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Hatch, David Allen

THE CULT OF PERSONALITY OF KIM IL-SONG: FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF A STATE MYTH

The American University Ph.D. 1986

University Microfilms I nternsti03 nI 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106

Copyright 1986 by Hatch, David Alien All Rights Reserved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE CULT OF EERSOHALITY OF KIM IL-SONG

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF A STATE MYTH

David Allen Hatch

submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Public and International Affairs

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

The Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

International Relations

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman: Ï. _ ^ p

M Dean of the College ^

Date 1986

The American University (jp(j^3P \ Washington, D.C. 20016

TEE AMERICAN ÜNI7ERSITY LIBRAS?

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BY

DAVID ALLBM HATCH

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

1986

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT

THE COLT OF PERS0RAL1TÏ OF KXfi XL-SOEG:

FOHCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF A STATE HITH

by David Allen Hatch

A Cnlt of Personality in a coaaunist nation appears

to be an incongruity, the aggrandizement of an individual in

a society committed to the role of the masses and a theory

of historical determinism. However, a Cult has practical

functions: patriotic agitation, legitim ization of a regime,

policy promotion, or factional weapon. A Cult may also

derive from the ego needs of a strong leader. The Cult

figure usually adopts a charismatic leadership style and

uses personality projection as a leadership strategy.

Five characteristics differentiate a Cult of

Personality from mere positive image-making or hero-worship:

1) it exists under an authoritarian regime; 2) special

virtue is attributed to the subject; 3) the subject is

hailed as an authority on any and a ll matters; 4} the

subject has a "canon" of authorized writings; 5) most

important, national experience or history is interpreted

through the object's life. Social properties which abet a

Cult of Personality include weak institutionalization, lack

of opposition by intellectuals, strong foreign enemies, and

disruptive social changes.

Content analysis was applied to North Korean

publications to determine the core of the mythology about

Kim Il-song, to ascertain how the Cult images developed and

i i

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. changed over time, and to discover which images might be

correlated to specific events or policy changes.

The Cnlt of Personality of Kim Il-song of North

Korea underwent three distinct phases: from 1945-50, when

basic images were developed and hero worship fostered; the

Korean Har and era of reconstruction, until about 1965, when

hero worship progressed to a genuine Cult of Personality;

and the modern period, when the Cult assumed international

dimensions and prepared for transfer to a new leadership

generation.

The Kim Cult performed the following functions:

legitim ization of the regime, policy promotion, generation

of national and personal pride, attraction of support for

reunification policies, and easing of leadership succession

to Kim's son.

The Cult of Kim was artificially maintained and

adopted characteristics and techniques from the Cults of

Stalin and Mao. However, it succeded because it appealed to

basic Korean societal patterns, which may have derived from

Confucian ideals still prevalent in social and family

organization.

I X i

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A6STBACT...... 1 1

TABLE OF C O N T E N T S...... i v

C hap ter

I. THE COLT OF PEBSOHALITÏ...... 1

DIMENSIONS OF A COLT OF PEBSONALITI

POLITICS IN DEVELOPING AND COMMUNIST COONTSIES

STATE MYTHS AND SYMBOLS

LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES

THE ISSUES IN KOREAN CONTEXT

PROCEDURES

I I . NORTH KOREA: AN INTRODUCTION...... 33

A BRIEF HISTORY OF NORTH KOREA

NORTH KOREAN SOCIETY

NORTH KOREAN IDEOLOGY

KIM IL-SONG: MAN AND CULT OBJECT

I I I . THE EARLY PERIOD...... - ...... 72

THE IMAGE OF THE LEADER

THE GUERRILLA BACKGROUND

KIM AND THE KPA

IMAGES Or STALIN AND MAO

COMMENTS

IV . WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION...... 138

THE IMAGE GOES TO WAR

AMPLIFICATION OF THE IMAGE

IMAGES OF STALIN AND MAO

THE IMAGE DURING RECONSTRUCTION

i v

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BAR AMD REMEMBRANCE

STALIN AND THE CULT OF PERSONALITY

T. THE MODERN PERIOD...... 2 2 4

THE IMAGE AND EVENTS

THE IMAGE CATEGORIZED

KIM AND REUNIFICATION

THE GREAT FAMILY

KIM CHONG-IL AND THE SUCCESSION

V I. ANTECEDAHTS OF THE CULT OF PERSONALITY...... 3 1 6

STALIN

MAO

THE JAPANESE EMPEROR

THE CONFUCIAN MODEL

COMMENTS

VII. CONCLUSIONS...... 3 5 6

APPENDIX I : NOTES ON S O U R C E S ...... 3 9 8

APPENDIX II: A B B R E V IA T IO N S...... 400

ENGLISH BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 403

KOREAN BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 414

BROADCAST BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 443

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I

THE COLT OF PERSONALITY

All regimes undertake public relations to promote

policies and canny leaders utilize the media to project

useful images. Politics offers many examples of leaders

sk illfu l at turning media to their own purposes and, in

fact, most successful politicians in the west are strong

because they have become adept at managing events to create

a preferred image. A prime example is Ronald Reagan, who

shaped his media exposure to make maximum use of his acting

talents, but even a politician of minimal crowd appeal such

as Richard Nixon was able to control his campaign

appearances to present a favorable image.* Dwight Eisenhower

also manipulated his exposure to present a public image

greatly different from his actual leadership s t y l e . z

However, a Cult of Personality transcends mere

public relations or image creation, anchoring as it does the

events and history of a nation solely in terms of the life

ipor details of Nixon's media manipulation, see Joe McGinnis, The Selling of the President, 1968 (New York: Trident Press, 1969).

2 Fred I . G r e e n s te in , The Hidden—Hand P r e sid e n c y : Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982}.

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aud activities of one individual.

The term "Cult of Personality," originally applied

to the dictatorship of Josef Stalin, although the term has

acquired the wider meaning of individualistic leadership in

a communist s o c i e t y . ^ it also implies separation of the

leader from the masses, plus use of the "great man" theory

to justify both policies and immodesty.* A Cult of

Personality has been defined this way: "A huge subservient

following gathered through personality or force by a top

leader. A term used to describe Stalin's absolute control

over the party."S

One author suggested that in addition to confusion

over the role of the individual in history, factors

conducive to a Cult of Personality include international

isolation, a threat from abroad, preparation for intensive

^Shortly after Stalin's death, Pravda employed this obscure phrase from Marx, and ironically stated that Stalin joined Marx, Engels, and Lenin in eschewing the Colt of Personality in favor of emphasizing the historic role of the masses. George Eortoli, The Death of Stalin, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 195.

*R. N. Carew Hunt, A Guide to Communist Jargon (The MacMillan Company, 1957), pp. 50—53. A thorough discussion of the "great man" theory may be found in Eugene E. Jennings, An Anatomy of Leadership; Princes, Heroes, and Supermen (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), particularly pp. 2-8. The Great Man Theory teaches simply that major changes in organization or society result from innovative efforts by superior individuals. Jennings observes however that "there is no more evidence that great forces rule men than there is evidence that great men rule these forces."

SRoy D. Laird, The Soviet Paradigm (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 242.

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indttstciallzation, and economic underdevelopment.* Another

argued that the Personality Cult had its roots in the

amorphous concept "Dictatorship of the proletariat," in one-

party government-, complete state control of media, and a

ruthless police system.? A third has suggested that a Cult

of Personality may derive from the psychological needs of

the leader, the sycophancy of those around him, and

(undefined) facets of mass psychology.*

Such factors undoubtedly propel a leader's cult, but

these analyses miss the point: observers may be misled by

the amount of propaganda* which emanates from such a fount

into dismissing the cult as symptomatic only of megalomania

or random historical factors unique to a single era. A

Personality Cult actually constitutes a facile tool in the

service of a regime, one sufficiently flexible to allow

application in many areas of concern to the elite.

*Hans-Josef Steinberg, "Personality Cult," in Marxism, Communism, and Western Society: a Comparative Encyclopedia, ed. C. D. Kernig (Hew York: Herder and Herder, 1973), pp. 291-92.

TJosef Hilczynski, "Personality Cult," An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Marxism, Socialism, and Communism (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981), pp. 430-3*.

«T. H. Sigby, ed., Stalin: Great Lives Observed (Englewood C liffs, M. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 109.

*The tern "propaganda" has acquired negative connotations not inherent in the word itself. As used in this study, propaganda refers to public statements by DPEK media, designed either to influence public opinion or to make an official position available. Osed in this way, the matericil constitutes an abundant and valuable source for understanding what North Korea wants known about itse lf.

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In this regard, Hannah Arendt wrote of Stalin's

R u ssia :

He always suspected, but we now know that the regime was never "monolithic" but "consciously constructed around overlapping, duplicating, and parallel functions," and that th is grotesquely amorphous structure was kept together by the same Fuerher—principle — the so-called "personality cult" — we find in Nazi Germany.*®

The thrust of this dissertation w ill be to show that

a Cult of Personality is really a powerful leadership

strategy, one with many practical applications, and

demonstrate its use in a particular case, that of Kim Il-

song of North Korea.

I . DIMENSIONS OF A CULT OF PERSONALITY

The importance of the individual in history is

ambiguous in the writings of Harr, although the Marxist

thrust is that man does not make history out of conditions

chosen by him self, but those at hand, and a leader is

significant only as a class agent; his power is to modify,

accelerate, or retard within a particular historical period.

Revolution is not individual work, but the spontaneous and

necessary expression of social needs. Marx did state,

however, that every age needs heroes and would invent them

if they did not exist.**

Thus it is, as Adam 01am wrote, that

*®Hanaah Aresdt, Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Horld Inc, New Edition, 1966), p. xvi.

**G eorge H. H aapsch, The Theory o f Communism (New York, The Citadel Press, 1965), pp. 97-99.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Communism te lls its story in terms of heroes and villains, saints and heretics. By not allotting any share in history to accident, inertia, human fa llib ility , or whim, the most prosciic political and economic development is seen as resulting from miracle- making or treason . *2

Power within a tiered communist party retreats into

ever-smaller bodies: central committee, politburo,

presidium, etc., allowing an ambitious individual to

concentrate it into his own hands. Thus, a "great man" has

emerged within most communist parties, witness Stalin, Mao,

Castro, Kim. A curious paradox thereby suffuses communist

history: despite a view of history as progress via

predetermined and impersonal forces, the movement is best

understood in terms of its major characters.*3

Soviet theorists defined the Cult of Personality as

the violation by Stalin of Leninist norms of collective

leadership and a departure from socialist legality.

According to this view, Stalin let party and state successes

go to his head and had claimed they were the result of his

own genius, leading him into serious errors at the end of

i2Adam B. Ulam, Stalin: the Man and Bis Era (Hew York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 11.

i3Hodger A. Swearingen, "Introduction," In Leaders of the Communist Horld, Ed. Rodger A. Swearingen (Hew York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. ix, x. Also, see fl. M. fiostow and Alfred Levin, The Dynamics of Soviet Society (Hew York: i. H. Norton and Company, 1967), particularly chapters 1 and 3. Another discussion of communist leadership valuable to this section is Michael H aller, The Lang wage of Communism: a Commentary (London: the Bodley Head, 1972), particularly pp. 1 1 6 -1 8 .

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his life-** Despite criticism of Stalin's leadership style,

his successors have to a greater or lesser extent violated

the principle of collective leadership, and have authorized

an inordinate amount of public adulation.*s

A Soviet critic argued that glorifying leaders was

not a Personality Cult, but a "Power Cult," that is, a cult

of the senior party position. Poland's Hladyslaw Gomulka

was quoted as stating privately that the cnlt of personality

was grafted onto a ll East European communist parties by the

USSR, and that the essence of the system was a "hierarchic

ladder of cults" leading to Stalin's. Like Stalin, "First

Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist

Parties donned the robes of in fallib ility and wisdom in

their turn."**

Mao Tse-tung, himself a major cult figure, once

wrote that Stalin had won honors for his correct

interpretations of Leninism, but had "erroneously

exaggerated his own role" and imposed his authority over

collective leadership, a contradiction of his own precepts.

**James Melnick, "Soviet Perceptions of the Maoist C u lt o f P e r s o n a l i t y ," S t u d ie s i n C om parative Communism IZ , (Spring/Summer 1976) : 131—32.

**Laird, Paridigm. pp. 74—76. Also, see George 9. Breslauer, Khrushshev and Brezhnev as Leaders; Building Authority in Soviet P olitics (London; George Allen and Onwin, 1982), pp. 77, 194, 198, 221.

I*Anton Antonov—Ovseyenko, The Tine of Stalin: Portrait of a Tyranny, trans. George Saunders (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 285.

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Kao affirmed that leaders have Importance in history, but a

leader who placed himself above party and masses would lose

his insight: "Even so outstanding a personality as Stalin"

fell into error, a "victim to subjectivism and one­

sidedness." He concluded that the "cult of the individual

is a rotten carry-over from the long history of mankind."*?

That was the public Mao. In a private conversation late in

life , he agreed that his cult had been necessary, although

its excesses should have been curbed, and wondered if

perhaps Khrushchev had fallen because he had no cult of

personality at all.*®

The term "Cult of personality" is usually associated

only with communist regimes, although it need not be. The

suggestion by Hannah Arendt, above, that the Nazi movement

utilized the principle, is corroborated by Karl Mannheim,

who wrote that the heart of fascism was a belief in the

decisive deed and the initiative of a leading elite;

programs were less important thcin unconditional

subordination to the leader.** The glorification of the

leader may be observed in regimes less overtly committed to

i?«Stalin»s Place in History,", 5 April 1956 editorial, Jen—min Jih Pao, quoted in Stuart fi. Schram, The P olitical Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Praeger Publishers, revised and enlarged edition, 1970), pp. 432-33.

*®Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 70, 168-70, 205.

**K arl Mannheim, I d e o lo g y and U top ia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), p. 119.

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ideology, such a«s those of Saddam Hussein or Juan Peron.

An important factor in the exercise and maintenance

of a Cult of Personality is the development of a "canon,"

that is, an official collection of writings, chosen from

political motives and frequently but surreptitiously altered

to reflect current events. The canon gives proof of the

cult object's philosophical prowess and moreover provides

ample fodder for the population's participation in political

study. As an example, both Mao and his conferedates often

re-edited his works to reflect new perspectives and the

current party line .2 0

Se may posit the properties of a Cult of Personality

as these: 1) it must exist under an authoritarian regime, at

least one having control over media access and content; 2)

the regime must attribute special virtue to the subject,

crediting him with a ll important policy and successful

results (but no failures); he enunciates policy as well as

accepting credit; he may be an authority on all non­

political matters on which he chooses to comment; 3) he

should have no rivals in rank or achievement; 4) he must

have a "canon" of authorized writings; 5) interpretation of

the character and/or history of the nation is through the

Cult object.

Social properties conducive to a Cult of Personality

2 0Helmut Martin, Cult and Canons the Origins and Development of State Maoism (Armonk, New York: M. £. Sharpe Inc., 1982) , pp. 3—5-

8

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include 1) weak institutionalization; 2) weak or fragmented

intelligentsia; 3} real or imagined enemies internal or

external; 4) frequent campaigns for social/economic change,

including industrialization; 5) a low eduction level and/or

remnants of strong superstitons.

A Personality Cult has generally been characterized

by effusive propaganda about the object, although this

probably largely reflects the possibilities inherent in the

proliferation of media; volume of material is no less a

defining property than its content. No doubt such cult

aspects derive from a leader's ego, as well as from

subordinates eager to demonstrate loyalty or ingratiate

themselves through zealous execution of Cult rituals.

These properties differentiate a Cult of Personality

from image-making and hero worship. Image-making is

probably lim ited to general news management and presupposes

a competitive environment. Hero worship is an intermediate

stage, where a number of these properties are present, but

not all; some competitive politics may occur, for example.

I I . POLITICS IN DEVELOPING AMD CONMDNIST COONTBIES

Politics is less well differentiated from social and

personal relations in non-western societies, with power and

prestige often dependent on social status, and political

groups tending tp represent a way of life rather than mere

cohesion on issues. The political process itself is

exemplified by cliques and development of acute loyalty to

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the leadership of parties; few explicitly organized interest

groups have specific roles. Charismatic leaders tend to

prevail, further, in non-western societies, less consensus

exists as to legitimate means of political action, while

while the intensity and breadth of political discussion bear

little relation to actual decision-making. The political

process is also characterized by sharp differences in

political orientations of the generations. 2*

Hew states or regimes, whether the product of

revolution or not, must confront the problem of creating

legitimacy. This involves many factors, including building

institutions and developing fam iliarity through passage of

time, but here it may simply be defined as the process

through which a regime gains general acceptance by its its

people as a valid representative of their interests. Bauer,

et.ai. also raised the point that a communist party may

seek positive identification of itself as custodian of all

basic questions of doctrine . 22 Building authority is not the

same as consolidating power. Authority is legitim ized

power; leaders seek to legitim ize their programs and

demonstrate their indispensibility. The need to build

authority assumes that mere rank is sometimes insufficient

2*Lucian 9. Pye, "The Hon-Hestern P olitical Process," The Journal of P olitics XX (August 1958); 469-73, 477-81, 484-85.

22£aymond A. Bauer, Alexis Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhorn, How the Soviet System Horks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 31.

10

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to accomplish a leader's p r o g r a m . 23

Revolutionary leadership especially is passionate,

ruthless, usually humorless, and based op a messianic

philosophy, but practical in application of its principles.

It believes in "angels and devils and salvation...(and) does

not tolerate heretics." It requires a "prophet," but also

institutional support and collective leadership. 2«

Franz Schumann noted that revolution followed by

political centralization has been a common phenomenon, and

that post—revolutionary organizations must make conscious

efforts to survive. Ideology, rather than a class or

individual concept, is the manner of thinking characteristic

of an organization and the more systematic an organization

becomes, the greater is the need for a systematic set of

ideas to direct it . 2s ^s a revolutionary regime consolidates

power, efforts are dedicated to continuing the status quo.

& regime thus tries simultaneous preservation of

revolutionary dynamism and protection of itself from this

dynamism. One writer attributes the tensions in Soviet

political socialization to this contradiction. 2*

23Breslauer, Khrushchev, p. 3.

2*james MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1978), p. 239.

zsfranz Schumann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2nd enlarged edition, 1968) , pp. xrxir, zlv iii, 18.

2*G ayle Durham H o lla n d e r , S o v ie t P o l i t i c a l Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda

11

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I I I . STATE MYTHS AHD SYMBOLS

It has been asserted that myths are essentially a

variety of poetry, one by which mankind lives; myths have

universality, making the ordinary seem extraordinary.

Because of their eventfulness and m alleability, myths are

uniquely capable of bridging old and new, absorbing new

meanings, and giving structure to the inchoate. Therefore,

authorities "always" employ myths, particularly historical

m y t h s . 2 7 & myth can be a "credible, dramatic, socially

constructed re-presentation of perceived realities that

people accept as permanent, fixed knowledge of reality while

forgetting...tentative, imaginative, created, and perhaps

fictional qualities . "28

"Myth lies at the basis of human society," wrote one

commentator, because myths are general statements about the

world that are believed true and acted upon "whenever

circumstances suggest or require common response." Although

myths are based more on faith than fact, public action is

difficult to provoke or sustain without believable myths.

Since people are subject to symbolic stim uli credible

symbols make a difference in how believing people act.

since Stalin (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972) , p. 4.

27Lee C. McDonald, "Myth, P olitics, and Political Science," Hestern P olitical Quarterly XXII (March 1969); 1 4 1 -4 3 .

2*Dan Nimmol and Janes £. Combs, Subliminal P olitics: Myths and Mvthmakers in America (Englewood C liffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1980), p. 16.

12

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However, simple belief is insufficient to ensure a society's

goals: the British and Germans subscribed to competing myths

about the superiority of their respective systems, but only

one emerged victorious from the war. 2*

Mannheim wrote that in societies tending toward

individualization, a life style devoid of collective myths

is "scarcely bearable." While the elite hold positions

requiring rational decisions according to individual

interests, this is not true of "peasants" and subordinate

workers holding positions involving little initiative.

Their behavior is regulated to a certain extent by myths,

tradition, or mass faith in a leader.3®

Ernst Cassirer considered state myths from an

historical perspective, concluding that no great culture

existed without being "dominated by and pervaded with

mythical elements." He argued that although the subjects of

myth and ritual were diverse, the motives were always the

same, unity of thought. Myths are not individual

confessions, but an "objectification of man's social

experience."3 1 Cassirer also warned of an alarming new power

in modern p olitics, the myth. Myth had always been viewed

as the product of unconscious activity, but new political

29william H. McNeill, "The Care and Repair of the Public Myth," Foreign Affairs LXI (Fall 1S82): 1-13.

3®Mannheim, Ideology, pp. 31—32.

31 Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), pp. 3—5, 37, 47.

13

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myths were being manufactured "in the same sense and

according to the same methods as any other modern weapon."

Past despotisms had been content to compel action only, but

the new p olitical myths were being wielded to change the

person in order to control his deeds.

State myths can facilitate legitimacy by providing

the political order with credibility leading to acceptance,

although both time and achievement are necessary.

Legitimacy involves "attention to emotional and material

appetites," needing both manipulation of symbols and

production of results. Such symbols as are deployed must

also be "relevant to the time in question," as reputations

and slogans based on "receding events" largely pertinent to

an older generation cannot be expected to support a

government structure ind efinitely.33

Murray Edelman has written that a government affects

behavior chiefly by shaping the cognitions of large numbers

of people. Myths help create beliefs about propriety,

perceptions of what is fact, and expectations of the future.

Myths impart meaning to complex or confusing circumstances ;

an individual thus may gain a personal identity from mythic

statements about his country or leadership, and may use this

to order or illuminate his activities. Senior policymakers

32ibid.. pp. 282-86.

33Michael Leifer, Dilemmas of statehood in Southeast Asia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1972), pp. 105-07.

14

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in state myths are perceived as monolithic and resolute,

even though they may actueilly be ambivalent and divided.

State myths are further associated with frustration, fear,

or anger.3* Political myths have archtypical patterns, one

of which defines a savior-hero—leader who is to be obeyed

and for whom deprivation, suffering, or sacrifice are

gratifying. Edelman emphasized that myth generation is not

irrational or random, but system atic.3s

Myths should not be confused with ideology: both are

replete with metaphors, but while myth concentrates on

image, ideology relies on logic and categorization. Myth

personalizes events, while ideology facilitates rational

comprehension of them. Moreover, myth is plastic, it grows

with the tellin g, but ideology is committed to writing and

worked out logically; mythic images compress meaning, but

ideology explains the significance of events and possible

courses of action.3* North Korean ideology exists separately

from the Cult of Personality; although they touch at several

points, neither is subsumed to the other. The provenance of

the prevailing ideology was always attributed to Kim and he

3*Murray Edelman, P olitics as Symbolic Action: Mass A rou sal and Q u iesc en ce (C h icago: Markham P u b lish in g Company, 1971) , pp. 6-7, 15, 42, 53-54.

3Sibid., pp. 15, 99. Edelman also noted that this same process is utilized to identify and act against a national enemy.

3*Hillard A. Mullins, "On the concept of Ideology in P olitical Science," American P olitical Science Review 1X¥I (June 1972); 506.

15

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served as its arbiter, at once originator and guarantor of

its validity. This suggests a symbiotic relationship in

which ideology assumed power through its association with

Kim, and Kim in his guise as ideologue gained additional

merit for his rejsntation.

P olitical symbols may be distinguished as to

"manifest" and "latent" content: in contrast to those which

have literal or direct political meaning, a symbol may

purport to represent a non—political fact, but actually

relate to an important political demand. Hor are all

symbols "propaganda," that is, used to seek control of

opinion, since symbols may arise spontaneously.s?

Propaganda may be considered the manipulation of

symbols for control of public opinion, furthermore, it

operates in accordance with given predispositions; whether

true or false, propaganda must be formulated to agree with

directions in which the targets are already leaning.a* In

propaganda, complex issues are sim plified to brief and

dogmatic statements appealing to a target group's prejudices

and often involve a choice between acceptance or rejection

of this prejudice. Propagandists often associate ideas with

persons or objects of authority and prestige, and foster a

claim for universality, taking advantage of a common

3?Harold lassw ell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: a Framework for P olitical Enquiry (Mew Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 104.

38ibid. . pp. Ill, 113-14.

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misconception that an idea must be good if it attracts a

great deal of s u p p o r t . 3»

Herbert Harcnse wrote in connection with this:

The decline of independent thought vastly increases the power of words — their magical power... Protected against the intellectual effort which traces the way back from thé words to the ideas they once expressed, the words become weapons in the hand of an administration against which the individual is completely powerless. ♦<>

IV. LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES

Reduced to i t s lo w e s t common d en o m in a to r, le a d e r s h ip

may be described as the focus of group processes;

personality and its effects; the art of inducing compliance

or exercise of influence; or, a form of persuasion or

instrument of goal achievement.** On a more personal level,

leadership has been defined as the process by which one

individual consistently exerts more influence than others in

executing group functions; the distinguishing feature of

political leadership is the target of the influence: the

change of group goals or allocation of resources. Following

prescribed rules does not require political leadership, even

3?H. Frazier Hoore, Public Relations: Principles. Cases and Problems (Homewood, Illin o is: Richard D. Irwin Inc., 8th edition, 1981), pp. 56-57.

*0Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism: a C ritical Analysis {Hew York: Vintage Books, 1961), pp. 75-76.

♦*Ralph M. Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership; a Survey of Theory and Research (Hew York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 7-16.

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though an actor fills a role of authority.*% For many

writers, leadership constitutes more than mere executive

ability; it emphasizes great changes, wrought by superior

individuals, leaders exist to effect better organization or

adaptation, and are essential for formulation of theories,

policies, and ideals — their resence helps define the

character of society.*3

In addition to general functions, a ruling

individual or coterie must undertake additional tasks to

retain power as well as utilize it. iriggins argued** that

the nature of politics in the "third world" forces leaders

into one or a combination of strategies to aggregate power.

These include 1} personality projection; 2} organization

building; 3) ideology promotion; 4} rewarding the faithful

and the susceptible; 5) intimidating the opponent and the

wavering ally; 6) developing the economy; 7) expanding or

contracting political participation; and 8} using foreign

p o l i c y .

Specifically, iriggins stated that a strategy of

personality projection offers the following advantages. I j**

a society lacking legitim acy, a personality can gain

*2Daniel Katz, "Patterns of Leadership," in Handbook of P olitical Psychology, ed. James H. Knutson (San Francisco: Jossey—Bass Publishers, 1973), pp. 204—06.

*3Jennings, Anatomy, pp. 1, 8, 16.

**i. Howard iriggins. The Euler's Imperative (Hew York: Columbia University press, 1969), pp. 98-238.

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acceptance for the exercise of power and may he the focus of

common l o y a l t y . Where i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r p o l i t i c a l b a r g a in in g

are ill-form ed, a personality can define general goals to

which cill may agree. A personality also may em.aody both

tradition and future as well as personify a new state at

home and abroad.*=

Personality projection as a ruling strategy also has

definite liab ilities. This strategy is unlikely to

encourage arrangements for orderly succession; a leader

often needs guick results or dramatic acts rather than slow

or inconspicuous action; he must avoid giving others of high

status an opportunity to be fully conversant with public

affairs; he may become unduly impressed with his own

reputation; and, serious d ifficu lties may arouse resentment

or hatred toward him.** In addition, personality projection

may retard the development of enduring institutions and

hamper the practice of acceptable patterns of political

give-and-take.

The Cult of Personality may be symptomatic of the

"political type" posited by Harold lassw ell, the individual

who accentuates power over other values. The "political

type" is characterized by an intense craving for deference,

un gratified in hj.s personal life , and displaced on public

♦sibid. pp. 98-101.

*&ibid., pp. 104-07.

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objects. Power is expected to overcome low self-esteem .*?

High emotions and exaggerated beliefs about a leader

are abetted b y a certain degree of distance; leaders

observed only on grand occasions or under special

circumstances arouse charismatic feelings. Such a leader

should be close enough to a group to permit identification

with him, but he is also to be perceived as having a "magic"

about him that denotes a superior figure. Too close a

relation would risk the exposure of weaknesses.**

The concept of "charismatic leadership" originated

by Max Weber is associated with political myth-making.

According to Carl Friedrich, charismatic power originates in

a shared belief that the leader is invested with divine

favor or grace. Be suggested that charisma, whether genuine

or manufactured, does not adequately define leadership but

power, and may serve to cloak absolutist pretensions.**

Weber's definition of charisma attributes leadership to

"gifts of grace" which mark superhuman or supernatural

qualities, or at least specifically exceptional powers.

Robert Tucker cautioned, however, not to confuse charisma

with power, for power produces conterfeits resembling

*?Harold Dwight Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: The Yiking Press, Compass Books Edition, 1962), pp 22, 38 .

*®Katz, nleadership Patterns," pp. 215-16.

**Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Leadership and the Problem of the Charismatic Power," The Journal of P olitics XXIII (February 1961): 3-24.

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charisma. Modern technology heis enabled the inducement of

mass adulation of a leader lacking actual c h a r i s m a . so An

important factor in charismatic leadership is the people's

"will to believe." This "will" can overcome doubts about a

leader's ability and the sense of media manipulation which

may accompany modern simulated charisma.**

James MacGregor Burns rejected the term "charisma"

as overworked, preferring instead "heroic leadership." He

defined the concept as a belief in a leader because of his

personage alone, a readiness to grant to the leader the

power to handle crises, and mass support for the leader

expressed directly rather than through intermediaries or

institutions. He asserted that heroic leadership was not

simply a personal quality, but a "type of relationship

between leader and led. Emotional needs of both hero and

people are involved, with no additional motive beyond

"Short-run psychic dependency and gratification ."*2

Erik Erikson suggested that seme contemporary

factors, such as waning of religion, have made people

"charisma-hungry." A charismatic leader may address fear.

soBobert C. Tucker, "The theory of Charismatic Leadership," Daedalus XCVII (Summer 1S68): 731, 740.

s*Beinhard Bendix, "Reflections on Charismatic Leadership," Asian Survey 711 (June 1967): 244,348-49.

s^Burns, Leadership, pp. 244-49. In opposition to the heroic leader. Burns offers the "idolized hero," an ideological leader who dedicates himself to explicit goals of social change, plus the organization needed to pursue them .

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anxiety — that fs, lack o f identity — and "existential

dread" — that is, distress when "rituals of existence" are

c o l l a p s e d .S3

Claude Ake posited "charismatic legitim acy," in

which loyalty to a new state is created through the personal

influence of a charismatic leader. Ake suggested Ghana's

Kwaae Nkrumah a s an example.** According to Katz, the

population of an emerging nation may experience an identity

crisis as old customs lose meanings or old structures which

united people crumble. A leader who has acguired his own

sense of new identity and can articulate it for others

becomes a charismatic figure. His appeal is not to

political forms and measures alone, but represents a shared

orientation on a deeper lev el.**

V. THE ISSUES IN KOBEAN CONTEXT

If myth treats collective problems and aspirations,

it is important in studying the Cult of Kim II—song to

understand the major problems to which it has been applied.

The many images of the Cult of Personality were applies

against a range ,pf problems over a 40-year span; these

problems may be grouped as follow s.

s3Quoted in Tucker, "Charismatic leadership," p. 745.

s*Claude Ake, "Charismatic Leadership and P olitical Integration," Comparative Studies in Society and History IX (1966): 1, 3-5.

ssKatz, "leadership Patterns," pp. 217-18.

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1 . LEGITIMIZATION

Although legitim ization is not a simple task, it

was somewhat eased in Korea by homogeneity of culture and

common colonial background. The main requisite for

contention for power in 1945 was a solid anti—Japanese

background; the regimes which eventually legitim ated

themselves in both North and South Korea traded heavily on

this. However, Korea in the 1940s was fragmented

politically, with many disparate groups seeking power, with

no uniting institutions, with national purpose undefined.

Korean energies had been expended in fighting the Japanese,

but little or no preparation for the post-Japanese era had

been possible. Korea was a model of the post-colonial and

underdeveloped nation described in Section II.

The problems of legitim ization and policy promotion

were doubled in north Korea, since senior officials were

promoting not only a new regime but also a Communist Party

which they intended to be the fountainhead of doctrine. The

creation of an exaggerated background portraying Kim II-song

as a succesful guerrilla leader helped to consolidate a

secure political base for him, eliminate rivals, and

legitim ize both regime and party during the early period of

their existence; the myth continued as a weapon against

rivals in subseqnent political struggles. It seems likely

that these were the original functions for the myths about

Kim and may be considered an instance of "charismatic

legitim ization," the concept raised by Ake.

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2 . POLICY PSGHGÏXON

The first use of the cult reflected the concerns of

taking and holding power, but the cult was handy for support

of the use of that power also.

Richard Solomon wrote that the Chinese have a

dependency orientation, that is, a hierarchical conception

of authority and great concern over interpersonal conflict,

attributes which account for both the sense of order and

episodes of unrestrained violence which characterized

Chinese society. The Chinese Communists have attempted to

maintain the unitary quality of Confucian polity, with its

hierarchical authority structure, yet create a society in

which change is an accepted and ongoing process, where

cooperative social relationships have knitted society

together.** These same tensions obtain in Korean society, as

traditional Korea was itse lf a Confucian nation and

internalized the same values the Chinese honored.*?

Attribution of correct formulation and

interpretation of doctrine for practical social and economic

aeeisures to the Great Leader abetted social control in

implementing the regime's programs. Various cispects of the

**Bicfaard H. Solomon, "Mao's Effort to Réintégrate the Chinese Polity: Problems of Authority and Conflict in Chinese P olitical Processes," in Chinese Communist P olitics in Action, ed. A. Doak Barnett (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 273-76.

*?See Chapter VI for a discussion of congruities between Confucianism and the Kim Cult.

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cult story, with an elaborate hagiography of heroes,

provided positive role models reinforcing the government's

values within the population. In addition, the

comprehensive nature of the cult encouraged social stability

by presenting a universal world view, precluding any need

for external political or social doctrines. It may be that

the example of Kim's life and the expectations of social

behavior attributed to him constitute one method the regime

used to maintain its status, even as officially it preached

revolution, a solution to the dilemma posed by Hollander

(above), the conflict over maintenance of revolutionary

fervor and stability.

A claim for military sagacity and invincibility has

also proved invaluable in reassuring the North Korean

population during times of international crisis. A similar

use of the image helped retain the loyalty of the m ilitary.

3 . PEI&E

Following liberation, Koreans felt keenly the need

to reestablish a sense of identity, the Japanese having

attempted to eradicate Korean culture in favor of their own.

The perception of strong domestic leadership probably aided

or reinforced feelings of Korean-ness in a bewildered

population. Such feelings may at one and the same time have

been the by-product of and beginning of political

legitim ization.

After centuries of domination by the greater powers

surrounding the peninsula, and after nearly a half century

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of Japanese imperialism, Koreans needed not only to re­

establish a cultural identity but a sense of basic self

worth, what Erikson, above, called the «rituals of

existence.n Pride in a superior leader, particularly one

who had defeated several powerful enemies, helped re­

establish this.

Therefore, the Cult of Kim appealed strongly to this

Korean hunger for esteem. Kim's in itial attraction was as a

leader who had repreatedly humbled the hated Japanese — the

people could be proud they had produced such a man. Later,

Kin projected an image of international stature, suggesting

that through him this once downtrodden people were making a

valuable contribution to the world.

4 . fiSONXFlCÀlXOH

The Korean people are suffused with a deep-seated

belief in themselves as a separate and pure race and,

whether or not justified, this forms the basis for the

Korean self-im age. Given this powerful feeling of unity,

the political division has been extremely painful, more so

even than in other divided nations, and the impetus for

reunification has tapped elemental emotigns. Thus, the

presence of a legendary figure with charismatic claims

represented a potent factor in the reunification struggle.

Since Kim 11-song preempted the field on many expressions of

nationalism, he enjoyed a good claim to being the embodiment

of reunification hopes. The Cult may assist in focusing

attention on this primacy in the North-South struggle.

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5 . SUCCESSION

The imputation of personal worth and revolutionary

insight not only to the Great leader him self, but to his

family also, including remote ancestors, assisted in

preparing for transfer of power to Kim's son. The

succession question has probably become a vital one for

continuation of the regime. Since Kim, the cult object, was

so closely identified with the regime and its policies, it

may have been perceived as necessary to replace the

leadership well within the boundaries of the cult to insure

the regime's survival.

If, as Pye stated, developing countries are marked

by sharp difference in political outlook between

generations, the use of the cult in the succession issue may

be one way to attempt to bridge this gap. This seems to be

the theme of the DPEK campaign calling for loyalty

"generation after generation."

Although Iriggins suggested that regimes which use

personality projection as a tool of leadership do not

prepare well for succession, transference of power to Kim

Chong—il in North Korea is simultaneously the capstone of

the use of the ou It and a necessity for its continuation —

its ultimate challenge.

Certainly, the promotion of a Cult of Personality,

such as Kim Il-song's, involved strategies of personality

projection, promotion of ideology, and intim idation, as

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Hriggins wrote. It is clear, also, that other strategies

and leadership tools have been used, but the cult served as

support for them.

VI. PfiOCEDDBES

At this time it would be impossible to separate Kim

the man from Kim the cult object; iconoclasm, at any rate,

is not the purpose of this dissertation. The aim is to

examine the aforementioned aspects of the North Korean Cult

of Personality, concentrating on functions, with reference

also to historical development. Auxiliary tasks w ill be to

ascertain why the Cult of Personality flourished in Korea

and to compare this cult with those c f other communist

leaders in order to provide context.

It w ill be demonstrated that the Cult of Personality

of Kin Il-song was artificial, that legends about him were

constructed from the very beginning for the purposes

previously mentioned. The dissertation w ill illustrate the

cult's growth and changes, w ill seek reasons behind the

changes, and w ill attempt to determine the individuals or

groups which benefitted from its manipulation. Also to be

studied are institutional and social factors which gave rise

to it and which sustained it, as well as the liab ilities it

e n t a i l s .

Many conventional tests of leadership can be applied

to Kim Il-song sparingly, if at a ll, since much of the

activity by which he conducted business occurred apart from

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public scrutiny. Nor do we have access to candid appraisals

from associates, which would enable a closer judgement of

his leadership ab ilities. The DF£K has not yet produced a

D jilas. Lacking the insights provided by defector

literature, it is impossible to judge the actual attitudes

of the North Korean people or to discover the leadership

decisions at each juncture in the Cult development.

Since North Korean media assumed that adulation of

Kim was merely normal practice and since we lack access to

senior leaders, a ll deductions about the utility of the Cult

must be speculative. However, it is possible to compile

sufficient instances of specific uses of the Cult of Kim to

demonstrate the iiklihood that this premise is valid.

The use of vocabulary related to religion and some

comparison with religious groups may be unavoidable in

studying a Cult of Personality, but this should not be taken

to imply that the Cult is a religion, or as sometimes

suggested in the popular media, that Kim had been "deified"

in a literal sense. It seems true that the Cult performed

certain material functions undertaken by universalist

religious groups — providing a holistic world view,

undergirding practical activities with philosophy, and

fillin g spare time to reduce opportunities for apostasy —

but lacked altogether any supernatural connotations.

This writer views himself as an outside observer: I

have never been to North Korea nor have I had personal

contact with North Korean citizens. Therefore, I seek only

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to analyze documentary evidence about the country to learn

what may be obtained from such written sources.

This dissertation w ill attempt to discover the core

of the Kim myth, as promulgated in the post-liberation

period, then trace its evolution to the 1980s, noting

additions and deletions. Content analysis w ill be utilized

to ascertain what facets of the myth were emphasized at a

particular time and how these may correlate to events or

policy changes. This dissertation is not interested,

however, in the truth or falsity of the Kim legend except

when identification of deliberate falsehoods may aid in

understanding the function of the legend or its operational

m ethod.

Since this is the case study, even biography, of an

idea and how that idea was pressed into the service of a

regime, this dissertation w ill ask the following questions:

1) Hhat Korean factors allowed a Cult to emerge and

survive? Hhat physical details were used to maintain the

c u lt ?

2} Hhat do the terms of reference for Kim reveal

about the needs and responses of the Korean people? This is

to be watched in light of Lasswell and Kaplan's truism that

propaganda must confirm to what people are predisposed to

believe and his description of the "latent" content of

propaganda.

3) Hhat do changes iq the story or in myth

terminology reveal about the uses of the public myth?

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The dissertation w ill also undertake to support or

refute the following propositions:

1) The myth of Kim Il-song was a rtificial, designed

in itially to provide assistance in obtaining power and

legitim izing KimIs rule, but proceeded to perform other

tasks for the regime later.

2) Once established, the myth was employed to give

identity to the Korean people, and reestablish what Erikson

called the "rituals of existance."

3} A public myth, such as that of Kim Il-song*s,

while not the only tool in a leader's strategy, serves to

reinforce his other tools.

4} Every attempt was made to make the Kim Il-song

state myth sufficiently flexible to survive changes in

policy and international environment. The regime had a

variety of images from which to choose, and the appropriate

one was selected for emphasis at critical periods. The

regime was willing and able to falsify history as needed to

support the myth.

Chapter II w ill provide a short summary of pertinent

Korean history as well as an examination of the nature of

North Korean society. This is to be used for reference in

assessing the developments in the Cult of Kim over a 40-year

p e r io d .

In Chapter III, we w ill discuss the foundation of

the Kim Cult in the period 1945-50. During this time the

Cult developed most of the theses which it would retain for

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its entire duration, although due to the presence of

competitive powers, Kim's system did not advance past hero

worship. The Cult was used at this time to seek

legitim ization for Kim and his regime, and to struggle

against political rivals.

Chapter IV w ill cover the period of the Korean Har

and post-war reconstruction until about 1965. During this

period, the hero worship of Kim progressed to an actual Cult

of Personality, according to the definition posited above;

it was used to rally the population during wartime and to

encourage them to sacrifice during the years after.

In Chapter V, we w ill consider changes to the Cult

as North Korea and Kim sought new international relations,

and as the regime began to prepare for succession to Kim.

It is during this period that the Cult expanded to include

Kim's ancestors and some lateral relatives; part of this

expansion was to prepare for succession, but much of it may

be traceable to Kim's ego gratification.

In Chapter VI, we w ill discuss four possible models

from which the Kim Cult could have adopted attributes:

Stalin's Cult, which had many of the same images later found

in Kim's; Mao's Cult, which likewise had images Kim adopted;

the Japanese emperor; and the Confucian authority figure.

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NORTH KOREA: AN INTRODUCTION

The DPEK** is one of the most isolated countries in

the world, occupying the upper half of a small peninsula;

besides a Demilitarized Zone separating it from the BOK, it

shares a common border only with the PRC and the USSR.

Moreover, it has intentionally kept itself aloof, not only

from western influence it deems capitalist and decadent, but

also as much as possible from the influences of its

communist neighbors. Thus, the DPEK has largely followed

its own leanings, constructed its own brand of communism,

according to its own interpretation of Marxist—Leninist

thought, and propagandized its people to believe they

inhabited a "socialist paradise."

It may well be impossible to write objectively about

the nature of North Korea and Korean communism, a lim itation

which applies not only to politicians and polemicists but

scholars as w ell. The DPRK's claims about itself are so

extravagant and independent data so scare that a certain

**In th is paper, "North Korea" and Democratic People's Republic of Korea" or "DPBK" w ill be used interchangeably without political prejudice, as will the terms "South Korea," "Republic of Korea" and "ROK-"

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shallowness is forced upon analysis and the observer's

political orientation takes on exaggerated importance.

For example, Lee Chong-sik and Kim Naa-sik have

called the DPEK one of the most efficient totalitarian

regimes in the world, where systematic purification

campaigns and indoctrination have placed the people under

tight control.** Joungwon A. Kim referred to continued

Stalinist patterns of control and invariable dullness in

DPBK sloganeering.** On the other hand, Gavan McCormack more

charitably viewed the DPBK as a highly disciplined country,

characterized by a "top down mass line."** Bruce Cumings

contends that scholars ask the wrong questions about North

Korea, that they should concentrate on the Korean element in

Korean communism. He claim s that North Korean communism

since 1945 has manifested two distinct characteristics, a

nationalism /self-reliance and an exceptional degree of

political organization in society . *2

Hhat most distinguishes North Korean communism from

**Lee Chong-sik and Kim Nam-sik, "Control and Administrative Mechanisms in the North Korean Countryside," The Journal of Asian Studies KXIX (February 1970): 309.

* 0Joungwon A. Kim, "Pyongyang's Search for Legitimacy," Problems of Communism XX (January—April 1971): 3 7 .

**Gavan McCormack, "North Korea: Kimilsungism — the Path to Socialism?" The Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars XIII (October-December 1981): 50, 55.

* 2Bruce Cumings, "Kim's Korean Communism," Problems of Communism XZIII (March-April 1974): 27.

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other variants may well be the pervasive control, the

regime's ability to penetrate all societal levels to obtain

complicince with j.ts norms. Although such control may be

unsurprising for a nation of only 17 million people in a

relatively small territory, control in the DPBK is abetted

by organizational strength in depth.

Before proceeding to an analysis of Kim II—song, it

would be best to seek an understanding of his society and

its history in as objective a manner as possible.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF NORTH KOREA

This section by no means constitutes a definitive

history of North Korea; it merely offers general facts as a

basis for studying the Kim Il-song Cult. The material

therefore emphasizes events this writer deems useful for

grasping the Cult's development or use, even if omitting

much which others may consider important. Summarized events

and topics w ill be amplified in the body of the text.

The circumstances which produced rival regimes on

the Korean Peninsula are well known. After a generation of

haphazard struggle, the Korean Kingdom became a Japanese

protectorate, then was formally annexed in 1910. This

unhappy event proved the genesis of Korean nationalism, as

it stimulated a fragmented but earnest anti—Japanese

movement. Some eminent figures, including Syngman Rhee, Kim

Koo, and An Ch'ang-ho, led resistance predicated on western

or Kuomintang Chinese support; Marxism attracted many

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others, particularly after the Sussian Revolution. Korean

communism sp lit into a domestic faction, which conducted an

underground struggle inside Korea, and erpatriots who fought

the enemy outside, either with Soviet or Chinese Communist

assistance.** Factional strife prior to 1945 debilitated the

Korean Communist Party (KCP), although the primary causes of

weakness in the original KCP were "lack of training in the

basic ideological discipline of communism" and inadequate

leadership.*♦

Severe Japanese repression, including a policy of

eradicating Korean language and culture, le ft Koreans at the

time of liberation in need of re-establishing a sense of

Korean life and traditions, but uncertain cf the process and

the extent this should take in the modern world. This

became as much a political need as a cultural one; most

early political parties featured prominent "planks" calling

for rebuilding Korean cultural norms.**

**The nature of pre- and immediate post-1945 communism in Korea has been detailed in Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement. 1916-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). Factionalism in both communist and non-communist movements before 1945, with emphasis on the latter, is one of the themes of Lee Chong-sik*s The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

**Suh, Movement, pp. 332-36.

**A ROK poet spoke eloquently of his cultural confusion in being Korean but having had Japanese education, then experiencing a liberation as much spiritual as physical. He found great joy in such seemingly simple matters as speaking his own language freely or learning to write it; he found ecstacy in discovering previously unknown

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Despite more than a generation of arduous struggle,

Korea was liberated from Japan not by the efforts of the

people themselves but by the victory of the Allied Powers in

1945. Dnder a hasty agreement made at the time of the

precipitous Japeinese collapse, the OSSB was to accept the

surrender of Japanese forces in Korea, disarm them, and

repatriate them from territory north of the 38th parallel.

Once this task was completed, the Bed Army was to withdraw

to allow the Koreans to settle their own political future.

The Soviet Army had crossed into northern Korea on

August 14, 1945, occupying Pyongyang by August 24th, and

taking effective control of the entire northern zone by

early September. They found Japanese authority

disintegrating and power accruing rapidly to spontaneous

People's Committees. The Russians kept a low profile,

preferring to act through Korean groups, but worked steadily

to effect a Soviet—style regime. Major participants in

north Korean politics in 1945 thus included the Soviet Army,

the People's Committees, domestic communists, pro-OSSB

(Soviet Faction) and pro-Communist Chinese (îenan Faction)

figures, and Kim Il-song's group (known as the Kapsan

Faction). Following his advent in the north in September-

October 1945, Kim clearly enjoyed the favor of Soviet

occupation leaders.

Korean heroes. See Pak Hui—chin's epic poem, "Chaos and Creation," Sasanggye, April 1965, pp. 356-72.

37

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Host major non-communists were purged bj early 1946,

either arrested or driven south.** In February 1946, a

conference of North Korean parties, social groups, and

adm inistrative organizations convened in Pyongyang; here,

they formed the Provisional People's Committee (PPC) as an

interim central administration to serve until unification.

Kim Il-song became chairman, with Kin lu-bong of the Yenaa

Faction as vice chairman; only two non-communists held

senior positions, technical posts at that. The PPC enacted

far-reaching reforms, including land redistribution and

nationalization of industry.

Ownership of agricultural land changed radically as

landlords were dispossessed. Many were driven south, some

shot, others reduced in social rank; land was given to the

peasants or formed into cooperative farms. Heavy industry,

largely Japanese—owned prior to liberation, became state

p r o p e r ty .

In a series of conferences in mid—1946, the North

Korean Communist Party merged with minor parties to form the

North Korean Horkers Party (NKHP). Kim Tu-bong was elected

chairman, with Kfi Il-song one of two vice chairmen, this

**À fu ll, though somewhat biased history of this p e r io d may be found i n S c a la p in o and l e e . Communism in Korea, Part I: the Movement {Berkeley: University of California Press^ 1972), particularly chapter five, "Korean Communism under Soviet Tutelage." A fine summary by Lee Lee Chong-sik of Korean history from early times through the 1970s is "Historical Setting,” in North Korea: a Country Study, ed. Fredericks M. Bunge (Washington: American Unversity, 3rd edition, 1981), pp. 1-48.

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precedence enacted to placate the Ienan faction and minor

parties. In 1949, the NKHP and smaller South Korean Horkers

Party amalgamated into the Korean Horkers Party (KHP), with

SKHP Chairman Pak Hon-yong becoming vice chairman along with

Ho Ka-i. Pak had been a member of the original KCP, and was

best known of a ll old-time communists; Ho was a Soviet-

Korean who became chairman of the Organization Department of

the KHP Central Committee.

Hith the formation of the Republic of Korea in 1948

making unification with the south unlikely, the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea was formed, with claims to

sovereignty over the entire peninsula. The DPRK claimed

elections had been held in the southern zone as well as in

the north, so it allotted seats in the Supreme People's

Assembly in Pyongyang for delegates representing the south.

Southerners also filled some government posts; Pak Hon-yong,

for one, became foreign M inister.

The Korean People's Army (KPA) was founded

officially on February 8, 1948, but its antecedants may be

traced to security forces formed as early as 1946.

P olitically safe individuals were placed in command, while

those whose military experience or influence might make them

dangerous — officers like Mu Chong, for example — were

relegated to lesser or training positions.

The origins of the Korean Har remain unclear, with

academic opinion divided generally according to political

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preference.*? Hhat the Best labels the Korean Har started on

June 25, 1950, when combat began between major units along

the 38th parallel, each side claiming the other had invaded

its territory first. It seems probable that the KPA

initiated the fighting: the DPfiK's well-prepared forces

quickly reduced resistance in their path; by early July, the

KPA controlled a ll but a small perimeter around the

southernmost city of Pusan. That the KPA did not absorb all

the south was due to swift O.S. military intervention, the

O.S. invoking the authority of the United Nations to justify

its actions. The United Nations Command undertook its own

counteroffensive in September with an amphibious assault at

the port of Inchpn; Seoul was recaptured and the KPA smashed

— its remnants retreated back behind the 38th parallel.

The largest foreign contingent of the ON Command

being U.S., the Americans took a ll major decisions, ordering

UN forces to cross the 38th parallel in pursuit of the KPA,

and doing so despite stern warnings from the PEC that

foreign troops in north Korea would be taken as a threat.

*?The traditional version of the war's origin, with a ll blame devolving cn North Korea, is quite well known. A view sympathetic to the DPBK may be found in Jon Halliday, "The Korean Har: Some Notes on Evidence and Solidarity," The Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars XI {July-September 1979): 2-18. This view states shrilly that South Korea was not invaded by North Korea in 1950, Korea was invaded by U.S. imperialism in September 1945. For an objective view of the war, see Alfred Crofts, "The Start of the Korean Har Reconsidered," The Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal VII (April 1970): 109—17. Crofts raises interesting questions, but, given the lack cf solid evidence, fails to answer many o f them .

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The warning became reality in September when Chinese

People's Liberat4.cn Army "Volunteers* crossed the Xalu River

to repulse the OH Command. Seoul changed hands twice, until

the battle line stabilized in the waist of the peninsula by

mid-1951, and both sides agreed to truce talks. Serious

political guestions stalled the talks, and the war dragged

on until 1953. An armistice — not a peace treaty — ended

the war on July 25.

Individual battles of the war are relatively

unimportant for this study; what is significant is that just

as the United States had rescued the ROK eind had assumed the

burden of war on its behalf, the PEC assured the survival of

the DPfiK and bore the brunt of combat subsequent to its

entry into the war. Chinese troops remained in the DPfiK

until late 1958. Paradoxically, however, the Korean Ear

produced positive new images, despite its disasters. The

DPBK now portrayed itse lf as the victor over the most

advanced western nation and reliable defenders of the

"eastern outpost of the socialist camp."** The Armistice

essentially re-established the status quo ante. But, the

DPfiK had been devastated by U.S. bombing and badly needed

economic reconstruction. Wartime policy struggles also

revealed internal political problems which the leadership

had to address.

**Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Bepublic (Stanford: Hoover Institution Studies:1 1 , 1 9 6 6 ), p . 3 8 .

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Near the war's end, starting perhaps in February

1953, the SKiP faction was purged, including its ranking

official. Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong. in trials and in

propaganda, the regime indicated that the faction was being

blamed for losing the war; it accused many faction members,

including Pak himself, of spying for the United States. Pak

was executed in December 1953. Bo Ka—i also was assailed

for KWP failure during the war; he committed suicide in

March 1 9 53.**

Postwar emphasis lay in reconstruction of both party

amd economy. Economic reconstruction was effected with

assistance from the PEC and Communist bloc nations; the

official figure for aid rendered was $550 m i l l i o n . w h ile

actual figures may never be known, substantial sums in

credit and material aid enabled the DPBK to achieve a viable

economy by the early 1970s. Despite copious aid from Bloc

countries, however, the people themselves bore the heaviest

load: austerity programs requiring popular sacrifice built

heavy industry. Coupled with resistance to pressures to

integrate the economy into COMECON, th is allowed Korea to

acquire a relatively independent economic system, albeit at

**Scalapino and lee. Communism. I pp. 436-52.

TOfiven Jon Halliday, a OPBK-suppcrter, terms th is figure "impossibly low." See, "The North Korean Enigma," New Left Review. May-June 1981, p 35. The DPBK version of economic development may be found in Ellen Brun and Jacques Hersh, Socialist Korea: a Case Study in the Strategy of Economic Development (New York: Monthly Beview Press, 1968}, particularly chapters 5 and 6.

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great cost, fij the early 1960s industrial production had

been restored under two five-year plans and emphasis shifted

to acquisition of technology. Reform of agriculture, begun

in 1946, resumed after the war, with complete transformation

from private ownership to cooperative farms achieved in the

m id -1 9 5 0 s.

These reconstruction programs entailed large-scale

dislocations of people. According to North Korean figures,

about 30% of households were collectivized by 1954; by 1958,

the figure was 100%. This represents 3,843 cooperatives,

totalling 1,055,000 households.T he movement of labor to

industry is indicated by the rise of the ratio of workers in

that sector from 29.7% in 1953 to 52% in 1960.73

Another pressing task was reconstruction of the KBP,

which had failed in its performance during the war. About

450,000 members put of 600,000 were disciplined following

the war; some ranking officials were dismissed as "impure"

or "mixed" elements, while parallel efforts at positive

party construction began. Kim 11—song denounced

bureacratisffl and stressed improvements in selection and

training of cadre. Increased efforts were undertaken to

eliminate "arrogance" and heighten a sense of identity with

7iiee Chpng-sik, "Historical Setting," pp. 23-26; also see, McCormack, "Kimilsung-ism," pp. 52-53.

72Rrun and Hersh, Socialist Korea, pp. 201—03.

73ibid.. p. 203.

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the masses of the people.

The ideological line enunciated at this time, and

stressed since, «as CfiOCBE. Kim Il-song first mentioned

this concept in a party plenum speech in April 1955, «hen he

denounced factionalism and issued appeals to nationalism.

Briefly put, CHITCfiE «as explained as nationalism , cessation

of dependence on foreign powers for cultural or physical

assistance, and elimination of a dogmatic approach to

communist theory. The CHOCfiE concept included positive

national sentiment for uplifting the consciousness of KBP

cadre cind elim inating negativism.

The DPBK regime did engage in "scapegoating" to

deflect criticism from the top levels, as when Pak Hon-yong

and the South Korean Faction were blamed for wartime losses.

Hore often, however, the villains were incorporeal concepts

— flunkeyism, formalism, and the like.

In 1956, following Krushchev's denunciation of

Stalin and during the subsequent de-Stalinization campaign,

the Yenan and Soviet Factions attempted to oust Kim Il-song

from government and party offices. Kin used appeals to

nationalism at the Third KBP Congress in April as

justification for the removal of major figures of both

insurgent factions; expulsion of his opponents was achieved

at a Central Committee plenum in August. Some factionalists

7*lee Chong-sik, The Korean Borkers Party; a Short History (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 85-88, 93-96.

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were arrested, while a few who possessed dual citizenship

were allowed into e x i l e . 7 s Kia Tn-hong was implicated with

the factionalists and purged, reportedly being demoted to

farmhand. This purge, along with the previous elimination

of the South Koreans, allowed Kim to remove the last of his

powerful rivals. Although he had always been the most

visible and virulent of the leadership, he had not been

unassailable. The dism issals of the mid— to late—19 50s

accomplished th is.

As the Slno-Soviet sp lit became public and

rhetorical arguments between the communist superpowers made

reconciliation unlikely, it became difficult for Pyongyang

to maintain fu ll and friendly relations with both. The DPBK

at first tried neutrality in the dispute, and as this became

untenable, aligned with the BBC. In October 1963, North

Korea's press attacked the OSSB directly, venting old

grievances on aid and chauvinism, also repeating Chinese

denunciations. However, since the Soviets could provide

advanced technology which the BBC could not, as Pyongyang

differed with the BBC over aid to Vietnam^ and moreover, as

the Koreans were appalled by Chinese excesses during the

Cultural Revolution, the DPBK began to reconcile with the

USSR. Bapproachm ent a c c e le r a t e d a f t e r t h e d e p o s it io n o f

Krushchev in 1964. Although the DPBK declared its

7SNam Koon-woo, The North Korean Communist Leadership. 1945- 1965 (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1974), pp. 101-19.

45

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vacillated between them, motivated as much by pragmatism as

doctrine; for some time, however. North Korea called for

unity in the communist camp to counter "im perialist"

threats. As another result of the communist sp lit, the DPBK

drew closer to other Asian communist parties, including

those of Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia, and took an interest

in the non-aligned movement.?*

The DPBK also heightened tensions with South Korea

and the United States in the late 1960s. Violence had been

frequent along the DHZ since the Armistice, but tensions

increased greatly after 1966. The North sent many agents

south and in 1968-1969 caused four major incidents, any of

which could have constituted a causus b elli.

In January 1968, the DPBK sent a 31-man squad to

assault the residence of the BOK president; an assassination

was narrowly averted. That same month, KPA naval units

captured a U.S. ferret ship on the high seas, rekindling

U.S. military interest in the Peninsula, although

overwhelming American preoccupation with Vietnam precluded

any but a mild U.S response. In late 1968, the North

Koreans inserted several hundred commandos into a remote

South Korean area, where they attempted Vietnam-style

village recruitment among the peasants; a ll the commandoes

7*Scalapino and Lee, Communism, I, pp. 576, 585, 6 2 6 -4 2 .

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were neutralized b j BOK authorities. These and other

incidents in the BOK were attributed to "South Korean

Bevolutionaries,." and an elaborate propaganda charade

invented to account for them.?? In April 1969, the KPA Air

Force downed an unarmed O.S. ferret aircraft over

international waiters, again risking war.

The DPBK began improving its diplomatic position

from the mid-1960s. It increased the number of nations with

which it had formal relations, concentrating on the newly

independent nations of Africa and Southeast Asia; it also

joined some international organizations. Pyongyang arranged

exchanges of high-level visitors, offered limited foreign

aid to poorer states, and promoted itself as a model of

independent development.

Both Koreas had traded reunification invitations and

proposed full-fledged programs through their media, but

genuine relief in North—South tensions occurred only in the

early 1970s. In 1971, talks began between Bed Cross

societies of the two zones in an attempt to find a way to

unite fam ilies separated by artificial barriers. On July 4,

1972, it was announced that senior officials from each

regime had visited the other's capital and agreed to

establish a Coordinating Committee to seek reunification

methods. However, little of substance was discussed in the

??Soon Sung Cho, "North and South Korea: Stepped-up Aggression and the Search for New Security," Asian Survey IX (January 1969) : 29-39.

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Committee, and North Korea suspended the talks in August,

complaining that the South's chief delegate, director of the

BOK CIA, was guilty of suppressing dissidents.?*

In 1980, following the assassination of BOK

President Pak Chong-hui, working—level North-South contacts

resumed, the ostensible purpose being preparation for a

meeting between premiers of the two Koreas. North Korea

terminated these meetings that same year, using the

assumption of power by Chon lu-hwan and suppression of the

Kwangju Uprising in the BOK as pretext. According to some

observers, the DPBK had intended the conferences as a way to

exploit political uncertainties in the south, and abandoned

them when the BOK proved resolute.?*

The DPBK began active promotion of Kim Chong-il,

eldest son of Kim Il-song, as successor to his father in the

1970s. Kim Chong-il had held a series of KBP posts since

graduating from Kim Il-song University in 1963, but was

presented to the North Korean public only from late 1973.

Thereafter, internal propaganda touted him heavily, and his

leadership potential was the subject of a strong internal

campaign. This campaign was largely hidden from foreign

analysts, however, through subtle use of slogans and obscure

?*B. C. Koh, "North Korea: a Breakthrough in the Quest for Unity,V Asian Survey XIII (January 1973)" 83-87; Lee Chae-jin, "South Korea: the P olitics of Domestic-Foreign Linkage," Asian Survey XIII (January 1973): 94-96.

?*Toung C. Kim, "North Korea in 1980: the Son Also Bises," Asian Survey XXI (January 1981): 114-15.

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symbols in media released overseas.** Kim Chong-il was

officially identified only at the Sixth Party Congress in

1980, when he was revealed as a member of the Politburo,

presidium of the Politburo, and the M ilitary Committee.**

NOBTH KOREAN SOCIETY

The ruling system in the DPfiK is characterized by a

relatively tiny leadership core plus stern social

discipline; one author described it as "authoritarian

oligarchy."*2 A study in the 1970s indicated that about 15

of Kin Il-song*s close followers constituted an inner circle

of power, being members simultaneously of the most powerful

committees in the party and government, and having control

of the m ilitary. These were men who had worked with Kim for

more than four decades.**

Social control is effected through astute use of

formal and informal mechanisms. Korea's population has

traditionally been infused with a keen sense of public

order, a trait deepened by the requirements of DPBK society:

*0Morgan E. Clippinger, "Kim Chong-il in the North Korean Hass Media: a Study of Semi-esoteric Communications," Asian Survey XXI (March 1981): 290-91.

**Young C. Kim, "Son Bises," pp. 112-13.

*2Ilpyong J. Kim, Communist P olitics in North Korea. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 26.

**Lee Chong-sik, "The 1972 Constitution and Top Communist leaders," in P olitical Leadership in Korea, ed. Suh Dae-sook and Lee Chae-jin (Seattle: Dniversity of Bashington Press, 1976), pp. 192-219.

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work characterized by high quotas and mandatory overtim e,

compulsory study sessions, and frequent meetings, all

serving to keep the people preoccupied with fulfilling

society's expectations. Formal mechanisms include

ubiquitous internal security forces and KBP functionaries, a

regimented life style, restrictions on travel, and a

rationing system for necessities.**

It has been argued, however, that tight organization

derives from an effort to prevent factionalism and its

resulting political paralysis, both of which have long

plagued Koreans and been a particular bane of Korean

Communists. Bruce Cumings identified such organization as

the key to implementing land reform and m arshalling

resources, prime achievements of the DPBK regime, fie noted

nevertheless that North Korea placed greater emphasis on

assuring compliance than on stim ulation, the Maoist method.

In the DPfiK, the emphasis "has consistently been on

revolution from above, from the top down."*s The character

of North Korean society does coincide with authoritarian

traditions in Korean life. Koreans have been socialized to

defer to strong authority figures, whether the father in a

family unit, local official, or king.**

«♦Gregory I- Binn, "National security,= in Bunge, Country Study, pp. 211-17.

«sfiruce Cumings, "Kim's Communism," pp. 28-31, 33.

**B. C. Koh, "Political leadership in North Korea: Toward a Conceptual Understanding of Kim Il-song*s

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Although unconcerned with luxury consumerism, the

DPSK provides basic necessities and good housing at low

cost. Many public benefits of a socialist society are

readily available: an extensive educational system, day care

fa cilities for working mothers, and health clinics.*?

The DPBK government was created in 1S48 by elections

to a Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), which was to be the

highest organ of state power, the summit of a series of

village, district, county, and provincial people's

committees. But, as a O.S. report noted, the meetings of

both local and central legislative bodies "were uniformly

infrequent, and uninfluential in the determination of

policy."** A 17-ministry cabinet, under a premier,

supervised economic matters and foreign relations, but since

it was immediately responsible to the KBP, it was lim ited to

administration. Mass organizations, which encompassed both

sexes, most age groups, a ll occupations, and diverse social

interests, brought the private sector under government

control, at the same time enabling easy mobilization of the

Behavior," Korean Studies II (1978): 148.

*?6avan McCormack, "Kimilsung-ism." A fine summary of North Korean social services may be found in Lee Manwoo, "How North Korea Sees Itself," In Journey to North Korea: Personal Perceptions ed. C. I. Eugene Kim and B. C. Koh (Berkeley: university of California Institute of East Asian Studies, 1983), pp. 123-27.

««O.S. Department of State, North Korea: a Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover (Washington: State Publication no. 7118, Far Eastern Series 103, January 1961), p . 2 8 .

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po pulation. « *

The DPBK government is conceived as the executor of

KBP policy; thus, most senior party officials hold top

government posts as well. O fficially, the highest organ of

state power is s till the SPA, although the SPA in actuality

undertakes no independent action. Onder a reorganization in

1972, the head of state and government is a President,

formally accountable to the SPA but with broad power and few

lim iting mechanisms. An Administrative Council, composed of

31 m inistries and eight committees, has responsibility for

the conduct of virtually a ll economic matters and foreign

affairs. If the Council constitutes a cabinet, the Central

People's Committee is a "supercabinet," which oversees

policy work, while directing the Administrative Council and

nationéü. security organs. The DPBK also has a judicial

branch, but it is not independent.** The reorganization

recognized changes which had occured since adoption of the

original constitution: subordination of the government to

the party, emergence of an actual head of state, and the

existence of a supreme leader.**

The KBP can truly be called a mass party, as it

®9ibid., pp. 28-31, 50-52. Philip Rudolph, North Korea's P olitical and Economic Structure (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959), pp. 18-23.

*0Shinn Binn-sup, "Government and P olitics," in Bunge, Country Study, pp. 167-75.

**lee Chong-sik, "1972 Constitution," pp. 192—98.

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possesses the highest member to population ratio of any

ruling communist party. By the late 1970s, EBP membership

was 2.5 m illion put of a population of 17 m illion.*2

Furthermore, the KBP is represented at a ll levels of society

and has members in a ll organizations. It has been suggested

that the high party membership reflects a North Korean

corporatism, and that the North Koreans have envisioned

their society as a mass rather than class-based or class-

divided society.** It is also possible that the high number

of party members is a political preparation for unification.

Even if the emphasis were on coercion rather than

stim ulation, the DPEK invests a great deal in resources and

time to motivate its people to internalize propaganda and

comply with its norms. Education centers on ideologic

indoctrination, particularly rote memorization of Kim's

writings from an early age. At £Lim II—song University some

65% of 1,300 instruction hours are devoted to studying Kin's

ideas.*♦ All enterprises, villages, and farms have elaborate

study balls for Kim's works. One visitor found people

*2Lee Chong-sik, "Historical Background," p. 42. lo compare the 14 percent membership in the DPBK, consider the following party membership percentages: CCE: 3 percent; Vietnam: 3.13 percent; Cuba: 4.1 percent; CPSU: 6.5 percent; and East Germany: 11 percent. Borld Encyclopedia of P olitical Systems and Parties, ed. George E. Delury (New York: Facts on File, 1983), pp. 193, 224, 353, 1071, 1175.

**Bruce Comings, "Corporatism in North Korea," The Journal of Korean Studies, IV (1982-83): 269-94.

**Gavan McCormack, "Kimilsung-ism," p. 57.

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required to study two hours daily, with even tots engaged in

memorization.**

The regime wields total control over public media:

all publishing and broadcasting are state-run. Unofficial

sources of news, such as word—of—mouth, if not stifled , are

at least dampened by sanctions against rumor—mongering. The

official line, constantly repeated in a ll media serves as

the basis for compulsory study in the workplace. An analyst

of Soviet media described it as haviug high visibility plus

broad penetration of political content, and great intensity

and internal consistency of political indoctrination.** This

exactly describes DPBK media.

In assessing the efficacy of North Korean media, it

must be noted, as Fred Carrier pointed out, that more than

half the DPBK population (in 1975) was under 25, and thus

remembers only to the time of the Korean Bar.*? It is also

important to realize that prior to 1945, information sources

were controlled by the Japanese, who suppressed Korean

culture and skewed news to suit their own biases. Following

liberation, the Soviets and North Koreans then tailored news

**Mark Gayn, "The Cult of Kin," The New York Times Magazine. October 1, 1972, p . 2 4 .

**Gayle Durham Hollander, Soviet P olitical Indoctrination: Developments in Bass Media and Propaganda Since S talin, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1 S 7 2 ), p . 6 .

*?Fred J. C arrier, North Korean Journey; the Revolution Against Colonialism (New York: International Publishers Co. Inc., 1 9 7 5 ), p . 5 3 .

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to conform to their own visions of society and the world.

Geography and political structures have prevented any hut

officially-sanctioned news from reaching the populace.

Moreover, not only is access to outside views lim ited, but

the government view is afforded constant media repetition as

well as reinforcement in compulsory discussion groups.**

A noth er j .n t e r e s t in g f a c e t has b een th e DFBK'S

attraction for intellectuals. The regime boasts that the

KBP "always granted a high regard for the role and the

mission of the intelligentsia," and that not only had it

"adhered to a policy of training the new Korean cadre," but

had also "had faith in the old intelligentsia, winning them

over to the revolution..."** The boast was not idle, for the

DPEK had surprising success in attracting and retaining

support from this group. A great number of intellectuals

migrated north from south Korea before 1953, many

disillusioned with conditions in the south, in hope of a

better life in the north, or with previous leftist

connections. The DPBK retained the loyalty of the "old"

intelligentsia by granting them special privileges.

**lt should go without saying that the regime manages all news items to conform with its official line. For personal examples of how this is done, see Lee Manwoo, "North Korea Sees," p. 123.

**fia Hong—siJc, "Int'eri-d ului hyokmyonghwa munche" {Problems in Revolutionizing the Intelligentsia) , Kulloia. 1Ï55, pp. 11-19.

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the "new" have trained under the communist system.*** In

1984, the DPBK identified a corps of 1.2 million

intellectuals, defined as scientists, technicians, and

engineers. This corps was called a "precious asset" which

the leaders had nurtured and which they trusted for

fulfillm ent of the corps* duty.***

Finally, North Korea is a land of contradictions.

Despite claims that people are the masters of revolution and

society, Koreans are taught to emulate the "Great leader" in

a ll matters and joake his ways their own. Symbolic of the

people's status, perhaps, are the mass gymnastic exhibitions

for which Pyongyang is famous, in which the individual is

submerged into a highly disciplined whole.

NORTH KOREAN IDEOLOGY

Korean communist ideology is multifaceted. The

regime took Marxism-leninism as a foundation, attempting

thereby to employ Marxist notions of class struggle and

Leninist concepts of organization against Korean problems.

While Marxist—Leninist aspects in DPBK ideology persist,

they have been de-emphasized except as ritual phrases, with

ideas from Korean experience given pride of place.

i**Scalapino and Lee, Communism. II. pp. 877-84.

xoI"120-man in t'eri taekun-ui wiryok-ul nop'-i palhwi-sik'yo sahoechn'ui konsol—ul him -issge milgo-nagacha" (Let us Vigorously Push Ahead with Socialist Construction by Giving Full Play to the Might of a Large Corps of 1.2 M illion Intellectuals), Nodong Sinmun. 20 August 1984, p. 1.

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The prime element of DPEK ideology is CfiOCHE.

CEUCHE began as a modem interpretation çf Marxism—leninism

for the Korean situation, bat gradually eclipsed Marxism-

Leninism as the guiding ligh t of Korean ccmmunism. So much

is it an essential component that the regime uses it in

adjectival form to suggest the correctness of policy: CHüCHE

economics, CHUCEE tactics, and CHDCHE foreign policy. The

word possesses many possible definitions, but probably may

best be rendered as "self-image" or "subjectivity."* *z xn a

1972 interview, Kim XI—song stated that in North Korea a ll

KBP p olicies "stem from and embody" the CfiOCBE idea, citing

man as the master of revolution, independence, socialist

transformation of agriculture, economic self-reliance, and a

self-defense policy as examples.***

Kim Il-song first used the term CBOCBE in a December

19 55 speech, although DPBK propaganda claim s that CBOCBE has

been the basis of a ll mainstream Korean communist endeavors

since the anti-Japanese struggle. One foreign analyst

claims to have found evidence of the concept, if not the

word, in Kim Il-song speeches of the 1940s.*** One facet of

*0 2B. C. Koh, «CfiOCHESONG in Korean P o litics," Studies in Comparative Communism VII {Spring—Summer 1974): 84, 89-91. It is interesting to note that the powerful appeal of the term has led to its use in the BOK also. Pak Chong-hui made prominent use of it in stressing development.

***ibid., pp. 85-88.

***D. Gordon W h ite, "North Korean CBOCB'E: th e P olitical Economy of Independence," The Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars VII (April-June 1974): 45.

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CEUCHE, that man is master of everything, may he egaated to

traditional socialist thought. Another foreign observer

viewed it as the "guintessentially Marxist theme of HOMO

FABER, Promethian man, whose nature it is perpetually to be

tr a n sfo r m in g n a t u r e ."* os

About the same time that it began emphasizing

CHDCHE, the regime elevated the history of the anti-Japanese

guerrillas to the status of national model. Eeminiscences

of partisans who fought the Japanese in Manchuria became

objects of study, with the public urged to emulate the

spirit of these heroes. The DPBK compiled an extensive

liturgical list of battles, incidents of bravery, resistance

organizations, political conferences, and manifestos, each

explicated in detail for historical meaning and contemporary

significance. Specific episodes were culled from this

history as moral lessons; for example, the "100 days of

hardship," a scaled-down version of China's long March, was

used as a model ,of sacrifice applicable to the present.

The emphasis of the anti-Japanese guerrilla campaign

became loyalty to the leader, with this quality praised as

the hallmark of Korean revolutionaries. The Manchurian

anti—Japanese forces, of which Kim Il-song was leader, were

proclaimed the mainstream of Korean revolution to the

exclusion of other events or personalities. In 1977, when a

losAiden Foster-Carter, "North Korea: Development and Self-reliance — a C ritical Appraisal," The Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars IX (January-March 1977): 48.

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friendly foreign visitor listed other examples of Korean

participation in leftist or communist resistance, he was

informed these events "were not part of the Koreem

r e v o lu t io n - " * 0 6

In economics, the DPBK pushed the "Chongsan-ni

Method," a management tool attributed to Kim in early I960.

Under th is Method, KBP and government functionaries were to

solve problems by going among the people instead of

remaining desk—bound. The Method was extended to industry

in late 1961 by Kim, when it became known as the "Taean Bork

System," after the factory where it was first enunciated.

The m ost p o t e n t sym bol o f p r o g r e s s was CBOILIMÂ, a Korean

Pegasus, which covered prodigious stretches of ground at a

single leap. Prom about 1956, high-production workers were

designated "CHOILIMA riders."*®?

Since the early 1970s, the DESK promulgated the

concept of the Three Revolutions, that is, revolution in

ideology, technology, and culture. Also, under this rubric,

the regime created Three Revolutions Teams in early 1973;

these small groups were despatched to industrial or

agricultural workplaces to troubleshoot problems and promote

technology.

* ®«Halliday, "Enigma," p. 22.

»o?Bunge, Country Study, pp. 294, 296.

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KIM Ilt-SOMS: MAN AND COLT OBJECT

For better or ill. North Korea may he described as

" K in 's Korean Communism" (to borrow a p h rase from Bruce

Cumings)• Kim has been the dominant figure in North Korea

since 1945, providing substance behind the shadow of the

Cult developed around him. Although it may now be

impossible to distinguish the man from the cult figure, some

solid data exists.

Opinion about Kim II—song is as diverse as that

about the DPBK, and predictably, divided along the same

political lines. Those hostile to the DPBK disparage Kim:

one journalist described him as a "dumpy little dictator"

who is the "world's greatest authority on every subject

under the sun."*®* A South Korean writer termed Kim a "small

Stalin," calling his "clanistic rule" a «remnant of Oriental

despotism."*®* With understated venom, a long-time analyst

of Korean affairs suggested that, although evidence is

flim sy, Kim had a "background conducive to and impressive

outward symptoms of emotional insecurities."**®

The South Korean view is typified in an article by

Hahn Sung-joe. Although Hahn denies any interest in

*o*Derek Davies, "Traveler's Tales," The Far Eastern Economic Beview. October 29, 1982, p. 31.

