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, it will be equally important for Poland, and the Czech Republic, to play an active role within the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS). It will also be important for these Member States to establish channels of influence with regard to the rotating EU presidencies, and to provide the Commission, Council and future EU presidencies with adequate expertise on Eastern policy.

Driving regional cooperation in the ESDP:

Poland and the Czech Republic should foster mutual solidarity and interdependence in security through enhanced defense cooperation and specialisation. Thus, both Member States could become a kernel of regional security cooperation (which could be further enhanced in various wider formats V4, V4+, etc). In this respect, Poland and the Czech Republic should: – strengthen the parliamentary dimension of security dialogue (e.g. ensure regular meetings of the Chairmen of the Defense and European Integration Committees), – seek optimal cooperation within the EU common market (joint security/ defense procurement/acquisitions), – build various levels of military cooperation – from joint training and exercises, through multinational units (e.g. battle groups) to joint operations and missions abroad.

Summary:

The purpose of this paper is to provide, within the Czech-Polish Forum, recommendations on how to increase Czech-Polish cooperation within NATO and the European Union. Methods of strengthening the overall strategic assurances stemming from Czech and Polish membership of these organizations are also addressed, as is the manner in which we can provide an efficient tool for the promotion of the foreign policy interests of the Czech Republic, Poland, and indeed the whole Central European region where possible. The key challenge for both the Czech and Polish foreign policies is how they can – alone or combined – influence the future policies of NATO and the EU.

27-32 14 maja 2010 09:25:20 Aleksander Szpor

Poland and the Czech Republic in the European Union – Common Challenges

Among the broad horizon of problems and challenges to be discussed in the coming years within the European Union, there are three which top the political agenda: combating the effects of the crisis as the axis for EU economic and social priorities; climate policy, which sets a new direction for EU activities on the global stage; and the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in such a way as to deepen integration and strengthen the European Union. These topics are multidimensional and in many ways mutually connected, but each of them is reflected in the strategic documents of the European Commission and European Parliament, as well as in the programs of upcoming EU presidencies.1 The aim of the present article is to outline these three issues from the perspective of Poland and the Czech Republic, and to identify possible areas for cooperation.

The Effects of the Economic Crisis for Poland and the Czech Republic

The collapse of the U.S. financial market in 2008 depicted the extent to which the world economy – including the European economy – is interconnected. While

1 Compare the inauguration speech by European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/president/view/en/press/speeches/sp-2009/sp- 2009-July/speeches-2009-July-1.html as of 12.12.2009, Jose M. Barroso’s action programme available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/press_20090903_en.pdf as of 12.12.2009, as well as the Draft 18 Month Programme of The Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Presidencies available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st16/st16771.en09.pdf as of 12.12.2009 and the Commission Working Document: Consultation on the Future “EU 2020” Strategy available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/eu2020.pdf as of 12.12.2009.

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fighting the downturn on the European stage, it became visible that the crisis was only an ignition fuse with regard to the flammable structure of the individual state economies. It also turned out that the European Union, along with its institutions, is but a secondary player, and that recovering from the crisis is a job left to national governments. Many questions resurfaced as to the opportunities for a further deepening of European economic integration, in particular with regard to the future of the monetary union and the chances of broadening it. In the initial phase of the crisis, the main threat stemmed from protectionism, which was present, for example, in France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands. Despite the rapid reaction of the European Commission and European Central Bank, the mutual trust of member states was strained. In the next phase, the now uncovered debts of some countries – Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain – became the primary problem. This resulted in a strengthening of voices which undermined the idea of solidarity within the Eurozone with regard to bearing the costs of mismanagement of individual governments in the face of a threat to the stability of the remaining countries. As part of the defensive reaction to the particularly dramatic case of Greece, the EU has accelerated work on creating new, specialized monitoring institutions, which possess the necessary tools to raise discipline among member states.2 These ambitious ideas, proposed by a trio of Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian presidencies, will nonetheless have to gain the acceptance of the governments of France, Britain and Germany, which for the time being are rather skeptical towards changing the status quo. With regard to the eastern part of the European Union, however, many experts felt that the crisis in the region will be much more difficult to overcome. This is exemplified not only by the dramatic economic situation in Latvia or Estonia (and, to a lesser extent, in Hungary and Romania), but above all, dependence on foreign investment and Western European markets.3 Improving the economic situation in Central and Eastern Europe will therefore only be possible after the crisis has been dealt with in Western Europe.4 Compared to other countries in the region, Poland proved to be a “green island”, which was quite lucky to avoid the worst effects of crisis. Poland is the only EU member state not to record negative growth, as well as the most

2 Communication from the Commission on the European financial supervision, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/communication_m ay2009/C-2009_715_en.pdf as of 12.12.2010 3 EU10. Regular Economic Report, The World Bank, Main Report: From Stabilization to Recovery, October 2009 , available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/POLANDEXTN/ Resources/RER_Oct09_report.pdf as of 12.12.2009 4 If it were true that we have passed the apex of the economic crisis, it would be worth concentrating on finding new strategies for the European economy aimed at raising its stability. If, however, it were true that the crisis will return within several months, it may turn out that creating member state solidarity mechanisms is of far greater importance.

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immune country in Central and Eastern Europe. This was mainly due to a large internal market, low dependence on Western loans and private investment, as well as amortization in the form of EU funds. Despite recording negative GDP growth, the Czech Republic also fared favorably when compared to other countries in the region. In the initial phase of the crisis, the main factor hurting the Czech economy was the fall of exports, followed by a rise in unemployment.5 However, the collapse of the Czech government, so disadvantageous in terms of the perception of the country abroad, proved to have a stabilizing effect in economic terms. The most serious problem facing the new prime minister were the limited possibilities of carrying out public finance cuts, which resulted from the high share of recurrent expenditure in the budget. However, the proposed rescue plan, despite possessing high social costs, won the support of the Czechs, thanks mainly to the apolitical attitude of the new prime minister and the ability to convince of the public opinion as to the global roots of the crisis. In 2010, the Czechs will grapple with the most serious effects of the crisis, all the while determining the method of fighting it. If the new Czech Prime Minister, chosen as a result of the June elections, shall continue to implement the current government’s plan, the country has a good chance to heal and stabilize the economic situation within three years. In Poland, however, even though the situation does not require such drastic intervention measures, the opportunities for major reform are also much smaller, due to the forthcoming Polish presidential and parliamentary elections, which could postpone the necessary decisions until 2011. Both Poland and the Czech Republic are trying to adopt the common currency. However, due to the recent turbulence within the eurozone, neither the countries belonging to it, nor the countries wishing to enter it are rushing with the decision to enter ERM 2. Perspectives agreed by Poland and the Czech Republic with the European Central Bank foresee the postponement of accession until 2015, at the earliest. For both countries the main challenge on the path to entering ERM 2 is the steadily growing budget deficit. Moreover, Poland must also deal with excessive inflation and very high long-term interest rates.6 Attaining these objectives, however, is beneficial not only in the context of eurozone accession, but also in constituting the most necessary steps for overcoming the crisis. Each country must do its homework, but coordination and cooperation in preparing the Euro adoption strategy is certainly to be desired.

5 For a broader description of factors influencing the crisis in the Czech Republic and Poland, see: http://www.visegrad.info/economic-crisis-in-ceecs/factsheet/economic-crisis.html as of 12.12.2009 6 In order to achieve this, it will be necessary to move away from stimulating economic growth as the main strategy for combatting the crisis.

