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Abyei-Edited-Clean-Report.Pdf REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL DIALOGUE STEERING COMMITTEE SUB-COMMITTEE FOR ABYEI AREA GRASS-ROOTS CONSULTATIONS FINAL REPORT DETAILS FOR ABYEI AREA December 2017 Report By: Sub-committee For Abyei Area www.ssnationaldialogue.org Documentation Notes on the Grassroots consultation meetings -- Abyei Area Sub-committee, December, 2017 PART ONE INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE AND SUMMATIVE OVERVIEW 1.1 Background Overview On December 19, 2016, President Salva Kiir established the NDSC (NDSC) with an overall mandate ‘to end all violent conflicts in South Sudan, constitute national consensus, and save the country from disintegration and foreign interference’. There are 11 specific or operational objectives, which are intended to guide the consultation processes in the three steps. The Committee was reconstituted in April 2017 and its members sworn in on May 22, 2017 in the presence of President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda. The NDSC members immediately embarked on consultative meetings, most of which were initially chaired by the Deputy Co-chairperson, Hon. Angelo Beda. Experts from South Africa, Tunisia and the United Nations were invited to share experiences on national dialogues conducted in Yemen, Senegal, Burundi, Tunisia and South Africa. As stipulated in the Concept Note of South Sudan National Dialogue, the NDSC is mandated to carry out the following tasks: Identify key stakeholders inside and outside of South Sudan. Facilitate consultations at the grassroots levels across the country. Prepare reports of the grassroots consultations. Prepare agenda of regional and national conferences Facilitate regional conferences. Prepare the regional conference report Manage the NDSC funds transparently and accountably. Build collaborative synergies and cooperation with International partners to support the National Dialogue technically and financially. Principles of the NDSC are inclusivity, transparency, accountability, credibility and participation. In terms of structure, the NDSC is pyramidal shape: at the top of the pyramid is the leadership, composed of co-chairs, deputy co-chair, rapporteur and two deputies, three female members, regional and international partners, members and members of the Secretariat. In terms of division of labour, the NDSC is split into 15 Regional Subcommittees each responsible for the 10 states, Abyei, Boma (Special Administrative Area in Jonglei), Headquarters, Security, refugees and international outreach. 1.2 Mandate and Objectives of Abyei Regional Sub-committee As is the case for other subcommittees, the Abyei regional subcommittee is mandated to: identify key stakeholders in the region; prepare budget and plan for the grassroots consultations; facilitate grassroots consultations; prepare regional consultation report; prepare agenda for the regional conference; facilitate regional conference; supervise selection of regional conference delegates; prepare the report of the regional conference and facilitate nomination of National Conference delegates. 1 Documentation Notes on the Grassroots consultation meetings -- Abyei Area Sub-committee, December, 2017 Specific objectives of Abyei Regional Subcommittee are: To make sure identification of stakeholders is conducted fairly To ensure grassroots consultation is carried out free and in a conducive environment. To ensure that minutes are taken accurately (verbatim). To make sure that verbatim report is guaranteed. The Abyei Regional Subcommittee is uniquely composed of members drawn from different parts of South Sudan. Its membership inspired the Dinka Ngok community and sent an unequivocal political message that their cause is still very much right at the center of the political equation of South Sudanese people. Members of the NDSC had the flexibility to choose any committee each member would wish to join. Hence, all Abyei Regional Subcommittee joined it in an absolute free will. The Abyei Regional Subcommittee members elected Gen Pieng Deng Kuol as their chairperson to lead the subcommittee programmatic activities in Abyei. The committee identified major stakeholders, operational locations (Counties and Payams) in Abyei region and prepared a work plan, which included budget projection for the recently concluded consultation phase. The stakeholders identified by the committee are: State authorities, State Executive, Legislature, local Government authorities. Traditional authority and community leadership. Youth and women associations. Farmers, Traders and cattle herders. Intellectuals and Senior government officials Political parties. Civil society organizations. Organised forces. Internally displaced persons. Identified counties are: Rum-Amer County. Alel County. Majak County. Ameth Aguok County. Abyei Municipality. 