*®*Hahn Sung-joe, "Building a Communist Dynasty: the Idolatry and Clanistic Buie of Kim Il-song," East Asian Review III (Summer 1976): 130.

**®B. C. Koh, "Ideology," p. 657.

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"imputing a moral judgment" on the Cult of Personality or

Kim's "clanistic rule," he calls Kim Il-song a "small

Stalin" with behavior "no less bizzarre and grotesque."

Eahn goes on to say that the Cult of Personality runs

counter to Marzism-leninism and fosters nepotism; he also

compares Kim Chong-il to Kaiser iilhelm II, who ruined

Germany.***

Kin, however, is lionized in his own country. He is

the Great leader. Fatherly Leader, Respected and Beloved

leader. Sun of the Nation; no accolade is too embarrassing.

Kim's authorized biography repeats a common North Korean

description of him:

General Kin II Song, the great Leader of the 40 million Korean people, peerless patriot, national hero, ever- victorious, iron—willed brillian t commander and one of the outstanding leaders of the international communist movement and working-class movement, (who) in the dark days of the national suffering when even the midday sun and the full moon had lost their luster, arose, with the destiny of the entire nation on his shoulders.**^

Kim also had many defenders outside the DPBK.

Wilfred Burchett wrote that every stage of DPBK development

bore Kim's "strong personal imprint," and described him as

having a "warm, human touch, the sim plicity of the great,

and a down-to-earth manner rare among men in his

***fiahn Sung—joe, "Communist Dynasty," pp. 130-31, 151.

***Baik Bong, Kim II—song Biography: Vol. I, From Birth to Triumphant Beturn to Homeland (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1969), p. 1.

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position-"*** One writer termed him "far-sighted" for taking

difficult decisions in the late 1950s, directing his country

on a course opposed both by domestic critics and allies, yet

achieving an independent economy.***

Hot a ll leftists hail Kim with unreserved acclaim.

Jon Halliday notes with understanding the historical

circumstances wh|.ch allowed the Kim Cult of Personality to

develop, but agrees that it is not a natural phenomenon. He

deplored the financial excesses, violation of socialist

norms of collective action, bureaucratization, and

repression associated with the cult. Halliday applauded

Kin's crucial role in the Korean revolution, but concluded

that the Cult had been instrumental in isolating the country

from the world solidarity it required.**®

This writer views Kim Il-song neither as saint nor

sinner, but as the shrewdest Korean politician in a century.

Kim transcended his origins as a Soviet protege, overcame

challenges from domestic rivals, including two factions

backed by foreign powers, and survived the stigma of a

destructive war. This writer views the successes in

development the DPEK has achieved under Kim while

recognizing the high costs this exacted in terms of

***Silfred Burchett, Again Korea (Hew York; International Publishers, 1968), pp. 92, 102.

***Foster-Carter, "Self-reliance," p. 48.

iisH alliday, "Enigma," pp. 43-45, 51.

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authoritarianism, and while 1 have personal opinions on

their relative merits, 1 have no interest in glorifying or

villifying Sim. I want to understand more clearly how Kim

retained his position during his long tenure and how he

accomplished his goals.

North Korean propagandists attributed a ll beneficial

events in modern Korean history to Kim. According to

official histories, Kim, born in 1912, an inheritor of

patriotic traditions, followed his father into exile in

Manchuria, where^, at an early age in the 1920s, he rallied

fellow youths in anti—im perialist organizations. In the mid

1930s, he founded and commanded the Anti-Japanese Army in

Manchuria, a force which waged guerrilla warfare,

occasionally venturing (and winning) battles at the Korean

border, until it liberated Korea. Kim returned to Korea a

general, then led political activities, founded the KWP, and

established the DPEK, until he was forced to repulse an

American-fiOK-ON invasion in the fatherland Liberation Bar.

Following his humiliation of the Americans, he presided over

reconstruction, converting the DPBK into the economic and

political "paradise" it became. All victories in war and

peace were attributed to his correct perceptions, wise

theoretical pronouncements, and bold delineation of

practical action.

Perhaps the fairest explication of the reality of

Kim's revolutionary background is Suh Dae—sock's study of

Korean communism. Suh wrote that Kim II—song was neither a

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"fake" with a totally fabricated past, as detractors

charged, nor the "savior" DPBK propaganda promoted.*** Kim's

real name was Kim Song—jn, "Il-song" being a non de guerre.

He attended Chinese schools in Manchuria, where he was

involved in leftist activities, though neither as early nor

as prominently as later claimed. He began as leader of a

small guerrilla band in Manchuria, which was absorbed into

the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, a CCP-controlled

guerrilla force in the mid—1930s, and rose to command the

6th Division of the Chinese First Boute Army. He won a

number of battles, including some in Korean border areas,

such as at Pocfa'pnbo in June 1937. Despite sketchy

evidence, it seems probable that in 1940-41, Kim retreated

under heavy military pressure into the Khabarovsk region of

the USSB. He returned to Korea with the Soviet Army in 1945

— according to seme accounts, a major.**?

Suh concluded that while Kim's record at his return

in 1945 was less than stated, it was still one of which a

33-year old could be proud.* *«

Kim's rise to power was not inevitable. He profited

from having the proper international credentials, i.e ., pre­

**«Movement, See chapter nine: "Kim Il-song and the Chinese Guerrilla Forces."

**?A pro—DPBK foreigner was told that in 1942—43, Kim was "training along the frontier," including training an eiir fo r c e in th e USSB; s e e Jon H a llid a y , "Enigm a," p . 2 3 .

* * «Movement, pp. 275, 293.

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liberation cooperation with both the Soviet Onion and

Communist Chinese, enabling him to draw on their support to

outmaneuver rivals in his guest of political power.

However, Kim also benefitted from mistakes made by the older

communists, who snubbed the Russian occupying forces or

concentrated efforts in the south. By seeking office in a

reunified Korea, they failed thereby to acquire sufficient

localized power in a truncated Korea. Moreover, those not

of the Russian or Kapsan Factions expected Kim to fa ll from

power once the Russians departed. Kim expanded his base

beyond the in itia l boost given him by the Russians, while

the older communists expended their strength in struggles

with non-communists and with each other.***

B. C. Koh called Kim's leadership behavior sui

generis and said his style was "messianic. " * 2 0 joan Robinson

echoed this, describing the DPBK as having a socialist

pattern of government, but centered on one individual. She

said Kim Il-song "seems to function as a messiah rather than

a d ic t a t o r . " *21 Comparatively little is known about actual

decision-making at the top in the DPBK or the extent of

Kim's personal participation, although North Korean media

attribute all to him. Authentic information has been

* **ibid., See chapter 10: "Kim's Seizure of Power, 1945-1948."

izom political Leadership," p. 142.

*2iJoan Robinson, “Korean M iracle," Monthly Beview XVI (January 1965): 548.

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scarce, since his domestic activities are selectively

reported and contacts with foreigners carefnlly stage-

m a n a g e d . ^22 ihe cumulative effect has been a paucity of data

by which to judge the man and his works.

On the other hand, a surplus of publicity exists

about Kin the Hero as a result of the regime's propaganda.

Those unfamiliar with the trappings of the Kin Cult of

Personality may experience difficulty comprehending its

depth and range. One long-time observer wrote:

Neither prolonged exposure to the North Korean press and publications nor fam iliarity with reports by previous visitors had prepared me for what 1 actually saw, heard, and felt in North Korea. President Kim 11 Sung was omnipresent. No matter where one went, one was never more than a hundred feet away from his portrait, bust, statue, or gnotations . ‘ 23

Kim excelled at projecting exciting images to his

people: the Great Leader, Invincible General, Fatherly

Leader, or Leader of the 40 M illion Korean People. 12* O ther

roles were emphasized as needed: socialist philosopher, man

of action in executing policy, or international statesman.

North Korea boasted Kim as a preeminent philosopher whose

original contributions enriched socialist thought and

attracted attention from lesser-developed nations, fi. C.

i2 2See Harrison Salisbury's To Peking — and Beyond (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973) for an interesting description of the interview process. 1238. c. Koh, “The Cult of Personality and the Succession Issue," in Kim and Koh, Journey, p. 25.

124Note that this figure includes South Korea.

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Koh rebutted that Kim subscribed to basic Harrist-Leninist

tenets, but added nothing new to them. 12s scalapino and Lee

agree that Kim Li-song "has made no original contribution to

Harrisa-Leninism," and "cannot be considered a theorist in

any sense." His writings and speeches are "pedestrian,

characterized by a low level of conceptualization and the

endless repetition of a few simple, central typical them es."126

Kim projects omnipresence: his face is ubiguitous —

on picture, bust, or statue. Quotations from his works are

inserted in articles, as well as billboards, monuments, and

newspaper mastheads (his name and words always in boldface,

even when incidental, as in KIH XL—SCNG Oniversity). Public

meetings begin wj.th the singing of the "Song of General Kim

U-song." Virtually all adults but Kim wore buttons bearing

his picture (for which an honorific verb was used), and his

portrait was hung in homes in the place of honor usually

reserved for parents. One observer commented that Kim

commanded a cult "even Stalin might have e n v i e d . " 127

Kim also perpetuated an image of omniscence through

"on-the-spot guidance," an inspection tour during which

1 2 SB. c. Koh, "Ideology and P olitical Control in North Korea," The Journal of P olitics XXZII (August 1970) 6 6 8 -7 1 .

i2 6scalapino and Lee, Communism, II, pp. 867—68.

i27saagei Kim, "fiesearch on Korean Communism: Promise Versus Performance," World P olitics XXXIII (1980): 2 9 3 .

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prior prompting allows him to speak profoundly on local or

technical subjects and make concrete recommendations.

Further, major national policies or goals were first

announced by Kimh i m s e l f . Frequently, Kim's annual Hew

Year's speech would publicly outline the goals for the year,

sector by sector, then be cited in each call for increased

production.

Kim's internationalist career began in April 1965,

when be attended a non-aligned conference in Bandung. Kim

cilso contributed an article to a revolutionary journal,

developing a thesis on small nations defeating the O.S. by

establishing CHOCBE in their policies.iz* International

propaganda emanating from the regime has claimed that Korea

has produced the "hero of the 20th century," a man and

thinker whose deeds and writings commanded worldwide

respect. However, this activity seemed as much for domestic

as international value. Paid advertisements in western

newspapers, often excerpts from Kim's speeches, are

exhibited in North Korea to demonstrate that Kim was

published even in the non-communist w orld.Sem inars on

CHOCHE were held in many regions, including Western Europe,

but seemed designed to reap maximum propaganda value at home

i2 8x.ee Chong—sik , "Kim II—song of North Korea," Asian Survey VII (June 1967): 380; B. C. Koh, "Political Control," p. 656.

i2 9cho, "Hew Security," pp. 35-36.

i30Gavan HcCormack, "Kinilsung-isa," p. 58.

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rather than in the host country.

Petty efforts were made to reinforce his sanctity.

Hark Gayn described a visit to a factory in Hungnaa, where a

huge model of the plant traced in lights Kim's path during

o n - t h e - s p o t g u id a n c e . A s p e c i a l fa c to r y museum p r e se r v e d

several chairs on which he sat, the table on which he leaned

his elbows, and a wheelbarrow he t o u c h e d . ^21 gome foreign

guests noted that at a banquet toast, the Koreeui hosts would

not hoist their .glasses above their Kim Il-scng badge. ‘32

another example, a newspaper article on synthetic fibers was

illustrated with a photograph of a fiber strand and a

bottle, the caption reading, "The viaalcn fiber and

plasticizer which the beloved and respected leader Comrade

Kim 11-song handled closely when he gave an on-the-spot

guidance at the 8 February Vinalon Factory in June 1967. « ‘ 33

The Berth Koreans treated slights against Kim as

lese maiestes as an example of this, two foreigners invited

to Pyongyang to bake charge of propaganda in European

languages were imprisoned for daring to suggest between

themselves that the official DPEK version of Kim's life was

i3iGayn, "Cult," loc. cit.

‘32fiobert A. Scalapino, "Current Dynamics of the Korean P e n in s u la ," Problem s o f Communism XXX (Novem ber- December 1981): 24.

‘ 33Kxb Eyong—sun, "Chuch'e—ui som-e kis-dun iyagi" (The Story of the Making of the Fiber of CHOCHE), Minju Choson, 1 June 1982, p 2.

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not believed in Europe.‘3*

Bruce Cuaings lists three reasons for the mythology

about Kin: 1) the need to assert that Koreans did resist

the Japanese and in some small measure, liberate themselves;

2) the reaction of an isolated people to the refusal by

outsiders to give Kim the credit due him; 3) Kin's

"monumental ego, which seems to require constant nourishment."13S

A frequent propaganda phrase, used as the title of a

song and movie,‘36 is "He have nothing to envy in the

world." Indeed, visitors to North Korea usually come away

with an impression that the population is satisfied with the

way things are. As one visitor concluded, the Kim Cult need

not be dismissed as sustained solely by the state power,

since Kim gained legitim ization through long-term leadership

and the long-term socialization process in the DPEK.‘ 3?

Jon Halliday, however, provided a poignant summation

‘3*Aii lameda. The Personal Account of the Experience of a Prisoner of Conscience in the DPEK (London: Amnesty International, 1979).

‘3SBxuce Cuaings, The Origins of the Korean Har; 13 beratioa and the Emergence of Separate Eeoimes. 1945—1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 556, note 51. These may well be correct, but they ignore the functional aspects of the Cult of Personality, which w ill he discussed in the chapters to follow.

‘3 6An English translation of the song of this title may be found in C.I. Eugene Kim, "Introduction: a Long Journey," in Kim and Koh, Journey, pp. 13-14.

‘37Young C. Kim, "North Korea in 1974," Asian Survey XV (January 1975): 51.

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of North Korean life . He told of meeting a pro-DPBK

Peruvian, a poet, who had written laudatory things about the

country, praising its economy, educational system, health

care, housing, and anti—American victories. But, when

Halliday asked hrs real thoughts, the Peruvian replied, "It

is the saddest, most miserable country I've ever been in in

my life. As a poet, it strikes bleakness into my h e a r t .

i38Halliday, "Enigma," p. 52,

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THE EABLÏ PEBIOD: 1945-1950

The Personality Cult of Kim Il-song may be divided

into three distinct periods, each marked by a different

central function or functions. The first, extending from

liberation until the Koreein Har, was a period in which the

burgeoning cult served as a weapon against rivals in a

struggle for power and as an attraction for unification.

From 1950 to the mid-1960s, the second period, the cult

retained its value as a weapon in factional struggles, but

was used also to unify the population in a war against

foreign forces, mobilize support for policy, fend off

intervention by North Korea's socialist a llies, reshape

ideology, and promote reunification on the DPBK's terms. In

the final period, from the mid-1960s on, in addition to

these same functions, the Cult was pressed into service to

assist leadership succession within the monolithic regime.

Many basic themes which characterized the Kim Cult

in later years were present from the beginning, albeit in

muted or nascent form. Such themes included the patriotic

upbringing of Kim, his guerrilla struggle, the necessity and

worth of his leadership, and his right of leadership over

the whole of Korea. These basic themes were expanded over

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time, embellished with both fact and fiction , and emphasized

in varying proportions as situations demanded.

 defining feature of the Cult of Personality was

lavish praise of Kim Il-song, which may have derived from

his ego as much as from his leadership strategy. The

terminology by which he was described underwent a slow

evolution, reflecting Kim's waxing power as well as the

ability to expand upon the image previously given to the

Korean public by adding new facets to the story and new ways

to apply them.

The logical progression of the Colt probably

accounts for its phenomenal success in taking Kim Il-song

from a major contender for power to unchallenged leader and

its effectiveness in expediting state or party goals.

Despite definite changes in the Cult myth and procedures as

it responded to changes in domestic requirements or

international environment, there were few precipitate

alterations in direction. North Korean citizens may have

been required on occasion to exercise a "willing suspension

of disbelief," but seldom did the regime undertake such an

about-face as to strain public credulity.

This dissertation attempts to examine the Cult

itse lf, with its myths and images, but it cannot measure

accurately its effect on the Korean people. Lacking direct

and open access to the North Koreans, it is impossible to

ascertain how they truly perceive the Cult. Those who

sought refuge in South Korea — in great numbers prior to

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19 53 and a trickle afterward — did so for ccaplez reasons,

including economic and personal motives as well as

ideological. It is possible only to say that the DPEK

system has survived, that the regime has obtained from its

people fierce loyalty and hard work, and has instilled pride

in being Korean. The Cult hais been an effective tool in

this endeavor.

À. THE IMAGE OF THE LEADEB

The liberation of Korea in 1945 engendered struggles

on several levels, two of which related directly to the

development of a cult of personality: the fight for

political power and the struggle to establish a Korean

identity. Individuals and groups who aspired to power

suddenly found themselves free to pursue long-suppressed

goals. Moreover, national and cultural emotions which had

been squelched by Japanese policies began to seek definition

and modes of expression.

Immediately after liberation, the power vacuum

created by the departure of Japanese authority was filled at

local levels by the spontaneous formation of People's

Committees throughout the peninsula; committees arose at all

levels up to the provincial, and a national organization was

forming when co-opted by the Soviets in northern Korea and

mandated out of existence in the south by the A m e r i c a n s . ‘ 39

‘39A superior analysis of the People's Committees may be found in Bruce Cuaings, Korean Har. particularly chapters eight and nine.

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Individuals of divergent convictions began creating

political parties or interest groups to contend for power.

The struggle for power was further complicated by

the return of expatriate politicians, many with claims to

leadership and often with organizational experience as well.

The first group of returnees were those who accompanied the

Soviets in August 1945 and assisted them in gaining

authority north of the 38th parallel. A large group of

exiles from China, generally those with ties to the Chinese

Communist Party, entered north Korea in late 1945; although

slighted by the Soviets, these returnees from China wielded

great influence j.n Korea, which only increased with the

founding of the jP£C in 1949 and the entrance of Chinese

troops in the Korean War in 1950.

The common denominator among contestants for power,

that is, the source of admission to political participation

in both north and south, was an anti-Japanese background.

It became common practice to exaggerate the extent of anti-

Japanese activity to obtain political advantage; this was

easiest for these returning from exile.

The decisive factor in the struggle for power in

14OA south Korean politician, who had been a senior expatriate officer in China, recalls that when he was introduced as a former general to the BOK Foreign Minister in 1948, M inister Chang remarked acidly, "Beally? Everybody who came back from China must have been a general." Kim Hong-il, "Chungkyong-eso kyoggun na-ui kwangbok) (My Liberation, Bon in Chungking), Chungang, August 1974, p. 201.

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north Korea vas to be Soviet favor, although this vas not

apparent in 1945.i+i The Soviets, while retaining ultimate

authority, quickly established government structures staffed

by Koreans to handle routine business, deploying a

sufficient number of Sovietized Koreans to do this. At the

apex of Soviet support was Kim Il-song, a young politician

who had fought the Japanese in Manchuria under Chinese

Communist aegis until about 1941, then entered the OSSB to

elude Japanese m ilitary pressure.i+z Kim entered north Korea

with a group of comreades from his guerrilla days; these

became known as the "Kim" or "Kapsan Faction" (after an area

were operations had been conducted). Shortly after assuming

control in northern Korea, the Soviets introduced Kim

privately to leading figures in Pyongyang, then proceeded to

provide him with a public "buildup."‘*3

i4iReaders seeking details of the actual mechanics of the struggle fcr power should consult Scalapino and lee. Communism or Suh Dae—sook. Movement, both of which have ample explications of the politics of this period.

i4 2 a a n y n r i t e r s have r a is e d th e q u e s t io n , "why Kim?" Apparently, Kim was attractive to the Soviets because he had an acceptable anti-Japanese and le ftist background; had spent virtually his entire career in exile and thus lacked extensive ties in Korea which might allow him autonomous operations (and also lacked factional enemies from past feuds); and was youthful enough to be malleable.

i43sah Dae-sook, in Movement, p. 319, emphasizes, however, that Kim was not thrust into power automatically by the Soviets, and even with their support, "it was a long and difficult process by which kin became the single dominant power in the North." A short summary of the post-liberation leadership strugjgle may be found in this dissertation. Chapter II, pp. 37-36.

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1 . THE EA£L1ESI PERIOD

This campaign to present Kim to the public laid the

foundation for the Cult of Personality which was to follow.

Kim and his supporters employed a ll seven leadership

strategies enumerated by Hriggins,‘4«

The first step in the promotion of Kim Il-song was

an introduction at a Pyongyang mass rally on October 14,

1945; with the Soviets well represented, Kim was presented

to the population as a legendary anti-Japanese hero by a

nationalist figure of wide reknown. Although intended to

launch Kim's public career with a rousing event, according

to some witnesses, this rally backfired, creating a poor

impression because of Kim's youth — the legendary Kim was

at least a fu ll generation older — and disappointment that

his speech contained only pro-Soviet sentiments.‘4S

Following the rally, the Soviets sought media

attention for Kim. Han Chae-tok, a former North Korean

‘♦♦See Chapter I, pp. 18-19. but made particular use of the first strategy, personality projection. The thrust of the Kim Faction in the early period was to establish a political persona for Kim and position their leader in a favorable vantage vis a vis rival politicians.

‘♦SThe Pyongyang rally's negative effect, along with derogatory information about Kim's background, is given in Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pukhan sip 'onvoa-sa (15-year History of North Korea) (Seoul: Chimungak, 5 March 1961), pp. 57-58. Scalapino and Lee, Communism. I, pp. 324—25, quote an eyewitness account to this effect, which the authors claim is corroborated by others. Suh Dae-sook, Movement, pp. 256-61, summarizes what is known about the "legendary" Kim Il-song. The DPRK of course does not concede that the October 14 rally was a failure; on the contrary, the story of its success is a cornerstone in their history of Kim.

77

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journalist, related that although the population was eager

to read newspapers in Korean and the means to print them was

available, permission to publish was denied until October

15. Ban suggested that this was to ensure that the first

news Koreans read in their own language would be about Kim's

rally. The public, he reported, went for the newspaper

"like thirsty men drink water," and found a picture of Kim

as well as stories of his home and background.

According to Han, the favorable articles he wrote

for the Pyongyang Hinbo, o fficia l newspaper of the North

Pyongan Province P olitical Committee, served as the genesis

of the myths about Kin Il-song, for, whatever the truth of

his reception at the October rally, the articles were

written in a positive vein and touted "Kim Il-song's

triumphant return." The paper called Kim "general" and

"national hero;" Han remarked drily that it was for lack of

a better alternative that on his own inititative he called

Kim a general. Thereafter, Kin carefully cultivated Han, in

order to obtain favorable press coverage. Other writers

were then required to call Kim "general" and hew to the

“facts" of the triumphant return story.i*?

Lee Chong-sik noted examples of Kim's early press

coverage. An article in Chonson, the organ of one faction

‘♦♦Han Chae-tok, Kin Il-song kopal-handa (I Indict Kin Il-song) (Seoul: Munoi Cultural Press, 1S65), pp. 71-74.

‘♦^ibid.i, pp. 76, 79-90; Kin Ch'ang-sun, Pukhan, p. 5 8 .

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of the KCP, based in Seoul, for October 27, 1945 called

General Kin Il-song a comet among stars, referred to his

guerrilla backgrpund in Manchuria, and compared him to lito

in Yugoslavia.The November 5 issue of Baebana IIbo.

organ of a second KCP faction, also based in Seoul,

headlined "Nelcome, General Kim Il-song, young hero of

Korea" and occupying one-sixth of the front page, praised

Kim for having fought the Japanese for 20 years, calling him

a welcome additipn to the political world. The article

stated that "if we were to count the true leaders of our

people before August 15, we would have to count General Kim

Il-song fir st."1*9

Following his first appearances, even as ICim and his

supporters endeavored to attract political support through

organizational work and negotiations with other factions,

they sought to publicize his name and visage. His

photograph was widely displayed, usually in tandem with that

of Stalin, which the Soviet occupiers had proliferated. Two

Soviet visitors who arrived in Pyongyang in early 1947 found

in various north Korean cities a profusion of flags and

three portraits, Lenin, Stalin, and Kim. Kim, they found,

was the "national hero and the most popular man in the

‘ ♦®Lee C h o n g -sik , M a te r ia ls on Korean Communism (Honolulu: Oniversity of Hawaii Center for Korean Studies, 1977), p. 165.

‘♦«ibid., pp. 48-49, 165.

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C O e n t r y .

Dae to the paucity of materials from the immediate

post-liberation p e r i o d , i t is difficult to compile a

satisfactory picture of Kim's image at that time. However,

it appears that Kim and the Soviets sought to build the

image of an activist leader, interested in and concerned for

the varied constituencies in north Korea. This was

portrayed through workers* gratitude for legislation or

confidence that Kim would be able to provide the required

assistance. The following examples from 1946 are typical of

the period, showing reaction to Kim as chairman of the

Provisional People's Committee. A Soviet source reported

railroad workers reviewing a draft labor law, showing that

of three who made speeches, two praised Kim Il-song. One

remembered that Kim, chairman of the PPC, had enforced land

reform, the other expressed confidence that the draft would

become law through the "good offices" of Kim and the PPC.‘*2

Several union leaders also discussed the draft law: one

expressed appreciation to Stalin for enabling Korea to draft

isoA. Gitovich and B. Bursov, North of the 38th Parallel (Shanghai: EPOCH Publishing Company, June 1948), p p . 9 , 1 7 .

isigee note on sources.

iS2iiBailway iorkers Praise New Labor Bill" (text), Moscow in Korean via via Komsomolsk, 0620 EST 8 July 46. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report — Far East Section (Hereafter, FBIS DR FES), no. 136-1946, pp. D1-2. (Library of Congress Photoduplication Service microfilm 02755} (Hereafter L/C PS). See the note on sources for broadcast references.

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such a b ill, while another urged unions to exert themselves

in "enforcement" of the b ill "under the leadership of Mr.

Kim Il-son g. **‘53

Coal miners discussing the draft labor law took a

different approach. One thanked Stalin for liberation, but

another spoke of a son who had died for lack of money for

medicine, concluding, "If our chief, Mr. Kim Il-song and the

Communist Party, had been here at that time, my son would

not have died." He pledged his life to Kim and the Party.

A third thanked the PPC and Kim because workers' children

were now able to complete elementary s c h o o l.S ix women

who spoke at a meeting on women's rights thanked Kim for his

leadership, while only one thanked the Soviet A r m y . ‘ 5s

Kim frequently undertook to link himself to Stalin

and the Soviets, who were perceived in north Korea as the

liberators of the country. As noted, Kim's portrait was

displayed with that of Stalin at rallies and parades, and

often in the media. At the end of a report on her visit to

i53«oaion Leaders Support Hew Labor Bill" (text), Moscow in Korean to Korea via Komsomolsk, 0300 ESI 1 July 46. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS Efi FES, Ho. 130-1946, 2 July 1946, pp. El-2. (L/C PS 02755)

is*"Coal Miners Approve Draft Labor Bill" (text), Moscow in Korean to Korea via Komsomolsk, 0640 ESI 1 July 46. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS Dfi FES, Ho. 135-1946, pp. D1-2. (L/C PS 02755)

‘♦♦"Korean Women's B ill Gets Hide Support" (text), Moscow in Korean to Korea via Komsomolsk, 0300 ESI 26 August 46. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB ESI, No. 171-1946, 28 August 1946, pp. H2-3. (L/C PS 02755)

81

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82 the OSSB in October 1946, So Chong—snk led cheers for

Generalissimo Stalin, "leader of world democracy and

liberator of the weak peoples of the world;" for Soviet-

Sorean friendship; and for Kim, "hero of the Korean people

and a great leader of the people."‘s*

The leadership type chosen for propagation to the

public was clearly Weber's "charismatic leader." Kim was

portrayed as having, if not magic, at least exceptional

powers, with high emotions and exaggerated beliefs

encouraged. Kim was shown as close enough to the masses to

permit identification with them, but no intimacy was

eJ.lowed. Kim's image, as w ill be seen, met the criteria

posited by James MacGregor Burns for "heroic leadership:"

belief was encouraged in Kim for his person alone, the

people granted him power to handle crises, and support was

expressed directly rather than through interm ediaries.‘s?

2 . lEADEHSfllP IMAGES 1947-1948

If the record is incomplete prior to 1947, it is

clear that from then on, Kim was positioning himself as

north Korea's only suitable leader. Bis picture, with or

without a companion portrait of Stalin, was widely

circulated and frequently used as a frontispiece in books or

‘♦♦"Koreans Impressed by V isit to USSB" (text), Moscow (Komsomolsk Belay) in Korean to Korea, 0300 ESI 6 October 46. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS Dfi FES, No. 205-1946, 15 October 1946, pp. Hl-2. (1/C PS 02755)

isvgee Chapter I, pp. 20-22.

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journals. His speeches, delivered in great numbers, were

reprinted in journals as veil as individual volumes. His

name vas kept before the public through placenames, such as

Kim il-song Square or Kim Il-song U niversity. His

photograph «as displayed at virtually all public meetings

and carried in parades or dem onstrations.

The emphasis lay on Kim's leadership, using the

Korean term chidoja, with an adjective stating that this

leadership was wise or correct.‘s* For example, an article

noted that the "correct leadership" of Kim had effected

resonstruction in politics, economics, and culture.

The Soviets, whether initiators of the program or

not, took an active part in the propaganda buildup of Kim as

an extraordinary invididual. Two Soviet writers who met Kim

several times complimented his "remarkable genius, his

natural gift for organization, his quick decisions, and

determination in the struggle for the freedom and

independence of his fatherland."i*® Two Soviet moviemakers

is*The word denotes "guide." A fuller explanation w ill be given below.

i5«ïi Chonq-kun, "Haebanq 1—nvon-e issos pukchoson rodongcha- dul - ai saenghwal" (The life of north Korean Workers Two Tears after Liberation), Podo, No. 4, n.d., pp. 17-25. The periodical was undated, but probably published in September or October 1947.

16 OnArticle from the May 25 Issue of BED STAB by fie porters Muloto.v and Kor otkevitch : 'The Hero of the Koreans, Kim II Sung'" (text), Moscow, Soviet Far East Service via Komsomolsk, in Korean to Korea, 0630 EST 27 May 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS OB European Section, No. 71, 3 June 1947, pp. CC5-7. (L/C PS 01766)

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who visited Pyongyang to film Kim called him "the hero of

the Korean people's liberation movement and the man who so

well represents the people." In an intriguing non-seguitur,

they explained that "although not so tall in stature, (he)

is an alert man.f‘*‘

An article in a journal of commentary in late 1947

argued that following liberation, Soviet assistance and the

"correct leadership" of "wise leader" Kim Il-song had

reconstructed politics, economics, and culture, the article

reiterating the phrase "correct leadership" several times.

The article predicted that 400,000 workers in north Korea,

rallied firmly around Kim, would be victorious against

reactionaries and complete the establishment of a democratic

interim government, not to mention develop politics,

economics, and culture a ll the higher.‘*2

In addition to praising Kim directly, the pro-Kim

elem ents bolstered Korean self—esteem, at the sane time

linking Kim with the new pride in being Korean.

In early 1947, journalist Han Chae-tok assured the

Korean people that they were living in an historic time,

when the people were becoming masters and special privilege

was ending. Great progress had already been made with the

161MÜ3S2 Cameramen Report on Korean V isit" (text), Moscow, Soviet Far East Service, via Komsomolsk, in Korean to Korea, 0600 ESI 10 June 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB European Section, Ho. 80, 16 June 1947, pp. CC3—4. (L/C PS 01766)

i 6 2j± chpng-kun, "Haebang i'nyon," pp. 17—25.

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kind assistance of the Soviet Aray and the leadership of

Chairman Kim. The author cited several examples of the work

of the North Korean People's Committee, such as land reform,

and associated Kim with the committee's work through

pertinent quotations from him. After lauding the committee,

organized under Kim, and its standing committee under Kim

lu-bong, Han discussed the question of strengthening

people's rights, showing how democratization and

economic/cultural revitalization had been carried out under

the glorious leadership of Kim Il-song. Finally, Han

asserted that Koreans, preparing to celebrate the March

First holiday, were remembering the blood shed in the past

and thus were united closely around Kim il-song in

struggling for their rights.‘*3

An important component of Kin's image at this time

was his supposed leadership of a ll the people, matched by

their responsiveness to him. For example, about 350,000

marchers congregated in Kim Il-song Square to celebrate

March First, carrying posters with portraits of Stalin, Kin,

and Kim Tu-bong. The chairman of the Pyongyang City

Committee attributed reforms, enabled by the Soviet Army, to

the "entire people, led by the great leader. General Kim Il-

song." He exhorted the people to exert themselves in

fu lfillin g 1947 production quotas "in answer to the call of

i*3Han Chae-tok, "lidae-han si'il" (A Great Era) , Podo. no. 1, March 1947, pp. 45-51, 60-

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Chairmcm Kim II—so n g ." In another example, Kim was

elected a member of the Farmers' Bureau, as it was explained

that he had "enforced the land reform before undertaking

other democratic measures."!®^ At an inaugural ceremony for

an irrigation canal in North Hamgyong Province, farmers

"pledged to Chairman (Kim) their determination to complete

the project."I*®

These themes, the accomplishments of the leader,

Kim, in a wide variety of spheres, which earned not only the

approval of the people but their desire to follow him, were

to be repeated often in the media. The images Kim chose to

project in the early period were designed to gain

legitim izing approval from the populace fcr an individual

who, after a ll, had been an unknown personality a short time

before. The emphasis on "correct leadership" and popular

responsiveness, coupled with perfunctory and businesslike

references to other leaders, also suggest an attempt to

undercut rival claimants to power. These are not mutually

‘♦♦"Mar. 1 Anniversary Observed in North" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 EST 1 March 47. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES No. 8-1947, 2 March 1947, pp. LL-1-5. (L/C PS 01766)

‘ ♦♦"North Korean Farmers Hold Conference" (text) , Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 ESI 13 March 47. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES No. 16-1947, pp. L 1L 1-2. (1/C PS 01766)

i66npjongyang Sees Production Increases" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 EST 6 May 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB EES No, 54, 8 May 1947. (L/C PS 01766)

86

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exclusive interpretations.

Kim projected an image of leadership in education.

Since North Korea had "felt keenly" a shortage of

technicians, the "foresight of our great and wise leader"

brought expansion of educational opportunities. Kim Il-song

Oniversity was one answer to that call.i*? The Manchung

Institute, established by Kis for orphans of

revolutionaries, celebrated its opening on October 12. The

institute had renovated its buildings, appointed faculty,

and enrolled students with support from Kim; therefore,

although it had opened on September 1, the school fixed its

anniversary date as the 12th, the day Kim, tie "father of

the institute," first entered Pyongyang after liberation.

Articles often stressed Kim's personal concern for

t h e p e o p le , r e v e a lin g human q u a l i t i e s b eh in d th e r a th e r

formal official photographs and articles, for example, a

women's magazine related the story of a farm wife, aged 31,

who offered a gift of grain to General Kim in gratitude for

agricultural production increases under the new system. Kim

praised it as a thoughtful act, and moreover, when he

learned that the woman was illitera te, encouraged her to

i*7"4,0D0 Enrolled at new Institution" (excerpts), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 EST 5 September 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS 0£ FES No. 139, 10 September 1947, pp. PPP9-10. (L/C PS 01766)

lasMgchool for Bevolutionist Orphans Opens" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0700 13 October 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS Dfi FES No, 164, 15 October 1947, pp. LLL3-4. (L/C PS 01766)

87

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learn to write, promising to exchange letters. The lady

immediately enrolled in a school, learned to write, and

composed a letter to the "esteemed general, our leader,"

stating that Kim had a love for the people no different than

that of a father; he of course wrote hack despite his busy

schedule. The magazine concluded that the Korean people

were fortunate to have such a leader and should unreservedly

respect, love, and learn from him.‘®«

Kim was portrayed as a dispenser of benefits. A

female worker from a Pyongyang textile m ill expressed

amazement that she could vacation at a fine resort, and

concluded "all this I owe to General Kim," who enforced the

appropriate laws. Another worker who appreciated a hot

springs vacation pledged, "the only way I can repay this is

to work hard for (Kim) and 1 will do so until my last

day."170 Akin to this was an item which described official

support to the National Theater, which enabled it to give

both musical and dramatic performances and train new

musicians: "Such developments have been made possible only

through the democratic reforms and able leadership of the

‘♦«"Kim changggun—gwa kulpae*ulgos-ul yaksok-hago sagaewolman-ei Kin changgun-eigei p'yonchi-rul ssopo—naen Kangwondo—i kyesan yocha" (The Kancwon Province Woman Who Promised General Kim to Learn to Write and Wrote Him a Letter after Four Months), Choson Yosong. December 1974, pp. 9 0 -9 1 .

‘ voMjiorking Class Enjoys Vacations for First Time" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0700 EST 7 July 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS BE FES, Ho. 97, 10 July 1947, pp. LL12-3. (L/C PS 01766)

88

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people's hero." Since the People's Committee met their

economic needs and treated them as worthy artists, "it is no

wonder that they are devoted to the construction of the

fatherland" under Kin and the Committee.

Another .important aspect of Kim's image was the

assertion that his "correct leadership" had garnered support

not only from peasants but also from the elite, who

represented a broad spectrum of backgrounds and interests.

A newspaper series on bureaucrats emphasized that they had

accepted Kim as leader. One article profiled Yi Tong-yong,

who had been imprisoned for student organization activities

in connection with the March First Movement, then had become

a physician; after liberation, Yi had been a founder of the

Korea Democratic Party. The article stressed that Yi, as

director of the People's Committee Health Bureau, had

accepted the "correct leadership" of the "wise leader,"

viewing it as effective for fundamental development of

p u b lic h e a l t h . ‘72 & biography of Chu Bwang-pyong related his

youthful anti—Japanese activities, based on his experience

of repression in a farm village, noted his graduation from a

Japanese law school, and stated that he had served as

i7iM*atipnal Theater Contributes to Culture" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0600 2ST 1 September 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES Ho. 135, 4 September 1947, pp. LLL2-3. (L/C PS 01766)

‘ 7 2"0ri-eigeinun irohge chunpi-twoen chido iiggun- duli issda: I Tong—yon sonsaeng" (Ihese are the leadership Functionaries Who Prepared the Say for Os: Mr. Yi Tong- yong), Minju Choson, 14 January 1948, p. 2

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chairman of a local branch of a Chondogjo political party.

Yi, as director of the People's Committee Communication

Bureau, had accepted Kim's correct l e a d e r s h i p . ‘ 7 3

Kim received support from unlikely sources.

Delegates of the 45,000 Chinese residents of north Korea

praised Kim's able leadership.‘7♦ a more important

endorsement came from Christians, a small but influential

m in o r ity . A Christian delegate agreed that the road to

democracy had been opened by "the correct leadership of our

great and wise national leader and patriotic fighter." He

pledged a Christian march toward the founding of the

fatherland, «solidly rallying" around K i n . ‘ 7s

Although it was clear that Kim was leader of all the

people, he was presented as acceptable especially to women

and youth — not coincidentally two groups new to political

activity. At the conclusion of a conference, Madame So

‘73MQci_eigeinun irohge chunpi—twoen chido ilggun- duli issda: Chu Hwang-pyon" (These are the Leadership Functionaries Who Prepared the Hay for Os: Mr. Chu Hwang- pyong), Minin Choson, 15 January 1948, p. 2. Chondogyo is an indigenous Korean religion with a history of social activism; it maintains a political arm, the Young Friends P a r ty .

i74ticbinese in N. Korea Appreciate Freedom" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 EST 4 September 1947. T r a n s la tio n by th e FBIS. FBIS BE FES No. 139, 10 Septem ber 1947, pp. LLL3-4. (L/C PS 01766)

i7 5nspeech by Lee Chae fiyun, a Christian, on Voice of the People Program Entitled, 'He Utterly Denounce the United Nations Commission on Korea'" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0445 EST 24 January 1948. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES No. 234, 27 January 1948, pp. PPP11-12. (L/C PS 01766)

90

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 91 Chong—suk saluted Stalin as liberator of the world's weak

peoples, but proceeded it with a salute to Kin, "leader of

the Korean people and lib erator of the women."i?* àt a

Women's League meeting. Chairwoman Pak Chong-ae moved

acceptance of a Kim report on the isproveaent in women's

status, particularly citing the Law on Sexual Equality.

Pak, in leading a cheer for Kim, explained that he had

achieved much in accordance with the reguirments of

democratic women.i??

Another article, which called Kim the "true and

close friend of youth," claimed that without liberation the

people would lack pride and happiness, but that even the

Soviet Army was unable to effect true liberation with its

advance into Korea. The people's happiness and livelihood

were due to the fu ll effort for reconstruction and

democratization carried out under correct leadership, headed

by Kin Il-song. The article concluded that above a ll,

Korean youth had adopted Kim as their own leader, and that

in north Korea, he had already led them on the democratic

i7 6Hstatenent by Madame Chong Sook Sur, representative of the Worth Korean Democratic Women's Federation, Who Attended the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Women's Democratic federation in Moscow" (text), Moscow (Komsonolsk relay) in Korean to Korea, 0630 EST 20 Oct 46. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES Ho. 218-1946, 31 October 1946, pp. fll-4. (L/C PS 02755)

iffPak Chong—ae, "Inmin-ui paksu ch'achi-han yosong— un Kim I l - s o n g ch a n g g u n -u i c h e s i- h a n k i l —lo m aechin" (Women, to the Applause of the People, Advance Along the Boad Presented by General Kim IL-song), Cboson Yosong, January 1947, pp. 12-14.

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road to freedom and happiness.i?*

Even the dead were pressed into service validating

Kim's leadership. An obituary of revolutionary An Kil

(1907—1947) reviewed bis patriotic activities, then stated

he had fought the Japanese in Manchuria, serving about ten

years under Kim ll—scng's leadership. The article recounted

that after liberation, although ill from diseases incurred

in the struggle. An accepted Kim as leader from the day he

returned to Korea and stood in the forefront in constructing

an independent nation.

Kin's leadership produced results, stated the media.

A news item reported that state enterprises had greatly

surpassed the forty percent increase over the previous

year's average, the goal set by Kim. "This clearly shows

how r ig h t th e g r e a t and w ise le a d e r s h ip o f Chairman (Kim) i s

and how much the entire people have supported this

program.Kim.'s mere presence was allegedly sufficient to

inspire greater efforts. Much moved by an inspection at the

Songjin Steel Works, the plant's workers took an oath to

i7*"Kim Il-song changgun-ui hoso chonchoson ch'ongnyon—un hwanho-handa* (All Korean Youth Acclaim General Kin Il-song's Petition), Podc, no. 3, August 1947, pp. 4 2 -4 5 .

i7*"Ko An Kil sonsaeng ryakso" (A Short Biography of the Late Mr. An K il), Miniu Choson. 6 December 1947, p. 1.

18ONProdnotion Index Shows Monthly Increases" (text), Pyongyang in Korean at dictation speed for the Korean press, 0900 EST 9 July 1947. Translation by the PBIS. FBIS DE FiES Ho. 97, 10 July 1947, p. 1LL1. (L/C PS 01766)

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Kim: 4,000 workers determined to complete the 1947 economic

plan by December 20. The plant's workers reported that they

had surpassed production on the day of Kim's v isit and since

then had been inspired to exceed their daily quota.i**

When Kim stood for election at Samdung Township, he

made a campaign appearance on Hovember 2nd; the media

pointed up a parallel between the sunny day and the

brilliant leader. The rally site was decorated with such

slogans as "Let us repay Kim Il-song by fu lfillin g the

people's economic plan by December 10," and the rally itse lf

began with the "Seng of General Kim Il-song." The local

citizens, who pledged to advance to creation of a democratic

Korea under Kim's leadership, felt so honored and happy at

his presence, they were unaware of the setting sun.

It is possible to discern in these statements an

attempt to affect behavior by shaping cognitions, as

explained by Murray E delm an.Statem ents about Kim's

special relationships with constituencies as well as

promotion of his leadership of all the people served to aid

individuals in finding a personal identity amid confusing

tem songjia Steel Workers Adopt Pledge" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 EST 6 October 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS BE FES No. 160, 9 October 1947, p. L1L1. (1/C PS 01766)

i82"Kim Il-sung Speaks to Constituents" (text), Pyongyang in Korean at dictation speed for the Korean press, 0900 EST 4 November 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES No. 179, 5 November 1947, pp. 1111-2. (1/C PS 01766)

is35ee Chapter I, pp. 14—15.

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circumstances. The individual could see himself as an

important component of a group possessing resolute and

purposeful leadership, with the wise leader in charge,

their efforts were not wasted, hut were a valued input

important to an overall plan.

The ultimate result of Kim's leadership and service

was the popular response, often expressed in the phrase

"united around the leader." For example, the Korea-Soviet

Union Society, requesting hooks from a Georgian Society,

noted "We the people of north Korea are united around our

able leader Kim 11—song and the People's Committee.*** When

the People's Committee met in May 1947, President Kim Tu—

bong, one of Kim's rivals, opened the session by intoning,

"...two months have passed since the conclusion of the first

congress.. .During this period the people of north Korea,

firmly united around our leader, Kim Il-song, have

courageously striven" to exceed production quotas.**s

iB^nsociety for Korean-Soviet Delations" (brief), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, n .t. 6 May 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES Ho. 57, 13 May 1947, p. 1111. (L/C PS 01766) This phrase was occasionally used elsewhere, as when theater people were described as "solidly rallying around" their manager: see, FBIS, "National Theater." Kim himself occasionally used it, as in a report to the Youth league, when he said that youth "must rally more solidly around the People's Committees;" see "Youth league Committee Holds Meeting" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 EST 21 October 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES No. 170, 23 October 1947, p. 1112. (L/C PS 01766) In the main, however, the phrase applied to Kim.

issnpeople's Council 2nd Congress Convened" (excerpts), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0700 EST 15 May 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES No. 63, 21 May

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One image which Kim coaid not adopt at this time (he

adopted it nearly two decades later) was that of liberator.

The Soviet Army, which retained troops on Korean territory

until 1949, had pccupied Korea north of the 38th parallel,

so the paeans of liberation went to Stalin and the Bed Army.

However, Kin had fought the Japanese and cleverly

capitalized on his history to obtain a measure of credit in

the liberation, for example, Korean girls in the USSfi for

education sent an open letter to him, terming him the

"sagacious leader of the Korean people," and acknowledging

that he "for the sake of our complete independence has for

20-odd years fought desperately in the Manchurian praries

against the evil Japanese im perialists, forgetful of sleep

and other comforts and crossing the death-line several

hundred tim es...5 The girls prayed for his health as well

as other Korean leaders, but named only him.***

Skimpy holdings of prewar North Korean newspapers

and other periodicals**? hamper a thorough investigation of

the media treatment of Kim, although a subjective look at

the government newspaper, Miniu Cboson, does provide an

indication of his press image. Prior to establishment of

1947, pp. LL11-3. (I/C PS 01766)

***"Students in Tomsk Greet Kim 11 Sung" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 18 March 1947, 0500 EST. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES No. 20-1947, 20 March 1947, pp. ILL 1-2. (L/C PS 01766)

**?Befer to notes on sources for holdings consulted.

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the DPEK in September 1948, Kin vas most frequently called

"general" or "chairman" (of the People's Committee); after

that he vas called "premier." On occasion he was given such

titles as "our people's vise leader" or the "leader of the

30 m illion Korean people." He was frequently quoted —

particularly thrpugh aid-1948, while Han Chae-tok was editor

— primarly on economic or agricultural topics, occasionally

on people's rights or reunification. His name was kept

prominent in the newspaper via declarations or open letters

from professional or social organizations. His major

speeches were printed, each accompanied by a formal

portrait, and they served as topics for discussion as well.

Despite the small sampling of issues, its seems

clear that Kim's faction had effective control of north

Korean media, sufficient control to use it to promote Kim.

Laudatory things were occasionally said about others: for

example, at an election rally for Kin lu-bong in 1948, one

main speaker averred that a ll voters in the district were

united around Kim II—song and Kim Tu—bong, while a second

speaker noted that Kim lu-bong had fought for the interests

of workers and farmers. Next, representatives of farmers,

Christians, and women told how Kim Tu-bong had upheld their

interests-*®« The point is that such compliments to others

i8 8n7oters Honor Candidate Kin Doo Hong" (Summary with quotations):, Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0430 EST 6 August 1948. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS Dfi FES, Ho. 370, 9 August 1948, pp. PPP4-9. (L/C PS 01766)

96

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were usually lim ited to special occasions or meetings; Kim

11—song received them as a regular matter or along with the

other leader. At the aforementioned rally, for example, two

speakers led cheers for both Kins, and the subject of the

rally himself paid homage to Kim Il-song in his speech.

North Korean journals, which published sore and

longer theoretical articles than newspapers, gave prominent

coverage to Kim, compared with other leaders. For example,

the four issues of Podo, official organ of the North Korean

People's Committee, featured much material by or about Kim.

The first issue (March 1947} published two Kim speeches and

a photograph, in addition to several articles on domestic

affairs and a description of Soviet bloc nations. The

second issue (May) had no original Kim material, but was

seeded with references to his wise leadership. Issue three

(August) was replete with material about Kim: two statements

by him on the establishment of an interim government, two

cirtides hailing him as leader of the people and the chosen

leader of Korean youth, a discussion of his 20-point

program, and frequent quotations in domestic articles. The

fourth (undated and seemingly last) issue published a Kim

speech plus several articles attributing democratic reforms

and agricultural development to Kim's leadership, with

several items on the South, one of which suggested that

democratic reforms carried out under Kim's leadership gave

confidence to the south Koreans. A later DPEK government

journal, Inmin, reprinted Kim's speeches and placed frequent

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Kim guotaticss in feature articles.

The organ of the Democratic lomen's league Central

Committee, Choson Syosong, took am internationalist position

in 1949 and 1950:, devoting many features to the lives of

women in bloc countries and quoting Russians. Kim was the

only North Korean politician to be given attention in its

pages, with speech reprints and frequent quotations. The

same situation obtained in Ch'ongnyon Saenghwal, published

by the Democratic Youth League Central Committee. Soviet

figures were quoted as extensively as Kin, but Kim was the

only local politician accorded the honor.

Kin's leadership was related to actual events, ihen

tie north exchanged its currency for a new issue in late

1947, Kim got the credit, allegedly receiving more than

10,000 letters of thanks. & farmer from South Hamgyong

Province wrote, "Bell done, indeed...Now we can live well.

It is all to the credit of our leader...who works for the

laboring people. Now, prices are going down and the value

of money is going up."***

In 1947, with the possibility that a Soviet-3.S.

Commission would establish a provisional government over

both zones, north Korea began offering Kim as the logical

choice to lead a united regime. Kim him self, as Secretary

tevncurrency Exchange Going On in N. Korea" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0501 ESI 8 December 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS OB FES, No. 201, 9 December 1947, pp. ILL 1-2. (L/C PS 01766)

98

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of the North Korean Democratic People's Front, remanded to

the Commission 1,256 letters and telegrams, all of which

stressed that the proposed provisional government mast be a

people's regime ias found in the north, one capable of

executing reforms. The letters called prominent southern

politicians, including Sjngman Shee and Kin Koo,

traitors.**® One such letter was from Songch'on County,

where a land improvement project had just been finished: the

writer urged that the future government be patterned after

the People's Committee and that Kim, "our greatest leader,"

be named its head.***

Elsewhere, a worker described idealic conditions in

north Korean factories and urged a redoubling of production

efforts in light of the impending Joint Commission

decisions. The worker cilso urged people to crush

reactionaries by rallying more solidly around Kim and

asserted that the "provisional government to be established

must be one that is led by Chairman Kin Il-song . " * * 2

A commentary on a Kin policy report concerning the

**o"Letters From North" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0700 ESI 10 June 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 77, 11 June 1947, pp. 1112-3. (1/C PS 01766)

***i b i d .

i92«?oice of the People Hour — 'Bomen Workers in Our Factory are Struggling' by Mme Kim Do Sung of the Pyongyang Tobacco Factory" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 EST 16 June 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 83, 19 June 1947, pp. 1111-2. (L/C PS 01766)

99

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provisional government cited Communication and Education

Bureau workers, a farmer, school principal, nurse, and

teacher, a ll of whom opined that the report bad illuminated

the nation's future course. The Education Bureau employee

also named four south Korean politicians, stated that they

should be eliminated, and explained tnat this was to be

accomplished by "rallying around (Kim) solid ly."**3

Organizations affiliated with the North Korean Federation of

Trade Onions issued statements urging that reforms existing

in the north be implemented in the south, and that the

"Korean people's vise and great leader. General (Kim), be

the head of the proposed provisional government, so that the

happiness and freedom of the people may be secure and Korea

may become...an independent, sovereign nation."***

The Joint Commission failed to agree on a method for

establishing a unity government, so this attempt to promote

Kin as a pan-national leader came to nought-**® As the O.S.

M ilitary Government scheduled elections in the south to seat

a Constituent Assembly, the north proposed a unity

leamcomrnentary by a 'Station Beporter'" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 ESI 16 June 1947. Translation by the PEIS. FBIS DB FE, Ho. 83, 19 June 1947, pp. PPP1-4. (L/C PS 01766)

i99«Trade Unions Bally to Back Kin II Sung" (text), Pyonayang in Korean to Korea^ 0500 ESI 1 July 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 92, 2 July 1947, p. LLL1. Elipses in the original. (I/C PS 01766)

**®See below, pp. 119—23, for details of the promotion of Kim in the south.

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conference of national leaders to forestall permanent

division of the country. This conference convened in

Pyongyang on April 19, with many prominent southerners

attending, including Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik.*** ih ile Kim

11—song dominated the conference, he was not proposed as a

unity candidate; conference documents and speeches did not

exceed the usual attribution of north Korean success to him.

However, Kim did use the conference to promote an image of

himself as a pan—national leader. Many southerners attended

a closing rally on April 25; at one point, a wreath was

presented to Kim as "a token of respect and love from the

whole of the people from north and south Korea." Later,

three south Korean delegates (all of whom later held high

office in the DPEK) made speeches denouncing southern

conditions, praising the north, and complimenting Kim.**?

Although there was no general endorsement of Kin

from the two principal south Korean participants, after the

conference a secretary to Kim Koo, a rightist, was quoted as

saying, "Bhat moved me most was that General Kim ll-scng and

the People's Committee were doing whatever was in the

interest of the people, no matter what the difficulties and

***A general survey of the conference is in Lee Chong—sik, **'Negotiations * Among Private Groups: the Case of the 1948 South—North Consultative Conference," Journal of Asiatic Studies XII (December 1969): 379—92.

**?"Events of Second-day Session Given" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0800 ESI 25 April 1948. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DE FES, No. 298, 27 April 1948, pp. LLL3-5. (L/C PS 01766)

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hardships might he." k secretary to Rim Kya-sik, a

centrist, was quoted as "X express my gratitude to Kim Il-

song and the People's Committee for their efforts in which

they spare no money and no material in establishing a

brilliant national culture..."***

Kin was seen as the perfector of Korean government.

A commentary on the third anniversary of the formation of

the North Korean People's Committee concluded, "Be owe a ll

the achievements of the (Committee) to the correct

leadership of General Kim Il-song."*** Bhen the DPBK was

established, a commentator noted that it was what a ll Korea

had "SO ardently." anticipated, and asserted that, headed by

Kim, it was the ."only true national government . " 200

After the establishment of the DPBK, Kim was known

not only as "general" or "chairman" or "premier," but also

by specialized titles: "the great leader," "respected

chairman," «our people's great leader," "our people's wise

*94"Dr. Kin's Secretaries Tell of E. Korea" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 ESI 15 May 1948. Translation by the PEIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 313, 18 May 1948, p. LLL3. (L/C PS 01766)

i9 9"0n the Third Anniversary of the Formation of the North Korean People's Committee" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0915 EST 7 February 1949. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 25, 8 February 1949, pp. LLLl-4. (L/C PS 01766)

2oo"xhe Korean People are Fighting for the Implementation of the Proposal of the Soviet Govezmment for the Simultaneous Withdrawal of the Troops of the Two Powers from Korea" (excerpts), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0615 EST 16 September 1948. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 41, 22 September 1948, pp. PPP9-10. (L/C PS 01766)

102

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leader," or the Fleader of the 30 million Korean p e o p l e . "201

Kin was s till pictured as the dispenser of bounty. An

article revealed that since liberation. Kin had distributed

individual pianos to composers who were developing Korean

music. On the fourth anniversary of August IS, Kin, through

the M inister of Culture and Propaganda, bestowed pianos on

four composers, who also received m e d a l s . 202 completion

of the Central General Hospital in Pyongyang loomed, it was

noted that the construction "was started in May last year by

the special consideration of Premier Kim II— song."203

Sometime after the founding of the DPHK, Kim

effected a subtle change in his title . The Korean language

requires an appelation after a name, be it "general,"

"doctor," or "mister." Heretofore, he had been called

chidoja. which denoted an ordinary leader or g u i d e . 2 0*

Thereafter, Kin began to use the term survong for

h i m s e l f , 2 0s suggesting increased authority and prestige. An

zoisee, for example, "Kin Il-song wiwonchang—eigei ponae—nun meiseichi" (Messages Sent to Chairman Kin I l- song) , Hodonq Sinmnn. 22 August 1948, p. 1.

aoawKim Il-song susang-ggeso chakgok—ga sassi—eigei p'iano suyo" (Premier Kim Il-song Distributes Pianos to four Composers), Cboson Myosong. September 1949, p. 59.

203"Hain Construction at Hospital Ends" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0600 EST 29 July 1949. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, Ho. 148, 3 August 1949, pp. CCC4-5. (1/C PS 01766)

2 04iiritten with the Chinese characters:

2QSBritten with the Chinese characters:

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early Korean-English dictionary defined the root noun from

which chido1a was derived as "directions, instructions,

guidance, leading," and survong as "chief of a political

party; chieftain, leader."z®* The latter term was the

translation of the Russian vozhd, (which Holfezo? notes is

equivalent to dncc or fuehrer), which Stalin appropriated to

h i m s e l f . 2oa g y this linguistic device. Kin promoted himself

from a probably subordinate leader to a clearly independent

and important chieftain.=®*

B. THE GOEHBILLA BACKGROUND

The second powerful social factor which appeared

after liberation was the intense desire to establish both a

national identity and a sense of worth. Japanese

assim ilation policies had stifled expressions of Korean

culture, including outlets for language and literature, and

had fostered distortions of what little Korean history was

2®«Gale's Dictionary, Meiji 44, pp. 891, 582.

2®?Bertrand D. Wolfe, Khrushchev and Stalin*s Ghost (Hew York: Praeger, 1957) , p. 60.

20*Bruce Cumings traces the first use of survong to February 1950, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the KPA, noting that it put Kim on a par with Stalin and thus was not used until Soviet troops were safely out of Korea; "Corporatism in North Korea," The Journal of Korean studies, vol. 4, 1982-83, p. 286. However, the term was used at the founding of the KPA itself in 1948; see "Cboson inmin-ui songpyok-in inmingundae-ui ch'angsol" (Founding of the KPA, Bastion of the Korean People), Pukchoson T'ongsin, no. 22, February 1948, pp. 12-13.

2®*Some of Kim's attributes were sim ilar to those of the traditional Confucian king; see Chapter VI for a discussion of this sim ilarity.

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taught. Koreans in both zones sought to re—establish a

concept of being Korean and pride in this existence. 2*0 j t

is to be assumed that the north Korean public, having

undergone Japanese repression and accustomed to thinking of

Korean politicians as collaborators, were anxious for a hero

— and one who had succeeded against the hated Japanese at

t h a t .

Although Kim's history as an anti—Japanese leader

was to assume great importance later, it had considerable

significance in the early years as well. It must be

remembered that Kim was contending for power against older,

more seasoned politicians, many with large followings; Kim

was youthful and even though the bearer of a legendary name,

was an unknown or unproven character. His rivals Pak Hon—

yong and Kim Tu-bong, an experienced labor organizer and

academician, respectively, were familiar to the public.

Emphasis on Kin's guerrilla background proved a way to

outpace them: academics and organizing may be respectable

enterprises, but lack the excitement associated with a

combat leader. This was also a way to undercut his rivals

within the domestic communist faction, since their anti-

Japanese activ ities had been conducted underground and hence

went unpublicized.

The background information given about Kim provided

a foundation for later periods, when the anti-Japanese

2i03ee Chapter II, p. 36, n. 65.

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guerrilla history would be elevated to the status of

national myth, although most themes later stressed were

present in the 1940s. The Soviets conducted an in itial

propaganda barrage about Kim, but with facts often askew and

occasional descents into mysticism. The north Koreans, at

least in the begj.nning, kept to facts, even if exaggerated

and selective.

If Kim could not be accounted Korea's actual

liberator, his service to the country still could be

celebrated. A Soviet commentator reported on the first

anniversary of liberation that Koreans were s till grateful

to the Soviet Army and spoke of the leader of the Interim

People's Committee as "the national hero who gave his whole

life to the battle of liberation of his fatherland from the

Japanese yoke."2**

A biography in the Soviet Komsomclskava Pravda

related that Kim had lived among revolutionary youth,

growing into a professional revolutionary. He had organized

a peasant corps and become a general when the Japanese

invaded Manchuria; at first he had 1,000 troops and no

weapons, but armed them quickly, so that by age 20, he led

30,000 volunteers. The Japanese, who could not arrest him,

attempted to bribe him with a governorship in Manchuria; he

211"Commentary by Danilov" (text), Moscow in Korean to Korea Komsonolsk relay, 0600 7 September 1946. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, Ho. 182-1946, 12 September 1946, pp. H1-H4. (L/C PS 02755)

106

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was reported dead several tim es. How, "everyone in Horth

Korea understands that Kim II—song w ill place the interest

of the people above all things." The commentary went on,

however, that people believed Kim capable of mysterious

tricks, such as flying or creeping underground; some people

said he looked like a "superhuman b e i n g . «212

Other Soviets took a more rational line on Kim and

gave more reliable information. Gitovich and Bursov

elaborated on Kim's history, based on stories from ex-

guerrillas cuid interviews with Kim. They mentioned that

Kin's father, a teacher and professional revolutionary, had

been imprisoned twice and died of illness; they noted that

Kim's mother had provided her son with weapons hidden by the

father. The Soviets quoted Kim as not having seen his

father more than a few months in his life , but being

impressed with his nationalism. Kim founded his first

guerrilla unit of 30 fighters shortly after the Qanchurian

Incident, captured weapons, and conducted operations against

the Japanese. In 1934, the partisans reorganized into a

division, then raided border towns; by the time Kim was 25,

the people dubbed him a general. At the end, Kim's forces

reached 100,000, although Korea was liberated by the Soviet

2i2"Commentary by Hirov on II Sung Kin, Published in the Komsomolskaya-Pravda Onder the T itle 'II Sung Kim, Hero of the Korean People, a Living legend'" (text), Moscow Komsonolsk relay in Korean to Korea, 0300 ESI 30 October 1946. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DE EES, No. 221-1946, 6 Hovember 1946, pp. HI-4. (L/C PS 02755)

107

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Army not the partisans. Kin addressed the "free citizens"

of Pyongyang in 1945, thanking the OSSB and Stalin, to the

people's great approval.2 4 3

The definitive Korean source was the "triumphal

return" material of Han Chae-tok, related first in newspaper

ÔŒtid e s, then a book incorporating them. Han stated that

"speaking scientifically," such a large and great people

cannot lack great leaders, and "as everyone knows," they

possess one — "our greatest patriot, our people's sun of

hope." Han portrayed Kim as the "all-Korean hero," who had

from the age of 17 stood in the forefront of the liberation

movement, created an anti—Japanese army, made the Japanese

fear him, and led the Fatherland Restoration Association —

in short, a person of whom the Korean people had boasted and

s till could be proud. Kim's fight was a shining struggle in

the history of liberation wars by small and weak p e o p l e s . 2

Han's book contained a first-person account of the

guerrilla struggle that summarized the experience of the

time, emphasizing its nationalistic character. The

guerrillas perservered out of self-sacrifice and patriotic

love to become a people's army which conducted continuous

2i3Gitovich and Bursov, North of 38, pp. 23-34. This story is paralleled in Hulutov and Korotkevitch; These reporters apparently interviewed the same sources, perhaps hewed to the same propaganda requirements.

2 1♦Han Chae-tok, Kin 11-song changgun kaesongi (The Triumphal Return of General Kim Il-song) (Pyongyang: Democratic Korea Company, 20 November 1947, reprinted 20 March 1948), pp. 7-9.

108

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combat against the enemy. The comrades in the guerrilla

unit lived as if it were their own family, naturally

suffused with brotherly love, with trust and respect for

each other. Above a ll, the spirit of Kim Il-song pervaded

the unit like the sun, so that it derived strength from

uniting closely with him. This produced trust between the

unit members and Kim, which in turn generated faith in

inevitable victory. The struggle, wrote Han, was a people's

struggle in which the people's blood was shed, but always

Kin stood in the front, keeping the people on the right road

— therefore, a ll the Korean people now accept Kim and

fo llo w h im .21®

The same stories are given in a 1947 article (in

words so sim ilar, Han may have written it). The eirticle

noted that the Korean people were inextinguishable, but in

this critical time they could not do without a leader for

reconstruction cind development, so the leader must be a hero

of the people. The article went on to review Kin's career,

calling him an ever-victorious general against the most

powerful enemy in the world, the leader the enemy feared

most. The fight was a people's fight requiring all the

blood and might they could muster, but Kin put the struggle

on the correct road. Today, Koreans were following Kin in

the struggle for construction and development, and he had

already established national independence, people's rights.

2i5ibid.. pp. 10-11, 3 9-65.

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l a n d reform, and sexual e q u a l i t y . 2 i«

The themes in this story — heroism and success

against the hated enemy plus unity — had a powerful appeal

to Koreans who had been oppressed by the Japanese and were

now witnessing a confused, vicious power struggle. The

portrayal of Kim Il-song as unifier must also have have been

meant to appeal to Koreans in both zones, a majority of the

population, who were directly affected by the division of

the peninsula, with family or economic communication

s e v e r e d .

While Kim frequently appended "general" to his name

and had credit about his background inserted into articles,

the media did not in general publish detailed accounts of

his history, these were lim ited to occasional treatment.

Typical was an article in a women's magazine about a 1937

episode, concentrating on the guerrillas themselves and

their devotion tP duty, with little mention of Kim. The

article concluded, however, that the guerrillas fought for

independence and liberation under General Kim, "the peerless

patriot."21? Some articles gave a central role to Kim, as in

a youth magazine story about the raid on Eochonbo. The

article described the significance of the location, the

21«"Kim II—song changgun—un chonchoson minchok—ui ryongdocha-ida" .(General Kim Il-song is the leader of All the Korean People), Podo, no. 3, August 1947, pp. 18—21.

2i7pak Kyong-suk, "Ppalcchisan sidae-rul hoisang- hamyonso" (Recalling Partisan Times), Choson Hyosong, February 1950, pp. 32-33.

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expectant atmosphere in town, planning by the guerrillas,

and the raid itse lf, during which townsfolk cheered Kin

mightily. The article emphasized the planning as well as

the assistance and cooperation Kin received from comrades

within the country, including at least four organizations

under his direct control. After the raid, Kim's unit fought

off an attacking column to escape, including one pursuing

Japanese unit led by a Korean officer. 2 1a

In addition to the proficiency Kim showed in

planning and executing operations, the article mentioned one

other important point in the Kin story, that Kim founded and

led numerous general or specialized organizations within

Korea. In fact, the story enumerated as many points as

possible where the anti-Japanese guerrillas had direct or

indirect contact with Korea. Many stories retold Kim's

border raids, such as at Pochonbo in 1937, which reminded

Koreans that Kin was their friend and leader. In addition

to groups he organized for "liberated” areas in Manchuria,

Kim dispatched political operatives to at least the five

northernmost povxnces, where underground organizations were

formed. Kim was also credited as an important link in

Korea's anti-Japanese thought. 219 ihis aspect of the story

2i*Yun Se-chung, "Ku'usi—kokaes Kim changgun ppalcchisan chont'u-ui han t'omak" (Ku'usi Pass: an Instance of Combat by General Kin's Partisans), Ch'ongnyon Saeaghwal. March 1950, pp. 84-90.

2i*KCNA, "Choson inm in-ui chinchok yong'ung Kim I l- song changgun" (General Kim Il-song, the Korean People's

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doubtless helped offset the fact that Kim's guerrilla

activity had been largely outside Korea and he for that

reason might not be considered a "mainstream" politician.

Although, as noted in Chapter 1, the DPBK regime in

later years portrayed Kim's struggle as the only legitim ate

Korean revolution, this exclusivity could not be maintained

in the early period. Too many veterans of foreign and

domestic anti-Japanese struggles who had no connections with

Kim were active in politics to permit Kim to usurp their

historical place. An example of this was a reprint of

speeches given to mark the first anniversary of liberation:

an introduction referred to the Fatherland Restoration

Association, founded by Kim in 1939, after which a Kim

speech was printed — in which he thanked the Soviets for

liberation, then proceeded to talk about current realities

in Korea. Kin was following by Kim lu-bong, who dissected

Japanese economic imperialism, and Mu Chong, who described

his anti-Japanese struggle in China. Other articles

recalled struggles on the homefront and in south K o r e a . 2 2 0

In another example, an election biography of Ch'oe Yong—kon.

National Eero) and "Choson haebang—gwa Ssoryon-ui kyolchong- chok yokhwal" (Korean Liberation and the Decisive Bole of the Soviet Union), Korean Central Yearbook 1949, pp. 62—63, 29-30. KCNA, "Choson minchok-ui ryongdocha Kim Il-song-ui kwiguk" (The Betnrn of General Kim Il-song, the Korean People’s Leader) , Korean Central Yearbook 1950, pp. 187—89.

22opanil t'usa yonsol-chip (Collection of Speeches on the anti—Japanese Fighters) (Pyongyang: Aaugust 15 Liberation First Anniversary Remembrance Central Preparatory Committe, 15 August 1947).

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a close associate of Kim, related his participation in the

Chinese Bevolutipn and told of his organizing an anti-

Japanese unit, which he personally commanded and which

exceeded 10,000 fighters by 1936. The biography noted that

the unit had been assim ilated into the Northeast Anti-

Japanese United Army as the seventh A r m y . 221

Where possible, Kim sought to co-opt other

revolutionaries. A series of newspaper sketches on

bureaucrats sim ilar to the one already referenced described

those who had struggled for Korean independence or suffered

for their patriotism. Typical of these profiled was Chang

Si—u, chief of the Commerce Bureau. A sketch told of

Chang's several imprisonments as well as his mass

organization work in the Harbin area; it emphasized that

Chang had accepted Kim's leadership and was concentrating

his energies on tasks under Kim's g u i d a n c e . 222

Kim's story was often appended to other history.

For example, a straightforward history of the Korean labor

movement detailed its vicissitudes after 1910, mentioning

22i»Election Candidates' Background Given" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0715 EST 7 August 1948. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FES, No. 371, 10 August 1948, pp. PPPl-4. (L/C PS 01766). Scalapino and Lee, Communism, I, p. 224, noted that Ch'oe and his small non- communist troop joined Kim II—song's band in early 1938. The unit size is certainly exaggerated.

222"0ri Hinchu choguk konsol-ui sont'u-eiso t'uchaeng—hanun iroh—han chidocha—iyossda" (These are Those Who Struggle in the Forefront of Our Democratic Fatherland's Construction), Hiniu Choson, 24 December 1947, p. 2.

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many noa-commonist organizations. The article went on to

say that in the midst of suppression in the 1930s, Kim

undertook armed struggle, centered on national liberation

forces, beginning in September 1931. The struggle inspired

and influenced the domestic labor movement. After

liberation by the Soviet Army, Korea embarked on the road to

victory under the splendid leadership of Kim; the article

conluded that Koreans, united "rock-like" around Premier

Kim, should march to victory . 223

Two articles on the March First Movement of 1919

linked Kim to this patriotic holiday, second only to

Liberation Day in its emotional impact. A superficial

article for a youth magazine enumerated reasons for the

failure of the Movement, mentioning that it also had its

good effects, continued resistance to the Japanese being

one. After 1931 there were meaningful steps to develop the

struggle for liberation under the "national hero and

peerless patriot Kim I l - s u n g . " 22* A second, more thoughtful

article provided context for the movement itself as well as

reasons for its failure and with this perspective, described

both domestic and foreign patriotic organizations and

22 3Ho Song—t'aek. "Choson rodong kyegup—ui choguk- ui wanchon chaju toknip-ul widaehan t"uchaeng" (The Struggle for the Complete Independence of the Fatherland by the Korean working C lasses}, Inmin IV (May 1949): 37—52.

22*Hyang Chin, "Sam-il undong-ui kyonghom-gwa kyohun" (The Experience and Lessons of the March First Movement), Ch*onenvon Saenghwal, March 1949, pp. 14-17.

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actions which developed in the wake of the tiovenent. The

article imparted that it was in this matrix that Kim's

struggle arose and concluded that while the Soviets

liberated Korea, the straggle under Kim against invaders

c o n t in u e d . 22s

Past and present were sometimes explicitly linked,

as when Kim's immediate post-liberation policies were traced

to his guerrilla days. Two articles addressed North Korean

development after 1945, attributing it to the efforts of the

Soviet Army and Kim's correct leadership, but noting that

during his guerrilla struggle, Kim had demonstrated his

leadership qualities with the "Ten great principles" of the

Fatherland Restoration Association in 1935, which were

widely accepted by the people. These compared favorably

with the 20-point program Kim preferred in 1945, which

illuminated the road to the people's w e l f a r e . 226

Modern history was enshrined in the Pyongyang

Central H istorical Museum in 1947, which added displays for

these events.227 The museum's Modern Era Section had a room

22 5Kim Tu-yong, "Sam-il undong 30 chu'nyon-ul machi- hamyonso" (Celebrating the 30th Anniversary of the March first Movement), Inmin IV (March 1949): 23-33.

22CKCNA, "Pukchoson kaekwan" (An Overview of North Korea) and "Choson inmin-ui minchok yong'ung Kim Il-sung chsmggun ipsong" (The Entry to the Capital of Kim Il-song, the Korean people's National Hero," Korean Central Yearbook 1949, pp. 55-56, €3-67.

227itAncient Culture Developed and Restored" (excerpts), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 ESI 8 September 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No.

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for Soviet Army displays as well as one for Kim and one for

the country's progress. The Sim Boom included a model of

Mangyongdae, Kim?s boyhood home, plus a photograph of

another childhood home and a school he attended. The

displays on national progress contained 316 item s, those on

Sim alone totalled 316 item s, and the Soviet Department had 909 item s.228

In summary, Kim's biography emphasized heroism and

unity, two values sorely needed in post-liberation Korea.

The stories were worded not only to suggest that he had

earned his posts as a reward for past deeds, but that these

deeds promised valorous and beneficial acts in the future.

The same lin e argued that Kim had been a unifying leader in

the past and could be again, even in the deeply fractured

society Korea was in the 1940s.

In some small measure at least, Kim sought to

identify himself with the mainstream of recent Korean

patriotic history, showing himself a part or logical

outgrowth of it. Korean—ness, heroism, unity — these were

the core ideas of the Kim myth, the ideas on which Kim would

rise to supremacy.

144, 17 September 1947, pp. PPPl-3. (L/C PS 01766)

22 8iiKim II—song changgun t'ochaeng-ui Jcirot, Ssoryon knndae-ui viyong — Pukchoson cnungang pagmulgwan hyondae—sa s il kaekwan" (The Record of General Kim Il-song's Struggle, the Grand Appearance of the Soviet Army: Opening of the North Korean Central Museum Modern History Hcoa), Miniu Choson, 13 August 1947, p. 3.

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C. KIM AND THE KPA

The formal establishment of the Korean People's Army

in February 1948 — military forces had existed in various

guises prior to this time — gave Kim II—song an additional

role, that of founder and leader of the country's armed

forces. A news dispatch reported that Kim, the wise leader

of the Korean people and originator of the KPA, had

proclaimed the KPA's existence in a formal ceremony. The

dispatch noted that the KPA possessed the strength of those

who fought the Japanese, and with Kin as its leader would be

ever-victorious.229

On the first anniversary of its founding, an article

in a youth magazine reported that the KPA was doing well

under Kim's correct leadership, that it was composed of

young anti-Japanese guerrillas loyal to the fatherland, and

that it was close to the people in the same way the Soviet

Army had ties to its people. The article stressed that the

KPA had inherited the "precious tradition" of the glorious

anti-Japanese units, led by the peerless patriot. K i n . 230

A 1949 article by a member of the EPBK inner circle

characterized the KPA as a people's army, quite different

from the military in capitalist countries, quoting Kim, its

22*MChoson Inmin-ui songpyok," p. 102.

23 05ong Ch'ol, "Inmingundae-ui pokou-nun ch'ongnyon- dului kosang-han yongye-ida" (Service in the KPA, the High Honor of Youth), Cfa'onqnyon Saenghwal. February 1949, pp. 1 9 -2 1 .

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founder, on the nature of the army. The author asserted

that with Soviet assistance and Kim's correct leadership.

North Korea bad successfully achieved development, but now

was menaced by South Korea under Syngman Bhee. The KPA,

however, composed of patriots who had struggled against

Japanese imperialism, could defend the country. In

particular. North Korea's national liberation struggle

boasted the anti-Japanese guerrillas led by Sis I l - s o n g . 23»

The implication was that Kim would be as successful in

defense as he had been in offense against the Japanese.

An anniversary evaluation of the KPA in 1950

reported that the Korean people were proud of their army and

that youth had answered the call to protect their country.