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Economic cooperation is an important factor in terms of Polish-Czech common actions undertaken to fight the crisis. With regard to trade, Poland is the Czech Republic’s third largest partner, while the Czech Republic is Poland’s fifth largest partner.7 The steady increase of this trade balance accurately reflects the potential for economic cooperation between both countries. In addition, Poland is planning large spending on transport infrastructure in the coming years, which shall create an opening for the shrinking Czech labor market. The local dimension of the cooperation, concerning investment in border regions8 using European funds, in particular from the Poland-Czech Republic Cross-border Cooperation Operational Program 2007 – 2013, is especially significant. Support for small and medium-sized enterprises by facilitating credit remains a key element of this cooperation. On the regional level, promoting market leaders, in particular among small and medium-sized enterprises, would constitute an additional stimulus to help strengthen Polish-Czech economic cooperation. Regardless of the decisions regarding the possible enlargement of the eurozone to include the Czech Republic and Poland, the governments of both countries should focus on enhancing the attractiveness and flexibility of the domestic market, as well as balancing the quality of life of citizens. In the slightly longer term, there will also be a need to move from the position of gross payer to net payer, in connection with the transformation from a cheap labour economy into a hi-tech and knowledge-based economy. To this effect, both countries must implement economic development strategies that will allow them in future to obtain a comparative advantage in selected areas of the European market. Maintaining the EU’s social and economic cohesion and its further integration lies in the interests of both the Czech Republic and Poland. However, the Czech Republic, with GDP per capita amounting to 80% of the European average, leaves Poland – at the level of 57% – far behind.9 This signifies that the objectives of both countries in creating the future cohesion and regional policy may vary. This issue, however, is certainly not yet closed and will be monitored based on progress made in EU negotiations over the future financial perspective.

7 For more see: http://www.mg.gov.pl/Wspolpraca+z+zagranica/Wspolpraca+ gospodarcza+Polski+z+krajami+UE+i+EFTA/czechy.htm as of 21.12.2009. 8 Polish-Czech regional cooperation takes place in six Euroregions: Neisse, Cieszyn Silesia, Silesia, Pradziad, Glacensis, Beskidy. 9 Statisctics for 2008 according to: http://www.visegrad.info/statistics.html as of 21.12.2009

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Climate Policy

Climate policy is increasingly reflected in national legislation and strategies, both in Poland and the Czech Republic.10 The main motor for change is the 20-20-20 strategy, which obliges countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, increase usage of renewable energy sources and improve energy efficiency. Despite the economic crisis, which has reduced the ambitious targets set out by European green policy leaders, there is still a clearly visible gap between “old” and “new” EU countries. The obsolete and high-emission industrial framework and the lack of funds for investing in renewable energy sources are common issues in Central and Eastern European states. EU budget negotiations - starting under the Hungarian Presidency in the first half of 2011 and continuing under Poland - will constitute an opportunity to strengthen the voice of the region in postulating the need to maintain climate policy cohesion. Obtaining a broader agreement within the EU with regard to EU climate policy mechanisms and the tasks facing individual member states will allow for effective interaction on the international arena. The negotiations on the new Energy Action Plan for 2010–2014, scheduled for March, will constitute an occasion to develop this cooperation. Drafting an agreement on such issues as energy security, broadening the common energy market and instituting a just partition of the implementation costs of the 20-20-20 strategy would help obtain a stronger position in the COP 16 negotiations in Mexico. In the debate over climate policy, one cannot ignore the achievements of the Copenhagen summit, dubious as they may be. The lack of convincing arguments in the climate debate has undermined the credibility of the EU as a leader in this domain. This may result in the reduction of competitiveness of EU economies on the global market, in particular with regard to Central and Eastern European countries. Therefore, in the longer term, it is in the Polish, Czech and European interest to ensure adequate funding in future EU budgets (in the future financial perspective), in order to stimulate the research and development of new technologies and to incorporate them in strategic documents, in particular “EU 2020 ”, as well as to develop entrepreneurship related, among other things, to the use of new technologies.

10 More information available at the Webpage of the International Energy Agency – as for the Czech Republic: http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=cc&action=view&country=Czech_Republic and as for Poland: http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=cc&action=view&country=Poland as for 21.12.209

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After the Treaty

In the debate on the new, post-Lisbon Treaty institutional structure of the European Union, the most attention is placed on two new positions: the President of the European Council and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.11 The stance and actions of these officials were to be crucial not only in solving everyday issues, but also – in accordance with the practice developed in the course of subsequent treaty amendments – in creating important cases of precedence, which will serve as a reference for their successors. However, the appointment of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton, candidates with little European experience, is rather an indication that EU member states wish to maintain control over the shaping of competences of these two positions. Even if the decision taken by these countries stemmed mainly from the fear of a threat to European integration, it does not foresee an easy start for the President of the European Council and the High Representative, who were meant to be the EU’s new driving force. The weak position of both posts means that the institutional triangle – Commission, Parliament and Council – will remain of primary importance. As a result of Treaty changes, the Council will cooperate more closely with the European Council. In the ongoing competition to exert influence on the shape of the Union, the time it takes the Commission and Parliament to gain momentum in performing their duties works in favour of the Council and the European Council. Therefore, in the short term, it is the Council, under the direction of the European Council, which will take the major decisions. In this competition, member states should support the strengthening of the Community institutions, i.e. the Commission and the Parliament, but not without certain conditions. In the case of the Commission, there is a need for actions aimed at increasing the transparency of the decision-making process within the institution’s framework and the respect for national parities in the employment structure. Simultaneously, Poland and the Czech Republic should not only actively support the Commission in all initiatives beneficial from the point of view of the community, but also precede them with their own proposals. The

11 The innovations relating to the competence of the President of the European Council include the provision of the TEU according to which the President shall ensure the Union’s external representation in matters concerning the common foreign and security policy. This creates a potential conflict with the competence of the High Representative, who “shall contribute through his proposals towards the preparation of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council”. In practical terms, a further fragment of the provision stating that the President shall perform this task “without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”, is of little significance.

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Eastern Partnership project has so far been the most spectacular success of this type, but there is also a need for smaller initiatives, in which a group of leaders takes responsibility for implementing innovations in a particular field. In conjunction with the ability to cooperate with more experienced countries, such actions may contribute to strengthening the position of these countries. In the case of the European Parliament, it is necessary to strengthen Polish and Czech activities in undertaking political and legislative initiatives. This applies primarily to the broadly understood EU eastern policy, including the Eastern Partnership project, relations with Russia and energy security, since on these issues, MEPs from Poland and the Czech Republic represent particularly similar positions, with only minor variations arising from party lines. It is also important, however, to act in less strategic areas, such as education and culture. A very important issue from both the Polish and Czech perspective is the functioning of the European External Action Service. With the entry into force of the new treaty, the European Union has gained a single diplomatic corps and structure, which will include about five thousand civil servants arriving from the European Commission, the European Council and member state government administrations. The extent of External Action Service’s diplomatic functions is not yet fully clear. Apart from exercising tasks currently performed by EC Delegations, will they also focus on other activities, such as representing the EU’s economic interests or collecting security information for EU usage.12 Developing the Community’s esprit de corps within this institution, composed largely of employees who had previously represented national interests, may represent a challenge. There is no established EEAS share of expenditure on implementing external policies, nor a budget for this institution. The institution will possess a strong, Community-based character only if it will take into account the diplomatic experience of all member states. The appeal by Estonian President Toomas Ilves regarding the fair representation of Central and Eastern Europeans in the diplomatic corps was heard by Brussels. Together with other countries in the region, Poland and the Czech Republic should consistently strive to strengthen that voice, but also offer modern solutions which take into account the new challenges facing diplomacy in the 21st century.13

