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For Help Getting Started, Visit IPSEC FOR LARGE SCALE DEPLOYMENTS DevConf, Brno, January 2020 Presented by Paul Wouters, VPN Technologies THE LIBRESWAN PROJECT An Internet Key Exchange (“IKE”) daemon for IPsec • Continuation of openswan, which itself was a fork of freeswan • Uses the NSS library for all its crypto • Certified (FIPS, Common Criteria, USGv6, etc.) • Supports X.509 and DNSSEC as PKI • Supports raw public keys and PSK • Supports IKEv1 and IKEv2 2 IPsec for large scale deployments IPsec PRIMER IKE + IPsec = VPN IKE (USERLAND) IPsec (KERNEL) ISAKMP, IKE SA, PHASE 1 IPsec SA, CHILD SA, PHASE 2 UDP PORT 500 AND 4500 PROTOCOL 50 (ESP) AND 51 (AH) • Command Channel • Data Channel • Peer authentication • Encapsulated Security Payload • Connection parameter negotiation (ESP) IP packet encryption • IPsec symmetric key generation • Authenticated Header (AH) • Communicates to kernel • ESPinUDP (for NAT) • IKE itself is encrypted • Tunnel Mode (IP in IP) • IKE does not encrypt the IP traffic • Transport Mode 3 IPsec for large scale deployments LINUX IPsec IMPLEMENTATION (XFRM) 1. IPsec in the kernel has policies (SPD) and states (SAD) Visible via: ip xfrm policy, ip xfrm state Communication between userland and kernel visible via: ip xfrm monitor • Packets matching policies with a linked state causes encryption/decryption • Unencrypted packets matching an encryption policy without state are dropped • First outgoing plaintext packet matching IPsec policy without IPsec state triggers an ACQUIRE 2. Userland inserts “trap” policies for on-demand tunnels 3. Userland requests to receive ACQUIREs and processes these when received • Perform IKE negotiation with remote peer • Send IPsec policy and encryption/authentication keys to the kernel 4. Kernel processes netlink messages • Install received crypto keys in state, link crypto state to policy • If TCP was stored, send out cached TCP packet 4 IPsec for large scale deployments LINUX IPsec IMPLEMENTATION (XFRM) Mobile IKE: Support for mobile clients that change IP address 1. Libreswan receives an IKE message from a new IP address 2. Matches the encrypted IKE packet via SPI’s to an existing peer 3. Decrypts and confirms this IKE packet is a new packet (via sequence number) 4. Send XFRM_MIGRATE message to kernel 5. Kernel updates endpoint IP of the XFRM state 6. Libreswan confirms via a reply IKE message using the new destination IP address 5 IPsec for large scale deployments LINUX XFRM / NETKEY KERNEL STATE srcsrc 10.3.230.191/3210.3.230.191/32 dstdst 0.0.0.0/00.0.0.0/0 dirdir outout prioritypriority 666666 ptypeptype mainmain tmpltmpl srcsrc 76.10.157.6876.10.157.68 dstdst 209.132.183.55209.132.183.55 protoproto espesp reqidreqid 1641316413 modemode tunneltunnel srcsrc 0.0.0.0/00.0.0.0/0 dstdst 10.3.230.191/3210.3.230.191/32 dirdir fwdfwd prioritypriority 666666 ptypeptype mainmain tmpltmpl srcsrc 209.132.183.55209.132.183.55 dstdst 76.10.157.6876.10.157.68 protoproto espesp reqidreqid 1641316413 modemode tunneltunnel srcsrc 0.0.0.0/00.0.0.0/0 dstdst 10.3.230.191/3210.3.230.191/32 dirdir inin prioritypriority 666666 ptypeptype mainmain tmpltmpl srcsrc 209.132.183.55209.132.183.55 dstdst 76.10.157.6876.10.157.68 protoproto espesp reqidreqid 1641316413 modemode tunneltunnel srcsrc 209.132.183.55209.132.183.55 dstdst 76.10.157.6876.10.157.68 protoproto espesp spispi 0x605ad2be0x605ad2be reqidreqid 1641316413 modemode tunneltunnel auth-truncauth-trunc hmac(sha1)hmac(sha1) 0x4b7e46cdee9c27588a1a75f6846073cea0x4b7e46cdee9c27588a1a75f6846073cea 9696 encenc cbc(aes)cbc(aes) 0x11ddc9080945111087e81f9ebda5aacb7612c78af18950x11ddc9080945111087e81f9ebda5aacb7612c78af1895 srcsrc 76.10.157.6876.10.157.68 dstdst 209.132.183.55209.132.183.55 protoproto espesp spispi 0x8ca00de30x8ca00de3 reqidreqid 1641316413 modemode tunneltunnel auth-truncauth-trunc hmac(sha1)hmac(sha1) 0x1119585d334a88e023134a100eca6b09f0x1119585d334a88e023134a100eca6b09f 9696 encenc cbc(aes)cbc(aes) 0x310b852b9cbaf2cace7979c1aeb5df4b32eb418c5c3000x310b852b9cbaf2cace7979c1aeb5df4b32eb418c5c300 6 IPsec for large scale deployments 2019: Libreswan • RFC 8229 “TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec packets” support [*] • Proof of concept for per-cpu IPsec SA support (pCPU XFRM) • XFRMi virtual interface support to replace VTI virtual interfaces • libvirt/KVM based testing complimented with namespace based testing Much faster, takes less resources, can run tests in parallel • NSS: Use the new “IPsec profile” X.509 validation (RFC 4945) • Dramatically improve IKE performance by offloading more code to threads • NSS: Cache decrypted private keys (Bob’s performance trick) • RFC 5685 IKEv2 REDIRECT support for dynamic load balancing • CVE-2019-12312 (crasher) and CVE-2019-10155 (sig validation