The KPA was progressing in military science with the "flesh

and b l o o d " 2 3 2 o f General Kim's anti-Japanese guerrillas.

Basking in the wise leadership of Kin and in the bosom of

the fatherland, the KPA was rated highly by the Soviets and

other countries.^33 Kin Il-song's identification with the KPA was low-

key; he was acknowledged its founder and leader, but such

23iKim II, "Choguk powi—nun kongin-ui sinsong-han wimu—imyo yongye-ida" (Fatherland Defense, the Sacred Duty and Honor of the Public), Inmin IV (July 1949): 21-31.

232Literally, "marrow and liver," an obscure term seeming to denote great intimacy.

23 3«inBingundae-nun uri-ui charang-imyo yongkwang- ida" (The KPA — our Boast and Glory), Ch'ongnvon Saenghwal. February 1950, pp. 8-9.

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references were generally lim ited to anniversary articles.

His leadership of the anti-Japanese guerrillas, however, was

held np as a guarantee that the KPA was capable of

protecting the country, a necessary reassurance, considering

the newness of the KPA, the proximity of the O.S. Army, and

the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1949.

D. BELAIIOHS WITH SOOTH KOBEA

Prior to 1948, when separate regimes arose in the

two halves of Korea, reunification remained the

responsibility of the Soviets and the O.S., leaving the

occupying powers to seek ways of installing a unity

administration. Hhen talks failed and rival regimes

emerged, each side proposed unification plans. North Korean

appeals centered on achievements in the north or on

nationalism, portraying Syngman Bhee as a O.S. puppet. The

Kin I1-song image was also used, however.

In early 1947, a representative of the North Korean

People's Committee, approving the decisions to reopen

Soviet—O.S. negotiations on unification, boasted that north

Korean fulfillm ent of the international decisions on Korea

would become the "cornerstone" of a democratic provisional

government, since north Korea was determined to strengthen

democratic reforms. The representative continued, "The

greatest leader of our people is Kim Il-song. To

immediately enforce the democratic reformations throughout

Korea as have been carried out in north Korea, we must

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follow this leader."23*

A mid-1947 article on Kim's leadership, previously

cited, argued that Kim was not lim ited to north Korea, but

because he had struggled for the liberation of a ll Korea, he

was indeed a hero to the entire people. The democratic

reforms he executed were models for all Korea, so therefore

all patriots who wished liberty and prosperity held Kim in

esteem as their leader, including south Koreans, who daily

desired his direct rule.23s Another previously cited article

appealing to youth on Kim's leadership noted that south

Koreans did not have true liberation, thus lacked peace and

happiness. After stating that Korean youth had adopted Kim

as leader and that he had benefitted them in the north, the

article assured its readers that the "sun of Korean youth"

shone also on youth in the south.23*

Upon establishment of the DPBK, North Korea took the

line that social groups and political parties in the south

which hoped for a unified and independent country supported

the DPfiK central government led by Kim II—song. A DP£K

newspaper reported for example that the Educators' Society

in South Korea had passed a resolution noting Kim's anti-

23*njoint Parley Spurs Hopes for Democracy" (excerpt), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0700 ESI 24 Hay 19 47. Translation by the PBIS. FBIS DE FES, Ho. 67, 27 flay 1947, p. LLL1- (L/C PS 01766)

23Snuinchok-ui ryongdocha-ida," pp. 18-21.

2 36wch'ongnyon-un hwanho—handa," pp. 42—45.

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Japanese struggle and the reforms adopted in the north. The

South Korean Science and Technology League compared the two

zones, finding South Korea dominated by im perialists and

traitors, and wanting fu ll democracy as found in the north

under the DPfiK led by Kim Il-song.237

Occasionally, North Korea cited Kim as the

prospective leader of the whole nation. The Ministry of

Defense issued an Order of the Day on the first anniversary

of the KPA, summjLng up the Korean situation and noting that

in the fiOK, indignant over U.S. imperialism and traitors,

the people "have risen in opposition to the oppressors and

are launching an august struggle to overthrow the Syngman

Bhee puppet government and unite a ll Korea under the central

government of the DPfiK, which is headed by General Kim 11-

s o n g . 2 3 8 Kim occasionally obtained endorsements from South

Korean figures. Two trade union officials, who transited

Pyongyang on their way to a conference in Prague, talked

about a general strike underway in the south, contrasting it

with democratic reforms seen in north Korea: these had been

achieved with the assistance of the Soviet Army and "under

237M%ia Il-song changgun-ul susok-uro ham un konghwaguk chung.*ang chongpu choldae chichi: Namchoson gak chongdang tanch'e-dul songmyong" (Absolute Support for the fiepublic's Central Government Led by General Kim II—song: Statements by Various South Korean P olitical Parties and Social Groups), ainiu Choson. 19 September 1948, p. 2.

238iij)efense Minister Issues Order of Day" (text) , Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0800 ESI 9 February 1949. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS Dfi FES, No. 27, 10 February 1949, pp. LLL7-10. (L/C PS 01766)

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the brilliant leadership of oar beloved l e a d e r . "239

Kim was frequently compared with the south Korean

leadership, naturally to his credit. An article on the

anniversary of the Kwangju Incident of 1929 noted that

students in South Korea were fighting the O.S. and traitors

such as Syngman Bhee and Kim Koo. In North Korea, by

contrast, democratic reforms had been carried out under

K i m . 2 *0 Even more directly, a 1949 item exclaimed that "when

the traitors in south Korea, in collusion with the Japanese,

drove the flower of Korean youth to the aggressor

battlefields, Korean patriots beginning with General Kim Il-

song kept up a long guerrilla warfare against the

overwhelmingly superior Japanese forces within and without,

thus defending the glory and tradition of our n a t i o n . 2*1

Defectors to the DPBK from the BOK m ilitary told a

Pyongyang crowd about bad conditions in the south. A

representative of former aviators said, "I pledge a ll my

23 9niiE2o Delegates Ask for United Struggle" (text) , Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 ESI 5 June 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 76, 10 June 1947, pp. 1113-4. (1/C PS 01766)

2*o

2+iwThe Korean People's Army is a Strong Fortress to Protect the Fatherland and the People" (summary), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0930 ESI 4 January 1949. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 10, 14 January 1949, pp. PPP1-4. (1/C PS 01766)

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loyalty to the Fatherland and General Kin Il-song" to fight

for reunification. A BOK Havy representative also pledged

his comrades to straggle for the fatherland, "upholding the

leadership of General Kim II—song. 2 *2

These themes were expanded in later periods and

reiterated countless times. The important image, central

then and later, mas Kim Il-song as a national rather than

regional leader. This was linked in all periods to the

attractiveness of the communist social system as one of the

underpinnings of the DPBK reunification program. It is

certainly possible that the north promoted Kim as a national

leader, not out of intention to attract wide support in the

south, but as a calculated move to boost his image locally.

However, the image of Kim as a hero to the southern Korean

population is consistent with other facets of the overall

image which portrayed Kim as having fought the Japanese for

the liberation of all Korea and as the ultimate product of

the Korean race. The north Koreans never considered

themselves a rump regime ruling half the peninsula, but as

the government of all Koreea, temporarily denied the

exercise of power in the south; the image of Kim as a

national leader complimented this concept.

2* 2wg. Korea Airmen Glad They Came" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0900 EST 28 September 1949. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS OB FE, No. 190, 3 October 1949, pp. CCC4-7. (L/C PS 01766); "Two S. Korea Crewmen Hake Statements" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0900 EST 28 September 1949. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS Dfi FE, No. 192, 5 October 1949, pp. PPPl-4. L/C PS 01766.

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E. IMAGES OF STALIN AND MAO

Stalin's Cult of Personality was at its height in

the 1940s, at the time Korea was liberated and during the

formative years of Kin's regime; this cult was exhibited in

north Korea by the Soviet occupation force, with paeans to

Stalin appearing regularly in the media. Stalin's portrait

was ubiquitous, at least until 1949, when Soviet troops

withdrew, and was prominent afterwards; Stalin was liberally

quoted in Korean publications.

As w ill be explained b e l o w , 2 * 3 stalin enhanced his

own stature by raising Lenin's and then associating himself

with Lenin; in sim ilar fashion. Kin associated himself with

Stalin while north Korean media praised the Soviet leader's

thoughts and accomplishments. Both the praise accorded

Stalin and Kim's connection with it could be expected in the

early period, when Soviet troops remained in occupation of

Korean territory., but, as w ill be seen, praise of Stalin

continued in the DPBK well past the dictator's death.

An early Soviet description of Korea quoted a

peasant as saying that since Stalin had liberated them,

Stalin was their f a t h e r . 2 * * Another early reference to

Stalin, from a provincial newspaper, explained that the

243A discussion of Stalin's cult and a comparison with Kim's is to be found in Chapter VI.

2++MÏWO Sorters Eeport on V isit to Bussia" (text), Moscow in Korean to Korea, 0300 ESI 30 October 1946. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 217-1946, 31 October 1946, pp. Dl-2. (L/C PS -2755)

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progressive peoples of the world were celebrating Stalin's

birthday. Stalin was the successor to Lenin's tasks, close

friend of the working masses, and teacher; under his

guidance, the Russian people first established a Soviet

nation. Stalin's whole life had been spent in struggle,

including the difficult times in the Fatherland lar, but had

he led the Soviet people to triumph. 2**

An open letter of gratitude, dated September 18,

1948, to the "beloved" Marshal Stalin, called him the "Iron

Marshal," and said the 30 m illion Korean people expressed

their deep emotions to him, since he liberated them, gave

them assistance, and continued to get them to advance on the

road to victory in national construction. 2*6 The open letter

then listed the many instances of progress since 1945 and

the fact that Stalin was standing up to the O.S.

A youth magazine stated that youth revered Stalin as

the "great leader"2*7 of the proletariat, teacher of the

democratic youth of the world, and creator of the world's

first socialist society. The magazine enjoined Koreans to

2*sm5soryon inmin taesungni-ui changchokcha—imyo inryu-ui kusong—in widae-han Ssutallin" (Great Stalin, Creator of the Great Victory of the Soviet People, the Sun of Mankind), Kanqwon Inminbo. 21 December 1947, p. 1.

246"Ssutallin taewonsu-eigei ponaen-nun kamsamun" (Letter of Gratitude Sent to Marshal Stalin), Sae-Choson. no. 9, undated, pp. 4-9. Note that the population figure includes both north and south Korea.

2*70sing the same term, widaefaan survong» which Kim Il-song later appropriated for his own title .

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learn from the Soviet experience. 2*3

On Stalin's seventieth birthday, a North Korean

magazine reported that the occasion was celebrated over the

entire world, because Stalin was friend to the world's

oppressed people; the Korean people joined them in offering

unlimited respect and honor to him. Onder Stalin's

leadership, the OSSS had been successful in uprooting plots,

righting class relationships, and establishing the Bed Army.

Koreans now joined with the Soviets in opposing D.S.

imperialism and Syngman Bhee. The article ended with a

cheer for the "benefactor of Korean iiberation."2*9

A 1950 book by a respected, ex-south Korean

intellectual provided North Koreans with first-hand

descriptions of the OSSB and its leader. The book asserted

that Marshal Stalin was not only Lenin's successor, but

also, as the "sun of communist thought," the founder of

communist society and "perfector of communism in one

nation." Therefore, Stalin, the greatest teacher, led more

than the Soviet Onion and Bolshevik Party, he led the

world's peoples and workers . 250

2*eyi Man-song, "Ssutallin-gwa ch'ongnyon" (Stalin and Youth), Ch'ongnyon Saenohwal, December 1949, pp. 8-15.

2*9"Ssutallin-un inryu haebang-ui kusong-ida: Ssutallin taewonsu t'ansaeng ch'ilsip chu'nycn-ei che-hayo" (Stalin, Organizer of People's Liberation: Offered on Marshal Stalin's 70th Birthday), Choson Nvoscnq, December 1949, pp. 2-7.

2sopaek Nam-un, Ssorvon insang (Impressions of the Soviet Onion) (Pyongyang: Korean History Editorial

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I d contrast to Stalin, Mao Tse-tnng received only

fleeting reference in North Korean media. It is important

to remember in this regard that the CCP did not take power

in China until 1949 and prior to that year, Soviet troops

remained in occupation of north Korea.

When North Korean media referred to Mao, he was

generally only called "comrade," or "mister," and his

leadership of the CCP noted. & book on the general

situation in China typified north Korean treatment of Mao:

it gave him only random mention. A chapter on CCP liberated

cireas said only that these areas were putting into practice

the points enumerated by Mister Mao in his speech on new

democracy at the Seventh Party Congress. This chapter

contained a one-sentence quotation from M a o . 2 5i

A more fulsome title was occasionally bestowed, but

Mao's importance as a world leader circumscribed. For

example, the DPBK described the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty as a

victory of Generalissimo Stalin's peaceful diplomacy and "a

new achievement of the great chairman Mao Tse—tung of the

Central People's Government of the CPE." 2S 2

Committee, 17 March 1950), pp. 4—5, 92-102-

251NKWP Central Headquarters Propaganda and Agitation Department, Chungguk cfaongsei (The China Situation) (Pyongyang: NKiP Publishing Company, 15 July 1949), pp. 38-39.

25 2HJJ. Koreans Welcome Sino—Soviet Treaty" (excerpts), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1100 EST 19 February 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 35, 20 February 1950, pp. CCl-4. (L/C PS 01766)

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It w ill be argued hereafter, in Chapter VI, that

much of the imagery of Stalin's Cult became the basis for

the later images in Kin's cult. Revolutionary, liberator,

founder, builder, teacher, father, great leader, world

benefactor — these are the images Kin propagated as his

own.

F. COBMESTS

Kim Il-song's in itia l images leave the impression

that he was sui -generis. He appeared as the leader, with no

public discussion on his qualifications or comparison with

others; he was simply there and leading. In another sense

also he seemed to have little background: the media provided

minimal data on Kim's early life. L ittle was said about his

parentage or education, and while much was made of Kim's

patriotic character and his guerrilla army, the story was

imprecise at many points of known history. L ittle enough

was told about how he acquired the noble traits and keen

ability the media touted.

The scope of media coverage of Kim in the 1940s was

not excessive for the chief executive of the country and

senior party official. What makes the coverage significant

is that, in a time when the leadership had not been settled

satisfactorily for many of the contenders, who yet wielded

considerable power, Kim was the only one whose activities

and background were regularly reported, whose photographs

were constantly published. It should not be supposed,

however, that every article included credit to Kim for

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ec(momie or social progress; most, in fact, merely described

the people's efforts with resultant benefits. But when

individual kudos were awarded to the leadership, they almost

invariably went to Kim.

Kin's position was reinforced not only by

consistently favorable exposure, but by constant repetition

of simple phrases about him. The repetition of the word

"leader" for Kim could not help but reinforce this concept

among the people. Repetition of elegant slogans and

reiteration of Kim's background undercut the claims of other

contenders for pgwer. In considering the examples provided

for the varied facets of Kim's image, it should be

remembered that each type of propaganda statement was

repeated countless times.

It is surprising to find so many phrases and

concepts characteristic of Kim's cult in later periods

already present in the 1940s. Perhaps these concepts have

deep appeal to the Korean people and thus remained current,

or perhaps Kin himself preferred this style of adulation.

The publicity about Kim was composed of a rtificia l

elements from the beginning. Hhether or net one can accept

Han Chae—tok's assertion that he invented certain elements

in the myth,2S3 it is certain that the earliest versions

2S3Han's story possesses a certain amount of appeal but it is difficult to assess his credibility. Scalapino and Lee, in Communism, do not address this directly, but quote Han extensively from both written material and interviews, at one point acknowledging a debt to him. They

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were already contrived to reflect certain politically—

significant factors. Kin's personal importance to the

revolution or liberation movement was exaggerated, as were

his rank and the size of the unit he commanded. Potentially

emharassing elements were elim inated, such as the Kim unit's

subordination to the Chinese Communists and Kim's interlude

in the Soviet Onion after 1941.

Thus, Kim's biography generally was lim ited to a

broad outline, without details, particularly about his early

years; as a rule Kin's life before the 1930s was limited to

a few dates and places, but with no explanations. Tales of

the guerrilla days themselves were lim ited to a relatively

few battles, associated organizations, and revolutionary

sites; much of the material addressed the daily lives and

national spirit of the fighters. It seems that the mere

existence of a revolutionary background was sufficient for

Kim's purposes at this time; as the myth's uses expanded,

the details did l i k e w i s e - 2 S*

The public reaction to Kim is difficult to gauge.

It is quite probable that a large fount of genuine respect

note that his 1970 death "was a great loss to scholars concerned with North Korea." See pp. 314-15, 323-24.

2s*one might speculate of course that Kim himself suppressed details not released at this time, as his subordination to the Chinese and probable exile in the Soviet Union could have embarassed him and nullified the advantages his biography had provided. The absence of more information about his parents is intriguing, the more so since they became major figures in the cult 15 years later. See Chapter ¥, pp. 267-72.

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and appreciation did exist, since Kim — apart from his

gu erilla background — vas portrayed as the purveyor of

material and spiritual benefits and the people, lacking

alternative sources of information, had no method of

weighing his contribution against that of others.ass The

close sim ilarity of media testim onials to Kim, however,

whether by the elite or the masses, clearly indicate that

expressions of appreciation or support were not free from

official influence.

It would seen, however, that the news and propaganda

cibout Kin said jnst what Koreans wanted to hear, that they

were a great people, the proof of it being their production

of an outstanding leader. This ran contrary to what they

had been taught by the Japanese, but appealed directly to

their badly-starved self-esteem and injured national pride.

This may be a "latent" content of the symbol, as Lasswell

and Kaplan have suggested. 2S6 Behind the boasts of Kim's

abilities resided the hunger of the Korean people for self-

respect and prestige.

There was no apparent conflict in simultaneously

bolstering both Kim and Korean pride. Kim's propaganda was

cleverly constructed to link him explicitly with the

zssprom juany perspectives, things were better materially for most Koreans: the hated Japanese had been replaced by a Korean regime and the quality of life had risen. The general public had no independent way of knowing whether th is was attributable to Kim or not.

2S6Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society, p. 104.

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resurgent feeling of nationalism and worth. Kim's virtues

were the proof that Korea possessed nobility of character,

his achievements the sign that Koreans were a people of

great ability.

It should not be supposed, however, that Kim was a

Korean "Everyman," the precursor of the future, the model to

which each Korean could aspire. He was clearly the

authority figure, a leader whose actions and thoughts were

to be studied and emulated, but one absolutely superior to

others. This image probably derives from the authority

figure of Korean Confucianism, which is to be discussed in

Chapter VI.

It was clearly indicated at least from 1947, the

time when possibilities for a genuine unified goverment were

receding, that Kim was the leader of a ll Koreans, although

the claim was not as strident as many others about Kim. The

concern seemed to be first, Kim as leader in the north — he

still had powerful rivals there. The claim often was made

with comparisons: the prosperous democratic north, led by

Kim, against the plundered, traitor-led south. Kin's claims

to pan-national leadership became most explicit when

important interzpnal events raised or lowered unification

chances. Claims to national leadership also bolstered his

claim to legitimacy in the north alone.

The Kim Il-song story provides a fine example of the

"modern weapon" which Ernst Cassirer warned against when he

noted that political myths were being manufactured to

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facilitate political c o n t r o l . 2 sr seems clear from the

effort expended on the Kim story that just such a weapon was

forged in North Korea from liberation.

The question of who developed the early cult and

shepherded its growth is still unclear. The early Soviet

involvement in according Kin a buildup strongly suggests

their hand in this. The Soviets had frequently criticized

factionalism in the KCF prior to liberation, 2sa and it seems

logical that they might seek a strong personal leader as a

safeguard against renewed and destructive Korean internecine

struggles. (If this be so, the Soviets hedged their bets,

allowing others such as Pak Bong—yong a measure of power and

prestige, perhaps as a check on Kim or as a replacement

should he prove unsuitable). While it is possible the

Soviets intended the nascent Kim Cult to legitim ize

communist rule in Korea rather than promoting Kim's

leadership for its own sake, communist politics in the north

became quite complex soon after liberation, with many

factions contending for power or influence. Thus, whether

the cult had an original legitim izing function — or even a

unifying function — it sw iftly evolved into a personal tool

in the leadership squabble.

The role of Kim and his supporters in the early

25 7Ernst Cassirer, Myth of the State, pp. 282-86.

2S8%enia Joukeff Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the Far East, 1920-27 (Stanford: Stanford U n iv e r s it y P r e s s , 19 5 7 ).

133

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period remains ambiguous. He certainly had ambition and, as

later events revealed, acute political sk ills, but the

extent of his early involvement is unclear. He must have

been more than a passive partner, but the nature of his

direction of the buildup cannot be determined.

The early period of Kim's Cult, which laid a strong

foundation for inter extension, served well in positioning

Kim among the other leaders. It did so largely by seeking

to restore what Erik Erikson called the "rituals of

existence" among the "charisma-hungry."2s* The propaganda

which stressed Kim's service in the struggle against Japan,

and even more, the stress on "uniting" around Kim in effect

invited Koreans to formulate a sense of themselves as

Koreans and to participate in a movement which was

establishing a genuinely Korean society and nation.

The process observed resembled Claude Ake's

"charismatic legitim ization," in which loyalty to a new

state is forged by the personal influence of a charismatic

leader. According to Ake, the crucial prerequisite for

charismatic leadership is mass perception of the leader as

endowed with grace, which stim ulates an emotional commitment

to him; this process includes flamboyant ceremonies,

ceaseless glorification, and occasional religious

santification.2*o The example of Kim does not fit Ake's

2S9see discussion in Chapter I, pp. 21-22.

2&ociaude Ake, "Charismatic Leadership," pp. 1-7.

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model perfectly, since Ake's example, Nkruaa of Ghana,

shoved how renowned figures in their countries' liberation

straggle lent their prestige to the new state. The struggle

to propagate Kim 11-song's fame occurred simultaneously with

the movement to establish a communist system in Korea;

nevertheless, as Kim acquired a reputation, he placed it at

the new system's service.

The Kim story did not achieve the status of "state

myth" in the 1945-50 period, nor could the phenomenon yet be

called a Cult of Personality, according to the principles

proposed in Chapter I. Although the Kim story appropriated

much o f t h e p r e s s s p a c e , many o th e r a n ti-J a p a n e s e a c t i v i t i e s

were mentioned, and while media attention might have

suggested Kim's was primary, this could not be stated

overtly. Memories were too fresh and others too powerful to

permit this.

In addition, no serious attempt was made to

interpret Korea's past or the Korean experience through this

single figure. Kim II—song was presented as an important,

even crucial, individual, but not yet the focus of Korean

h is t o r y -

social properties conducive to a Personality Cult

were certainly present: 1)with the collapse of Japanese

authority, most government institutions also collapsed;

those who promoted Kim had inordinate influence in their

reconstruction. Thus, not only was an institutional bulwark

against a cult lacking, the new institutions were designed

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to facilitate individual rule- 2} The intelligentsia was

fragmented, just as Korea itse lf was polarized between le ft

and right. Many intellectuals emigrated north, but in such

cases, lacked a base from which to criticize the regime

effectively. 3) The regime had enemies, both in the rival

structure emerging in south Korea and in contestants for

power in its own zone- 4) Immediately after liberation,

noirth Korea sought to achieve a radical social

transformation, j.ncluding agricultural reform and greater

industrialization, building upon the plant left by the

Japanese- The resultant mobilization struck at traditional

social organization in the villages, and may have been as

disruptive to the "rituals of existence" as outright

represssion had been- 5) Wide gaps existed in education

levels, with the masses either illiterate or marginally

literate- Despite this, there existed a pool of highly

educated personnel, although here too, lacking in technical

expertise. 6) The north Korean regime had a near monopoly

of the instruments of mass communications, with a ll

broadcasting and publication done by the state. Some south

Korean materials were available, but generally only in

lim ited areas.

In sum, these conditions constituted an unsettled

society, whose flux and discontent could be channelled into

manifestations desired by the regime, including a

Personality Cult- However, a cult did not emerge at this

tim e. The Kim phenomenon might more properly be called

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"hero worship" — and induced hero worship at that.

The Kim phenomenon emerged within the context of a

regime seeking authoritarian control. The controlled media

credited Kim with important policy initiatives and their

successes (failures were seldom if ever publicly admitted)

and he was quoted frequently, usually on technical subjects

such as agriculture or economics, although he did not yet

have a "canon" of approved writings. His speeches were

widely circulated and served as texts for study, but there

was no uniform version, and such study usually confined

itself to recent utterances, as opposed to a collection of

"classic" works. Finally, Kim still had rivals, both

perceived and in fact: Kim Tu-bong was his titular superior

within the KHP, while other high officials possessed strong

factions. Thus, both Kim's actual latitude as leader and

his image were somewhat circumscribed, albeit subtly.

137

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WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

Between 1950 and 1965, North Korean leaders

confronted challenges unprecedented in their experience.

They had likely assumed that a war would he of short

duration, after which a united country could solve the

ensuing economic problems. Instead, the Korean War lasted

in excess of three years, depleting manpower and resources,

and costing the DPRK its prewar industrial plant. Extensive

destruction necessitated great post-war sacrifices, even

with assistance granted by Bloc nations. The Kim Il-song

Faction also experienced a series of domestic challenges to

its leadership. Factionalists with leanings toward the

Soviet Union or the PRC actively sought to replace Kim or at

least obtain a greater measure of collective decision­

making; the factionalists were eliminated in the mid-1950s.

These factional challenges were abetted by

international events, including de—Stalinization, which

weighed against individualistic leadership, and the Sino-

Soviet sp lit, which ended the unified support North Korea

had enjoyed in the face of perceived U.S. threats. The DPRK

had reason to fear aggression from the south: Syngman Ehee

was overthrown in 1960, and an interim government was itse lf

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replaced by a military junta- The O.S. was seen as menacing

Cuba and Vietnam., and thus potentially an enemy to a ll small

communist states.

The responses by the Kim Faction to these internal

and external challenges involved a panoply of leadership

tools, of which the Cult of Personality figured prominently.

Kim successfully overcame each of these challenges, emerging

by the mid-1960s as a stronger, nearly unassailable leader.

The hero-worship begun during the first years after

liberation constituted a ready tool to brandish before a

people in need of unifying and sustaining symbols. The

images current in 1950 included Kim as a battle-tested and

ever-victorious general, peerless patriot, and source of

economic progress — a ll images with strong applicability to

the second period as well. The regime retained and in fact,

embellished them., adding further symbols appropriate to the

problems at hand.

The period of post-war reconstruction saw the

transition in North Korea from hero worship of Kin to a Cult

of Personality, according to the criteria posited in Chapter

I. Kim enunciated policy and was credited with resulting

successes- Increasingly, his speeches and theses assumed

the properties o^ an authorized canon- Most telling of all,

Korea's modern history was interpreted through Kin, the

vehicle being the development of a state myth about his

anti-Japanese guerrillas. The seeds of this transition were

planted during the war, with the use of Kim as a unifying

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symbol and with enhanced biographies, the fruition came

during reconstruction, with the leader a ubiquitous symbol

of progress.

One significant contribution of the Cult of Kim

during this period was an infusion of pride into the

population. This pride was both individual and collective,

helping those whp had been repressed by the Japanese to

regain a sense of self-worth and a resurgence of patriotism.

Pride lay in the fact that the country could produce such a

leader; worth resided in fulfilling his sage plans. To be

sure, Kim's invitation to pride coincided with a surge of

nationalism following the Korean lar, promoting it and

benefitting from it simultaneously.

In this chapter, we w ill discuss the changes and

extensions to the image Kim presented during the war and

immediate post-war years, plus the factors which turned hero

worship into a cult. As might be expected, during the war,

Kim's image stressed m ilitary prowess and unity, with

inspiration to the home front a secondary theme. Following

the war, Kim naturally emphasized his inspiration of and

participation in industrial and agricultural rebuilding,

with the economic benefits derived from his administration a

strong theme. In both segments of this period, the regime

revised history to support his image ; the first

comprehensive biography of Kim appeared in 1952 and was

supported in the following decade with increasing detail

about his life. This period also encompassed the beginning

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of a major shift in Borth Korean international alignment, as

it vent from closeness vith the USSB to vorldvide

associations. This vas also reflected in Kim's image:

daring the var, he closely identified vith Stalin and, to a

lesser extent, vith Mao; aftervard, be became a figure of

broader concerns.

I . THE HAETIME PEEIOD 195 0 -5 3

A. THE IMAGE GOES TO WAS

The Fatherland Liberation Bar (as the DPEK calls it)

began June 25, 1350

until September, the north enjoyed victorious southward

advance; from September to November, DPEK forces vere in

retreat before a O.S./ON offensive; from November, vhen the

CPT intervened, until the ceasefire in August 1953, the var

lay in general stalemate, vith limited operations confined

to the waist of the peninsula. The war ended with a

m ilitarily-tenable line as a boundary to replace the

cumbersome 38th parallel, but left the two Kcreas with

territory corresponding to prewar holdings. That is, the

Korean Har had settled nothing: its main results were a

terrible loss of life, incalculable physical damage,

international intervention, and ossification of attitudes in

both halves of the country.

1. THE EAEII SAE

The day following the war's onset, the DPEK

announced formation of a M ilitary Committee, in which a ll

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sovereign powers of the state were to be concentrated; Kim

U-song was named its chairman. On July 5, the SPA issued

an ordnance appointing Kim Commander—in—chief of the KPA.z**

Kin made a national radio address charging that the north

had been attacked, and calling upon the citizenry to repel

the invaders.

An editorial of early July explained the rationale

behind the appointments. Considering the emergency when

O.S. and EOK forces attacked, the SPA appointed the "beloved

and respected leader" and people's hero as Supreme

Commander. Kin had persisted for 20 years in the anti-

Japanese straggle and after liberation had led the people to

victory in democratic development. The KPA held him in

unlimited respect and had acclaimed him their supreme

commander. The editorial reminded the sons and daughters of

Korea about Kim's teachings on the independence struggle,

adding that Koreans upheld these and were ever more firmly

united around him.zaz

2*i"An Ordinance of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (tex t), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0828 GMT 26 June 1950. Translation by the FfilS. PBIS DB PE, No. 123, 26 Ju n e 1 9 5 0 , p . CCC1. (L/C PS 01766) and "Kim I I Sung Made Commander in Chief" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1000 GMT 5 July 1950. Translation by the PBIS. PBIS DR FE, No. 130, 6 July 1950, p. CCCI- (L/C PS 01766)

262nchonch'e inmin-un uri minchok—chok yong'ung Kim Il-song changgun chuwi-e touk kutke tangyol-hayo miche-ui ch'imryak-ul punsae-hacha" (Let Us, the Entire People, Even More Pirmly United Around Our National Hero, General Kim Il- song, Crush U.S. Imperialism's Invasion), Baebana Ilbo. 8 July 1950, p. 1.

142

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On the fifth anniversary of liberation, the press

found the people celebrating unprecedented victories, with

three reasons for elation: liberation itself; Koreans had

taken the correct path to independence and reunification

under Kim's leadership; and the O.S. invasion had been

rebuffed. Kin had given the order to repel the O.S. and the

Bhee "gang" in order to liberate the entire country and the

KPA had executed it; the Pusan Perimeter soon would be

l i b e r a t e d . 2*3 Pyongyang remarked that people had geared

everything to the war effort from the very start, under

Kim's leadership. They determined to attain unification and

independence, "so, let us advance with indomitable spirit

and unite more splidly around our national leader..."z**

Kim acguired key endorsements for the DPEK war

effort. Christians, who might have been expected to support

the EOK, spoke of their support for the north. For example,

the Chairman of the North Korean Christian league denounced

U.S. bombing and urged Christians to fight for the

fatherland in response to Kin's a p p e a l . 2*s y o u th , who bore

263wKim 11-song changgun-ui myongryong paddulgo ch'oechong—chok sungri-rul hyang—hayo ap'uro!" (Obeying General Kin Il-song's order. Forward Toward final Victory), giniu Choson, 18 August 1950, p .1.

264"Ihe Movement for Contributing to the Funds for the Purchase of Airplanes, Tanks, and Warships for the People's Armed Forces is Being launched as a Nation-wide Popular Movement" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0245 GMT 5 August 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS BE F£, No. 155, 10 August 1950, pp. PPP14-15. (L/C PS 01766)

265MChristian Clergy Hits U.S. Imperialism" (text),

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the brunt of the fighting, also endorsed Kim. In addition

to workers, youth were volunteering for the service.

Fifteen orphans under 15 years old said, "Premier (Kim) is

our father, we must go to the front."Z**

North Korean propaganda associated Kim fully with

victory. For example, a correspondent toured battlefields

and liberated areas in September, providing a factual

description of conditions. He heard the troops praising Kim

and quoted a number of slogans he heard, all to the effect

that Kim had given them the victory and would continue to do

50.26 7 The media reflected the pride felt in victory,

coupling it with unabashed praise of Kim. This mood was

often expressed in poetry:

O glorious/people's general./Our commander—in-chief./In any rear area or liberated region/at any front,/any attack zone "—/your image is always with us..../Y our affectionate voice:/a burning call of patriotism./Even vowing with our life's blood --/we today also/ beat the enemy — in glorious intimacy/we go south on the road of fighting, the road of victory.z**

Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 2200 GMT 6 August 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DS FE, No. 157, 14 August 1950, pp. BBB3-10. (L/C PS 01766)

266M%he Enemy is K illing Os. Take Op Guns and Go to the War Front to Exterminate the Enemy" (summary), Sinaiju (North Korean-controlled) in Korean to Korea, 1418 GHT 29 October 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 212, 31 October 1950, pp. PPP13-14. (L/C PS 01766)

26 7chon Ok, "Chongkunki: Kyongpuk chonson-eiso" (War Correspondence: at the North Kyongsang Battlefront), Miniu Chosong 12 September 1950, p. 4.

268üin Pyong-kyun, "Ori-ui ch'oego saryonggwan— sisyo" (He is Our Supreme Commander), Miniu Choson. 12

144

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The KPA continued to he associated vith its

purported antecedents. An editorial described it as truly a

people's army, a clear contrast to the ECK military in its

mutual love and respect vith the people. The KPA had

inherited the patriotism as veil as the combat experience of

Kin's guerrillas and proved itself with many examples of

heroism .26 9 a military official at the KPA anniversary in

1952 attributed the army's proficiency to its heritage, the

tradition of Kim's straggle — but also the "valuable

experience" of the Soviet Army. The official claimed that

the KPA was improving its sk ill by upholding the leader's

instructions, and that KPA casualties called mansei for the

KHP and Kim until their la st b r e a t h . 2 7 0

Interestingly, however, stories concerning

individual soldiers concentrated on their heroism and

patriotism, vith few references to Kim. The reasons for

fighting and sacrificing were universal themes: love of

country combined with comradeship and hatred of the enemy.

The DPEK also invoked the spirit of past heroes such as

August 1950, p. 2. (verses emitted)

269"chospn inmingundae-nun chinchong-han inm in-ui kundae—ida" (The KPA Dnits are a True People's Army), Haebanq Ilbo. 21 June 1950, p. 1.

270Kim Ong, "Choson Inmingun—un p'ilsungpulp'ae-ui ryokryang-uro changsong kanghwa-dwiossda" (The KPA has Strengthened its Growth as as an Invincible Force, Certain o f V ic t o r y ) , Modong Sinmun. 5 February 1 9 5 2 , p . 2 . M ansei is equivalent to the Japanese banzai, meaning "10,000 years," or "long live."

145

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Admiral ïi Sun—sin , who forced the withdrawal of fiideyoshi's

armies, and General Olchi Mun-dok, who turned hack Sui

D yn asty f o r c e s . 2^ 21 Another soldier told of executing the

leader's orders in battle and vowed he would fight to his

last drop of blood to carry them o u t . 2 7 *

Although Kim was primarily concerned with m ilitary

matters, he also projected civilian images, fie visited

rural villages to inspect wartime conditions and

preparations for spring planting; he mingled with farmers

and answered their guestions.2 7 s another instance, a

National Conference of Scientists adopted a message to Kim,

extending honor and congratulations to him, and promising to

aid in rehabilitation work as well as study advanced science

27iAn example of a Kim-less tale of soldiering — of which there were many — is Kin long, "Yang T'ae-hyon yong'ung-ui mopom-ul ttara" (Following the Example of Hero Yang T'ae-hyon), Hin1u Choson. 23 September 1950, p. 3. As will be explored below, the DPEK in later years claimed that loyalty and affection for Kim were the prime motivation for the troops. 272

27 2Q(idly enough, reports about guerrillas behind ON lines or exhortations to participate in such resistance generally made no reference to Kim's past as a partisan leader ; it is unclear why. There were, however, many passing references to Kim, as in the sketch of an heroic officer who explained that the army was fighting for the fatherland, party, and l e a d e r . 273

2 73«Konghwaguk i-chungyong'ung Paek Sa-sun chunkichung daechang" (The Fatherland's Double Hero Paek Sa­ sun, Armor Company Commander), Nodong Sinmun. 30 January 19 52, p. 3.

27«HSuryong karuch'i-nun killo* (On the Eoad the leader Taught), Modong Sinmun. 15 February 1952, p. 3.

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for the good of the n a t i o n . 2 7 6

O fficially, Kim was the KPA's "beloved and respected

leader," and "inspirer of our victory." At an award

ceremony for him, three soldiers representing KPA branches

testified that he always issued correct orders, always led

the KPA to victory, and the KPA always fu lfilled his orders.

The troopers insisted they could not speak of Kin's name and

glory, and offered him a letter of gratitude . 277 ih e SPA

noted in the award citation that it was for his "outstanding

services in founding and strengthening" the KPA and in

mobilizing the "entire national sight to crush the American

and (Bhee) invaders, insuring ultimate victory."27*

The most frequent appelation for Kim was "general,"

with an honorific suffix attached; he was also called

27S"General Kim II Sung Conversation with farmers in South Pyongyan Province" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1200 GUT 31 March 1951. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, NO. 68, 2 April 1951, pp. CCCl-5. (1/C PS 01766) The truth of the extent of these activities is uncertain, but is relatively unimportant; what concerns us is the image employed.

27 6w scisntists Sold National Conference" (excerpts), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1100 GMT 6 May 1952. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 91, 7 May 1952, pp. EEE2-3. (L/C PS 05125)

27 7uKim II—song changgun-ggeso kukkihunchang cheil— kup suyo padusinde—daehayo" (General Kim Il-song Awarded the National Flag Medal, First Class), Nodong Sinmun, 14 February 1951, p. 1.

278"KiB II Sung Given National Flag Medal" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1200 GMT 7 February 1951. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 32, 8 February 1951, p. BB1. (I/C PS 01766)

147

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"comrade,** "premier," and " com ma nder—in - ch ief " (almost a ll

war news appeared as reports from an unnamed commander-in-

chief) . Other titles included the "beloved and respected

leader," "the wise leader of the KPA, Democratic People's

Republic, and Korean people," "our people's leader," and the

"stimulator of victory." The title "leader" was always the

Korean word survong, denoting a superior figure. Each

phrase was reinforced by constant repetition.z?*

As before, the regime portrayed unity with Kim as a

high national virtue. This was often illustrated in

obituaries. The funeral notice for Kim long—sam claimed

that "like a ll the Korean people," the late Minister of

Electric Power had been united with Kim "like iron" in the

fight for independence and reunification. 2so a remembrance

of Kang Kon noted that he had joined Kim's guerrillas in

1933 at the age of 16, that he had accepted Kim's leadership

and become Kim's close comrade-in-arms. Kang had been in

numerous figh ts, but under Kin's "correct guidance and

teaching," he had emerged always victorious. After Korea

was liberated, Kang had nurtured military cadre, again under

Kim's direct guidance. 2*1

2795ee Chapter III, pp. 83, 103-04 for an explication of leadership terms.

2 8 0nkg Kj.m long—san tongchi" (The la te Comrade Kin Yong-sam), Nodong Sinmun. 1 September 1952, p. 3.

zoinyoly.ol-han aegukt'usa—imyo usu-han kunsa chonryokga-go Kang Kon tongchi" (The Ardent Patriotic Fighter, the Splendid M ilitary Devotee, the late Comrade

1 4 8

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Stress on Kim as an ideologue worthy of study

intensified as the war progressed. His speeches and

writings had been objects of study in the prewar period, as

noted above, but the effort became more organized. For

example, discussants at a 1952 conference urged adoption of

Kin's teachings as a way of uprooting old ideas while

strengthening party administrative work. 2 *2 Another article

related examples of KPA personnel, government o fficia ls, and

People's Committee cadre adopting Kim's teachings as their

guide. The chairman of the Pyongyang People's Committee

told of his work to adopt Kim's thoughts, which were based

on a scientific analysis of reality, to root out incorrect

or old-fashioned t h i n k i n g . 2 *3 Another article depicted the

masses, including farmers, engaged in discussing Kin's

speeches on the activities of functionaries. 28*

Kim's thought also applied to specific problems. A

Kang Kon), Nodong Sinmun. 8 September 1952, p. 2.

282»surypng-ui kyosi-rul silch'on k'iwi-han t'uchaeng: flamaamdo dangwiwon chonwonhoe-so" (The Struggle to Foster Eealization of the Leader's Teachings: at the Plenary Session of the South Bamgyong Party Committee), Nodong Sinmun, 19 March 1952, p. 2.

28 3«Kia Il-song changgun-ui kyosi-rul chich'im—uro inmin-ui ch'ungsil-han pokmucha-ka towchal" (Let Os be Public Servants Loyal to the People, Bith General Kim 11- song's Teachings as Guide), Nodong Sinmun. 6 March 1952, p. 1.

2 8*"KiB Il-song changgun-ui yonsol-ul chich'im-uro inmin-ui ch'ungsil-han pokmucha-ka ap'urol" (Let Os be Public Servants Loyal to the People, Hith General Kim II- song's Speech as Guide!), Nodong Sinmun. 24 February 1952, p . 1.

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1952 article explained the gravity of the grain question,

vith a need for p>arty workers to maintain links with the

people and motivate them. The way to motivate the public

was to study the leader's speeches and quote them to the

masses.285 jn this regard, quotations from Kim frequently

appeared in editorials addressing grain production as

crucial to the war effort. Elsewhere, Kim exchanged letters

with a farmer who harvested an early and large rice crop:

the farmer called Kim "the center of admiration of all

Korean people;" Kim highly praised the farmer's actions.z**

2 . THE IMAGE IS OCCUPIED SOOIfi KOREA

During the first months of the war. North Korean

forces engulfed nearly a ll South Korean territory, including

a majority of its population. The south was then subjected

to apparently long-prepared propaganda designed to gain both

cooperation and support. According to a 1950 study,

propaganda in the former ROK capital was "simple, intense,

bitter," and included praise for the Soviets and Kim's

government as well as promises of reform. The propaganda

sported pictures of Kim and Stalin; images of these two were

28SKxm Ch'ung—chi, "Suryong-ui kycsi—rul mopom- chokuro silch'on—hanun chido ilggundul: sep'o saop-eso" (Leadership Functionaries Bho are Realizing the Leader's Teaching as a Model: Cell Work), Nodong Sinmun. 16 Jun 1952, p. 2.

28 611Kin II Sung Writes Farmer on Rice Crop" (excerpts), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1000 GHT 3 September 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FE, No. 175, 8 September 1950, pp. BBB6-8. (L/C PS 01766)

150

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substituted for those of £0K dignitaries: the study cited

artists who complained that they had been assigned to paint

only pictures of Kim and S t a l i n . znv

A subjective analysis of Haebanq Ilbo. published in

Seoul in July and August 1950, 28a reveals an emphasis on Kim

Il-song, but no more than befitted the leader of the

country; indeed, Rim's coverage might be considerably less

than expected for a national leader on the brink of victory

in war. He was mentioned in all but three of the 28

available issues; however, apart from official statements,

most references were general ones about his "correct

leadership," or quotations from his speeches in editorials

and articles. Many articles noted in passing that a

particular segment of the population was upholding Kim's

teachings, then .proceeded to other news. Kim's rivals, Pak

Hon-yong and Kim lu-bong, were also depicted, generally as

executing government business or exchanging messages with

foreign counterparts.

It should be remembered that the northerners had the

2S7john H. alley Jr. & Bilbur Schramm, The Beds take a city (Hew Brunswick, H.J.: Butgers University Press, 1951), pp. 34, 49, 108, 113, 119, 37. The study was conducted via interviews in 1950 with survivors of the occupation of Seoul; it was hastily terminated by the approach of the Chinese Army. The authors state, without source attribution, that much of the printed propaganda material had been prepared well in advance cf its use, but was deployed in such a way as to suggest it was the work of local southern groups supporting the DPBK; see pp. 31-32.

288see n,otes on sources for issues available.

151

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task not just of promoting Kim but also of erasing the EOK-

induced image of him as an arch-enemy. Thus, efforts in the

occupied areas were often reminiscent of the promotion of

Kim prior to 1948 in the north.za* a housewife addressing a

mass meeting at Seoul's Ehwa University praised women-s

emancipation from the slave-driving Bhee regime; she thanked

the KPA and Kim for the gift of egual rights. 2*0 A worker

from Kyonggi Province toured the north, then described its

benefits: "It is a great pleasure and honor for us to

express our gratitude to (Kin) as the southern laborers are

now enjoying the same rights and privileges as northern

la b o r e r s . "2 91 As South Korean workers discussed a new labor

law, one expressed his direct gratitude to Kin and the KPA

for the law. Workers in four southern provinces were

se n d in g "warm g r a titu d e " t o Kim and th e KPA fo r th e s e

b e n e f it s . 2 92

A commentator in liberated Seoul explained that the

people, seeing the «reality of the northern half," were

28 9see Chapter 111, pp. 77-96 for details.

290«seoul Mass Meeting” (brief), Pyongyang in Koreein to Korea, 1 August 1950, n .t. Translation by the PBIS. PBIS DB FE, No. 150, 3 August 1950, p. BBB8. (L/C PS 01766)

29iiiaember of Tour Views N. Korea Progress" (text), Seoul (relayed by Pyongyang) in Korean to Korea, 1100 GMI 28 August 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 169, 30 August 1350, pp. BBB5-6. (L/C PS 01766)

29 2M38th Parallel No Longer Dividing Line" (summary), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1200 GMT 30 August 19 50. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 128, 3 July 1950, pp. CCC5-6. (L/C PS 01766)

152

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reraised over the Bhee regime. He casually noted that in

Seoul one could hear cheers for Kim and often hear the "Song

of General Kim H —song," s u n g . 2»3 aesidents of other urban

centers, such as Inchon and Suwon, sent messages to the

"respected and beloved leader," affirming their belief that

now that he had repulsed the enemy, he would guard their

happiness and productive activity.2** & regular feature of

North Korean newspapers were open letters of gratitude to

Kim from South Korean groups.

A reporter touring liberated areas described the

peaceful village of Yonan, where portraits of Kim were

posted everywhere. Construction and farming bad commenced

where once residents had lived in fear. The reporter

affirmed that the villagers "have long been sending their

respect and love to their leader," Premier Kim.29s At the

end of an article detailing land redistribution, a reporter

stated that "today, farmers in the southern half offer

unlimited gratitude and honor" to Kim, "who brought freedom

2*3Yi Tong—kyu, "Haepang-dwoen Soul" (liberated Seoul), Nodong Sinmun, 14 July 1950, p. 4.

2*4"Kim II—song chcinggun-gge messechi changchi: haepang-down nampanpu gakchi inmin-dulro put'o" (Local Messages to General Kim Il-song: from People in Various Areas of the Liberated Southern H alf,” Nodong Sinmun. 6 August 1950, p. 1.

295MComnent by Laborer" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1200 GMT 30 June 1950. Translation by the PBIS. FBIS DE FE, No. 170, 31 August 1950, p. BBE3. (L/C PS 01766)

153

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and h a p p i n e s s . "2 9 6 countless messages of gratitude were sent

to Kin from new Landowners in North Cholla Province, every

message "overflowing with joy and gaeity" from farmers who

received land gratis. The messages expressed gratitude to

Kim for his "mercy" to them and promised to supply food to

drive off the O.S.2«7

3 . PEOGBESS OF THE iAB

North Korea associated Kim with specific current

events. When Kim as Commander issued Order Number 82,

calling for complete victory by the end of August, a

commentator explained, "Our people have always been

triumphant under the direction of General (Kim). The

victory we are going to win w ill be the biggest yet . " 2 9a

As enemy advances imperiled Northern control over

the South, however, DPEK media plaintively recalled Kin's

virtues. A commentary explained that Koreans were living in

one of the nation's most historic periods and that the war

was ably directed by Kim, who had already achieved much.

2**Hong lang-uk, "Haepang chiyok-ui t'ochi kaehyok: 8 wol ilil-p u t'o t'ochi punyol saop kaesi" (land Beform in the liberated Areas: land Division Work Commencing from August 1st), Hindu Choson, 1 August 1950, p. 1-

297"N. Cholla Farmers Praise Kim II Sung" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0930 GHT 22 September 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 187, 26 September 1950, pp. B3B9-10. (L/C PS 01766)

298nonward Twoard Victory as Directed by General Kim II Sung" (summary), Seoul (North Korean-controlled) in Korean to Korea, 0250 GHT 18 August 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 162, 21 August 1950, p. PPP7. (L/C PS 01766)

154

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Kin vas their ever-victorious leader, his name their symbol

of victory and happiness, they had joy and enlightenment

whenever he directed them. His policies were the sole

inspiration and guidance of the Korean people in the task of

unifying the fatherland. The Korean people would fight to

their last drop of blood without hestitation under his

leadership, so great was their confidence in him.

Therefore, Koreans should finish off the O.S. aggressor in

answer to Kin's call . 299

When the OB breakthrough threatened the existence of

the DPEK, many cippeals for continued loyalty and resistance

invoked the leader: Premier Kim had appealed for a fight to

the last, so, upholding this, workers were going to the

front, refusing to become slaves again. All workers were

moved by Kin's appeal — miners were overfilling quotas,

farmers paying taxes in kind, and women making uniforms;

everyone was internalizing Kim's teachings on the unity of

the front and rear areas. 2*0 A commentary said that as the

2 9 9 «Let Os March Forward More Bravely by Oniting Firmly Around General Kim 11 Sung" (summary}, Seoul (North Korean-controlled) in Korean to Korea, 2300 GMI 17 September 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 183, 20 September 1950, pp. PPP29-30. (L/C PS 01766)

3 oowgpholding the Appeal by Premier Kim II Sung, the People of the Province are Going to the Fronts to Exterminate the Enemy" (summary), Sinuiju, North Korean- controlled, in Korean to Korea, 1430 GMT 2C October 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 207, 24 October 1950, p. PPP21. (L/C PS 01766); "All People of the Province Have Bisen Up in Unison to Strengthen the Fronts for Defense of the Fatherland and to Defeat the Enemy, Upholding the Appeal by Premier Kim II Sung" (summary), Sinuiju, North

155

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war entered the last stages, the liberation battle was

fiercer than ever; while there might be temporary reverses,

those fighting for justice and freedom were destined to win.

Korea had a history of expelling invaders and there was no

reason to become American slaves for "in their hearts flows

the blood of (General Kim), the anti-Japanese g u e r r i l l a . "^oi

The fatherland was facing grave dangers, but farmers should

not despair nor collaborate. Kim had said Koreans should

defend every inch of land, since final victory was near.

"He w ill win. He are led by General K i m . «302 ihe KPA had

conducted calculated retreats, but once the enemy's "mad

advances" were checked, it would gain victory under K i n . 3 0 3

Later, at a celebration of the recapture of Seoul

with the CP?, its people sent messages to Kim and Stalin,

Korean-controlled, in Korean to Korea, 1145 GMI 20 October 1950. Translation by the FBIS- FBIS DB FE, Mo- 207, 24 October 19 50, p. PPP22. (L/C PS 01766).

30inxet Os Fight the American Armed Agressors to the Death for Our Oltimate Victory" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 2230 GUI 30 September 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 196, 9 October 1950, pp. PPP11-15. (L/C PS 01766)

302wparmers, Gain Bcvenge to the Death on the American Bandit Who Want(s) to Deprive Os of Our Land" (text), Sinuiju (North Korean-controlled) in Korean to Korea, 1315 GMI 26 October 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 212, 31 October 1950, pp. BBB2-3. (L/C PS 01766)

3 0 3"Battle Notes: Men and Officers of the People's Armed F ro ces on th e O ff e n s iv e a r e C o n tin u in g T h eir Advances in Order to Destroy the Enemy Completely" (text), Sinuiju (North Korean-controlled), in Korean to Korea, 2145 GMT 6 November 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 218, 8 November 1950, p. BBE3. (L/C PS 01766)

156

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telling Kim, "All the citizens of Seoul welcome you as our

Great Leader," since they knew suffering under Bhee; they

voted thanks to Kim for their liberation.3o« At a later mass

meeting, the participants pledged to Kim to mop up the

enemy, uniting around Kim and the D P f i K . 3 0s As total victory

again seemed imminent, a commentary observed that confidence

was essential to achieving victory, ihen the O.S.

counterattacked, a Kim radio speech encouraged Koreans to

arm themselves, ihen the situation was grim, illustrious

Kim, with clear foresight and wisdom, led Koreans to victory

by indicating the tasks which had to be done. Under Kim,

whose principles were based on Marxism-Leninism, the Korean

people can see their future and are fighting in unison to

crush the enemy.306

Kim was usually associated with specific battles

only in retrospect. For example, the 7th Division sent an

open message to Kim, saying "it was by obeying your orders

and following your guidance" that they had won military and

306"Seoul Liberation Celebration Described" (summary) , Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1000 GMI 5 January 1951. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB f£. No. 5, 6 January 1951, pp. BBB3-4. (L/C PS 01766)

sosnKim Gets Pledge From Seoul Citizens" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1315 GHT 28 February 1951. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 47, 2 March 1951, pp. CCC1-2. (L/C PS 01766)

306MThe Korean People, Fighting Onder Their Illustrious Leader, March Vigorously, Confident of Victory" (summary), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1028 GMI 7 January 1951. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 10, 12 January 1951, pp. PPP7-8. (L/C PS 01766)

157

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political victories in the Kangdong and Snnchon sectors.

They pledged to centinne to execute his orders for fatherland liberation.307

Following "Operation L ittle Switch," in which

wounded and sick prisoners were exchanged, DPEK propaganda

centered on alleged enemy atrocities against POHs, but made

frequent references to Kim. One repatriated prisoner

rejoiced that he was "forever out of the evil enemy's

clutches," thanks to the "correct policy of the OPfiK

government" and the "kind consideration" of Marshal K i m . 30s

An ex—officer recalled the enemy's "harsh persecution" but

said that North Korean prisoners had never succumbed to it

because they had always been inspired by the fact that they

had with them the fatherland and Marshal K i m . 309

If Kin were not credited solely with the victory, as

he later would be, propaganda assigned him a major role in

the war. Hith the use of his image in this way, the

propaganda claim that he was the inspirer of victory was

307*%. Kprea 7th Division Vows to Hin Har" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1200 GMI 25 February 1951. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, NO. 43, 26 February 19 51, pp. BBB1-2. (L/C PS 01766)

3 0 8ncrowds Welcome Returnees" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1200 GMT 23 April 1953. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 79, 24 April 1953, pp. BEE11-12. (L/C PS 05125)

30 9"seturnees Recall Struggle in PCi Camps" (excerpts), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 2300 GHT 11 May 1953. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 91, 12 May 1953, pp. EEE6-7. (L/C PS 05125)

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valid from a certain point of view. Nevertheless, as with

his immediate post-liberation claims to anti-Japanese

victories, memories of the Korean Har were s till too fresh

to tamper with, thus keeping Kim's claims lim ited.

B. AMPLIFICATION OF THE IMAGE

The DPBK accorded Kim extra praise on his 40th

birthday in 1952. One commentary explained that the Korean

people had achieved honors and victory in peace and war

since liberation and General Kim's name was linked with

every one. Kim had made them invincible by teaching them

Marxism-Leninism as well as the revolutionary experiences cf

Lenin and Stalin. Victory was synonymous with General

K i m . 310 On this occasion, the SPA announced a decision to

establish memorial halls in his honor at Mangyongdae and

Pochonbo, as well cis found a high school named after him at

Hyesanjin, site of his first operations. This was done to

"commemorate forever** his "activities and great

achievements." At the same time, the DPBK government set up

a scholarship system in his name at Kim Il-song University

and five local schools.^ii a ceremony was held at

sionjihe Korean People are Firmly United Around Their Chief" (summary)> Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 2215 GMT 14 April 1952. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS ES FE, No. 75, 15 April 1952, pp. EEE1-2. (L/C PS 05125)

3111*Ordinance of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPBK, Issued on the Occasion of the 40th Birthday of General Kim II Sung" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1100 GMT 14 April 1952. Translation by the PBIS. FBIS DB. FE, No. 75, 15 April 1952, pp. EEE2-3. (L/C PS 05125)

159

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Mangyongdae on April 16 to erect a m a r k e r . 3*2

Newspapers reported that on Kim's birthday, workers

were celebrating by studying Kim's short biography; study

sites ranged from a factory shop to the Ministry of

Industry.313 Pyongyang students and faculty at a ll levels

were enthusiastically studying the biography to indoctrinate

themselves under the slogan "Let us arm ourselves ever more

soundly in Marshal Kim II—song's ideologies."3 1* The f i r s t

full-length biography of Kim was published on April 15, 1952

and immediately became an object of fervid study. The

following is a digest of this biography, which bridged the

"triumphal return" material from the previous period and the

detailed, worshipful hagiography of the 1970s and 1980s.

The Korean people, having ardent love, respect, and

unbounded confidence in him, hail the name of Kim Il-song.

They hail him as the glorious leader of the KPA and

organizer of victory in the war, as he had been the leader

in construction and democratic reforms after Korea was

3*2"Kim II Sung" (brief), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0300 GMT 17 April 1952. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 77, 17 April 1952, p. EEE4. (L/C PS 05125)

313£ o S a n g -s in , "Kim I l - s o n g changgun—ui ryakchon—ul inmin-dulun aedok yongu-hago issda" (The People are Beading with Pleasure and Studying General Kim Il-song's Short Biography), Nodong Sinmun, 14 April 1952, p. 1.

3i*"School Onits Study Kin II Sung History" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1100 GMT 12 April 1953. Translation by tie FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 70, 13 April 1953, pp. EEE18-19. (L/C PS 05125)

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liberated by the S o v i e t s . ’ i s

Kim vas born April 15, 1912 at Mangyongdae, near

Pyongyang. His father, Kim Hyong-chik, a poor farmer,

firmly anti-Japanese, had been influenced by the Hussian

Bevolution; he participated in the March First Movement of

1919, was arrested, went into exile in Manchuria, was again

imprisoned, and died at age 36 in 1928. Kim's mother,

identified only as "Madame Kang,"’ !* also of a poor farm

fam ily, was able to support her son and inculcate patriotism

in him. She died in 1932, when Kin was 20. An uncle. Kin

Hyong—kwon, engaged in anti-Japanese activities, was

arrested, tortured, sentenced to 15 years, and died in

p r i s o n .317

Such revolutionary influences made Kim anti-Japanese

from an early age. Be crossed the lain Biver at age 14 to

follow his father and attended middle school in Manchuria;

he joined the Communist Youth League in 1926 and was in the

van of the student movement. Kim studied Marxism-Leninism

and expanded the League, which led to his imprisonment;

after his release in 1928, he graduated from middle school,

then undertook secret missions as secretary of a special

31SKBP Central Committee Propaganda and Agitation Department, Kim Il-song changgun- ui ryakchon (A Brief Life of General Kim 11—song) (Pyongyang: KHP Publishing Company, 15 April 1952), pp. 1-2.

3 1« A c tu a lly , Kang Pan—so k s Korean women do n o t ta k e their husband's name at marriage.

31TBrief Life, pp. 2-4.

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district of the East Manchurian CIl. Kin joined the

Communist Party in 1931.3*8

Hith anti—Japanese feeling strong in both Korea and

China, Kin organized a force of workers, farmers, and

patriotic youth into a guerrilla band; its fame spread,

attracting more fighters, until it could capture weapons

from the enemy and expand into a mighty force. In 1934, Kim

unified guerrilla units from several areas into the Korean

People's Army. Each m ilitary unit had deep roots within the

masses, but at the core of each were communist party

members, along with communist youth groups. The force was

unified ideologically and m ilitarily.3i«

The guerrilla army maintained close links with

Koreans both within the country and in Manchuria; support

within Korea was kept via political operatives and

underground associations, notably the fatherland Bestoraticn

Association. The Pochonbo battle of 1937 was conducted in

liaison with the underground, and news of the victory spread

nationwide — news about Kim was printed daily in the

vernacular press until the Japanese prohibited it in 1942.

Political work included dissemination of publications, both

theses and journals explicating Korean communism; Kim

published many him self. Kim, confident of ultimate victory

3 1 «ibid.-, pp. 4—9. The book neglects to mention which Party Kim joined, since it must have been the CCP.

3i9jbid.„ pp. 10-14, 17.

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by the Soviets, wrote a thesis on the influence of the

October Revolution on the Korean people and stressed slogans

supporting the USSB. The Bed Army liberated Korea, then

accompanied Kim on h is triumphant return . 220

Following liberation, Kim exploited advantageous

conditions provided by the Soviet Army, delineating the

tasks necessary to establishing a People's Republic and then

leading the people in achieving them. At the head of

government organizations. Kin impelled the many democratic

reforms emplaced in the north, a ll of which earned him

prélise as the "originator of the people's rights, the

instigator and organizer of the KHP."32i

Anticipating the U.S.-Bhee plot to attack the north,

Kim prepared for it by founding the KPA under his personal

leadership. Throughout the conflict, he nurtured it and

developed its political consciousness in addition to its

combat sk ills. Thus, when war broke out despite Kim's

measures for peaceful reunification, he assumed the "entire

leadership" from the first day: as chairman of the Militéiry

Commission, he demonstrated the leadership witnessed

earlier, while as commander-in-chief, he had direct control

over combat operations, fie was a splendid leader, well able

to cope with the burdens of war; under this leadership, the

32 0ibid. . pp. 15-33. The pro-USSB refernces indicate heavy Soviet influence in the composition of the b io g ra p h y .

32iibid.. pp. 33-53.

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KPA w ill fight to the end to expel the O.S. and reunify the c o u n tr y . 322

Kim, loyal to internationalism , knowing it would

benefit his people and thus was ultimately patriotic, was

cultured in feelings of warm lowe for the Soviet Union, the

PEC, and other socialist nations. The Korean people love

the Soviet liberators as well as the PEC; Kim supported the

PEC l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g le f o r many y e a r s , b u t now b o th were

straggling together for p e a c e . 3 2 3

The biography concluded by affirming that the heroic

Korean people strongly supported Kim and had entrusted their

fate to him.

Other writers on Kim took their cue from this

biography. For example, an article in April 1952 asserted

that Kim's anti—Japanese struggle had great historic

importance and revolutionary significance, particularly

considering the current struggle for freedom and

independence. The article provided a general outline of

Kim's career, emphasizing its internationalist aspects —

the influence of the Russian Revolution on oppressed peoples

and noting that Kim's 1927 arrest had been by the KMT — and

the links the guerrillas had had with the people. The

article concluded that Kim had striven for liberation from

1930 to 1945 and this experience was applicable to the

322jbid.. pp. 53-64.

323ibid.. pp. 65-67.

164

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The wartime biography stressed Kin as a man of

action, involved in all phases of struggle. He was also

simultaneously an internationalist and Korean patriot, no

contradiction between the two being posited. It should be

noted that while the new biography filled in or confirmed

details of Kim's life and family previously left unsaid, it

contained few details of the guerrilla actions or post-1945

political work. It listed accomplishments and afforded them

fulsome praise, but left many blanks, affording a grand

effect with little substance.

C. IMAGES o r SIALIM AHB MAO

Although closer to Stalin, Kim identified publicly

with both Stalin and Mao. Stalin's image remained

consistent with that from the prewar period. For example,

on the anniversary of victory over Japan, an editorial

remarked that North Koreans expressed thanks to Marshal

Stalin and the Soviet Army, who brought peace to the world

and liberated Korea. Like them, Koreans under the

leadership of Kim w ill defeat American imperialism. 32s

Mao Ise—tung's image, however, saw considerable

32«Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, "Kim II—song tonchinun hcingil yugyokdae t*uchaeng-ui chochikchidocha—ida" (Comrade Kim Il- song is the Organizer and Leader of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Struggle), Nodong Sinmun. 18 April 1952, p. 2.

32SMSsoryon-ui ta e il chonsung o'nyon-e che—hayo" (On the Fifth Anniversary of the Soviet Onion's Complete Victory over Japan), Min4u Choson, 3 September 1950, p. 1.

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upgrading, necessitated by the participation of the CPV in

the war. Mao was promoted to at least egual status with

Stalin and Kim; Jsoth Kim and Kim lu-bong addressed Mao as

«your excellency?* and "premier" on the fir st anniversary of

the PEC.32* This promotion was seen at an anniversary

meeting for the KPA: the meeting hall was decorated with

portraits — "The Korean people's true liberator and close

friend, the great Marshal Stalin," the "leader of the Korean

people. General Kim 11-song," and the "great leader of the

Chinese people. Chairman Mao Tse—tung, who now gives a ll aid

for the just struggle of our Korean people."327

O ccasionally, DPE2 media heaped ample praise on Mao,

as in a 1952 p o e m . 3 2 « The poem avowed that, with his steely

strength, Mao was ever-victorious; one was never lonely or

fearful with him. The fatherland's fate, entrusted to him,

was sure. The flag of Korea's great leader soared in

32*"Pyongyang People Cheer Seoul Fighters" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1400 GMT 2 October 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS OB FE, Ho. 192, 3 October 1950, p. BBB1. (L/C PS 01766)

32 7”Chospn inmingun changgun samchunyon kinyom P'yongyangsi kyongch'uk daehoe songhwang" (Status of the Pyongyang City Congratulatory Bally on the 3rd Anniversary of the Founding of the KPA), Nodonq Sinmun, f February 1951, p . 1 .

32«Bong Sun-ch'ol, "Mo I'aek-tong chusok-eigei turi- nun norae" (A Song Present to Chairman Mao Tse-tung)* Nodonq Sinmun, 3 July 1953, p. 3. The phrase "great leader" referring to Kim, was one of the earlier uses of what was to be a constant appendage to his name. The phrase "beloved cind respected," applied to Kao, was the same as a title then given to Kin.

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victory; Mao's name, a proud one in China, vas equally high

in Korea: the flags of both countries sailed high forever.

Mao always gave victory in East Asia, bringing mankind peace

and freedom — beloved and respected person.

D. C0MM£5TS

The image of Kim Il-song during the war years

differed little from the prewar period, although the

emphasis was tailored to fit the special circumstances. Kim

was the ever-victorious commander, the guarantor of success,

the idol of his countrymen. Moreover, the image offered to

the occupied areas in the south greatly resembled the

"buildup" accorded Kim in the prewar north. Kim was the

leader and dispenser of benefits: sexual equality, workers'

rights, and above a ll, land. As in the prewar north, this

prompted spontaneous affection from the recipients.

The image of Kim provided a facile tool for

prosecution of the war. The citations of Kin's past

successes were as useful in sustaining the northern

population during reversals as in channelling feelings of

victory when the OfBK was ascendent. Kim alternately became

the leader who always led to victory and the commander who

guaranteed success after temporary retreats. Since much of

the wartime propaganda appealed to patriotic traditions and

expressions, and since many of the stories of wartime

heroism lacked references to Kim, it seems clear that the

Kim image was deployed as just another tool, not as the

primary motivator.

167

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The experience gained promoting Kin daring the

prewar years in the north was reflected in the manner in

which Kim was shown to the south. U ltlle the campaign did

not replicate the former effort rigidly, it reflected a

recognition of the u tility of the Kim image in generating

support when seeking legitim acy (and perhaps the appeal of

the images to the Korean mind as well.) The Kim image was

presented to the southern public in broad strokes,

unconcerned with the manner of his selection, but fu ll of

praise for his proficiency. As in the pre—1948 north, this

shaped public debate on leadership by shifting the in itial

formulation from one of choice to one of degree of

acceptance. The great stress placed on Kim as the ultimate

source of benefits was probably necessary to countermand the

negative image propagated by the BOK authorities.

A major factor in furthering Kin's image was

promulgation of the Brief life , which stressed the following

facets of Kin's image: 1) Kim as a prescient, capable

leader; 2) Kim as the focus of domestic support and leader

of fatherland operations by the guerrillas; 3) Kim as an

internationalist, closely associated with the Soviets,

secondarily with the Chinese. The biography featured the

first treatment pf his youth, although details were sketchy;

it portrayed young Kim as an activist in communist and anti-

Japanese groups (later regime propaganda had him as the

founder of many such organizations). The biography

explicitly stated that Kin's virtues and experiences had a

168

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v ic t o r y now a s he d id th e n .

The biography afforded Kim a wider background,

showing that his patriotic spirit was the direct result of

family training and early experiences, thus demonstrating

his qualifications as a Korean patriot and explaining his

early successes. Suh Dae-sook observed, "In the Korean

Communist movement and among Korean Communist leaders, Kim

is an alien who advanced through the ranks of the Chinese

Communist revolutionaries in Manchuria and was educated and

trained by the Chinese Communists as one of their o w n . . . " 2 2 9

One lik ely purpose of the 1952 Kim biography was to show

that Kim was not alien to the Korean patriotic tradition,

that his ties to the Soviet and Chinese, while real, were a

part of his duty as an internationalist, not as an adherent.

Kim's wartime image also contained the seeds of a

portrait pertinent to reconstruction. Kim devoted

considerable time during the war to civil matters, factors

necessary to victory, to be sure, but showing his interest

and competence in farming and industry. His postwar image

was to be heavily linked with these endeavors.

I I . &ECOMSTB0CT10M. 1953-65

North Korea at the end of the Korean War was a

devastated society. Unrelenting O.S. bombing and ground

32«suh, Movement, p. 293.

169

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combat over much of its territory left the country with its

industry destroyed, its agriculture at subsistance levels,

and its population dislocated. Moreover, the KBP, the

leading cadre of society, had failed in its wartime duty,

there having been many instances of desertion or

collaboration with the enemy.

Reconstruction proceeded via mass m obilization,

primarily in rebuilding heavy industry and its support

sectors, with secondary emphasis placed on housing

construction and service facilities. The regime directed

the collectivization of arming as well as improvements to

related work, such as orchards and sericulture. Despite

assistance from allied countries, the burden fe ll primarily

to Koreans themselves, as they endured great sacrifices in

effort and salary to re-establish, then surpass prewar

economic levels. KBP reorganization involved réévaluation

of its membership, with purges of the unreliable, and

elections to reshape party leadership. All party levels

were subjected to intensive political indoctrination, with

Marxism-Leninism and the regime's "monolithic" ideology

s t r e s s e d .

Among many f a c t o r s u sed t o a c t i v a t e th e p e o p le was

pride and a key component of this pride was the image of Kim

Il-song. The image was exercised in service of regime

policies with increased detail about his activities plus the

am plification and redaction of modern history.

170

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A. THE IMAGE DUBIMG BBCOHSTBDCTIOH

In itially, Kim's image was treated symbolically to

enhance his glory. A good example was a poem published in

early 1956 s

Just as the Æun shines upon the land,/everywhere a person looks/ truly, through the luster the leader radiates,/ our future is especially bright-33 0

Another hailed the glorious day of the people, with rice

blossoming in every field and irrigation ubiquitous.

Everyone sailed and a ll had a song in their heart, the song

of a bumper year. It was a day in which the leader's

intentions flowered and everyone boasted of the life the

leader gave.33» Other references insinuated the leader's

importance: an article described a pilot's first reaction at

glimpsing the capital from the air — "Pyongyang, the place

where the beloved and respected leader r e s i d e s . "332

1. ECONOMIC IMAGES

Hhatever Kim's actual role in the creation and

execution of agricultural and industrial policy, the image

projected was that of a wise leader heavily involved in

these pressing economic concerns.

330Hong Sun-ch'ol, "Saehae-ui insa" (New year's Greeting), Nodonq Sinmun, 1 January 1356, p. 2.

331KÎB puk—won, «ïoltu samch'onripol—ui saenorae" (A New Song over a Plain of 12- or 13,000 r i), Nodonq Sinmun, 9 June 1955, p. 3.

332chu Tong-kyok, "Minchu sudo-ui ch'anggong-ul nalmyo" (Flying the Blue Sky of the Capital of Democracy), Nodonq Sinmun, 1 May 1955, p. 3.

171

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The in itial contribution of Kin's image to

agriculture vas a common political tool, visibility: he

conducted many inspections of farming areas, which were

reported in detail, usually with accompanying photographs.

Typical was his tour of an agricultural cooperative in early

1957, where he explained recent party decisions and gave

guidance on such tasks as transplanting. 333 Qcring these

v isits, Kim evinced both a knowledge of farming and concern

for those engaged in it: during an inspection at Hanp'o in

1958, Kim stressed fitting crops to the local climate and

gave guidance on beekeeping, orchard work, and construction

to provide daily necessities. He noted improvments in

housing and fa cilities, but indicated aspects which required

upgrading.33* Kim occasionally chaired local meetings: for

example, at one in South Pyongan Province, he stressed

economic strengthening plus changes to "cultural life" in

rural villages. Participants, adopting his teachings,

sresolved to overfill their quotas.33S farm areas strove to

333KCN&, "Kin I I —so n g to n g c h i P 'yongnando—nae nongop hyopdong chohap-ul sichal" (Comrade Kim Il-song Inspects Agricultural Cooperatives in South Pyongan Province}, Nodonq Sinmun. 16 January 1957, p. 1.

3 3 * kcma , "Kim Il-song susang sang Manp'o chiku kiopso mich* nongop hyopdongchohap-ul sich 'al—hago hyonchi- eiso chido" (Premier Kim Il-song Inspects Enterprises and Agricultural Cooperatives in the Manp'o Hegion and Gives Guidance on the Spot), Min1a Cboson. 4 August 1958, p. 1.

335Han Chang-ho, "Kyehwik—poda 6 ch'ont'ong-ui algck chungsan-ul kyclwi-hago Anak-gun nonop'hyoptongchohapwon— duleigei kyongsaeng-ul hoso" (Sesolving to Increase Grain 6,000 Tons over Plans, a Straggle Appeal to the Anak-kun

172

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implement his teachings: North Pyongan Province was reported

to be developing a movement to realize Kim's on-the-spot

teachings about irrigation of paddies by watering additional

acreage in the new year.33*

Kim's image was identified as closely with industry

as with agriculture. A cabinet minister wrote in the late

1950s that DPBK construction was socialist, with anti-

feudal, anti-im perialist dimensions; it was patriotic,

inheriting traditions from the steadfast communists, with

Kim i n th e v a n . 337 ^ 1961 poem by a construction worker

called Kim's love "deep as the ocean" and "high as the

mountains," and attributed factory construction to h i m . 33a

As with agriculture, Kim's significant public

contribution to industry was visib ility, in giving workers a

sense of his concern. It was reported3 3 9 that Kim conferred

Agricultural Cooperative Members), Nodonq Sinmun. 30 January 1957, p. 1.

3 3 6ch'oe Pyong-che, "Kim Il-song susang-ui hyonchikyosi paddulgo 10-man chongbo-ui pat' kwasu ch'eikyo hwakrip" (Upholding Premier Kin Il-song's Cn-the-spot Teachings, Enlarging the Irrigation System by 100,000 Chongbo OJE Paddies), Minju Choson. 15 July 1958, p. 2.

3 3 7^0 Chong—suk, "Chosonminchuchu'uikonghwaguk honpop palp'yo 10 chu'nyon" (10th Anniversary of the Promulgation of the DPBK C onstitution), Minin Choson. 5 September 1958, p. 2.

33spak Kj.—ch'un, K n'i-ui k'unak'un sarang" (His Enormous Love), Bodonq Sinmun. 7 May 1961, p. 2.

33 9KCNA, "Kim I l- s o n g su sa n g k o n so l pumun—ul chikchong chido 18 il-einun P'yongyangsi solkye il'ggun- dulkwa tamhwa" (Premier Kim Il-song Confers with Pyongyang Drafting Functionaries on the 18th and Gives Direct Guidance

173

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with drafters responsible for Pyongyang construction, giving

direct guidance; they newly resolved to mobilize reserves

and expedite work based on his teaching. Elsewhere, Kin

conferred with builders, expressing satisfaction with

accomplishments, but stressing goals. The workers were then

more strongly determined to increase speed to make the

capital more beautiful.3*o The extent of Kim's interest and

ability was reflected by the range of his activities; one

example w ill suffice: in early Hay, Kim visited numerous

enterprises and gave guidance on synthetic fiber production

at a textile m ill, construction at Kim Ch'aek Iron Works,

agricultural cooperatives, a fishing station, and newsprint

at a pulp plant.3*1 Kim slowly developed a unique style for

these visits. Early in the post-war period he made

inspections of enterprises, where he gave guidance, but

gradually, by about 1958, the verb "to give on-the-spot

guidance" emerged, a type of v isit which only Kim undertook.

It should be noted that in addition to whatever

effect "on-the-spot guidance" had in boosting production, it

on the Construction Sector), Nodonq Sinmun, 19 January 1958, p. 1.

3*0Kim Sok—rae, "Kim Il-song susang Pyongyangsi konsolchadul-ul kyokryo" (Premier Kim Il-song Encourages Pyongyang City Construction), Nodonq Sinmun, 23 Hay 1957, p. 1. 341KCNA, "Kim Il-son g susang Hampuk—donae inminkyongchei kak-pumun-ul sich'al-hago hyonchi-eiso chido" (Premier Kim Inspects Various Sectors of the People's Economy in North Hamgyong Province and Gives Guidance on the spot), Nodonq Sinmun, 8 Hay 1958, p. 1.

174

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vas vital in inspiring sacrifice in a time of privation.