12 According to the Treaty on European Union, the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be determined by way of Council decision. The Council shall act on this matter at the request of the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and obtaining the Commission’s consent. 13 Carne Ross presented an interesting view on the matter, noting the lack of democratic legitimacy of these services, the separation of diplomats from the reality of multi-level decision making in international relations and the partial replacement of the hitherto existing state domination by the private sector and civil society. “It’s time to scrap ambassadors and their embassies” in: Europe’s World, Spring 2009, No. 11, p. 15–18

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The project regarding the creation of joint diplomatic missions was a positive signal sent by the Visegrad countries with regard to this issue. The project to exchange officials and diplomats between Poland and the Czech Republic, based on French-German model of diplomatic cooperation, is an equally valuable, albeit smaller, initiative. Neither project, however, should remain closed to other countries in the future.

Conclusions

Despite some discrepancies in the Polish and Czech government position with regard to certain EU policies, and despite the differences in political and economic considerations of both countries, for the past several years Polish-Czech bilateral relations have been experiencing one of the best periods in their history. The economic cooperation of both countries still remains at a high level, even despite the crisis. Maintaining this trend in the long run requires the efficient use of aid offered by the EU, as well as proper promotion on the regional level. On the government level, the main strategy should be aimed at increasing market flexibility. Climate policy currently constitutes the axis of European economic policies, but also requires large investments. By entering this framework, Poland and the Czech Republic cannot remain complacent with regard to the possibility of changes in these priorities in the coming years. At the same time, they must ensure that climate policy does not just constitute an investment in modernization, but also an opportunity to develop research and gradually evolve into a knowledge-based economy. In the new institutional order, both Poland and the Czech Republic should aim to increase the transparency of decision-making processes and the integration of national parities (in the case of the Commission, the External Services, and the Council Secretariat). It is worth noting that both countries have received key positions in the College of Commissioners. The Czech Commissioner for Enlargement will work closely with both the President of the European Council and the High Representative. Moreover, he will constitute an important voice in eastern policy matters, which hold great importance for Poland and the Czech Republic. In turn, the position of the Polish Budget Commissioner will be of particular significance in the upcoming negotiations on the new financial perspective for 2014–2020.

33-40 14 maja 2010 09:25:55 Filip Èernoch Petr Ocelík

Czech-Polish co-operation in the field of energy: The potential of LNG for energy security in Central Europe

The International Institute of Political Science of Masaryk University, Brno

While functional, it lacks dynamic. This statement accurately summarises the mutual co-operation which exists between the Czech and Polish republics in the field of energy and energy security. It must however be noted that the above-referred to stagnation is only characteristic of the diplomatic and intergovernmental relations between both countries, while the energy business between the Czech Republic and Poland on the other hand is flourishing. Poland acquired (albeit with certain problems) and currently manages the strategic Czech refinery and petrochemical conglomerate Unipetrol, while the Czech ÈEZ Group successfully operates the upper Selsian power companies Elektrociep³ownia Chorzów “Elcho” Sp. z o.o. and Elektrownia Skawina S.A. Recently the ÈEZ Group submitted an offer with regard to the privatisation of the heating plants in the Polish towns of Bytom and Zabrze. Along with the German company RWE, it is also interested in participating in a tender for the purchase of shares in the Enea energy company. The planned bi-directional natural gas pipeline Moravia, which would connect the distribution systems of Poland and the Czech Republic in the Cieszyn region, is of strategic importance. The recent natural gas crisis serves to emphasise its significance. It is therefore regrettable that mutual energy co-operation at intergovernmental level between both countries is only limited to short-term activities, such as the Czech-Polish common approach towards modifying the

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emission trading system which was adapted during the negotiations on the energy and climate package. The fact that not even last January’s natural gas crisis (which had a considerable impact on Central and South-eastern Europe), prompted the establishment of strong diplomatic ties in the field of energy supply and security between both countries is further exemplary of this unfortunate predicament. This paper will therefore focus on a particular area within which the co-operation of the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as the entire Central European region, could yield results in the form of increased energy security for all the parties involved. The area referred to concerns the supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and the so-called North-South connection project aimed at interconnecting the planned LNG terminals in Poland and Croatia. Notwithstanding that these are of course private projects which are financed predominantly from corporate resources, the role of States and individual governments should not be overlooked. This point is all the more prevalent considering the important security issues which are linked to energy security and planned infrastructure, as well as the fact that the States themselves hold shares in the majority of the energy companies operating in the various countries of this region. That is also why the LNG question, and the aforementioned connection, merits the attention and potential co-operation of individual governments, starting with Czech-Polish co-operation.

LNG and the countries of the Visegrad Group:

It is no exaggeration that liquefied natural gas can be regarded as one of the fastest developing markets in the global energy industry. Liquefied natural gas – which does not depend on a fixed transit pipeline – allows for the connection of the consumer to the majority of world producers. It introduces a significant element of competition into natural gas trade, while also allowing for the more flexible overall management of world natural gas transfers. In simplified terms, where there was once a long-term connection between the producer and the consumer provided through an expensive natural gas pipeline, a new market is emerging today, which is similar to the oil market. In this emerging market, liquefied natural gas is loaded onto a tanker and ideally unloaded at any LNG terminal anywhere in the world. Thus, LNG is becoming an interesting energy source for some European countries as it offers the possibility of decreased dependence on Russian supplies. LNG is also an interesting source because it offers the possibility of supplying Europe with energy supplies from previously inaccessible producer regions. Notwithstanding this, the large scale exploitation of liquefied natural gas has, until recently, been hindered by objective economic and technical

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reasons, including the high costs related to the entire LNG process, and the subsequent inability of LNG to compete with traditional pipeline supplies and high prices coupled with insufficient and low efficiency infrastructure. However, in the past number of years this situation has changed considerably. Due to rising world prices and the increasing consumption of energy, it now seems that, for the first time, LNG is becoming a real alternative to pipeline natural gas. That is why today, its import into the EU already represents approximately one third of the volume of Russian supply. This factor has also sparked a heated debate as to whether or not LNG could be the “miraculous” agent which could deliver Europe from ever more frequent energy disputes with Moscow by providing Europe with sufficient natural gas at a reasonable cost in the future. LNG is thus becoming an essential part of almost every debate on natural gas on the European continent. The governments of costal States, along with their energy companies are now considering investing massive amounts of money into re-gasification terminals. Moreover, liquefied natural gas has also made its way into the documents of the European Union, and its grant schemes.