1.3 Methodological Approach The members of the Abyei Regional Subcommittee members opted to use group consultative approach as opposed to other known methods of consultation. The identified stakeholders were profiled, categorised and regrouped based on profession and other social characteristics. For example, farmers, cattle herders, traders, youth and women associations were consulted together in each county, dictated by the time factor and resources’ available. The consultation processes were interactive and participatory. The participants expressed their opinions freely on a range of questions posed by members of the NDSC subcommittee. 1.4 Overview of the Consultation Process 2 Documentation Notes on the Grassroots consultation meetings -- Abyei Area Sub-committee, December, 2017 The committee’s activities required significant funding from the national government and its international partners; more importantly state government’s facilitation and cooperation across the country is a critical ingredient for the National Dialogue success. The national government allocated 2.4 billion South Sudanese pounds in this fiscal year budget. Although a number of donors—the Federal government of Germany, Japan, UNDP and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, UNMISS—had initially pledged to support the process technically, logistically and financially, they backtracked when the process was about to start. UNDP, which is supposed to be the custodian of the National Dialogue’s donor funds, advised the NDSC leadership to conduct regional consultations in phases, which was vehemently opposed by many members. The view of the leadership of the NDSC prevailed, although it was not necessarily the right approach technically. In order to avoid negative influence from those consulted first, it was advisable to carry out simultaneously the consultations across the country. The two parties reached a fitting consensus on this core operational strategy based on UNDP advice. Based on this understanding, the three regional subcommittees of Central Equatoria, Northern Bahr El Ghazal and Northern Upper Nile were selected in the first phase. Even then, UNMISS and UNDP were not only selective in providing logistical support to these subcommittees, they counselled against a precipitated process. After considerable delay, the members of Northern Bahr El Ghazal and Northern Upper Nile regional committees were they eventually airlifted to their respective regions, but the international partners declined to facilitate the regional subcommittee for Central Equatoria. During the planning process, NDSC partners demonstrated a commendable level of commitment—they identified areas for their intervention in accordance with their organisation’s mandates. When the regional subcommittees, Abyei included, were in the budgetary preparatory phase, international partners conveyed their willingness to support the NDSC with: air and land transport from Juba and within the region; accommodation and upkeep for the members; generator hiring, and protection when required in the field. Their last-minute backtracking had nearly brought the whole process to a standstill. The partners’ refusal to assist the regional subcommittees as agreed was incomprehensible. In fact, it amounts to an intentional act to delay the NDSC rolling out. However, the subcommittees decided to commence consultations without the support from partners. The subcommittee paid return tickets for its 21 members, exhausting the SSP 3m that the leadership of NDSC availed. The committee members left Juba for Abyei via Wau on December 6, 2017. Members of the NDSC were seen off by at Juba International Airport by Hon. Bona Malwal Madut, the rapporteur of the NDSC. On arrival In Wau, Abyei Administrative Area coordinator received the members. The Government of Abyei Administrative Area availed four vehicles, including the official car of Hon. Governor. The support received from the Abyei Administrative Area amounted to more than SSP 3m. The team then headed off for Kuajok, the capital of Gogrial state where it spent a rather tumultuous night. The seeming misfortune did not occur as a result of lack of hospitality in that state, it was merely due to an ineffective coordination between the state and the logistics unit team. 3 Documentation Notes on the Grassroots consultation meetings -- Abyei Area Sub-committee, December, 2017 Before the team departed Kuajok for Abyei on December 7, 2017, the Acting Governor of Gogrial State Hon. Kuanyin Agoth paid a courtesy call to the members of the subcommittee at around 8 AM. The Chairperson of the Regional Subcommittee, Gen. Pieng Deng Kuol, provided an elaborated briefing to the Acting Governor about the mission of the team, after which he escorted the team to
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