Hore important, j.t was a vaj to accrue grassroots support in

a time when Kim mas assailed bj factionalists.

As might he expected, Kim was credited with the

ensuing successess. At an opening ceremony for a railroad

lin e, the crowd cheered Kim, while a speaker noted that the

accomplishments had been achieved by adopting K is's

teaching,3*2 after reciting results at the Kangson Steel

Borks, its chief engineer concluded that workers would bear

in mind the correct policy of the party and what had been

accomplished under the teachings Kim had given during his

factory visits; this was a guarantee for future

successes.3*3 after an early 1956 Kim visit to the Sinuiju

Pulp Factory, the manager held daily meetings on ways to

implement the premier's teachings; the combination of these

teachings and worker creativity enabled a solution to a

problem which had baffled even the Japanese.3** an article

summarizing achievements of the Chollisa Movement also

explained that Kj.m had travelled to enterprises all over the

3*2"Kyongwonson Kosan-P'yonggang—gem ch'oldo kaet'ongsik kohaeng" (Holding the Opening for the Kosan- P'yonggang Pailrpad — the Kyongwon Line), Nodonq Sinmun, 29 September 1954, p. 1.

343%% chae—ch'on, "Chungsan-gwa cholyak yebi-rul ottohke ch'achassnun-ka?" (Bow Did Be Seek Increased Production and Conserve Beserves?), Nodonq Sinmun, 10 January 1957, p. 2.

34+pak se-kuk, "Ch'angcho-ui him** (The Power of Creation), Nodonq Sinmun, 30 August 1958, p. 4.

175

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country and an upturn had been experienced everywhere he

gave direct guidance.3+s

Kin moved to associate himself with the innovations

of Korean industry. He sent congratulations and gifts to

the producers of the first bulldozer in Korea,3*&

he inspected the first cargo truck made in the country,3+7

the first tractor and the first locomotive.3*8 ^im was

constantly associated with success through publication of

open letters from workers thanking him for his leadership,

and through awards he gave to meritorious workers.

Arguably Kim's most important function was his

association with efforts to improve livi^ug conditions.

During visits to industries or farms, he talked with workers

about their lives, visited housing, and conversed with their

3 4 5Kim Hon-son and Cho Kun-wol, "Chollima (2),'* Nodonq Sinmun, 3 August 1958, p. 2.

346KCNA, "Kim II—song susang: uri nara-eiso ch'oum- uro puldocheil—ul saengsan-han Pukchong kikyegongchang rodongcha-dului roryok songgwa-rul ch'ukha" (Premier Kim Il- song Congratulates the Labor Results of Workers at the Pukchung Machinery Factory, Who Produced a Bulldozer for the First lime in our Country), Nodonq Sinmun, 29 January 1959, p. 1 .

347MKia Il-song tongchi—rul piios-han tang-gwa chongpu chidocha—dul uri nara-eiso ch'oum-uro hwamul chatongch'a-rul mandun rodongcha, kisulcka-ul ch'ukha" (Party and Government Leaders, starting with Comrade Kim Il- song, Congratulate Workers and Technicians Who Made a Cargo Truck for the First Time in our Country), Nodonq Sinmun, 19 November 1958, p. 1-

348KCNA, "Kim II—song susang uri nara—eso ch'oum ttrakttoru-rul saengsan-han kiyangkikye kongchang ilggun- dulun ch'ukha" (Premier Kin Il-song Congratulates Functionaries Who Produced a Tractor for the First Time in

176

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faau.iies.3 44 He «as closely linked with efforts to

reconstruct and beautify Pyongyang: at the opening of three

streets, a speaker explained that the work resulted from

direct guidance by Marshal Kim, done by and for those who

loved the fatherland; cheers to Kim resounded.3so

repeatedly visited sites for apartment complexes, where he

inspired the workers and gave guidance. An editorial

concluded that the builders of the "capital of democracy"

were directly developed by Kim, innovated well, and, taking

their cue from him, were determined to adhere to the party

line and Kim's policy in housing construction.3si

Reconstruction was a national problem, while Kim and

his faction also confronted the question of personal

retention of power against rival factions. One leadership

Our Country), Nodonq Sinmun, 15 November 1958, p. 1; KCNA, "Ch'oum-uro chonki kigwanch'a 'pulk—un k i'—ul saengsan: Kim Il-song susang-ui piros-han tang-gwa chongpu chidocha-dul hyonchi-eiso ch'angwan" (The Electric Locomotive "Bed Flag' Produced for the First Time: Party and Government Leaders, Starting with Premier Kim Il-song, Inspect on the spot), Nodonq Sinmun, 31 August 1961, p. 1.

34*a typical example may be found in Yin Chong-kun, "Kin Il-song tongchi Hwanghae chech'olso-rul sich'al-hago rodongchadul-gwa tamhwa" (Comrade Kim Il-song Inspects the Hwanghae Iron Works and Confers with Workers), Nodonq Sinmun, 5 January 1957, p. 1.

3so"Kim II—song Kwangchang, Ssutallin Kori, Mo T'aek-tong Kwangchang, Inmingun Kori kaet'ongsik mich' Moranbong Kukchang, Moranbong Ondongchang chungongsik songdae-hi kohaemg" (Holding the Opening Grandly for Kim I l- song Square, Stalin Street, Mac Tse-tung Square, KPA Street, Moranbong Theater, and Moranbong Stadium), Nodonq Sinmun. 13 August 1954, p. 2.

3S1KCNA, "Kin I l - s o n g su sa n g P 'y o n g y a n g si

177

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strategy vas to identify Kim with programs beneficial to the

public. His high visibility also helped deflect potential

criticism on living conditions by suggesting that more was

being done for the consumer sector.

Kim was once again portrayed as bestowing a range of

benefits, although he often shared credit with the party and

government in the mid-1950s. A speaker at the first

anniversary of the Songdo College of P olitics and Economics

averred that the school had prospered in Kir's care, doing

well under party and government policies he illum inated.3sz

Learning of a cabinet decision to lower prices on basic

commodities, workers in urban areas and many counties

expressed their increasing gratitude to the party,

government, and beloved and respected l e a d e r . 3 5 3

An aperiodic series of newspaper articles, appearing

under the collective title "Among the people," printed

recollections of individuals from many locations and strata

konsolchang-ul sich'al-hago konsol saop-ul chido" (Premier Kin Il-song Inspects Pyongyang Construction Sites and Leads Construction Work), Nodonq Sinmun, 6 April 1958, p. 1; "P'yongyangsi konsolcha-ege yolryol-hi ch'ukha-rul ponaena" (Sending Congratulations Warmly to Pyongyang City Constructors), Nedonq Sinmun, 19 December 1958, p. 1.

352«songdo chongch'i kyongche taehak kaekyo il- chunyon kinyomsik kohaeng" (Holding the First Anniversary Ceremony for the Opening of the Songdo College of P olitics and Economics), Nodonq Sinmun, 30 October 1954, p. 1.

353"Tang-gwa chongku-wa suryong-ege turi-nun kamsa- wa kyol-ui" (Gratitude and Resolutions Sent to the Party, Government, and Leader," Nodonq Sinmun, 9 October 1954, p. 1. 178

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who had met Kim. Each person showed Kim to be approachable

and concerned with public welfare. For example, one who met

Kim at a rally of neighborhood chiefs had seen him on the

dais at other meetings, but his "joy and happiness were

unbounded" when Kim talked personally with some of them.

Kim put his guests at ease, then questioned them closely

about their lives, particularly the availability of

necessities, writing down the answers and instructing them

on the conduct of their work. The author concluded that

Koreans were living in a glorious age and were truly blessed

in the "warm bosom" of the premier.ss* Other articles in the

series described Kim's visits to industrial and agricultural

enterprises at a ll stages of DPBK development since the

1940s. The effect was to portray Kim as a ubiquitous

presence, concerned for popular welfare, and acting out his

concern, a listener as well as teacher.

DPBK medj.a published a series of articles designed

to reveal another side of the leader, his expression of

concern for future development even in the midst of war.

For example, despite the pressures of war, Kim attended a

conference of scientists in 1952; he gave clear instructions

on the use of scj.ence in national development. His guidance

and personal concern for the scientists led to a mature

3s*Ii I—ki, "Inmin—dulsokaeso: inain panchang-dului moin-eso" (Among the People: a Meeting of People's Heighborhood Chiefs), Nodonq Sinmun, 13 July 1962, p. 2. These articles were also anthologized.

179

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Chemical in d u s tr y and instilled hope of victory. 3ss

Kim vas frequently photographed in action or in

positions of command — inspecting agriculture or industry,

indicating lines of progress to construction workers,

leading cabinet meetings, or talking confidently to

foreigners. let, his speeches invariably were illustrated

with formal pictures of Kim's face staring impassively into

the camera. The cumulative effect of these photos gave the

impression of an involved and interactive leader, but one

who is ultimately unapproachable. This combination of

proximity and aloofness was previously mentioned as

characteristic of a charismatic l e a d e r . 2 sa

Although clearly dominant, Kim projected an image of

collective cooperation: for much of the period he was part

of a triad: the party, government, and l e a d e r . 2 5 7 jje made

many personal appearances at domestic functions and at

welcomes for foreigners, but frequently appearances and

headlines went to subordinates, primarily Kin XI and Ch'oe

Yong-kon.

3ssyi sung-ki, "Pinallon-e kisdus iyagi" (The Story of Making Vinalon), Nodonq Sinmun, 9 March 1962, pp. 2-3.

3S6see Chapter I, pp. 20-21.

3S7wTang-gwa chongpu-wa suryong-ege turi-nun naengse" (Vows to the Party, Government, and Leader) , Nodonq Sinmun. 26 October 1954, p. 1; "Choson fiodongdang chungangwiwonhoe, Chosonminchuchu'ui inmin kongwhaguk naegak, Kim Il-song wonsu-gge turi-nun maesemun" (Written Promises to the KBP Central Committee, DPBK Cabinet, and Marshal Kin Il-song), Nodonq Sinmun, 9 January 1956, p. 1.

180

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The most frequent titles for Kim were plain

"comrade" and "premier;" for the most part, the more

elaborate appelations were reserved for special occasions,

anniversaries, ceremonies, or for special groups like the

overseas Koreans. Letters from Koreans in Japan usually

called him "marshal" or "beloved and respected leader,"

terms also used by military officers.

2 . THE CANON Kia's philosophical discovery, CflOCBE,3se ^as

expounded occasionally, but was left understated. An early

article called it an extension of Marxism-Leninism, which

Kim had proposed as a core program to strengthen party

ideological work, based on a Marxist—Leninist analysis of

KBP development.'359 Another article claimed that CHUCHE

c o u ld a p p ly t o many s e c t o r s and was u s e f u l a g a in s t

defectors.360 ihat philosophy was not yet a field of primary

concern for Kim is illustrated by a number of articles on

CHUCHE which do not mention him at a ll. for example, in

1962, a professor's discovery in medicine was noted as

pursuant to a KBP congress decision on broadening CHUCHE in

35 8CBUCHE is explicated in chapter II, pp. 56-59, and below. Chapter V, pp. 242-46.

3S9Kia Chin-t'aek, "'Chuch'e'-edaehan olpparun rihae-rul wihayo." (Toward a Correct Understanding of CHUCHE), Nodonq Sinmun, 21 July 1956, pp. 2-3.

36 0Ha Ang-ch'on, "Sasang saop-esoe Chuch'e hakrip-ul wihayo" (On Establishing CHUCHE in Ideological Work), Nodonq Sinmun, 23 March 1958, p. 2.

181

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research. It was noted that the professor had been armed

with party policies and the revolutionary ideology of the

anti-Japanese guerrillas; Kim was not mentioned.3*i

If Kim was not yet touted as a theorist, he was

stressed as a teacher. An editorial on party education

explained that documents on policy and Kim's works were

models of Marxism-Leninism creatively applied to reality and

thus objects of study for party m e m b e r s . 3®2 & commentary

praised a Kim speech on the role of functionaries, noting

that those concerned had taken it as their own to fu lfill,

while respecting and studying it even more closely than when

n e w . 3*3 An article remarked that Kim's guidance on committee

work was a model of the genre, thus a ll administrative

levels were studying and employing it.36*

The Cult of Personality progressed toward

development of a canon. Kim's speeches were anthologized

and issued as his collected works, in serial editions.

36 1KCNA, "Hyondae saengmulhak mich' wihakpaichon-eso saeroun tangye—rul kaech'ok—han widae—han palchon" (Developments in the Cultivation of New Steps in the Development of Modern Biology and M edicine), Nodonq Sinmun, 30 January 1962, p. 1.

362wTanghaksup—eso kyochochu'ui-rul t'oech 'i—hacha" (Let Os Exterminate Dogmatism in Party Education), Nodonq Sinmun, 3 August 1955, p. 1.

3 6 3n£yoksa—chok i —wol kyosi" (The H istoric February Teaching), Nodonq Sinmun, 1 February 1955, p. 2.

36*HSaehwankyong-gwa kundang wiwonhoe-ui soap" (The New Environment and County Party Committee Work), Nodonq Sinmun, 22 February 1360, p. 1.

182

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These collected works were also published in foreign

languages. Quotations from him were salted in press

articles only sparingly through 1958, but their frequency

increased in early 1959; at that time also, Sim quotations

were highlighted in boldface type, which effectively

distinguished them from the surrounding text. The emerging

body of Kin literature began to meet the criteria of the

authorized text, which, according to Martin, validates the

cult object's philosophical credentials and provides for

popular participation in the cult via political s t u d y - 2* s

An article on party history called its "most

precious" documentation the works of party guidance cadre,

starting with Kim. In particular, Kim's reports, speeches,

conversations, and theses correctly reflected the party line

and were a model of applying Marxism-leninism creatively to

Korean realities. The party should work to collect these,

especially documents from the anti-Japanese era, since few

had been accumulated.3** Many articles commended the u tility

of studying Kim's works. One in the early 1960s explained

that the more one studied his classic writings, the more

conscientious one became — studying them, taking notes,

discussing them, and recording their gist was useful for

36ssee Martin, Cult and Canon, pp. 7-8.

36&KHP Central Committee Party History Research Center, "Tangryoksa yougu-wa kwanryon-han charyo-rul suchipchongri-hagiwihan myech'kachi munche" (Some Problems in Regulating the Collection of Materials Related to Party History Research), Nodonq Sinmun, 4 July 1957, p. 2.

183

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guidance in work and life . Many comrades put them to good

effect in solving problems and executing tasks.s*?

3 . KIM THE INXEEHATIOHALIST

Kim's image as an internationalist altered somewhat.

He had identified with Stalin in the prewar period, and this

convergenge continued, although not as intim ately. After

Stalin's death, Kim's image broadened to show him as a

figure of worldwide stature, s till committed to proletarian

internationalism. At meetings throughout the 1950s, the

suitable portrait of a Soviet leader was displayed beside

Kim's; after the CP? entered the war, Mac's picture made it

a triumvirate. International holidays were marked in the

media, and frequently included stock quotations from Kim

defending proletarian internationalism. Kim's return from

overseas was the scene of a tumultuous welcome: crowds

cheering him and singing his song. A newspaper commented

that the v isit demonstrated proletarian internationalism as

a guarantee of Korean victory.3*®

Kim's foreign trips were heavily reported and

copiously illustrated. Photographic coverage was

particularly lush when Kim visited much of the communist

367pyon Song—won, "Kim II—song sonchip'-ul sim 'ohi haksup-hachi: haengdong-ui chich'im" (Deeply Studying Kim's Collected Borks: Guidance for A ctivity), Nodonq Sinmun. 4 September 1961, p. 2.

36®Kim Otu-yop, "Huhan-han sin r i, yolryol—han hwanho!" (Boundless Trust, Barm Belcomei), Bodong Sinmun. 11 November 1958, p. 3.

184

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bloc immediately after the war: multiple photos showed Kim

meeting as egual the leaders of the USSB and the PEC. Kim

himself greeted high-ranking foreign dignitaries when they

visited Pyongyang, and was frequently photographed with

those of lesser status during their stay.

Kim dealt confidently with foreigners, and in itially

was candid about voicing Korea *s indebtedness to them. For

example, in late 1956, Kin attended the openings of two

factories built with Soviet aid and at another spoke of

gratitude for Bulgarian assistance.^** Elsewhere, Ki# met

visitors from socialist nations which were educating war

orphans, expressing satisfaction with the process and saying

that returning orphans would have no small role in Korea's

e c o n o m y . 37 0 dpbk media often claimed that foreigners were

deeply moved at meeting Kim: for example, when Kim and other

leaders visited a unit of repatriating CPV troops, the press

reported that upon hearing that Kim and his comrades were

expected, the troops were filled with emotion and waited

anxiously; they greeted Kim w a r m l y . 3 7 i i n another example.

3*9"Kim II—song susang P'yongyang-chiku kongchang mich' konsolchang—dulul sichal" (Premier Kin Il-song Inspects Pyongyang Region Factories and Construction S ites), Hodonq Sinmun. 11 November 1956, p. 1.

37WKCBA, "Kin Il-song susang Choson kwa-dulul tamtangkyoyuk-hago issnun hyongcheiguk-ka kyoyuk ilggun- dulul chopkyon" (Premier Kim Il-song Receives Educational Functionaries frpm Brotherly Rations Bhich are Responsibly Educating Korean Orphans), Nodonq Sinmun. 13 September 1957, p. 1 .

371KCNÀ, "Kim I l- s o n g su san g h y o n c h i-e is o kw iguk-

185

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Kim received a delegation of students from 26 countries,

chatting and shaking hands with them. The press reported

that joy and emotion at being received by the beloved leader

of the Korean people could be seen in each face.372

It is not surprising that Kim projected an

internationalist image, since the DPBK had survived the Bar

only with assistance from the PBC and the Soviet Onion and

was now the recipient of considerable largesse from Bloc

nations. Thus, the regime could argue that "proletarian

internationalisme paid off, although the latent symbols in

Kin's internationalist image may have been directed at

deeper concerns. It is arguable that Koreans have had deep

apprehensions about foreigners, as indeed they had suffered

much at alien hands, and thus Kim accrued virtue by

demonstrating his deft handling of them. His foreign trips,

during which he was pictured on egual terms with world-

famous personalities, were treated as triumphal tours, while

he was also depicted as the center of attention during

courtesy calls by visiting dignitaries. This use of the

image bolstered Kim's standing and simultaneously provided

security reassurance.

hanun Chunggukinmin chiwongun changbyong-kwa sangpong" (Premier Kim Il-song Meets Locally the CPV Bho are Be patriatin g ), Hodonq Sinmun. 13 March 1958, p. 1.

372KCHA, "Kim I l - s o n g su sa n g Choson pangmun 26 kaeguk haksaeng daep'yo-dulul chopkyon" (Premier Kin Il-song Receives Student Representatives from 26 Countries, Bho are Visiting Korea), Hodonq Sinmun. 14 October 1958, p. 1.

186

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Kim received strong support from one overseas group,

Korean residents of Japan, who had been transported for

heavy labor to free Japanese for service in the Pacific Ear.

They were officially stateless, mostly destitute, subject to

racial discrimination, and split politically. To North

Korea, however, they represented a potential source not only

of p olitical support but of desperately needed manpower.

The DPBK advanced the claim that these Koreans supported

them wholeheartedly and lobbied for their repatriation, the

first instance o# which occurred in 1959.

Open letters to Kim from Koreans in Japan became a

front page staple in North Korea, each letter espousing

support for DPBK policy while addressing Kim in more

laudatory terms than the DPBK press in general.A t th e

foundation of the Chosen Soren, which claimed to represent

a ll Koreans in Japan, the organization expressed its

loyalty, highest thanks, and glory to the beloved and

respected leader. Koreans in Japan derived strength from

Kim's victory in the Korean Bar and from socialist

construction, which unfurled Korea's glory to the world.

They wished Kim life and health in order to obtain the

unification and independence of the country.37*

373por example, KCNA, "Kim Il-song wonsu-ggei Upon fiikasi Kobe-ei kochu-hanun tongp'o-dulroput'o p'yonchi" (A Letter from Overseas Comrades Residing in Japan's East Kobe to Marshal Kin Il-song), Nodonq Sinmun. 18 June 1956, p. 1.

37*«chaeil Chosonin Ch'ongryonhaphoi kyolsongdaehoe; Kim Il-song wonsu-ke turi-nun pyongchi" (The Chongryon

187

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Kim associated himself with those Koreans who chose

to emigrate to North Korea, once Japan permitted it. Be

attended a rally in late 1959, where the first group cheered

him as the "respected leader," and explained its

gratitude.375 later, Kim received a representatives of the

five groups of arrivals, a ll of whom were emotional at

seeing Kim, whom they had always admired. When Kim told

them to study Marxism-Leninism and the construction

experience c£ the fatherland, all took it to heart and

resolved to work h a r d . 3 7 6 g any repatriates told their story:

an arrival from the first group was given a fine apartment,

but became apprehensive when told Kim intended to v isit.

However, Kim shook his hand, put him at ease, and arranged

for his schooling. Kim also visited and assisted many other

Formation Meeting for Korean Residents of Japan: a letter to Kin Il-song), Nodonq Sinmun. 26 June 1955, p. 1. This organization is known by its Japanese acronym "Choson Soren" as well as its Kprean, "Chochongryon." Its membership is estimated at about 200,000; see Shinn, "Government and politics," pp. 186-87.

37SNKyongae-hanun suryong Kin Il-song tongchi-nun widae-han kunsa chonryok'ka-isimyo paekchonpaeksung-ui kangch'oi-ui ryongchang-issda" (Full Gratitude and Great Happiness for the Respected and Beloved Marshal Kim Il-song by Repatriated Overseas Comrades, Gathered in One Place), Hodonq Sinmun. 22 December 1959, p. 1. A standard reference on North Korea states that over 93,000 Koreans repatriated from Japan between 1959 and 1974, with nearly 80% of these in 1960 and 1961; see Donald M. Seekins, "The society and its environment,." in Bunge, op.c it.. p. 65.

376&CNA, "Kim II—song chae-Ilpon Chosonin ch'ongryon haphoe-wa kusanha tanch'ei—duleiso sanop—handaga kwiguk-han il'ggun-dul chopkyon" (Kim Il-song Receives Repatriated Functionaries 8hp Horked with the Korean Residents of Japan Chongryon and Subsidiary Organizations), Nodonq Sinmun. 31

188

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repatriates. The author concluded, "compared to our

leader's deep love, anything is s m a l l . « 3 7 ?

Kim's benevolent association with the Koreans from

Japan served a dual purpose: it helped attract more

returnees, a vital function at a time when North Korea

needed more workers. It also provided parallels to

prospective citizens from South Korea and thus added weight

to the DPBK reunification program.

Once again. Kin was portrayed as the leader of South

Koreans as well. An open letter from ex-BOK troops who had

defected during the war thanked Kin for leading the Korean

people to victory and for bestowing happiness on them.

During his decade of leadership, the DPBK had established

people's rights and repelled imperialism, a clear contrast

with South K o r e a . 378 Alleged students from the south

addressed am open letter37* to Kim, "the symbol of happiness

to our youth and students, offering tanks and honor to him,

whose "warm bosom" prom ised a b r ig h t f u t u r e .

January 1960, p. 1.

377%i Byong—am, "Choguk-ui p'ua-sokeso" (In the Bosom of the Fatherland), Nodonq Sinmun. 13 April 1963, p. 2. 378wgigo ip'puk-han chon 'kukgun' changpyongdaehoe ch'amgacha ildung Kim Il-song wonsu-gge turi-nun maensemun" (Participants in the Conference of Former "BOKA" Soldiers Bho Entered the North: Britten Vow to Marshal Kim Il-song), Nodonq Sinmun. 1 June 1955, p. 1.

3 7 9fijKia Il-song wonsu-ege turn-nun p'yonchi" (Lette; to Marshal Kin Il-song), Nodonq Sinmun. 26 April 1955, p. 1.

189

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Farther, Kim vas heralded for his correct

reunification program, k meeting on the tenth anniversary

of liberation hailed a recent Kin report as the way to

peaceful reunification. Apart from the program's details,

the speaker stated that the key to the struggle was to rally

more firm ly around the government and the l e a d e r . 3uo

Thereafter, North Korean social groups endorsed Kim's

program as the only way to peaceful reunification. Kim was

a symbol of national salvation. As an article in the late

1950s put it, the O.S. had been an archenemy of Korea since

the 1860s, but united like iron around the KBP, led by Kim,

the Korean people could expel the O.S. Army from the south

and achieve peaceful reunification.

B. KOREAN HISTORY AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE STROGGLE

Following the Korean Bar, a new sense of nationalism

swept North Korea; although officially committed to

internationalism., the DPRK began a closer examination of

history, particularly its modern experience. One writer,

commenting on construction of a history museum, said that

while much remained from ancient days, post-liberation

remains ought to be preserved also. Artifacts related to

3 8 0ttsuryong-ui kyosi—rul nop'i paddulgo p'yongnwa- chok choguk t'ongil wiop-erol" (Upholding the leader's Teaching, on to the Great Bork of Peaceful Reunification), Nodonq Sinmun. 23 August 1955, p. 1.

38iyi Ki—yong, "Miche ch'imryakcha-dul taachoi- handa" (Condemning the O.S. Im perialist Invaders), Nodonq Sinmun. 25 June 1959, p. 5.

190

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accomplishments under Kin should he saved and displayed.3*2

Throughout the 1950s, DPRK reporting on its a llies

diminished* while the number of articles on recent Korean

history escalated. As an editorial noted, nothing could

stop the Korean people infused with the revolutionary spirit

of the party and leader, the proof of this being ten years

of victory. For centuries Korea had been a feudal colony,

but thanks to the Soviet Army, had been liberated to a new

era. Koreans were now moving to realize the tasks

enumerated hy the party and leader.383 Another editorial

reflected this changed relation: all Koreans were joyous at

the anniversary of liberation by the Soviets, but they

should not forget the events of the past decade, the

achievements under the party and leader; thus, in the midst

of celebration, the people should draw closer to them for

fu tu r e victories.384 & subtle assertion of nationalism was

the increasing substitution of the native Korean term for

"guerrilla" to replace "partisan," a Russian loan word.

Thus, Koreans began to seek their contemporary

382Kim C h'ang-il, "flunhwa yumul pochon-kwa ryoksa pakmulgwan" (Preserving Cultural Remains and the History auseum), Modonq 5inmun, 6 June 1955, p. 3.

383"3ang—gwa suryong-ui ryongdo-ha*e" (Onder the leadership of the Party and leader), Hodong Sinmun. 15 April 1955, p. 1.

36 4iixang—gwa suryong-gge yongye-rul turinda" (Giving Honor to the Party and leader), Nodonq Sinmun, 13 August 1 955, p . 1.

191

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recent past. By shaping the study of history* particularly

by filtering it through Kin's experience* the regime molded

the population's concept of itself and of the nature of the

regime. This was especially important for continuation of

the regime as Korea in the 1950s raised a generation which

had experienced neither imperialism nor war. Cye reminded

us that non-western politics is often characterized by sharp

generational differences. 3ss xhe Cult image of Kim* which

meshed with other official interpretations of the past*

assisted in the socialization of the young to the values of

their elders.

1 . EARLY HISTORY

Even though EPRK media printed articles on Korea's

distant past* the principal concerns of popular historical

study were the effects of colonization and post-liberation

construction; interpretation of recent history was essential

to defining their current identity. It was important to

understand why the country had been imperialized and how it

had reasserted itse lf. The former question was answered by

teaching that Korea had been betrayed by corrupt or weak

officials (equated to those in power in South Korea); self­

esteem was bolstered with an emphasis on resistance to the

Japanese and successful post—liberation construction

(northern victories). Hodern history, in its popular form.

38spye, J»Hon-western," p. 77.

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took an episodic form, each story containing didactic

applications or a ocral for contemporary events. Questions

of modern history, then, held vital political significeince.

The flarch F irst Movement of 1919 had ambiguous

meaning for the DPRK, since Christians rather than

communists had been among its guiding forces, but North

Korea had its interpretation of this landmark. The Russian

Revolution had greatly influenced Korean anti-Japanese

sentiment, and while 33 bourgeouis democrats had published a

Declaration of Independence, seeking aid from the west, the

mass meetings which ensued turned the Movement into a

positive revolutionary struggle; the Movement failed as

feudal elements took the lead instead of the working

class.386 An editorial, noting nothing was more precious

than the fatherland — which, it said, was the mother of the

people — urged Koreans to emulate the patriotism of the

March First Movement and unite strongly around the KHP and

Kim, to develop revolutionary traditions and patriotic

s t r e n g t h f o r socialist construction.38?

An inevitable question became the role of the party

and Kim himself. A typical discussion of this explained

that the KCP had led the people's struggle in the 1920s, but

3 8 6chang Mun-son, "Chonminchok-chok p'oktong 3.1 undong" (A Pan—national Rebellion, the March First Movement), Nodonq Sinmun. 1 March 1956, p. 2.

387MQ2Î inmin—ui yonggwang—suroun aeguk chon'tong" (Our People's Glorious Patriotic Tradition), Nodonq Sinmun, 1 March 1957, p. 1.

193

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under Kim's leadership in the 1930s, the fight progressed to

a new level, that of armed combat. During the new phase,

the communists mobilized popular strength and made

ideological preparations for a Marxist-Leninist party, which

had to await liberation.one article, discussing the role

of the KCP of the 1920s, admitted that the KCP had failed,

but that the failure was due to the presence of petty

bourgeois intellectuals, which weakened its ranks. Seal

communists, led by Kim, based their struggle on Marxism-

Leninism; their experience included the founding of the PEA,

which in turn prepared the way for the KHP. The experience

of the PSA proved useful when, under Kim's lead, KHP fought

the sp littists and regionalists, centered on Pak Hon-

yong.389 Thus history was pressed into service against the

Kim Faction's vanquished rivals.

A rticles frequently highlighted famous prewar anti-

Japanese incidents. For example, one described the

suppression of workers during a wage struggle at the Pusan

Textile M ill in 1930; a major cause of the strikers' failure

was lack of a working class party which could organize the

fight. It was at this time that the national liberation

struggle under Kim passed from negative to positive

3 8 8 M 0 ria a n g -u i kyuyak" (Our p a r t y 's C o d e ), Modonq Sinmun, 3 May 1956, p. 1.

38 9yi Ho, "Dridang-urn kang-han hyokmyong-chok t'uchaeng-sokeso ch'anggon yusong-dweossda" (Our Party was Founded and Nurtured in the D ifficult Revolutionary S t r u g g le ) , Modonq Sinmun, 5 A ugust 1956, pp. 2—3.

194

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action.390 The 1929 general strike in ionsan showed what

could be accomplished with the working class in the van,

when it was ready to assume a leading role. In the 1930s,

the struggle rose to a new level under Kia's leadership.3*i

Furthermore, Kim's struggle in Manchuria abetted those in

the homeland. A struggle by farmers begun in 1934 lasted

only four years, since it lacked links with national

revolutionary elements and an organization for mobilization.

However, their struggle did not end, and the FRA, led by

Kim, as well as propaganda about Kim's partisan unit,

strengthened the farmers' resolve to struggle.392

Each of these topics, recurring on the anniversary

of the event, emphasized the inspiration but failure of

previous anti—Japanese conflicts, then said that the

struggle had subseguently advanced to a more successful

level — led, of course, by Kin. Some tribute was paid to

390*1930 Pusan pangchikgongchang rodongcha-ui p'aop* (The 1930 Pusan Textile M ill Workers' Strike), Modonq Sinmun, 12 January 1956, p. 3. It should be noted in passing that each article on recent history carried a didactic meaning for contemporary problems in addition to its lesson about the past. A common argument was that past heroic struggles should inspire redoubled labor efforts.

3 9iflan Yong-hae, «Ilch'ei sikminchi ryakt'alcha- dulul pandae-hayok kwolki-han Wonsan rodongcha-dului ch'ongp'aop" (Opposing the Japanese Im perialist Colonial Plunderers, the Bousing Wonsan Workers' General Strike), Modonq Sinmun, 14 January 1957, p. 3.

392chong Kyong-chun, "Ilch'ei sikminchi t'ongch'i- rul pandae-han Myongch'on nongmin p'okt'tong" (The Hyongch'on Farmers' Rebellion Opposing the Japanese Im perialists' Colonial Rule), Hodong Sinmun, 5 February 1956, p. 3

195

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earlier struggles in which many North Koreans bad

participated, while real credit was reserved for Kim.

2 . THE AHII-JAPANESE 6ÜEEEILLAS

The struggle of the anti-Japanese guerrillas became

a major object of study, with printed materials circulated

widely. Ex—guerrillas wrote articles, which were then

anthologized; these in turn became textbooks. A review of

one volume hailed it as a text for socialist education,

stating that people read it for pleasure. The book showed

the partisans' patriotism and love for the people, their

loyalty to party and revolution, their comradely love. This

provided an example for the masses to unite firmly around

the party and the l e a d e r . 39 3 a review of a later volume

affirmed that it was impossible to collect all the stories

about Kim into a few books, but that the reader of the

current one would gain an understanding of Kim's great

thought, immortal exploits, and lofty communist virtues.

All party members should study the book and strive to

realize these virtues in their life and w o r k . 39* Many o f

these stories were also dramatized or filmed.

39 3Kim Ea-myong, "Kongsanchui kyoyang-ui kyogwaso: 'Hangil ppalcchisan ch'angacha-dului hoisanggi* che 3 chip- edaehayo" (A Textbook of Communist Education: on the 3rd Volume of the "Reminiscences of the Anti—Japanese Partisan Participants"), Nodonq Sinmun, 16 July 1960, p. 3.

3 9*sok Chun-hak and Kim Kyong-sok, "Kongsanchui kyoyang-ui hullynng-han kyogwaso: hoisanggi—chip 'Inmin-ui chayu-wa haebang-ul wihayo" (A Splendid Text for Communist Education: on the Memoirs "For the Freedom and Liberation of the People"), Modonq Sinmun, 14 August 1962, p. 2.

196

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Repeated regularly as they were, these themes

reinforced the cpncept that pertinent Korean history began

in the anti-Japanese era, or more properly, after Kim's

advent. Lessons about the failure of pre-Kim struggles

probably had the secondary purpose of "poisoning the well"

against domestic comuunists who rivaled the Kin Faction.

North Korea strove to collect and exhibit materials

on the guerrilla struggle. A team was sent to Mt. Paektu as

early as September 1953 to survey revolutionary sites-3*®

The National Central Liberation Museum opened in 1955, with

one room displaying materials on Kim's family and youth.

Other exhibits dwelt on the guerrillas and their battles and

Kim's post-liberation return. About 100,000 people

reportedly visited the museum during its first w e e k . 396 A rt

exhibits prominently displayed pictures of the struggle.

For example, one on the thirtieth anniversary of the

guerrilla army hung many paintings showing Kim's virtues,

including his fatherly love and care for the u n i t . 39?

39scho Chung-kuk, "'Paektusan cdiscna poinda'-eidaehayo" (Concerning "Seen anywhere on Mt. Paektu"), Nodonq Sinmun. 23 December 1956, p. 3

396Kim Song-hwan, "Kuknip chungang haebang t'uchaeng pangmulgwaa kaekman" (The National Central Liberation Struggle Museum Opens), Nodonq Sinmun. 14 August 1955, p. 3; "Kuknip chungang haebang t'uchaeng pangmulgwan—eso" (At the National Central Liberation Struggle Museum), Nodonq Sinmun. 25 August 1955, p. 3.

3 97xong Pcng-sop, "Hangil yukyokdae-ui sung-han hyokmyong chongsfn-ul pae'ucha" (Let us Learn the Lofty Revolutionary Spirit of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Unit), Modonq Sinm un. 21 A p r il 1 9 6 2 , p . 3 .

197

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To the extent possible, articles linked Kin and the

guerrillas to Korea, since most episodes occurred in a

foreign country; often, if there were no direct link with

Korean territory, articles would mention the guerrillas'

love for the country and people. A travelogue on the Ht.

Paektu region remarked that the mountain had sheltered Kim

and his comrades and that they had savored the mountain's

waters on their way to combat in fiusan.^vs a youth

delegation spent twenty days in the Ht. Paektu area, where

many sites reminded them of Kim's unit and the 3,000—plus

combats it had in 1937-39; they reflected on hardships

endured by the unit eind on Kim's leadership. 399 a K9P

inspection team surveyed 170 Korean sites associated with

the communist anti—Japanese struggle (not a ll of them Kim's)

and collected relics as well as photographs and movies.

This material was classified by location, starting from the

period Kim began his activities.♦oo

An annual reminder of Kim's ties to the homeland

were the observances of the battle at Pochonbo, a town on

3980 Ik—kun, "Paektusan-eso Ballasan-kkachi (1)" (From Mt. P aektu to H t. B a lia (1)), Modonq Sinmun, 3 January 1961, p. 3.

399AÎB ch'ang-sik, "Chogui—ui mul-un olmana malk-go masi-i issnunga!" (How Clear and Tasty is the Fatherland's Water!), Modonq Sinmun, 2 September 1958, p. 2.

*ooMQri inm in-ul sungri-wa yonggwang-ero komn-hanun hangil muchang t'uksaeng—ui pnlmyol-ui sachok" (Immortal H istoric Sites of Anti-Japanese Character Which Stimulate Our P e o p le t o V ic to r y and g l o r y ) , Modonq Sinmun, 30 November 1959, p. 3.

198

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the Korean-Hanchurian border which Kim had attacked on Jane

4, 1937. At the tenth anniversary of liberation, a statue

of Kim was erected beneath the tree from which he had

commanded the battle. A speaker reminded Koreans of the

glorious place the fight had in h i s t o r y . & branch of the

National Central Liberation Struggle Museum opened in

Pochonbo, pointedly where the Japanese security office once

stood; its displays traced the history of Kim's guerrillas.

A new spaper to u r th rou gh th e museum a t Pochonbo in 1963

reported that 600 pictures, relics, documents, and statues

were classified nnd displayed, showing the struggle of Kim's

guerrillas from the early 1930s and stressing its deep roots

within the country . *02

Although DPBK sources exaggerated the battle's scope

and ferocity,403 Pochonbo actually had boosted revolutionary

morale during the struggle and in retrospect affirmed Kim's

*oiMpoch^onpo'up-ei konrip—dwoen Kin XI—song wonsu— ui tongsang chemaksik kohaeng" (Unveiling a Statue of Marshal Kim Il-song, put up in Pochonbo), Nodonq Sinmun, 8 August 1955, p. 1.

*02"Kakrfp chungang haebang t'uchaeng pakmulgwan Poch'onpo pungwan kaekwan” (The National Central Liberation S tr u g g le Museum Pochonbo Branch O p en s), Nodonq Sinmun, 8 August 1955, p. 1; 0 Kyu-tae, "longgwang-ch'an sungni-ui k il: sae-ro kaekwan—twoenun Poch'onpo pangmulgwan-eso" (The Road to Glorious Victory: the Newly-opened Pochonbo Museum), Nodonq Sinmun, 4 June 1963, p. 3.

*o3According to Scalapino and Lee, Communism. I, p. 222, Kin's force numbered about 80, one-half what North Korean sources claim; Japanese casualties were seven killed and seven wounded: this was essentially a night raid, not a set-piece battle.

199

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Korean—ness. It is unnecessary to rehearse a description of

the battle, it suffices to note that they were repeated at

length annually. Many articles reinforced the impression

Pochonbo made on the populace: a worker from a nearby

forestry station wrote of emotions he felt when

contemplating what Kim had done years before, thoughts

prompted by the museum and statue. Koreans could boast of

this tradition as they constructed a new nation by upholding

the party and leader.* 0* One writer found inspiration in the

accomplishments of farmers in the area, noting that it

stirred his patriotism to see the area's people still gather

around Kim's s t a t u e . 40s on the twentieth anniversary of the

battle, 30,000 youth held night festivities, including a

march over the battleground; they congregated before the

former Japanese residential area to shout anti-D.S. and

anti—im perialist slogans and resolved to inherit the

revolutionary tradition for fatherland construction.

Another tool employed to emphasize Kim's ties to

Korea was the story of the founding of the PEA.**? One

40*Kim Ch'i-kun, "Poch'onpo-ui ch'ongsori" (Ihe Peal of Pochonbo), Hodong Sinmun. 11 November 1955, p. 3.

♦oschcn long, "Poch'onbo—eso" (At Pochonbo), Nodonq Sinmun, 4 June 1956, p. 3.

*06iipongjiwa hum—nun Poch*ongpo-ui pamkori" (Night Streets in Pochonbo in Which Torches Wave), Nodonq Sinmun, 5 June 1957, p. 2.

*0 7as Suh Dae-sook makes clear in Movement, pp. 26 8-74, the FBA was an actual united front organization among Koreans in Manchuria, but it lasted less than a year

200

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article noted that Kim waged his anti-Japanese struggle at a

time of heavy suppression, taking the fight to a new level;

moreover, from the first, he elucidated the line that it was

to be a unified national struggle. Xo coalesce all

patriotic elements. Kin founded the FBA, which applied

Marxism-Leninism creatively and thus attracted adherents not

only in liberated and border areas, but as far into Korea as

Chorwon. The FBA stiffened the struggle of communists

inside Korea while imparting political consciousness to

workers and farmers. After Pochonbo, it helped make the

fatherland "a reliable rear area," keeping alive the

people's faith in victory.*0*

Another potent method for establishing Kim's

legitimacy as a mainstream leader was to trace the

provenance of modern institutions or sentiments to the

guerrilla era, as some examples have already suggested. KBP

rules underwent revision in the 1950s and one clause made

explicit the claim that the party was the successor to the

liberation struggle of the Korean working masses. During

the anti-Japanese era, the liberated areas had had a

revolutionary government plus organizations linking the

masses and Kim had promulgated his line based on these

and had no connection with the real Kim 11-song.

40*Ho Kap, "Choson minchok haepang t'uchaeng-gwa Choguk kwangbok—hoe" (The Korean People's Liberation Struggle and the FBA), Nodonq Sinmun, 5 May 1955, p. 2. Chorwon is a city in the center of the peninsula, now in South Korea.

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experiences.40 9 ihen straggles led by other elements failed.

Kin united diverse patriotic groups, oat of which the FSÂ

was founded; the current Democratic Front for the

Reunification of the Fatherland was the successor to this

united front policy. Moreover, the KFA had inherited the

tradition of the guerrilla army and the rights enjoyed hy

DPBK citizens were the inheritance of the rights from the

l ib e r a t e d a r e a s . 4 lo From its inception, Nodonq Sinmun worked

for development and took as its model Pravda, but it also

inherited the tradition of the Sanil Holgan. published in

the era of Kin's anti-Japanese struggle.4ii (Although Kim

was touted as leader of a ll Korea, the stories of his

guerrilla activities generally emphasized his effects on

northern Korea; seme southern cities were named in the

tales, but most locations were northern. Xhe implication is

that these materials were intended primarily to influence

those he already led, rather than attract southerners.)

The strongest parallel of all was the presence of

♦0 9sin Ho-kun, "Choson rodongdang-un Choson rodong kyekup-ui hyokmyong-chok hangil haebang t'uchaeng-ui kyesungcha—ida" (The KHP is the Successor to the Revolutionary Anti-Japanese Liberation Struggle of the Korean Working C lass), Hodong sinmun, 7 March 1956, p. 2.

4ioyi Chong—won, "Ilche t'ongch'i-haeso-ui Choson inmin-ui haebang t'uchaeng" (The Liberation Struggle of the Korean People from under Japanese Imperial Buie), Modonq Sinmun, 6 August 1955, p.2. The DFBF was organized to implement North Korean reunification policy and included many form er South K orean s.

41 liiTang-ui sasang—chok kisu" (Xhe Party's Ideologic S tandard B e a r e r ), Modonq Sinmun. 1 November 1 9 5 5 , p . 1 .

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Kim, with the care and leadership he exhibited. One author

asseverated that wherever Koreans go, no place is without

the hand and teaching of the beloved and respected leader.

Just as twenty years before he had cared for his men, his

deep fatherly love now touched everyone with food and

clothing.4 12 Another remembered being wounded during combat

in 1940, and Kim ensured that he received proper treatment.

How, whenever he received medicine in a hospital, he

recalled Kin's care for people's health.

The stories of the past era included many which

embroidered the new political forces in Horth Korea. For

example, an article noted that women had participated in the

March First Movement as well as many of the strikes, but

claimed the struggle for social equality really changed in

the period of struggle led by Kim and the communists; in

fact, Kim's struggle abetted social liberation and women's

rights. Kim placed great trust in women partisans, among

whom were many brave fighters and communists.*** Children

*i2awang Sun-hui, "Ku'i-nun uri-ui opoi-sida" (Be is Our Father), Hodong Sinmun, 13 April 1961, pp. 2—3.

♦lach'oe In-tok, "Handaewon-ui konkang-ul nyomryo- hawoyo" (Solicitude for One Unit Member's Health), Nodonq Sinmun. 5 April 1963, p. 2.

*i*Ii long-sun, "Choson nyoscng-dului yonggwang- suroun aeguk chon'tong-gwa hyokmyong-chok cholgae" (The Glorious Patriotic Tradition and Revolutionary Fidelity of Women), Hodong Sinmun, 28 February 1960, p. 3. This article listed a number o f courageous partisan women, among whom Kim Chong-suk was unobtrusively named. This was one of the earliest references to the lady, who, from this modest start, became a major Cult object. She was wife to Kim II-

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were well cared for in the guerrilla era: even in difficult

times in liberated areas children enjoyed the biggest houses

and warmest clothes, nor did they know hunger. This was due

to Kin's warm love, "deeper and bigger than a parent's.

Articles on the guerrillas frequently mentioned

connections to the Soviets, particularly on liberation Day.

One article noted that in 1939 Kim attacked the Japanese

specifically to relieve pressure on Soviet forces, then

under attack by the Japanese, doing this to fu lfill his duty

to internationalism .♦*« Another article called liberation

the great desire of the guerrillas and described their joy

on August 9 when the Soviets declared war on Japan. The

guerrillas in Manchuria persisted in attacking, and on

August 9 at 0800, "we" landed at Onggi with Red Army units.

People then cheered liberation, Kim, and the Soviet Army,

which had shed blood for Korean liberation.**?

3 . KIM'S EIOGSAPHÏ This period included adjustments to Kim's biography,

alterations more cn the order of fine tuning than radical

song and mother to Kim Chong-il; see Chapter V, pp. 284—88.

**SKim Ok-sun, "Ttugoun oboi sarang" (Harm Fatherly Love), Hodong Sinmun. 2 March 1962, pp. 2-3.

♦**Ch*oe Hyon, "P'uroreit'aria kukcheichu'ui kich'i- mit'ei" (Onder the Flag of Proletarian Internationalism ), Hodong Sinmun, 13 August 1959, pp. 2—3.

♦*?0 Paek—ryong, Polk-an kundae-wa topulo" (Together with the Red Army), Nodonq Sinmun. 13 August 1960, p. 2.

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teachings; schools and enterprises already maintained

special areas for propaganda, and these were converted to

the study of Kim. An early example was Byesan Middle and

High School, which established a research cabinet for

studying Kim's life: students and faculty collected

publications, including the Brief Life, a lifelin e, a map cf

the Pochonbo battle, plus pictures and Kim's works.

Although they had biographies of Lenin, Stalin, and others,

they were learning from Kin's anti-Japanese struggle, which

fostered unlimited respect for the l e a d e r . **3

O fficial biographies now supplied details about

Kim's childhood and youth. One example intended for young

people, published in 1963, found rich instances of

inspiration in the leader's background.*** The book opened

with a description of Mangyongdae, the "native place of the

heart," coupled with the assurance that although Kim's

family had resided there since his grandfather's time, the

family had been poor and life hard due to landlords. The

roots of Kim's patriotism were found with his parents and

several relatives who were arrested for anti-Japanese

♦ie«Suryong yongu ggapinet'u: chipang sinmun-duleso" (A Cabinet for Researching the Leader: From Regional Newspapers), Hodong Sinmun. 24 March 1955, p. 3.

***Yun Ki—pok. Kin I l- song wonsunin-uio r in s ic h o l ivaqi (Stories from the Youth of Marshal Kin Il-song) (Pyongyang: Democratic Youth Publishing Company, 20 April 1963) .

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activities. Kim vas raised in deep parental love, his

parents being paragons of virtue and patriotism, his mother

as veil as his father — she opposed feudalism, particularly

regarding women.

The young marshal was surrounded by respectful

friends, many of whom considered him an elder brother. He

was a daydreamer often consumed in lonely thought; when very

young he wanted to touch the sky and catch a rainbow. Upon

learning that his innocent father had been arrested and

tortured, his hatred of Japan intensified and he played at

anti-Japanese war games. His father returned from prison

only to go into exile; before he departed, Kim's father

abjured the boy to heed his mother, study hard, and grow

into a hero who could help his nation. Kim's subsequent

youthful exploits included harassment of a landlord who aped

foreign ways and blocking expansion of a Japanese road with

r o c k s.

upon hearing that his father had been rearrested.

Kin cogitated about his family and his country's future,

then left his grandparents' care to walk to Manchuria to be

reunited with peuzents and siblings. He entered school in

Manchuria, where he showed a love of learning and was

friendly with Chinese students. At his father's deathbed,

Kim vowed to fight until Korea was liberated, and as the

book reminded its readers, "The marshal at last brought

freedom and happiness to our fatherland and planted the

earthly paradise of today in this land."

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Although the primary intent of the biography was

probably to provide a role model for youth, it sought to

explain how Kim acquired his commendable attributes, while

also demonstrating that his adult accomplishments were

presaged in his youthful activities. Bhile allowances must

be made for exaggeration of Kim's precociousness and role,

the book's events are not inherently implausible: the anti-

Japanese sentiments and the Manchurian exile mirror the

experiences of that generation of Koreans.

In the early 1960s came an increased emphasis on

Mangyongdae, Kim.'s family home. An early article conducted

readers on a tour, describing the house and landmarks, such

as a tree planted by Kim's father plus "toboggan rock" and

"battleship rock," where Kim played at war. The article

recalled that when the intruding O.S. ship GENERAL SHERMAN

passed here, Mangyongdae residents had helped fight it, that

they had participated in the March First Movement, and

thoughts of home bad inspired Kim when he marched to the

fatherland in 1937. In the first quarter of 1960, 15,000

people visited Mangyongdae, while in April, the month of his

birth, over 111,000 toured the place. A visit gave new

meaning and new strength to K o r e a n s . *20 mid-1965, DPRK

newspapers were printing photographs of foreign delegations

posed before Mangyongdae, a feature which became more and

♦20yang Chae-ch'un, "Mangyongdae," Hodong Sinmun, 4 April 1960, pp. 3-4.

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more prominent.

The assertion that modern national history began

with the era of Kin's struggle, coupled with an increased

emphasis on his biography, marked a salient point in the

regime's eventual effective subordination of all Korean

history to Kin's life. This movement culminated, as w ill be

seen, in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

C. HAS AND REMEMBRANCE

Hhile the primary emphasis of the 1950s and 1960s

was reconstruction, the subject of defense remained crucial

and much propaganda was devoted to it . One aspect, as

Scalapino and lee have indicated, involved the need to get

the KPA's absolute loyalty to the KBP and Kim; to this end,

Kim's picture and symbols were widely distributed within the

m ilitary while the emphasis on the anti-Japanese movement

may have derived from t h i s . *21 jf this were indeed the

p u rp ose o f much o f t h i s propagan da, i t s u c c e e d e d . * 2 2

But the need for m ilitary propaganda transcended

questions of KPA loyalty: the populace at large required

constant reassurance about security. The large ROK Army was

perpetually poised on the southern border, while the DUS.

♦2iscalapino and lee. Communism, I, pp. 496-97.

*22chung Kiwon, "The North Korean People's Army and the Party," in North Korea Today, ed. Robert A. Scalapino (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963) suggested that a KPA- led coup was foiled in early 1958. However, Scalapino and Lee, Communism. 1 pp. 496-98, 935 deny that one was attempted and argue convincingly that none had been planned. The m ilitary has been loyal since the war.

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seemed increasingly aggressive. The CPV began a phased

withdrawal from Korea in the late 1950s, raising concerns

about the DPBK's ability to defend itself on its own.

Moreover, the Sino-Soviet sp lit, probably apparent to

Korea's leadership in the 1950s before it became public,

cast doubt on international guarantees of the DPBK's

e x is t e n c e .

Once again the regime used diverse methods to build

military loyalty and reassure its people on security

matters, but the propaganda about Kim was not an

inconsiderable ko cl. Kin's military image seemed to address

both prime concerns.

A first step in insuring military loyalty was to

define its character in terms of the party and Kim. A

general in 1955 reiterated that the KPA, founded under the

direct leadership of the KBP and the beloved and respected

leader, had had seven years of victory. Onder their care

and with support from the masses, the KPA developed into an

army of revolutionary fighters? its wartime results

vouchsafed continued anti-O .S., anti-Bhee s u c c e s s e s . *23 xhe

KPA dogmatically traced its lineage to the anti—Japanese

guerrillas: one pfficer explained that it had been founded

by the party and leader, settling successfully the tasks of

+23KÎB Kwang-hyop, "Choson inmingun-un uri inmin-ui chinchong-han muchangryok-imyo choguk powi-ui kangryok-han songpyok" (The KJPA is a True Armed Force of Our People, a S tro n g Rampart t o P r o te c t th e F a th e r la n d ), Modonq Sinmun, 7 February 1955, p. 2.

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creating armed m^ght to protect the people's rights. The

KPA had been founded as the "flesh and b l o o d " * 2 * o f Kim 's

partisans and had inherited their traditions; victory would

come under the firm leadership of the party and K i m . * 2 5

Another wrote that the KHP under Kim's direct leadership

founded the KPA, which protected the fatherland during the

war. The KPA's inheritance from Marshal Kim's guerrillas

was the deep source of all KPA victories: it inherited the

guerrillas' ideology, was close to the masses, and supported

proletarian internationalism. Now, firmly united around the

KIP Central Committee, led by Kim, the KPA was able to

defeat any e n e m y . * 2 6

Kim helped inspire military loyalty precisely as he

had aided production, with a vigorous inspection program.

For the KPA's 15th anniversary, Kim inspected the Chon Mun-

sop unit: he toured the post, met the soldiers, conversed

with them about their lives, and visited the village to see

their fam ilies' hemes. The troops, perceiving the care of

the party and leader, promised to execute their duties

♦2*see Chapter III, p. 118, note 232-

*2Sch'oe Chong-hak, "Choson inmingun-un p'ulpae-ui chont'uryok—ul soyu—ban saeyong-ui kundae-ida" (The KPA is a New Type of M ilitary Having Invincible Combat Strength), Nodonq Sinmun, 3 February 1956, p. 5.

*2 6so Ch.'ol, "Choson inmingun-un hangilmuchang t'uchaeng-ui pich'—nanun hyokmyong chondong—ul kyseung—han inmin-ui muryok" (The KPA is a People's Armed Force Inheriting the Shining Revolutionary Tradition of the Anti- Japanese Armed Struggle), Nodonq Sinmun, 1 February 1959, p. 2.

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f a i t h f u l l y . *2 7 Axa also shoved care for military dependents,

as in early 1957 when he conferrred with participants in a

c o n fe r e n c e o f women a c t i v i s t s and KPA f a m i l i e s . He

expressed concern for their well-being and answered

questions about their problems and women's education.* 2s

DPBK aedj.a highlighted Kim's wartime role as

commander-in-chief and the personal loyalty of the m ilitary

to him. A first—person account, for example, had a soldier

iterate that he was heir to the guerrilla tradition, since

he had enlisted to become one of Kin's fighters and protect

the fatherland. The KHP and Kim always taught correctly and

led to victory. In relating his combat experience, the

soldier said that he had fought crying, "Kim Il-song

mansei," and was s till prepared to fight the enemy . *2 9

By the late 1950s, the DPRK found itself without

*27KCHA, "Kin Il-song tongchi-ui ch'amsok-haei Chon Mun-sop sosok kundae changpyong-ul Choson inningun ch'angkon 15 chunyon-ul songdae—hi kyongch'uk" (Bith the Participation of Comrade Kim XI—song. O fficers and Men of the Unit to which Chon Mun-sop is Attached Grandly Celebrate the 15th Anniversary of the KPA), Hodong Sinmun. 9 February 1963, p. 1. KPA units are usually identified in the press by the name o f a p rom in en t member.

*2*KCHA, "Kin I l - s o n g su san g chonguk—ny o so n g - yolsongcha-hoeui^ei ch'amga hayosston aeguk yolcha yugachok mich' inmingun hnbang kachok-dul-gwa tamhwa" (Premier Kim Il-song Confers with the Families of Patriotic Martyrs and KPA Rear Area Families who are Participating in a National Homen A ctivists' Conference), Hodong Sinmun. 14 April 1957, p . 1 .

*2 9Kiœ D-chin, "Tang-gwa suryong-i uri-rul k'iossda" (The Party and Leader Raised Us), Nodonq Sinmun. 22 January 19 55, p. 3.

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international guarantees it had previously enjoyed, making

it necessary to xeassure its population, lartime stories

about Kim shifted from emphasizing loyalty to stress Kim as

a skilled and reliable commander. For example, a senior

officer recalled that Kim had led the combat at H ill 1211

directly, and that he had meticulously executed Kim's orders

on coordinating infantry and artillery. Kin had summoned

the officer, questioned him in detail, then issued orders,

which had won the day, not only at H ill 1211, but all along

the front.*30 According to another memoir, Kim inspected

H ill 351 in October 1952, analyzing the situation and

ministering to the troops' needs. He devised a plan suited

to the terrain, and when the enemy attacked, the KPA

repulsed them according to his plan. In the decade since,

North Korea had eradicated war damage under the leadership

of the KHP and Kim, and, based on the experience of the war,

the country was now prepared to defend i t s e l f . * 3 i

As with the emphasis on the guerrilla era, the

thrust of the wartime stories enhanced Kim's stature by

further applauding his leadership. Even more directly than

♦ 3och'oe Hyon, **1,211 kochi chont'u-rul hoisang- hayo" (Remembering the Combat at B ill 1211), Modonq Sinmun. 1 February 1962, pp. 2-3. H ill 1211 is known to Americans as Heartbreak Ridge.

♦3iyi ïong-ho, "Chont*u hoisanggi: 351 kochi chont'u-rul hoisang-hayo” (Combat Memoirs: Remembering Combat at H ill 351), Nodonq Sinmun. 21 December 1962, pp. 2-3. H ill 351 is in central Korea, in what the O.S. Army called the "Iron Triangle."

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the guerrilla stories — although they also say have had

this function — the wartime material tended to reassure the

population about security in a time of transition and

uncertainty: Kim, the crucial factor in prior victories,

remained in charge. Note that this emphasis took propaganda

elements which had been of lesser import during the war,

that is, Kim's personal influence on the troops, and gave

increased weight to them. This trend was to continue in the

next period.

D. STALIN AND THE COLT OF PERSONALITY

The apotheosis of Stalin in North Korea came during

the war, when the Soviet leader died. An editorial declared

that the whole world mourned, and heaped heavy praise on

him, averring that his name could not be eradicated from the

Soviet, world, or Korean people.*32 Koreans were adjured to

study literature relating to Stalin's death, including a

message of condolence and eulogy from Kim; workers responded

by intensifying wartime production and seeking to absorb

advanced Soviet experience.*33 Kim c o n tin u e d to i d e n t i f y

*32=Chousegye inmin-ui kip'—un aedo" (Xhe Deep Sorrow of the Pepple of the Bhole Horld), Hodong Sinmun. 9 March 1953, p. 1. The attributes given Stalin in the article were the same as those quoted in Chapter III, so I have omitted them.

*33*pazty Members Ordered to Study Stalin»* (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1100 GMT 21 May 1953. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FE, No. 55, 23 March 1953, pp. EEE9-10. (L/C PS 05125); "Horkers O verfill Quotas for Stalin" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1400 GMT 22 March 1953. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FE, No. 56, 24 March 1953, pp. EEE3-4. (L/C PS 05125)

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himself closely slth Stalin at the time of the Soviet

leader's death. An article discussing the literature about

Stalin's death called for progress to victory, united around

Marshal Kim, "one of the excellent disciples of Stalin."*3*

A memorial address for Stalin termed Kim "one of the

faithful disciples of great Stalin," adding that Kim had

"founded, guided, and consolidated" that KHP on the basis of

the "all—victorious Leninist—Stalinist t h e o r i e s . "*3s

Hithin three years, however, the Soviets undertook a

serious campaign to downgrade Stalin, simultaneously

suggesting that overseas allies do likewise. This presented

a dilemma to foreign communist parties, since, unlike the

new Soviet leaders, their political power had been based on

uplifting Stalin, not deprecating him.*3* This problem was

particularly acute in North Korea, since Kim's ruling

structure greatly resembled Stalin's and Kim had identified

closely with Stalin. Downgrading Stalin meant imperiling

Kim.

In April 1956, the KHP newspaper reprinted two

♦3*Minter€st in Stalin's Death Increasing" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0800 GMT 27 March 1953. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DS FE, No. 61, 31 March 1953, pp. ESE1-2. (L/C PS 05125)

*3Sicaemorial Bites for Stalin Described" (text), Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 2300 GMT 9 March 1953. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DE FE, No. 47, 11 March 1953, pp. EEE9-11. (L/C PS 05125)

*36& brief discussion of the de-Stalinization program and its effect in the PEC may be found in Chapter VI.

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editorials from Pravda on Stalin's errors, but did not

itself disparage him. North Korea's position on the problem

vas articulated at the top, in answers Kin provided an

Indian journalist. Kim admitted that Stalin's Colt of

Personality had been questioned at the CPSO 20th Congress,

and agreed that fve communists" censured such cults as

contrary to Leninist principles of collective leadership.

However the leader's role was not without meaning, that

Marzism-Leninism taught its importance in history, and

Stalin himself had greatly contributed to the international

workers' movement and the Soviet Union. Even so, at the end

of his life, Stalin exaggerated his own role and thus

damaged party and national work. Therefore, while

recognizing his achievements it was only natural that the

CPSÜ had exposed the errors and struggled to extirpate their

effects.*37 This analysis, similar to that in the PEC,

addressed only the question as it pertained to the OSSE,

avoiding local im plications, and while it admitted errors by

Stalin, it quarrelled not at all with the concept of strong leadership.*3 8

Although other Soviet leaders replaced him as a

tutelary figure for North Korea, notably Lenin, Stalin

*37KCNA, "Chcsonminchuchu'ui'inmingonghwaguk naegaksusang Kin Il-song wonsu-ga indo kicha Pu. Pu. P* urachadu-ui ch*lmun-ui daehayo chun daedap" (DPRK Premier Marshal Kim I 1—song Replies to Questions by Indian Journalist V. V. Prasad), Nodonq Sinmun, 31 flay 1956, p. 1.

*3 8a discussion of this may he found in Chapter 71.

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continoed as a source of gaotatiors fee the press, at least

through Spring 1964. Many of his works were translated

after his death, published, and publicized in the OFBK well

into the 1950s. Also, on Stalin's 80th birthday in 1959, he

was remembered as a wise leader and splendid Marxist-

Leninist, who had achieved much in the OSSB. His errors in

the last years were small compared with his domestic and

international contributions. His theses and practical

activities had been lasting.*3*

Kim 11-song may have outgrown direct identification

with Stalin after the Soviet leader's death, but Kin

personally refused to repudiate him, contenting himself with

charging his mentor with pecadillos. Kim was most anxious

to retain respect for the concept of strong leadership.

E. COMMEHIS

If the 1950s were a period of tribulation and

transition for Horth Korea, the regime responded

successfully, surviving war, reconstruction, factionalism,

and international isolation. The problems were confronted

with varied leadership strategies, including appeals to

patriotism , mass mobilization, re-education, and purges.

Kin's Cult of Personality aided in implementing these

strategies in a number of ways.

43 9MÏlakwol—han M alksu-Lenin-chn'icha I . H. Ssutallin t'ansaeng 80-chunyon* (Ihe 80th Birthday of the S p len d id M a r x is t - I e n in is t J . V. S t a l i n ) , Modong Simmun, 22 December 1959, p. 2.

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victorious commander, and during reconstruction, that of the

vise leader guiding rehabilitation. Hithin these broad

categories, the regime extended the images projected during

the prewar period. Kim, the wartime leader, was a logical

extension of Kim., the anti—Japanese warrior; Kin, the leader

of reconstruction, was the natural progression from Kim, the

liberator and builder of socialism . He was directly

associated with victory or with the expectation of ultimate

victory during reversals. Propaganda described Kim as the

people's choice for military leader as well as uniquely

qualified to exercise command. During the war itse lf, Kim's

association with victory was frequently lim ited to general

events — advances, inspiration to heroism, ideological

motivation of troops; when discussing the war in retrospect,

however, Kim was associated with specific battles and

individuals. Ihe earlier generality may in part be

attributed to wartime security strictures, but it is more

likely that the later specificity derived from a desire and

ability to manipulate history in the service of the regime.

Throughout the later 1950s, Kim slowly evolved an

image as a canny and dynamic leader, guiding reconstruction

with thought and deed. He developed a distinctive

inspection style, one tailored to show him both

knowledgeable and caring. His appearances at factories and

farms were occasions for the enunciation of policy, but,

more importantly, were used to boost worker morale; Kim was

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able to express his concern for workers* lives at a time

when the regime had little materiel to distribute. (Quite

likely, these inspections did result in production

increases, as propaganda claimed, due to the personal

attention he gave workers).

Despite his high visib ility, Kim was not yet the

ubiquitous and sole representative of the regime, as he was

to become in the later period. For most of the 1950s and

early 1960s, Kin was usually linked with the party and

government. Several subordinates also received considerable

publicity although there was no doubt who was at the top.

Once again, Kim's image contained a combination of

closeness without intimacy, the feeling of identification

with the masses, but with a concurrent superiority to them.

Kim was never one of the crowd, despite his frequent visits

to all levels of society; he was clearly the leader, the

dispenser of benefits.

As in the previous period, however, Kim was the only

leader mentioned regularly by name and the only one provided

with an historical background. His name was kept before the

public in a variety of says, always sanctified with an

appellation attesting his leadership. Open letters sent

both ways were a convenient way of publishing his name while

simultaneously associating him with economic progress or

foreign adulation (and could be used even when there was no

actual news to report). Kim's name was used symbolically in

all spheres of official life, but not exclusively so:

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general activities or endeavors were often described without

reference to anypne, but when a a national figure was

identified, more often than not, Kim was that figure.

The nature of the stories about Kim subtly changed

over the fifteen years of this period. Initially, Kim had

beai associated with the legislation and change after

liberation, and although he was credited with the advances,

little specific was given but praise. His wartime

leadership was likewise praised, but once again, the image

contained little specificity at the time. By the late

1950s, however, the stories began to include a wealth of

personal detail both with the contemporary economic activity

and the retrospective episodes. This suggests a serious

alteration of style and perhaps some creative writing as

well. It probably derived from fading memories of the

actual events and the elimination of rivals able to protest

excision from the record.

Michael Liefer, in discussing the manipulation of

the symbols of legitimacy,*** wrote that such symbols must

be "relevant to the time in question" to produce results,

since reputations and slogans pertinent to an older

generation lose their efficacy over time. The symbols used

**ogote nlso that in discussing the failure of struggles in the 1920s and 1930s, the fatal element was given as the lack of a guiding party, not, as in the next period, the lack of a leader.

** *Dilemmas of Statehood, pp. 105—07.

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by the Kim Cult bad strong relevance to the Korean populticn

of the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, since most adults had

experienced Japanese imperialism and the Korean Bar. In

this time, however, the regime undertook to make Kim's

background a majpr object of education; this was one aspect

of a burgeoning campaign to convince succeeding generations

that Kim's version of history was their history, and that

previous situations were replicated in current events. This

created a sort of syllogism leading to the conclusion that

previously successful leadership patterns would again

suffice to solve the country's problems.

While it was important to Kim personally to prove

his nationalist identity, this image coincided with rising

nationalism in North Korea, and with a need for the country

to emerge from the shadow of its more powerful protectors.

The concept of the anti—Japanese guerrillas presented a

series of stories in which the Koreans could take pride and

which would in still confidence in them. It was still no

small accomplishment that Kim was able tc convince the

public that his struggle had been the main anti-Japanese

fight and that while an internationalist, he was the epitome

of Korean patriotism .

The social properties conducive to a Cult of

Personality**2 were s till present in North Korea: 1) the

group which supported Kim's claim to leadership had greatly

♦*2See Chapter I, pp. 8-9.

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influenced the establishment of the country's institutions

and their reconstruction after the war. Although these

institutions were strong in the sense of providing for

social control, they were weak regarding restraints on

leadership, since they allowed senior officials to hold

office in both party and government and provided for a

"topdown" system of control. 2) The regime, with its superb

mechanism for social control, kept the intelligentsia from

coalescing into an interest group with social power. In

fact, the regime redefined the concept of "intellectual,"

converting them from philosophical thinkers to technicians

in the service of the state. 3} The OPBK's enemies were

real enough, a three—year war being the proof; after the

war, massed U.S. and fiOK forces were present just below the

DMZ. In addition to these physical enemies. North Korea

arranged social struggles against abstract ones:

flunkeyism, bureaucratism, etc. 4} Following the war, which

itself caused extensive social dislocation, the regime

embarked on an ambitious plan for reconstruction of industry

and agriculture; rural sectors underwent widespread

collectivization. 5) North Korea's education levels rose

rapidly, with universal literacy campaigns and the

imposition of compulsory schooling, but it should be

remembered that the educational materials were those which

supported the regime and the leader. Each of these factors

in its way facilitated the Cult by dislocating society or

removing checks and balances. A symbol of stability and

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For the first time, the aura surrounding Kim assumed

the properties of an actual Cult of Personality, not hero

worship, according to the criteria posited in Chapter I. As

before, the activities were under an authoritarian regime,

one with exceedingly tight control over the media. 2) Kim

was accorded the opportunity to announce important p olicies,

as the media attributed to him both initiatives and

successes. 3} Even more than in the first period. Kin's

works became a "canon" for intensive study, for personal as

well as policy guidance: his works were issued in authorized

editions and used for systematic political education. 4)

Increasingly, Sim came to be regarded as an authority on

diverse subjects unrelated to political affairs; this is

attested to by the on-the-spot guidances at different work

places and the many disparate types of economic successes

for which he received credit. 5) Ihe key factor in this

transition to a Cult of Personality was the increasing

tendency to interpret national history in terms of Kim and

his struggle. Ihe enhanced biographies made the beginning

of Kim's armed struggle the beginning of modern Korea, and

Korea's successes were his successes.

In control of the educational system and all media,

the DPEK regime was able to foster its view of history no

less than current events without encountering contrary

opinions. This the regime did, particularly from the late

1950s on, when strong political rivalry within the elite had

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of events and the leadership image from the pre-1950 era,

broadened them, and added details, then incorporated it as a

primary object of study and propaganda.

This image served its purpose well in this period,

helping the regime surmount unprecedented d ifficu lties. The

existence of the enhanced version of Kim *s image was then

available for use and additional extensions in the next

p e r io d .

223

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THE MODEEN PEEIOC

I . TBS HATOSE IMAGE

From the 1960S on, several domestic factors

facilitated not merely the continuance, hut the enhancement

of the Cult of Personality in North Korea. The major

political rivals of the Kim Faction had been eliminated,

leaving Kin surrounded at the top by comrades from the

guerrilla era, and with a corps of technocrats lacking

strong factional allegiance below. The population was

young, with a majority having known nothing but the official

DPEK version of events. Thus, the regime lacked chronic

domestic opposition or popular resistance for its version of

events and government style.

While large-scale internal economic movements,

including agricultural collectivization and heavy

industrialization, factors already noted as contributors to

a Cult, continued, the DPEK also underwent sweeping changes

in its international position. As As Sino—Soviet conflict

intensified. North Korea carefully enunciated its

independence, occasionally taking sides when the regime

perceived an advantage in doing so, as when economic

assistance was required. To garner international support,

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the DPEK first developed closer relations with sympathetic

le ftist governments and parties, then identified with the

emerging non-aligned movement. Kin II—song lent his

prestige to these changes in itially to gain their acceptance

within North Korea; increasingly, however, he adapted a non-

aligned internationalist aspect to his image for external

consumption.

One conspicuous component of cult propaganda was

that of pride, pride in Kim and country. According to this

propaganda, Koreans could be proude of Kin and his

accomplishments, while by following and respecting him, by

close connection with him, they were a greatly respected

people. Kin became not only the source of domestic success

but the country's valauble contribution to the world. This

must have been an attractive proposition for a people which

had been abject and despised in the recent past; official

history reminded the people of past humiliations, cult

propaganda provided a release from it .

The Qodern period brought increased confrontation,

as military incidents raised the possibility that tension

with the EOK and O.S. might escalate to actual war. Thus,

the regime again had to assure its population about

security, at the same time ensuring the loyalty of an

expanded m ilitary force.

Finally, the regime faced the question of a

successor to Kim II—song. The negative (to the DPEK)

changes in the OSSB after the death of Stalin and in the PEC

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after Mao must have convinced the ruling elite that

preparations were necessary for a succession if their system

were to endure after the leader died. At least from the

early 1970s — spme suggest from the 1960s — Kin's eldest

son was groomed as the DPEK's next leader.

In a ll these matters, the Cult of Personality played

a distinct role fn facilitating regime policy and actions.

It must be said, however, that from the 1970s,

function alone is insufficient to explain the amount of Cult

propaganda. Hhile each Cult theme undoubtedly served a

useful purpose, as will be explained, the proliferation of

Kim's image and the sheer quantity of propaganda eibout him

indicate that he was exploiting the lack of political

opposition to satisfy deep personality needs of his own.

Both volume and content in many cases so transcend

utilitarianism as to suggest only the exercise of ego.

A. IHE IMAGE AND EVENTS

From the 1960s, the DPEK ruling elite had to

confront the tension between continued ideological

commitment to revolution and a desire for stability and

perpetuation of their governing system. This dichotomy was

solved in part by redefining revolution to encompass

renovation of society and by channelling public endeavor

into positive construction, often with an imprimatur from

Kim. He was able to trade on his longevity and previous

images to symbolize stability.

An article prescribed as a class duty having the

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spirit of the anti-Japanese guerrillas plus a trust in

Marxism-Leninism; the lin e drafted by Kim in the 1930s was

the sole guide for revolutionary activity and was concrete

Marxism-Leninism applied to Korean reality. This same

spirit was deemed necessary to complete the last half of the

seven-year economic plan, so that all cadre should have a

thorough grasp of the premier's t e a c h i n g s . **3 ^ companion

article cited magy instances in which Kim's scientific

analysis, coupled with his followers' knowledge of his

teachings, produced favorable results; such cases included a

guerrilla march through enemy forces in 1937 to reach the

Yalu Biver, and many political operations within Korea. The

same spirit was important for functionaries in carrying out

the seven-year plan.***

As previously, Kim associated himself with success

and encouragement in agriculture and industry. A 1965

editorial, for editorial,**: for example, reminisced about

post-liberation accomplishments, and said these indicated

that all party members should unite more firmly around the

**3Chon Kun-won, "Hangil pplacchisan hyokmyong-chok kip'ung" (The Revolutionary Spirit of the Anti-Japanese Partisans), Nodong Sinnun. 4 January 1965, p. 5.

♦**Chon Kun-won, "Hangil ppalcchisan-dului hyokmyong-chik chonkaeryok" (The Revolutionary Development Force of the Antj.—Japanese Partisans) , Modong Sinnun. 14 April 1965, p. 6.

**s"SuDgri-wa yonggwang—uro pich'—nanun 20nyon" (Twenty Shining Years for Victory and Glory), Modong Sinnun. 15 A ugust 1 9 6 5 , p . 1.

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Central Committee, with Kim as its leader, to complete the

seven-year plan and advance reunification.

Kim continued to give "on—the-spgt guidance" at

industrial and agricultural enterprises as well as

construction sites, each accorded extensive media coverage.

Beyond public treatment of the event, moreover, each was

kept continually before the enterprise's workers and treated

retrospectively as if it were crucial to the site's

operations. Sites subsequently displayed plaques

commemorating the visit; some also used sand tables to

display the route of his inspection, while objects he

touched were frequently treated as museum pieces

thereafter.*** An article on synthetic fibers, for example,

had a photograph of a bottle and a single strand, with the

caption, "the vinalon fiber and plasticizer which the

(leader) handled closely when he made an on-the-spot

guidance at the 3 February Vinalon Factory in June 1967."***’

As war with the O.S. became a real possibility

following the capture of the Pueblo in January 1968, North

Korea gave increased front-page coverage to the Great leader

and noted that the population would fo il the enemy under the

vise guidance of the ever—victorious iron commander, as they

***C. I. Eugene Kin, "Introduction; a long Journey," in Journey, ed. Kim and Koh, pp. 12, 21; Salisbury, To Peking, pp. 206-07.

**?Kim Eycng-sun, "Chuch'e-ui som-e kis-dun iyagi" (The Story of flaking the Fiber of CEUC3E), Biniu Choson. 1 June 1982, p. 2.

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gathered solidly around him.*** The focus of Pueblo-related

articles, however, was on O.S. violations and aggression.

In the nj.d-1970s, the media credited Kim with an

important program to modernize industry, saying he

"personally initiated" the Three Revolutions Team Movement

as well as formed teams of 20— to 30-persons each which were

dispatched to enterprises.*** Kim was also evoked for the

movement to create the "Speed of the 80s," a drive to

modernize the economy. For example, workers at the Kim

Ch *aek Iron Horks, summoning their fellow s to increased

efforts, quoted heavily a Kim speech on economic

development, then suggested that Kim and the Party

Center,*:* had made the Horks the forefront of the struggle

and they should repay this trust by upholding his plans.***

**8npaekchu-e kamhaeng-han miche-ui nal kangdo haengwi" (Acts of Bobbery Committed Blindly by O.S. Im perialists), Modong Sinmun. 26 Jamuary 1968, p. 1; Michekukchn—uicha—dului saechonchaeng topal ch*aektong-ul punswai-hacha!" (let Os Smash the Hew Bar Maneuvers of the O.S. Im perialists), Modong Sinman, 28 January 1968, p. 1. This writer had expected to see more articles on Kim as a military commander during this crisis; there was a series of historical articles and pictures on Kim with the KPA and the guerrillas, but these began before the seizure of the Pueblo and were connected to the anniversary of the KPA.