Map n. 1 – source: Oœrodek Studiów Wschodnich, www.osw.waw.pl

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Liquefied natural gas can also be a useful instrument in energy security in light of its problem-free operation even at regional level. The situation of the Visegrad Group countries (V4) – Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary can serve as a typical contemporary example. In natural gas terms, these countries share two fundamental characteristics. The first such shared characteristic concerns the high dependency these countries have on supplies from the Russian Federation stemming from their former adherence to the Soviet bloc, and their role as transit countries for Russian natural gas flowing to Western Europe. The first supplies from the east arrived in Poland in 1966, and a year later the Brotherhood pipeline leading to the CSSR was constructed. This development was followed by the gradual construction of the current transit system connecting Russia and Western Europe. That is why, today, the vast majority of Russian natural gas flows through the V4 countries – through the Svaz and Brotherhood natural gas pipelines which run through Slovakia and the Czech Republic and the Yamal natural gas pipeline which traverses Poland. For the Visegrad countries, this represented a long-term connection to a massive, and previously problem-free, supply of natural gas flowing through their territories. The flaws of this arrangement became apparent in the context of the new security environment in which the V4 States found themselves after the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, and their integration into contemporary western structures. Due to the stable supply of natural gas, the V4 countries were not forced to diversify their suppliers, which is why today their natural gas imports are predominantly linked with Russian supply; see Table 1.1 While Poland, Hungary, and in a very limited manner also the Czech Republic, are able to cover a small part of their domestic consumption from their own resources, these resources are, in reality, very limited and insufficient to satisfy the long-term requirements of these countries. Table 1 also highlights the second aforementioned common characteristic of the Visegrad countries, which is shared by all EU Member States; the overall increase in the consumption of natural gas. While this factor is related to the preference of natural gas as an environmentally friendly energy source, it is also related to the relatively short time period necessary for the commencement of power generation which compares favourably to other energy sources. Importantly, the drop in the consumption of natural gas visible

1 In the case of the Czech Republic, the connection to the Norwegian supply through the North German natural gas pipeline NETRA, which opened in 1995, represents a certain diversification of suppliers. This pipeline is connected to a pre-existing connection between Berlin and North Bohemia (the VNG Leipzig pipeline system). Overall, this network provides the CR with approximately 20–25% of our total consumption. Norwegian natural gas started to flow into the CR in 1997, and the 20-year contract with the Norwegian consortium group of Statoil, Norsk Hydro, and Saga Petroleum stipulates a supply of 53 bcm/y.

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in the year 2008 may be attributed to the impact of the economic crisis, and it is very likely that this drop is only temporary and does not represent a long-term change in usage trends. LNG could be the means of resolving the current problem whereby the import of natural gas is under increasing pressure, and there are limited possibilities for geographical and transit diversification in its supply.

Table 1. Situation of the V4 countries in natural gas supply from the Russian Federation

bcm Domestic Consumption Import Russian Russian (billion cubic production. from import import share metres – Year 2008 2002 2004 2006 2008 Russia share in in 1 000 000 000) 08/overall imports. consumption import Year 2008 Year 2008 Czech R. – 8,7 9,1 9,6 8,7 6,6/8,61 77% 76% Poland 4,1 bcm 11,1 13,1 13,7 13,9 7,2/9,8 73% 52% Slovakia – 6,5 6,1 6,0 5,7 5,6/5,6 100% 98% Hungary – 11,8 13,0 13,4 12,0 8,9/11,5 77% 74%

So u r ce: BP Sta ti sti cal Re view of World Ene r gy. June 2009. On - li ne at: http://www.bp.com/li ve as sets/bp_in ter net/glo balbp/glo balbp_uk_en glish/re ports_and_pu b li ca tions/sta ti sti cal_ene r- gy_review _2008/STAGING/loca l_assets/2009_do w nloads/na tu ra l_gas_sec tion_2009. pdf. As of 1.12.2009.

The first plans are “on the table”:

The proposed use of liquefied natural gas in order to satisfy the needs of Central Europe rests in the finalisation of the planned LNG terminals in Poland and Croatia, and in their interconnection via the so-called North-South connection. The Œwinoujœcie terminal should become the cornerstone of the entire project. The construction of this terminal is planned in the port of Œwinoujœcie which is situated close to Szczecin. In the first phase, the terminal should be able to process approximately 2.5 bcm annually with a realistic expansion of its re-gasification capacity of up to 7.5 bcm. As in the case of most projects with a similar scope, the finalisation of the Œwinoujœcie terminal is also under delay. The originally planned opening of the terminal in 2011 has thus been postponed to 2014 or 2015. However, there are some positive developments in this respect in Poland. In mid-summer 2009, the Polish company PGNiG, which is the main guarantor of the construction, signed a Sales and Purchase Agreement with the Qatar Quatargas Operating Company Ltd. for the future supply of approximately 1.5 bcm of natural gas annually for a period of

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20 years.2 The selection of the project’s main construction company has also been finalised by the selection of the Canadian SNC – Lavalin, while the total cost of the project has been estimated at between 350–450 million euro. If we compare the projected maximum capacity of the Polish terminal – 7.5 bcm annually – with the domestic consumption of approximately 14 bcm and the production of 4 bcm, coupled with imports from other countries, the Œwinoujœcie terminal demonstrates significant potential for natural gas re-export to Europe. This remains the case even if one considers the standard utilisation of re-gasification terminals, which differs greatly from the nominal capacity (in the case of the EU the average utilisation is 54%). On the other hand, the export potential of Œwinoujœcie may be limited by the anticipated steep increase in Poland’s natural gas consumption which stems from the fact that today more than 90% of Poland’s power is generated from coal. A massive dependence on natural gas can be expected in the future due, for example, to the introduction of the second generation of the European Emission Trading System (ETS) as of 2013, as well as the technical status of Poland’s thermal power plants. The natural gas Nord Stream pipeline which is currently under construction, and which will connect Russian Vyborg with the German town of Greifswald through the Baltic Sea, may also affect natural gas consumption in Poland. The finalisation of this natural gas pipeline could lower the volume of gas flowing to Germany through pipelines in Poland, and could thus eventually lead to a decrease in Russian energy exports to Poland. At the moment, it is hard to quantify the consequences of these individual trends. It can however be concluded that, when Œwinoujœcie is finished, the European continent will gain a significant amount of natural gas in the form of LNG which Poland can further export. In fact, Poland may be forced to export LNG due to the high cost of the terminal’s construction. These high costs could partially be recovered by revenue gained from re-export. The Adria terminal on the Croatian island of Krk should develop as the Southern European counterpart of the Polish terminal. This terminal is a joint venture between E.ON Ruhrgas with 31.15%, OMV with 25.58%, Total and Geoplin with 1% and previously RWE with 16.69% of the shares. However, the latter shareholder announced its withdrawal from the project on 20 October 2009, and its shares will probably be divided between the remaining companies. There is also a long-term ongoing debate about the participation of Croatian companies INA, HEP, and Plinarco. After the finalisation of the second construction phase, the terminal should be capable of

2 Umowa na dostawy LNG podpisana. Oficiální portál PGNIG. On-line text at http://www.pgnig.pl/pgnig/com/8387/?r,main,docId=10308. As of 1.12.2009.