failure) • Improvements for Enterprise-wise (mesh) encryption 8 IPsec for large scale deployments XFRMi virtual interface • Specify: ipsec-device=<num> will create device ipsecN • tcpdump on ethX shows encrypted packets, on ipsecN shows plaintext • Can be managed by the system (eg NetworkManager) or by libreswan • Allow for routing based VPNs – if packet enters device, encrypt it • Uses XFRM IF_ID (new IPsec policy parameter) and does not require MARKing • Can be placed in a network namespace to enforce VPN-only access • Some support in NetworkManager and systemd • Older VTI (ip_vti0) implementation had limitations: Each IPsec SA needed its own VTI interface and could only be ipv4 or ipv6 There could only be one wildcard interface (max 1 dynamic IP remote client) VTI Only supported Tunnel Mode, not Transport Mode Used GRE keys and MARKs 9 IPsec for large scale deployments TCP support for Remote Access VPN • IPsec (ESP) is usually encapsulated in UDP to traverse NATs • IKE protocol uses UDP • Some networks block IPsec (or all UDP except DNS) • RFC 8229: TCP encapsulation of IKE and ESP Port number not defined (evasive actions) “IKETCP” prefix to support demultiplexing (aka IPsec-in-TLS support) • New per connection options: tcp-listen=<port> tcp-remoteport=<port> tcponly=yes|no 10 IPsec for large scale deployments Per-CPU support for high speed IPsec SAs • Proof of Concept for per-cpu IPsec SA support (pCPU XFRM) • Currently, 1 IPsec SA can only use 1 CPU (about 1-5 gbps) • With pCPU, create <num> cpu times identical IPsec SA’s One IPsec SA is the main (catch all) IPsec SA Further identical IPsec SA’s are installed for a specific CPU • Processes generating traffic on one CPU, use the one IPsec SA Reduces out-of-order packets if multiple processes are sending data • lab result show CPU combined speed (eg 3 CPU * 1gbps/cpu results in 3gbps) • TODO: per-cpu “fake” ACQUIRE messages for per-CPU on-demand support • TODO: support for on-demand QoS IPsec SA’s • See libreswan.org/wiki/XFRM_pCPU for kernel and libreswan code and docs clones=<num> 11 IPsec for large scale deployments Libreswan testing • KVM/libvirt testing - 700+ tests • libreswan.org/wiki/Test_Suite_-_KVM • Took between 4 and 8 hours to run – reduced to 2-3 hours • Would regularly hang KVM instances • Tests cannot run in parallel • Introduced namespaces based testing • libreswan.org/wiki/Test_Suite_-_Namespace • Re-uses KVM/libvirt tests, so most of the 700+ tests are functional • Tests can be started in parallel (but sadly not too many still) 12 IPsec for large scale deployments TESTING.LIBRESWAN.ORG 13 IPsec for large scale deployments IPsec deployment types • Host to host VPN • Site to site VPN • Remote Access VPN • Enterprise wide encryption (mesh encryption) • Internet wide Opportunistic Encryption (try IPsec, fallback to clear) 14 IPsec for large scale deployments Host to host example configuration Using self-signed or CA based certificates: ## installinstall localcertificate:localcertificate: ipsecipsec importimport MyName.example.com.p12MyName.example.com.p12 ## ConventionConvention used:used: leftleft meansmeans local,local, rightright meansmeans remoteremote ## /etc/ipsec.d/host-to-host.conf/etc/ipsec.d/host-to-host.conf ## bringbring upup manuallymanually using:using: ipsecipsec autoauto –up–up host-to-hosthost-to-host connconn host-to-hosthost-to-host left=192.1.2.23left=192.1.2.23 [email protected][email protected] ## ourour certificatecertificate leftcert=MyName.example.comleftcert=MyName.example.com right=192.1.2.45right=192.1.2.45 [email protected][email protected] ## IDID mustmust bebe SubjectAltNameSubjectAltName onon certcert ## theirtheir certificatecertificate transmittedtransmitted viavia IKEIKE auto=ondemandauto=ondemand 15 IPsec for large scale deployments Net to Net example configuration Using self-signed or CA based certificates: ## installinstall localcertificate:localcertificate: ipsecipsec importimport MyName.example.com.p12MyName.example.com.p12 ## ConventionConvention used:used: leftleft meansmeans local,local, rightright meansmeans remoteremote ## /etc/ipsec.d/net-to-net.conf/etc/ipsec.d/net-to-net.conf ## bringbring upup manuallymanually using:using: ipsecipsec autoauto –up–up net-to-netnet-to-net connconn net-to-netnet-to-net left=192.1.2.23left=192.1.2.23 leftsubnet=192.0.1.0/24leftsubnet=192.0.1.0/24 [email protected][email protected] ## ourour certificatecertificate leftcert=MyName.example.comleftcert=MyName.example.com right=192.1.2.45right=192.1.2.45 rightsubnets={192.0.2.0/24,rightsubnets={192.0.2.0/24, 192.168.0.0/16}192.168.0.0/16} [email protected][email protected] ## IDID mustmust bebe SubjectAltNameSubjectAltName onon certcert ## theirtheir certificatecertificate transmittedtransmitted viavia IKEIKE
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