***Yi Po-ham, "3-dae hyokmyong socho untong-un sasang hyokmyong, k isu l hyokmyong, munhwa hyokmyong suhaeng- ui him-issnun ch.'utongryok" (The Three Revolutions Team Movement — Vigorous Motive Force for Carrying out the Ideological Revolution, Technical Revolution, and Cultural Revolution), Hod-ong Ch'ongnyon, 1 February 1977, p. 2.

*soA designation for Kim Chong-il; see p. 290.

*:*"Chonguk rodongcha, kisulcha, samuwon-ege ponae- nun hosomun" (An Appeal Sent to the Country's Workers,

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Ihe regime was officially committed to concepts of

revolution, hot no less committed to public order, control

of the population, and its own continued existence. Thus,

revolution had to be redefined, to be directed outward.

Thus, the DPEK occasionally used Kim's image to confront

this tension between a call for continuous revolution and

the desire for stability. According to one commentary,

leading a life in accordance with socialist rules and

regulations embodied the Great Leader's teachings and party

policies. Once a climate was created in which all so live,

the people would grow as true revolutionaries who think and

act in conformity with Kim's thought and w i l l . * * 2 A nother

added that only when one upheld the leader could one carry

out revolution and find life worth l i v i n g . * * 3

After the DPEK dispatched humanitarian aid for South

Korean flood victims in 1984, the north reported that this

led to great reverence for Kim (and his son) by inhabitants

of Seoul. One was quoted as asking, "Hho else but General

Technicians, and Clerks), Nodong Sinmun. 10 July 1982, p. 1.

4S2Mstrengtheaing of the Socialist Legal Life is an In dispensible Eeguirement in Consolidating and Developing Our Society" (text), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 0300 GMT 17 May 1S77. Translation by the Joint Publications Research Service (herafter JPES). JPSS Translations on North Korea, 20 June 1977, pp. 35—39.

♦S3chong Kwan-ryong, "Hyokmyong-ui ri'ik -u l kwichung-hi yoki—nun kos-un hyokmyong-ga-ui kosang-han p'umsong" (Treasuring the Interests of Revolution is the Noble Trait of Eevolutionaries), Modong Sinnun, 26 March 1985, p. 1.

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(Kim) would send so huge an amount?" and answering it ,

"There is nobody in the world so kind" as him. Another

allegedly told relatives they had to repay the favor by

cherishing this kindness in their hearts.***

As in previous periods, Kim was closely associated

with current affairs, both long-term developments and single

events. It should be noted also that these were only

positive happenings, that he was never directly associated

with failures. This allowed him to continue accruing public

support for himself as well as to provide the people with

assurance that there were serving a government well able to

meet its goals and fu lfill their needs.

B. THE IMAGE CATEGORIZED

The DPBK abounded with physical reminders of Kim:

most meetings opened and/or closed with "The song of General

Kim Il-song." It became commonplace to describe the

settings for meetings by saying a portrait or bust of Kin

had been "placed respectfully" in the background. Most of

the populace wore Kin buttons. But these reminders were

only one part of the homage to Kim.

From the mid-1970s, Kim's image stabilized on a

number of themes which have persisted until the present,

images utilizing stock phrases, repeated incessantly, with

appeals to anecdptes from history for their justification.

***"7ictims Revere Leaders" (text), Pyongyang KCSA in English, 0304 GMT 20 September 1948. FBI5 DB Asian and Pacific (hereafter "AP"), Vol. IV; 184, pp. E13-14.

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Since these themes continued from then on, when Kim had

little or no opposition, they must he considered the image

he favored as well as those which the regime believed most

useful for policy support. Many images, together with the

accompanying anecdotes, indicated virtues the DPR wished to

inculcate: patriotism, industry, loyalty, etc. Others

glorified the leader's talents and habits, and seem to have

been intended to inspire personal respect and admiration for

him no less than confidence that the country was in good

hands. 1. PATRIOT: One enduring title had been "peerless

patriot," and, as detailed above. Kin emphasized his

nationalist credentials. Propaganda traced this image to

the anti-Japanese days; a frequent reference was to a speech

allegedly delivered in September 1943, in which Kim

impressed upon the guerrillas a need to deepen study of

their homeland to accelerate its liberation.***

The DPBK insisted that the regime, though

revolutionary, preserved Korean traditions rather than

destroyed them. A senior official explained that the

determining factpr in Kim's "golden age" was his active

development of the assets and traditions of the people in

harmony with practical demands in socialist construction.

Kim saved the people's cultural assets, changed a distorted

***Kim Il-song, The Korean R evolutionaries Must Know Korea Well (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1973) .

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national history to a CHOCHE-oriented one, and restored

facets of Korean life missing for centuries. This was not

"reaction-isB," but meant that his leadership helped create

new morality, culture, and life corresponding to national

emotions.*®*

Kim's patriotism extended to the country's animals.

An article on the habits of otters, for example, was

preceeded by the notation that "under the leadership of the

Great leader...w ildlife cure positively protected in our

country."*®?

2 . COMCEBSED LEADER: The im age o f Kim a s a le a d e r

concerned for individual welfare continued from the 1950s,

when Kim was depicted as interacting with people to their

material benefit. Articles attesting to this were accorded

prolonged distribution; for example, several books by the

K9P History Institute consisted of a series of sketches

written in the 1960s about Kim's on-the-spot guidances in

the 1950s- In them. Kin demonstrated detailed knowledge of

equipment and materials, while also exhibiting solicitude

for the workers; at many factories he sought repeat visits

*®*Iiffi Ch'un-ch'u, "Kyongae-hanun Kim Il-song tongchi-nnn choguk-ui kwangpok-gwa minchok-ui ponyong-ul wihan wiop-ul pich'—nage iggulo'oshin widae—han ryongdo- isida" (The Respected and Beloved Comrade Kim XI—song is the Great Leader who has B rilliantly led the Cause of the Liberation of the Fatherland and Rational Prosperity), Nodong Sinnun. 25 July 1985.

*5*An Chae-tok, "Sutal" (O tters), Min1u Choson, 25 May 1982, p. 4.

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with workers consulted previously. During interviews he

expressed concern for living conditions no less than

production.*** This was the stuff of both good politics and

good i mage-naking.

Many such articles probably had several levels. One

told of meetings Kim had with coal miner Kim Chik—hyon; they

met first at a banquet in 1947; Kim always asked after Chik—

hyon when he inspected the nine. This helped encourage

production even under adverse circum stances.*** This story,

in addition to reminding its audience that Kim had been

important to economic endeavor since the 1940s, also

identified him wj.th an influential local figure. Kim Chik-

hyon in 1977 was made a Double labor Hero and was thus

likely a person of some consequence locally.***

All major policy initiatives were attributed to him,

at the time of enunciation as well as retrospectively. His

Hew Year's messages became economic directives listin g

**“Party History Insitute of the C. C. of the Workers Party of Korea, Man is the most precious in the world (Pyongyang: Foreign languages Publishing House, 1977); Envying Mo One and Nothing in the world (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977).

***Yi Si-kyong, "Sae-Choson-ui sonkucha-rago puro- chusidon kunal—roput'o: widae—han suryong-nimkkeso Kim Chik-hyon tongmu-ege tollyo-chusin sarang—gwa mit'um-e taehan iyagi" (From that Day He Was Called the Vanguard of New Korea: the story of Love and Trust the Great Leader Bestowed on Comrade Kim Chik—hyon), Nodong Sinmnn. 16 October 1982, p. 2.

***East—West Problems Research Center, Pukhan inmvong sachon (Dictionary of North Korean Biography) (Seoul: Chungang Ilbo Company, 1981), p. 110.

234

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example of interpreting the past, Kim mas praised for the

"historical measure" abolishing the tax system. This mas

proof of the "greatness" of the leader who "devoted himself

to the happiness of the working masses..."***

Rim continued to show concern for special interest

groups, notably semen and youth. An article on the progress

of women explained that, based on Rim's analyses during the

anti-Japanese period, women's organizations were formed to

aid the struggle, and that women repaid Kim with loyalty.

They continued to progress under his leadership . * * 2

As before. North Korean media issued regular "first-

person" tales about Kim's direct kindness to an individual,

who repaid it with loyalty and action. Cne biologist**®

told hew, unable to earn a degree in South Korea, he

received a doctorate in the north, where the leader showed

love and faith to the author and his fellows by giving

programmatic guidance and establishing experimental

stations, then reviewing first results. The group therefore

bred the "Kim Il-song Flower," a "flower of loyalty," the

***"Nodong Sinnun Narks Tax Abolition Anniversary" (text), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2234 GMT 20 March 1984. Translation by the FBIS. PBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 058, 23 March 1984, p. D7.

462MChospn minchu nyosong tongmaeng che5ch'a daehoe" (The Korean Democratic Women's League Fifth Congress), Nodong Sinnun, 27 June 1983, p. 1.

**®Song Bak-kun, "Sarang—gwa sinnyom" (Love and Faith), Chollima, January 1984, p. 64.

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"most honorable" research work for biologists. Nor did it

have to be a member of the elite. One author told of Kim

dispatching medicine by helicopter to an ailing construction

worker, concluding that whenever people "walk" in his

"nurture," they receive the trust and love, "whoever they

a r e . " * * *

3. SOURCE OF BENEFITS: Complimenting Kim's image as

a concerned leader was Kim as the source of a ll benefits.

This image was treated above,*** and it need only be said

here that examples continued in the previous style. On his

birthday every April, the DPEK supplied gratis clothing and

foodstuffs to children.*** The "Song of Paradise" listed the

benefits available in North Korea, then concluded, "Curs is

a socialist nation best in the world/the great leader has

built it."**^

The dominant image was that of the leader who

"unstintingly contributes everything only for prosperity and

our people's happiness," so that only by executing his

intentions could people fu lfill their tasks, repaying his

♦**Ch*oe Sang-kyu, "Eodong kyekup-ui songchang-ui k il-ei kis-dun kokwi-han unchong" (Precious Grace Dwelling in the Path of Nurture of the Working C lass), Nodong Sinmun, 23 August 1982, p. 2.

***See Chapter IV, pp. 173-75.

***"KCNA on Eve of Birthday" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1510 GMT 13 April 1984. JPES Korean Affairs Report, JPBS-KAE-84-026, 2 May 1984, pp. 110-11.

**?A translation of the lyrics may be found in C. I. Eugene Kim, "Introduction," pp. 13—14.

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trust and expectations.*** Thus, in 1985, the 40th

anniversary of hj.s rule, a senior official could declare

that "nothing in our country — a river or a mountain, a

building or a piece of art displaying our people's wisdom —

could he created without the Great Leader's leadership."***

4 . GUABAJilOB OF VICTOR I: The DPEK in th e 1970s and

1980s existed with many of its goals unmet. Although

reconstruction had been achieved, the economy lagged while

reunification remained a distant possibility. It was to

address these concerns most likely that the regime displayed

Kim a s a le a d e r who had b ro u g h t v ic t o r y d i s p i t e g r e a t odds

in the past and jwould do so again. In so doing, the regime

was able to take full advantage both of its longevity and

its long-term domination of the media.

One article admitted the difficulty of building

socialism and communism, the path being beset with trials.

However, the anti—Japanese guerrillas, with loyalty to Kin,

abounded with revolutionary optimism and faith despite

adversities; they even endured a "march of hardship," which

they converted to a "march of victory" under Kim's "warm

outstretched hands." This same faith sustained the country

*68"Hodun ilggun-dulun tangchongch'aek-ul muchokon kwanch'ol-hanun hyokmyong-chok kip'un-ul nop'-i palhwi- hacha" (Let All Functionaries Loftily Manifest the Revolutionary Spirit of Unconditionally Carrying Out Party Policy), Hodonq Sinmun, 7 February 1977, p. 2.

***Iim Ch'un-ch'u, "Kyongae—hanun Kin Il-song," p. 2. 237

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while completing great economic projects.*?* Again, the

revolutionary faith of the Korean people had been inherited

from guerrillas loyal to Kim and only if they held that

faith could they overcome blocks, since pessimists became

weak. The guerrillas never faltered, even under torture or

on the gallows, their earnest wish being to live every

minute solely for the sake of the leader and to return to

his bosom, even after death. Koreans s till faced enemies,

but with the Great Leader, there were no unbreakable

barriers or unconquerable fortresses.

Experiences in the Korean War served as potent

reminders of victory despite adversity. One author noted

that Kim's victory had been based on a scientific analysis

of revolutionary war, so that today he was regarded as a

great military tactician and the "symbol of victory in anti­

imperialist struggle." Just as in the past, with loyalty to

the Leader, Koreans would complete a ll indicated t a s k s . *22

*7*Chu Pyeng—sun, "Hangil yukyokdaewcn-dului hyokmyong-chok sinnyom" (The Revolutionary Faitn of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Onits), Modong Sinmun, 27 July 1982, p. 2 .

*7*Kim Chae-sun, "Hangil yukyokdaewon-dului hyokmyong-chok sinnyom-gwa hyokmyong-chok rakkwanchu'i" (The Revolutionary Faith and Optimism of Members of the Anti- Japanese G uerrillas), Kulloia, March 1984, pp. 13-16.

4 72tiKyongae—hanun suryong Kim Il-song tongchi—nun widae-han kunsa chonryok-ka-isimy paekchonpaeksung-ui kangch'ol-ui ryongchang-issda" (Beloved and Respected Leader Comrade Kim Il-spng is a Great M ilitary Tactician and an Invincible Iron Commander), Miniu Choson. 24 July 1983, p. 2.

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Another recalled that Kim had won many battles during the

war, including the UH "Home for Christmas" offensive.

Koreans would accomplish the task of reunification.*^3

5 . OMNISCIENT LEADER: By th e 1 9 7 0 s, North Korean

media depicted Kim as knowledgeable on an increasing number

of subjects, most unrelated to politics or war. This image

was an outgrowth of two phenomena from previous periods, the

on-the-spot guidance, during which Kim demonstrated specific

knowledge, and the seeding of his quotations in

publications.*?* The use of quotes was a simple way of

fostering an image of expertise. For example, an economic

dictionary had at least one Kim quotation to illustrate each

entry, with longer definitions having several.*?* The wide

range of topics on which he was quoted is illustrated by the

total of 49 diverse subjects treated in one month of Nodong

Sinmun alone:*?* CHHCHE, the synthetic rubber industry, the

Mongolian revolution, coal mining, animal husbandry, movies

as mass education, Korean history, magnesium production, and

♦?®Kang Chong-ch'ol, "Hidae-han rycngdo, ryoksa-chck sungri" (Great Leadership, Historic Victory), Miniu choson, 26 July 1983, p. 2.

*?*Marshall Pihl noted that Kim quotes began to open issues of literary magazines regularly from 1966; see "Engineers of the Soul: North Korean Literature Today," Korean Studies, I (1977): 79.

*?*DPBK Social Science Institute Economic Research Center, Kyongche sachon (Dictionary of Economics) (Pyongyang: Social Science Institute Publishing Company, 2 vol., 1970).

*?*July 1983; issue selected at random.

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land reclamation. Even though quotations were frequently

general and repeated often, the cumulative effect must have

reinforced the image of a leader able to direct work

skillfully on any subject.

His guidance ranged widely. Thus, Kim's 1948 talk

on managing state enterprises was a CHOCEE-based "integrated

theory," which indicated a "new way" to embody the mass

line.*?? Kin's 1963 speech on banks was the "guiding

principle" for banking.*?* Kim's wisdom was responsible for

the "leaping development" of engineering.*?* A new

turnaround occurred in "all branches" of revolution and

construction, due to the Three Revolutions Movement,

"personally initiated and s till led" by the Great leader.***

But, Kim.'s guidance extended to areas unexpected for

477WBodonq Sinmun C it e s Kim I l- s o n g on CHDCHE Management" (text), Hodonq Sinmun. 25 January 1978. Translation by the JPES. JPES Translations on North Korea, No. 575, 22 February 1978, pp. 14-20.

*?«"Sahoechu'ui unhaeng-ui kinung-gwa yokhal—ul took nop'icha: widae—han suryong Kim Il-song tonchi-ui rochak 'unhaeng saop ch-'ekye'rul koch'il-de dae-hayo' palp'yo 15 doks-e chu'ua-hayo" (Let Us Further Enhance the Hole and Function of the Socialist Bank — on the 15th Anniversary of Publication of the Great Leader's Hork "On Changing the Work System of Banks"), Hodonq Sinmun. 29 November 1978.

*79"KCNA R ep orts on DPBK E n g in eerin g In d u stry " (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1546 GMT 26 July 1978. JPES Translations on North Korea, JPES 71658, 10 August 1978, p. 10.

***"3 dae hyokmyong socho untong-ul touk him-issge poUyo—nagacha" (Let Us More Energetically Carry Out the Three Revolutions Movement), Nodong Sinmun. 3 February 1977, p. 2 .

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a political leader: his thesis on linguistics offered a

scientific elucidation of practical problems, in which he

analyzed intrinsic relations between language and national

development and prescribed methods for linguistic purity.

The "fatherly leader" personally laid the basis for

cinematic success not only by increasing the industry's

budget but also by explaining each production detail for the

first Korean feature film .*«2

A subset of this image lauded Kim's foresight, in

which it was claimed that he had planned or made provision

for a certain enterprise even while otherwise engaged. For

example, even in the difficult times after liberation, Kim

had provided for education and cadre training.*=3 In Kay of

1939, while resting at Samjiyon, Kim directed that a

recreation center be established there after liberation.*8*

In 1951, returning from the front, Kim stopped at a spot in

♦«xchong Sun-ii, "Ono-nun minchok-ul t'ukching- chinun kachang chungyo—han kongt'ongsong" (Language is the Most Important Common Feature Characterizing a Nation), Kulloia, January 1984, pp. 33—36.

♦82chong Bun—kyu, "Chuch'e sidae-rul pich'-nae'inun: nam-duli sasang—-do nos—hanun kos—ul uri-ka ch'angcho-haeya handa" (Ray of Guidance Shining Upon the Era of CHOCBE: 8e Bust Do Hhat Others Cannot Even Imagine), Nodong Ch'ongnyon. 6 February 1977, p. 2-

48 3paek Ch'an—pin, "Nuguna ta maum-kkos pae'n-nun kkut* ops-nun haengpok" (The Unlimited Happiness of All Studying to Their Heart's Content), Biniu Choson. 14 April 1977, p. 2.

♦8 4yi chong-t'ae and Hong Pyong-su, "Hyokmyong-chok rakkwan" (Revolutionary Optimism), Nodong Sinmun. 19 June 1983, p. 2. Samjiyon is on the Korean-Banchurian border.

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fijonpo D istrict and planned a large-scale orchard on

devastated ground ; his plan was realized after the war.**s

The lineage of certain programs was also extended,

to jibe with other campaigns utilizing the anti-Japanese

guerrillas. For example, one article argued that the basis

of the revolutionary guidance method was to achieve the

Chongsan-ni sp irit, "the work method of the anti-Japanese

guerrillas created by the Great leader."*** (As we have seen

above. Kin indeed enunciated this work method, but in the

1960s) .

6 . PBILOSCPEESz Kim's writings and speeches had

always been used as the authoritative word on political and

economic subjects, but he had portrayed himself primarily as

a man of action. From the mid-1960s, he increasingly

pictured himself not only as a practical thinker, but as a

social philosopher of worldwide repute. It should be noted

that this was the reverse of Stalin's model, since the

Soviet leader began his cult by portraying himself as the

premier communist philosopher. (See Chapter VI)

Early articles defined Kim as an interpreter of

classic socialism . Just as one cannot fight without a

♦*s"Paek?kwa churong-chin Ch'ongch'un kwawon" (Ch'ongch'un Orchard, Clustered with Fruit), Biniu Choson, 25 August 1983, p. 3.

***"Kunchungroson—ui kwangch'ol-un hyokmyong-chok ryongto pangpop—mi kipcn yoku" (Implementation of a Hass Line is the Basic Demand of the Revolutionary Guidance Method), Bodonq Sinnun. 11 November 1983.

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weapon, one cannpt make revolution without a theory,

rendering study a communist duty. Study, for guerrillas,

was not merely a requirement hut that which set the terms of

struggle; Kim was a model in that he rose earlier than

others and lingered later to study and thus was able to

apply M arxist-Leninist principles to current problems.**?

Sut, gradually, JHorth Korea asserted the importance of

CHOCHE, Kim's creation. For example, it was vital to

independent development, and the K8P had deep roots in

CEUCHE; it was necessary for grasping a M arxist-Leninist

line and was an adaptation of it to the country's reality.

CHDCHE meant people taking their country's fate in their own

hands and it was to be expanded into a ll sectors.***

By the mid-1970s, Kim had become the "great thinker

and theoreticians who discovered the "immortal guiding idea

reflecting the demand of the times and aspiration of the

people." He solved creatively all questions arising in

revolution and construction to suit national conditions, not

wedded to any existing theories or experience.*** In fact.

**?Chon Kun-won, "Hangil ppalcchisan-ui haksup kip'ung" (The Study Spirit of the Anti—Japanese G uerrillas), Bodonq Sinmnn, 14 July 1965, p. 6.

***Kim Ch'ol-hui, "Choson hyoknyong—gwa uri dang-ui chuch'e sasang" (Korean Revolution and Our Party's CHOCHE Thought," Bodonq Sinmun, 30 September 1965, p. 2.

**9"Kyonga-hanun Kim I1-song tongchi-nun hyoknyong— ui ap'kil-ul palkhi-go uri inmin-ul sungri-wa yoaggwang-ero ikkusi—nun widae—han suryong—ida" (The Beloved and Respected Comrade Kim II—spng is the Great Leader Bho Has Illuminated the Course of Revolution and Brought Our People to Victory

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Kim summed up the experience of the revolution and pioneered

a new road, which gave victory in the anti-Japanese

struggle, Korean Heir, and reconstruction.*** Thus, Kim moved

from a mere interpreter of previous philosophy, including

Marxism-Leninism, to a thinker of great originality.

As w ith many a s p e c t s o f K im 's l i f e , h i s p h ilo so p h y

was traced to the anti-Japanese era. For example, in 1982

it was claimed that a Kim article published in the journal

Sokwanq in November 1937 contained unique ideology about the

anti—im perialist, anti-feudalist revolution, which explained

these "for the first time in history according to CHOCHE

ideology." Even 45 years later, when reunification was a

great problem, the work embodies real life in a unique

CHOCHE revolutionary line.***

Kim's ideas were held to be original as well as the

highest expression of Korean thought. Under them, man is to

be the master of a ll, to control his environment rather than

and Glory), Nodoaq Sinmun. 23 November 1977, p. 1.

**®Kim T-'ae—hyon, "Inm in daech un g-e w iko-hayo t'uchaeng-hanun gos-un hyoknyong sungri—ui kunpon yolswae" (Struggling by Belying on the Popular Masses is a Basic Key to Victory in the Sevolution), Nodonq sinmun, 29 November 1983.

**iCh'oe Ch'ang-chin, "Choson hyokmycng-gwa panche hyokmyongwiop—ui ap 'k il-u l palkhyo-chun widae-han munhon: kyongae-hanun Kim 11-song tongchi-ui pulho-ui kochon—chok rochak 'Choson gongsanchu'ichadul-ui immu'" (A Great Document Illum inating the Course of the Korean Revolution and Anti-feudal Revolutionary Tasks: Marking the 45th Anniversary of the Publication of the Beloved and Respected Comrade Kim Il-song's Immortal C lassic, "The Duties of Communists"), Nodonq Sinmun. 10 November 1982, p. 2.

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be ran by it, and a country is to be sovereign, controlling

its own destiny. CHOCHE could only have arisen in Korea

because it had experienced subordination to foreign

imperialism and because Kim, who was capable of using

Korea's objective conditions to create CHOCHE, was born

t h e r e . **2

The many writings and speeches were edited into a

canon,*93 i.e ., a body of authorized texts, updated and

revamped to remain current with changing times. The first

volume of the second edition of Kim's Selected works,

consisting of theses, reports, speeches, and talks from

1945-47, was published in 1963 in order to "give even

greater help to practical tasks and study." It was admitted

that the book had been edited in "the direction of

correcting shortcomings and déficiences" by the editor of

the first edition.*** It has been noted, for example, that

Kim's first recorded speech, given in 1945, and the version

**2Park Han-shik, "Chuch'e; the North Korean ideology," in Kim and Koh, Journey, pp. 85-89. ihen a philosophy professor from Kim ll-song University sensed that Dr. Park was not grasping aspects of CHOCHE, he comforted the visitor by stating that the idea was "such a profound 'eternal truth* that it was not meant to be fully comprehensible!"

**3see the discussion in Chapter I, p. 8.

***KCNA, Kim Xl-song sonchip che—2—p'an che-1-kwon palhaeng" (The First Volume of the Second Edition of Kim's Works Published]., Nodonq Sinmun, 4 January 1964, p. 1. Note that deficiencies were attributed to an editor, not Kin; this statement was likely needed to account for redactions, since memorizing Kim's works had long been an important aspect of DPfiK education.

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in the 1963 edition little resemble each other, except in

subjects treated; the later version fully reflected the

policy lines of the 1960s.*« By early 1984, the KiP

Publishing Company had issued 28 collections of Kim's works,

the latest containing material from 1971—73.***

The works of Kim assumed great importance in North

Korean study — the officially-espoused "ideal day" included

eight hours of study along with work and sleep. As noted in

the previous period, propaganda rooms in schools and work

places were converted from the study of general materials to

the study of Kim.**? Entering students at Kim ll-song

University were tested on their knowledge of Kim's works and

during 1,300 hours of instruction, some 65% were devoted to

Kim's ideas; in fact, a separate university department was

created for them.***

7. filllTAfil NONPAREIL: While North Korea from the

end of the war had faced a hostile ROK-D.S. coalition on its

border, the modern period had increased confrontation,

stemming from increased U.S. activities in Asia and the

DPRK's own adventurism. But North Korea had security

4 9sx.ee Chong-sik, M aterials, p. 9.

***"Kim Works Volumes 26, 27, 28 Published" (text), Pyongyang KCNÂ in English, 1511 GMT 12 April 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 073, 13 April 1984, pp. D9-10.

**?Gayn, "The Cult of Kim," p. 24.

***Park, "Ideology. " p. 89. McCormack, "Kimilsung- ism, " p. 57.

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worries not only cn its southern borders: the late 1960s saw

the Sino-Soviet dispute veer toward military conflict,

making Korean territory a strategic area either power could

use against the pther. Moreover, in 1966, the Soviet Army

occupied one of its European allies and deposed a legitim ate

socialist government over a disagreement on internal

m a tte r s .

As might be expected in the tense era following the

seizure of the PUEBLO, great emphasis was placed on Kim as a

military genius. Consistent with previous propaganda, he

was credited with the creation of the DPfiK's military force,

as when a general on the 29th anniversary of the KPA in 1977

noted that Kim had founded the army based on the tradition

of the KPHA.♦** However, by 1979, the KPA anniversary had

been changed, moving it from February 8, 1948 to April 25,

1932. As one general averred, the Great Leader, basing

himself on anti—Japanese tradition, "reorganized" the KPEA

into the KPA in 1948.s** The intent was clearly to identify

the military even more closely with the pre-liberation

**’"Report by Kim Ik-kyon, Lieutenant General of the KPA, at the 7 February Central Report Meeting in the 8 February House of Culture, Pyongyang, Marking the 29th Anniversary of the Founding of the KPA" (text), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 0805 GMT 7 February 1977. Translation by the F31S. FBIS DR AP, ¥ol IV: 27, 9 February 1977, pp. D2-12-

sooitGeneral So Choi Reports cn Anniversary of Founding of People's Army" (text), Pyongyang KCBA in English, 1612 GMT 24 April 1979. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IX: 081, 25 April 1979, pp. D-2.

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straggle, in harmony with the widespread campaign to "learn

from the anti-Japanese guerrillas."

Since the emergence of class society, argued one

article, there have been approximately 14,500 wars, from

which came many illustrious generals and strategists.

Never, however, has there been such a hero or strategist as

Kim, who defeated two formidable imperialisms in modern wars

in one generation; he was the most courageous commander of

the centary.soi This line characterized the 1980s, that Kim

was history's greatest military leader. This seemingly was

done both to reassure the population on security and give

them a point of pride.

North Korea illustrated the claim with anecdotes

from its wars. On the 38th anniversary of liberation, it

reflected on Kimfs heroism in defeating the Japanese while

in his twenties. He foiled many annihilation attacks, then

planned the final offensive, for which he gave the order on

August 9, 1945. Legends arose, such as the tale of the

"Paektusan Commander," the appearance of whose star

signalled that independence n e a r e d . * * 2 ihe Korean War was

soiyi Chong-t'ae, "Chonsungsang-un kangch'ol-ui ryongchang-ul norae-handa" (Sing of the iron-willed Victorious Commander), Nodonq Sinmun. 25 July 1983, p. 2.

sozKim Ch'ong-song, "Paektusan changsu" (Paektusan Commander), Nodoaq Ch'ongnyon, 15 August 1983, p. 2. Paektusan is Korea's highest mountain. Also note that August 9, 1945 was the date the Soviet Army attacked Japanese forces in Korea; the DPfiK could not now admit, however, that the Soviets and not Kim liberated Korea.

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«on by CHOCHE m ilitary thought and the leader's unsurpassed

commanding art: Kin, using CHOCHE, always seized the

initiative to deal a grave blow to the Americans. The proof

was that, while the victim of a surprise attack must undergo

great trials before counterattacking, Kim took the offensive

immediately, liberating Seoul within three days. Even

during the strategic retreat, he prepared for resuming the

offensive.sos

More modern events had also been influenced by Kim.

One author avowed that the FUEBLC episode proved that no

enemy could avoid downfall before the KPA, which had been

nurtured into a ."l-matches-lOO" army in the bosom of the

Great Leader. The unit which captured the spy ship, seven

against 82 O.S. ."rascals," had recalled Kin's 1961 visit to

their ship and hj.s teachings on defending the fatherland's

seas. Sim ilarly, the two airmen who confronted the EC—121

spy plane were young pilots who had grown up flying airplane

number 828, in which the Leader had personally sat and from

which he had issued teachings.***

Hell removed in time from the war, CP5K propaganda

so3paek Eak-rim, "Chuch'e-ui kunsa sasang-gwa t'akwol-han ryongkunsul-ui widae-han sungri" (The Great Victory of CHOCHE M ilitary Thought and Unsurpassed Commanding Art), Kulloia. July 1983, pp. 38-44.

so+MCompilation of Records: The U.S. Im perialists and Their Stooges Must Not Run Hildly and Recklessly* (text), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korea, 1115 GMT 22 January 1985. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 017, 25 January 1985, pp. D3—5.

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advanced the claim that devotion to Kim had been the prime

motivation of the fighters. In July 1951, in an on-the-spot

guidance at H ill 1211, Kin embraced all the combatants in

his fatherly love, as they in turn struggled to live up to

it. The soldiers pledged a desperate defense, to fight to

the last breath singing the "Song of General Kim 11-

sung."*o* Tanker Bo Sun-hak in 1950 did not fear death, and

in the last moment of his life, his fellows saw a beautiful

smile as he had completed the combat duty assigned by the

Great leader.*** Even campaigns to emulate martial heroes

reverted to Kim: soldiers of the KPA Unit to which Comrade

Chong Hang-ryop is Attached, believing only in the leader,

were determined to be the "Kin Hyok's and Cha Kwang-su's of

the 1980s."**? Kin and Cha were a pair of guerrillas

celebrated for their loyalty to Kim.

In addition to promoting KPA loyalty, the tales of

Kim's military prowess added reassurance about security. A

radio blurb had South Korean soldiers ruminating that O.S.

***Han Snn-song, "long'ung—ui kochi — 1211 kochi— eso" (H ill of Heroes — at H ill 1211), Nodonq Sinmun. 22 July 1983, p. 4.

***Yi P'yo-u, "315-ho ttangk'u-wa hanggei: konghwakuk yong'ung Ho Sun—hak tongmu-e taehan iyagi" (With Tank 315: the Stpry of the Republic's Hero, Comrade Ho Sung- hak) , Bin in Choson. 22 July 1983, p. 4.

5 0 7ngjQj^youg-chik sinnyom-gwa pulkyol-ui t'uchi-rul ango: Choson inmingun Chong Hang—rop tongmu sosok kupundae— seo" (Revolutionary Faith and Undying Spirit: at the KPA Unit to Which Comrade Chong Hang-ryop is Attached), Nodonq Sinmun. 27 July 1982, p. 3.

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troops were scared by the KPA, as indicated by the numbers

who went to hospitals or on leave during a recent

provocative exercise. The BOK soldiers all agreed that this

was because the KPA was guided by Kim.***

8. FATHER: Although the title was used occasionally

in earlier periods, the appellation «father" was applied

regularly from the late 1960s. Early use of the adjective

"fatherly" often involved his relations with youth, although

application of the term expanded to include the entire

population.*** Since the stress on Kim as father coincided

with the emphasis on Kin's family background, to be

discussed below, it might be supposed that Kim was somehow

compensating for the ruptured family life of his youth by

creating the ultimate extended family. The concept "father"

is also in line with Confucian traditions.

A lengthy article in an annual publication listed

reasons why Kim mas a father to his people. The major

headings affirmed that Kim had made workers the leading

class of the revolution and had seen to all their concerns;

he had ensured that farmers lived and worked with healthy

bodies; he was showing love and concern for the nation's

soangQjj Army O f f ic e r s S aid Awed by M ilita r y in North" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1512 GMT 5 September 1983. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 173, 6 September 1983, pp. D 7-8.

***As when 0 Chae—won, "Oboi suryong-ui k'unak'un p'umsok-eso" (In the Enormous Bosom of the Fatherly Leader) Nodonq Sinmun. 11 November 1967, p. 2, described Kim's care for students at the Mangyongdae Revolutionary Institute.

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Intelligentsia; he had upgraded the military and cared for

it with fatherly feeling; he had made certain that women and

children had nothing to envy in the world; he was the loving

father of youth and students. Each category outlined

specific types of care, most of them reiterations: improved

working conditions, research fa cilities, education system,

etc. For each social group. Kin had also provided an

appropriate mass organization.*^*

After explaining that Kim was endowed with the nohle

virtues of "extraordinary sim plicity and modesty," which

only the greatest leader of the people could possess, a

newspaper noted the people followed him with the "greatest

intimacy, as they do their real father . . . " * 1 1 A defector

from South Korea told of meeting a small girl in Pyongyang

and asking what was most valuable to her; she replied that

it was the Great Leader and his son. Under prodding she

admitted that her parents were precious, but the leaders

"give me greater love and grace than my parents do."*iz

*i*KCBA, "Kyongae-hanun suryong Kim ll-song tongchi- nun uri inmin-ul hanp*um-e ana-chusinun chaeroun obo-isida" (The Beloved and Respected Leader Comrade Kim ll-song is the Affectionate Father Bho Gathers Our People to His Bosom), Korean Central Yearbook 1972. pp. 193-244.

St iwModonq Sinmun h ails Kim's Leadership, Chuche, Part I" (text), Pyongyang KCSA in English, 0356 GMT 23 November 1977. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 226, 23 November 1977, pp. D 5-7.

sizotpress Conference with Former South Korean Army Private First Class Cho Shun-hui, Held at the People's Cultural Palace in Pyongyang on the Afternoon of 9 August — Recorded" (text), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 1228

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Whether she fe lt truly so is unknowable, but this was the

textbook answer, the image of the leader as the greatest

p a r e n t.

9. THE GBEAT LEADER: The movement to learn from the

anti—Japanese guerrillas progressed to glorification of the

leader principle. Propaganda emphasized the necessity of

having a leader and pride in a proper one. The relation was

reciprocal, with Kim elevating the people and the nation,

the people repaying with loyalty. Naturally, Kim was a

superior leader, surpassing all other leaders.

Thus, the BPRK could assert, "All victories and

gains won in our revolution and everything our people

cherish are directly linked to the noble name of (Kim)." By

holding him in high esteem and advancing under his

leadership, Koreans have become a "powerful and dignified

people in charge of their own fate."*** Further, "our party

propounded (the) noble idea that the fatherland is precisely

the Great Leader. This is a perfect exposition of the

essence of the fatherland based on the philosophical

viewpoint of CHOCBE and on the theory of the decisive role

of the leader." While everyone has a native land, it cannot

GUT 9 August 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR A£, Vol. IV: 157, 13 August 1984, pp. D4-12.

5i3tiAn Expression of Absolute Trust on (the) Part of Our People for the Great Leader Comrade Kim II—song" (text), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2319 GMT 8 February 1982. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 029, 11 February 1982, pp. D5-9.

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be a genuine fatherland if it is imperialized; a fatherland

should have joy, laughter, and a "genuine flowering of human

life." Such a place is built by and prospers from the

leader, while "every proud thing" is connected with him .*

On the 39th anniversary of Kim's declaration of the founding

of the KHP, North Korea avowed, "Thanks to the invincible

unity achieved by the Great leader," the party had become

victorious, absolutely authoritative, and dignified, while

the population had become a "most proud people."***

Contrary to previous assertions, the DPEK now

claimed that previous revolutionary efforts failed due to

lack of a leader, rather than lack of a party, as heretofore

claimed.*** The term "Great leader" incorporated many such

propaganda theses. One commentator**? argued that Koreans

had suffered in the past due to lack of a great leader, but

thanks to Kim, they had become independent and prosperous.

Thus, the Korean people's pride and dignity came in

upholding the Great Leader so they became a great and

514""Hew Philosophical Exposition' Stressed" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 2227 GMT 8 August 1983. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 155, 10 August 1983, pp. B7-8.

***"Onattributed Special A rticle: 'Great Unity and Invincible Strength" (text), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korea, 2310 GMT 9 October 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 202, 17 October 1984, pp. Dl-4.

***See Chapter IV, pp. 218-19.

SIvifEndless Pride in Upholding the Great Leader" (text), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2243 GMT 30 June 1984. Tranislation by the FBIS. FBIS Dfi AP, Vol. IV: 130, 5 July 1984., pp. D8-11.

254

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 255 Influential people, greatly contributing to the common cause

of mankind for gtcbal peace, security, and socialism.***

North Korea contended that popular adoration was

natural and spontaneous. When a visiting American professor

of Korean birth indicated his annoyance that a museum

portrayed Kim as the only Korean revolutionary of any

consequence and that Kin's affiliation with the Chinese

Communists had been excised, the director retorted that Kim

himself had criticized the displays on just these grounds,

but the masses had such deep love and respect for him they

would not permit the museum to make any changes.***

These nine aspects of Kim's image encompassed pretty

nearly the entire universe of a North Korean citizen's

existence from basic physical needs through national

identity and security concerns to spiritual matters. Kim's

image became involved in a spectrum of public amd private

matters, constituting the linkage which bound the many

elements of North Korean life together.

Two other images of Kim most be considered, but

these w ill be treated separately since they help define the

period of cult devlopment.

siaMEnaiess Pride in Upholding the Great leader" (text)^ Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2243 GMT 30 June 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DS AP, Vol. IV: 130, 5 July 1984, pp. D8-11. 519B, c. Koh, "The Cult of Personality and the Succession Issue," in Kim and Koh, Journey, p. 30.

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C. KIM, THE INTERNATIONALIST

Kim had identified with proletarian

internationalism., that is, a pro—Soviet foreign policy

augmented by good relations with others in the Communist

bloc. Following the entry of the CPV into the war, Korea

adopted a balance between its neighbors, although this

"balance" tilted toward the USSR until the early 1960s. The

DPEK favored the PRC in the Sino-Soviet dispute, since

Pyongyang also disagreed with Khrushchev's "peaceful

coexistence" policy. From 1965, however. North Korea

publicly declared its independence from both Communist

neighbors, although it sought correct relations with each.

In practice. North Korea shifted its ties, warming to the

Soviets when it needed economic assistance and to the PRC

(at least until the death of Mao) when the leadership wished

to emphasize hardline ideology.

In the early 1960s, Kim's internationalist image

retained many previous features: he met often with visiting

delegations and exchanged greetings with friendly leaders.

However, greater press coverage than hitherto was devoted to

communist or leftist countries less associated with the

major powers, such as Vietnam or Indonesia. Later, the

image of Kim reflected greater independence by portraying

him as an international figure of repute, with concommitant

influence on major affairs. The in itial image of Kim as an

internationalist seems to have been designed to foster

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domestic acceptance of independence ; it then became a matter

of national pride.

Two events marked a turning point in Kim's

international image: participation in the 1965 Bandung

Conference — his first travel outside the Communist bloc —

and the publication under his name in 1968 of an article in

the leftist journal Tricontinental. These were the first

times Kim exposed himself or his writings directly to non-

North Korean controlled channels.*z*

Many p r e v io u sly -m e n tio n e d a s p e c t s o f K in 's im age

assumed expanded dimensions. For example, DPRK media

depicted foreigners as enthralled with Kim's background and

writings, a familiar image but one in which reporting

increased over time. In 1965, the visit to Mangyongdae by a

delegation from Vietnam was reported factually, as they

viewed implements from Kin's youth and heard stories about

h i s f a m i l y . *2 1 By 1976, a caption for a series of

photographs of visitors to the old homestead could read,

"Mangyongdae, the native place in the heart of the world's

S 2 0"Kim Treatise in AALAFSO Organ Marks Che Death" (text), Pyongyang KCNA International Service in English, 1538 GMT 9 October 1968. FBIS DB AP, Vol. II: 199, 10 October 1968, pp. D1-9. (1/C PS 05126)

szich'oe On-sik, "Kim ll-song tongchi-ui ch'ungsil- han chonsaga-dwoel gos-ul ch'ukwon-handa: nampu Seitnam minchok haebangchonson taep'yo-nun Mangyongdae-rul pangmun" (Invoking Fighters loyal to Comrade Kim II—song: the South Vietnam National liberation Front Delegation V isits Mangyongdae), Nodonq Sinmun, 22 May 1965, p. 4.

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p e o p l e . " * 2 2 Greeting foreigners increasingly usurped a

strong place in the media image. Often in the early 1980s,

newspaper pictures of Kim with visiting delegations

outnumbered those with domestic themes.

A media staple became notices that Kim's works had

been reprinted overseas. For example, KCNA noted that Kin's

replies to a Japanese research center had been picked up by

lass, Zinhua, AP, Voice of America, and newspapers in

Vietnam, Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.* 2 3 from th e

1970s, such notices were printed almost daily. The BPRK

expanded efforts to make Kim's literature available and by

the 1980s, KCNA reported that volume 15 of his works,

containing 19 "classic" articles, had been published in

Russian, Chinese, Japanese, English, french, German,

Spanish, and A r a b i c . * 2+ North Korea not only distributed

these writings, it avowed that foreigners were avid to read

then. For example, a three-page spread showed westerners

reading Kim's works fresh from the press, grabbing eagerly

for copies, holding them aloft, cheering, and kibbitzing

*22"Hangyongdae," Choson. no. 233, April 1976, pp. 10-11. This sentiment was often attributed to Koreans.

*23%cNA, "Kakkuk t ' o n g s i n , sin m u n -u l kwangpom-hi podo" (Widely Reported by Various Countries' Broadcasts and Newspapers), Nodonq Sinmun, 14 January 1965, p. 1.

s2 4tiKio il-song Works Printed in Foreign languages" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1512 GMT 16 December 1983. JPRS Korean Affairs Report, JPRS-KAB-84-003, 11 January 1984, pp. 55-56.

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over shoulders to see t h e n . * 2 s

Foreigners earnestly admired Kim. The DPEK

published an appreciation of him written by admirers from

Costa Sica, Panama, Pakistan, and Japan, including former

members of the Imperial Army.* 2* This was accompanied by

sim ilar books, articles in North Korean periodicals, and

foreigners' poems dedicated to Kin. North Korea also stated

it was no accident that 100 m illion Europeans had greeted

Kin on a recent trip, since he was respected e v e r y w h e r e . * 2 7

The next development was the convocation of seminars

to study Kim's thoughts. The DPSK printed papers and

speeches given at the International Seminar on the CHOCHE

idea, held in Antananirivo in September 1976, which had

drawn participants from 39 c o u n t r i e s . *28 Also, permanent

societies for the study of CHOCHE were formed. KCNA

reported that a Latin American Institute cn the CHOCHE Idea

had been established in February 1978, and a Pyongyang

International Institute in April, a time when the "desire of

525Hgi^ae—han suryong Kim ll-song tongchi manse" {Hurrah for the Great leader. Comrade Kim ll-song), Choson. no. 233, April 1976, pp. 6—8.

*26gxn ll-song: legendary hero for all ages (Pyongyang: Foreign languages Publishing House, 1978).

*27"Eadless Pride in Upholding the Great leader" (text), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2243 GMT 30 June 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 130, 5 July 1984, pp. D8-11.

52 8juche; the banner of Independence (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1976).

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the world people to study (CHUCHE) was rapidly growing

stronger." An Asian regional institute was founded in 1980,

as was a branch in India. These helped satisfy a need for

literature on CHUCHE, so that the world people, who found a

"genuine truth of life" in it, extended their praise to

Kim.*2* An active institute was even founded in Japan by a

scholar who had long admired the leader.***

Two articles 17 years apart illustrate the changes

to Kim's image relating to foreigners. A 1965 "news" item

opened with a statement that the "Song of General Kim ll-

song" was heard on the bank of the river Niger, but then

gave a direct description of M ali's geography and history,

including the country's friendship with the CPBK. A sim ilar

article in 1982 had a brief description of life in Mali,

then emphasized the ever—expanding circle of students

studying Kim's works formally; the article intermixed a

geography lesson with stories of Malians studying Kim.*3*

*29"A ctivities of Chuche Study Groups Summed Up" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1533 GMT 2 April 1984. JPES-KAR-84-025, 18 April 1984, pp. 122-24.

s30Hong Rwang-ki, "Widae-han sasang-gwa chnri-ui pach'pat—soke: chuch'e sasang kukcheycngnsc risachang-i paksa, kyosuin 3Casui Kaour—wa ku—ga tantan-un kokwi-han unchong-edaehan iyagi" (In Great Love and Bay of Truth: the Story of Professor Yasui Kaoru, the Ph.d. Who was Director of the International Institute on the CHUCHE Idea, and the Precious Grace He Deceived), Nodonq Sinmun. 29 November 1982, p. 2.

S3ichu Tong-p'al, "Ch'inson-ui k il 10-manri: Malli gongwhaguk-eso" (100,000 fil Path of friendship: the Republic of Mali), Nodonq Sinmun. 5 February 1965, p. 5; "Nicheru Kang-ui yongwon-han hurum-gwa topulo" (Together with the

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The latter was clearly the thrust of the piece: Kin's

attraction for Malians rather than the country itse lf.

Finally, in the 1980s, North Korea presented Kin not

merely as a perspn admired by foreigners, but as a leader

whose thoughts and deeds had greatly influenced people and

events, saying that Kim was a powerful figure within the

Non-aligned Movement (NAM). Thus, an article noted that by

leading the Korean War to victory, Kim had shattered the

myth of O.S. power, providing an opportunity for a turn in

the world's struggle against imperialism. This was an

immortal contribution to the cause of world independence . * * 2

The DPBK went further: Kim had dedicated himself to

strengthening and developing the NAM by systematizing and

integrating theories about it into a greater whole. The

theories he propounded for opposing imperialism have

elicited wzLcm support from NAM members and progressive

people. The results of the seventh NAM summit in New Delhi

proved the "justness and vitality" of his p o l i c i e s . *33

Kim's image progressed through three stages: from a

proletarian internationalist, concerned with domestic

Eternal Plow of the Niger Biver), Nodonq Sinmun, 17 July 1982, p. 4.

*32pak Mun—son Kim Chong-kyu, "Chekukchu'i-rul pandae-hago segye—ui chachuwha-rul takuch'yo nakacha" (Opposing Imperialism, Let Us Achieve Borld Independence) , Nodonq Sinmun. 9 July 1983, p. 2.

s33«ppaHok pulkatam untong-un wiryok-han hyokmyong ryokryang-ida" (The Non-aligned Movement is a Powerful Bevolutionary Force), Nodonq Sinmun. 1 September 1983.

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reperçassions of ties to the Communist bloc; through that of

a world leader with wide interests; to that of Korea's gift

to mankind.

S . KIM AND REU N IFIC A TIO N

Prompted partially by shifting relationships among

the great powers in the 1970s and given urgency by a

perception that little time remained for the liberation

generation, both Koreas explored new approaches to ending

the country's division. These innovations included altered

propaganda styles and the first face-to-face conferences

since the 1950s. Many DPfiK themes were usual ones — BOK

desire for North Korea's lifestyle, southern disaffection —

but Kim's figure became more prominent in them. Heretofore,

as indicated in discussions of previous periods, although

North Korea maintained that Kin was leader to a ll Koreans,

the subtle appeal of the pro-Kim propaganda was primarily to

the north.*3* From the 1970s, North Korea belabored Kin's

concern for and leadership of all Korea and the reciprocal

feelings of Southerners, who revered him, yearned to be

united with him, and prepared for that time by secretly

studying his works.

The epitome of Kim's attitude toward the BOK came

during the 1984 relief effort for southern flood v i c t i m s . *3s

53«see Chapter III, pp. 119-23; Chapter IV, pp. 1 8 9 -9 0 .

*3ssee above, pp. 230-31.

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The DPEK noted that North Koreans had brotherly love among

themselves and toward their South Korean compatriots,

although this had not been so in classical times. The

source of this love was Kim, who had always kept Southerners

in his heart; he had fought for liberation of the entire

nation and had sent booty from Japanese warehouses to the

south after liberation. The conclusion was that the Great

Leader had been ."sent by heaven. He is the symbol and

father of the people, who has shown kindliness to all the

fellow countrymen."S3*

& DPBK yearbook emphasized that the South Korean

straggle in 1970 had progressed to a higher stage to

surmount weaknesses by taking Kin's CHUCHE as its guide. A

full page listed incidents in which South Korean patriots

expressed love for Kin either openly or covertly.**? A year-

end summary also listed the "essential characteristic" of

the South Korean revolution as the "infinite respect for,

trust in, and adoration" of Kim growing among the southern

masses. His ideas were "taking root" among them.*** North

s3*"Nodonc[ Sinmun 29 September Essay: 'Compatriots, Hold This Warm Hand Quick” (excerpts), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2200 GMT 28 September 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 192, 2 October 1984, pp. 3 - 5 .

S37KCNA, "Namchoson hyokmyong-gwa chcgok t * o n g i l - u l wihayo" (On the South Korean Devolution and fatherland R eunification), Korean Central Yearbook 1971. pp. 283—84.

538"Eeview of South Korean P olitical Situation in 1970" (text), Pyongyang International Service in English, 10 05 GHT 29 December 1970. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 252, pp.

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Korea further listed three ways the South Koreeuis fe lt about

Kim: th e y adm ired M arshal Kim a s a h ero and p e e r le s s

patriot, respected him as the solitary core of national

reunification, and were fighting stubbornly to hasten the

glorious day when they would be gathered to his bosom.ss*

Much propaganda praised life in North Korea, given

by the Great leader, citing this as a key reason why the

south wanted reunification, nor was there any doubt that the

northern system would be adopted throughout the peninsula,

for example, workers in Sokcho expressed resentment at BOK

repression and told colleagues that Kim had made the north

"heaven on earth," that he was "our future," and they should

believe only in him.*** The appeal of a Kim-derived

lifestyle was attributed to — and directed at —

specialized groups. For example, students lacking tuition

were allegedly attracted to Kim's policy of paying school

D 2-6. (L/C PS 05126)

S3 9KCNA, "Kyongae-hanun suryong Kin ll-song tongchi- kkeso Namchoson inmin-dulege peip'ulo-chusinun ttukoun sarang-gwa yukcWik-chok paeryo, ku-ege taehan Namchoson inmin—dului taham—opsnun kyongmo" (The Harm love and H eartfelt Care the Beloved and Respected Leader Comrade Kim ll-song Bestows on the South Korean People, their Limitless Respect for Him), Korean Central Yearbook 1972, pp. 249-53. Note that the DPfiK used the title "marshal" for Kim in regard to South Korea; the media used this term or "general" for Kim when the subject was South Korea, youth, or Koreans in Japan. Otherwise, "comrade" or "president" was used.

**®"'Kim ll-song chaqggunnim-ggeso kyesiyo uri minchung-egedo haengbok-han r a e 'il-i kiyak-twoeyo issda" ("General Kim U —song has Become the Pledge of a Blessed Tomorrow for Our People"), Nodonq Sinmun, 21 June 1983, p. 1, 264

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fees through college and expected to study happily after

reunification-

According to North Korea, South Koreans held secret

meetings and formed underground organizations to uphold Kin.

A 1982 review found that many Southerners had secretly

celebrated Kim's 70th birthday, including at a CHUCHE study

center at an unnamed college. The "Song of General Kim ll-

song" was heard w i d e l y . * * 2 r report in 1984 listed three

covert study societies for Kin's teachings in Seoul, with

groups in five other cities.*** Defectors from the fiOK (of

whom a majority were militciry} from the 1970s on usually

mentioned a desire to be united with Kim as a prime

motivation. An ex-BOKA PFC, for example, stated that since

South Korean troops watched DPBK television, th is exposure

to the good life accorded by the Great leader had hardened

his determination to go north to he "embraced in (Kim's)

5 * in'Kin 11 — song changunnim-un kwangpok—ui unin— isid a ': widae-han suryongnim-ul Kwangju-ui han kodunghakkyc kyowon-gwa haksaeng-duli yolryol-hi hummc" ("General Kin ll- song is the Patron of Liberation": Faculty and Students of a Kwangju High School Heirmly Admire the Great Leader) , Nodonq Sinmun. 25 December 1982, p. 1.

s*zom II—kyu, "'Panmannyon minchoksau-e kachang ch'anran-hi pich'.*—nanun yongkwang': widae-han suryong—ul yolryol-hi hummo-hanun Namchoson inmin-dul" ("The Host Splendid Glory in Our People's History of 5,000 Years': the South Korean People Hho Harmly Admire the Great Leader), Nodonq Sinmun. 31 December 1982, p. 4.

**3"People in South Said Following Chuche Idea" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1013 GHT 6 April 1984. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 68, 11 April 1968, pp. D6-7

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bosom."S** & civilian defector had survived South Korea's

hell thanks to his hope for life in the north and noted that

as livlihood in the south became harder, the masses'

admiration for Kim intensified. Ihe people had developed an

argot to speak of North Korea; the word "reunification," for

example, was "synonymous with being embraced in the bosom of

the fatherly l e a d e r .

finch of the argument about Kim vis-a-vis South Korea

turned on the guestion of legitim acy, as leadership was made

the element which settled the dispute between the two zones.

A purported interview with a Seoul professor guoted him as

saying the north was the legitim ate nation because it had

liberated the country and maintained independence.s** one

commentator stated that South Korea had yearned for Kim...... '

before and after liberation, and had been prepared to

welcome him then. Although a proverb held that even rivers

and mountains change over a decade. South Korean feeling for

Kim had remained unaltered for 35 y e a r s . s*?

s*♦"South Korean Defectors Holds Press Conference" (text}, Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0450 Gfil 26 October 1983. PBIS DE AP, Vol. IV: 208, 26 October 1983, pp. D6-7.

^♦«"Earlier Defector Enjoying Life" (text), Pyongyang Domestic Service in in Korean, 0700 Gfil 16 September 1984. Translation by the PBIS. PBIS DE AP, Vol. IV: 182, 18 September 1984, pp. DIO-11.

s^ * "V E P E on Support for DCEK, Legitimacy of North" ( t e x t ) , VEPE in Korean to South Korea, 1000 Gfil 19 Pebrueary 19 84. Translation by the PBIS. PBIS DE AP, Vol. IV: 39, 27 Pebruary 1984, pp. D12-14.

^♦7Pak In-ch'ol, "Hinchok-ui t'aeyang-ul ddalu-nun

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The emphasis on South Korean desire for Kin

indicates that the DPEK conceived of — and was fostering a

strong image among its people — a reunification with its

society dominant. Ho doubt this latent propaganda content

helped give a gualitative weight to its position as a

counterbalance tp many BOK quantitative advantages (greater

population, for example). However, this use of Kim's

presti^ also lessened the prospect of agreement between the

zones by making it more d ifficu lt for the regime to

compromise and by heightening southern suspicions.

F. COH&EHIS

Twin themes permeating the image of Kim in the

modern period were the leader's primacy and Korean pride in

him. DPEK propaganda constantly emphasized his greatness,

as seen in prolific writings, wide-ranging knowledge, and

superlative accomplishments. Akin to this was the

attribution of every good thing to him not only in

agriculture and industry but in the people's personal lives

as well. His greatness was all-encompassing.

Equally weighty was the pride, since Korea had been

a downtrodden nation, with centuries of domination by larger

powers behind it plus the recent memory of humiliation by

Japan. Kin tapped a nascent strain of nationalism by

portraying himself as the man who freed the people, elevated

maurn" (Hearts Filled with the Sun of the People), Modong Sinmun, 30 August 1985, p. 5.

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them from feudalism, kept them free from newer aggressors,

and earned them a due respect from countries to which they

had once felt inferior.

II. THE GBEAT EAHIH

The DPEK began a major extension of the Cult of

Personality in the late 1960s, one with several levels of

interest, and about which controversy remains. This

expansion was the glorification not only of Kim himself but

his family also, to include parents, some lateral relations

and ancestors, and eventually his first wife and eldest son.

On the surface, this campaign seemed designed merely to

prove that the country was in good hands with the Kim

family, which had acted constructively on its behalf for

generations, but the material did have multiple uses.

An in itia l level of argument suggests the references

to the family reinforce the concept of strong leadership.

K in's father, Hyong-chik,®^® had bequeathed a mission to

him, while the driving tra it of others, including his

mother, was revolutionary loyalty. Further, the

glorification of Kim's fam ily provided role models as well

S4 8IQ order to distinguish among Kims, a considerable number of whom appear below, only Kim Il-song w ill be referred to by the patronym "Kim" alone, consistent with established practice in this paper. Kim Chong-il w ill be known by his in itials, "KCI." Others w ill be called by their given names, as "Hyong-chik."

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as specific historic examples to use in validating the

official version of history. Kim himself had served as a

role model for action, but the others exhibited additional

traits the regime wished to foster among specific groups.

The most conseguential use of Kim's family

background was to promote Kim's son as his successor. This

may have begun as early as the late 1960s, according to some

analysts,but, on the basis of the "great family"

propaganda, I believe that a more likely starting time was

the mid-1970s. The principal clue indicating a later date

was the eclipse of Kang Pan-sok as the main mother figure by

Kim Chong—suk (wife of Kim, but more importantly, mother of

KCI) about 1973. ih ile fiadame Kang was never downgraded,

the amount of material devoted to her declined significantly

with a corresponding increase in that devoted to Chong—suk,

suggesting a majpr shift in cult direction — which I submit

was a decision concerning the succession.®®®

A. THE ;£KHAHCED LIFE OF KIM Il-SCNG

While Worth Korea in the 1960s undertook for the

first time to lionize Kim's relatives, this was accompanied

s4 9For example, Lee Chong—sik , in "Evolution of the Korean Workers Party and the rise of Kim Chong-il," Asian Snrvev 2KII (May 1982): 434-41, notes some expressions of concern for perpetuation of Kim's revolution as early as 1963, and connects this explicitly with the beginning of the extolment of the Kim family in 1968.

ssoxhis coincides with propaganda about KCI as the "Party Center," which began in 1974, and additional internal campaigns dating from late 1973. For details, refer to Morgan Clippinger, "Kim Chong-il," pp. 290-91.

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by redoubled glorification of Kim him self. Material from

previous periods was reiterated, but the biography was

improved in subtle ways. Kim's importance was extended

backward in time, additional events crowded his chronology,

and the effects of his struggles were exaggerated. There

was also an upgrading of propaganda methods, with heavier

emphasis on motion pictures and television.

A new bipgraphy of Kim, written in 1968, detailed

his life from birth. Although it had no organization beyond

a year-by—year narration of Kim's activities and speeches,

its themes were two: Kim's unchallenged superiority and the

adoration in which Koreans held him. Despite hundreds of

incidents each in three volumes, the author apologized that

since Kim's activities had been "broad and comprehensive,"

it was an "impossibility" to "exhaust" them all.®®i

Kim's birthday became an increasingly important

national holiday. It was the "most felicitous event of our

nation," because it meant the beginning of the end of

n a t io n a l sufferings. oa that date, clothes, school

supplies, and daily necessities were issued, while most

ssiBaik Bong, Kim Il-song biography. Vol. I; from birth to triumphant return to homeland (Tokyo: Hiraisha, 1969), pp. 3-4. Another biography which summarizes this material is 4 ch'onman—ui widae-han snrvong Kin Il-song wonsunim (Marshal Kim Il-song, the Great leader of the 40 M illion) (Pyongyang: SHTL Publishing Company, 5 May 1971).

5®2"Eadio Praises Kim's Achievements" (text), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2100 GMT 14 April 1985. Translation by the PBIS. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 072, 15 April 1984, pp. 3-4.

270

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areas had exhibitions, special entertainment, parties, and

sports events to celebrate the day.®®®

The newer biographies increased the amount of data

on Kim's background, adding detail especially about his

early life. A yearbook for 1971 listed 191 entries about

his life from birth to 1967.®®* An article stated that all

youth was aiming "in unison" to learn from the early years

of the Great leader. This was a worthy task to make the

revolution and tp ensure that the leader's cause flourished

"generation after generation."®®® Throughout the period,

North Korea added incidents to embellish an already heralded

career. For example. North Korea issued a speech he

allegedly delivered in 1943 in which he urged patriotism on

the partisans.®®* Other incidents included a visit to Height

1211 in September 1951 "under a rain of enemy bullets and

®®3"Kim II—song Celebrates 73rd Birthday 15 April" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1001 GMT 13 April 1985. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 072, 15 April 1985, pp. 02-3.

®®*KCNA, "Kim Il-song tonehi hyokmyong ryoksa chuyo'nyon taep'yo" (Important Chronology for Comrade Kim II—song's Bevolutionary H istory), Korean Central Yearbook 1971. pp. 117-22.

ssswHodua ch'ongso'nyon—dulun chuch'e wiop-ui ch'am— taun kyesangcha—ro t'unt'un—hi chunpi—hacha" (let Os Thoroughly Prepare All Youth as the Beal Inheritors of the CHOCHE Cause), Nodonq Sinmun. 22 January 1977, p. 1.

®®*Kim H -song, The Korean revolutionaries. Volume one of Baik Bongos adoring biography, which contains copious detail about Kim's movements and speeches prior to 1945, lists no personal activities for him in 1943, indicating that this speech must be a later revelation or invention.

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shells through a steep mountain pass."®®? The truth of these

cases matters little except to illustrate a willingness and

ability to manufacture more attributes for Kim.

Moreover* the newer biographies enhanced the extent

of Kim's activism . Whereas earlier biographies, including

the Brief life of 19 52, presented Kim as merely an important

participant in le ftist and communist groups during his

youth, the newer material listed no less than 22

organizations founded by Kim between 1926 and 1936.®®®

Singled out for emphasis among these organizations was the

Down with Imperialism Onion (DIO), Kim's alleged first group

in 1926. Patrticularly in the 1980s,®®® the EPBK advanced

the claim that the formation of the DIO was an historic

occasion, a new departure in the Korean revolution, that for

®®7"Kim Il-song*s Leadership During War Remembered" (text), Pyongyang KCBA in English, 1600 GMT 23 February 1983. FBIS DE AP, Vol. IV: 038, 24 February 1983, pp. D7-8. Again, volume two of Baik Bong's biography casually mentions that Kim visited the front at personal risk, but regarding Height 1211, writes only of telephone calls and couriered messages to inspire the troops; see pp. 359-67.

®®®KCHA, "Hyokmyong-ui widae-han suryong Kim Il-song tonchi—kkeso hangil hyokmyong t'uchaengsiki mu'usin chuyo hyokmyong chochik" (Important Revolutionary Organizations Which the Great Leader of Revolution Comrade Kim Il-song Created at the Time of the Anti-Japanese Struggle), Korean Central Yearbook, pp. 142-46. This claim is not outlandish, as a main activity of revolutionaries in and out of Korea was creating organizations. What stretches credulity are claims that small groups founded by a teenager among fellow students had great consequences in modern history.

®®*Ch'oe Kwang-su, "Chuch'e hyokmyong wiop-ui sieon- ul yolonoh-un rypksa—chok sabyon: widae-han suryong Kin I l- song tongchi-kkeSo I'ato chegukchu'uitongmaeng-ul kyolsong- hasin 56 toks-ei chu'un-hayo" (The H istorical Event Opening

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the first time the national liberation struggle was based on

the principle of independence.

The new biographies also claimed earlier influence

for Kim. For example, it vas sometimes claimed that Kim had

participated in the March First Movement, the premier

patriotic event of the era. one source stated firmly that

"...at the time of the 3.1 Uprising, (Kim) fostered

revolutionary passion, personally participating in the

ranks."®*® A speech commemorating a 1926 anti-Japanese

demonstration argued that participants in the incident had

been influenced by Kim and his analysis of CBUCBE

revolution.®*! xn assessing these claim s, we must remember

that Kim was seven years old in 1919 and twelve in 1926.

The regime placed a greater emphasis on Mangyongdae,

the "native place of the Korean heart, which blooms in our

the CHOCHE Revolutionary Task: Marking the 56th Anniversary of the DIO, Which the Great leader Comrade Kim Il-song Organized) , Mini-u Choson, 17 October 1982, p. 2.

®*®KCNA, "Euknae chungyo hyokayopg sachokchi: inmin- ui t'aeyang-i sos-un hyokayong-ui yoram — Mangyongdae" (Important Domestic Revolutionary Remains: Mangyongdae — the Cradle of Revolution Over which the Sun of the People R ises), Korean Central Yearbook 1972, pp. 114—17.

®*iKCNA, "Namchcscn inmia-dulun paami chachahwa-ui kich'i-rul nop'i tulgo minchok-chok tokrip-gwa chachukwon-ul silhyon-hagi wihan t*uchaeng-ul him -issgi pollira: panil 6.10 manse siwi t'uchaeng 57 doks P'ycngyangsi kinyom pogohoe chinhaeng" (The South Korean People, Upholding the Upholding the Anti-U.S. flag, are Strongly Spreading the Struggle to Attain National Independence and Sovereignty: a Pyongyang City Commemorative Report Meeting Held on the 57th Anniversary of the Anti-Japanese 10 June MANSEI Incident Struggle), Miniu Choson, 10 June 1983, p. 3.

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people's love every year."®*^ Mangyongdae was the family

seat of the poor hut patriotic Kims, and here Hyong-chik, as

well as Kim, his younger brothers and important cousins were

born. Many articles described landmarks where Kim as a boy

had played with friends, developed his physique or mulled

questions of patriotism and revolution. Mangyongdae was

visited by Korean workers and youth in addition to foreign

friends, making it a "school" for "arming" the people with

Kim's thoughts, as it was the "fertile ground" for the

"roots of the Korean revolution."®*® Mangyongdae became an

expected stop for foreigners, and the numbers stopping there

sometimes became enormous, as in August 1983, when the media

reported 60 different delegations visiting it.

Much of Kim's personal history, like that of the

guerrillas, unfolded for the public in a series of

paintings, all done in socialist realist style. In each

picture Kim was ihe focus of attention, each participant

having beatific or determined expressions, as appropriate.

All elements in the pictures are in perfect order — clean

uniforms, a fu ll array of armaments or tgols, and Kim in

control.®**

®*2"4 wol-ui Mangyongdae" (Mangyongdae in A pril), Nodonq Sinmun, 15 April 1964, p. 5-

®*®KCNA, "Kuknae chungyo hyokmyong sachokchi," pp. 1 1 4 -1 7 .

®**Many of the o fficial paintings, together with intrusively real photographs, are reprinted in Korean H evolutionarv Museum (Pyongyang: Foreign language Publishing

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Movies about Kim became more explicit. A milestone

film vas 1977's ."Fire spreading a ll over the land," treating

Kim and his fam ily's feats, in which the figure of Kim

appeared on the screen for the first time. Thereafter films

dealt with his life and times. A film series under the

collective title "Star of Korea" scrutinized the revolution

in detail, centering around the guerrillas.®*®

In keeping with its emphasis on Kim as an

internationalist. North Korea published much m aterial abroad

and moreover, placed advertisem ents in influential

publications. Sometimes these heralded Kim's career, as

when paid articles in the New York Times told stories of his

life or reproduced speeches verbatim.®** However, many

pages, although placed in the foreign press at great

expense, were designed as much for their value in persuading

domestic audiences of Kim's international reputation. A

House, 1963).

®*®Yi Chong-sun, "Widae-han ryoksa, pulmyol-ui opchok-ul p'yolch'yo-pyoyochunun kinyompi—chok taechak: yesnl yongwa 'Nuri-e put'—nun pul'-e taeha—myo" (A Commemorative Work Showing Great H istory, Immortal Achievements: on the Feature Film "Fixe Spreading All Over the Land"), Knlloia. August 1977, pp. 28—35; Ch'oe Chong- k il, "Widae-han .opchok, pulmyol-ui ryoksa-eitaehan pich'-nun hwap'ok: yesul yonghwa 'Choson-ui pyol* 4, 5, 6 pu- eidaehayo" (Shining Pictures about Great Results, Immortal History: Concerning Parts 4, 5, 6 of the Feature Film 'Star of Korea,'" Nodonq Ch'ongnvon, 23 July 1982, p. 2.

®**For example, 0 Baek Syong, "The Commander is Also a Son of the People," New York Times. 14 April 1977; and, "Let Us Further Promote the Building of Socialism by Vigorously Carrying Out the Three Revolutions," New York Times, 15 June 1975, p. 13.

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number of visitors have attested seeing them displayed in

DPSK mnseums with publication data but without the

information that they were ads.®*?

She new biographies achieved two main purposes. It

inserted Kim into all aspects of modern Korean life , thereby

justifying his rule, and encouraged pride among the Korean

p e o p le .

B . TEE PATHEE, KIM HYONG-CHIK

As seen in the biographies of previous periods,

Kim's early life was treated sketchily. Hyong-chik was

little more than a name in the earliest treatments or at

most, the source of the leader's patriotism. Increased

recognition of him dated from the late 1960s: a gravestone

was set up for him in June 1966 and a statue erected in June

1968.®*® The 1968 release of a fu ll biography,®*® revealed

Hyong-chik as an organizer and revolutionary in his own

right. The biography claimed that Hyong-chik's story was

deeply imbedded among the people, encouraging them in their

struggle for reunification aqd victory.

®*?B.C. Koh, "The Cult of Personality and the Succession Issue," in Kim and Koh, Journey, p. 28.

®*®KCNA, "Choguk kwangpok-ui saepyokkil-ul heich'yo- gan hyokmyong-ui ttang — Ponghwari" (Ponghwari: the land of Revolution Which Plowed the Dawn Hoad of Fatherland Restoration), Korean Central Yearbook 1972. pp. 119-22.

**®KWP Central Committee Party History Research Center, Pnlkul—ui panil hyokmyong t ' usa Kim Hyong-chik sonsaeng (Indomitable Anti-Japanese Revolutionary Fighter Hr. Kim Hyong-chik) (Pyongyang: KWP Publishing Company, 12 June 1968) .

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Hyoag-chik had been bora in 1894, to a poor farm

family. He loved to study# learned to love his country

while hating the Japanese, and engaged in sports. He began

his revolutionary activities in 1910; his work centering on

the northern provinces, fie made a penetrating study of the

Japanese invadera and O.S. imperialism, based on his

experiences at a missionary school, then he founded the

Korean National Association in March 1917; the KNA consisted

of about 100 people, the largest such group of its time. Be

did organizational work and sent agents to the south; he led

the March First demonstrators in a provincial area, as his

brother-in-law did in Pyongyang. Hyong-chik was arrested

auid served about cne year in prison, after which he

travelled the north, teaching love of country. Many of his

pupils became great patriots (although none were named; this

might detract from Hyong-chik's glory). Most importantly,

the parents inculcated patriotism in their sons. After

continued struggle, another stretch in prison, and exile in

Manchuria, Hyong-chik died in June 1926.®?®

Hyong-chik thus served as a role model for the

organizer, probably aimed at North Korean cadre. He was

selfless, patriotic, and determined to succeed whatever the

hardships. He also demonstrated that Kim's heritage was a

national one, with a lineage of struggle antedating his life

to encompass the major events in Korea's tragic twentieth

s? o i b i d .

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century history.

As with other Cult figures, Hyong-chik had public

edifices named after him. On March 23, 1975, the Pyongyang

First Normal School was renamed in his honor.®?* Hyong-chik

also had relics. For example, an article described a visit

to a house in Pyongyang, a building linked with Hyong-chik

when he studied at Sungsil Academy and organized cne of his

early political g r o u p s®?z . And, given DESK love of musical

propaganda, he had a song.®?®

It is also interesting that Hyong-chik was given an

anti-H.S., anti-Christian bias, even in the context of

pre-1945 Korea. Western missionaries had enjoyed a positive

reputation prior to liberation due to their support for

Korean nationalism against Japan. The North Koreans do not

deny that Hyong-chik attended Sungsil, a missionary school,

but the biography has him leading a boycott against an

exploitative work-study program at the school. Another

source indicated that Hyong-chik opposed the missionaries

because they were attempting to paralyze student

®?*7oong C. Kim, "The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea in 1975," Asian Survey XVI (January 1976); 91.

®?®Ch*oe Ch’ang-chin, "Pulmyol-ui opchok Aprokgang- ui hurua-gwa topulo yongwon-hari: Ch'ongsu hyokmyong sachokchi-rul ch'achaso" (Perpetual Flow of the Immortal Yalu River: in Search of the Ch'ongsu Revolutionary H istorical Remains), Nodonq Sinmun. 10 July 1982, p. 2.

®?®"Kim Hyong-chik sonsaengnim-ggeso chicsin norae" (A Song for Hr. Kim Hyong-chik), Nodonq Sinnun, 27 March 1968, p. 3.

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conscioasness in the name of religion.®?*

It is tempting to infer that in the romanticization

of Hyong-chik we find Kin paying homage to a father he

little knew. An alternate, non-conflicting analysis is that

Kim was placing the best possible interpretation on a

slightly embarrassing past: his parents had be m involved

with Christians and Hyong-chik had been a failed

revolutionary. £y recasting the Sungsil years and

attributing greater influence to the KBA, Kim could fashion

a past of which he as a communist revolutionary and son

could be proud.

C. THE MOTHER, KAHG PAB-SOK

Madame Kang Pan-sok, in the imagery of the DPRK

regime, was the epitome of the female revolutionary — an

organization woman, helpful to others, and above a ll, loyal.

But she transcended her function as a role model to become a

wider symbol of motherhood.

Her early image complemented that of her husband.

Although born to a patriotic family, she received

revolutionary nurture from Hyong-chik and unselfishly

supported his activities. She was a positive help to him

and moreover, after his death, served as chairwoman of the

Women's Society in their region; she taught women to read

®?*Indomintable, pp. 24—29 "Kim Hyong-chik's Career Praised on Anniversary" (text), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2300 GMT 10 July 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 136, 13 July 1984, pp. D14-22.

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and propagandized them. Her greatest achievement, shared

with Hyong-chik, was the patriotic upbringing of her three

so n s.® ? *

The most detailed biography of Kim emphasized Madame

Kang as a dutiful woman, who labored hard for her family,

but who supported Kim's revolutionary activities with gifts

of food or money, even by smuggling pistols. She died in a

foreign land, thirteen years too soon to see her son

victorious in achieving his father's task.®?* She was to

North Korea the symbol of the woman who sacrifices a ll for

her family; women in both halves of Korea were urged to

"live and fight like the madame, united firmly around

Premier (Kim)."®?? For example, members of a provincial

women's committee vowed to establish the primacy among women

of the party's ideology and Kim's teachings, using Madame

Kang a s a model.®?®

Even though Kang Pan-sok was eclipsed in daily

propaganda by Kim Chong—suk (see below), she was honored

regularly, particularly on anniversaries. On the 50th

®?®lndcm itable, pp. 103—12.

®?*Baik Bong, vol. I, pp. 30-35, 68-69.

®??Propaganda lea flet acquired by the author in 1969: "Let Os Live and Fight Like the Great Mother of Korea, Fighter Kang Pan-sok."

®?«KCNA, "Kang P a n -so k n y o s a -u i n o p o i-u l ponpada nyosong-dulul hyokmyongga—ro kyoyang-hamyo kachong-ul hyokmyonghwa-hacha" (Let Os Revolutionize Families and Nurture Women as Revolutionaries, Adopting the Model of Madame Kang Pan-sok), Nodonq Sinmun, 4 Septembe. 1967, p. 2.

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anniversary of her death, she was extolled as the Great

Mother of Korea, who gave a ll for women's liberation and

freedom, who had created the anti—Japanese Women's Society

— under Kim's leadership — the fir st CHOCHE—type women's

organization, and who had abetted her sons' activities.®?* A

reviewer, commenting on a film portrayal, summarized her

image: "From old, the most precious thing in the world to a

person is his mother; the purest and warmest thing is a

mother's love for himself. However, if the love of ail the

mothers in this land were combined, it would by no means

compare with the great love of Madame Kang Pan-sok."®*®

Once again, Kim was romanticizing his mother's life

and perhaps, revealing his suppressed need for her

affection. Another aspect to consider in the popularity of

Madame Kang's life is the Korean love of sad stories. The

pathos in the tale of a woman who sacrifices all for a son

but dies before witnessing his triumph must have broad

appeal among a ll Koreans.