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processing up to 15 bcm of natural gas annually. The terminal opening is planned for 2014. Total costs will reach 800 million euro. From the perspective of Central and Southeast Europe, the most interesting aspect of the terminal is its fairly large capacity (up to 15 bcm/y) when compared to Croatian domestic natural gas consumption which stood at 3.2 bcm in 2008. The export potential from the terminal is thus evident, as stressed in the official documentation of the project: “(The project) will not only satisfy gas demand in Croatia, but will also secure alternative natural gas supply routes for markets in Central and Southern Europe… In this way, Croatia becomes an important player on the fast-growing European Union energy market.”3 This very promising first impression of the Adria project is however somewhat clouded by one fundamental problem – the long-term delay in the commencement of the terminal’s construction. While the first construction plans date from as far back as 1995, the feasibility study was only concluded in 2008. Moreover, the terminal still requires a building permit and approval for its location, both of which should be issued in 2010. Notwithstanding that the construction of the LNG terminal is strongly supported by the Croatian government, and in light of the fact that the ever growing debate concerning the energy security of the country prompts its quick completion, the credibility of the project along with the perspectives for its finalisation are impeded. This situation has only been compounded by the aforementioned withdrawal of RWE – a financially and politically strong actor on the European energy market with its own LNG portfolio. While the reasons for this withdrawal remain unknown at the time of the writing of this text, the official position of RWE states its withdrawal was the result of the restructuring of the Company’s policy concerning its LNG projects in Europe.

Table 2 Capacity State Operating since: Adriatic LNG 8.3 bcm/y Italy Rovigo-North Adriatic 2008 Trieste 8.0 bcm/y Italy Zaula 2009, Offshore 2010 Revithoussa 4.2 bcm/y Greece 2000 Marmara 6.0 bcm/y Turkey 1994 Aliaga 7.4 bcm/y Turkey 2009

The conundrum concerning the construction of key LNG terminals which could have a dramatic influence on energy security and supply in Central

3 Adria LNG. On-line text at: http://www.adria-lng.hr/?t=0&l=2,0&c=project&lng=eng. As of 1.12.2009.

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Europe is accentuated by the planned German Wilhelmshaven terminal. This terminal is currently being constructed by E.ON, which is also participating in the Nord Stream project, in order to meet seasonal demand. The completion of the Wilhelmshaven terminal will therefore probably not be critical insignificantly decreasing the dependence of European countries on Russian supply. Moreover, the terminals in Italy (Adria, Trieste), Greece (Tevithoussa), or Turkey (Marmasa, Aliaga) bear an even more limited potential. While all of these facilities are beyond the direct reach of the region under analysis for the purpose of this paper, their activities are also focused on, and contracted to, other customers.

Table 3. Import terminals with potential for V4 countries

Adria (CH) Œwinoujœcie Wilhelmshav Total (POL) en (GER) Investor OMW, Total, RWE, PGNIG E.on – Geoplin, E.on Capacity/expansion 15 3–5/10 10 28–30/35 (bcm/y) Finalisation 2014 Q4 2013 2010 – Cost (milion euro) 800 400 480 1680

The North-South connection:

Up until this point, the situation looks quite promising, with at least two large LNG terminals, both with significant export potential, awaiting construction. At a very basic estimate, the maximum projected capacity of both terminals is 22.5 bcm/y, with a typical utilisation of 54%. This adds up to more than 10 billion cubic metres, which represents more than two thirds of the combined consumption of natural gas in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Notwithstanding this, the problem lies in the missing transit infrastructure which would facilitate the transport of these supplies. As mentioned before, major high capacity natural gas pipelines in Central Europe run East-West. No North-South interconnection exists as such a transit route was not necessitated in the Soviet era. Without this infrastructure, the potential of both LNG terminals to contribute to the energy security of the V4 region, as well as the broader Central European region, is minimal. The gravity of the situation was best demonstrated by the natural gas crisis in January 2009, when disputes between Russia and Ukraine led to the temporary cessation in the supply of natural gas to Europe. This had a significant impact on, among other countries, Slovakia. As Slovakia is

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Map n. 2 – source: Petržílka, O., Kastl, J.: Jaký vliv bude mít “plynová krize” a ekonomická recese na budoucnost dodávek zemního plynu pro Èeskou republiku? Pro-Energy 3/2009

completely dependent on Russian natural gas imports, it was thus forced to restrict supply to approximately one thousand of its large companies (with a consumption of more than 60 thousand m3 daily), and was also faced with the possibility of a natural gas shortage for domestic use. At that time, Zsolt Hernádi, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the local refinery and petrochemical company MOL Hungary, offered assistance.4 However, due to the absence of a relatively short interconnection between the Slovakian and Hungarian networks, at least a portion of the required natural gas had to be routed through a system of Czech pipelines from Germany. In fact, the afore-described crises allowed Germany the opportunity to test its reverse operation for the first time. The cost of the natural gas shortage thus was

4 Slovensko je pripravené èerpa• maïarský plyn. On-line news 24. hodín. On-line text at: http://www.24hod.sk/clanok-68974-Slovensko-je-pripravene-cerpat-madarsky-plyn.html. As of 1.12.2009.

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estimated by the Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico at one hundred million euro daily.5 There is no doubt that a good interconnection system between Central European countries would be capable of minimising these costs, as well as the costs of other countries suffering from similar supply shortages. The problems relating to the incomplete energy infrastructure in Central European countries have, however, been evident for a long time. Consequently, various alternatives to the so-called North-South connection similar to the one in pic. 2 are being discussed, at at least at expert level. Ideally, a network of interconnectors should link producers like Denmark (in the case of an LNG terminal) or Poland with Central Europe and the Balkans, with the supply terminating in Croatia. It is necessary to understand that, at the moment, this plan only represents a vague concept, which is shared by some experts and politicians in order to address the demand for alternative transit routes to the existing connection between Russia – Western Europe. The issue of the North-South connections is thus more generally regarded as one of the energy priorities in a number of documents and strategies produced by the EU institutions. However, this does not represent the existence of a classic project concerning one natural gas pipeline with a clear route, specific schedule, construction consortium, and budget.

New and planned interconnectors:

The fact that the North-South connection project is not yet specified is not, however, commensurate to an absence of progress in this area. Individual States in the region, as well as natural gas companies, realise the advantages of a more integrated gas network and invest in this field without a direct link to the construction of terminals in Poland and Croatia. The annual Russian-Ukrainian disputes represent a strong incentive for cooperation in this regard. The effort to maximise the number of transit routes is also supported by the growing consumption of natural gas, and thus the need for an increase in supply volume. The joint development agreement between the Hungarian transit company and operator FGSZ Ltd. and its Croatian counterpart Plinarco on the interconnection of their transit systems by the Városfold – Slobodnica pipeline from 3 March 2009 serves as a typical example. The future pipeline is due to be finished by 2011, and is intended to cover a distance of 296 km at a capacity of 6,5 bcm annually. Also relevant in this context is the projected interconnection

5 SR stále bez ruského plynu, dodávky prúdia z Èeska. On-line news 24. hodín. On-line text at: http://www.24hod.sk/clanok-68871-SR-stale-bez-ruskeho-plynu,-dodavky-prudia-z- Ceska.html. As of 1.12.2009.

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of the Hungarian and Slovakian networks. This project is aimed at covering a distance of 115 km between the towns of Ve¾ký Krtíš and Vecsec on the outskirts of Budapest, and should be operational by 2013. When commenting on the project,6 Andreas Rau, who is one of the Chairmen of the Board of Directors of the shareholder company Eustream Ltd. (the second shareholder company is the Hungarian FGSZ Ltd.) stated that: “the concept behind the project is simple. Sufficient cross-border capacities will increase the liquidity of the natural gas market as well as increase the security of natural gas supply to this region”.

Map n. 3 – source: Zpracováno na základì ´Plánu evropské hospodáøské obnovy´, IP/09/142

Both aforementioned projects basically form a part of the “North-South connection” concept, along with a number of other planned or constructed interconnectors depicted in pic. 3. The original uncertainty surrounding the potential benefits of developing LNG terminals for the Central European market is also gradually dissipating, largely due to the fact that the European Union has allocated resources in order to support the construction of these

6 Slovensko s Maïarskom prepojí nový plynovod. On-line text at: http://hnonline.sk/podniky/c1-38914950-slovensko-s-madarskom-prepoji-novy-plynovod. As of 1.12.2009.

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terminals. The position of the EU on the North-South connection project will be analysed in the following part of the text.

The EU supports the project, but cautiously:

It has already been noted that the natural gas infrastructure in Central Europe, including the considered North-South connection, has been attracting attention at European Union level for quite some time now. For example, the North-South connection coupled with a growing emphasis on LNG, the Southern corridor, the Baltic interconnection plan, and other issues, was set as one of the priorities of the Green Paper on the Future of European Energy Network dating from November 2008. This document, which was intended for debate and position formulation, was followed by a formal and conceptual document for the formulation of EU energy priorities: the Second Strategic Energy Review – EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan. The aforementioned priorities, including LNG and the North-South connection, are mentioned in this document with the same emphasis: “North-South gas and electricity interconnections within Central and South-East Europe need to be developed as a priority… promote the development and effective transparent operation of commercial storages, diverse supply connections enabling flexible sourcing from LNG or neighbouring providers within the EU internal market…” and so on.7 While the European Commission does not have the competence to initiate the formulation of infrastructure and energy projects itself, it can nonetheless offer financial support when individual Member States, or their companies, decide upon such action. This possibility was evidenced in January 2009, when the European Commission proposed the allocation of approximately 5 billion euro from unused EU funds from the year 2007 to projects in energy, as well as towards the expansion of broadband internet as a part of anti-crisis measures and the support of “green growth”. After extensive debates concerning the final amount of money involved, its allocation to various projects, and specific financing issues, the Member States reached an agreement at the beginning of July 2009 on the future energy projects concerned. Consequently, 3.98 billion euro has been allocated to these projects for the years 2009 and 2010.

7 Sdìlení komise Evropskému parlamentu, Radì, Evropskému hospodáøskému a sociálnímu výboru a Výboru regionù – Druhý strategický pøezkum energetické politiky . akèní plán EU pro zabezpeèení dodávek energie a jejich solidární využití. Eur-lex. On-line at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0781:CS:HTML. As of 1.12.2009.

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– 18 infrastructure projects for natural gas to the amount of 1140 million euro. – 9 power infrastructure projects to the amount of 910 million euro. – 2 projects for Malta and Cyprus to the amount of 15 million euro. – 5 coastal wind power stations, 565 million euro. – 13 carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects capturing carbon dioxide CO2 from fossil fuel power plants, to the amount of 1050 million euro. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe were dissatisfied with the amount of financial resources allocated to the interconnecting pipelines in the region. In the original proposal, this amount was set at 115 million euro for all seven interconnectors. In comparison, 200 million euro was allocated to the ninth natural gas interconnection between Belgium and France. The perceived imbalance in the allocation of funding in this respect thus caused rancour among the Central and Eastern European countries, while also stirring up strong emotions. Table 4. EU Financial support

Natural gas infrastructure Project State Anticipated EU support Final EU (million euro) contribution Southern gas corridor Nabucco 250 200 ITGI – Poseidon 100 100 Baltic Interconnection Poland Skanled Sweden 150 150 Denmark LNG Network Poland 80 80 Œwinoujœcie Infrastructure in Central 160 310 and South-East Europe Mediterranean Strengthening the French transit network on the France 150 200 Africa-Spain-France axis North Sea Grid Natural gas pipeline Germany-Belgium-Great Belgium, France 35 35 Britain Natural gas pipeline Belgium 100 200 France-Belgium Overall 1025 1240

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In particular, the Bulgarian MEP, Iliana Iotova, complained that “[I]t is abnormal that the country worst hit by the gas crisis (from January 2009) will receive the smallest share of the European funds for economic recovery.... There is no coherence, there is no balance, there is no policy”.8

90

80

70

60

50 Wsch.

40 Zach. 30 P³n. 20

10

0 1. Kw 2. Kw 3. Kw 4. Kw Notwithstanding the fact that the allocation of funding for Central and Eastern European countries was increased in later debates, the final budget does not look very favourable: 47 energy projects to the amount of 3.98 billion euro out of which 18 construction projects of natural gas infrastructure are planned to the amount of 1440 million euro and only 310 million euro is allocated to Central and Southeast Europe both of which expected much more from the package due to the impacts of the gas crisis and the evident and urgent need for natural gas interconnectors.

If you need a helping hand, you will find one at the end of your arm:

It thus seems that liquefied natural gas has considerable potential for the energy security of Central and Southeast Europe, and even more so for the countries of the V4. While the preparations for the construction of two re-gasification terminals are progressing slowly, the infrastructure capable of transporting the imported natural gas to its final destinations outside of the

8 Bulgaria blasts Commission’s energy projects . EurActiv. On-line text at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/bulgaria-blasts-commission-energy-projects/article-1791 48. As of 1.12.2009.

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LNG importing countries is already being created. However, it would be a mistake to expect the spontaneous realisation of the aforementioned project as there are too many unknowns in this equation. The projected completion dates for both LNG terminals is such an example. In the case of Adria, constant delays concerning the commencement of construction have become customary, and the withdrawal of the German company RWE merely serves to raise more doubts about the prompt construction of the terminal. Moreover, the Œwinoujœcie project also has its drawbacks. The anticipated rapid increase in domestic Polish consumption does not allow for a precise calculation of how much natural gas Poland will actually be able or willing to re-export. Nor is the construction of individual interconnectors progressing all that smoothly, notwithstanding the vocal political support which these projects enjoy from individual member countries. Furthermore, individual governments often seem to suffer from short-term memory loss in the field of energy security, and recurring problems with natural gas supplies are not sufficient to make the construction of these infrastructures on their top-priorities lists. Not to mention situations where the construction of interconnectors by partially or fully State-owned companies may also prove to be both controversial and problematic. The support of the European Commission, which has been criticised by countries which contribute relatively little to the EU budget, is poignant proof of this short-sightedness and passivity. This package may rightfully be criticised for allocating its resources predominantly to Western Europe, which already benefits from a relatively robust natural gas network, rather than supporting vitally important interconnectors in countries situated in the East. It is however necessary to note that the creation of this infrastructure required considerable expense and the countries involved have invested significant resources in its construction. The resources invested in the creation and maintenance of this infrastructure creates a difference between the Central European States and Central and Southeast Europe. On the one hand, Central European States speak of these pipelines in terms of their vital interest, which require the support of Union resources and which are a priority. On the other hand however, these States are not willing to invest their own resources in this indispensable infrastructure. Solutions such as the Czech IKL oil pipeline – which was primarily build as a diversification and security measure, and which is therefore economically non-profitable on a long-term perspective – are rather exceptional. However, the initiative with regard to these security issues should come from the Member States themselves; Union resources should really only play a secondary role, and should act as essential, but not indispensable support.