5 ? «Ch'oe Ch'ang—chin, "Widae-han omoni-ui pich'-nanun hyokmyong-chok songae: pulyo pulkul-ui kongsanch'tti hyokmyong t'usa Kang Pan-sok yosa-ui soko 50 toks-ei chu um-hayo" (The Shining Bevolutionary Life of the Great Mother: Marking the 50th Anniversary cf the Death of Madame Kang Pan-sok, the Indomitable Communist Revolutionary Fighter), nodonq Sinmun, 31 July 1982, p. 2.

saoxong gong-sop, "Widae-han sarang-uro sunok-achin pulmyol-ui ryoksa-edaehan pich'-nanun hwapok: yesulyonghwa 'Choson-ui pyol' 7—pu 'Mamman—eso'—edae hayo" (Shining Portrait of an Immortal History Displaying Great Love: on Part 7 of the Feature Film 'Star of Korea' — 'At Mamman)," Nodonq Sinmun, 29 July 1983, p. 2.

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D. PERIPHERAL RELATIVES

The Cult propaganda encompassed a select number of

other Kims, lesser relatives of the leader. These secondary

figures did not have crucial roles in the Cult story, but

their vignettes served to reinforce lessons derived from the

main story — the fam ily's patriotism etc. They may also

have been used to inject some variety into the regular round

of anniversary celebrations and lend verisim ilitude to Kim's

b io g ra p h y .

Kim's younger brothers, long—chu and Ch'ol-chu, were

noted as staunch activists, who had absorbed parental

patriotism and later participated in the revolution.®** They

never became major figures, despite or because of their

fraternity with Kim, but describing them as revolutionaries

validated the patriotic education Hyong-chik and Madame Kang

provided Kim. A sim ilar theme of patriotism and sacrifice

permeated the story of Kim's uncle, Hyong-kwc-n, who became a

communist and died in prison. Another uncle became a farmer

who supported Hyong-chik's activities.®*®

An interesting case of historical revision presented

Kim's great-grandfather, Ong-u, as a nineteenth century

anti-U.S. leader. In September 1866, a vessel carrying

some Americans, the "General Sherman," became trapped on a

®**Indcm-itable, pp. 109-10.

®*®ibid.. pp. 111-12.

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sandbar near Pyongyang while attempting to open the country

to trade; the frustrated crew resorted to violence,

prompting angry Koreans to burn the ship and k ill a ll on

board. North Korea had often used this story, citing it as

an exemplary instance of popular anti-im perialist

resistance, but without any specific references to

leadership.®»® By the time of the Baik Bong biography, Ong-

u, it was claimed, "fought fiercely in the van of the masses

and led them" in blocking the passage of the pirate ship.®»*

Later, Ong-u was portrayed as the leader in sinking the

vessel.®»® Further, the DPEK seized on another incident

after the "Sherman" episode, in which the O.S. Navy sought

to discover the fate of the earlier ship. In this version,

Ong—u organized molunteers, established a command system,

preferred a daring defense plan, and led Koreans in

repelling the invaders.®»»

The lesson was that Kim's patriotism ran deep, and

that defense of the country, even from the Americans, had

®»®See, for example, Nodonq Sinmun, 25 June 1963 or 1 August 1964.

®»*Vol. 1, p. 14. Note that according to Baik Bong, Ong-u was a tenant farmer and landlord's grave keeper, a low caste in Confucian society.

®»®"Hin1u Choson Recalls 1866 Burning of O.S. Ship" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0942 GUI 2 September 1984. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 173, 5 September 1984, p. D1.

s8 6"Daily on H istorical Repulsing of O.S. Ship" (text) , Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1016 GMT 30 July 1984. JPRS-KAR-84-050, 24 August 1984, pp. 76-77.

283

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been a Kim family specialty for generations.

E. THE WIFE, KIM CHONG-SOK

Although Madame Kang remained the ultim ate mother

figure, she was supplanted in the mid-1970s by Kim Chong-

suk. Kin's first wife.®»? Since Chong-suk was the mother of

KCI, the improvement to her status was directly related to

the movement to make KCI his father's successor. Just as

Kim demonstrated his patriotic heritage through his parents,

KCI was to show that he got a rich legacy from both.

It should be noted is passing that it was never

stated overtly that Chong-suk was wife to Kim, possibly in

deference to Kim's current spouse, a senior official in the

women's movement.®»» She was, however, occasionally

identified as KCI's mother. It should also be stated that

in keeping with hCI's attempt to build a constituency in the

younger generation, much of the propaganda about Chong-suk

was directed at youth.

As noted above,®»* Chong-suk received no special

®»?A possibility exists that Chong-suk was Kim's second wife, not his first. Harrison Salisbury relates that he saw a gold ring on exhibit in a museum, with a notation that it was a present from Kim to female guerrilla "Kim Hauk Fu" about 1936. Although the guides would confirm no relationship, the ring was identical to one given Chong-suk, perhaps about 1939; see To Peking, pp. 210-11.

®»»Kim's present wife, Kim Song-ae, makes appearances in connection with women's affairs and accompanies Kim on ceremonial occasions, but has played no part in Cult propaganda.

58«See Chapter IV, p. 203.

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emphasis daring the early phases of the campaign to glorify

the guerrillas; she was merely one name among many, with no

distinguishing features. Even Baik Bong's detailed

biography of Kin devoted no more than two paragraphs to her,

recording that she lo st her parents and grew up in the

C hildren's Corps., that she had once been arrested but was

rescued by an underground organization; it also explained

that she became a member of the headquarters mess unit, and

protected the headquarters at the risk of her life. A

famous, and later oft-repeated story, told of her shielding

Kim's body with her own during an enemy raid, while she and

Kim gunned down two in filtra to rs in tandem.®*®

Idolization of Chong-suk began in mid-1974,

sy m b o lized by ch a n g es in t i t l e from "Comrade" t o "Madame" to

"Mother." Her relation to Kim weis couched in euphemisms

such as "making the leader happy" or "the person closest to

the leader," and her maternal role was an "immortal

exploit."®*! In October 1975, a bronze status of Chong-suk

was unveiled at a mausoleum for revolutionaries.®*® later, a

county was renamed in her honor.®*®

S90?ol. 1, pp. 512-13.

**!Clippinger, Kin Chong-il, pp. 296-97.

®*®Young C. Kim, "The DPEK in 1 975," p . 9 2 .

®*®Chi Kf-sang, "Ch'ungsong-ui hankil—ei ch'ongch'un-ul pach'icha: yonghwa-rul t'onghan ch'ungsilsong kyoyang-ul silsok-isskei" (let Os Consecrate Youth on the Eoad of Loyalty: Solidly Nurturing in Loyalty Through Film s), Nodonq Ch'onqnvon. 16 December 1982, p. 3.

285

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A series of articles conducting a verbal tour of the

15 rooms of a memorial disclosed details of her life . She

grew up in poverty, although her father and brother

inculcated patriotism in her; when, at age 11, she found her

father arrested, she crossed into Manchuria, and was

educated by young communists, then joined the Youth Vanguard

organized by Kin. She carried out such liaison duties as

were entrusted to them.®** She entered the KEA in 1935, and,

after getting her rifle in April 1936, joined the leader's

personal guard. She subsequently engaged in underground

political work and women's social work.®*® After liberation,

she guarded the leader and also did political work to arm

the masses with his ideology.®*»

Chong-suk died on September 22, 1949. Kim hastily

returned from an on-the-spot guidance when he heard of her

illness; she smiled through tears to assure him she was

well, though all knew otherwise. Her children wept for her

®**Yi Yong-sam, "Kim Chong-suk tongchi hyokmyong sachokkwan—ul ch'achaso (2): hyokmyong-ui kil-lo" (Seeking the Comrade Kim Chong-suk Revolutionary Memorial (2): on the Eoad of Revolution), Nodonq Ch'ongnvon. 26 November 1982, p. 2. ®*®Yi Y ong-sam , "Kim C hong-suk to n g c h i hyokmyong sachokkwan-ui ch'achaso (4): yongwon-han ch'unsil-ui pyol-i twoesimyo" (Seeking the Comrade Kin Chong-suk Revolutionary Memorial (4): Eeccming the Star of Eternal Loyalty), Nodonq Ch'onqnyon. 4 December 1982, p. 2.

®*»Yi Chong-sun, -Kim Chong-suk tongchi hyokmyong sachokkwan-ul ch?chaso (6): haebang-twoeq choguk ttang-eso" (Seeking the Comrade Kin Chogg-suk Revolutionary Memorial (6): on the Liberated Fatherland's Ground), Nodonq Ch'onqnyon. 10 December 1982, p. 2.

286

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at her graves!te, while Kim comforted them and eulogized her

struggle. Kim instructed that she have a statue in military

uniform-*»?

Beyond the pathos in her life story, which rings

true, Chong-suk*s biography served two important purposes:

it provided a female role model and became a bridge between

the older leader and his successor-

She quickly became a role model for the female

activist, in which capacity she was probably more useful

than Madame Kang., since the latter was more of a homebody

and from a pre-revolutionary generation. Chong-suk could be

associated with the anti-Japanese era and with real action.

Like Madame Kang, moreover, Chong-suk led back to Kin: as

one article intoned, the study of "the mother of revolution,

our mother," Chong-suk, impelled Koreans on the path of

endless loyalty to the leader.*»®

Her most important function, however, was her

linkage of Kim and KCI. One article noted that Hoeryong,

*»?%i Yong-sam, "Kim Chong-suk tongchi hyokmyong sachokkwan-ul ch'achaso (7): chuch'e hyokmyong wiop—gwa topulo yongwon-hari" (Seeking the Comrade Kim Chong-suk Bevolutionary Memorial (7): Ever Together with the CHOCHE Revolutionary Task), Modong Ch'onqnvon. 21 December 1982, p, 2. *»*Kim Pycng-rok, "Bidae-han suryong-nimgge kkut' opsi ch'ungchik-han ch'inwichonsa-ui kachang pich'-nanun hansaeng: pulyopulkul—ui kongsanchu'i hyokmyong t'u sa-isin Kin Chong-suk omoni-ui sogo 33 doks-ei chu'um-hayo" (Ihe Host Shining Life of a Bodyguard Endlessly Loyal to the Great Leader: Marking the 33rd Anniversary of the Death of the Indomitable Communist Revolutionary Fighter, Mother Kin Chong-suk), Modong Ch'onqnvon. 22 September 1982, p. 2.

287

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her birthplace, was honored just as was Mangyongdae, Kim's

home. The article then described a painting showing the

family just after liberation: Kim stands arms akimbo, gazing

into the distance, "anticipating the bright future of the

fatherland," while next to him on a white horse is the

"(honored) young child," in uniform and with his father's

binoculars and white flag. Chong-suk stands there also,

holding the reins and steadying the child.*»* She is the

loyal follower, serving both generations of leadership.

1 1 1 . KCI AND THE SOCCESSICN

The final use of Kim's Cult is to facilitate the

transfer of leadership to a chosen successor, his own son,

KCI. The movement to promote KCI as the top leader employed

many of the leadership strategies outlined by Iriggins,**®

which are outside the scope of this study, but a primary

strategy was the use of personality projection. Hhile

others, such as the creation of loyal factions, were

conducted privately, personality projection by definition

had to be done in public; the chief ingredients of a Cult of

Personality are a series of mass images.

The guestion of KCI's succession had several unusual

*»»Yi Yong-sam, "Kin Chong-suk tongchi hyokmyong sachokkwan—ul ch/achaso (1): chokuk kwangpok-ui saepom" (Seeking the Comrade Kim Chong-suk Revolutionary Memorial (1): the Early Spring of Fatherland Restoration), Nodonq Ch'onqnvon, 21 November 1982, p. 2.

60osee Chapter I, pp. 18—19.

288

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dimensions, and Colt propaganda was deployed to preempt

expected criticism on several of them. A major point of

dissatisfaction was the choice of Kim's own son as

successor, raising question of nepotism or dynastic

intentions.»®* Therefore, Cult propaganda emphasized two

points, that KCI was best qualified because his closeness to

the leader meant he had most deeply absorbed the leader's

thoughts, and that his own innate ability and intelligence

qualified him for leadership.

A second objection to the choice of KCI was his

comparative youth, since he had been born in 1941 and thus

did not share the formative experiences of a majority of the

ruling class, that is, either the anti-Japanese struggle,

the Korean Bar, or construction of Socialism. Very little

is known in detail about KCI's early life and career.»®® In

making his choice of successor, Kim had thus passed over the

senior and middle levels of DPEK officialdom. Thus, in

addition to doubts over experience, the selection must have

»®*Commentators often imputed dynastic intentions to Kim before KCI by suggesting that his brother Yong-ju had been selected as successor. See, for example, Lee, "Evolution," p. 442. This writer, however, believes the evidence is slim .

*®®KCI apparently began his career in 1964 in the Organization Division of the KHP Central Committee, then progressed steadily through the Agitprop Bureau and the Organization Bureau. Since 1979, he has been a member of the Politburo and M ilitary Affairs Committee. See Kang In- dok, "North Korean Publications on the 'Programmatic Guidance* by Kim Jong-il," Vantage Point, vol. VI, no. 10, October 1983, p. 3.

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elicited hard feelings among the older generation, even

among Kim loyalists. A strong propaganda campaign linked to

the Cult would help to make KCI more palatable and leave no

doubt he was Kim's choice. One result was the claim that it

was necessary to ensure continuance of the revolution as far

into the future as possible, or "generation after

generation."

Before its explicit linkage with Kim's Cult

propaganda, the KCI campaign began a semi-public "buildup"

in the early 1970s. In conjunction with internal propaganda

not available outside Korea, the regime began referring to

KCI's activities and achievements regularly, but shielding

them behind cover names, primarly the "Party Center."»®® It

is unclear why this was so, although it may have been to

circumvent expected objections to nepotism and youth by

reducing target Size. It may also have been used by the

propagandizers to create an aura of mystery and anticipation

among the people, perhaps in im itation of the way Kim was

presented to the public in 1945.

Another major consideration for the KCI partisans

was the absolute necessity to avoid undercutting Kim's

prestige and authority even while constructing an attractive

persona for a successor: a monolithic system can tolerate

»®®This phrase may derive from KCI's early days in important party positions, but also had the advantage of being sim ilar to regular terms for KRE components and thus it had "deniability" in case of an anti-KCI backlash.

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only one Great Leader at a time, and the elite may have been

mindful that father—son conflict had often marred the

harmony of Yi Dynasty Korea. This delicate task was

accomplished by taking pains to show, in itially at least,

that Kd had derived his sk ills from the Colt principal and

was merely acting as the agent of Kim's w ill.

A salient facet of the succession guestion was

redefinition of the concept of personal leadership, since

much past propaganda had called party leadership or the role

of the masses critical. One article defined the

"revolutionary view of the leader" as the position the

leader assumed with the working masses plus the mass stand

to serve the leader with sincerity. The leader spoke for

the masses and directed their action; he occupied an

absolute position which nothing could break down.*o* Another

argued that the lesson of history was that the victory of

the revolution depended on unity with the leader; just as

the orbits of the planets was unthinkable without the sun^

society's movements depended on the people's center of

g u id a n ce.

Next was the guestion of succession. The creation

*o*Yi su—kun, "Hyokmyong-chok surycnggwan-e taehayc" (Concerning the Bevolutionary View of the leader), Chollima. November 1983, pp. 69-76.

6 0 5MEssa.y Stresses Loyalty to Party Center: Onattributed Sadio Essay 'Permanent Companion to the Bevolution'," (text) Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2330 GST 15 February 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 034, 17 February 1984, pp. D9-15.

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and Inheritance of the tradition of loyalty to the leader

was the greatest pride in the history of the Korean

Commnnist movement, according to one editorial, and many

fighters devoted their lives to safeguard him and his ideas.

But, the farther the revolution advanced, the more argent

the guestion of j.nheritance became; its future depended on

how the question was solved. Koreans should unite around

the party center.*** Long communist experience showed that a

failure to inherit the tradition of the leader meant lack of

guarantees about the purity of party ranks, maintenance of

revolutionary lineage, and advancement of socialism .**? This

suggests that the DPEK feared that unfavorable changes in

the USSB and the PEC could be replicated at home.***

Many of the images KCI offered paralleled those of

his father: patriot, concerned leader, theoretician. He

was also the idol of South Korea. Unlike Kim, however, KCI

also exhibited an artistic bent, and among the many subjects

***Pak Pyong-kyu, "Hyokmyong-ui ryongdocha-edaehan ch'ungsilsong—ui chondong—ul ch*angcfao-han kos-un Chosen kongsanchu—ui untong-ui k'unak'un charang" (Creation of a Tradition of Loyalty to the Leader of Bevclution is the Great Pride of the Korean Communist Movement), Bodong Sinmun, 16 April 1984, p. 2.

*07«ori tang-e wihan hyokmyong chont'ong—ui kyesung palchon-gva Choson hyokmyong-ui palk-un chonto" (The Inheritance and Development of the Bevolutionary Tradition by Our Party and the Bright future of the Korean Bevolution), Bodong Sinmun, 11 February 1984, p. 2.

606x.ee, in "Evolution,** speculates that KCI's apprenticeship was cut short by the changes in the PBC after the death of Mao.

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on which he showed expertise, the arts figured prominently.

Finally, much of KCl's early propaganda was aimed at

youth, which must have been considered a natural

constituency; this was consistent with the theme of

revolutionary perpetuity. As one article pointed out,

members of the Young People's Corps were the masters of

tomorrow. Kim had created the group after liberation and

led it wisely, so that its members have grown up as loyal

revolutionaries. S till, as the revolution advanced, they

had to be more firmly prepared, and KCI was deeply

interested in projects to strengthen this organization.***

A. LINKAGE WITH KIM ANC THE GBEAT FAMILY

Given the pervasiveness of Kim's Cult, it is only to

be expected that any sanctioned successor would seek first

to associate himself directly with Kin. The association in

this case was logical, since KCI was the leader's son.

Although, as w ill be seen, KCI was more often portrayed as

Kin's spiritual heir, occasionally the blood relation was

made exp licit. One commentator*** noted that Eyong-chik had

established the KHA to achieve independence and build a

genuine civilized state on Korean efforts alone. This

60 9nsony.on tanwon—dulul hyokmyong-ui hupidae—ro t'ont'un-hi chunpi—sik'ida* (Let Os Firmly Prepare Members of the Young People's Corps to Bcome Bevolutionary Beserves), Hodone Sinmun, 6 June 1984, p. 5.

6 1owHail Achievements of Independence Fighter" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1522 GMT 23 March 1984. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 060, 27 March 1984, pp. D12-12.

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aspiration was "brilliantly inherited and realized" by Kim

and was "being brought into fu ll bloom" by KCI.

Just as Kim's birthday became a national holiday,

KCI's was marked, its official celebration dating from 1976.

Although it became a matter for internal celebration, not

until the 1980s did it feature exchanges of greetings and

public festivities.

KCI's early image was as interpreter and agent of

Kim's intentions. An early editorial explained that the

Party Center had elucidated the basic way of implementing

the leader's teachings.*** The Party Center held it as his

"historic mission" to relieve the leader's worries and

complete the cause he pioneered, so to this end, he studied

the leader's instructions and theories, and originated the

campaign to dye the entire society with CflOCHE.*** The P a rty

Center perceived the richness of the revolutionary tradition

and the necessity of its perpetuation, thus was determined

that the leader's achievements, ideas, and "noble communist

morality" were "emulated and eternally glorified."***

6 1i"surycng-nimggeso hana-rul malssum-hasimyo uri- nun yolgachi-rul ch'ach-ko paek gachi-rul haekyol-hanun kip'ung-ul sewoya-handa" (He Must Establish the Spirit of Finding Ten and Solving 100 Problems Hhen the Leader Tells Os One), Modonq Cb'ongnvon. 22 January 1977, p. 2.

**2Kim Ong-nam, "On-sa hoe—r ul chuch'e sasanghwa— ha nun k il'lo!" .(Onward on the Path of Imbuing the Entire Society with the CHOCfiE Idea), Modonq Ch'onqnyon. 19 February 1977, p. 2.

***Kim Ong-nam, "Chuch'e-ui hyokmyong chondong-ul pich'nae'imyo" (The G lorification of the Revolutionary

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By the 1980s, KCI was not only the successor but the

one who was completing the leader's tasks. As an editorial

agreed, "just as we cannot imagine the pioneering of the

CHOCHE cause" in the 1920s without the Great Leader, so "we

cannot imagine the succession to and completing of the

(leader's cause) without the dear leader," KCI.*** Thus, on

the 35th anniversary of the BPEK, people celebrated Kim, the

founder, and KCI, who was making the leader's "lofty w ill

blossom." Kim had founded for the first time in Korea "a

happy paradise" for workers and KCI had raised the dignity

and honor of the fatherland of CHOCfif to its highest

l e v e l . *** Although by 1984 and 1985 KCI began to develop a

separate persona, his image retained its linkage to his

father throughout the period. Such a link doubtless

continued for two reasons: this allowed KCI to ride the

"coattails" of Kim's entrenched image and derive reflected

glory from it, while it also avoided threatening the elder's

p o s it io n .

Tradition of CHOCBE), Modonq Ch'onqnyon, 15 February 1977, p. 2 .

***"Ch'oggsonyon-edaehan sasang kyoyang-eso tae-rul t'unt'un—hi seu-cha" (Let 0s Firmly Establish a Tradition in the Ideological Indoctrination of Youth and Children), Modonq Ch' onqpvon. 29 June 1 9 8 3 , p . 1.

***"Stronger Unity Around Kim Il-song, Kim Chong- il Orged" (text), Modonq Ch'onqnyon in Korean, 9 September 1983, p. 4. Translation by the JPfiS. JPBS Korean Affairs Report, No. 322, 16 November 1983, pp. 20-25.

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B. IMAGES OE THE SUCCESSOR

Just as did Kim, KCI evolved a series of images

which became standard properties in his Cnlt propaganda.

Many examples drawing on these images were reiterated.

In addition to stock images, KCI developed a series

of descriptive prhases, sim ilar to those used for Kim, which

were employed either as adjectives with the name or as

substitutes for it. If the elder was the "respected and

beloved leader," KCI became the "dear leader." In addition

to "Glorious Party Center," KCI was known as the "Star of

Mount Paektu," referring to his birth place, the "Sun of

Communism," and "Star of Guidance." The following are the standard images used to honor

KCI in North Korea's media.

1 . PATRIOT: S in c e a prim ary f u n c t io n o f th e C u lt was

to stimulate national feeling and identify Kim with it, KCI

had to be presented also as an ardent patriot. One

commentator recalled how KCI, while a student, had written a

patriotic poem entitled "Korea, I w ill make you shine."

While some felt the necessity of a foreign education, KCI

had favored Kim Il-song University. Be had also asserted

that Korean history should center around Koguryo rather than

Silla, showing that in his teens he had grasped the real

tenor of national history in a way even professional

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historians had not, blinded as they were by finnkeyism.* * *

2. CONCERNED LEADER: Recalling his father's campaign

to express his concern for the lifestyle of the public, KCI

also mounted an image of concern. Since he did not begin

independent inspections until rather late, KCI's image

frequently was composed of individual incidents of

solicitude. For example, in 1984, an ordinary fisherman

took sick on the high seas. On hearing of it, KCI sent a

naval vessel to carry the man to shore and dispatched

medical workers by air to restore him to health.**?

KCI was also tied to improvements in living

conditions, if not to the extent his father was. A

commentary ascribed many new houses and thirty public

buildings at a Cooperative Farm to KCI's kindness, as he

carried to reality Kim's rural construction plan.*** KCI was

identified with many campaigns and slogans, including

***"The 37th Installment of the Travelogue on the North: 'Star was Shining,' Written by Yi Chong-un, Head of a Hyongmyong Choson Delegation Which Attended a World Meeting of Journalists Held in Pyongyang" (text), VRPR in Korean to South Korea, 1000 GMT 13 December 1984. Translation by the FBIS, FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 243, 17 December 1984, pp. D9-11. This historical insight contained subtle pro-DPRK bias, since Koguryo was a northern dynasty and Silla a southern one before Silla unified the peninsula in the seventh century.

**?"Ngdong Sinmun on Episode of Kim Chong-il's Solicitude" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1557 GMT 7 March 1984. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 047, 8 March 1984, p. D12.

***"Kim Chong-il's Housing Guidance Praised" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1032 GMT 24 November 1983. JPRS- KAR No. 331, 22 December 1983, pp. 92-93.

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claimed authorship of the campaign to "live, work, and study

like the anti-Japanese guerrillas."

3 . SATIOKAL DEVELOPER: As w ith any p o l i t i c a l le a d e r ,

KCI had to show results, so he identified himself with

construction efforts. Although associated with many

endeavors, he often was connected with modern technology,

possibly to differentiate him from Kim.

At fir st, KCI accompanied his father on inspections,

but by the early 1980s, he developed his own style. Just as

the senior Kim gave "on-the-spot guidance," KCI gave

"working guidance."*** He continued his father's work: at

the 36th anniversary of Kin Ch'aek University, it was

recalled that Kim had shown constant care for the school,

founding it and giving guidance more than 200 times; KCI

sim ilarly acted to improve it, inspecting it and personally

sending hundreds of items of technical equipment.*2*

Countless (used advisedly] press and broadcast news

items credited KCI with spurring technical development. For

example, he bad kindled the "Speed of the 80s," to enhcince

the abundant life and happiness created by Kim. Whereas Kim

instructed the people in launching innovative movements, KCI

***"KC»A Reports Further on Kin Chong-il Guidance" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0416 GUI 22 Hay 1984. JPRS-KAB-84-033, 5 June 1984, pp. 46-49.

62 0"kcha cn Kin Chaek University Founding Anniversary" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0024 GMI 27 September 1983. JPRS-KAR-313, 13 October 1983, p. 87.

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drew them into the era of science and t e c h n o l o g y . * 2 1

Elsewhere, Kim advanced a plan for the complete emancipation

of man, while Kd was translating it into "shining reality"

through automation and industrial t e l e v i s i o n . * 2 2

Gradually, KCI emerged as an economic leader in his

own right. One .commentator noted that workers at the Nampo

Lockgate construction were "hold" due to the "unusual w ill

of iron and incomparable courage" of KCI; he showed wisdom

in solving problems and the "commanding art" in allocating

resources. Kin's ideas and achievements wen brilliant

victories in the 1960s and 1970s, but now KCI was doing the

same in the 1980s . *23

Economic development and construction was a vital

area, since here policy was transferred to visible action.

It also represented a field yhere KCI could demonstrate his

expertise without threatening his father's reputation. He

in fact moved to identify himself with technical progress in

the same way Kim had been linked with basic development

techniques in the post-liberation and post-war periods.

62inch'onqnyon—dulun '80 nyondae sokdo' ch'angcho— eso kisu—ga twoe—go yong'ung—i twoe—cha" (Let Youth Become Standard Bearers and Heroes in Creating the "Speed of the 80s"), Hodonq ChJonqnyon, 15 July 1983, p. 1.

622"Automation of Industry in DEBK Praised" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 2217 GMl 21 February 1984. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 037, 23 February 1984, pp. D14-15.

623nKim Chong-il Guidance on Nampo Lockgate praised" (text), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 0928 GM2 19 June 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 121, 22 june 1984, pp. D21-25.

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4. HBIIEfi AH£ THEORETICIAN: Although Kim's speeches

ciud writings were from the beginning treated as worthy of

study and execution, his image tended toward action; indeed,

much of his canon then and in later years consisted of

action programs and elaborations on them. Only after the

stress on CHOCHE from the 1950s was Kim hailed as a

philosopher, and, as we have seen, it was only in the 1970s

that he was touted as an original thinker rather than a mere

interpreter of Marxism—Leninism. KCI, however, began his

public career in the 1970s, well after his father had

adopted the image of philosopher, and thus he also claimed

philosophic talent. As with other aspects of his image,

KCI's early writj.ngs were presented as abetting his father's

glory or aiding the study of Kim, but steadily, KCI emerged

as an original thinker him self.

Propaganda traced KCI's writings to the 1960s, as

when the media celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the

1964 publication of "Let us become revolutionaries

boundlessly faithful to the party and leader." This work

had analyzed relations between the leader and his people and

applied to the whcle peirty Kim's Chongsan-ni work method.* 2*

It matters little that confirmation is lacking that KCI

wrote this or wrote it in 1964; the point is that Cult

propaganda claimed that KCI authored an important treatise

62«NKim Chong-il Work Published in 1964 Praised" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1520 GMT 30 March 1984. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 065, 3 April 1984, pp. D17-18.

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virtually from his entrance into politics.

KCI moreover became a proponent of the importance to

the Korean revolution of the SIS, allegedly founded by Kim

while a middle school student.*2* A probable reason for the

emphasis on the SIU was the early age at which Kim had

created it; praise of Kin's ability to move history in his

teens would help deflect criticism of KCI's youth without

directly confronting the guestion.

KCI furthermore was hailed as a theorist on the role

of the leader, for example, his treatise "Let us advance

under the banner of Marxism-Leninism and the C H O C H E id e a ,"

argued from history that the struggle of the masses would be

victorious when guided by the revolutionary idea of a

leader. Great ideas were invented by an outstanding leader:

Lenin succeeded Marx, and in pioneering the Koreein

revolution under the Marxist—Leninist banner, Kim invented

CHOCHE. *26 Bhiie KCI's writings about support to the leader

had the overt intention of rallying the people to Kim,

clearly, the latent content was to create a climate of

support for a ll leadership so that such support could be

transferred to the successor.

5. MILITARY MAN: Through the period, the regime made

*25See the section on Kin biographies, pp. 272-74.

*26Kim Sj.-Chung, "Ori hyokmyong sunri-ui ap'kil-ul malk—hayochunun kwichung—han chich'im" (The Precious Guideline that Illuminates the future Path of our Revolution's Victory), Nodong Sinmun, 3 May 1S84, p. 2.

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only desultory attempts to portray KCI as a military leader,

one area in which he could not claim an image akin to his

father. Whatever the truth of the extent of Kim's wartime

activities, he at least had been a combat leader and senior

commander; as far as is known, KCI served no time on active

d u ty .

In this case, the Cult propaganda contented itself

with a derivative image, with KCI only in peripheral

military activities. For example, troops of the KPÂ Unit to

which Comrade Ch.*oe Ch'ang—su is Attached remembered August

I960 when both Kim and KCI visited their unit. While Kim

worked on a "model company movement," KCI toured the unit

and inspired warm l o y a l t y . * 27 gci also inspected on his own:

the Triple Red Flag Onit to which Comrade Sok Ch'on-ul is

Attached recalled July 1967, when they were visited by KCI;

they became famous in the struggle to internalize the Great

Leader's teachings as well as the Dear l e a d e r ' s . * 2s

Only occasionally did North Korea speak of KCI as a

military thinker. A KPA general, speaking about the end of

the Korean War, attributed victory not only to Kim's

unsurpassed leadership but also the CHOCfiE idea and CHOCHE

tactics. Although the country was s till threatened, it

*2 7pak II, "Apchang-eso chonchon-hanon ch'ol—ui dae'o" (Ranks cf Iron Advancing in the Forefront), Nodong Ch'onqnyon. 5 August 1983, p. 3.

6 2 8yin ïong-ho, "Kunal-ui yonggwang kasum—e ango" (The G lory o f t h a t Day R e s ts in t h e i r Bosom ), Modonq Ch'onqnyon, 13 July 1983, p. 3.

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remained under Kj.m and the "sagacious leadership" of KCI,

"who is a remarkable military genius of our tim e."* 2* The

im plication seems to be that wartime victory was not only

attributable to one individual's genius, but to CHOCHE

thought. KCI, though he lacked military experience, was

frequently noted as an unparalleled master of CHOCHE

ideology — perhaps an acceptable substitute for military

s k i l l s .

Given the overweening importance of m ilitary affairs

in North Korean politics, the regime could not avoid giving

KCI a military image. However, considering the paucity of

KCI involvement with the m ilitary, the regime likely pursued

other leadership strategies, such as personnel replacements,

and lim ited propaganda for personality projection.

6 . OTHER TALENTS: As o f t h i s w r it in g , KCI had n o t

sought to show the wide range of expertise which Kim did,

yet KCI evinced special interest in specified areas,

particularly literature and the arts.

One commentary applauded changes in the types of

authors in modern literature, saying that more workers and

peasants were contributing important works. This was due to

the wise leadership of KCI, who had a policy of popularizing

literature and provided conditions favorable to mass

* 2«ïi lu—ch'an, "O.S. Im perialists Should iithdraw from South Korea by Discarding Their Anachronistic Policies," Nodonc Ch'onqnyon, in Korean, 26 July 1983, p. 1. Translation by the JPRS. JPRS Korean Affairs Report, No. 310, 29 September 1983, pp. 97-102.

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literature, including literary circles and prizes.*** This

literary bent had its practical side also. An article noted

that in the 1960s opportunists who sought artistic freedom

had rejected party leadership to revive reactionary

tendencies, including admiration of things foreign. KCI

decided to take personal charge of a program to tighten

party control when the "state of literature and art was very

complicated."***

From his youth, according to an article, KCI had

energetically pursued literature and art. Be turned his

primary attention to motion pictures and made the Feature

Film Studio a model o f production as he gave guidance at a ll

lev els.**2 A famous South Korean filmmaker who defected

testified that KCI had given him encouragement and advice,

with a promise of no ideological interference. KCI had seen

almost all of his films and praised his directorial

technique.***

KCI further innovated in other arts. Hhereas Kim

*3o«Korea*s Mass Literature Reaches Heyday" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1019 GMT 30 November 1983. JPRS Korean A ffairs Report, No. 331, 22 December 1983, pp. 100 - 01 .

***"Kim Chong-il's Role in Literary and A rtistic Revolution Lauded" (text), Choson Yesul. in Korean, February 19 84, pp. 12-13. Translatiou by the JPRS. JPRS-KAfi-84-034, 13 June 1984, pp. 40-44.

**2i b i d .

633npurther on Sin Sang—ok, Ckoe Dn-hui Issue" (tex t), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0913 GMT 20 May 1984. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 099, 21 May 1981, p. D1€.

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had founded the Pyongyang Circus during the Korean War and

guided its subsequent development, KCI in the 1970s, basing

himself on a deep grasp of theory and practice in

acrobatics, had illuminated problems in circus art.*** His

guidance facilitated the appearance of the OKfilOKOM, a

musical instrument sim ilar to an ancient one, but based on

scientific analysis.*** He also dabbled in decorative art:

he spurred fu ll development of ceramic art by advancing

policies, sending artists to factories, and personally

overseeing designs to raise artistic value.***

C. KCI A80 SOOTH KOHEA

According to the DPEK, KCI was as popular in the

south as in the north. The South Koreans were anxious for

reunification because of his co-leadership, just as the

media once had them avid for Kim. Much pro-KCI propaganda,

particularly in the early 1980s, was attributed to the

Bevolutionary Party for Reunification (RPR), a group

resident in Pyongyang but purporting to be an underground

ROK organization. A rticles about KCI and the south

emphasized the twin themes of pride in KCI and longing for

***"KCMA on Kim C hong-il's Guidance of Circus Art" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1508 GMT 24 December 1984. JPES-KAR-85-004, 11 January 1985, pp. 89-90.

***So T'ae—sok, "Okryukum," Minin Choson. 3 September 1982.

***"KCNA P r a is e s Kim C h o n g -il f o r Ceram ic A rt Development" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 2222 GMT 21 November 1983. JPRS Korean Affairs Report, No. 331, 22 December 1983, pp. 98-99.

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him .

For example, an article presented reactions from the

south on publication of KCI's treatise on Marxism-Leninism

and alleged everyone vas enthusiastic about it; a certain

Professor Pak called it the "event of the 20th century,' and

the "great glory of modern man."**? A greeting to him not

only remarked on his enrichment of Kim's thought, but called

him a "genius," and "star of guidance," who was steering the

direction of history.*** A professor at a Seoul university

noted how foreign heads of state and public figures extended

greetings to KCI on his birthday, while men of letters wrote

him poems.*** A defector recalled his business travels and

stated that foreigners he met assumed that Korea meant the

DPEK and connected him with Kim and KCI.***

These items reflected pride in KCI, with the claim

**?KCHA, " 2 0 - s e ik i t t o h a n a -u i sa p y o n , hyondae inryu-ui tayanggwang" (The Event of the 20th Century ; the Great Glory of Modern Man), Modonq Ch'onqnyon, 7 July 1983, p. 2. Attributions to South Korean people generally gave only a surname; articles often included a professor among those quoted.

***"'Message of Congratulations' from the EPE Central Committee to Kim Chong-il on Mew year's Day — Head by Announcer" (text), Voice of the EPE in Korean to South Korea, 1 January 1984, 1000 GMT. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DS AP, Vol. IV: 003, 5 January 1984, pp. D4-7.

639iisouth*s People Revere Kin Chong-il" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1028 GMT 11 September 1984. JPRS-KAR-84-057, 28 September 1984, p. 24.

**0"Press Conference Held with South Defector" (excerpts), Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 1227 GMT 29 November 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 233, 3 December 1984, pp. D3-7.

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that South Koreans also understood that KCI, like his

father, had brought renewed glory to the nation. This

propaganda paralleled the style of that about Kin and the

south,*** showing that southerners took pride in him,

supported his leadership, admired his accomplishments, and

sought reunification under his aegis.

D. KCI AND FOREIGNERS

The regim e's buildup of KCI was conducted through

internal propaganda, largely hidden from foreigners. KCI's

contacts with foreigners were lim ited and materials about

him not disseminated abroad. From about 1983, however, KCI

began limited contact with foreign leaders, including a trip

to the PBC,**2 and DPRK propaganda began issuing some

reports about outside appreciation for him, although these

were lim ited in scope. As with propaganda about KCI as a

military man, this paucity of publicity likely indicates

KCI's lack of experience in the field and more probably,

Kim's unwillingness to relinquish control of a vital

security area.

The most common type of propaganda relating KCI to

foreigners was news that his works had been published

overseas or that foreigners had praised him. For example, a

1983 report stated that five volumes about him had been

***See this chapter, pp. 253-58.

**2"iate Report: PRC's Hu Confirms Kin Chong-il Visit" (text), Beijing XIHHOA in English, 1133 GMT 7 July 1983. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 131, 7 July 1983, p. D15.

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published in Japan.*** Another had three-quarters of a page

of quotations from the press of three continents praising

KCI as a revolutionary.*** Many foreign publications carried

his treatises and study sessions were held to discuss his

w orks. ***

In 1984, KCI's involvement with foreigners

increased. DPEK missions abroad held receptions on his

birthday. A number of world newspapers also featured

articles on him. Later, KCI exchanged gifts with foreign

leaders, including Ethiopia's Mengistu.***

Even if KCI's image did not advance deeply into

foreign affairs, it at least began a progressive

involvement. For the most part, the image complemented the

domestic image: j.f he were so sagacious, it was only logical

6**KCSA, "Ch'aek 'widae-han sarang-ui ch'an'ga: Kin Chong—il piso—wa inm in'-ul ch'ulp'an" (Publishing the Book Praise of Great Love: the People and Secretary Kim Chong- il) , Nodong Ch'onqnyon, 25 May 1983, p. 1.

***KCNA, "Ch'inae-hanun chidocha Kim Chong-il tongchi-ui hyonmycng-han ryondo-mit'e Choson—esonun sein-ul noUaeu-nun kichok—chok songgwa-duli ch'angcho twoigo-issda; seikyo sahoekye-ui panyang" (Under the Hise Leadership of the Dear Leader Comrade Kim Chong-il, Korea is Creating Miraculous Results Shich Surprise Borld Peoples: Reactions From the Borld and Socialist Borld), Nodong Ch'onqnyon. 9 July 1983, p. 2.

**®"Reportage on Kim Chong-il's Treatise" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0759 GMT 21 March 1984. JPRS- KAR-84-022, 9 April 1984, p. 42; KCNA, "Chuch'e sasang-un chachusidae—ui widae-han chido sasang" (CBOCfiE Thought, Great Leadership Ideology of the Era of Independence), Nodong Ch'onqnyon. 13 August 1983, p. 2.

***"Reportage on Celebration of Kim Chong-il's Birthday" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 2214 GMT 23

308

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that he would be hailed by the world's people no less than

his own. The key factor here was probably the avoidance of

threat to Kim's image; the Great Leader was the most

respected abroad, in North Korea's scheme.

IT . COMMENTS

Without dissent, thus without fear of contradiction,

the DPEK regime was free to use its control of the media to

create whatever image of the leadership it desired.

Therefore, Kim's image added even more personal glory to the

magnificence extant from previous periods. The sheer amount

of this propaganda, coupled with the effusive praise,

indicates that much of it stemmed from the leader's ego

needs — or perhaps from zealous subordinates eager and able

to curry favor by gratifying these needs. This raises the

possibility that this Cult propaganda reveals Kim to be

Lasswell's political type, the individual who craves

deference and uses power or public affection to replace that

un gratified in hj.s personal life.**?

Many aspects of the leader's image touched on pride

— pride in the leader himself, in the country which

produced him, and the fact that people were repaying the

leader with outstanding results. Whereas in previous

February 1984. JESS-KAS-84-018, 21 March 1984, pp. 80-90; "Kim Chong-il Sends Present to Ethiopian leader" (text), Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1102 GMT 23 June 1984. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 126, 28 June 1984, p. D12.

6*?x.asswell, Power and Personality, pp. 22, 38.

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periods the image had been largely employed to spur the

populace to greater achievement, non in addition to that

use, it was deployed to make the people feel good about

these accomplishments, but doing it in such a way as to

ensure an association with the leadership.

This pride, as manifested in an assurance of victory

under Kin, became an important factor in enabling the regime

to weather m ilitary confrontation. A simple knowledge of

the DPBK's size and power must have been dismaying to the

citizen until he realized the country was led by the man who

had twice defeated overwhelming forces.

International changes also led to both positive and

negative Cult propaganda. With the increased opening to

non-bloc nations, the regime most have been concerned to

shelter the masses from outside influence as well as protect

foreign relations from Korea's traditional xenophobia, thus

it publicized these contacts in terms of the Cult: Kin met

foreign delegations, foreigners admired him, and they were

more concerned with leeirning Kim's ideology than capitcLbism

or other dangerous philosophies. In this way, the Colt

could be interpreted as a method of avoiding genuine contact

with foreigners, substituting ritual or myth for real

exchanges. In a more positive vein, this state of affairs

showed Korea seeking to make a contribution to the world and

giving what it felt was needed, the career and ideas of an

inspiring leader.

The more modern developments in the Cult,

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particularly the concentration on Kim's family, may have

arisen ont of egotism and the need for security assurance,

but they were also well suited to facilitate the succession.

With a blood relation chosen as successor, the use of these

familiar images provided a vital sense of continuity and

credibility. This solved what must have loomed as a serious

problem in bringing forward any other claimant, that is,

living up to the standards set by Kin. Given the image

created by Kim, almost any succession acceptable to the

regime and seeking its perpetuation would have to use a Colt

context, but the choice of KCI immeasurably sim plified this

t a s k . This intimate relation and its use in transferring

power may succeed in overcoming one of the lia b ilities

posited by Wriggins in the use of personality projection,**®

that is, difficulties in arranging an orderly succession.

Certainly, arranging for a successor who w ill feel no

obligation to downgrade the leader — or indeed be able to

do so without harming himself — makes this task an easier

one for the Cult principle.

The increased emphasis on the leader and unity with

him seems likely to have originated in the deep-seated North

Korean fear of weakness due to factionalism , rending it

imperative to have a figure to which all could repair. The

trend, begun in the last period and continued in this, of

**®iriggins. Baler's Imperative, pp. 104-07.

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avoiding the triad of "government, party, and leader" in

favor of the "leader" only probably reflected the

realization that bureaucratization had rendered the triad

members into competing groups. Other such interest groups

with potentially divergent interests included the m ilitary,

the technical intelligentsia, and youth. The need to unify

these groups was strong in the 1970s, and may also have led

to fear that disunity after Kim's passing would weaken North

Korean ideological fervor — thus the campaign for loyalty

"generation after generation" and an "in—house" succession.

Youth became an important focus of the Cult efforts

on succession, partly of course because this group would

live under the next leader, but also because of a perceived

need to transfer the symbolism of the older generation to

the new, which had never experienced imperialism, war,

extreme poverty, or the Japanese.*** This transfer was

abetted by KCI*s direct family connections to the events of

the past and to campaigns deriving from the symbols. If, as

Pye notes,*50 one characteristic of the non-western

political process is a sharp difference in the political

orientation of the generations, the regime seems to have

***As Kim poignantly noted in his 1963 speech, "Our People's Army is an Army of the Working Class, an Army of the Revolution; Class and Political Education Should be Continuously Strengthened," in his Selected works Vol. I ll {Pyongyang; Foreign Language Publishing House, 1971), pp. 4 6 7 -7 0 ,

6 5 o p y e, "Bon—western P r o c e s s ," pp . 477—79 , 4 7 6 -7 7 . See also Chapter I of this dissertation, pp. 9—10.

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been successful in foisting its worldview on the newer

generation, using the Kim Cult as a major tool.

Never more so than in the modern period has North

Korea chosen to tell its story in terms qf heroes and

villains. This has resulted in cheapening the real

accomplishments in economic development and resurgence of a

once-disgraced national sp irit. Attribution of all to Kim

obscured the deep sacrifices and hard labor of the masses.

Despite th is, adherence to the Cult helped provide

individuals with identity and personal stability. The Cult

most of a ll engendered pride in country, explaining its

recent history not in terms of national weakness and foreign

assistance, but in that of betrayal and rescue by its own

heroic efforts —^ albeit under an outstanding leader.

The Colt also helped reduce the complexities of

modern existence. Individual economic and political action

ultimately derived from the w ill of the leader, obviating

the need to make difficult personal choices and turning the

inability to do so into the virtue of obedience. The

leader's largesse provided the necessities of existence even

as it enriched their cultural life.

The state of the Cult in the modern period reveals

some disadvantages that overreliance on it produces. First,

the cost of the propaganda,*** particularly that

***In addition to the advertisements placed in major world newspapers, the distribution of Kin's works in the third world most be costly. While specific data are

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disseminated abroad, most constitute a considerable drain cn

a developing economy. Also, as already noted, the

attribution of a ll successes to Kin purloins the credit from

those who strove and sacrificed; this portends both the

liklihood of eventual disaffection within the population and

the possibility that the regime w ill be unable to deflect

responsibility for massive failures, should they happen.

Equally serious in the long term, the North Korean people

have been inculcated with skewed concepts of their country's

political, m ilitary, and diplomatic situations, and perhaps

most importantly, of the reunification problem. Such

misconceptions can only hamper success in achieving

re unification with the south or improved relations with the

non-communist world.

lacking, it is d ifficult to conceive of CHOCBE seminars being convened im foreign countries without considerable financial support from the DPEK.

314

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ANTECEDENTS OF THE CUIT OF PESSGNALITÎ

While it is likely Kim's Cult of Personality

developed through a combination of planning and

fortuitousness, at least four models could have influenced

its origin and growth — the cults of Stalin and Mao, the

Japanese Emperor, and the traditional Confucian authority

figure. The latter two were fam iliar both to Kim and the

target population; Stalin's cult was at its apogee when Kim

took power, while Mao's was expanding. Although the extent

of outside influence on the Kim Cult remains a matter for

speculation, these four models provide a basis for

comparison, and w ill assist in interpreting the Kim Cult's

origins and methpds of maintenance.

It should be said at the outset that no documentary

evidence is available to prove absolutely that aspects of

Kim's Cult were adopted directly from other Cults; the

possibility remains that similar trends in glorification

will emerge in totalist societies. Key aspects of the Kim

Cult were present from its inception, indicating outside

influence; later developments often resemble tne Cults of

others and may have been ingested when it was "safe" or

convenient to add dimensions. The fact is , those who

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devised the Kim Cult were fam iliar with foreign examples and

had the time, opportunity, and motive to herrow attractive

attributes from the Cults of Stalin and Hao.

Korean Cpnfucianism also influenced Kim's Cult, but

it is likely that few facets if any of the Cult were adopted

consciously from Confucianism, the sole possible exception

being the concept of Kim as father. Bather, the totalist

system developed in North Korea was compatible with

Confucian—derived societal norms and thus achieved popular

acceptance. The leadership system, including its Cultish

dimensions, fit comfortably within these norms. The

citizenry of the CPBK, it should be recalled, passed from a

system controlled by the Japanese to the system devised by

those who constructed and manipulated the Cult; they had

little or no exposure to outside or variant concepts of

political organization.

The realization that certain aspects may have been

taken from others should not keep us from understanding that

the Cult of Kim flourished in North Korea because it suited

the Korean people and filled their sociopolitical needs.

The Cult makers, rather than adopt wholesale the facets of

another leader's Cult, even Stalin's, added to Kim's Cult

only those dimensions it could support.

I . STAIXN

The concept of "Cult of Personality," difficult to

define as it is, since it involves many unguantifiable

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factors, has occasioned considerable controversy between the

commnnist powers. The Soviets claimed that the Chinese

Personality Cult was a product of China's society, in

particular its Cpnfucian heritage; they stressed that Maoism

and Confucianism shared characteristics, that Mao's Cult was

hero-worship or fanatisism by a charlatan in communist

g u i s e . *52 noted earlier, Maoist China mildly condemned

Stalin's Cult.*53 in their own case, the Soviets view the

Cult of Personality as a violation of Leninist norms of

collective leadership: Stalin had claimed party and state

successes as his own and had departed from "socialist

legality" to ccmimit serious errors in the last part of his l i f e . *5*

Lenin opposed a cult for him self, and with some

exceptions, stifled public adulation in his lifetim e.

However, after he was incapacitated by illn ess and

especicilly, after his death, his cult was promoted as a

leadership tool. Stalin promoted the Lenin Cult, so that by

constructing a powerful image of Lenin and tying himself to

it, he was able to enhance his own political stature.*5S %t

652A. James Melnick, "Soviet Perceptions of the Maoist Cult of Personality," Studies in Comparative Communism (Spring/sum m er 1 9 7 6 ): 1 3 2 -3 4 .

6S3see Chapter I, pp. 6-7.

*5*Melnick, "Soviet Perceptions," pp. 131-32.

*ssTucker, "Stalin's Personality Cult," pp. 347-52, 3 6 4 .

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of Stalinism, with its emphasis on eguating the dictatorship

of the masses with that of the party and the "arbitrariness"

of the "political police."***

The Personality Cult forged by Josef Stalin remains

the epitome of the genre. Adam Dlam remarks tersely that

although Mao disliked Stalin and the Soviets, he modeled his

own Cult "on the best available example."**? According to

Dlam, the cult began about 1930, as Stalin, having

consolidated his control of the Communist Party, intervened

forcefully in rewriting recent history, using this history

to discredit his rivals. He moreover fostered the habit

among writers of seeding their works with guotations from

himself. By the time of the Seventeenth Party Congress in

1934, Stalin was extolled publicly in superlatives, although

he was careful to portray himself as merely an executive

agent of the party, Lenin's pupil, and the promoter of

Eussian greatness.*** A Russian critic of Stalin traced the

cult's origin even farther back, to 1925, when excessive

*5*Ilya Zemstov, Lexicon of Soviet Political Terms (Fairfax, 7a.: Hero Books, 1984), pp. 71—73. Dr. Zemstov claims that Lenin fostered his own cult by immodestly casting himself as a great scholar, the greatest of revolutionary thinkers, and the friend of the oppressed. Lacking the pervasiveness and excesses of adoration found in a true Cult, however, this should be considered merely image-making.

**7Jlam, Stalin, p. 695.

*s*ibid.., pp. 338-41, 371-72.

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praise of Stalin was manifested at the Party Congress, and

when the city of Tsaritsyn was renamed Stalingrad. The

celebration of Stalin's fiftieth birthday also generated

excessive adulation.***

History was rewritten to expand Stalin's

achievements and role in the Revolution, while lenin was

made to acknowledge Stalin's superiority. A list of twenty-

four titles, including the phrase "great leader," was

concocted for himself.*** The adulation of Stalin emphasized

his versatility, his genius, his competence in all

matters.**! This veneration included stories of

in fallib ility and omniscience, so that he became arbiter not

only of ideological or social matters, but physical science

as well. The most celebrated example of Stalin's

intervention in scientific matters was his support for -

Lysenko's theories of genetics, with conccmmitant

condemnation of other theories. Stalin imposed his thought

and taste not only on literature but also cn film and

a r t . * * 2 Stalin accrued legitim acy by managing news in World

*5«Antonov-0vseyenko. The Time of Stalin. pp. 2 2 4 -2 6 .

** ojbid. . pp. 229—30. Boy Medvedev, Let History Judge; the Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (New York: Knopf, 1971), pp. 499-505, 522-24.

**!Robert H. McNeal, The Bolshevik Tradition (Englewood C liffs, N. J .: Prentice—Hall, 2nd edition, 1975), p. 102-

**2Medvedev, History, pp. 522-33.

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War II and proaalgating an official history in which his

actions predominated; this may have been one of the most

potent aspects 0$. his image in later years.***

Pe rpet nation of the cult was achieved variously: the

pomp for Stalin's birthday, monumental statues, and

c o n v e r s io n o f a fioscow museum i n t o a museum o f g i f t s to

Stalin.*** In addition to renaming of geographic features,

his titles and visage were perpetuated through profiles on

coins or medals and in song. Stalin's pictures also

exaggerated his height: only 5'4:, he seemed a giant in many

portrayals ; the ubiguitous portraits showed him towering

over others — sometimes over impressive landmarks — and

always in charge.**®

Even folklore was pressed into service in

propagating Stalin's glory.*** When in the early 1930s it

was realized that oral folklore could become a valuable

propaganda tool, folk stories became a carefully composed

literary form. This "official" folklore praised the regime.

***Seweryn Bialer, Stalin and His Generals: Soviet M ilitary Memoirs of World War II (Hew York: Pegasus, 1969) , pp. 17-18, 28-29.

*6«Medvedev, History, pp. 507—08.

**®àntonpv—Ovseyenko, Time of Stalin, pp. 228-29, 234, 249. Bortoli, The Death of Stalin, pp. 5—7.

***Prank J. M iller, "The Image of Stalin in Soviet Russian Folklore," The Russian Re vie w. XYXIY (January 1980): 52—54, 55—63. Miller also noted that after Stalin's death folklorists admitted the hoaxes but continued to publish sim ilar stuff to glorify Lenin and the Communist Party.

320

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Stalin in particular, and fostered stories of a central role

in the Russian Revolution for him, with lenin as a

"tutelary" or "guardian" deity.

It should he recalled that Stalin attained power not

by personal magnetism but by dint of sk ill in bureaucratic

struggles, competing against those who exercised

considerable talents in oratory or theory.**? Significantly-

he was later hailed as a theoretician, while his speeches

were widely reprinted and used as a basis for study. The

Cult may have been compensation for earlier perceived

inadequacies.

Several reasons account for Stalin's Cult, including

mass mobilization and foreign enemies. Marcuse noted that

the rise of Stalinism coincided with the ascent of German

fascism, and continued during post-war reconstruction, in

the attempt to outstrip capitalist development.**®

Industrialization and collectivization altered the life of

m illions in a working class which retained such vestiges of

peasant mentality as excessive respect for personal

authority. The Stalin Cult grew because it also served as a

prop for Stalin's personal insecurities, his need for

**?Olam, Stalin, pp. 236-39, 253-54.

**«Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, pp. 58-61. Many aspects of Stalin's Cult, as noted in the foregoing, predated the rise of German fascism; undoubtedly, however, this powerful externeil enemy spurred further development of the cult in the later 1930s.

321 r Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 322

worship.**® In addition to the low education level of the

Soviet people, Medvedev cited national traditions of

despotism and deep trust in leadership, since the

revolutionary leaders had achieved sweeping changes in a

short time but old attitudes did not alter. Moreover,

Medvedev explained that Stalin involved "m illions" in his

crim es, either directly or through meetings against

"enemies," thus gaining their acquiescence and

commitment.*?*

In a "secret report" delivered to the Twentieth

Congress of the CPSD in February 1956, Khrushchev detailed

the crimes of the Stalin era, attributing them to the Cult

which developed around him. Khrushchev explained that it

was alien to Marxism-Leninism to elevate an individual into

a "superman" who "knows everything, can do anything, is

infallible in his behavior." Khrushchev compared this to

Lenin, who condemned cult manifestations while teaching that

the party should maintain unity with the people; he then

catalogued ensuing abuses of legality and morality,

including elimination of the old Bolsheviks, elevation of

sycophants, and subordination of party and government to his

w ill. The Congress then adopted both a de—Stalinization

program and a declaration on principles of collective

***Tucker, "Stalin's Personality Cult."

*7OHistorv. pp. 362-66.

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leadership. * 7 t o n ecommentator pointed oat, however, that

Khrushchev actually praised Stalin twice in the "secret

speech," particularly for applying terror against the

Trotskyites and within three years, even he gave tentative

rehabilitation tp Stalin for his party service.*?*

Despite this flirtation with de-Stalinization,

Stalin's heirs enjoyed similar, if lesser, cults, which

seemed to mark unchallenged authority. A Cult flowered for

Khrushchev at the 21st CPSO Congress in 1959, as indicated

by excessive praise and the failure to mention collective

leadership. Similarly, a sharp rise in adulation for

Brezhnev was seen in Soviet media after 1969.*?*

It should be noted, as Hannah Arendt observed,*?*

that S talin's Cult — and thus those influenced by it — had

a basic sim ilarity to the "Fuehrer principle" of Nazism.

This principle defined the Fuehrer as the "bearer of the

collective w ill of the people," wherein he embodied the

political unity and entirety of the people.*?® Sim ilarly,

*?lA copy of the accepted text of the "secret report," with commentary, may be found in Wolfe, Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost, pp. 88—253. While this speech was circulated within the party, it was never released publicly.

*?*Herman Achminow, "A Decade of de-Stalinization," Studies on the Soviet Onion, new series. Vol. V, no. 3, 1966, pp. 11-15.

*?*Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, pp. 77, 194, 198, 2 2 1 .

*?*See Chapter I, p. 4.

*?«Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich,

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Italian fascist theory held that the masses, chaotic and

anarchic, had to he led and inspired hy an elite; the

individual was to be made to identify with the state and

elite by such "nonlogical, emotive appeals" to an

essentially nonrational people as ritual or mass

demonstrations.*?* The heart of fascism , observed Mannheim,

was a belief in the decisive deed and the initiative of a

leading elite.*?? While the ends of communism may be

considerably divergent from fascist ones, much of its

conception of leadership shares a view of man with its

opposite ideology; this convergence of leadership viewpoints

finds expression in the communist cult of personality.

I I - MAO Stanley Karncw wrote that Mao "like every Chinese

emperor since the plebian Liu Pang" actively nurtured a Cult

to portray himself as a "charismatic, infallible

philosopher—king."*?* Mao placed himself in this tradition

when he told Edgar Snow in 1965 that excesses in this Cult

were to be expected since China had 3,000 years of emperor-

"National Socialism," in Readings on Fascism and National Socialism, ed. Raymond E. Murphey et (Denver: Alan Swallow, n.d. ), pp. 74-75.

*?*A. James Gregor, The Ideology of fascism: the Rationale of Totalitarianism (Hew York: The free Press, 1969), pp. 231-39.

*??Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 119.

*?«Stanley Karnow, Mao and China: Prom Revolution to Revolution (New lork: The Viking Press, 1972), p 8.

324

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worshipping tradition."*?*

Mao, however, carefully manipulated his image to

e lic it support from his associates, the bureaucracy, and the

public. Moreover, to do this, he had to project a different

image to each constituency.*«* Mao's cult clearly had two

stages — its use as a leadership strategy during the

Revolution and the subsequent period of consolidation, then

as a tool to accomplish Mao's goals during the C ultural

Revolution by placing him above the party.

There was little hero-worship of Mao in 1936, when

Snow visited Yenan, but Mao gradually encouraged the

development of a cult. Mao and close confederates rewrote

party history to emphasize his role and in still a concept of

his in fallib ility; he also promoted veneration of himself as

leader by praising and emulating Stalin.**! The Cult of Mao

accelerated in the early 1940s,*** promoting him as the

greatest figure in Chinese history; until about 1966,

however, the thrust of the cult was Mao's thought, while

thereafter, his person was emphasized as well. Another

*?*Snow, The Long Revolution, p. 169.

***Michel Oksenberg, "The P olitical leader," in Mao Tse-tunq in the Scales of History ed. Dick Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 98.

**!William F. D orrill, "Transfer of legitimacy in the Chinese Communist Party: Origins of the Maoist Myth," China Quarterly me. 36, October-December 1968. Karnow, op.cit.. pp. 46, 67. Martin, Cult and Canon, p. 10.

*8*stuart fi. Schramm, "Mao Tse-tung as a Charismatic Leader," Asian Smrvey VII (June 1967): 386.

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biographer suggests that Mao's enhanced image was a

consequence of the war effort, that all World War XI leaders

became "larger than life." Additionally, the CCP needed a '

figure to offer the Chinese people in opposition to Chiang

Kai-shek.*®3 One observer traces Mao's Cult to the CCP

squabbles of the 1950s, when Mao abandoned his struggle for

control of the party. At this time, Mao sought other

supporters, such as the PLA, and also established himself as

a source of truth superior to the party.*®*

De-Stalinization apparently came as a surprise to

Mao and le ft him vulnerable. Public reaction in China was

cautious and although in mid—1956 the Chinese press

denounced Stalingsm, condemnation never reached the Soviet

proportions. The tone of criticism was light: Stalin had

made mistakes, but these were outweighed by his merits as

leader of the world communist movement. Stalin's image was

never destroyed, and was later revived.**® Mao did criticize

Stalin for some excesses, but also speculated*** that

Khrushchev may have fallen for lack of a Cult.

The apotheosis of Mao occurred during the C ultural

68 3goss T errill, Mao, a Biography (Hew York, Harper and Bow, 1980), p. 161. Terrill advances the interesting claim that during the war the Cult of Mao "did not exceed that of Stalin, Churchill, or Roosevelt."

*®*Pranz M ichael, Mao and the Perpetual Revolution (Woodbury, New York: B arron's,1977), pp. 138-39.

**®ibid. . pp. 113-14.

68 6Qaoted in Chapter I , pp. 6-7.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Revolution, as ttao used personality projection to re­

establish preeminence within the leadership, after some

years in eclipse. The trappings of this phase are familiar:

omnipresent portraits of the Chairman, the " little red book"

of digested guotations, and mobs chanting his slogans.**?

One prominent event of this period, the appearance of Mao

before Red Guards in Peking on August 18, 1966, reminded

Stanley Karnow of a "religious ritual as Mao the god

communed with the devotees of his cult."*** Another observer

also cited quasi-religious instances, particularly the

mounting of Mao's portrait in prominent places in houses,

sometimes in the space once occupied by ancestral tablets,

and the holding of public or family rituals before it.***

Mao remained remote, deliberately, to the masses, so

that he could elicit awe of himself in light of imperial

traditions. In his last years, however, he was less

successful in projecting benevolence, as he became

identified with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution; he

may in fact have encouraged media comparisons of himself

with the tyrannical first Chin emperor.*** This coincides

with a remark attributed to Peng leh-huai, that "all through

**?Maurice Meisner, Mao's China (Sew York: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 336-37.

***Karnow, Mao and China, p. 202.

***3olmes Welch, "The D eification of Mao," Saturday Review. September 19, 1970, p. 25.

***Oksenberg, "The P olitical Leader," p. 99.

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oar history, the first emperor of every dynasty has been at

once brillian t and strong-handed."***

Mao's Cult also had an international dimension. As

one facet of the PfiC challenge to the Soviet Onion, Mao was

extolled as the foremost revolutionary and greatest Marxist-

Leninist theoretician of the era. This image was projected

energetically to non-ruling communist parties, where Mao

attracted a following among younger members.**?

Publications were an important factor in Mao's cult.

His supporters, first Liu Shao-ch'i, then Lin Piao, edited

his works rigorously to ensure that his reputation for

doctrinal rectitude was maintained, that selections were

available with both content and format to suit contemporary

needs.*93 Chen Pc-ta, Mao's secretary, penned articles

proclaiming Mao's primacy and attributing virtue to his

thought. Lin indoctrinated the PLA in a belief in Mao,

politicizing it on behalf of Mao rather than the party. The

use of phrases and slogans in the "Little Bed Book" became

widespread in the army, then diffused to the population.**♦

Simon Leys reminded westerners that Mao had " little

personal charisma": he was a poor public speaker, had a

strong accent, and lacked warmth. Leys further argued that

***Terrill, Mao, p. 274.

**?Michael, Mao and fievolution, pp. 138-39, 184.

*93Martin, Cult and Canon, pp. 3, 10-14, 16—19, 27.

**«Micfaael, Mao and Revolution, pp. 143-44.

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Mao consciously propagated an emperor—image to exploit the

Chinese need for such a figure.**® Pye suggested that the

secret of Mao's greatness was not in any of the

institutional rol.es he filled , but in his "extraordinary

ability to understand, evoke, amd direct" human emotions and

to use his "persona" to "command the sentiments and passions

of others."***

The Mao Cult was not used to create a political

personality where none existed, but to magnify a truly

important individual. Mao had proven leadership abilities

and, until the late 1950s, stood in high esteem among his

comrades. Yet, as with Stalin, the cult did not outlast its

object. Mao's successors de-emphasized his role and allowed

derogatory information to circulate, but as with Stalin's

heirs, Mao's carefully imposed lim its on the iconoclasm,

lest they also be implicated in his excesses and mistakes.

I I I . THE JAPANESE EMPESCP

Japan also greatly influenced modern Korea, with

emperor worship part of that influence. The Japanese

emperor was the source of a ll legitim ate authority, although

he did not necessarily exercise direct rule; the Japanese

were guite satisfied with a figurehead monarch. For the

**®Simon leys, "Aspects of Mao Ise—tung (1893—1976)," Broken images (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 63-64.

***Lucian S. Pye, "Mao Tse-tung's leadership Style," P o l i t i c a l S c ie n c e Q u a rterly XCI (Summer 1 9 7 6 ): 2 2 0 -2 2 .

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Japanese, the emperor was inseparable from Japan, he was

"inviolable" and claimed popular loyalty. As a living

symbol, he could respond to their dedication: the people

worked to "ease his heart," and were moved that he turned

his thoughts to them. The highest duty was repayment to the

emperor.**? The oligarchs who instituted the Meiji system in the

late nineteenth century consciously enhanced the position of

the emperor as a means of ensuring adoption of their

proposed government system — not to mention preserving

their own power.**® The oligarchs reasoned that neither

Confucianism nor Shintoism had sufficient strength to

undergird the state, as the Church did in the European

nations on which Japan modeled its new system.***

The Meiji emperor followed ancient precedent,

"reigning without ruling." Bis putative powers were

delegated, he was in fact kept from intervention in public

affairs but became critical as a state symbol, in which

capacity he attended carefully prepared ceremonies, or was

used as the authority to transact state business. The

emperor's symbolic position was further elevated by the

**?Euth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Company), 1946, pp. 29-33, 58-59, 125-32.

**®Beischauer and fairbank. East Asia, pp. 226, 296.

***Hugh Bortcn, Japan's Modern Century (Hew York: The Ronald Press, 1955), p. 138.

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m ilitarists of the mid-tventieth century, as his

mythological status was emphasized and his awesome presence

used to justify their rule. For most, however, the emperor

was not a deity in the western sense, hut rather a source of

values, an embodiment of the Japanese moral order. He

possessed the same prestige or authority as a father, but

deeper; he was the highest figure in the Japanese world­

view, which did not distinguish between politics and

religion.?** A national cult centered on the emperor after M eiji,

bolstered by Confucian ethics and Shinto. The emperor Meiji

"spoke less like a modern chief of state" than an "ancient

sage king, imparting moral guidance to his children." One

facet of his rule stressed the unbroken descent of his

imperial line from the Sun Goddess.?** A school text called

the emperor the ."fountainhead" of national life , adding that

to serve him and adopt his "august will" as one's own made

"historical 'life' live in the present" and was the basis of

m orality.?*2

So-called "emperor worship" constituted one part of

7 0*ibid.. pp. 250-52, 532-38, 565.

?**Byusako Tsunoda, Hilliam Theodore De Bary, and Donald Keene, Sources of Japanese Tradition (Mew York: Columbia University Press, 1958, third printing 1967), Vol. II, pp. 87, 134-35.

7 02tiFundamentals of Our National Policy," published by the Ministry of Education in 1937; excerpted in Tsunoda, Sources, pp. 280-81,

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Japanese cultoral policy during the 1920s and 1930s in

Korea. Honor of the emperor became important in Japanese-

administered schools, as imperial rescripts were objects of

study and the emperor's symbols part of school ritual. In

the 1930s, Japanese authorities constructed Shinto shrines

and used them for public ceremonies.?*® A missionary in pre­

liberation Korea reminisced about the Japanese emperor's

portrait. It was kept "inviolate," veiled in its own safe

in every school, until needed for patriotic meetings, each

ceremony including a mass bow to the portrait. The

missionary recounted "many m ortalities" among Japanese who

attempted to rescue it from conflagrations and speculated

that it was kept covered because, as he had observed, when

it was hung exposed on a wall, passersby continually stopped

to bow at the window through which it could be seen.?**

IV. THE COMFOCIAH MODEl

Although Korean propaganda emphasizes the

revolutionary upbringing Kim Il-song received from his

parents, it is safe to assume that he also experienced the

Confucian tradition which permeated his society. Kim spent

his childhood in sem i-rural areas near Pyongyang, attended a

local school, and was in the care of grandparents for a

?*®Sohn Pow-key, Kin Chol-choon, and Hong li-su p . The H istory of Korea (Seoul: Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 1 9 7 0 ), p p . 3 2 1 -2 3 .

?**fl. B. Drake, Korea of the Japanese (London: John Lane the Bodley Bead Lim ited, 1 9 3 0 ), p p . 2 5 -3 6 .

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lengthy time. Although the question of the extent of Kim's

exposure to Confucian attitudes is moot, it is undeniable

that he struggled for power, and then became leader in a

society with a strong Confucian heritage, one in which these

attitudes were still puissant.?*®

It seems plausible that the BPEK has had to

recognize Confucian attitudes when undertaking social

action, thus has consciously or unconsciously tailored

organizational and propaganda activities to fit these

a t t i t u d e s .

Confucianism had three premises: the universe was

characterized by order and harmony; it was possible to

discern this underlying order; and the true gentleman

devoted himself to study and accumulation of knowledge. The

basic universal order to be discerned was a moral one,

rather than rational.?** Ideal s o c ie ty was to be governed by

morality, with personal probity, loyalty, and altruism the

ethics necessary for harmonious functioning; law was a

useful administrative tool, but personal morality the

foundation of society. Confucianism stressed not only how

?*®The frequency and intensity of DBEK campaigns to uproot outdated modes of thinking bear witness to a leadership perception that traditional thought patterns had and continue to hold currency in their society.

?**William Theodore de Bary, "Some Common Tendencies in Meo-Confucicuxism, " in Confucianism in Action ed. David S. Hivison and Arthur F. aright (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959) pp. 39, 41.

333

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things sere, but how they ought to be.?*? Personal conduct

was determined by observing rituals and proper behavior for

five special relationships: ruler/subject; father/son;

husband/wife; elder/younger brother; and friend/friend. Of

these, three were determined by kinship and all but one

(friend/friend) involved a superior-inferior relation. The

burden of proper conduct was placed on the obedient

inferior.?** Confucianism held that humans were malleable,

that they could be taught proper behavior.

Confucianism drew its inspiration and examples from

a "golden age," that of the early Chou Dynasty, which was

perceived as more orderly and peaceful than present times.

The Chou nobles were exemplars of proper conduct.?**

Confucian orthodoxy i(as regulated in practice by a

corps of scholars who governed and ensured that entry into

their number was contingent upon thorough study of classic

works. These scholars possessed a "fundamentalist urge" tc

restore society to values and rites from the "golden age"

described in these writings, and made historical research an

important exercise. In addition, these officials as a group

emphasized geneology as a means of internal solidarity.?**

?*?ibid. pp. 30, 41.

?0 8joe Hanne J., Traditional Korea; a Cultural History (Seoul: Chungang University Press, 1S72J, p. 300; i b i d .

?**Eeischauer and Fairbank, Fast Asia, p. 70.

71 Ode Bary, "Some Common Tendencies," pp. 28-29, 37,

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Traditionally^ the Chinese stressed a government of

man as preferable to one of laws; whereas laws were

impersonal and required self-reliance, a government of man

had personalized authority on which people might rely. Such

an authority assumed responsibility while providing security

for dependents.?-** Confucianism assumed that the ruler had

decisive influence over both his people's conduct and

thinking, that he had no less importance in intellectual

matters than in political . ? *2 The role of the ruler was

equated to that of an autocratic father; obedience to the

state was likened to filia l piety — the state, in a cliche,

was regarded as the family «writ large."?*3

Korea's Yi Dynasty (1392-1910) established

Confucianism (or, revitalized neo-Confucianism) as the state

ideology, complete with scholar/officials and an institute

of Confucian learning from which they were recruited. The

Yi intended it as a bulwark against political and religious

interlopers, primarily Buddhists, so Confucianists allowed

no group tc gain sufficient power to rival the center.

42. Joe, Traditional Korea, pp. 301-02. Geneology was particularly important to Confucian gentry-officials in K orea.

?**fiichard H. Solomon, "Mao's Effort to Reintegrate the Chinese Polity: Problems of Authority and Conflict in Chinese Social Processes," in Chinese Communist P olitics in Action ed. A. Doak Barnett (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), p. 280.

?i2de Bary, "Some Common Tendencies," p. 28.

?*3Beischauer and Fairbank, East Asia, p. 240.

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Perhaps due to tensions between conflicting factions,

perhaps because it was a borrowed ideology, Korean

Confucianism grew ever more dogmatic and concerned with

orthodoxy than Confucianism in China.?** Despite a central

organization, Korean Confucianism was fragmented, possessing

both imported and domestic interpretations of the teaching.

Contending factions all seemed to agree, however, on the

need for public ceremony as a core doctrine.?*®

Nevertheless, the centralized structure probably operated

more efficiently than in China, given the higher degree of

Korean ethnic, cultural, and linguistic homogeneity, as well

as lesser territory to rule.?*®

Koreans believed that a king's most important

attribute was virtue, a virtue attainable through rational

knowledge. Further, this knowledge was not technical or

administrative expertise, but a knowledge of fundamental

ways, since practical details were to be left to lower

echelons. The ruler, lim ited by time and space, was to set

?**Sohn, Kim, and Hong, History of Korea, pp. 130-31. Gregory Henderson, Korea: the Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 23—24. Joe, Traditional Korea, pp. 299-300. Heischauer and Fairbank, East Asia, p. 433.

?*®Key P. Yang and Gregory Henderson, "An Outline History of Korean Confucianism: Part XI, the Schools of Yi Confucianism," The Journal of Asian Studies YVIII (February 19 59): 259-76.

?*®fiahn Bae-ho, "The Authority Structure of Korean Politics," in Korean politics in Transition, ed. Edward Reynolds Wright (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), p 292.

336

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a good example, and as he did so, order would prevail.?*?

Leadership hj Yi kings was circumscribed in several ways:

the king competed for p olitical power and economic resources

with the bureaucracy and aristocracy.?** Although the king

was the chief sage, ultimately responsible for politics and

morality, a large bureaucracy ruled in his name. Popular

loyalty may have been to the king, but he seldom interfered

in affairs; the bureaucracy, recruited from the nobility,

interpreted his will.?**

The Korean family has always been the unit of

personal security, yet it also maintains a horizontal

structure with strict observance of proper relationships.

The family is the one place a Korean may find relaxation,

trust, and comfort, but i t demands loyalty and performance

of filia l duties in return. The family as a collective

transcends the individual, with its name and welfare to be

placed above individual needs. Family ceremonies are solemn

and important occasions.? 2 o xhe relationship of father and

?*?Hahm Pyong—choon, "The Korean P olitical Tradition and Law," The Korean P olitical Tradition and Law (Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1967), pp. 15-16.

?**James Palais, "Political Leadership in the Yi Dynasty," in P olitical Leadership in Korea, ed. Suh Dae-sook and Lee Chae—jin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976) , p. 4.

?**Henderson, Vortex, pp. 25, 384; Sohn, Kim, and Hong, History of Korea, pp. 130—31. Joe, Traditional Korea, p. 3 0 1 .

?2opaul S. Crane, Korean Patterns (Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1967), pp. 13, 22-23.

337

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son has ambivalent qualities, there is little fam iliarity or

open affection; J.n fact, the father is often reserved and is

a strict disciplinarian. The son must show utmost respect

toward his parent nevertheless, an attitude which demands

courage and stifling of personal initiative. One observer

rem arked, "God o n ly knows how many Korean s o n s m ust b a te

their fathers."? 2 i

V I. COMMENTS

It would be overly facile to view Kin Il-song as

merely a new Korean king with a modernistic Confucianism as

his ruling style, but his chosen style harmonizes with

Confucian values retained in the culture. This is true

despite frequent DPEK claims to have extirpated remnants of

the old society and replaced them with a new socialist

culture. It would also be overly glib tc suggest that Kim

copied his Cult wholesale from Stalin and Mao .? 2 2

Nevertheless, it is possible to discern something of each of

these models in Kim's Cult. Kim seems to have adopted the

"father figure" from traditional Confucianism, then modified

this with the imagery and media techniques of Stalinism, the

?2*Cornelius Osgood, The Koreans and their Culture (New York: The Bpnald Press Company, 1951), pp. 39, 48.

?22àn Tai Sung, in North Korea in Transition (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983) purports to see many sim ilarities between the careers and writings of Kim and Mao, but fails to address them explicitly; see pp 42-43, 62-63. Bruce Cumings records one solid example of copying from Mao in Kim's writings; see "Corporatism in North Korea," The Journal of Korean Studies IV (1982-83): 285.