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The initiative of the Hungarian oil and natural gas group MOL, which is now known as New Europe Transmission Systems (NETS) from December 2007, represents an interesting activity in this context. This initiative concerns the proposed interconnection of eight or more transit networks within Central and Southeast Europe into one functional natural gas market. Moreover, the project anticipates the creation of one common owner/operator, and was initially offered to the operators of Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia with the potential for expansion into other countries.9 Notwithstanding the evident economic advantages of this venture, which would allow for greater following investments, the realisation of this project would also bring other benefits. In particular, the project would facilitate risk-sharing in possible natural gas supply shortages, a stronger position with regard to Gazprom’s interest in acquiring natural gas infrastructure in individual countries, as well as a positive solution regarding the unbundling requirements contained in the EU’s third liberalisation package. This is essentially why the NETS proposal has gained the support of the European Commission. The project is however progressing at a much slower pace than MOL probably expected at the outset. Until now, only the Romanian Transgaz, Croatian Plinarco, and GH-Gas from Bosnia and Herzegovina have actively joined the project alongside its initiator. The remaining companies have chosen not to participate for strategic reasons, preferring to maintain a position of observation. Notwithstanding this relative setback, it is becoming clear that the countries of the region are starting to realise their uncertain position, and are coming to terms with the fact that the improvement of these conditions will first and foremost require further negotiations between the governments and companies concerned. While Brussels will more than likely provide a certain amount of financial support, the realisation of any larger-scale projects – such as LNG and the North-South connection – will primarily depend upon the will and effort invested into them by the countries involved.

Conclusion

As can be seen, the North-South connection project bears the potential to increase the energy security of the entire Central European region. Czech-Polish co-operation on the Gaz-Moravia interconnector, along with the planned finalisation of the interconnection between Croatia and Hungary and

9 Socor, V. (2008): Gas Companies Welcome Hungarian MOL´s „NETS“ Projekt for Central and Southeastern Europe. Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 52. On-line at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33472. As of 1.12.2009.

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the finalisation of the construction of both terminals, could constitute the first steps towards the realisation of this project; a piece-by-piece approach seems therefore to be the most adequate solution in this respect. The motivation from the Polish side is of a strategic, security, and economic nature. The LNG terminal in Œwinoujœcie will significantly contribute to the geographical and transit diversification of the supply of natural gas, while the North-South connection will provide transit (and potentially also geographical) diversification which will be beneficial to all countries involved, along with a considerable increase in the crisis-management possibilities in supply should the need arise. Poland could also become a natural gas re-exporting State which would thus strengthen Poland’s position with regard to negotiations on pipeline supply prices. The motivation from the Czech side is primarily of a strategic and security nature. If the North-South connection project is completely implemented (i.e. the connection of the Œwinoujœcie terminal with the Krk island terminal through the gas hub in Baumgartner), the Czech Republic could gain a natural gas version of the oil pipeline IKL. This would especially be the case if the planned Nabucco pipeline were also to end in Baumgartner. The possibilities of a North-South connection have also been reviewed by the Polish group PGNiG, although in specific relation to Nabucco. The alternative to the North-South connection must also be considered. Rather than running through the territory of the Czech Republic, this alternative would run through Slovakia and towards the storage tanks in Baumgartner, or possibly to storage facilities in Hungary (in particular the facilities located at Györ, which is connected to Baumgartner by a high pressure pipeline with a capacity of 4,5 bcm, have been the subject of some attention in this regard). The Czech Republic could also benefit from this alternative via re-exports from Slovakia through the main transit natural gas pipeline. It is thus clear that securing a natural gas supply to the region will depend on the co-operation of all the aforementioned countries: the V4 countries, Austria, and Croatia. If, in the past few years, and especially after the accession of the Visegrad Group countries to the EU, there has been talk about the limits and the loss of purpose of V4 co-operation. Notwithstanding this however, issues concerning energy security and V4 relations with the Russian Federation could provide an impetus for renewing co-operation in this context, and could possibly create a foundation for a Central European security dialogue. Only a coordinated position and approach on the part of all V4 countries to the threat represented by the restriction or cessation of the natural gas supply from Russia can lead to the desired result: the creation of a sufficiently robust and flexible transit and distribution system which would ensure the diversification of supply. The European Union Presidencies of Hungary and Poland in 2011 thus present a great opportunity to emphasise the

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significance of (not only) this project. This is especially the case in relation to the acquisition of financial support from the EU (which would also increase the attractiveness of the project for potential investors). Based on the aforementioned reasons, Poland and the Czech Republic (the priorities of the latter during its EU presidency revolved around energy security) should therefore be the initiators of such a project.

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Jablonna PL/CZ Conference – 9–10 November 2009 Summary of Recommendations:

Poland and the Czech Republic – internal policy and bilateral relations:

1) To strengthen the understanding of the strategic importance of Polish-Czech relations in the structures of both national governments – within the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) and in other Ministries and departments both centralised and local. 2) To intensify, with the support of the respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs, annual strategic and regular policy consultations between varying departments of the MFAs of both countries (European, Eastern, Policy Planning, International Security etc.) in order to develop a common approach, and in particular in order to: ¡ develop and coordinate policies aimed at addressing identified issues, countries and areas of common concern; ¡ weaken the consequences of possible conflicts of interests. 3) Following the recommendation from Vilemov, to resolve the security clearance problem and to allow for the seconding of diplomats and trainees to the MFA’s of third party country and to other branches of administration (also, during Polish Presidency). 4) To involve PL/CZ and CZ/PL forums in the process aimed at deepening the relationship between the Czech and Polish national Parliaments and the different commissions of both chambers of Parliaments in order to strengthen the relationship between the politicians of both countries. 5) To deepen the relationship between both Polish and Czech political parties, also involving the MEPs of both countries.

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6) To concentrate on the development of business-facilitation programmes, particularly with regard to the creation and/or improvement of the transport and communication infrastructure in the border regions. To identify regulatory, institutional or bureaucratic barriers which could prevent economic development, including investment, trade, labour mobility, tourism and others. 7) To organise an annual Czech-Polish Business Forum with the participation of Ministries, regional authorities and business associations in order to address: ¡ strategic development challenges and – ¡ sector specific trans-border projects in areas such as energy, transport, water management, etc.

Relations with countries in the region:

1) Visegrad Group a. To streng t hen the role of PL and CZ in the V4 as the ba ck bo ne, sta bi li zers and ini tia tors of new pro gram mes; b. In the case that, owing to pa r ti cu lar cir cu mstan ces, the V4 ap pro ach fa ils, to ad apt a bi la te ral ap pro ach on a case -by - case ba sis and to lead by the exa m p le of PL and CZ co o pe ra tion. Owing to li mi ted re so u r ces, PL and CZ sho uld aim at sha ring re so u r ces and ini tia ting co m bi ned pro jects, which re qu i res con fi den ce and so li da ri ty; c. Con su l ta tions re gar ding the prio ri ties of the Po lish Pre si den cy, and the means of im ple m enting the se priori ties in the PL-CZ, V4 and V4+B3 (Ba l tic 3) or V4+B3+2 (Bu l ga ria and Ro ma nia) fo r mats wo uld lead to a stren g t he ning in the re la tion s hip be twe en Po land and Czech Re pu b lic; d. The for m at V4 plus B3 (and possi bly +2) is reco g ni sed as being par ticu la r ly im po r tant in or der to sa fe gu ard the imp le men ta tion of EU and NATO poli cie s which are vital to PL and CZ, such as: ¡ The Eastern Partnership: to develop the project further and to strengthen support for the EaP countries and civil societies (Civil Society Forum) while also working out new common approaches with the help of experts; ¡ To influence European and Transatlantic discourse on particularly important issues, such as: the NATO New Strategic Concept, the development of CFSP and ESDP, relations with Russia and PCA2 negotiations, the Medvedev initiative, energy and climate policies, structure as well as the modus operandi of a new European External Action Service, etc.