338

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remoteness of Map, and the sanctity of the Japanese Emperor.

Scalapino and Lee commented, "that Kim has qualities that

have historically elicited awe and fear of leadership —

cunning, ruthlessness, cruelty — is...common knowledge in

e litist circles at least, and undoubtedly in the marketplace

a s w e l l . ?2 3

It is first of all important to remember that Kim's

Cult began, as hero-worship under our definition, while

Soviet troops controlled north Korea. Certainly, enough

manifestations of Stalin's Cult were seen in Korea prior to

the Soviet leader's death to provide inspiration for a

native Cult, even if no overt instruction were given.?z* As

Stalin did with Lenin and Mao did with Stalin, Kim linked

himself to the Spviet leader, generally by displaying

companion portraits and with praise. North Korea emphasized

the need for a strong leader by extolling Stalin. let there

were major parts of Kin's story — particularly the anti-

Japanese exploits — which had no connection to Stalin, so

Kim could always be seen as a strong nationalist no less

than an internationalist. Whatever uses Kim made of Stalin

or Stalin's Cult, there was no intimacy between them.? 2s

Some of the trappings of K it's Cult indeed resemble

T2 3scalapino and Lee, Communism, 11. p. 753»

72*See Chapter 111, pp. 124-28; Chapter IV, pp. 1 6 5 -6 7 .

72ssee Chapter 111, pp. 82-85.

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Stalin's. Kin, like Stalin, intruded into many aspects o f

national life . Even in the early days, Kim employed

flattering and oft-repeated titles, while having guotations

from his works seeded in articles. There were many

sim ilarities between the titles for leader used by each:

within three years after liberation, Kim had adopted the

term suryong. which signified independence and was

equivalent to the vozhd of Stalin.?2® Other manifestations

which developed in North Korea along Stalinist lines

included the ubiquity of portraits of the Cult object and

the claim to ability in diverse fields. Just like Stalin,

Kim had a museum to d is p la y g i f t s from f o r e ig n e r s . As w ith

Stalin, albeit on a smaller scale, the DffiK tried to invent

folklore in support of the Cult image. An example of this

would be the story of the "General star," which supposedly

heralded liberation by Kim.???

What is striking is that by the modern period, much

of the imagery Stalin sported in the post-1945 era was in

the imagery of Kfrn Il-song: revolutionary, liberator,

founder, builder, teacher, father. Great Leader, and world

benefactor.

Both Stalin and Kim demonstrated a willingness to

revise history to suit their purposes. Stalin greatly

?2&See Chapter III, p. 103-04.

?2?See this chapter, pp. 305-06, and Chapter ¥, pp. 24 8 -4 9 .

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exaggerated his role in the Bassian Revolution to increase

his importance in modern history, at the same time

overstating his closeness to Lenin in order to enhance his

own political aoceptahility. Kim in like manner credited

himself with greater importance than deserved in Korea's

liberation, but unlike Staliq, revised history to excise any

closeness or dependence on others. Be became not merely the

greatest figure in the revolution, but the only figure: his

chosen image was sui generis.

The Cult of Personality in North Korea also derived

from severe conditions sim ilar to those which accompanied

the rise of Stalin.72* The first qualitative enhancement to

the personal aura around Kim, as signifified by the

publication of the Brief Life and memorials to him at

Mangyongdae and Pochonbo,72v occurred during the Korean iar,

when the very existence of the OPBK was threatened by

outside enemies. Many facets of Kim's persona developed

during the intense period of reconstruction following the

war, when the country was characterized by change and

dislocation. It would seem that in such tumultuous times,

the people needed the reassurance of the presence of a

strong leader, perhaps even welcomed the extraordinary aura

ab ou t him.

72*see this chapter, pp. 321-22; Chapter II, pp. 3 8 -4 4 .

72»see Chapter IV, pp. 159-65.

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Although Stalin claimed high status as a

theoretician as early as the 1920s, Kim edged to this status

only gradually, and in fact, may have received more

influence from Mac in this matter. All three claimed to

have affected world political development with their

w r it in g s .

In contrast to DPEK treatment of Stalin, Mao's

images were little evident in North Korea, except when

required in response to the presence of Chinese troops.

Maoist images enjoyed neither the prominence nor the warmth

accorded those reserved for Stalin, but Korean awareness of

them is attested by the avidity with which Kim sought to use

Mao's presence during visits.^ao Although Kim's Cult derived

its basic form and impetus from the Stalinist model, some

aspects were obtained from Mao s Cult. It would be

sim plistic to say that Kim's history was copied from Mao,

but many aspects have a superficial resemblance, like the

official history of the CCP under Mao, Kim's anti—Japanese

story relates successful combats against superior forces,

important conferences in which crucial political lines were

mandated, a "long march," and a larger-than-life hero

astride all events.

It is interesting to note that w^ile Kim's system

became a real Cult (vice hero worship; see the comments at

730see Chapter III, pp. 127-28; Chapter 17, pp. 1 6 5 -6 7 .

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the end of chapter 1?), at the beginning of the 1960s,

several important dimensions, particularly its international

aspects, did not appear until the late 1960s, after the

apotheosis of Bao in the Cultural fievoluticn. Some

international dimensions to Kin's Cult are attributable to

the DPBK's unique status: the need to acquire allies in the

Sino-Soviet sp lit or competition with the BOK; but others,

including claims of foreign respect for Kim, may trace to

Mao's Cult. One area of Sino—Soviet strife, conducted among

foreign communist parties, revealed the attraction the

Maoist version of communism had in the third world as well

as the personal inspiration many revolutionaries took from

Mao's struggle. It seems likely that this revelation

spurred North Koreans to propagate what they felt to be a

worthwhile alternate communist experience.

One of Mao's contentions concerned the primacy of

his philosophy, his interpretation of the basic communist

theories in the wake of what the Chinese viewed as Soviet

apostacy. With the increased emphasis in North Korea on

CHÜCHE as a unique and correct interpretation of communism

for small nations, this must have appeared as a "saleable"

product for the international marketplace of ideas and must

have been appealing to a nation seeking international

approbation.73i

731It is also interesting to speculate that this was an area in which egos dominated. China's Bed Guards denounced Kim during the Cultural fievolution, at one point

343

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Stalin had an official collection of writings, as

did Kim from the early period, yet this aspect was even more

characteristic of Mao's system. Helmut Martin detailed the

propagation of Maoist ideology through obligatory study of

the historical Mao and his writings, arguing that this

derived not from a Stalinist model but from Confucian

notions of orthodoxy via written commentaries.73% The Cult

of Kim, no less than Mao's, has made exhaustive study of its

object, his writings, with commentaries upon them a prime

method of propagagation and orthodoxy. The use of Kim

quotations was one example of his works becoming a canon, as

was the requirement within all grades of the educational

system for extensive memorization of his writings.73 3

Neither the Cult of Stalin or Mao stressed ancestry:

in fact, to the extent it described his early life, Mao's

biography emphasized his break with an oppressive father

(although both did have "saintly" mothers). Korean

Confucianism stressed ancestry, while one claim for the

Japanese Emperor was his descent from the roots of Japanese

culture. Claims for Kim's lineage reverted only to his

great-grandfather, roughly a century, but the biographies

asserted that the fam ily's revolutionary outlook passed to

calling him a "fat revisionist ;" Kim or his supporters may have sought to even matters by providing international competition in philosophy.

732Martin, Cult and Canon, p. 5.

73 35ee Chapter II, pp. 53-56.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 345 Kim and KCI. The tales of Kim's ancestry sere introduced

gradually into the Cult, thus seem artificial devices for

manipulation. 7 34 jt should also be noted that Kim's use of

relatives as role models vas a divergence from the other

Cults. While Stalin and Mao idealized their early lives,

the stories were not held up for emulation — possibly

because they sere were involved in revolution against their

own states, while Kim fought external enemies.

Like Stalin and Mao, Kim, at least in the beginning,

exhibited little of the personal attractiveness necessary to

mass p olitics. According to Han Chae—tok, he appeared

countrified and was not a good s p e a k e r . 7 3s Stalin and Mao

used Cult propaganda to overcome physical disadvantages, Kim

needed to neutralize his handicaps to leadership.

Just as the Japanese emperor embodied and symbolized

his nation. Kin embodied North Korea. It is probably in

this light that DPEK propaganda on the unity of Kim and the

people should be viewed. Kim became the focus of national

duty and national effort, just as the emperor did in pre-war

Japan, although, unlike the emperor, Kim also wielded the

power to decide how this duty would be fulfilled. It is

here that at least part of the source nay be found for the

continual phrases on "uniting with the leader," which date

734see Chapter III, p. 116; Chapter 17, pp. 161-62, 205-08; Chapter 7, pp. 268-69, 272-74.

73 5Han Chae-tok. Kin Il-song kopal—handa, pp. 58-62. See Chapter III, pp. 77-78.

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from the earliest period, and the frequent reminder that the

people were repaying with loyalty or action the leader's

t r u s t .

If the pervasive iconography of the Kim Cult traces

from Stalin, who flooded the Soviet Onion with pictures and

busts of him self, it is arguable that the deference bestowed

on Kim's images may also derive from that shown the

emperor's portrait.

Despite the aura about Kim which resembles the pre­

war Japanese emperor, the Great Leader's image had at least

once major dissim ilarity. Whereas the pre-war emperor

remained remote, aloof both physically and politically, Kim

has projected an image of involvement: his on-the-spot

guidances showed him interacting with people, while a prime

component of the image from the earliest period was his

bestowal of benefits personally and control of events to the

material betterment of the pqpulation.

It may be eirgued strongly that the Japanese emperor

is merely a national variant of the Confucian authority

figure. Hhile Sjcme of Kim's attributes probably reflect the

Japanese influence on modern Korea, more of his official

behavior patterns as observed in the Cult images coincide

with Confucian ideals. These patterns fit not only

traditional political thought but Korea's authoritarian

family structure, thus constituting a comfortable fit on

Korean society.

Foremost among Confucian images for the supreme

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leader is that of "father," with society being a

metaphorical family "writ large." One author has suggested

that Confucian structure took the family as its central unit

of socialization, with the father as authority figure, and

that Kim has been able to transfers filia l piety into

commitment to the leader.736 ^im consciously promulgated his

titles "Father of the 50 m illion Korean people" and

"Fatherly Leader." Frequent propaganda about his

providential care for the masses and the needy individual

illustrate this concept in action; the Confucian leader took

responsibility for the family in return for loyalty received

from it. In accordance with traditional family patterns,

the national fatherhood of Kim was strict, demanding

unquestioned loyalty and self-restraint. Kim showed trust

and mercy, but no indulgence; as a stern father who took

charge of his family, Kim would publicly outline economic

goals or enunciate p o l i c y . 73? Despite its seeming austerity

and one-sidedness, the family is a comfortable unit for most

Koreans and it is to be expected that they would transfer

this feeling to a national system which was a family "writ

l a r g e . "

Infrequently, the regime made the family concept

explicit. The "triumphal return" material of Han Chae-dok

portrayed the anti-Japanese partisans as a happy family.

736iipyong J. Kim, Communist P olitics, pp. 26, 29.

737see Chapter II, pp. 67—68.

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united under Kim.^ss ^ 1983 editorial charged that past

regimes were vehicles for domination and rule, but the DPEK

government could be called the people's «faithful servant"

and the «family head responsible for the people's liv es.«7 39

As if in counterpoise to the fatherhood of Kim, the party

was occasionaly compared to a mother. For example, a 1982

editorial described the KHP as a mother whose love is deep

and incalculable. Kim taught, "Our party is a party which

works for the people, a mother party.«7*o

Just as the Confucian king was to exercise

comprehensive leadership, with responsibility for his

people's moral behavior no less than political orthodoxy,

Kim has sought to control or influence all aspects of North

Korean life . His speeches and writings address not only

political and economic questions but matters of social

interaction as well. It may well be that the Kim quotations

placed in articles were intended to demonstrate his

ubiquitous concerns and authority as much as they were

intended to show his extensive knowldedge.

Kin's image also showed Confucian "virtue,” a

73«see Chapter III, pp. 108-10.

739itchuch'e-chokin chonggwcn konsol-ui k il—ul pich'na-ge kaech.'ck-hayo'on widae-han ryongdc-ui ryoksa" (History of Great Leadership Brightly Developing the Eoad of Constructing a CflOCHE-type Eegime), Hodonq Sinmun, 27 August 1983, p. 2.

7 4oyi Kun and Sin Hun—ho, «îongwon-han sarang-ui p'um« (The Boson of Eternal Love), Nodong Sinmun, 20 July 1982, p. 2.

348

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quality which surpassed mere technical expertise and became

a fundamental knowledge. In the earliest period, Kim was

heralded for his "wise leadership, " 7 an intangible

attribute, but possibly meant as that deep Confucian virtue

of leadership. Similarly, this virtue became apparent with

the emphasis on CfiOCBE, particularly in the modern period,

when the philosophy was touted as a basic truth of life and

Kim as the only .thinker capable of analyzing objective and

subjective conditions to enunciate it. DfBK propaganda

constantly stressed Kim's "lofty socialist virtues," a

quality reminiscent of the Korean king's. It may be

significant also that KCI was hailed for "wise leadership"

in times before he had tangible accomplishments to cite.

The Confucian authority figure was to wield power

largely through example. B. C. Koh noted that this was a

prime facet of Kin's sty le.7*2 North Korean propaganda

constantly cited Kim as worthy of emulation, people were

continually exhorted to unite closer to him, and the man

himself conducted unique "on-the-spot guidance" sessions to

direct economic activity by word and deed. In Confucian

terms, while the ruler was to set an example of correct

behavior and attitude, his moral presence alone was supposed

74 1See Chapter III, pp. 83-84 for a discussion of the "wise" or "correct" leadership theme.

7^2Koh Byung Chul, "Political Leadership in North Korea: Toward a Conceptual Understanding of Kim Il-song's Leadership Behavior," Korean Studies II (1978): 145.

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to inspire senior officials, who would then inspire their

subordinates, who in turn would ensure propriety among the

people. The flavor of this may be observed in the numerous

pronouncements that the KiP takes its theoretical and

practical cues frcm Kim and then communicates this among the

m a sse s.

This theme is stressed by a 1982 visitor to the

DPEK, who pointed out that Koreans dislike impersonal

relations, that they link politics and morality: the leader

transforms his country. Thus Kin developed an intensely

personal leadership style: he is said to have visited every

county and village in the nation, and during his on-the-spot

guidances, he expressed genuine concern for the people's

livlihood. One contact told the visitor that when men as

"evil" as Pak Chung-hui or Khrushchev become leader, it

reflects serious defects in the system.f+s

North Korean society, with its precise definitions

of levels and functions, greatly resembles class-based

Confucian Korea. Moreover, as did the Confucianists, Kim's

Cult enjoyed the advantages that Korean cultural homogeneity

has bestowed. Another parallel with Confucian tradition has

beai a frequent use of ceremony, although this is also a

feature of fascism or centralized states in general. Kim

made ceremonial appearances, sometimes also issuing

important statments, on holidays and anniversaries, both

743Lee Manwoo, "How North Korea Sees," pp. 128—29.

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traditional ones and those associated solely with the

regime.?** Also, in line with Medvedev's comment on

Stalin,7*5 Kim involves his people in a ll events or

movements. North Korea is a land of state-controlled

organizations and mass meetings, frequently convened.

The North Korean system may well be described as a

government of man not laws, in the Confucian tradition, or

as Bruce Cumings termed it , "Kim's Korean Communism.”

Although the nation has socialist laws and behaviorial

norms, with Kim often cited in support of them, the Cult

allows Kim to sidestep them as needed in support of

policies. Kim may be subject to the influences of interest

groups, but he has not been circumscribed by a burdensome

bureaucracy as was the Confucian k i n g . ? * *

North Korea no less than Confucian China resurrected

a "golden age" as its inspiration and model for social

practice. The era of the anti-Japanese partisans was more

contemporary than the Chou Dynasty, but thanks to modem

communications, could be readily manipulated to produce

7**CurioBsly, former EOK president Pak undertook agricultural ceremonies associated with traditional rituals, such as sowing seed or harvesting. Kim does not attend to t h e s e .

7*5See this chapter, p. 322.

7**Ihis is not meant to suggest that the DPEK is not saddled with a large bureaucracy or the disadvantages attendant upon one. But one can view certain aspects of the Cult, such as the on-the-spot guidances, as Kim's way of avoiding dependence on officials for input or for dispensing b e n e f i t s .

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examples with political u tility for the regime's lessons.

Ho less than Staiin and Mao, Kim altered the history of this

"golden age” to eliminate rivals and exaggerate his

contribution. Gj.ven that the armed resistance to Japan

occurred outside the country, making refutation difficu lt,

the golden era of the partisans proved tailor-made for Kim

to emphasize his role at the expense of others.

With his primacy of political power and ability to

dominate the media. Kin early and steadily made his version

of liberation — then of post—liberation events — the

official one. It is clear that the Korean people were eager

to have and embrace a native hero, especially one who had

humiliated the national enemy. As rival claimants were

elim inated, Kim's regime returned more often to the "golden

age" for examples of behavior and precedents for

contemporary practices.

Since personality projection as a leadership

strategy was taken to hero worship virtually from the

beginning of Kim:' s rule, considering also that Soviet forces

played a dominant role in shaping early North Korea, it

seems clear that Kim and his advisors derived this

leadership style from the most pertinent example, Stalin.

This must remain speculation unless Soviet or DPEK archives

become available, but the parallel behavior strongly

suggests it.

Much of the development of the Kim Cult subsequent

to its implantation in Korea proceeded in ways compatible

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with a Confucianist society. Images shoved Kim as a vise

and all-eabraciag leader, one vho demanded much o£ the

people, bat one who exhibited fatherly care for them. The

people, according to this view, were always rallying s till

closer to him in a "family-like" grouping, like the rigid

Confucianists of the Yi Dynasty (and bolstered by the

exclusivity of Marxism-Leninism), North Korea has insisted

on the absolute correctness of its position and of Kim's

leadership.

The discordant aspect to Kim's Confucian image was

that of Kim as a figure of worldwide importance; arising as

it did in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it would seem to

borrow from Mao rather than Confucianism.?*? Mao had

international repute and influence, and the DPEK sought

similar status for Kim. This status also helped sate the

Korean need for international approval after a generation of

humiliation.

The Cult may have adopted certain leadership

concepts from Korean Confucianism, including the fatherhood

of Kim and his holistic system of rule, but lacking direct

confirmation of the inner processes of Cult construction, it

is impossible to conclude more than the fact that the two

systems had compatible features. These features were those

with which the Kprean people were satisfied, particularly

7*?The Confucian emperor in China pretended to universal sway; the Confucian king in Korea did not and had to be satisfied with lesser or vassal status.

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those in the northern areas which had lim ited experience of

non-Asian political or social organization.

L ittle has been said about the "who," that is, about

the personalities who created and manipulated Kim's Cult.

The problem is that little evidence exists to allow their

identification; certainly the Kim or Kapsan Faction has

benefitted greatly from the Cult, but this fact alone is

insufficient to credit them with it. The senior leadership

has shifted over the years, and those who ended up in the

top positions may be only the beneficiaries of a system

devised earlier by others. However, until more detailed

information becomes available, the disproportionate share of

system rewards which accrued to the Kapsan faction make it

the most likely candidate for complicity in the Kim Cult.?**

The question of whether Kin's Cult should be

considered a religion is an exceedingly interesting one. It

is clear that despite ascription of considerable mental and

physical capacity to Kim and attribution of all national

successes to him, no attempt has been made to introduce

super- or supra-natural powers in his image; in fact DPEK

propaganda denounces those who believe in superstitions or

expect other-worldly intervention- Nevertheless, the Cult

has a number of dimensions characteristic of organized

?**Nam Kocn-ioo, North Korean Leadership, discussed the changes to the DPEK leadership up to 1965. In pp. 144- 4 9, he indicates the high number of senior offices which went to the Kapsan Faction at the KIP Fifth Party Congress in 1970.

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religion: a charismatic central figure, an ideology with

universal pretensions, an expectation of ultimate victory or

vindication, a wide range of activities to fill idle time,

cind an intolerance of distracting philosophies. It would be

incorrect to interpret the Kim Cult as a new religion, but

proper to view it as an all-embracing philosophy, much

sim ilar to Confucianism.

The subject of this dissertation is Kim's Cult, not

Stalin's or Mao's, but it is important to understand that

Kim's system did not arise in a vacuum — that he is not in

actuality sui generis, as he wants believed — and that many

surface features were adapted from others. Absent the

original documentation from Soviet and North Korean

archives, it is impossible to determine the degree of

coincidence of underlying principles. It is also important

to understand that dimensions of the Kim Cult correspond

with fam iliar social patterns in Korean, primarily those

derived from Confucianism, thus facilitating the Cult's

acceptance among the people.

355

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CONCLUSIONS

Viewed solely by its surface manifestations, a Cult

of Personality in a communist nation appears to be an

incongruity, the aggrandizement of an individual in a

society committed to the role of the masses and to a theory

of historical determinism, ahile indeed egoism can be one

substantial factor in development of a Cult, the phenomenon

has practical uses — patriotic agitation, legitim ization of

the regime and leadership, or policy promotion, for example

— which facilitate the state or party's operation, fihat

appears at first blush to be aberrant may be seen in reality

as a clever device for mass control and policy promotion.

Although the concept of a Cult of Personality may be

alien to fundamental communist theory, the monolithic and

conspiratorial nature of a ruling party allows the

development of a strong leader and mandates support to him.

The Cults of Stalin and Hao as well as Kim II—song stand out

because of excesses in adulation which characterized them,

but most communist leaders have had sim ilar, if scciled down,

versions. Whether called "Cult of Personality," "Cult of

the individual," or "Power Cult," as Antonov-OvseyenJso

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suggested,?** the practical and personal advantages, coupled

with the opportunity to create them, have led to major or

minor cults throughout the communist bloc.

It is important to differentiate between Cults of

Personality and lesser phenomena. Many — read, most —

regimes undertake to create positive images for political

purposes or to manipulate state symbols, but this is

generally self—lim ited in scope and is carried out in the

face of competition for attention, thus is merely image-

making and lacks the pervasiveness even of the second stage,

hero worship. This second stage approaches a Cult, but

fails to meet all tests, as will be discussed below. North

Korea's Mangyongdae nay resemble Mount Vernon, for example,

and western leaders may foster frequent repetitions of

slogans or pithy guotations from speeches, but there exists

a great difference in emphasis and the uses to which they

a r e p u t.

The purposes of this chapter are first, to re­

examine the properties of a Cult of Personality, as

originally given in Chapter 1, in light of specific examples

of the Cult of Kim, then to draw inferences from the Cult's

pattern of development.

?**Antonov-Ovseyenko, The Time of Stalin, p. 285,

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I . THE COLT OF PEBSGHALITI AMD THE STATE HYIH

A. THE EEFIMITJON

The term "C ult o f P e r s o n a lity " i s now a common

epithet among communists and their opponents, thus diffusing

its meaning; what was in itially difficult to define has

become even more cpague. However, the properties of a Cult,

as proposed in the first chapter of this dissertation, are

these: 1) the Cult must exist under an authoritarian regime,

certainly one having media control; 2} the regime attributes

special virtue to the subject, in particular, crediting him

with all successes but no failures; 3} the Colt object is

hailed as an authority on a ll non-political matters on which

he chooses to comment; 4} the Cult object has a canon of

authorized writings; 5) national experience or history is

interpreted through the Cult object's life . In addition,

the Cult figure is the subject of a great volume of

laudatory propaganda. Let us take them in this order.

1. Little comment is necessary about the first

component, for the DPRK is by almost any standard

authoritarian, with strict controls on the lives of its

citizenry. Print and broadcast media have always been

closely supervised by the regime.?** It w ill be argued below

that Kim's ability to obtain favorable media coverage for

his image to the exclusion of his rivals was a key factor in

?*®Discussions of the quality of life in North Korea may be found in Chapter II, pp. 33-35, 49—56.

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his retention of power and the creation of a Colt.

2. Virtually from the beginning. North Korean

sources referred to Kim's "wise leadership," coupling the

references with examples of his reforms.?*^ from the 1950s,

the regime emphasized his salutary effects on production in

all sectors, publicized his specific knowledge, and stressed

his farsightedness. Both official pronouncements and quoted

statements from workers credited him with successes, either

by direct intervention or by inspiration. No failures were

laid on him.?*2

Thus, by the 1980s, North Korea could assert that

"all victories and gains" in the Korean revolution were

linked to the "noble name" of Kim-?**

3. Kim exercised his special virtues to intervene in

exceedingly diverse subjects, many quite removed from the

political or economic spheres expected of a government

leader. Even prior to the Korean Bar, Kim encouraged

agriculture and industry with his presence, but, beginning

in the period of postwar reconstruction, his guidance became

more specific for specialized sectors and occupations.

Propaganda portrayed him as knowledgeable on a ll phases of

?*iSee Chapter III, pp. 80-81, 83-91.

?*2See Section A of Part II of Chapter IV for examples of Kim's image during postwar reconstruction; Section A of Part I of Chapter V categorizes many of the images of success associated with Kim.

7S3see note 512 in Chapter V, p. 253.

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workers* lives and as a leader whose personal appearances

had significant effects on production, from the mid-1960s,

however, his range of official interests — as reported in

the press — broadened and he was credited with concrete

contributions to education, science, linguistics, morals,

and even entertainment.?**

4. Kia developed a canon of authorized works.

Helmut Martin defined a canon as an official collection of

writings, freguentl; altered to reflect current events,

which can be used for mass political eduction.?** Kim's

speeches were used as objects of study and anthologized frcm

the prewar period, while the custom of quoting him in

articles and addresses also dates from that time. From the

1950s, the party called for greater efforts to collect

documents connected with Kim and intensified measures to

have them studied. Ey the late 1950s, Kim's works were

equated with Marxist-Leninist classics; at that time also,

the regime stressed their importance back to the anti-

Japanese struggle. By 1959, the frequency of Kim quotations

increased in articles and steps were taken to highlight

them; by the late-1S60s, they were obligatory.?**

Kim's anthologized works were edited to update them

?**See Chapter II, pp. 66-68 and Chapter 7, pp. 2 3 3 -3 6 .

?s*Martin, Cult and canon, pp. 3-5.

?s*See Chapter III, pp. 82-83; Chapter IV, pp. 149-50, 181-84; and Chapter V, pp. 239-42.

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also celebrated on the anniversaries of their appearance.

Their memorization constituted an important aspect of the

DPEK educational system, while a ll enterprises maintained

rooms dedicated to the study of Kin's life and works. Kim's

works were also translated into foreign languages and

disseminated widely.?*?

Although they increased in importance over the next

decades, it seems clear that by the aid—1950s, Kim's works

had assumed the essential character of a canon, in that they

had been collected officially, were revised as needed, and

used for political education.

Closely connected with the concept of the authorized

canon was the idea of the leader as thinker; Martin

suggested that one reason for the canon was to prove the

leader an accomplished philosopher.?*® Kim's philosophic

discovery, CHOCHE, got off to a slow start in the 19 50s, but

by the 1960s had become identified with most aspects of

North Korean lif e : CHUCHE economics, CfiOCfiE diplomacy,

CHOCHE attitu d es. By the 1970s, CHOCEE had replaced

Marxism-Leninism as the primary ideologic reference of North

Korean communism and Kim adopted "philosopher" as a major

title . The concept of CHOCHE was also redacted to provide

philosophic underpinnings for the anti—Japanese struggle.

?*?See Chapter I, pp 7-8; Chapter V, pp. 239-42.

?s«Martin, Cult and Canon, see also Chapter I, p. 8.

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Secondarily, Kim was also credited with developing two

efficacious management theories, the Chongsan-ni Method for

agriculture and the Taean iork System for industry.?**

5. The most telling property differentiating a Cult

of Personality from hero worship or image-making is the use

of the Cult's central figure as a touchstone hy which to

interpret the national experience, particularly recent

history. Such a phenomenon presupposes the lack of at least

overt political competition and the ability to rewrite

history. It also bespeaks an attempt to reform society in

the leader's mold, perhaps for generations.

The prinicple method for reinterpreting Korean

history was prom-ulagation of two interrelated state myths

(see below), the story of the anti-Japanese guerrillas and

the prodigiality of the Kim Family. The original

biographies on Kim, disseminated prior to 1952, flattered

the leader but were short on details, especially about his

early life .?** Frcm April 1952, when the Brief Life was

issued, Kim's personal history became ever more important to

North Korean historiography; his putative leadership of

armed anti-Japanese resistance after 1931 was indicated as

the turning point for modern Korea. More information about

?**The introduction of CHOCHE to North Korean life is mentioned in Chapter 17, p. 181; Kim's philosophic claims are treated in Chapter V, pp. 242-46; see also Chapter II, pp. 5 7 -6 0 .

?*"Discussion of the pre-war biography of Kim may be found in Chapter III, pp. 105-10.

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his life , including his youth, became available and was used

for study, but the salient point for our definition is the

fad: that increasingly from the late 1950s the regime

promoted Kim as henefitting a ll aspects of national life and

claimed he had done so since the onset of his career.?** At

the same tim e, the North Korean public was fed heavy doses

about the anti-Japanese guerrillas, each story containing a

moral for modern life and many teaching that institutions or

practices of contemporary North Korea derived directly from

the anti-Japanese period. Initially, these history lessons

were compatible with the Kim biography but not lim ited to

his experiences: gradually in the 1960s, the leader became

their focus.?**

Therefore, from at least the late 1950s, the North

Korean regime filtered modern Korean experience through the

life of Kim Il-song, meeting the fifth and most important

property of a Cult of Personality. Ihis was a progressive

process for which it may be impossible to list a precise

date, but it is clear that the transition from hero worship

to Cult of Personality occurred early in the period of

reconstruction.

To be sure, in the two decades following, the

?**The wartime biography of Kim, from the April 1952 publication of Kin Il-song changgun- ui rvakchon, is discussed in Chapter IV, pp. 159-65; the enhanced post-war biographies are detailed in Chapter IV, pp. 204-08.

?*2See Chapter IV, pp. 190-204.

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identification of Kin with Korean life and history became

even more extreme. Propaganda linked him to a ll historical

achievements in his time and credited him with a ll admirable

aspects of curreat life; through study of his ancestors and

lateral relatives, the regime extended the influence of the

Kim family both vertically and horizontally.?**

This final and most important property of a Cult of

Personality, the re-interpretation of Korean life and

history through .one man, has a symbiotic relationship with

the North Korean "state myth." à "state myth" has been

defined as a "credible, dramatic, socially constructed

representation of perceived realities that people

accept..."?** Such myths have a number of functions, both

for the state and individual.?** For individuals, myths

render understandable much that is incomprehensible about

modern life , bridge old and new social norms, furnish a

self-identity, and create expectations for the future. For

the state, these myths facilitate legitimacy, sustain the

population during difficult tim es, and allow control of

behavior through the shaping of basic cognitions.

The myth of the victorious anti-Japanese guerrillas

made it possible for the Korth Korean citizen to have a

?**This is the theme of virtually all of Chapter ¥.

?**Nimmoi and Combs, Subliminal P olitics, p. 16.

?**State myths are discussed in more detail in Section III of Chapter I.

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positive attitude toward himself and his society hy

stressing resistance and success instead of generations of

humiliation. It further created favorable expectations of a

brighter future based on the mythic knowledge of past

successes. By identifying itself with these past struggles

and victories, the DPBK regime gained legitim acy and then

justified its institutions and practices by tracing their

origins to the guerrillas. National behavior was influenced

by reference to the early days: sacrifice by the guerrillas

to effect a free Korea required equal diligence to

production today; study of the classics was the reason for

the guerrillas* success, thus was necessary in today's

campaigns.?**

The state myth of the anti-Japanese guerrillas and

Kim's Cult of Personality closely supported each other.

Obviously, they covered much of the same historical period,

making the acceptance of one as truth crucial to acceptance

of the other. Beyond this, the framework of the anti-

Japanese history provided a plausible matrix for the tales

about Kim, allowing scarcely credible stories to seem

possible. The Kim biographies validated the historicity of

the former era, lending its prestige to the official

v e r s io n .

By the 1970s, extending trends present from the

766see section B of Part II of Chapter IV for discussion of the use of history in North Korea.

36 5

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1950s, the Kim Cult dominated the state myth, as the tales

about the anti-J a gam ese fighters focused on the ubiguity of

the leader, his accomplishments, his solicitude, and the

loyalty offered to him. Ihat had begun as a powerful state

myth became largely a prop for the leader's Cult.

B. DE¥E10PHEHI OF KIM'S COLT

Kim'S Cult of personality traversed several distinct

phases, corresponding to significant periods in North Korean

history and associated also with events affecting Kim's

rule. These phases moved from hero worship in the prewar

and wartime eras to a genuine Cult during post-war

reconstruction. The modern period, from the late 1960s, was

a time in which the Cult adulation intensified and marked

the transition to a new generation of leadership within its

framework. The Cult underwent no dramatic alterations, but

continued in steady development over 40 years, always adding

such elements as were necessary in ways consistent with what

had gone before.

Those promoting Kim for leadership in the post­

liberation period, which included the Soviet occupation

force as well as Kim's own faction, took advantage of the

political naivity and social needs of the Korean people to

create a persona for him suited to an unsophisticated

audience. Kim was portrayed not only as the heroic leader

who had struggled against the Japanese but also as the

source of all economic and political reform after 1945.

Between liberation and the outbreak of war, in addition to

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creating a basic public identity, the emphasis seemed to be

the legitimacy of Kim and his innate abilities — necessary

themes since Kim was essentially an unknown quality and

somewhat of an outsider. Many basic themes were adopted

from the model of Stalin's Cult and remained throughout the

existence of Kim's Cult, including the necessity and worth

of Kin's leadership and his patriotic anti-Japanese

background.

During the war, the Cult marked a crucial departure,

using Kin as a symbol as well as a visible leader, ihile

the DPEK marshaled many propaganda themes for exhortation to

victory, Kim as the symbol of victory became a prominent

one. This usage of Kim resulted in an enhanced emphasis on

his life, as seen in publication of the Brief life , but also

focused on him as a sure leader and committed

internationalist. This image of Kim was necessary and

useful for conduct of the war, as he presented a rallying

point in retreat and a focus of victory.

The symbology surrounding Kim evolved greatly during

reconstruction, much more so than during the W c t r . Kim

became a visible presence in spurring development of the

economy and remaking the KSP. It was during the

reconstruction period that the regime collected his works

into an authorized canon, promoted Kin as a philosopher, and

began steady reinterpretation of Korean history through his

life . More was tcld about Kim, his background was traced

further backward, and more details included, while his

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presence was inserted into more and more varied events. The

Cult of Kim both abetted and benefitted from new-found

nationalism and self-confidence, using them to promulgate

the o fficia l worldview upon a younger generation which had

seen only communism. The Cult intensification process was

aided immeasurably by the passage of time, which diminished

collective memorJ.es of events. The post-war era of

reconstruction witnessed the transition to a fu ll Cult of

Personality.

Three facets marked the modern or post—1965 period.

The Kim Cult assisted the DPEK in changing from exclusivity

in relations with the Communist filcc to wider international

ties, and in the process sought to make Kim a figure of

worldwide importance. Moreover, his biography was greatly

expanded and sim ultaneously, his family background made an

object of intensive study. Entwined with the emphasis on

his great family was an effort to support the transition to

a new generation of leadership, with Kim's son as successor

to his father.

Mindful of these stages in the development of Kim's

Cult, it is important to understand the social properties

which sustained it as well as some of the means the regime

used to maintain it.

C- SOCIAL PROPERTIES COBLOCIVE TO THE COLT

Despite the power of modern media and the

methodology employed in totalist states, the crucial factors

in development and maintenance of a Cult must be the

368

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properties of the society in which it arises and the matrix

of events surrounding it. These social properties and

evaits may also determine the direction in which the Cult

develops.?*?

North Korea seems to provide an ideal matrix for the

development of an extreme Cult of Personality. It is small

in territory, somewhat isolated, with a manageable

propulation size — a ll factors which enable the government

to maintain an almost absolute control over information and

population movement. The Korean people themselves place a

premium on conformity of outlook.

1. The fj.rst property which abets a Cult is weak or

conducive institutions. From its inception the DPBK

possessed a structure which facilited the concentration of

power among the few, with a virtually powerless legislature,

a government responsive to the KIP, and the KBP structured

in ever-tightening circles of power. The 1972 government

reorganization accorded the executive with even broader

power but few lim iting mechanisms. Mass organizations have

been firmly under government control.?**

Thus, government and party structure invited the

emergence of a strong and dominant leader.

2. The DPBK has kept its intellectuals weak and

?*?These general social properties were listed in Chapter I, pp. 8-9.

?*«The original structure and the 1972 reorganization were summarized in Chapter II, pp. 51-52.

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tamed. The north had great attraction for the "old”

intelligentsia and retained their loyalty; a new class of

intellectuals knew only the communist system. The regime

also prevented the emergence of an opposition group by

redefining "intellectuals" to concentrate on scientific and

technical expertise.?**

There would be little or no opposition from

intellectuals to strong leadership or a Cult of Personality

surrounding it on the part of the purely technical

intellectual class in North Korea.

3. Unquestionably, the DPEK possessed enemies.

H ostility with the south existed from 1945, as did enmity

with the O.S., this intensifying after the Bar. The

presence of hostile foreign troops on its southern border

was a powerful and visible symbol of the popular enemy. In

addition to external enemies, the country strove against

internal and intangible enemies, including capitalist

remnants and flunkeyism.

The perception of such dangerous enemies argued for

the necessity of an equally powerful leader and, moreover,

the necessity to propagate among the people reassuring

images of a victorious leader.

4. North Korea has been characterized both by

disruptive changes and agitation in support of official

campaigns. Agricultural collectivization and heavy

?6*See Chapter II, pp. 55-56.

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xndastrializatxon began in the prewar period, but

intensified during reconstruction; these movements altered

the lives of a majority of the nation's population — which

also underwent the destabilizing experience of war.??*

Moreover, the regime continually fostered campaigns for

attitudinal changes to foster increased effort or approved

behavior.??!

Throughout these exhaustive changes, the images of

the leader could be viewed as the single constant, providing

continuity and reassurance of victory.

5. Hhile a low educational level or high level of

superstition was posited as a social property conducive to a

Cult, the case of North Korea differs somewhat. By most

standards, the DPSK has a high level of education, with a

favorable literacy rate, compulsory schooling, and

widespread opportunities for adult training. However, this

system is rooted in the Cult object, with memorization of

Kim's works mandatory from early ages and with his writings

basic textbooks.??2

The educational system, therefore, is not only a

??*The scope of changes in agriculture and industry were given in Chapter II, pp. 42-44 and in Chapter I?, pp. 1 6 9 -7 7 .

??iSome examples of mass movements would be the campaigns to emulate the anti-Japanese guerrillas or to create the «Speed of the 80s.”

??2The role of Kim's works in education is noted in Chapter II, pp. 53-54.

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Perhaps the most telling social property abetting

Kin's Cult was its striking sim ilarities to Confucian

patterns which retained currency in modern North Korea.??*

The fatherhood of Kin resembled traditional family patterns,

while Kin's personal style fitted vestiges of Confucian rule

readily acceptable to the people.

D. MAINTENANCE OF THE COLT

A rtificial devices both great and small served to

perpetuate the Cult and to make it seem reasonable to the

North Korean citizen. These devices included exclusivity of

media coverage, repetition of the language of leadership,

and the ubiguity of symbols.??*

Undoubtedly the most crucial of the maintenance

mechanisms for Kin was the thoroughness and style of media

coverage. Initially, press and broadcasts alike supported

Kim as the senior leader and even while rivals persisted in

power, his coverage consistently was larger and of higher

quality. He was mentioned most often of all senior leaders

and was the only one whose background became a frequent

feature.??* Prominent media exposure was necessary in the

??*This is the theme of Chapter VI, Section IV.

??*The factors to be discussed here are those apart from institutional ones such as the education system, which supported Kim in powerful ways.

??*Kim's early press coverage is discussed in Chapter III, pp. 78-79, 94-98.

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beginning to pabiicize the little —known figure of Kim;

continued coverage enabled him to acquire the popular

impression of the wise leader which undergirded many of the

other components of the Cult image.

One of the most subtle yet enduring mechanisms was

the use of and constant repetition of appositive phrases

identifying Kim's leadership qualities. Expected titles

such as "Comrade," «General," or "Premier" arose frequently,

bu t Kim a l s o had appended to h i s name th e p h ra se s " w ise

leader," «respected and beloved leader," or "great

leader."??* The variant forms of the title "father" raised

Confucian images latent in the population to emphasize the

superior position of Kim and the subservient role of the

citizen.??? The reinforcement of these phrases through

uncounted (used advisedly) repetition must make it

impossible for the North Korean citizen to conceive of Kim

without also thiniing of him in one or more of these

laudatory images. The frequently repeated Kin quotes in articles and

speeches helped create and reinforce the concept of Kim as a

renaissance man. Even though general, the constant

repetition must have helped convince many of his

intellectual prowess.

??*The language of leadership is discussed in Chapter III, pp. 83, 103-04; Chapter IV, pp. 147-48; and Chapter V, pp. 251-55.

???See Chapter VI, pp. 337—38.

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The many tales of Kim presented a unified and

satisfying story. Sandpapering over the many disputes and

rival personalities of twentieth century Korea, it made a

simple story, with all black and white characters, one which

did not raise unwanted questions for the regime. The tales

became more detailed the farther in time they were from the

actual event and the more prepared the population was by

previous propaganda.

Another aspect of the language of Cult leadership

was the recurrent claim that the people were firmly united

around Kim, usually compared to steel or stone in firmness,

or the no less frequent exhortations to unite in that

manner. Other habitual descriptions of life in North Korea

as being in Kim's bosom??* helped define North Korea as the

land of Kim in the minds of the population.

The North Korean citizen is moreover surrounded by

myriad physical reminders of Kim and his grandeur. Gigantic

statues of Kim stand in public places, as well as portraits

or slogans derived from his works. Bis picture, often in

active or dominant poses, appeared often in publications.

From the early post—liberation period, certain public

buildings or institutions were named after him. In the

modern period, most adult Koreans wore lapel badges with his

visage on them and a special verb was used to denote wearing

them with pride. In addition, an emphasis on relics from

??*See, for example. Chapter V, p. 251, n. 509.

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factory v isit, served at once to verify the original event

and personalize it. Most of these physical reminders have

been present from the time he first tcok office.??*

The physical reminders of Kim added a forceful sense

of his ubiquitous presence among the people. Eecall the

remark by a long-time observer of North Korea whose first

v isit to Pyongyang overwhelmed him with Kim's image and he

found himself never more than a hundred feet from a

representation of Kim.?** Both sight and sound worked to

reinforce Kim's leadership and proprietary position over

North Korea.

I I . FONCTIONS OF THE COLT OF PESSGNALITÏ

Â. LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES AND STILES

The many manifestations of the Cult appear to

outsiders as irrational and egoistic, symptoms of absolute

power coupled with megalomania — the validation, perhaps,

of Lord Acton's famous aphorism on power and corruption.

However, it has been the theme of this dissertation that

shrewd method resides behind the seeming madness, that a

Cult performs essential regime functions. In the case of

North Korea, Kim.'s Cult has been applied in varying degrees

to the problems of legitim acy, policy promotion.

??*Chapter II, pp. 67—69; Chapter III, p. 79—80; Chapter IV, pp. 150-51.

?«*See Chapter II, pp. 66.

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pride/nation building, reunification, and succession. The

Cult has been more effective on some issues than others, as

w ill be discussed below, but has been applied to them a ll,

generally in combination with other leadership strategies.

While all political systems perform sim ilar

functions, albeit with differing structures, politics in

non-western nations has unique problems. Non-western

politics is less differentiated from social relations, and

may be exemplified by strong cliques and factionalism .

Politics tends to be an elite activity, with intense

discussion of issues but little expectation of action.?**

Although certain attributes cf communist parties and

states may abet the development of a Cult of Personality —

the monolithic structure of the party, for example — the

emrgence of a Cult is not inevitable. The ruling structure

in Vietnam provides a good instance wherein a collegial

pattern of rule has emrged rather than a personalized system

as in North Korea. Despite the premise of this study, it is

therefore possible that stimultion of pride and policy

promotion could have been achieved without the presence of a

Cult of Personality in North Korea.

A leader or ruling group has available a wide range

of options or strategies to retain power or utilize it in

governing.?*2 Such strategies include personality

?«*Chapter I, pp. 9-10.

?*2Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative, pp. 98-238.

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projection, an option which offers several unique

advantages. Hriggins stated that personality projection

allows a leader to become the focus cf common loyalty and

embody the state, both important in a new nation where

institutions are not yet strong and political patterns

nascent. Used in conjunction with other strategies,

personality projection is a facile tool for a leader in a

newly independent nation lacking traditions of political

competition. It may also, because of its concentration on

one individual, lead to a Cult of Personality. In the early

period of Kin's rule, his press uonopolization and

promulgation of positive images was a use of personality

projection. The enhancement of these images led to

development of a Cult.

Closely allied with a Cult of Personality is the

concept of the "charismatic leader.-' This type of

leadership is based on the perception or belief — real or

manufactured — that the leader possesses exceptional

attributes of power and grace; it should also be based on

belief in the leader for his person alone and expressed

directly, without intermediaries. Charismatic leadership

serves the emotional needs of both leader and people.?** The

interaction of a charismatic leader with the public is

carefully controlled, allowing sufficient proximity to

these strategies are summarized in Chapter I, pp. 18-19.

?**Chapter I, pp. 20-22.

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permit group identification with him and the perception of a

special aura about him, but not close enought to allow

exposure of weakness.

Personality projection, in the guise of a Cult, was

used by Kin to cjonfront the personal problems of his

retention of power as well as the national issues before

him .

North Korea certainly subscribed to the "great man"

theory — that great leaders change history. The country

clung to this despite its self-contradictory pronouncements

on collectivization and the people as masters of their

s t a t e . ?**

B. COLT FONCTIONS

Political leadership is the process by which an

individual exerts more influence than others in executing

group functions, and involves setting or changing goals or

allocating resources. A leader helps to define the

character of society.?** All leaders utilize their authority

or power to dispose of pending problems, whether related to

t h e i r own p o s i t i o n or to p u b lic i s s u e s . Kim a s a

charismatic leader, often used his Cult images in service of

both types of problems, which may be generalized as follows.

1. LEGITIMIZATION

P olitics in post-liberation Korea was a cauldron of

?**See Chapter I, pp. 2.

?**Chapter I, pp. 17-18.

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competing factions and interest groups, exacerbated by the

division of the country and the presence of foreign

occupiers.?** The primary attribute sought in would-be

leaders was an anti—Japanese background, and there were many

in both zones and Koreans of many political persuasions who

possessed this quality. Next, Koreans looked for a leader

able to solve the myriad economic and cultural questions

resulting from colonial exploitation.

As explicated in great detail in Chapter XIX, Kim's

images in the 1945-50 period addressed these two requisites

for leadership. Kim exaggerated the extent and autonomy of

his anti-Japanese activities, and appended the title

"general" to his name. He emphasized the major battles

under his command and Japanese fear of him. Nevertheless,

since Kim was but one of many rivals with anti-Japanese

experience, he had to lim it his claims and could only use

them to show his patriotism and acceptability for senior

leadership. At the same time that Kim used these positive

images to seek legitim ization from the population, moreover,

they served to undercut his rivals for power.

The thrust of Kim's image after liberation, one

designed to gain legitimacy for his leadership, argued that

his achievements in reform and democratic development proved

his right to senior leadership and that he was the only one

78 6£efer to the historical section in Chapter II, pp. 3 5 -3 9 .

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so qualified. As detailed iq Chapter III, Kim claimed to

have effected far-reaching reforms in labor, industry,

education, and sexual equality, while his direction produced

positive economic results. The im plicit content of this

propaganda was that Kim was the only leader able to

accomplish all this.

Limiting revolutionary history to Kin's guerrillas

was a shrewd method for attesting to the nationalism of a

man who had spent virtually his entire adult life and career

outside the country at the same time it helped restrict the

political agenda to discussion the regime wanted.

Reiteration of the myth of the anti—Japanese guerrillas

reinforced the concept of the people for a strong leader,

since they had not saved themselves from Japan, it also

debased the domestic faction rivals of Kim, as well as those

who fought overseas but were not part of Kim's coterie. The

power of the state myth to do this is demonstrated by its

ability to make a sideshow in foreign lands seem both

domestic and victorious.

Perhaps most pertinent, the media promulgated the

image that the people had responded to these achievements by

acclaiming him leader. This "bandwagon" claim was supported

by rallies in local areas as well as by many media

statements from citizens.?*? It should also be noted that

this same method was employed to seek legitim ization from

?*?See Chapter III, pp. 80-82, 85-86.

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South Koreans in occupied areas during the first phase of

the Korean Bar. "Liberated" Koreans expressed gratitude for

the many reforms brought to them and responded by hailing

Kim as their leader.?**

Another boost to legitim ization came by tracing the

antecedents of modern policy to the practices of the

guerrillas or early members of the Kin family. Certain

types of behavior or mass organizations were redacted to

earlier eras: anti-Americanism to the time of Kim Syong—

chik, for example, or political study by the guerrillas.

The methpd chosen by Kim and his supporters is akin

to Claude Ake's concept of "charismatic legitim ization," in

which loyalty to a new state is created through the personal

influence of a charismatic leader.?** Xn the case of North

Korea, the personal influence and the appeal to loyalty were

simultaneous: Kim was presented to the population as if he

were a longstanding hero and the prestige he supposedly had

was used partially in defining the DPBK. This new prestige

was spread a bit thin since the ruling circles were seeking

not only to create identification with the new state but

also with a communist system.

It could be argued that in the new nation, a clear

need existed to focus loyalty on one object. Many factions

?**3ee Chapter IV, pp. 150-54.

?**Ake, ^Charismatic Leadership," pp. 1, 3-5; see also Chapter I, p. 22.

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competed for power and several domestic groups led by

popular figures raised the possibility of a fragmented or

impotent state. Moreover, both new and traditional interest

groups — bureaucracy, m ilitary, party — needed a unifying

force. No doubt Kim, no less than many officials understood

how factionalism had weakened the Korean Kingdom and

hampered the early KCP.

The Cult of Kim and the DPBK matured together. By

the 1980s, the regime was defining the country in terms of

the leader and his deeds. In 1983, for example, it was

said, "our party propounded (the) noble idea that the

fatherland is precisely the Great leader" and further

explained that "every proud thing" was connected with

him .?**

2 . POLICY PROMOTION

Once power was taken in North Korea, the Kim regime

used it forcefully to remake society and spur industrial

development, generally following a Soviet model. It was in

these endeavors that the Cult played an especially strong

r o le . The nascent Cult assisted the transformation of

society in the post-liberation period. Kim was credited

with the many reform laws in industry and social relations,

so that what was good was attributed to his "wise

leadership" (with passing gratitude to the Soviets, of

?**See Chapter V, pp. 253.

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course). Those who were in charge of the new system

acknowledged him their leader and he dispensed many of the

benefits resulting from the improvements.?**

Kim painstakingly identified himself with the

regime's policies in the reconstruction era and promoted

them actively. He was most visible in touring industrial

and agricultural sites and in giving guidance. His presence

on-the-spot helped create an image of a caring regime during

hard times and helped show the government in control of

seemingly impossible tasks. The explicit message of the

tales of Kim's guerrillas and his leadership in the Korean

Bar was that victory was inevitable, self-sacrifice and

effort under his leadership had succeeded against heavy odds

before and would do so again.?*% Moreover, since the drive

to industrialize and to collectivize agriculture involved

the dislocation of a majority of the population, the

reassuring figure of Kim helped keep the people manageable

and prepared for productive endeavor.

Kim promoted policy in the modern period with his

Cult. Again, he set goals, made appearances, gave guidance,

and approved results. Modern institutions?** and social

organizations or cutoas from earlier days. The methods used

?**This is the theme of most of Chapter III.

?*2This is the theme of most of Section I of Chapter IV.

?**See Chapter V, pp. 241-42, 244.

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were generally an extension of those employed in the period

of reconstruction. In addition, the regime could vary the

images deployed to fit the dictates of a particular

situation: Kin the victorious general, the inspirer of

production, the unifier, or the focus of loyalty.

Primarily in the modern period, the Cult set up Kim

and his family as a pantheon of role models to encourage

increased production or perseverance. Certain Cult figures

have specific job applications, as Hyong-chik was a model

for organizers or Chong-suk for women activists, but all

were given as models of diligence and loyalty.?**

Since the regime's policy from the reconstruction

era to at least the late 1970s was development of

agriculture, heavy industry, and technology at the expense

of consumerism, Kim was able to use his image to reassure

the people that the government and party were mindful of

th^ and benefits were being distributed. His on-the-spot

guidances usually included expressions of concern for living

conditions, while frequent articles, such as the "Among the

people" series, im plicitly told the citizenry that the

government was interested in their well-being.?**

Thus the image of the strong leader, possessed of

wisdom and sure of victory, was an important tool in

?**See Chapter V, pp. 276-79 for Hyong-chik; Chong- suk is discussed in pp. 279-81.

?**See Chapter IV, pp. 177-81.

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particularly when these policies contravened the immediate

interests of the people.

Kim's image as a m ilitary leader had a double

purpose. On the one hand, tales of sk ills coupled with

reminders that he had defeated two major imperialisms in his

lifetim e helped reassure the people, who must have been

quite conscious of the nation's powerful enemies. But the

Cult images also served as a tool for retaining the loyalty

of the KPÀ — the military was defined in terms of its

traditions and leadership.?**

3 . PBIDE

Perhaps the strongest function of the Kim Cult was

inspiring pride.?*? Even as it acts strongly itself on the

Korean people. Cult-induced pride greatly abetted

legitim ization.

Pride was an element of Kim's image from the early

days. The "triumphal return" material argued that

"scientifically,." the great Korean people should produce

great leaders — and had. This material, articles and a

book written by Ban Chae-dok, created a rich legend of Kim

as a popular hero, one who humbled the enemy, thus one who

?**See Chapter IT, pp. 208-13.

?*?In fact, this function proved much stronger than I initially expected. It seems to touch most aspects of the Cult image.

385

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Inspired enormous pride among the people.?**

The image of the victorious hero was retained

throughout Kim's career and broadened as the regime

described more incident over which Koreans could be proud.

As North Korea experienced a surge of nationalism after the

war, this Kim image increasingly identified with these great

struggles. He became involved in story with the great

events of twentieth century Korea and it was claimed he

succeeded where others failed.?** The theme of pride

pervades a good deal of propaganda in the modern period.

For example, it was noted that thanks to the "invicible

unity" Kim forged, the population had become a "most proud

p eo p le.* ® *

The element cf pride was quite apparent in the

international image the regime promulgated about Kim. Kim's

many overseas trips occasioned pictures and text showing him

dealing with major world figures on an equal basis. A

corallary theme paraded before the public numbers of foreign

leaders who visited Korea and were received by Kim.*** The

international image was extended in the modern period to

claim that North Korea was now benefitting world peoples —

?**Han Chae-dok, Kim 11- song changgun kaesongi This material is digested in Chapter III, pp. 108-09.

?**The linkage of Kim and historical events is discussed in Chapter IV, pp. 192—96.

*o*See Chapter V, p. 254.

*o!See Chapter IV, pp. 184-87.

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via Kim's thoughts, writings, and system. Foreigners

eagerly sought his works, took courage from his anti-

American victories, and made pilgrimages to Hangyongdae . * * 2

Thus, a once-despised nation rose to a position from which

it was able to assist others, largely thanks to Kim.

It is important to remember that the images of Kim

were what the people wanted to hear and were predisposed to

believe, as pointed out by lassw ell and Kaplan.*** Moreover,

one must realize that few other systems could give the

individual such a sense of intimacy with its leader. This

may be what Erikscn meant about charismatic leadership

restoring the rituals of existence."***

4 . BFÜHIFIC&TION

The problem of the divided nation after 1945

affected a ll Koreans, some in economic or political ways,

but most in emotional costs. Given the strong feelings of

racial kinship and the fact that many fam ilies were

separated by the border, this issue was one leaders had to

address most carefully.

Prior to the emergence of opposing regimes. North

Korean sources claimed that Kim had struggled to liberate

all Korea, that he was a hero to all the people, that all

wanted him as their leader. Kim was cited as necessary to

®*2See Chapter V, pp. 256-61.

*0 3Quoted in Chapter I, p. 16.

***Quoted in Chapter I, pp. 21—22.

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effect the same democratic reforms in the South as he had in

north Korea. After 1948, Kim was touted as the inspiration

behind the DPBK, with its superior institutions. Both

before and after 1948, Kin was favorably contrasted with

southern leaders.«**

Dealing with the occuped south in 1950, the Kim

image was used much the same way it had been in the prewar

north. Personal endorsements and expressions of gratitude

in addition to official praise portrayed Kin as a necessary

leader and dispenser of benefits.*®*

Hhile the DPBK continued to acclaim Kim the leader

over all Korea, this was stressed increasingly from the

1970s, perhaps out of concern that Kin's generation had

little time left to achieve re unification. The chief themes

were the concern Kim had for South Koreans, their great love

for him, and their desire to be united under his rule.*®?

However, the latent content of much of the

historical propaganda about Kim suggests that Kim directed

his appeals to his own people, not to southerners. It would

have been simple to include more examples of southern

support for the revolution, but this was lacking. Added to

this was the harsh effect of DPBK propaganda in 1970-1980

which heightened fiOK government hostility. I therefore am

«oschapter III, pp. 98-102, 122-23.

*o*See Chapter IV, pp. 150—54.

*®?See Chapter V, pp. 262-67.

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o f the opinion that North Korea's Cult propaganda on

reunification did not reflect official assessments hut was

designed strictly for domestic effect, to show government

concern on an issue the regime could in actuality do nothing

about. The propaganda may also have reflected wishful

thinking by the regime.

5 . SUCCESSION

North Korea underwent a sharp generational change in

the 1970s and 1980s: young people came of age who had

experienced none of the formative events of the country and

who were much better educated than their elders. This

generation had had no exposure to any worldview but that of

t h e DPEK.

This was also the period when the regime began

preparing for the succession to Kim, who was born in 1912

and thus was nearing the end of his effective rule. Kim and

the regime were probably impelled by the knowledge of

significant policy changes in the OSSE and the PEC after the

deaths of Stalin and Mao and were determined to seek

continuity of their system. The regime doubtless also

feared that powerful interest groups, including the

bureaucracy, m ilitary, and party, and perhaps provincial

interests, which were united largely by Kim's presence,

would engage in destructive competition when he was no

longer in charge.

Since Kim and the system were so intimately

connected, the succession needed to be within the Cult. By

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settling on Kim Chong-il as successor, the regime chose a

member of the newer generation and was able to keep the

process clearly within the Cult. Thus, succession became

the ultimate use cf the Cult and traasferrance of the mantle

of the Cult object to another its greatest challenge. Not

only did it eliminate fear that a successor would destroy

the Cult system, it eliminated worry that a successor would

not measure up to Kin.

The public steps in the succession process within

the Cult began with a heavy stress on the necessity of a

strong leader and unity with him. Then came the creation of

a problem: inheriting his ideas and sk ills. Finally, the

regime solved the problem with a suitable candidate, KCI.

He was promoted much as Kim had been in the early days,

through creation of a persona acceptable to the population.

First, KCI adopted the image of interpreter and agent of

Kim's w ill; one who served the leader, carrying out his

orders. Then KCI became the one who had been closest to Kim

and having absorbed most from him, was best fitted to

complete his tasks. In time, KCI promulgated familiar

images sim ilar to those of his father: patriot, concerned

leader, national builder, theoretician, and military man.

Although it may be true in general as Hriggins

argued,so* that regimes which engage in personality

projection do not prepare well for succession, this proved

sossee Chapter I, pp. 19.

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incorrect for the DPBK. Considering the sturdy linkage of

Kin's Cult with the country, the regime probably had little

choice but to formulate succession plans in order to keep

the problem within Cult boundaries and prevent demolition of

their system.

Placing the focus of the succession problem on

compatibility with the leader and inheriting his leadership

sk ills enabled the regime to sidestep unpleasant questions,

such as the method by which the successor was chosen. It is

an open matter whether the Great Family propaganda was

designed solely tc expedite the succession to KCl. I

believe it derived first from Kin's egoism, but whatever its

original motivation, it served well in aiding the leadership

transition.

Thus the Cult performed in four major areas of

concern. The Cult proved useful in obtaining legitimacy for

the regime and in defeating Kim's rivals. It was

(particularly effective in policy promotion, as it provided a

stable point in the midst of turbulent activities, won

acceptance for the regime's policies, and provided security

assurance. Although it supported the CPfiK's reunification

position, the Cult seems to have been primarily of cosmetic

value in this area. With the decision to promote succession

within the Cult framework. Cult images were energetically

worked and seemingly successful.

391

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D. DIS&HVABTAGES OF A COLT OF PERSONALITY

81th no independent source of information about the

DPBK, it remains virtually impossible to assess the quality

of life in the country or the real opinions of its people.

O fficial sources report only favorable events and claim that

the population is unanimous in its satisfaction and support

for the regime.

However, Brigqins postulated a number of

disadvantages to the use of personality projection, which

may applay equally well to a Cult.*®*

The firsh liab ility Brigqins suggested was the

unliklihood of preparation for an orderly succession. As we

have seen in the section above. North Korea's unique

circumstances have rendered this postulate invalid.

The leader often needs quick results or dramatic

action rahter than slow progress. In North Korea, whatever

the reality of development activity, it is largely bold

action and great initiative that is publicized, all of it

attributed to the Great Leader. The danger is also present

that the leader may be unduly impressed with his own

reputation and embark on unsound or perilous courses of

action. One can speculate that this may have happened in

the 1960s, causing the incidents which brought the DPBK into

increasing m ilitary confrontation.

aovfluler °s Imperative, pp. 104—07; see also this dissertation. Chapter I, pp. 19-

392

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L ittle is known of the inner workings of North

Korean senior officialdom, hut it appears that the leader

gives few others the opportunity to become conversant

overall with state affairs. Kim has apparently even kept

his chosen successor from invovlement in crucial military

and diplomatic matters.

Although the regime continues to herald the esteem

in which Kim is held, it is possible that serious

d ifficu lties may arouse resentment toward him. Since he is

hailed as the author of both policies and accomplishments,

it is only logical that serious reverses may provoke the

people to place blame where credit was once assigned, and

perhaps thereby tc bring down the entire structure.

In addition to the lia b ilities proposed by Rriggins,

several other disadvantages obtain in a Cult. The

exorbitant c o st of maintaining the Cult at home as well as

disseminating it abroad represents considerable expenditures

for a developing nation.

When all credit accrues to the leader, those to whom

it should fall do not have their sacrifice and effort

acknowledged. To be sure, the DPBK states that some

successes are due to worker innovation and loyalty, but the

ultimate credit goes to Kim. How much this may cause

disaffection is difficult to determine.

More serious, by interpreting the country's

d.iplomatic and reunification policies in terms of Cult

images, the regime has propagated skewed concepts of the

393

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nation's place in the world and possible methods for

rapprochement with the fiOK. These m isconceptions in turn

may produce unrealistic expectations and hamper or prevent

real solutions to the OPBK's international problems.

In general, personality projection or a Cult may

retard the development of enduring institutions or the

development of sound political practice. If, as in the case

of North Korea, diverse factions and interest groups are

united only in the Cult object, their com petition may be

unrestrained and injurious once the Cult object is removed.

Thus, while Kin has prospered from his Cult and the Cult has

helped unify the country during his lifetim e, the long-term

effects pertaining to political stability are as yet unclear

and may indeed be harm ful.

III. FDBTHEB STODÏ

Although this has been prim arily a case study rather

than an exercise in theory, the m aterial does indicate

several lines for farther study. These additional

investigatory lines are also case studies, but ones which

would add im portant knowledge about sm all communist states

and about com parative communism.

This dissertation has argued the importance of the

state myth about the anti-Japanese guerrillas to the North

Korean regime as well as to Kim personally. This state myth

deserves a separate study, concentrating not necessarily on

its historical basis, but on its functions and development.

394

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This dissertation referred to instances in which

Kin's works underwent «canonical” revision**® to reflect

never policy positions. Kin's works deserve a thorough

study, although the sheer quantity of them probably mandate

that this be done piecemeal, by subject, rather than in

their entirety.

This dissertation could encompass little more than a

superficial comparison of Kim's Cult with those of Stalin

and Mao. Each of these comparisons, if done in sufficient

depth, would increase our understanding of comparative

communist systems and furnish greater insight into North

Korean relations with the major communist powers.

Comparative studies could also profit from biographical and

literary comparisons of Kim and Mao. By the sane token,

comparison of the Kim Cult in depth with tradition Confucian

values and practices would illuminate more fully the

derivation of the former and the effect of the latter.

I V . SOMMATION

In examining the definition of a Cult of

Personality, the development of Kim's Cult, the social

properties conducive to a Cult in Korea, and the physical

meems by which the Kim Cult was maintained, we answered the

three basic questions posited in Chapter one.®**

®*®See Chapter I, pp. 7-8; Chapter V, pp. 242-46.

»*»See p. 30.

395

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The body of the dissertation has marshalled

sufficient examples from the Cult of Kim between 1945 and

1985 to assert the validity of the basic propositions, as

f o U o s s :

1. The myth of Kim 11-song was artificial. It

originated to support Kim's claim to power but progressed to

other functions.*12

2. The myth helped to give pride and identity to the

Korean people.®*3

3. The public myth served to reinforce other

leadership strategies.® *♦

4 . The m.yth o f Kim was k e p t s u f f i c i e n t l y f l e x i b l e to

adapt to changes in domestic policy and international

environment, and was replete with a variety of images

appropriate to differing regime needs.®*®

A Cult of Personality as typified by Kim Il-song is

composed of three crucial elements. The first is a

charismatic leadership style; to this is added a state myth.

Both the leader and the state myth must closely reflect

national character. The third element is effusive

propaganda about the object. Once established, the Cult is

able to perform basic functions in support of the regime.

®*2See this Chapter, pp. 372-75.

8 2 35ee this Chapter, pp. 385-87.

®**See this Chapter, pp. 375-78.

®*®See th is Chapter, pp. 366-68-

396

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In fact, there is nothing illogical about North

Korea's Cult of Personality. If one believes that the

country has an inspired leader, one who is ever correct, it

follows in a syllogism that his pronouncements, directives,

and actions brook no modification or compromise. The

problem rests not with the logic but with the basic North

Korean premise about leadership

In effect, the Korean people were recreating

themselves and their country after 1945. It is proof of the

strength and effectiveness of the Cult of Personality of Kim

II—song and to the appeal of Kim himself that both were

remade in his image.

397

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APPENDIX I : ABBREVIATIONS

CCP...... Chinese Communist Party

CPSU...... Communist Party of the Soviet Onion

CPV...... C hinese People's Volunteers

D PfiK ...... D em ocratic People's Republic of

Korea

DIO...... D ow n with Imperialism Onion

FBIS DB AP...... Foreign Broadcast Information

Service Daily Report Asian and

Pacific Edition

FBIS DB FES...... FBIS Daily Report Far Eastern

S e c t io n

FRA...... Association for the Restoration of

the Fatherland

JPB S...... Joint Publications Research Service

K AR...... Korean Affairs Report

L/C PS...... library of Congress

Photoduplication Service

KCI.Kim C h o n g -il

KCNA...... Korean Central News Agency

K C P...... Korean Communist Party

KPA...... Korean People's Army

K B P ...... Korean Borker's Party

NKBP...... North Korean Barker's Party

PLA...... P eople's liberation Army

PPC...... Provisional People's Committee

PRC...... P eople's Republic of China

398

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EOK...... R epublic of Korea

RPR...... Revolutionary Party for

Reunification

SPA...... Supreae People's Assembly

SKHP...... South Korean Borker's Party

OSSR...... Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

399

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APPENDIX I I : NOTES ON SOURCES

The Romanizatlon o f Korean names presents a problem

since the sim ilarity of patronyms and placenames allows for

easy confusion. I have followed the BcCune-Beischauer

system except where a preferred variant exists, as in

«Syngman Rhee."

Once of the few advantages in using communist media

is that nothing appears by accident, everything is state-

sanctioned material, in effect what that country wants known

about itself. The duplication or repetition of materials

and themes in North Korean media is extensive, and it has

thus been possible to choose a few representative examples

of each Cult theme without having tc reproduce the entirety.

The majority of Korean articles used in this

disseration have been taken from general DPRK publications:

the newspaper Nodong Sinmun is the party daily, and contains

more theoretical articles than the others; ainiu Choson is

the government daily, and includes much the same coverage as

the party newspaper, but concentrates on economics rather

than theory. Kodong Ch'ongnvon is the youth newspaper and

carries more articles of interest to young people.

The citations listed as "broadcasts'* are from North

Korean public propaganda sources, as reported by the foreign

BroadCcist Information Service or the Joint Publication

Research Service. The citation is by city of origin, date,

and time; I have retained the form of the original, whether

given as local or Greenwich time. I have kept in mind that

400

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this material is pre-digested, thus may ^ot reflect

proportionate attention the DPBK has put on certain topics,

so I have used it only where printed sources are sparse or

not available, as the Korean Bar period, or when the

quotation is particularly apt and reflects trends seen in

printed sources.

Few materials are available from the DPBK for the

pre-Korean Bar period. Some holdings are available at the

National Archives, but they run to about one-third of the

issues published until the end of the Korean Bar, although

propaganda broadcast material fills in many gaps.®*® No

newspapers were available from October 1953 to July 1954;

thereafter, virtually all issues have been shelved.

The newspapers, journals, and books on North Korean

1945-1950 in the 0. S. National Archives were acquired

during the Korean Bar, and of their acquisition almost

ensures that the collection is spotty and unsystematic.

Nevertheless, it is the best available glimpse of North

Korea in that period. Regular acquisition in the United

States of North Korean periodicals apparently began just

after the Korean Bar. Acquisition of other printed matter,

such as books, was inconsistent until the late 1960s.

The following are the prewar periodicals consulted:

Choson Yosona (also printed as Choson Nypsonp), a women's

•*®It should be noted that in a few cases for early propaganda broadcasts, 1 have changed the spelling of names to conform to the McCune-Reischauer system.

401

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magazine, composed of general features and commentary,

published by the Democratic Bomen's league; Ch'ongnvon

Saenghwal, directed at young people, and published by the

Democratic Youth league; Dodo, a commentary of p olitics and

economics published by the North Korean People's Committee,

it ceased with the founding of the D££K; thereafter, Inmin

reflected the views of the government. The Eukchoson

T'ongsin contained news releases from the pre-1948

government. Also available were random issues of the

provincial newspaper Kangmin Inbo.

The newspaper Haebang Ilbo was published by the

North Koreans in occupied Seoul during July and August 1950;

28 issues were available in the 0.5. National Archives.

In addition, the North Korean Central Yearbook has

been published annually by the KCNA and purports to collect

statistics for each year as well as list happenings of

importance; the statistics may be suspect, but the

chronologies at least highlight the events the DPBK believed

worth publicizing.

402

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World Peoples: Reactions from the World and Socialist World) Hodonq Ch'ongnvon. 9 July 1983, p- 2-

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. "Ch'oun-uro chonki kigwanch'a 'pulk-un ki'-ul saengsan: Kim Il-song susang-ul piros-han tang-gva chongbu chidocha-dul hyonchi—eiso ch'angwan." (The Electric locomotive «Red Flag" Produced for the First Time: Party and Government Leaders, Starting with Kin Il-song, Inspect On-the-spot) Nodong Sinmun, 31 August 1961, p. 1.

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"Hyokmyong-ui widae—han suryong Kim Il-song tongchi-ggeso hangil hyokmyong t'uchaengsiki mu'usin chuyo hyokmyong chochik." (Important Revolutionary Organizations Which the Great leader of Revolution Comrade Kim Il-song Created at the Time of the Anti-

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Japanese fievclationarj Struggle) Korean Central Yearbook 1972. Pyongyang: KCNA, 1973, pp. 142-46.

"Hyondae saengnulbak mich* wibakpalchon-eso saeroun tangye-rul kaech'ok—han widaehan palchon," (Developments in the Cultivation of New Stages in the Development of Modern Biology and Medicine) Nodong Sinmun. 30 January 1962, p. 1.

"Kakkuk t'ongsin, sinmun-ul kwangpom-hi podo." (Widely Bepjprted by Various Countries' Broadcasts and Newspapers) Nodong Sinmun. 14 January 1965, p. 1.

"Kang Pan—sok nyosa-ui mopom-ul ponpada nyosong- dulul hyokmyongga-ro kyoyang-hamyo kachong-ul hyokmyonghwa-hacha." (let Os Revolutionize Families and Nurture Women as Revolutionaries, Adopting the Model of Madame Kang Pan—sok) Nodong Sinmun, 4 September 1967, p. 2.

"Kim Chong-il sonsaeng-un chuch'e yesul-ul hwalcchak kkoch' p'i—usin yesul-ui taeka-isida: ch'inae-hanun chidocha tongchi—rul Masan—ui hankyowon-i yolryol-hi hummo." (Mr. Kin Chong-il is the Man of Art Who has Caused CHOCHE Art to Bloom Widely: a Professor i n Masan Warmly R e sp e c ts th e Comrade Dear le a d e r ) Nodong Ch'ongnvon, 20 August 1983, p. 1.

"Kim Il-song chae—Ilbon Chosonin Ch'ongryon haphoi-wa kusanha tanch'ei-du leiso sanop—handaga kwiguk-han il'kknn-dul chopkyon." (Kim Il-song Receives Repatriated Functionaries Who Worked with the Korean Residents of Japan Chongryon and Subordinate Organizations) Nodong Sinmun. 31 January 1960, p. 1.

. "Kim Il-song sonchip che-2-p'an che—1-kwon palhaeng." (The First Volume of the Second Edition of Kim II—song?s Selected Works Published) Nodong Sinmun, 4 January 1964, p. 1.

. "Kin Il-song susang chonguk nyosong yolsongcha hoiui-ei ch'amga hayosston aeguk yolcha yugachok mich' inmingun hubang kachok—dul-kwa tamhwa." (Premier Kim Il-song Confers with the Families of Patriotic Martyrs and KPA Rear Area Families Who are Participating in a National Women A ctivists' Conference) Nodong sinmun. 14 April 1957, p. 1.

. "Kin Il-song susang Choson kwa-dulul tamtangkyoynk-hago issnun hyongcheiguk-ka kyoyuk ilggun—dulol chopkyon." (Premier Kim II—song Receives Education Functionaries from Brotherly Nations Which are Responsibly Educating Korean Orphans) Nodong

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Sin»an. 13 Repteaber 1957, p. 1.

"Kim II—song sasang Choson pangmnn 26 kaegnk haksaeng daép'yo-dolnl chopkyon." (Premier Kim Il-song Receives Student Representatives from 26 Countries Who are V isiting Korea) Nodong Sinmun, 14 October 1958, p. 1.

. "Kim Il-song susang Bampuk-donae inminkyongchei kak-pumun-ul sich'al-hago hyonchi-eiso chido." (Premier Kim Il-song Inspects Various Sectors of the People's Economy in N. Hamgyong Province and Gives Guidance On—the—spot) Nodong Sinmun. 8 Bay 1958, p. 1,

"Kim Il-song susang hyonchi-eiso kwiguk-hanun Chunggukinmj.n chivongun changbyong-kwa sangpong." (Premier Kim Il-song Beets locally CPV Troops Who are Repatriating) Nodong Sinmun. 13 March 1958, p. 1.

"Kim Il-song susang konsol pumun-ul chikchong chido 18 il—einun P'yongyangsi solkye il'ggun-dulkva tamhva." (Premier Kim Il-song Confers with Pyongyang City Draftibg Functionaries on the 18th and Gives Direct Guidance on the Construction Sector) Nodong Sinmun. 19 June 1958, p. 1.

"Kim Il-song susang P'yongyangsi konsolchang-ul sich'al—hago konsol saop-ul chido." (Premier Kin Il- song Inspects Pyongyang City Construction Sites and Leads Construction Bork) Nodong Sinmun. 6 April 1958, p . 1 .

"Kim Il-song sasang sang Manp'o chiku kicpso mich' nongop hyopdongchohap-ul sich 'al—hago hyonchi- eiso chido.." (Premier Kim Il-song Inspects Enterprises and Agricultural Cooperatives in the Manpo Region and Gives Guidance On-the-spot) Nodong Sinmun. 4 August 1958, p. 1.

. "Kim Il-song susang: uri nara—eiso ch'oum-uro puldocheil-ul saengsan-han Pukehung kikyegongchang rodongcha-dului roryok songgma-rul ch'ukha." (Premier Kim Il-song: Congratulates the Labor Results of Workers at the Pukchung Machinery Factory, Who Produced a Bulldozer for the First Time in Our Country) Nodong Sinmun. 29 January 1959, p. 1.

"Kin Il-song susang uri nara-eso ch'oum tturaktooru—rul saengsan-han kiyangkikye kongchang ilggun-dulun ch'ukha" (Premier Kin Il-song Congratulates Functionaries Who Produced a Tractor for the F irst Time in Our Country) Nodong Sinmun. 15 November 1958, p. 1.

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"Kim XI—so n g to n g c h i hyokmyong ry o k sa ch ayo'n yon taep'yo." .(Important Chronology for Comrade Kin Il- song* s Revolutionary History) north Korean Central Yearbook 1971. Pyongyang: KCNA, 1972-

"Kim I l - s o n g to n g c h i—ru l p ir o s-h a n tang-kw a chongpu chidocha-dul uri nara—eiso ch'oum—uro hwamul chatongch'a-rul mandun rodcngcha, kisulcha-ul ch'ukha." (Party and Government Leaders, Starting mith Comrade Kin Il-song, Congratulate Workers and Technicians Who Sade a Cargo Truck for the First Time in Cur Country) Hodonq Sinman. 19 November 1958, p. 1.