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2) Germany is to be considered as a key partner for both CZ and PL, both in the context of intra-EU and external relations policies, and particularly in respect of the Eastern Partnership. It is thus necessary to initiate PL/CZ consultations with Germany, as well as between the think-tanks of these respective countries, on issues of common concern such as those regarding the above- mentioned relations with Russia in certain strategic areas. ¡ To organise a common PL-CZ-GE conference on European foreign policy and security in Berlin in the first half of 2010. 3) A macro-regional approach: to strengthen the position of the V4 countries within the EU though a regional and macro-regional approach: to share our common experience and expertise in order to open a North-South alignment (a Baltic Sea – Black Sea corridor), involving the countries of both regions, such as Sweden and Finland on one hand, and Bulgaria and Romania on the other. 4) The Western Balkans: approaching European perspective by these countries should encourage PL,CZ and V4 Group to increase its influence by developing a common approach and common projects in this respect. A visible presence should be established in all Balkan countries.

Security Policy – the United States, NATO, EU and Russia:

1) As Central Europe has faced a certain period of de-koniunktura which risks leading to uncertainty and even instability in the region, it is thus necessary to consider measures which would empower CZ, PL and other countries of the region, both individually and as a de-facto informal bloc within NATO and the EU. 2) To this effect, it is necessary to conduct regular consultations – bilateral and in other formats: V4, V4 +B3 and V4 + B3 + 2 (Romania and Bulgaria). 3) The obstacles inhibiting a process of cooperation regarding the defence industry of both countries should be addressed. 4) It will also be necessary to engage in a substantive debate on the role of Central/Eastern Europe in future strategies: a. In Washington, with the US government and think-tank community; b. In the NATO-based process concerning the development of a New Strategic Concept, to insist on avoiding the lowest common denominator approach and to develop contingency plans in the possible conflict zones; c. In the EU-based debates on the development of the CFSP and ESDP. 5) Policy towards Russia: a. To state and reiterate the principle of common NATO and EU policies vis-B-vis Russia and its neighbours;

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b. To engage the Russians in a friendly and open fashion, for example in relation to the Medvedev initiative; c. To avoid considering CE countries, including the Czech Republic and Poland, as obstacles in reaching a ‘reset’ agreement with Moscow, while also establishing clear and firm ‘red lines’ with regard to Moscow’s relations towards its neighbours as well as in respect of its energy policies; d. To strengthen the importance of the Ukraine with respect to NATO and EU security policy considerations; e. To formulate a common position with regard to the Medvedev proposal on a European Security Treaty, and to counteract any damaging proposals, such as the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Security Council (as referred to in the recent report of the Aspen Institute, Berlin). 6) As the US concentrates more on Romania and Bulgaria as strategic allies which are close to the crucially important Black Sea region, it is important to develop a separate security dialogue and initiative between PL and CZ and Romania and Bulgaria.

Poland and Czech Republic in the EU:

1) CZ and PL should aim at assembling and strengthening the regional alliances (V4 + B3 + 2) with regard to key issues. 2) Other Member States (for example the Scandinavian Member States) should be engaged in order to obtain their support. 3) To strengthen the presence and influence of CZ and PL think-tanks among the network of European think-tanks, policy networks and EU advocacy groups by way of offering timely proposals. 4) In the European Parliament: ¡ to prepare a list of MEPs who are ready to work together on selected issues; ¡ to create a platform of common interests (national and party-political) within the E.U. Parliament. 5) The Eastern Partnership should be the main project undertaken by PL and CZ: ¡ CZ and PL, with the support and participation of Sweden, should organise and coordinate seminars on EaP in the capital of each consecutive Member State holding the EU Presidency; ¡ Use the Troika format in order to popularise the Eastern Partnership among future Presidencies (for example to engage Hungary which is already cooperating with Spain and Denmark); ¡ To discuss the creation of an unofficial and inclusive Eastern Partnership forum in the European Parliament, which would function right across the political party spectrum;

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¡ To grant effective support for the EaP Civil Society Forum; ¡ To organise the Economic Forum of the EaP, possibly with the support of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), in order to further its aims and potential benefits. 6) To cooperate in the process for the creation of the European External Action Service, and to gather support for agreed candidates for the top positions. 7) To consider the creation of a common EU CZ-PL Task Force in order to coordinate activities within the EU: Prague-Warsaw and in Brussels. To recognise that Poland belongs to the EU’s G6 of large countries. CZ expects, should thus be continuously and promptly informed and consulted on Poland’s contacts relating to the Weimar Triangle, common initiatives with France in relation to CFSP and ESDP, as well as on other initiatives;

Polish and Czech perspective towards a Common Energy Policy: The energy security of CZ and PL depends on the formulation and implementation of EU policies, and on the political/strategic and commercial initiatives of both countries which must include all neighbouring countries, and particularly the Visegrad 4 partners. 1) It is important to assess, in a coordinated manner, the countries and areas which CZ and PL can influence in relation to the EU energy and climate policies. 2) To act together in order to: a. eliminate trade practices which violate the EU acquis, norms and regulations; b. create a common liberalised gas market which is strengthened by the principle of unbundling; c. support proper funding from the EU budget for strategic gas interconnections, particularly during the Polish and Hungarian Presidencies in 2011 and also in respect of the New Financial Perspective for 2014–2020; d. stress the importance of the Second Strategic Energy Review (SER2) to the Commission. 3) It is also necessary to insist on the creation of an EU legally binding regulatory framework which will be applicable in the event of an energy crisis. ¡ In particular, to gather support among the other Member States, and within the European Parliament, with regard to Poland’s new proposal concerning the regulation of EU gas security and supply, which should be based on the following 3 principles:

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a. A precise trigger mechanism in view of a European gas crisis; b. A solidarity clause which will establish a mechanism for a common EU reaction; c. A compensation mechanism which will benefit the countries in need. 4) To press for the quickest possible construction of the Nabucco gas pipeline as a strategic EU project. 5) To insist that the strategically important Trans-European Energy Network be co-financed from the EU budget, the European Investment Bank, EBRD etc. rather than leaving the financing of this project to individual commercial companies. 6) To develop together a common gas energy strategy, as the PL-CZ gas interconnector (which is to be ready in 2011/2012), as well as Poland’s interconnectors to Slovakia and Germany, will diversify the routes of supply, but not the sources of supply. 7) To strengthen the Visegrad 4 cooperation and coordination through the V4 Energy High Level Group. 8) To encourage the main V4 energy companies to develop common projects and to work together on a bottom-up principle: PKN Orlen, CEZ and MOL. 9) To develop and coordinate PL-CZ and V4 policies (especially in the field of R&D) in order to achieve synergy with regard to the limited-carbon emission orientated economies of the future (clean coal technologies, CCS in Be³chatów mine etc.) 10) To consider alternatives which would lead to the strengthening of regional electrical grids. 11) Nuclear energy: since Poland will require the support of many technicians and other experts, the Czech Republic could help with their training.

Eugeniusz Smolar CSM – CIR 23 November 2009

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