. "Kim Il-song tongchi P'yongnamdo-nae nongop hyopdong chphap-ul sichal." (Comrade Kim Il-song Inspects Agricultural Cooperatives in S. Pyongan Province) Nodong Sinmun. 16 January 1957, p. 1.

. "Kim II—song tongchi—ui ch'amsok-haei Chon Hun- sop sosok kundae changpyong-ul Choson inmingun ch'angkon 15 chunyon-ul songdaehi kyongch'uk." (With the Participation of Comrade Kin Il-song, Officers and Sen of the Unit to Which Chon Mun-sop is Attached Grandly Celebrate the 15th Anniversary of the KPA) Nodong Sinmun. 9 February 1963, p. 1-

. "Kim Il-song wonsu-ggei Upon Bikasi Kobe-ei kochu—hanun tongp'o—dulrcput'o p'yonchi." (A Letter from Overseas Comrades Residing in Japan's East Kobe to Marshal Kim Il-song) Nodong Sinmun, 18 June 1956, p. 1.

"Kuknae chungyo hyokmyong sachokchi: inmin-ui t'aeyang-i sos-un hyokmyong—ui yoram — Mangyongdae." (Important Domestic Revolutionary Remains — Mangyongdae, the Cradle of Revolution over which the Sun of the People Rises) North Korean Central Yearbook 1972. Pyongyang: KCHA, 1973, pp. 114-17.

. "Kyongae-hanun suryong Kim Il-song tongchi-ggeso Namchoson inmin-dulege peip'ulo-chusinun ttukoun sarang-gwa yukch'ik-chok paeryo, ku-ege taehan Namchoson inm in-dului taham-opsnun kyongmo." (The Warm Love and H eartfelt Care the Beloved and Respected Lader Comrade Kim Il-song Bestows on the South Korean People, Their Lim itless Respect for Him) Korean Central Yearbook 1972. Pyongyang: KCNA, 1973, pp. 249-53.

"Kyongae—hanun suryong Kim Il-song tongchi-nun uri inm in-ul hanp'um—e ana—chusinun chaeroun obo— isida." (The Beloved and Respected leader Comrade Kim Il-song is the Affectionate Father who Gathers Our People to His Boson) Korean Central Yearbook 1972.

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Pyongyang: KCNA, 1973, pp. 193—244.

. "Namchoson hyokayong-gwa chogak t'ongil—ul vihayo." (On the South Korean Revolution and Fatherland Reunification) North Korean Central Yearbook 1971. Pyongyang: KCNA, 1972, pp. 283-84.

. "Namchoson inmin-dulun panmi chachuhva-ui kich'i- rul nop'i tnlgo minchok-chok tokrip—gva chachukwon-ul silhyon—hagi wihcin t'uchaeng—ul him -issgi pollira: panil 6.10 nanse siwi t'uchaeng 57 doks P'yongyangsi kinyoB pogohoe chinhaeng." (The South Korean People, Upholding the Anti-U.S. Flag, are Strongly Spreading the Struggle to Attain National Independence and Sovereignty: a Pyongyang City Commemorative Report Meeting Held on the 57th Anniversary of the Anti- Japanese 10 June Incident Struggle) Minju Choson. 10 June 1983, p. 3.

. "Pukchoson kaekvan." (An Overview of North Korea) Korean Central Yearbook. 1949. pp. 55—56.

"20—seik i tto hana—ui sapyon, hyondae inryu-ui taeyanggwang." (The Event of the 20th Century, the Great Glory of Modern Man) Minju Choson. 7 July 1983, p. 2.

Kim C h'ang-il. "Munhwa yumul pochon-kwa ryoksa pakmulgwan." (Preserving Culturil Remains and the History Museum) Nodong Sinmun. 6 June 1955, p. 3.

Kim Ch'ang-sik. "Choguk-ui mul-un olmana malk—go mas-i issnunga!" (How Clear and Tasty is the Fatherland's Water!) Nodong Sinmun. 2 September 1958, p. 2.

Kin Ch'ang—sun. Pukhan sip 'onyon-sa. (15-year History of North Korea) Seoul: Chimungak, 5 March 1961.

Kim Che-sun. "Hangil yukyokdaevon-dului hyokmyong-chok sinnyom-gwa hyokmyong-chok rakkwanchu'i." (The Revolutionary Faith and Optimism of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Units) Kulloja. March 1984, pp. 13—16.

Kim Ch'i-kun. "Poch'onpo-ui ch'ongsori." (The Peal of Pochonbo) Nodong Sinmun.11 N ovem ber 1955, p. 3.

Kim Chin-t'aek. "'Chuch'e'-edaehan olpparun rihae-rul wihayo," (Toward a Correct Understanding of CHUCHE) Nodong Sinmun. 21 July 1956, pp. 2-3.

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Kim Ch'ol. "Si*naesga-eso." (At the Edge of the City) Nodong Sinann. 2 September 1954, p. 3.

Kim Ch'ol-hni. "Choson hyokmyong-gwa uri dang-ui chuch'e sasang." (The Korean Revolution and Our Party's CHOCHE Thought) Nodong Sinmun. 30 September 1965, p. 2.

Kim Ch'ong-song. "Paektusan changsu." (Paektusan Commander) Nodong Ch'ongnvon. 15 August 1983, p. 2.

Kim Ch'ung-chi. "Suryong-ui kyosi-rul mopom-chokuro silch 'on-hanun chido ilggundul: sep'o saop-eso." (leadership Functionaries Who are Realizing the Leader's Teaching as a Model: C ell Bork) Nodong Sinmun. 16 June 1952, p. 2.

Kim Ha-myong. "Kongsanchui kyoyang-ui kyogwaso: 'Hangil ppalcchisan ch'amgachadul-ui hoisanggi* che 3 chip- edaehayo.M (A Textbook of Communist Education: on the Third Volume of "Reminiscences of the Anti-Japanese Peurtisan Participants") Nodong Sinmun. 16 July 1960, p. 3 .

Kim Hong-il- "Chungkyong-eso kyoggun na-ui kwangbok." (My Liberation, Son in Chungking) Chungang, April 1974, pp. 1 8 6 -2 0 1 .

Kim II. "Chogak powi-nun kongin-ui sinsong—han wimu-imyo yongye-ida.f (Fatherland Defense, the Sacred Duty and Honor of the Public) Inmin IV (July 1949): 21-31.

Kim Kwang-hyop. "Choson inmingun-un uri inmin-ui chinchong— han muchangryok-imyo chogak powi-ui kangryok-han songpyok" (The KPA is a True Armed Force of Our People, a Strong Rampart to Protect the Fatherland) Nodong Sinmun. 7 February 1955, p. 2.

Kim Ok-sun. "Ttngoun oboi sarang." (Harm, Fatherly Love) Nodong Sinmun. 2 March 1962, pp. 2-3.

Kim Puk—von. "îpltu samch'onripol-ui saenorae." (A New Song over a Plain of 12- or 13,000 Hi) Nodong Sinmun. 9 June 1955, p. 3.

Kim Pyong-rok. ."Bidae-han suryong-nimgge kkut' opsi ch'ungchik—han ch'inwichonsa-ui kachang pich'-nanun hansaeng: pulyopulkul-ui kongsanchu'i hyokmyong t'usa- isin Kim Chong-suk omoni—ui sogo 33 doks—ei chu'um- hayo." (The Most Shining Life of a Bodyguard Endlessly Loyal to the Great Leader: Marking the 33rd Anniversary of the Death of the Indomitable Communist Revolutionary Fighter, Mother Kim Chong-suk) Nodong Ch'ongnvon. 22 September 1982, p. 4.

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Kia Syong-sun. fChach*e-ui soo-e kis-dun iyagi." (The Story of the flaking of the Fiber of CHOCHE) Minin Choson, 1 June 1982, p. 2.

------— "Ogacha inmin-dului chongscng." (The loyalty of Buchiatzu's People) Minju Choson. 3 June 1983, p. 2.

Kim Si—chung- "Uri hyokmyong sungri—ui ap'kil—ul aalk- hayochunun kwichung-han chich'im ." (The Precious Guidance that Illuminates the Future Path of Our Revolution's Victory) Nodong Sinmun. 3 flay 1984, p. 2.

Kim Sok—rae. "Kim Il-song susang P'yongyangsi konsolchadul- ul kyokryo.." (Premier Kim Il-song Encourages Pyongyang City Constructors) Nodong Sinmun. 23 May 1957, p. 1.

Kim Scng-hvan. fKuknip chungang haebang t'uchaeng pangaulgvan kaekvan." (The National Central Liberation Struggle Museum Opens) Nodong Sinmun. 14 August 1955, p . 3 .

Kim Su—myong. "Eahoechu'ui unhaeng-ui kinung-gva yokhal—ul to'uk nop'i-cha: widae-han suryong Kia Il-song tongchi- ui rochak ' unhaeng saop ch'ekye-rul koch'il—edaehyo' palp'yo 15 doks—e chu'um-hayo." (Let Os Further Enhance the Role and Function of the Socialist Bank: on the 15th Anniversary of the Publication of the Great Leader's Bork "On Changing the Work System of Banks") Nodong Sinmun. 29 November 1978, p. 3.

Kin T'ae-hyon. FInmindaechung—e wiko-hayo t 'uchaeng-hanun gos-un hyokmyong sungri-ui kunpon yolswae." (Struggling by Relying on the Popular Masses is a Basic Key to the Victory of the Revolution) Nodong Sinmun. 29 November 1983, p. 2.

Kin Tu—yong- "Sam-il undong 30 chu'nyoa—ul machi—hasyonso." (Celebrating the 30th Anniversary of the March First Movement) Inmin IV (March 1949): 23—33.

Kin 0-chin. "Tang—gwa suryong—i uri-rul k'iossda." (The Party and Leader Raised Os) Nodong Sinmun. 22 January 1955, p. 3.

Kim On—yop. "Muhan—han sin r i, yolryol—han hwanho!" (Boundless Trust, Warm Welcome!) Nodong Sinmun. 11 November 1950, p. 3.

Kin Ong. "Choson inmingun-on p'ilsungpulp'ae-ui ryokryang- uro changsong kanghwa-dwiossda." (The KPA has Strengthened its Growth as an Invincible Force, Certain of Victory) Nodong Sinmun. 5 February 1952, p. 2.

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Kim On^nam. "Chuch'e-ui hyokmyong chondong-nl pich*—nae'imyo." (The G lorification of the Revolutionary Tradition of CHOCHE) Nodong Ch'ongnvon, 15 February 1977, p. 2-

"On-sahoe-rol chuch'e ScLsanghma-hanun k i l ' l o ! " (Onward on the Path of Imbuing the Entire Society with the CHOCHE Ideology!) Nodong Ch'ongnvon. 19 February 1977, p. 2.

Kim Non-son and Cho Kun-wol. "Chollima (2)." Nodong- Sinmun. 3 August 1958, p. 2.

Kin long. "Yang T'ae-hyon yong'ung-ui mopom—ul ttara." (Following the Model of Hero Yang T'ae-hyon) Minju Choson. 23 September 1950, p. 3.

KWP Central Committee, Party History Research Center. Pulkul-ui panil hyokmyong t ' usa Kim Hyong—chik sonsaeng. -Indomitable Revolutionary Fighter, Mr. Kia Hyong—chik) Pyongyang: KHP Publishing Company, 12 June 1968.

, Party History Research Center. "Tangryoksa yongu- wa kwanryong-han charyo-rul suchipchongri-hagiwihan myech'kachi munche." (Some Problems in Regulating the Collection pf Materials Related to Party History Research) Nodong Sinmun. 4 July 1957, p. 2.

, Propaganda and Agitation Department. Kin Il-song changgun-ui rvakchon. " (A Brief Life of General Kin Il-song) KNP Publishing Company, 15 April 1952.

Min Pyong-kyun. "Ori-ui Ch'oego saryonggwan—isiyo." (He is Our Supreme Commander) Minju Choson. 12 August 1950, p. 2 .

NKHP Central Headguarters Propaganda and Agitation Department. Chungguk Chonqsei (The China Situation) Pyongyang: RKBP Publishing Co., 15 July 1949.

O Chae-won. "Oboi suryong-ui k'unak'un p'umsok-eso." (In the Enormous Bosom of the Fatherly Leader) Nodong Sinmun. 11 November 1967, p. 2.

0 Ik-kun. "Paektusan-eso Hallasan-kkacbi (1)." (From Mt. Paektu to at. Halla (1)) Nodong Sinmun. 3 January 1961, p . 3 .

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O Kju—t'ae. "ïonggvang—ch*an sangni—ui k il: sae—ro kaekwan- twoenan Poch'onpo Pangmalgvan-eso." (The £oad to Glorious Victory: the Newly-opened Pochonbo Museum) Nodong Sinman. 4 June 1963, p. 3.

0 Paek—ryong. "Pulk-un kundae-wa topulo." (Together with the Bed Army) Hodonq Sinmun. 13 August 1960, p. 2.

Om II-kyu. "'Panmannyon minchoksau-e kachang ch * anran-hi pich'-nanun yongkwang': widae-han suryoog-ul yolryol-hi hummo-hanun Namchoson inmin—dul." ("The Most Splendid Glory in Our People's History of 5,000 Years": the South Korean People Who Warmly Admire the Great leader) Hodonq Sinmun, 31 December 1982, p. 4.

Paek Ch'an-pin. "Nuguna ta maum-kkos pae'u-nun kkut' ops- nun haengpok." (The Unlimited Happiness of Everyone Studying to Heart's Content) Minin Chosen. 14 April 1977, p. 2.

Paek Hak-riffl. "Chuch'e-ui kunsa sasang-gwa t'akwol-han ryongkunsul—ui widae-han sungri." (The Great Victory of CHUCHE M ilitary Thought and Unsurpassed Commanding Art) Kulloia. July 1983, pp. 38-44.

Paek Nam-un. Ssoryon insang. (Impressions of the Soviet Union) Pyongyang: Korean History Editorial Committee, 17 March 1950.

Pak Chong-ae. "Inmin-ui paksu ch'achi—han ycsong-un Kia I l- son g ch a n g g u n -u i c h e s i- h a n k i l - l o a a e c h in ." (Women, to the Applause of the People, Advance Along the Hoad Presented by General Kin Il-song.) Chosen Hvosong. June 1947, pp. 12-14.

Pak Hui-chin. "Hondon—gwa Ch'angcho." (Chaos and Creation) Sasangye, April 1955, pp. 356—72.

Pak li. "Apchang-eso chonchon-hanua ch'ol-ui dae'o." (Banks of Iren Advancing in the Forefront) Nodong Ch'ongnvon. 25 August 1983, p. 3.

Pak In-ch'ol. "Minchok-ui t'aeyang-ul ddalu-nun maum." (Hearts Filled with the Sun of the People) Nodong Sinmun, 30 August 1983, p. 5.

Pak Ki-ch'un. "Ku'i-ui k'unak'un sarang." (Bis Enormous Love) Nodong Sinmun. 7 May 1961, p. 2.

Pak Kyong—suk. "Ppalcchisan sidae-rul hoisang-hamyonso.« (Recalling Partisan Times) Choson Nyosong. February 1950, pp. 32-33.

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Pak Mum-song and Kin Chong-kya. "Chekakchn'i-rul pandae- hago segye-ai chachahwa—rul takuch'yo nakacha." (Opposing Imperialism, Let Os Achieve World Independence) Nodong Sinmun, 9 July 1983, p. 2.

Pak Pyong—kyu. yHyokmyong—ui ryongdocha-etaehan ch'angsilsong-ui chondong-ul ch*angcho-han kos-un Choson kongsanchu'ui untong-ui k'unak'un charang." (Creation of a Tradition of Loyalty to the Leader of the Revolution is the Great Pride of the Korean Communist Movement) Nodong Sinmun. 16 April 1984, p. 2.

Pak Se—kuk. "Ch.'angcho-ui him." (The Power of Creation) Nodong Sinman.30 A u g u s t 1958, p. 4.

Pyon Song—won. ••Kim Il-song sonchip'—ul sim 'ohi haksup- bachi: haengdong-ui chich'im." (Deeply Studying Kin Il-song*s Collected Works; Guidance for Action) Nodong Sinmun. 4 September 1961, p. 2.

Ro Sang-sin. "Kim Il-song changgun-ui ryakchon-ul inmin- dulun aedok yongu-hago issda." (The People are Reading with Pleasure and Studying General Kin Il-song's Short Biography) -Nodong Sinmun. 14 April 1952, p. 1.

Sin Ho—kun. "Choson Rodongdang-un Choson rodong kyekup-ui hyokmyong-chok hangil haebang t'uchaeng-ui kyesungcha- ida.” (The KWP is the Successor to the Revolutionary Anti-Japanese Liberation Struggle of the Korean Working Class) Nodong Sinmun. 7 March 1956, p. 2-

So Ch'ol. "Choson inmingun-un hangilmuchang t'uchaeng—ui pich'-nanun hyokmyong chondong-ul kyesung-han inmin-ui muryok." (The KPA is a People's Armed force Inheriting the Shining Revolutionary Tradition of the Anti- Japanese Armed Struggle) Nodong Sinmun. 1 February 1959, p. 2-

So T'ae-sok. "Okryukum." Minin Choson. 3 September 1982, p . 4 .

Sok Chun-hak and Kim Kyong-sok, "Kongsanchui kyoyang-ui hullyung-han kyogvaso: hoisanggi-chip 'Inmin-ui chayu- va haebang—ul wihayo." (A Splendid Textbook for Communist Education: on the Memoirs "For the Freedom and Liberation of the People") Nodong Sinmun. 14 August 1962, p. 2.

Song Ch'ol. "Inmingundae-ui pokmu-nun ch'ongnyon-dului kosang-han yongye-ida." (Service in the KPA, the High Honor of lonth) Ch'ongnvon saenghwal. February 1949, pp. 1 9 -2 1 .

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Song Hak-kan. "Sarang-gwa sinnyom." (Love and faith) Chollima. January 1984, p. 64.

long Pong—sop. fSangil yukyokdae-ui sungo-han hyokmyong chongsin-ul rae'ucha," (Let us Learn the Lofty Revolutionary Spirit of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Units) Hodonq Sinmun. 21 April 1962, p. 3.

------• " I id a e -h a n saran g—uro sunoh—ach in p u lm y o l-u i ryoksa—edaehan pich*—naan hwapok: yesulyonghva 'Choson- ui pyol* 7—pu *Namman-eso'—edae hayo." (Shining Portrait of the Immortal History Displaying Great Love: on Part 7, **At Hamman," of the feature film "Star of Korea") Hodonq Sinmun. 29 July 1983, p. 2.

Yang Chae-ch'un. "Mangyongdae." Hodonq Sinman. 4 August 1960, pp. 3—4.

Yi Chae-ch'on. "Chungsan—gwa cholyak yebi-rul ottohke ch'achassnun-ka?" (How Did He Seek Increased Production and Conserve Reserves?) Hodonq Sinmun. 10 January 1957, p. 2.

Yi Chong-kun. "Haebang i*nyon-ei issoso Pukchoson nodongcha-dului saenghwal." (The Life of north Korean Workers in Two Years of Liberation) Podo. no. 4, n-d., pp. 1 7 -2 5 .

Yi Chong—sun. "Iidae-han ryoksa, pulmyol-ui opchok—ul p*yolch'yo-pyoyochunun kinyompi-chok taechak: yesul yonghwa *nuri-e put*-nun pul*-e taeha-myo." (A Commemorative Work Showing Great H istory, Immortal Achievements: on the feature film "fire Spreading All Over the Land") Kulloia. August 1977, pp. 28—35.

Yi Ch*ong—von. "liehe t'ongch'i-haeso-ui Choson inmin-ui haebang t'uchaeng." (The Liberation Struggle of the Korean People from under Japanese Im perialist Rule) Rodong Sinmun. 6 August 1955, p. 2.

Yi Chong-t'ae. "Chonsungsang-un kangch'ol-ui ryongchang-ul norae-handa." (Sing of the Iron-willed Victorious Commander) Hodonq Sinmun. 25 July 1983, p. 2.

------and Hong Pyong-su. "Hyokmyong-chok rakkwan." (Revolutionary Optimism) Hodonq Sinmun. 19 June 1983, p. 2.

Yi Ho. "Uridang—un kango—han hyokmyong-chok t'uchaeng- sokeso ch'anggon yusong-dweossda." (Our Party was founded and Nurtured in the D ifficult Revolutionary Struggle) Nodong Sinman. 5 August 1956, pp. 2-3.

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Yi I-k i. "Inmin-dulsokeso: inmin panchang-duloi moim-eso." (Among the People: at a Meeting of Neighborhood Chiefs) Hodonq Sinmun. 13 July 1962, p. 2.

Yi Ki—yong. "Miche ch'imryakcha—dul tanchoi—handa." (Condemning the O.S. Im perialist Invaders) Hodonq Sinmun, 25 June 1959, p. 5-

Yi Kun and Sin Mun-ho. "Yongwon-han sarang—ui p'um." (The Bosom of Eternal Love) Hodonq Sinmun, 20 July 1982, p. 2 .

Yi Man-song. "Ssutallin-gwa ch'ongnyon." (Stalin and Youth) Ch'ongnvon saenghwal. December 1949, pp. 8-15.

Yi Ha-yong. "Choson hyokmyong undong-eso-ui Choguk Kwangbokhoi-ui ryoksa-chok wich'i." (The Historic Position of the ERA in the Korean Revolutionary Movement) Nodong Sinmun. 13 May 1956, pp. 3—4.

Yi Po—ham. "3-dae hyokmyong socho untong—un sasang hyokmyong, k isu l hyokmyong, munhwa hyokmyong suhaeng-ui him-issnun ch'utongryok." (The Three Revolutions Movement, Vigorous Motive Force For Ideological, Technical, and Cultural Revolution) Nodong Ch'ongnvon. 1 February 1977, p. 2.

Yi P'yo-u. "315—ho ttangk'u—wa hamggei: kcnghwakuk yong'ung Ho Sun-hak tongmu—e taehan iyagi." (iith Tank Number 315: the Stpry of the Republic's Hero, Ban Sun-hak) Minju Choson. 22 July 1983, p. 4.

Yi Ryong-am. "Choguk-ui p'um-sokeso." (In the Bosom of the Fatherland) Nodong Sinmun. 13 April 1963, p. 2.

Yi Si-kyong. "Sae-Choson-ui sonkucha-rago puro-chusidon kunal-roput.'o: widae-han suryong-nimggeso Kim Chik— hyon tongmu—ege tollyo—chusin sarang-gwa mit'um-e taehan iyagi." (From That Day He was Called the Vanguard of the New Korea: the Story of Love and Trust the Great Leader Bestowed on Comrade Kin Chik-hyon) Hodonq Sinman. 16 October 1982, p. 2.

Yi Su-kun. "Hyokmyong-chok suryonggwan-e tae—hayo." (Concerning the Revolutionary View of the Leader) Chollima. November 1983.

Yi Sung-ki. "Pinailon—e kisdus iyagi." (The Story of Making Vinalon) Nodong Sinmun.9 M arch 1962, p p . 2—3.

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îi Tong-kyu. "Haebang—dvoen So*al." (Liberated Seoul) Nodong Sinman, 14 July 1950, p. 4.

Zi Zong-ho. "Chont'u hoisanggi: 351 kocbi cbont*u-rul hoisang-hayo." (Combat Memoirs: Remembering Combat on H ill 351) Hodonq Sinmun. 21 December 1962, pp. 2-3.

Yi Yong-sam. "Kia Chong-suk tongchi hyokmyong sachokkwan-ul ch'achaso (1): chokuk kwangpok-ui saepom." (Seeking the Comrade Kim Chong-suk Memorial (1): the Early Spring of Fatherland Restoration) Nodong Ch'ongnyon. 21 November 1982, p. 2.

------. "Kin Chong-suk tongchi hyokmyong sachokkwan—ul ch'achaso (7): chuch'e hyokmyong wiop-gwa topulo yongwon-hari." (Seeking the Comrade Kin Chong-suk Memorial (7): Ever Together with the CHOCHE Revolutionary Task) Nodong Ch'ongnyon, 21 December 1982, p. 2.

"Kim C hong-suk to n g c h i hyokmyong sach ok k w an -u l ch'achaso (6): haebang-twoen choguk ttang-eso." (Seeking the Comrade Kim Chong-suk Memorial (6): on the Liberated Fatherland's Ground) Hodonq Ch'ongnvon. 10 December 1982, p. 2.

- . "Kim Chong-suk tongchi hyokmyong sachokkwan-ul ch'achaso (2): hyokmyong-ui kil-lo." (Seeking the Comrade Kim Chong-suk Memorial (2): the Road of Revolution) Nodong Ch'ongnyon. 26 November 1982, p. 2.

_ "Kim Chong-suk tongchi hyokmyong sachokkwan-ul ch'achaso (4): yongwon—han ch'unsil-ui pyol-i twoesimyo." (Seeking the Comrade Kim Chong-suk Memorial (4): Becoming the Star of Eternal Loyalty) Nodong Ch'ongnyon. 4 December 1982, p. 2.

Yi Yong—sun. "Choson nyosongdul-ui yonggwang—suroun aeguk chon'tong-gwa hyokmyong-chok cholgae." (The Glorious Patriotic Tradition and Revolutionary Fidelity of Korean Women) Nodong Sinmun. 28 February 1960, p. 3.

Yis Chong-kun. "Kim Il-song tongchi Hwanghae chech'olso—rul sich 'al—hago rodongchadul-gwa tamhwa." (Comrade Kim I l- song Inspects Hwanghae Iron Works and Confers with Workers) Nodong Sinmun. 5 January 1957, p. 1.

Yin Ch'un—ch'u, fKyongae-hanun Kim Il-song tongchi-nun choguk-ui kwangpok-gwa minchok-ui pqnyong-ul wihan wiop-ul pich'-nage iggulo'osin widae-han ryongdocha- isida." (The Respected and Beloved Comrade Kim Il-song is the Great Leader Who has B rilliantly Led the Cause of the Liberation of the Fatherland and National

432

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Prosperity) Nodong Sinann,25 J u l y 1 9 8 5 , p . 2-

ria Yong-ho. "Knnal-ui yonggwang kasoa-e ango." (The Day's Glory Rests in Their Bosoms) Nodong Ch'ongnyon, 13 July 1983, p. 3.

Yun Ki-pok. Kia Il-song wonsunim-ui orinsichol iyagi. (Stories from the Youth of Marshal Kia Il-song) Pyongyang: Democratic Youth Publishing Company, 20 April 1963.

Yun Se-chang. "Ku'usi—kokae: Kim changgun ppalcchisan chont'u-ui han t'omak." (Kn'usi Pass: an Instance of Combat by General Kim's Partisans) Ch'ongnvon saenghwal M arch 1950, pp. 84-90.

(unsigned). "Chaeil Chosonin Cb'ongryonhaphoi kyolsongdaehoi: Kim Il-song wonsu-ke turi-nun p'yonchi." (The Choson Soren Formation Meeting for Korean Residents of Japan: a letter to Marshal Kim 11- song) Nodong sinmun, 26 June 1955, p. 1.

. "Choach'e inmin-un uri minchok-chok yongung Kin Il-song changgun chuwi-e tout kutke tangyol—hayo miche- ui ch'imryak-ul punswae-hacha." (Let Os, the Entire People, Even More Firmly Onited Around Our National Hero, General Kim Il-song, Crush U.S. Imperialism's Invasion) Haebang Ilbo. 8 July 1950, p. 1.

. "Chonguk rodongcha, kisulcha, samuwon-ege ponae— nun hosomun." (An Appeal Sent to the Country*: Workers, Technicians, and O ffice Workers) Nodong Sinmun. 10 J u ly 1982, p . 1.

. "Ch'ongnyon-dulun '80 nyondae sokdo' ch'ancho-eso kisu-ga twoe—go yong'ung—i twoe—cha." (let Youth Become Standard Bearers and Heroes in Creating the "Speed of the 80s") Nodong Ch'ongnyon. 15 Julj 1983, p. 1.

, "Ch'ongsonyon-edaehac. sasang kyoyang-eso tae-rul t'unt'un-hi seu-cha." (Let Us Firmly Establish a Tradition in the Ideological Indoctrination of Youth and Children) Nodong Ch'ongnvon. 29 July 1983, p. 1.

"Chonsegye inm in-ui kip'—un aedo." (The Great Sorrow of the People of the Whole World) Nodong Sinmun, 9 M arch 1953, p . 1.

. "Choson Inmingun ch'anggun samchunyon kinyon P'yongyangsi kyongch'uk daehoe songfawang." (Status of the Pyongyang City Congratulatory Bally on the Third Anniversary of the Founding of the KPA) Nodong Sinmun. 9 February 1951, p. 1.

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"Choson Inmingondae-nun chinchong-han inmin-ui kundae—ida.i* (The KPA units are a True People's Army) Haebang Ilbo. 21 July 1950, p. 1-

. "Choson inmingun-ui songpyck-in inmingnndae-ui ch'angsol." (Pounding of the KPA, the Bastion of the Korean People) Pukchoson t'ongsin. no. 22, February 1948, pp. 12-13.

"Choson minchu nyosong tongaaeng che5ch'a daehoe." (The Korean Democratic Women's league Fifth Congress) Hodonq Sinmun. 27 July 1983, p. 1.

"Chospn Rodongdang chungangvimonhoe. Chosonminchuchu*ui inmin konghvaguk naegak, Kim Il-song vonsu-gge turi-nun maesemun." (Written Promises to the KWP Central Committee, DPRK Cabinet, and Marshal Kim Il-song) Hodonq Sinmun. 9 January 1956, p. 1.

"Cboson-ui omoni." (The Mother of Korea) Rodong Sinann. 19 August 1967, p. 6.

• "Chuch'e-chokin chong'gwon konsol-ui kil-ul pich'na—ge kaech'ok-hayo'on widae-han ryongdo—ui ryoksa." (History of the Great leadership Brightly Developing the Road of Constructing a CBDCHE-type Regime) Rodong Sinmun. 27 August 1983, p. 2.

. "Hyokmyong-chok sinnyom-gwa pulkyol-ui t'uchi-rul ango: Choson Inmingun Chong Hang-ryop tongmu sosck kupundae—eso." (Revolutionary Spirit: at the KPA Onit to Which Comrade Chong Hang-ryop is Attached) Rodong Sinmun. 27 July 1982, p. 3.

. "Inmingundae-nun uri-ui charang-imyo yongkwang- ida." {The KPA — Our Boast and Glory) Ch'ongnvon saenqwhal. February 1950, pp. 8-9.

"Kim changgun-gwa kulpaeulgos—ul yaksok-hago sagaevolman-ei Kim changgun-eigei p'yonch-rul ssoponaen Kangwondo-i kyesan yocha." (The Kangwon Province Woman Who Promised General Kim to learn to Write and Wrote Him a Letter After Four Months) Chosen Yosong. December 1947, pp. 90-91.

. "Kim Hyong-chik sonsaengnim-ggeso chiosin norae." (A Song for Mr. Kim Hyoqg-chik) Rodong Sinmun. 27 March 1968, p. 3.

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"Kia 11—song changgun—gge messechi changchi: haebang-dcen nanpanpu gaXchi inoin-dulrc put'o." (Local Messages to General Kim Il-song: From People in Various Areas of the Liberated Southern Half) Hodonq Sinmun. 6 August 1950, p. 1.

"Kia Il-song changgun-ggeso kukkihunchang ch eil- kup suyo padusinde-daehayo." (General Kim II—song Awarded the Rational Flag Medal, First Class) Hodonq Sinmun. 14 February 1951, p. 1.

"'Kim II—song changgunnim-ggeso kyesiyo uri minchung-egedo haengbok—han r a e 'il-i kiyak—tvoeyo issda.'" ("General Kim Il-song Has Become the Pledge of a Blessed Tomorrow for Our People") Hodonq Sinmun. 21 June 1983, p. 1.

"'Kim Il-song changgunnim—un kwangpok-ui unin— isid a': widae-han suryongnim-ul Kwangju—ui han kodunghakkyp kyowon-gwa haksaeng-duli yclryol-hi hummo." ("General Kin Il-song is the Patron of Liberation": Faculty and Students of a Kwangju High School Warmly Admire the Great Leader) Rodong Sinmun. 25 December 1982, p. 1.

. "Kin Il-song changgun t'uchaeng-ui kirck, Ssoryon kundae—ui wiyong — Pukchoson chungang pagmulgwan hyondae-sa s il kaekvan." (The Record of General Kim Il-song's Struggle, the Grand Appearance of the Soviet Army: Opening of the Rorth Korean Central Museum Modern H is to r y Room) Minju C hoson. 13 A ugust 1947, p . 3 .

. "Kin Il-song changgun-ui hoso chonchoson ch'ongnyon—un hwanho—handa." (A ll Korean Youth Acclaim General Kim II—song's Petition) Podo. no. 3, August 1947, pp. 42-45.

. "Kim Il-song changgun-ui kyosi-rul chich'im—uro inmin-ui ch'ungsil—han pokmucha-ka toechaS" (Let Os be Public Servants Loyal to the People, with General Kim II—song's Teachings as Guide!) Hodonq Sinmun. 6 March 1952, p. 1.

"Kim Il-song changgun-ui mycngryong paddulgo ch'oechong-chok sungri-rul hyang-hayo ap'uroî" (Obeying General Kim Il-song*s Orders, Forward Toward Final Victory!) Minju Choson. 18 August 1950, p. 1.

. "Kin il-song changgun-ui ycnsol-ul chich'im-uro inm in-ui ch:' ungsil—han pokmucha-ka toecha!” (Let Us be Public Servants Loyal to the People, with General Kim Il-song's Speech as Guide) Hodonq Sinmun. 24 February 1952, p. 1.

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"Kim Il-song changgun—ul susok-uro hanun konghvaguk chung'ang chongpu choldae chichi: namchoson gak chongdang tanch*e—dul songmyong." (Absolute Support for the Republic's Central Government Led by General Kim Il-song: Statements by Various South Korean P olitical Parties and Social Groups). Minju Choson. 19 September 1948, p. 2.

"Kim II—song changgun-un chonchoson minchok-ui ryongdocha-rda." (General Kin Il-song is the Leader of all the Korean People) Podo. no. 3, August 1947, pp. 1 3 -2 1 .

"Kia Il-song Kwangchang, Ssutallin Kori, Mo T'aek-tong Kwangchang, Inmingun Kori kaet'ongsik mich' Moranbong Kukchang, Moranbong Ondongchang chungongsik songdae-hi kohaeng." (Holding the Opening Grandly for Kim Il-song Square, Stalin Street, Mao Tse-tung Sguare, KPA S treet, Moranbong Theater and Moranbong Stadium) Hodonq Sinmun. 13 August 1954, p. 2.

"Kia Il-song susang-ggeso chakgok-ga sassi-eigei p'iano suyo." (Premier Kim Il-song Distributes Pianos to Four Composers) Choson Hvosong. September 1949, p. 59.

"Kim Il-song susang P'yongyang-chiku kongchang mich' konsolchang-dulul sich'al." (Premier Kia Il-song Inspects Pyongyang Area Factories and Construction Sites) Hodonq Sinmun. 11 November 1956, p. 1.

. "Kim Il-song wiwonchang-eigei ponae-nun m eiseichi." (Messages Sent to Chairman Kim IL-song) Hodonq Sinmun. 22 August 1948, p. 1.

. "Kim II—song wonsu-ege turi-nun p'yonchi." (Letter to Marshal Kin Il-song) Hodonq Sinmun. 19 Hovembec 1954, p. 1; 26 April 1955, p. 1.

. "Ko An K il so n sa en g r y a k s o ." (A S h o rt B iography of the Late Mr. An Kil) Minju Choson. 6 December 1947, p . 1.

"Ko Kim Yong-sam tongchi." (The Late Comrade Kim Yong-sam) Hodonq Sinmun. 1 September 1952, p. 3.

"Konghwaguk i-chungyong'ung Paek Sa-sun chungkichung daechang." (The Republic's Double Hero, Paek Sa-sun, Armor Company Commander) Hodonq Sinmun. (The republic's double hero Paek Sa-sun, armor company commander)

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. "Kakrip chungang haebang t'uchaeng pangmuigwan- eso." (At the National Central liberation Struggle Museum) Hodonq Sinmun. 25 A ugust 1 955, p . 3 .

"Kukrip chungang haebang t'uchaeng pakmulgwan Poch'onpo pnngvan kaeguan." (The National Central l i b e r a t i o n S tr u g g le Museum Pochonbo Branch Opens) Hodonq Sinmnn. 8 August 1955, p. 1.

. "K unchungroson-ui kwangch'ol-un hyokmyong-chok ryongto pangpop-ui kipon yoku." (Implementation of a Mass Line is the Basic Demand of the Revolutionary Guidance Method) Hodonq Sinmun. 11 November 1983, p. 1.

"Kyongae-hanun Kim Il-song tongchi-nun hyokmyong- ui ap'kil-ul palkhi-go uri inmin-ul sungri—va yonggvang-exo ikkusi—nun vidae-han suryong-ida." (The Beloved and Respected Comrade Kia Il-song is the Great Leader Who has Illuminated the Course of the Revolution and Brought Our People to Victory and Glory) Nodonq Sinmun. 22 November 1977, p. 1.

"Kyongae-hanun suryong Kia Il-song tongchi-nun widae-han kunsa chonryok'ka-isiayo paekchonpaeksung-ui kangch'ol-ui rycngchang-issda." (The Beloved and Respected Leader Comrade Kim II—song is a Great M ilitary Tactician and Invincible Iron Commander) Minju Choson. 24 July 1983, p. 2.

• "Kyongae-hanun Kia Il-song vonsu—rul hanchari—esc mosin kwikuk tongp'o-dului pokch'an kamkyok-gwa k'unak'un haengdong." (The Full Gratitude and Great Happiness for the Respected and Beloved Marshal Kim Il- song by the Repatriated Overseas Comrades, Gathered in One Place) Hodonq Sinmun. 22 December 1959, p. 1.

"Kyongwonson Kosan—P'yonggang-gan ch'oldo kaet'ongsik kohaeng." (Holding the Opening Ceremony for the Kosan—P'yongang Railroad — the Kyongwon Line) Nodonq Sinmun.29 S e p te m b e r 1 9 5 4 , p . 1.

. "Michekukchu'uicha-dului saechcnchaeng topal ch'aektong—ul punswae-hacha!" (Let Us Smash the Hew War Maneuvers of the U.S. Im perialists!) Nodong Sinmun. 28 January 1968, p. 1.

. "Modun ch'ongso'nyon-dulun chuch'e wiop-ui ch'am- taun kyesungcha-ro t'unt'un-hi chunpi-hacha." (Let Os Thoroughly Prepare All Youth as the Real Inheritors of the CHOCHE Cause) Hodonq Sinmun. 22 January 1977, p. 1.

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• "Modun ilggun-dulun tangchongch'aek-ul muchokon kvanch'ol—hanun hyokmyong—chok kip'ung-ul nop'-i palhwi—hacha. *• (let A ll Functionaries Manifest the Bevolutionary Spirit of Unconditionally Carrying Out Party Policy) Hodonq Sinmun. 7 February 1977, p. 1.

. "Munhak yesul hyokmyong-gwa pich'nanun ryongdo." (Literary and A rtistic Revolution and Brilliant Leadership) Choson Yesul. February 1984, pp. 12—13.

. "Hicheru Kang—ui yongwon—han hurum-gwa topulo." (Together with the Eternal Flow of the Niger River) Hodonq Sinmun, 17 July 1982, p. 4.

. "Paekchu-e kamhaeng-han miche-ui nal kangdo haengwi." (Acts of Robbery Committed Blindly by the U.S. Im perialists) Hodonq Sinmun. 26 January 1968, p. 1. . "Paek'kwa churong-chin Ch'cngch'un kwawon." (Ch'ongch'un Orchard, Clustered with Fruit) Minju Choson. 25 August 1983, p. 3.

Panil t 'usa yonsol-ehip. (Collection of Speeches by Anti-Japanese Fighters) Pyongyang: August15 Liberation F irst Anniversary Remembrance Central Committee: 15 A u g u s t 1 9 4 7 .

. "Poch-'cnpo'up-ei konrip—dwoen Kin Il-song wonsu- ui tongsang chemaksik kohaeng." (Unveiling the Statue of Marshal Kim Il-song, Put Up in Pochonbo) Nodonq S in m u n . 8 A u g u s t 1 955, p . 1 .

. "Ponghwa huru-nun Poch'onpo-ui pankori," (Night S t r e e t s in Pochonbo in Which T orch es Wave) Nodonq Sinmun. 5 June 1957, p. 2-

. "PPullok pulkatan untong-un wiryok-han hyokmyong ryokryang-ida." (The Non-aligned Movement is a Powerful Revolutionary Force) Nodonq Sinmun. 1 September 1983, p. 1.

. "P'yongyangsi konsolcha—ege yolryol-hi ch'ukha— rul ponaena." (Sending Congratulations Warmly to Pyongyang City Constructors) Hodonq Sinmun. 19 December 1958, p. 1.

"Ryoksa-chok i—wol kyosi.« (The H istoric February Teaching) Nodonq Sinmun. 1 February 1955, p. 2.

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• "Sahoeclia 'ai unhaeng-ui kinung—gwa yokhal—ul touk nop'icha: widae-han suryong Kim 11-song tongchi-ui rochak "unhaeng saop ch'ekye-rul koch'il—de daehayo* palp'yo 15 doks-e chu'um-hayo" (let us Farther Enhance the Bole and Function of the Socialist Bank — on the 15th Anniversary of the Great Leader's Bork "On Changing the Bork System of Banks") Hodonq Sinmun. 29 November 1978, p. 2.

"Saehwankyong-gwa kundang wiwonhoe-ui saop." (The New Environment and County Party Committee Bork) Nodonq Sinmun. 22 February 1960, p. 1.

"Sahoechu'ui nongch'on kyongri—ui kailch'ung-ui angyang-ul wihayo." (To Raise One Step Higher Socialist Rural Management) Nodonq Sinmun. 11 January 1959, p. 2.

"Songdo chongch'i kyongche taehak kaekyo il— chuyon kinyossik kohaeng." (Holding the First Anniversary Ceremony of the Opening of Songdo College of P olitics and Economics) Nodong Sinmun. 3 October 1954, p. 1.

"Sonypn tanwon-dulul hyokmyong-ui hupidae-ro t'unt'un-hi chunpi-sik'ida." (Let Ds Firmly Prepare the Members of the Young People's Corps to Become Revolutionary Reserves) Nodonq Sinmun. 6 June 1984, p. 5 .

"Ssoryon inmin taesungni-ui changchccha-imyo inryu-ui kusong-in widae-han Ssutallin." (Great Stalin, Creator of the Great Victory of the Soviet People, the Star of Salvation of Mankind) Kanqwcn Inminbo. 21 December 1947, p. 1.

. "Ssoryon-ui taeil chonsung c'nyon-e che—hayo." (On the Fifth Anniversary of the Soviet Onion's Complete Victory over Japan) Minju Choson. 3 September 1950, p. 1.

. "Ssutallin taewonsu-eigei ponae-nun kamsamun." (Letter of Gratitude Sent to Marshal Stalin) Saechoson. no. 9, n.d., pp. 4-9.

"Ssutallin-un inryu haebang-ui kusong-ida: Ssutallin taewonsu t'ansaeng ch 'ilsip chunyon—ei che— hayo." (Stalin, Organizer of People's Liberation: Offered on Marshal Stalin's 70th Birthday) Choson Hvosong. December 1949, pp. 2-7.

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"Sungri-wa yonggwang-uro pich'-nanun 20nyon." (Twenty Shining Tears of Victory and Glory) Nodong Sinman. 15 August 1965, p. 1.

. "Surypng Jcarach'i-nun killo." (On the Road the Leader Taught) Hodonq Sinann. 15 February 1952, p. 3-

• "Suryong-nimggeso hana-rul malssum-hasimyo uri- nun yolgachj.—rul ch'ach—Jco paek'gachi-rul haekycl-hanun kip'ung—ul sewoya—handa." (He must Establish the Spirit of Finding Ten and Solving 100 Problems When the Leader T ells Os One) Hodonq Ch'ongnvon. 22 January 1977, p. 2.

. "Surypng-ui kyosi-rul nop'i paddulgo p'yonghwa- chok choguk t'ongil wiop-ero!" (Holding High the Leader's Teaching, on to the Great Task of Peaceful Reunification!) Hodonq Sinmun. 23 August 1955, p. 1.

"Surypng—ui kyosi-rul silch'on k'iwi—han t'uchaeng: Bamnamdo dangwiwon chon*qnhoe—eso." (The Struggle to Foster Realization of the Leader's Teachings: at the Plenary Session of the South Hamgyong Province Party Committee) Nodonq Sinmun. 19 March Ï952, p . 2 .

"Surypng yongu ggapinet'u: chipang sinmun- duleso." (A Cabinet for Researching the Leader: from Regional Newspapers) Nodonq Sinmun. 24 March 1955, p. 3 .

"I'akwcl—han Halksu-Lenin-chu'icha I. H. Ssutallin TFansaeng 80-chunyon." (The 80th Birthday o£ the Splendid Marxist—Leninist J. V. Stalin) Nodonq Sinmun. 22 December 1959, p. 2.

. "Tang—gwa chongbu—wa surycng-ege turi-nun kamsa- wa kyol'ui.." (Gratitude and Resolutions Sent to the Party, Government, and Leader) Nodonq Sinmun. 9 October 1954, p. 1.

"lang-gwa chongbu-va surycng-ege turi-nun maengse." (Vows to the Party, Government, and Leader) Hodonq Sinman. 26 October 1954, p. 1.

. "Tang-gwa suryong-gge yongye-rul turinda." (Giving Honor to the Party and the Leader) Nodonq Sinmun. 13 August 1955, p. 1.

. "Tang-gwa suryong-ui ryongdo-ha'e." (Onder the Leadership of the Party and Leader) Nodong Sinmun. 15 April 1955, p. 1.

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. "laaghaksup-eso kyochocha* ai—ral t'oech'i—hacha." (Let Us Exterminate Dogmatism in Party Education} Sodonq Sinman. 3 August 1955, p. 1.

• "Tang—ui sasang-chok kisu." (The Party's Ideological Standard-bearer) Modcng Sinmun. 1 November 1955, p. 1.

"Dridang-oi kyuyak,« (Our Party's Code) Hodcng Sinmun. 3 Hay 1 9 5 6 , p . 1.

"Ori—eigeinun irohge chunpi-tuoen chido ilggun- duli issda: Chu Hwang—pyon." (These are the Leadership Functionaries aho have Prepared the Hay for Os: Chu Hwangp-Pyon) Minin Choson. 15 January 1948, p. 2-

. "Ori-eigeinun irohge chunpi-twcen chido ilggun- duli issda: 1 long-yon sonsaeng." (These are the Leadership Functionaries Hho have Prepared the lay for Os: Hr. Yi Tong-yon) Hiniu Choson. 14 January 1947, p. 2. . "Ori inmin-ui yonggwang-suroun aeguk chcnt'cng." (Our People's G lcriois Revolutionary Traditions) Hodona S in m u n . 1 March 1957, p . 1.

. "Ori inmin-ul sungri—wa ycnggwang-ero komu-hanun hangil muchang t 'uksaeng-ui pulmyol—ui sachok." (Immortal Historic Sites of Anti-Japanese Character Which Stimulate Our People to Victory and Glory) Hodona Sinmun. 30 November 1959, p. 3.

. "Ori minchu choguk konsol—ui sont'u-eiso t'uchaeng-hanun iroh-han chidocha-iyossda." (These are Those Who Struggle in the Forefront of Our Democratic Fatherland's Construction) Hiniu Choson. 24 December 1947, p. 2.

. "Ori tang-e wihan hyokmyong chont'ong-ui kyesung palchon—gua Choson hyokmyong—ui palk—un chonto." (The Inheritance and Development of the fievolutionary Tradition by Oui Party and the Bright Future of the Korean Revolution) Nodong Sinmun. 11 February 1984, p. 2.

"Widae-han suryong Kin Il-song tongchi-ggeso ch'angsi-hasin chuch'e-ui sahoecha'oi kyongche kwanri riron." (The CHOCBE-based Theory of Management of the S ocialist Economy, Founded by the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-song) Nodong Sinmun. 25 January 1978, p. 2.

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. "Wigo ip'puk-han chon 'kukgun* changpyongdaehoe ch'amgacha ildung Kim Il-song wonsu-gge turi-nun maensemun.M (Participants in the Conference of Former "BOKA" Soldiers Who Came Worth: Written Vow to Marshal Kim Il-song) Nodong Sinmun. 1 June 1955, p. 1.

"lolyol-han aegukt'usa—imyo use-han kunsachonryokga-go Kang Kon tongchi." (The Ardent Patriotic Fighter, the Excellent Military Devotee, the Late Comrade Kang Kon) Nodong Sinmun. 8 September 1952, p . 2 .

. "3—dae hyokmyong socho untong—ul to'uk him-issge polryo nagacha." (Let Us More Energetically Carry Out the Three Revolutions Movement) Nodong Sinmun. 3 February 1977, p. 2.

. 4 cbJ onman—ui w idae-h an suryong Kim I l- s o n g wonsunim. (Marshal Kim Il-song, the Great Leader of the 40 M illion) Pyongyang: SWIL Publishing Company, 5 May 1971.

"4 vol-ui Mangyongdae." (Mangyongdae in April) Nodong Sinmnn. 15 April 1964, p. 5.

. "8.15 haebang 20-chu'nyon." (The Twentieth Anniversary of the August 15th liberation) Miniu Choson, 15 August 1965, p. 1.

. "120-man int'eri taekun-ui wiryok-ul nop*-i palhwi-sik'yo sahoechu'ui konsol-ul him-issge milgo— nagacha." (Let Us Push Ahead Vigorously with the Construction of Socialism by Developing a Corps of 1.2 M illion Intellectuals) Nodong Sinmun, 20 August 1984, p . 1 .

"1930 Pusan pangchikgongchang rodongcha-ui p'aop." (The 1930 Pusan Textile M ill Workers' Strike) Nodong Sinman. 12 Janaury 1956, p. 3.

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"Ancient Culture Developed and Restored" (excerpts). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 EST 6 September 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FES, Ho. 144, 17 September 1947, pp. PPPl-3. L/C PS 01766.

"An Expression of Absolute Trust on (the): Part of Our People for the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-song" (text). Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2319 GMT 8 February 1982. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 029, 11 February 1982, pp. D5-9.

"An Ordnance of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0828 GMT 26 June 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FE, Ho. 123, 26 June 1950, p . CCC1. L/C PS 01766-

"Article from May 25 Issue of Bed Star, by Reporters Mulotov and Korotkevitch: 'the Hero of the Koreans, Kim II Sung" (text). Moscow, Soviet Far East Service via Komsomolsk, in Korean to Korea, 0630 ESI 27 May 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR European Section, Ho. 71, 3 June 1947, pp. CC5-7. L/C PS 01766.

"Automation of Industry in DPRK Praised" (text). Pyongyang KCHA in English, 2217 GMT 21 February 1984. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 037, 23 February 1984, pp. D14-15.

"Battle Rotes: Men and O fficers of the People's Armed Forces on the Offensive are Continuing Their Advances in Order t o D e str o y th e Enemy C om p letely" ( t e x t ) . S in u ij u (North Korean-controlled) in Korean to Korea, 2145 GMT 6 November 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FE,

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NO. 218, 8 November 1950, p. BBB3- L/C PS 01766.

"Chinese in H. Korea Appreciate Freedom" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 ESI 4 September 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS BE FES, No. 139, 10 September 1947, pp. LLL3-4. L/C PS 01766.

"Christian Clergy Hits U.S. Imperialism" (text). Pyongyang in Korean tp Korea, 2200 GNI 6 August 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS OB FE, No. 157, 14 August 1950., pp. BBB3-10. L/C PS 01766.

"Coal Miners Approve Draft Labor Bill" (text). Moscow in Korean to Korea via Komsomolsk, 0640 ESI 1 July 1946. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FES, No. 135-1946, 9 July 1946, pp. D1-2. L/C PS 02755.

"Comment by Laborer" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1200 GMI 30 August 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FE, No. 170, 31 August 1950, p. BBB3. L/C PS 0 1 766.

"Commentary by a 'Station Reporter*" (excerpts). Pyongyang in Korean tp Korea, 0500 ESI 16 June 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FE, No. 83, 19 June 1947, pp. PPP1-4. L/C PS 01766.

"Commentary by Danilov" (text). Moscow in Korean to Korea, Komsomolsk Relay, 0600 ESI 7 September 1946. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FES, No. 182-1946, 12 September 1346, pp. HI-4. L/C PS 02755.

"Commentary by Nirov on II Sung Kim, Published in the Komsomolskaya-Pravda Under the T itle *11 Sung Kim, Hero of the Korean People, a Living legend" (text). Moscow Komsomolsk Relay in Korean to Korea, 0300 EST 30 October 1946, 0300 ESI. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FES, No. 221-1946, 6 November 1946, pp. Hl-4. L/C PS 0 2 7 5 5 .

"Compilation of Records: The U.S. Im perialists and Their Stooges Must Not Run Wildly and Recklessly" (text). Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korea, 1115 GMT 22 January 1985. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV; 017, 25 January 1985, pp. D3-5.

"Crowds Welcome Returnees" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1200 GMT 23 April 1953. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FE, No. 79, 24 April 1953, pp. EEE11-12. L/C PS 05125.

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"Corrency Exchange Going On in N. Korea” (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0501 ESI 8 December 1947. Translation by the PBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 201, 9 December 1947, pp. L lll-2. L/C PS 01766.

"Daily on H istorical Repulsing of O.S. Ship" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1016 GMI 30 July 1984. JPRS-KAR-84-050, 24 August 1984, pp. 76-77.

"Defense Minister Issues Order of Day" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0800 EST 9 February 1949. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FES, No. 27, 10 February 1949, pp. L L L 7-10. L/C PS 0 1 7 6 6 .

"Dr. Kim's Secretaries Tell of N. Korea" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0530 ESI 15 May 1948. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FES, No. 313, 18 May 1948, p. LLL3.

"Earlier Defector Enjoying Life" (text). Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korea, 0700 GMT 16 September 1984. Translation by the FBIS- FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 182, 18 September 1984, pp. DIO-11.

"Election Candidates' Background Given" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0715 EST 7 August 1948. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 371, 10 August 1948, pp. PPPl-4. L/C PS 01766.

"Endless Pride in Upholding the Great Leader" (text). Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korea, 2243 GMT 30 June 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 130, 5 July 1984, pp. D8-11,

"Essay Stresses Loyalty to Party Center: Unattributed Radio Essay 'Permanent Companion of the Revolution" (text). Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2330 GMT 15 February 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS OR AP, Vol. IV: 034, 17 February 1984, pp. D9-15.

"Events of Second-day Session Given" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0800 EST 25 April 1948. Translation by the FBIS. FEIS DR FES, No. 298, 27 April 1948, pp. L1L3-5. 1/C PS 01766.

"Farmers, Gain Revenge to the Death on the American Bandit Who Want (s) to D ep rive us o f Our Land" ( t e x t ) . S in u ij u (North Korean-controlled), in Korean to Korea, 1315 GMI 26 October 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FE, No. 212, 31 October 1950, pp. BBB2-3. L/C PS 01766.

445

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 446

"Further ou Sin Sang-oJc, Choe On-hui Issue" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0913 GMI 20 May 1984. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 099, 21 May 1981, p. D16.

"General Kim II Sung Conversation with Farmers in South Pyongyang Province" (text). Pyongyuang in Korean to Korea, 1200 GMT 31 March 1951. Translation hy the FBIS. FBIS Efi FE, Ho. 68, 2 April 1951, pp. CCCl-5. L/C PS 0 1 7 6 6 .

"General So Choi Reports on Anniversary of Founding of People's Army" (text). Pyongyang KCHA in English, 1612 GMT 24 April 1979. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 081, 25 April 1979, pp. Dl-2.

"Hail Achievements of Independence Fighter" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1522 GMT 23 March 1984. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 060, 27 March 1984, pp. D12-13.

"Interest in Stalin's Death Increasing" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0800 GMI 27 March 1953. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 61, 31 March 1953, pp. EEE1-2. L/C PS 05125.

"Joint Parley Spurs Hopes for Democracy" (excerpt). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0700 ESI 24 May 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 67, p. LLL1. L/C PS 01766.

"KCNA on Eve of Birthday" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 15.10 GMT 13 April 1984. JPRS-KAR-84-026, 2 May 1984, pp. 110-11.

"KCNA on Kin Chaek University Founding Anniversary" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0024 GMI 27 September 1983. JPRS Korean Affairs Report, No. 313, 13 October 1983, p . 8 7 .

"KCNA on Kim Chong-il's Guidance of Circus Art" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1508 GMI 24 December 1984. JPRS-KAR-85-004, 11 January 1985, pp. 89-90.

"KCNA Praises Kim Chong—il for Ceramic Art Development" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 2222 GMT 21 November 1983. JPRS Korean Affairs Report, No. 331, 22 December 1983, pp. 98—99.

"KCNA Reports Further on Kim Chong-il Guidance" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0416 GMI 22 May 1984. JPRS- KAR-84-033, 5 June 1984, pp. 46-49.

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"KCNA Reports on EPBK Engineering Industry" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1546 GMT 26 July 1978. JPBS Translations on North Korea, No. 606, 10 August 1978, p . 1 0 .

"Kim Chong-il Guidance on Nampo lockgate Praised" (text) . Pyongyang Dpnestic Service in Korean, 0923 GMI 19 June 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS D£ AP, Vol. IV: 121, 22 June 1984, pp. D21-25.

"Kim Chong-il Sends Present to Ethiopian Leader" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1102 GMI 23 June 1984. FBIS DE AP, Vol. IV: 126, 28 June 1984, p. D12.

"Kim Chong-il's Housing Guidance Praised" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1032 GMT 24 November 1983. JPBS Korean Affairs Report, No. 331, 22 December 1983, pp. 9 2 -9 3 .

"Kim Chong-il Work Published in 1964 Praised" (text). Pyongyang KNCA in Englsh, 1520 GMI 30 March 1984. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 065, 3 April 1984, pp. D17-18.

"Kin Gets Pledge from Seoul Citizens" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1315 GMT 28 February 1951. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 47, 2 March 1951, pp. CCCl-2. L/C PS 01766.

"Kim Hyong-chik's Career Praised on Anniversary" (text). Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2300 GMI 10 July 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DE AP, Vol. IV: 136, 13 July 1984, pp. D14-22.

"Kim Il-song Celebrates 73rd Birthday 15 April" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in Englsih, 1001 GMI 13 April 1985. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 072, 15 April 1985, pp. D2-3.

"Kim Il-song's Leadership During War Remembered" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1600 GMI 23 February 1983. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 038, 24 February 1983, pp. D7-8.

"Kim Il-song Works Printed in Foreign Languages" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1513 GMT 16 December 1983. JPBS-KAB-84-003, 11 January 1984, pp. 55-56.

"Kim Il-song Works Volumes 26, 27, 28 Published" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1511 GMI 12 April 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 073, 13 April 1984, pp. D9-10.

447

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 448

"Kim 11 Sung" (brief)• Pyongyang in Korean to Korea,0300 GMT 17 April 1952. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 77, 17 April 1952, p. SEE4. I/C PS 05125.

"Kin II Sung Given National Flag Medal" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1200 GMT 7 February 1951. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 32, 8 February 1951, p. BBI. L/C PS 01766.

"Kin II Sung Made Commander in Chief" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1000 GMT 5 July 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FEIS DB FE, No. 130, 6 July 1950, p. CCCl. L/C PS 01766.

"Kin II Sung Speaks to Constituents" (text). Pyongyang in Korean at dictation speed for the Korean press, 0900 GMT 4 November 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 179, 5 November 1947, pp. LLII-2. L/C PS 0 1 7 6 6 .

"Kim II Sung W rites Farmer on Bice Crop" (excerpts). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1000 GMT 3 September 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 175, 8 September 1950, pp. BBB6-8. L/C PS 01766.

"Kim Treatise in AALAPSO Organ Marks Che Death" (text). Pyongyang KCNA International Service in English, 1538 GMT 9 October 1968. FBIS DB AP, Vol. II: 199, 10 October 1968, pp. Dl-9. L/C PS 05126-

"Koreans Impressed by V isit to Russia" (text). Moscow (Komsomolsk relay) in Korean to Korea, 0300 EST 6 October 1946. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 205-1946, 15 October 1946, pp. HI-2. L/C PS 02755.

"Korean Bomen's B ill Gets Hide Support" (text). Moscow in Korean to Kprea, 0300 EST 26 August 1946. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 171-1946, 28 August 1946, pp. H2-3. L/C PS 02755.

"Korea's Mass Literature Beaches Heyday" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1019 GMT 30 November 1983. JPBS Korean Affairs Beport, No. 331, 22 December 1983, pp. 100- 01.

"Late Beport: PBC's Hu Confirms Kim Chong-il Visit" (text). Beijing XINflOA in English, 1133 GMT 7 July 1983. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 131, 7 July 1983, p. D15.

"Letters from North" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0700 EST 10 June 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 77, 11 June 1947, pp. LLL2-3. L/C PS 0 2 755.

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"Let Us Fight the American Armed Aggressors to the Death for Our Ultimate Victory" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 2230 6BT 30 September 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB F2, No. 196, 9 October 1950, pp. PPP11-15. L/C PS 01766.

"Let Os March Forward More Bravely by Uniting Firmly Around General Kim 11 Sung" (summary). Seoul (North Korean- controlled) in Korean to Korea, 2300 GMT 17 September 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 183, 20 September 1950, pp. PPP29-30. L/C PS 01766-

"Main Construction at Hospital Ends" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0600 EST 29 July 1949. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 148, 3 Agusut 1949, pp. CCC4-5. L/C PS 01766-

"Mar. 1 Anniversary Observed in North" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Kprea, 0500 ESI 1 March 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 8-1947, 2 March 1947, pp. L L 1-5. L/C PS 0 1766.

"Member of Tour Views N. Korea Progress" (text). Seoul (relayed by Pyongyang), in Korean to Korea, 1100 GMI 28 August 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 169, 30 August 1950, pp. BB35-6. L/C PS 01766.

"Memorial Bites for Stalin Described" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 2300 GMT 9 March 1953. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 47, 11 March 1953, pp. EEE9-11. L/C PS 05125.

"'Message of Congratulations' from the BPB Central Committee to Kim Chong-il on New Year's Day — Bead by Announcer" (text). Voice of the BPB in Korean to South Korea, 1000 GMT 1 January 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB AP, Vol. lUVs 003, 5 January 1984, pp. D4-7.

"Hiniu Choson Recalls 1866 Burning of U.S. Ship" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0942 GMT 2 September 1984. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IT: 5 September 1984, p. D1.

"National Theater Contributes to Culture" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0600 EST 1 September 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 135, 4 September 1947, pp. LLL2-3. L/C PS 01766.

"N. Cholla Farmers Praise Kin II Sung" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0930 GMT 22 September 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 187, 26 September 1950, pp. BBB9-10. L/C PS 01766.

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"'Hew Philosophical Exposition* Stressed" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 2227 GMT 8 August IS83. FBIS DE AP, Vol. IV: 155, 10 August 1983, pp. D7-8.

"Sodonq Sinmun C ites Kim Il-song on Chuche Management" (text). Nodong Sinmun. in Korean, 25 January 1978, p. 1. Translation by the JPBS. JPBS Translations on North Korea, No. 575, 22 February 1978, pp. 14-20.

"Nodong sinmun Hails Kim's Leadership, Chuche, Part I" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0356 GMT 23 November 1977. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 226, 23 November 1977, pp. D5-7.

"Nodong Sinmun Marks Tax Abolition Anniversary" (text). Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2234 GMT 20 March 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 058, 23 March 1984, p. D7.

"Nodonq Sinmun on Episode of Kim Chong-il's Solicitude" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1557 GMT 7 March 1984. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 047, 8 March 1984, p. D12.

"Nodong Sinmun 29 September Essay: 'Compatriots, Hold This Wéirm Hand Quick'" (excerpts). Pyongyang Domestic Service in Borean, 2200 GMT 28 September 1934. Translation by the FBIS- FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 192, 2 October 1984, pp. D3-5.

"North Korea Farmers Hold Conference" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 EST 13 March 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DE FE, No. 16-1947, 17 March 1947, pp. DLL1 -2 . L/C PS 0 1 7 6 6 .

"N. Korea 7th Division Vows to Win Bar" (text). Pyongyang in Korean tp Korea, 1200 GMT 25 February 1951. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 26, 26 February 1951, pp. BBBl-2. L/C PS 01766-

"N. Koreans Welcome Sino-Soviet Treaty" (excerpts). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0900 ESI 19 February 1950. TBanslation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 135, 20 February 1950, pp. CC1-4. L/C PS 01766-

"N. Korea Youths Observe Anniversary" (excerpts). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 ESI 4 November 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 181, 1947, pp. LLL2-4. L/C PS 01766-

"On the Third Anniversary of the formation of the North Korean People's Committee" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0915 EST 7 February 19 49. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 25, 8 February 1949, pp.

450

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LLL1-4. L/C PS 01766.

"Onward Toward Victory as Directed by General Kim 11 Sung" (summary). Seoul (North Korean-controlled) in Korean to Korea, 0250 GMT 18 August 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, Ho. 162, 21 August 1950, p. PPP7. L/C PS 01766.

"Ordinance o f the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPBK Issued on the Occasion of the 40th Birthday of General £im II Sung" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 14 April 1952, 1100 GMT. Translation by the FBIS. FEIS EH FE, No. 75, 15 April 1952, pp. EEE2-3. L/C PS 01766.

"Party Members Ordered to Study Stalin" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1100 GMT 21 March 1953. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 55, 23 March 1953, pp. EEE9-10. L/C PS 05125.

"People's Council 2nd Congress Convened" (excerpts). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0700 ESI 15 May 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 63, 21 May 1947, pp. LLL1-3. L/C PS 01766.

"People in South Said Following Chuche Idea" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1013 GMT 6 April 1984. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 68, 11 April 1984, pp. D6-7.

"Press Conference Held with South Defector" (excerpts). Pyongyang Dromes tic Service in Korea, 1227 GMT 29 November 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 233, 3 December 1984, pp. D3-7.

"Press Conference with Former South Korean Army Private First Class Cho Shun-hui, Held at the People's Cultural Palace in Pyongyang on the Afternoon of 9 August — Becorded" (text). Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 1228 GMT 9 August 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 157, 13 August 1984, pp. D 4 -1 2 .

"Production Index Shows Monthly Increases" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0900 ESI 9 July 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 97, 10 July 1947, p. LLL1. L/C PS 01766-

"Pyongyang People Cheer Seoul Fighters" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1400 GMT 2 October 1950. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FF, No. 192, 3 October 1950, p. BBBI. L/C PS 01766.

451

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"Pyongyang Sees Production Increases" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 ESI 6 May 1974. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS Dfi FES, Ho- 54, 8 Hay 1947, p. lill. L/C PS 01766.

"fiadio Praises Kim's Achievements" (text). Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2100 GHI 14 April 1985. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS Dfi AP, Vol. IV: 072, 15 April 1985, pp. 3-4.

"Railway Workers Praise New labor Bill" (text). Moscow in Korean to Kprea via Komsomolsk, 0620 ESI 8 July 1946. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 136-1946, 10 July 1946, pp. Dl-2. L/C PS 02755.

"Reportage on Celebration of Kim Chong-il's Birthday" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 2214 GMT 23 February 1984. JPfiS-KAB-84-018, 21 March 1984, pp. 8 0 - 9 0 .

"Reportage on Kim Chong-il's Treatise" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0759 GMT 21 March 1984. JPBS- KAR-8 4-022, 9 April 1984, p. 42.

"Beport by Kim Ik—hyon. Lieutenant General of the KPA, at the 7 February Central Report Meeting in the 8 February House of Culture, Pyongyang, Marking the 29th Anniversary of the Founding of the KPA" (text). Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 0605 GMT 7 February 1977. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 027, 9 February 1977, pp. D2-12.

"Returnees Recall Struggle in POW Camps" (excerpts). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 2300 GMI 11 May 1953. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DR FE, No. 91, 12 May 1953, pp. EEE6-7. L/C PS 05125.

"Review of South Korean P olitical Situation in 1970" (text). Pyongyang KCNA International Service in English, 1005 GMT 29 December 1970. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 252, 30 December 1970, pp. D2—6. L/C PS 05126. ^

"ROK Army O fficers Said Awed by M ilitary in North" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1512 GMT 5 September 1983. FBIS DR AP, Vol. IV: 173, 6 September 1983, pp. D7-8.

"School for Revolutionist Orphans Opens" (excerpts). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0700 ESI 13 October 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 164, 15 October 1947, pp. LLL3-4. L/C PS 01766-

452

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"School Units Study Kim 11 Sung History" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1100 GMI 12 April 1253. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS EB FE, Ho. 70, 13 April 1953, pp. E8E18-19. L/C PS 05125.

"Scientists Hold National Conference" (excerpts). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1100 GMT 6 May 1952. Translation by the FEIS. FEIS BE FE, No. 91, pp. EEE2-3. L/C PS 0 5 1 2 5 .

"Seoul Liberation Celebration Described" (summary). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1000 GMI 5 January 1951. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 5, 6 January 1951, pp. BBE3-4. L/C PS 01766.

"Seoul Mass Meeting" (brief). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1 August 1950, n. t. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS Dfi FE, No 150, 3 August 1950, p. BBB8. L/C PS 01766.

"S. Korea Airmen Glad They Came" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0900 GMT 28 September 1949. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 190, 3 October 1949, pp. CCC4-7. L/C PS 01766.

"Society for Korea-Soviet Relations" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 6 May 1947, n .t. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, Ho. 57, 13 May 1947, p. L1L1. L/C PS 0 1 7 6 6 .

"Songjin Steel Workers Adopt Pledge" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 EST 6 October 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 160, 9 October 1947, p. LLL1. L/C PS 0 1 766.

"South Korean Defector Holds Press Conference" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0450 GMI 26 October 1983. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 208, 26 October 1983, pp, D6-7,

"South's People Severe Kin Chong-il" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 1028 GMT 11 September 1984. JPBS- KAB-84-057, 28 September 1984, p. 24.

"Speech by Lee Chae Hyun, a Christian, on Voice of the People Program Entitled, 'We Utterly Denounce the United Hatipns Commission on Korea'" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0445 EST 24 '^nnary 1948. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 234, 27 January 1948, pp. PPP11-12. L/C PS 01766.

"Statement by Madame Chong Sook Sur, Representative of the North Korean Democratic Women's Federation, Who Attended the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Women's Democratic Federation in Moscow"

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(text). Moscow (Komsomolsk relay) in Korean to Korea, 0630 ESI 20 October 1946. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES:, No. 218-1946, 31 October 1946, pp. Hl-4. L/C PS 02755.

"Strengthening of the Socialist legal life is an Indispensible Begoirement in Consolidating and Developing Our Society" (text). Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 0300 GMI 17 May 19744. Translation by the JPBS. JPBS Translation on North Korea, No. 535, 20 June 1977, pp. 35-39.

"Stronger Unity Around Kim Il-song, Kim Chong-il Urged" (text). Nodong Ch'oncnvon in Korean, 9 September 1983, p. 4. Translation by the JPBS. JPBS Korean Affairs Beport, No. 322, 16 November 1983, pp. 20=25.

"Students in Tomsk Greet Kim II Sung" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 EST 18 March 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 20-1947, 20 March 1947, pp. L11-2. L/C PS 01766.

"The Enemy is Killing Us. Take Up Guns and Go to the Bar Front to Exterminate the Enemy" (summary). Sinuiju (North Korean-controlled) in Korean to Korea, 1418 GMI 29 October 1950- Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 212, 31 October 1950, pp. PPP13-14. L/C PS 01766.

"The Korean People are Fighting for the Implementation of the Proposal of the Soviet Government for the Simultaneous Withdrawal of the Iroops of the Two Powers from Korea" (excerpts). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0515 EST 16 September 1948. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES., No. 401, 22 September 1948, pp. PPP9-10. L/C 0 1 7 6 6 .

"The Korean People are Firmly United Around Their Chief" (summary). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 2215 GMT 14 April 1952. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No- 75, 15 April 1952, pp. EEEl-2. L/C PS 05125.

"The Korean People, Fighting Under Their Illustrious Leader, March Vigorously, Confident of Victory" (summary). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1028 GMT 7 January 1951- Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FE, No. 10, 12 January 1951, pp. PPP7-8. L/C PS 01766.

"The Korean People's Army is a Strong Fortress to Protect the Fatherland and the People" (summary). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0930 EST 4 January 1949. Translation by the FBIS. FEIS DB FES, No. 10, 14 January 1949, pp. PPP1-4. L/C PS 01766.

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"The Movement for Contributing to the Funds for the Purchase of Airplanes, Tanks, and Warships for the People's Armed Forces is Being Launched as a Nation-wide Popular Movement" (text). Pyongyang (relayed by Seoul) in Korean to Korea, 0245 GMT 5 August 1950. Translation by the FBIS- FBIS DS FE, No. 155, 10 August 1950, pp. PPP14-15. L/C PS 01766.

"The 37th Installment of the Travelogue on the North: 'Star was Shining,' Written by Yi Chong-un, Head of a Hyongmyong Choson Delegation Which Attended a World Meeting of Journalists Held in Pyongyang" (text). Voice of the BPB in Korean to South Korea, 1000 GMT 13 December 1984. Translation by the IBIS. FBIS DS AP, Vol. IV: 243, 17 December 1984, pp. D9-11.

"Trade Unions Bally to Back Kin 11 Sung" (text). Pyongyang in Korean tp Korea, 0500 EST 1 July 1847. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS Dfi FES, No. 92, 2 July 1947, p. LLL1. L/C PS 0 1 7 6 6 .

"Two S. Korea Crewmen Make Statements" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0900 EST 28 September 1949. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS Dfi FE, No. 192, 5 October 1949, pp. PPPl-4. L/C PS 01766,

"Unattributed Special Article: 'Great Unity and Invincible Strength" (text). Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 2310 GMT 9 October 1984. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB AP, Vol. IV: 202, 17 October 1984, pp. D 1-4.

"Union Leaders Support New Labor Bill" (text). Moscow in Korean to Korea via Komsomolsk, 0640 EST 1 July 1946. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 130-1946, 2 July 1946, pp. Dl-2. L/C PS 02755.

"Upholding the Appeal by Premier Kim II Sung, the People of the Province are Going to the Fronts to Exterminate the Enemy" (summary). Sinuiju, North Korean—controlled, in Korean to Korea, 1145 GMT 20 October 195Q. Translation by the FBIS. FEIS DB FE, No. 207, 24 October 1950, p. PPP21. L/C PS 01766.

"USSB Cameramen Beport on Korean Visit" (text). Soviet Far East Service via Komsomolsk, in Korean to Korea, 0600 EST 10 June 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB European Section, No. 80, 16 June 1947, pp. CC3-4. L/C PS 0 1 7 6 6 .

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■•Victims Revere Leaders" (text). Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0304 GMT 20 September 1984. PBIS BE AP, Vol. IV: 184, 20 September 1984, pp. D13-14.

"Voters Honor Candidate Kin Doo Bong" (summary with quotations). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0430 EST 6 August 1948. Translation by the PBIS. PBIS DE PES, No. 370, 9 August 1948, pp. PPP4-9. L/C PS 01766.

"VEPE on Support for DCEK, Legitimacy of North" (text). Voice of the RPB in Korean to South Korea, 1000 GMT 19 February 19B4. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DE AP, Vol. IV; 039, 27 February 1984, pp. D12-14.

"SFTO Delegates Ask for United Struggle" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 EST 5 June 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FEIS DS FES, No. 76, 10 June 1947, pp. LLL3-4. L/C PS 01766.

"■Women Workers in Our Factory are Struggling* by Mme Kim Do Sung of the Pyongyang Tobacco Factory" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0500 EST 16 June 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FEIS DB FES, No. 83, 19 June 1947, pp. LLL1-2. L/C PS 01766.

"Workers O verfulfill Quota for Stalin" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1400 GMT 22 March 1953. Translation by the FBIS. FEIS DB FE, No. 56, 24 March 1953, pp. EEE3-4. L/C PS 05125.

"Working Crass Enjoys Vacations for the F irst Time" (excerpts). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 0700 EST 7 July 1947. Translation by the FBIS. FEIS Dfi FES, No. 97, 10 July 1947, pp. LLL2-3. L/C PS 01766.

Yi Tu-ch'an, "U.S. Im perialists Should Withdraw from South Korea by Discarding Their Anachronistic Policies" (text). Nodong Ch'onyon in Korean, 26 July 1983, p. 1. Translation by the JPBS. JPBS Korean Affairs Beport, No. 310, 29 September 1983, pp. 97-102.

"Youth League Committee Holds Meeting" (text). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 21 October 1947, 0500 EST. Translation by the FBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 170, 23 October 1947, pp. LLL2-3. L/C PS 01766.

"2 Workers Beport on V isit to Russia" (text). Moscow Komsomolsk relay in Korean to Korea, 03CQ ESI 30 October 1946. Translation by the FEIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 217-1946, 31 October 1946, pp. Dl-2. L/C PS 02755.

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"38th Parallel No Longer Dividing Line" (summary). Pyongyang in Korean to Korea, 1200 GMT 30 June 1950. Translation hy the PBIS. PBIS DE PE, No. 128, 3 July 1350, pp. CCC5-6. L/C PS 01766.

"4,00 0 Enrolled at New Institution" (excerpts). Pyongyang in Korean tp Korea, 0500 EST 5 September 1947. Translation by the PBIS. FBIS DB FES, No. 139, 10 September 1.947, pp. PPP9-10. L/C PS 01766.

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